PLOTINUS

The Enneads

The *Enneads* by Plotinus is a work which is central to the history of philosophy in late antiquity. This volume is the first complete edition of the *Enneads* in English for over seventy-five years, and also includes Porphyry’s *Life of Plotinus*. Led by Lloyd P. Gerson, a team of experts present up-to-date translations which are based on the best available text, the *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer and its corrections. The translations are consistent in their vocabulary, making the volume ideal for the study of Plotinus’ philosophical arguments. They also offer extensive annotation to assist the reader, together with cross-references and citations which will enable users more easily to navigate the texts. This monumental edition will be invaluable for scholars of Plotinus with or without ancient Greek, as well as for students of the Platonic tradition.

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General Introduction to the Translations

THE EDITION

This volume presents a new annotated translation of the *Enneads* of Plotinus (204/5–270 CE). We include as well the *Life of Plotinus* written by Porphyry of Tyre (223/4–c. 305 CE), who was also the first editor of the *Enneads*. Most of what we know about the life of Plotinus and the circumstances surrounding the composition of his treatises comes from Porphyry’s biography and so there is no need to repeat the details here. We follow Porphyry’s idiosyncratic arrangement of these treatises, an arrangement which does not correspond to the chronological order of their composition, as Porphyry himself tells us. A table comparing Porphyry’s ordering with the chronological ordering follows this introduction.

THE TRANSLATION

1.

This translation into English of the *Enneads* of Plotinus is a ‘successor’ to two great monuments to scholarship, the translations by Stephen MacKenna (1917–1930) and A. H. Armstrong (1966–1988). It is not a replacement for those works, which can still be consulted with considerable profit. In the case of MacKenna, he was impeded by the absence of a critical edition of the Greek text. That did not appear until the publication of the *editio maior* of the *Enneads, Plotini Opera* by Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolph Schwyzer (1951–1973). In the case of Armstrong, the first three volumes of his seven-volume work (Enneads 1–3) appeared prior to the publication of the third volume of the *editio minor* of the *Enneads* by Henry and Schwyzer (1964–1982) containing several hundred corrections to the text of *Enneads* 1–5 in the first two

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1 A number of excellent complete translations in European languages now exist. Special mention should be made of the Spanish translation of Igal (1982–1985), the French translation edited by Brisson and Pradeau (2002–2010), the German translation of Harder, continued by Beutler and Theiler (1956–1971), the Italian translation by Faggin (1992), and the modern Greek translation by Kalligas (1994), with *Ennead 6* yet to appear.
volumes. Although textual problems hampered MacKenna much more than they did Armstrong, neither work has been rendered obsolete by the results of the critical work of Henry and Schwyzer, which, incidentally, continues to be advanced by a number of other scholars up to the present, for example, the late Jésus Igal and Paul Kalligas.

The rationale for the present translation is twofold. First, there was the desire to produce a translation that would take account not only of the textual work that has been done since Armstrong, but also of the enormous proliferation of scholarship on Plotinus generally, many facets of which have had an inevitably anonymous influence on the present work. Second, it was thought beneficial to provide a translation in one volume to facilitate the study of Plotinus, something which necessarily requires the comparison of many disparate texts. There are very few of the so-called treatises in the *Enneads* that exhaust Plotinus’ treatment of a particular question or topic. Consequently, one usually has to read several passages in different treatises together in order to get a more or less clear picture of Plotinus’ position. It is hoped that with one volume, and numerous cross-references, this will at least be made easier to do for the reader. In this regard, the English glossary of key terms, containing many references, should also provide assistance.

The default text used in this translation is that of the *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer, conventionally designated as HS₂. Unless otherwise noted, this is the text that the authors of this work have translated. We note all deviations from that text in the notes, citing, for example, the reading of HS⁴ over that of HS². In a separate table, we list all the changes to the text we have followed, although space precludes a discussion of the reasons for the changes. Those who can benefit from the side-by-side Greek text of Armstrong’s Loeb edition, can do the same with the *editio minor* (*OCT*) and our translation.

The work of translating the *Enneads* (along with Porphyry’s *Life of Plotinus*, here included) has been an intensely collaborative effort. Although the work of translating individual *Enneads* was originally apportioned out to the individual members of the ‘team’, each draft was read and critically discussed with at least two other members. The final product is genuinely collaborative, with the inevitable proviso that

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2 The *editio maior* is usually labelled HS¹; the *editio minor* HS²; *addenda* to HS¹ labelled HS³; textual *addenda* to HS² labelled HS⁴ and the article by H. R. Schwyzer, ‘Corrigienda ad Plotini textum’, *Museum Helveticum* 44, 1 (1987), 191-210, is labelled HS⁵. Even though Henry’s name does not appear on the article (he died in 1984), he no doubt participated in the work that led up to this article and by common agreement he is listed as one of the authors.
each member of the team would like to reserve a minority dissenting position on this or that issue. Compromise was the price paid for achieving the desired result of publication. Strenuous efforts were made to attain a uniformity of vocabulary where appropriate, although the authors could only reflect with awe on the Septuagint as an unattainable ideal of perfect unanimity that, as legend has it, was attained by the 70 translators of the Torah into Greek.

2.

The present work, given its size limitation, could in no sense provide a commentary on the often desperately difficult thought of Plotinus, to say nothing of his inelegant, allusive, and sometimes even apparently ungrammatical Greek. The reader will certainly want to have recourse to what is now an abundance of basic exegetical commentary in many languages. For the English reader, the commentary of Kalligas (Enneads 1–3, English translation, 2014; translations of 4–5, and 6 forthcoming) sets a high standard of conciseness, erudition, and philosophical insight. Many individual treatises have by now had the benefit of book-length commentaries.3

In the light of the challenges thrown up for the reader by a translation of the Enneads unadorned with any exegetical commentary, the authors have adopted a number of expedients. First, the notes contain brief explanations for words or passages otherwise quite unintelligible on their own. Second are the above-mentioned cross-references, which allow Plotinus to comment on himself, as it were. Third, is the extensive listing of fontes in the notes. These require a bit of explaining. The starting point for these is the appendix to the editio minor of Henry and Schwyzer, which includes hundreds of these. Henry and Schwyzer had no illusion that their table of fontes was complete. Inevitably, everyone who works intently on one or another treatise discovers additional ‘sources’. We have tried to be capacious in our listing of these sources because there is hardly a sentence of the Enneads that does not reflect Plotinus’ immersion in the ancient Greek philosophical tradition, including the ongoing involvement in that by his contemporaries. Often, these fontes provide just by themselves a helpful commentary on what Plotinus is arguing since they enable us to understand exactly what he is arguing against. Nevertheless, the term fontes has a broad meaning, including everything from direct quotations from

Plato’s dialogues, to phrases or even illustrative examples of principles from, say, Aristotle or Alexander of Aphrodisias, to Stoic texts that may well not have been even known to Plotinus but which nevertheless are our best source for an expression of the Stoic doctrine that Plotinus is addressing. Some of the fontes provided are, of course, disputable given the parameters for selection. In addition to those taken from the editio minor, many are gratefully mined from previous translations and commentaries. In the nature of the case, and given the unavailability to us of scores of texts Plotinus had at his disposal, any index fontium is bound to be incomplete. Finally, the cross-references should not be understood by the reader as indicating that the translators always believe that the passages cited express the identical doctrine. Indeed, there are occasions when the passages, at least on the surface, seem to say conflicting things. These references are meant only to assist in the interpretative process.

In the translations themselves, the authors have adopted many orthographic, grammatical, and stylistic devices intended to facilitate comprehension. Paragraphs have been introduced to divide the text into more or less logical units. Lengthy periodic sentences have been shortened for the sake of clarity along with the liberal use of punctuation. When the reference of a pronoun is grammatically and semantically certain, the proper name has been introduced. For example, Plotinus often says ‘he says’ followed by a direct quotation from a Platonic dialogue. This appears as ‘Plato says’. When the reference is not certain but probable, the identification is made in a footnote. Plotinus has a number of grammatical idiosyncracies that indicate that he is introducing a new point or a new argument or making a determinatio after a dialectical discussion. For example, he uses the Greek word ἢ which is normally translated as ‘or’ to introduce his answer to a question he himself raises or in reply to an argument of one of his opponents that he has just sketched. A sort of gloss on this feature of the text would be to render it as ‘or is it not the case that . . . ’ But apart from the facts that Plotinus is not expressing a rhetorical question, and that translating one Greek letter with seven words seems a bit much, there is a consistent pattern of use by Plotinus of this word to indicate that what follows is his own position. We render the word ‘in fact’ and set it off in a new paragraph to make the philosophical elements of the text as clear as possible. There are other terms, including τούτων (‘so’), οὖν (‘then’), γάρ (‘for’), that serve a similar demarcational purpose.

A much more delicate issue is the use of capitalizations. Conventionally, the three primary hypostases of Plotinus’ system are referred to in English as ‘One’ (or ‘Good’), ‘Intellect’, and ‘Soul’. When
these words are used other than for the three primary hypostases, they appear in lower case. Unfortunately, it is not always clear whether, for example, Plotinus in a given passage is referring to Intellect or to intellect, that is, to an individual intellect. The same problem turns up for Soul or soul. Here, interpretation is inevitable, but we have tended to default to lower case, when the reference is not at least highly probable or when the reference is generic.

In addition, capitalization has been used for the Demiurge of Plato’s *Timaeus*, given that this principle is invested by Plato and Plotinus with what we might term personal attributes. Plotinus uses the term θεός rather freely to refer to one or another of the primary hypostases. Although the absolute primacy of the first hypostasis is undisputable, to capitalize ‘god’ in this case would be misleading if that leads one to suppose that Plotinus is arguing for anything like a form of monotheism. On the other hand, he does sometimes invest the first principle of all with personal attributes in which case personal pronouns are used.

Plotinus’ ontological vocabulary cannot be mapped onto ordinary English vocabulary one-to-one. The distinctions between εἶναι, τὸ ὑπό, τὰ ὑπότα, and ὀὐσία cannot be straightforwardly rendered into English by different terms at the same time preserve the etymological connections among these terms. The importance of rendering the Greek in a perspicuous manner is heightened by the fact that Plotinus’ metaphysics is hierarchical and the higher, intelligible world is always treated as superior to and explanatory of the lower sensible world. The strategy we have adopted is to capitalize or put in lower case the identical term depending on whether it is used of the intelligible world or sensible world. Thus, ὀὐσία becomes ‘Substance’ or ‘Substantiality’ when referring to the intelligible world and ‘substance’ or ‘substantiality’ when referring to the sensible world. The terms τὸ ὑπό (τὰ ὑπότα) are rendered ‘Being’ (‘Beings’) or ‘being’ (‘beings’) based on the same principle. An analogous procedure is followed for εἶναι when used as a noun: ‘Existence’ or ‘existence’; the finite verb, however, is normally ‘exist(s)’.

A somewhat delicate translation issue arises for the terms ταύτων and ὅμοιον. In most English translations, the former term is rendered ‘same’ and the latter ‘like’. There are several reasons for resisting these translations. First, for Plato and for Plotinus ταύτων is ontologically prior to ὅμοιον as is evident from the fact that the former, not the latter, is one of the μέγιστα γένη (‘greatest genera’). Stated otherwise, if things are ὅμοιον that is because there is something ταύτων prior to it. To render ταύτων as ‘same’ raises a question for a Platonist that cannot be answered, namely, what explains the fact that two (or more) things are the same? Second, to
render δμοιοιον as ‘like’ or ‘similar’ undermines the very foundation of Platonism. This is so because, in English at any rate, to say that one thing is ‘like’ another or ‘similar’ to another is, typically, to make a claim that is irreducibly subjective. One may find one thing like or similar to another, whereas someone else does not. These claims are beyond objective adjudication; there is no way to determine who is right. Hence, for the Platonist, claims of likeness or similarity provide no reason for positing Forms. Such claims do not require objective or scientific explanation, whereas the whole point, one might say, of the Platonic project is that there are certain phenomenal facts that can only be explained by a theory of Forms, a theory of separate self-identical entities. Hence, the decision to translate ταυτόν as ‘identical’ and δμοιοιον as ‘same’. The nouns, δμοιοττης and δμοιωμα are, however, rendered ‘likeness’ which can have the connotation of ‘derived sameness’ as in ‘this work of art was intended as a likeness of that landscape’. In addition, the important term δμοιωσις is rendered as ‘assimilation’ indicative of a process of attempting to achieve a particular sort of sameness with regard to a model or paradigm.

There is on a number of occasions some awkwardness arising from this decision. For in English, we naturally say things like ‘they followed the same rule that we did’ or ‘we arrived at the same time’ or ‘one and the same principle is found both here and there’ or ‘the same account applies to both’ when Plotinus employs the term ταυτόν in all these cases. The justification for tolerating the awkwardness is, in addition to the above points, that for Plotinus ταυτόν and δμοιοιον are quasi-technical terms, meaning that they are occasionally used in a non-technical or colloquial way. But it was thought misleading to revert to the English colloquial translations in the latter cases, a practice that would always leave the reader wondering whether or how Platonic principles would be applicable in the given instance.

Another peculiarity of the present translation is that the term ἐκεῖ, which is the ordinary Greek word for ‘there’ almost always means for Plotinus ‘the intelligible (or non-sensible) world’, and is so translated. There are a very few places where it does in fact just mean ‘there’ in contrast to ‘here’, for example, in a discussion of spatial concepts. And occasionally it refers not to the intelligible world but to the sensible heaven or heavenly things as opposed to terrestrial things, the former including the planets and the heavenly spheres.

The Greek word λόγος has a wide semantic range. Apart from its use for any unit of intelligible discourse, the term also has a specific technical meaning for Plotinus. It refers to the expression or manifestation of a higher principle at a lower level. Thus, for example, each hypostasis is a λόγος of the one above and an enmattered form in the
sensible world is a λόγος of the Form in the soul of the cosmos which is itself a λόγος of the Form in Intellect. The term is most frequently translated into English as ‘rational principle’. But all principles are rational for Plotinus and this translation does not convey the important feature of the λόγος that it is derived from something higher in the hierarchy. In order to convey this essential feature of the technical term, we have translated λόγος as ‘expressed principle’. For these and many other translation choices, the glossary should be consulted.
Porphyry’s Arrangement of the Enneads

List of Enneads as Arranged by Porphyry and the Corresponding Chronological Order

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Enneads in Chronological Order and the Corresponding Order of Porphyry

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List of Textual Changes to Henry-Schwyzer
Editio Minor

1.4.2.35 – Reading προσλαμβάνετε with Armstrong.
1.4.4.24 – Reading εὖ with HS^4.
1.4.6.13 – Correcting the αὐτῇ of HS^2 to αὐτῇ.
1.4.8.5 – Reading ἐσται <καὶ> ἐν τῷ ἀλγείν, ἄλλα τὸ αὐτοῦ [καὶ ἐν τῷ] ἐνδον γέγογος οἶον with HS^4.
1.5.2.7 – Eliminating the quotation marks in HS^2.
1.5.7.25 – Restoring τὸ αἰῶνα from HS^1.
1.6.3.27 – Reading ὅλον with Kalligas.
1.6.7.14 – Reading ἀν <οὐκ> ἐκπλογείη with HS^4.
1.8.5.14 – Following the punctuation of HS^1 with a full stop before τῶ.
1.8.7.7 – Reading ἐκ θεοῦ τοῦ with Creuzer.
1.8.9.21 – Reading τοῦτοι with Dodds.
1.8.10.15 – Reading ἦ instead of ἦν.
2.1.1.15 – Reading μὴ δὲ τι with HS^4.
2.1.1.32 – Reading κατὰ with Igal and HS^5.
2.1.4.14 – Reading ἀρίστοις κειμένη δυνάμει θαυμαστὴ κινουμένη with HS^4.
2.1.5.12 – Correcting the typographical error σε in HS^2 to τε.
2.1.5.23 – Reading συλλαμβανομένη with HS^4.
2.1.7.7 – Reading μετέχειν δὲ ὑδατὸς πρὸς τὸ <τῶ> μὴ αὐχμηρὸν ἐχειν τε καὶ.
2.1.7.19 – Reading πυρότητα with HS^3.
2.1.7.24 – Reading οὐδετέρον with HS^3.
2.2.1.6 – Reading ἦ with Harder.
2.2.1.11 – Reading ἀλλοθι κατὰ with HS^4. Also, following HS^4 in changing the question mark after περιλαμβάνειν to a raised dot.
2.2.1.44 – Reading πᾶσα ἐστίν, αὐτῇς πάντῃ ἐφίλεται with HS^4.
2.2.2.19 – Reading λεπτῶν <δὲ> καὶ with HS^3.
2.2.3.11 – Retaining the ei μὲνον κινοῖτο of the mss.
2.3.5.17 – Reading τῶ with Beutler-Theiler.
2.3.6.5 – Reading πέρα with Igal and HS^4.
2.3.6.13 – Reading ἀναμονῆς for ἀναφορᾶς with HS^4.
2.3.7.16 – Following the punctuation of HS^4.
2.3.12.31 – Reading τῶ ἀναλόγω of HS^4.
2.3.13.10 – Reading τῶ δὲ ὅλῳ <τά> πάντα δὲ μέρη δύνα αὐτοῦ [tà πάντα] with the corrections of HS⁴.
2.3.14.13 – Reading καὶ <δ> τι with HS⁴.
2.3.14.26 – Reading διαπραξάμενον, <ἐτεροῦ δ'> ἔταιρων with HS⁴.
2.3.17.18 – Deleting χείρω with Müller.
2.3.18.3 – Following the punctuation of HS⁵.
2.4.1.12 – Reading οὐτεῖν with HS⁴.
2.4.5.34 – Reading ὡλὴ καθὸ ἔτερον with HS⁴.
2.4.12.1 – Following the punctuation of HS⁴.
2.4.12.36 – Reading εἰδοποιήσασα following ms Q.
2.4.14.28 – Reading τὸ with HS⁵.
2.4.15.5 – Deleting οὖδὲ τᾶς_after тετσαγμένον with HS⁵.
2.4.15.26 – Reading postpositive ὃς with HS³.
2.4.16.8 – Retaining οὖκ with HS⁴.
2.4.16.14 – Reading ἄρρενος <ἐφίεται> [καὶ] οὖκ ἀπόλλυται with O’Brien 1999: 70.¹
2.4.16.27 – Reading ἔτερον ἄν, πρὸς τῷ κακῶ, τοῦ ὄντος with Igal and HS⁴.
2.5.1.5 – Reading ἐστὶν ἐνεργεία […] καὶ ἐνεργεία with HS⁴.
2.5.1.9 – Reading οὐτῷ τῶ in line 9 with Igal and HS⁴.
2.5.2.24 – Reading καλύει κατ᾽ ἄλλον with HS⁴.
2.6.1.7 – Deleting ἡ οὐσία.
2.6.1.8 – Inserting ἡ before οὐσία with Kalligas and HS⁵.
2.6.1.35 – Reading πυρότητα for the πυρότης of the mss.
2.7.1.46 – Adding κέοιτο <τῷ> κατὰ with Theiler followed by HS⁴.
2.7.2.5 – Reading γενομένοις with Beutler-Theiler.
2.7.2.16 – Reading ὄντος with Armstrong and Ficino.
2.7.2.35 – Eliminating the question mark.
2.8.1.6 – Inserting ἡ καὶ with Theiler.
2.8.1.37 – Reading τοῦ δὲ εἰδοὺς <τοῦ> καθ’ ἐκαστον with Theiler and HS³ and ἡ ὄψις with Theiler and HS³ but retaining τοῦ καθ’ ἐκαστον of HS².
2.9.4.10 – Following the punctuation in HS⁴, but retaining the question mark after ῥη, but retaining the question mark after ῥη.
2.9.5.15 – Reading ψυχῆ ἐφιεμένης with HS⁴.
2.9.6.54 – Following the punctuation of HS⁴.
2.9.6.55 – Reading γνωσθῆσατα τάδ᾽ ὑστερον with HS⁴.
2.9.6.56 – Reading ἐν γε ὁς with HS⁴.
2.9.9.19 – Reading κατ᾽ ἀξίαν with HS⁴.
2.9.9.35 – Reading ἐνδεικνύμενον.
2.9.9.60 – Reading a full-stop instead of a question mark.

2.9.9.6ff. – Reading with HS\(^4\) Ὅιον ἐὶ ἐν πλεῖστοις ἀριθμεῖν ὤκε ἑιδόσιν ἀριθμεῖν ὤκε ἑιδόσιν πῆχεον χίλιον εἰναι ἀκούοι, <μόνον δὲ φαντάζοιτο ὡς τὰ χίλια ἀριθμὸς μέγας >, τι ἢ ἡ χιλιότητις εἰναι νομίζοι, τοῦς <ὅ> ἄλλους πενταπηχείς; [εἰναι ἀκούοι μόνον δὲ φαντάζοιτο ὡς τὰ χίλια ἀριθμὸς μέγας].

2.9.9.71 – Reading αὐτοῦ with Beutler-Theiler and Dufour.

2.9.9.77 – Deleting πάντα with HS\(^4\).

2.9.9.80 – Reading οὐ γάρ ἢ ἑπαγγέλτον ἐξεῖ, δὲ λέγει with Kirchhoff and HS\(^4\).

2.9.10.32 – Reading αὐτοῦ ἐξουσιν ἐπ’, with Theiler and HS\(^4\).

2.9.12.6 – Inserting καί before ἐλθόντες with HS\(^3\).

2.9.12.11 – Reading καὶ κοσμοῦ ἐκείνου λαβεῖν ἐννοιαν [κόσμου ἐκείνου] with HS\(^3\).

2.9.12.38 – Reading τὸ κοκόν with Heigl and Beutler-Theiler.

2.9.14.4 – Reading λέγουσιν ὡς with HS\(^5\).

2.9.14.8 – Following the interrogative punctuation of HS\(^5\).

2.9.15.15 – Deleting τε τὸ σωφρονεῖν with HS\(^4\).

2.9.16.10 – Deleting ὅτι with HS\(^3\).

2.9.17.7 – Reading καὶ with Kirchhoff.

2.9.17.9 – Reading τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ἀμερεὶ τῷ with Kirchhoff, Theiler, and Armstrong.

2.9.17.17 – Deleting ἐξεῖν as suggested by HS\(^5\).

2.9.17.19 – Reading τοσοῦτον with HS\(^5\).

2.9.17.53 – Reading προσιόν τι with HS\(^3\).

3.1.6.4–5 – Reading τοῖς γειναμένοις with HS\(^4\).

3.2.2.27 – Reading γένεσιν ἀλλαὶ with HS\(^3\) and Harder.

3.2.4.38 – Reading παρά του with HS\(^3\).

3.2.7.4 – Reading ἴναι <τί> with HS\(^3\).

3.2.8.31 – Reading παλαίστρας with Igal and HS\(^5\).

3.2.16.19 – Reading ἐὰν ἵν παρῇ with HS\(^3\) which follows MacKenna.

3.2.17.55 – Reading τοῦ ποιητοῦ <τοῦ> παντὸς ποιοῦντος κυρίους according to the conjecture of Creuzer.

3.2.18.19 – Reading εἰ <οὖκ> ἀτοποὶ with HS\(^3\).

3.3.3.11 – Reading τοῦτοι with Heintz and Kalligas.

3.3.5.8 – Reading πληγέντος with HS\(^5\).

3.3.5.24 – Reading τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα with HS\(^5\) following Heintz and Harder.

3.3.6.5 – Reading ὅτις ὅτι <ὅ> where, as HS\(^3\) notes, following Creuzer, ὅτι (= δῆλον ὅτι).

3.3.6.15 – Reading οὕτα <τέ> δίδωσιν εἰς τὸ ἐπικείμενον παρ’ αὐτοῦ with HS\(^3\).
Textual Changes to Editio Minor

3.4.6.28 – Reading καὶ [τοιούτω] θεῳ καὶ δοίμονι with HS^4 following Theiler.
3.4.6.29 – Reading αὐτῷ τοιούτω χρήσται with HS^4.
3.4.6.44 – Retaining τὴν with HS^4 and Guyot.
3.5.1.55 – Reading καλὸν [καὶ] <μὴ> διὰ with HS^4 following Ficino’s original emendation.
3.5.3.4 – Restoring the words καὶ ζῶσα which are bracketed in HS^2.
3.5.7.24 – Reading ἡμῖχανον with Kirchhoff and HS^4.
3.5.9.20 – Reading αὐτοῦ with HS^4.
3.5.9.53 – Reading πρὸς αὐτό.
3.6.3.25 – Reading ἀλλοιοῦμεν with Theiler, Fleet, Kalligas, and Laurent.
3.6.7.3 – Reading καὶ τὰ with Volkmann and Kalligas.
3.6.12.5 – Reading ζητῶν with Armstrong and Fleet.
3.6.18.23 – Reading ἡ with Theiler, Armstrong, Fleet, and Kalligas.
3.7.2.7 – Reading ὅτι with HS^4 and ὅτσεροὺοῦν (than either of the two’) according to a suggestion of Kalligas.
3.7.3.12 – Reading εἰς ἐν, <ἐστε> ὧμοι with HS^4.
3.7.4.2 – Reading ἀλλὰ ἐν ἑκεῖνῃ with Perna and Kalligas.
3.7.8.9 – Reading καὶ αὐτῇ <περιφεροῖται ἐν eἰς τὸ αὐτῷ>, ἐπερ τὴν περιφορὰν λέγουσιν, ἐν χρόνῳ τόπῳ [καὶ αὐτῇ περιφεροῖται ἐν eἰς τὸ αὐτῷ], οὕτω with HS^4 following a suggestion of Igal.
3.7.12.40 – Reading ὑκοῦν ὅν, ἵνα μετρῇ after a suggestion by Guyot.
3.7.13.1 – Reading αὐτῇ with HS^4 following Kirchhoff.
3.7.13.50 – Reading καταθέτειν αὐτῶν with HS^4.
3.8.1.16 – Deleting καὶ with Theiler.
3.8.1.24 – Reading καὶ πῶς with Kirchhoff.
3.8.4.5 – Reading ἐκόνων σωπώσεις with HS^4.
3.8.5.10 – Deleting τὸ λογιστικὸν with HS^4, following Kirchhoff.
3.8.5.12 – Reading μεταλαμβάνον <προέβαιν> with HS^4.
3.8.9.31 – Reading κάκη[ίνα] with Armstrong.
4.1.1.15 – Deleting καὶ κάτω with Bréhier, and adopting οὐσίας, with the majority of mss.
4.1.1.17 – Reading ὅρα ὃς with Igal.
4.3.3.12–13 – The line εἴῃ γὰρ ἐν ἀμφοτέρας ἀπασί is restored to ll. 17–18 from ll. 13–14 where HS^2 place it.
4.3.4.20 – Reading ὅγκους, as proposed by HS^2 in the apparatus.
4.3.5.16 – Retaining the words κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ of the mss.
4.3.10.5 – Reading εἴη with the mss and adding <τό> before πρῶτα.
Textual Changes to *Editio Minor*

4.3.13.26 – Reading οὕτως <τοῖς> with HS⁴ following Kirchhoff.
4.3.22.9 – Restoring the καὶ, the deletion of which by Vitringa is accepted by HS³.
4.3.26.12 – Reading αὕτον with HS⁴.
4.4.5.18 – Following HS⁵ correcting the text to ποιησάμεναι ὁρα . . . γνωρίζουσιν thus changing a question into an assertion.
4.4.7.8 – Reading ἐν with Theiler.
4.4.15.3 – Reading <ἐν> τῇ ὑποστάσει with HS⁴ on a suggestion of Igal.
4.4.17.22 – Retaining ἀσθενῆς with Kirchhoff.
4.4.24.9 – Correcting the typographical error, replacing ποθὲν with παθὲν.
4.4.25.7 – Correcting the typographical error, replacing αἰσθήσει with αἰσθήσεις.
4.4.28.32 – Accepting κράσεις, the reading of the mss.
4.4.28.44 – Replacing κἂν with HS⁴.
4.4.35.18 – Reading ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν λόγοις with Igal and HS⁴ and the mss.
4.4.36.7 – Reading δῆ with Kirchhoff.
4.4.43.23 – Reading τὴν ἀπάτην with Kirchhoff.
4.5.2.2 – Preserving φῶς with the mss.
4.5.2.25 – Reading διὸς διδομένων with Igal and HS⁵.
4.5.7.35 – Reinserting φῶς with HS⁴.
4.5.8.20 – Reading οὐδὲ τὴν σφαγίδα with ms R.
4.5.8.29 – Reading ἐκεῖ εἶναι ψυχή with HS⁴ after the correction of Igal.
4.6.2.23 – Reading νοῦς with Theiler and Harder.
4.6.3.26 – Reading μυθομονας with Creuzer and HS⁵.
4.7.2.15 – Reading <ἐν> οὐκ ἔστιν with Igal and HS³.
4.7.8.⁵.42 – Following Harder and HS⁴ in deleting the clause that follows these words: οίον ζῷον οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν γεννήσει.
4.7.13.17 – Reading ἐνεργεῖα τοῦ μένοντος with Harder.
4.8.4.36 – Reading αὐ τὰ with HS³, following Igal.
4.9.4.5 – Accepting Harder’s proposal μιὰ for the οὐσία (‘substantial being’) of mss and HS⁵.
5.1.2.18 – Correcting ἐστῶσα to ἐστῶτα as per HS⁴.
5.1.3.50 – Correcting the τί of HS² to τίς as per HS⁵.
5.1.4.18 – Reading παραθεών with Atkinson.
5.1.4.21–22 – Reading ἐν [τῶ] αὐτῶ . . . ἐν τῶ <αιῶν>. with Atkinson.
5.1.4.40 – Reading ἐν with Kirchhoff.
5.1.5.3 – Reading ζητεῖ with the mss followed by a comma.
5.1.6.18 – Reading αὐτὸ with Atkinson.
Textual Changes to Editio Minor

5.1.6.21 – Reading αἰτίας <τί> τάξεως αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν with Atkinson.
5.1.7.7 – Correcting ἦ to ἦ as per HS4.
5.1.9.9 – Supplying the negative οὐ.
5.1.9.24 – Reading συνεργήσει with Harder.
5.3.4.5 – Eliminating HS2’s <τῶ>.
5.3.4.15 – Reading εἰδε as per HS1 and the mss.
5.3.7.8 – Reading ἵναυτοῦ with HS’.
5.3.7.31 – Reading ἀπηρτημένας with Theiler.
5.3.8.35 – Eliminating οὐ.
5.3.11.13 – Reading ἐνδεόμενον as suggested by Igal.
5.3.12.23 – Following Igal in replacing ποιήσασαι with εἰάσασαι.
5.3.12.25 – Following Igal in reading ἄν παραχωρήσαι φο̣ρ ες ταραχωρήσαιν.
5.3.15.13 – Following de Strycker’s suggestion and reading ὅ ἄν εἴποι.
5.3.15.23 – Reading μετὰ τὴν ἁρχὴν with Igal and HS4.
5.4.1.13 – Reading τοι μὴ with Igal.
5.5.4.27 – Reading οὐ with the mss.
5.5.7.12 – Reading ἐπέκειτο with HS4.
5.6.6.5 – Reading ταῖς ἀλλαίς τίνες with Theiler.
5.6.6.12 – Moving σαφέστερον to modify λάβοι instead of νοσῶν Kirchhoff.
5.7.1.9–10 – Correcting the typographical error λολους to λόγους.
5.7.2.19 – Reading ἐνι with the mss.
5.8.5.11 – Reading ἐκεῖνο with some mss following Igal.
5.8.9.23 – Reading ἔλον with Harder and the mss.
5.8.11.1 – Reading εὶ with the mss.
5.9.5.13 – Adding the omitted τὰ in the words ἔστιν ἀρα δύντα.
6.1.5.14 – Adopting Igal’s suggestion τὸ σημαντικὸν ταύτης, τὸ δὲ.
6.1.10.34 – Eliminating the interrogative punctuation.
6.1.10.47 – Reading τὸ κόλλος with the mss.
6.1.12.10 – Omitting from line 10 the words τῷ ὑφελίμῳ καὶ βλαβερῷ which are a repetition of the words in line 8.
6.1.16.20 – Reading ἀναλογία with the mss.
6.2.2.15 – Reading ἄλλα with the mss.
6.2.3.35 – Reading αὐτῆς.
6.2.5.5 – Reading the emendation ἐξει with Igal.
6.2.10.9 – Not following the addition of the words <τὸ ἐν ὡς γένος>.
6.2.14.11 – Inserting lines 11–14 from Simpl., In Cat. 241.20–22, deleted by HS2.
6.2.21.59 – Accepting Igal’s addition <ἐκεῖν νό>. 
6.3.22.37 – Reading καθ’ ὅ with Brisson.
6.4.3.16 – Following Ficino’s emendation as understood by MacKenna and Igal: ὁ ἀν αὐτὸ ἐθέλη ὡς δύναται.
6.4.8.42 – Reading οὗ μετέλαβε with Igal.
6.4.10.15 – Reading ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ with Kirchhoff.
6.5.8.28–32 – Following Tornau’s reconstruction of the text: Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ πῦρ ἡ ἱδέα ἐν πάσιν θεωρεῖται παρέχου εἰκόνα ἑαυτοῦ, [καὶ] <οὐ κατὰ τὸ> τόπῳ χωρὶς ὃν [οὗ] παρέξει ὡς ἡ ἔλλαμβάς ἡ ὀρωμένη ἡδὸν γὰρ έιπν πάν τοῦτο τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἐν αἰσθῆσει, <οὐθ> [Εἰ π]αν αὐτὸ πολλά <εἰς>, ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἱδέας etc.
6.5.12.6 – Reading ἐξει with ms R.
6.7.4.33 – Adding a question mark to the sentence.
6.7.6.20 – Reading ἡ δεύτερα with the mss.
6.7.6.33 – Following Harder in reading διημένων, accepted by HS¹.
6.7.7.27 – Reading αἰσθήσιν ὦτι <ὁ>σωμάτων with Hadot.
6.7.8.1 – Following Hadot, we read δίως with the mss and adding a question mark in the first sentence and then adding <πῶς> at the beginning of the second sentence.
6.7.21.8 – Making the sentence into a question with Hadot.
6.7.28.18 – Reading μὴ ἄγαπητόν with the mss and HS¹.
6.7.30.39 – Reading συνέτευον with the mss and Igal and Hadot.
6.7.39.28 – Following Hadot in inserting a word not given in the note.
6.7.41.21 – Reading αὐτῶ with ms X, Theiler and Hadot.
6.8.1.38 – Reading κακεῖνο with HS¹.
6.8.3.25–26 – Preserving the words ὅσοι νῦν καὶ ὧρίζει τῇ κατὰ νοῦν ἔως with HS¹ bracketed by HS².
6.8.7.49 – Reading οὔτι with Kirchhoff.
6.8.9.5 – Retaining ἀρχὴν following Kirchhoff.
6.8.9.35 – Reading ἀρά γε τὸ οὕτως, ὡς εἶδον αὐτὸν ἔχουσα τὸ οὕτως συνέβη following Theiler.
6.8.13.53 – Retaining καὶ τὸ θελεῖν bracketed by HS².
6.8.14.20 – Retaining τοιοῦτον with HS¹.
6.8.15.16 – Retaining καὶ bracketed by HS².
6.8.17.20 – Reading λελογωμένου with Kirchhoff.
6.8.18.30 – Reading νοῦν with HS¹ and Ficino.
6.8.19.3 – Reading οὗτος.
6.9.5.24 – Correcting the typographical omission of μὴ before ἐν.
6.9.11.31 – Reading ὡς ἀρχὴ with ms Q.
§1. Plotinus, the philosopher active during our own lifetime, gave the impression of being embarrassed about having a body; he certainly could not stand talking about his race, his parents, or his original homeland. He so disliked the idea of being painted or sculpted that when Amelius asked him to allow an image to be made, he said: ‘Isn’t it enough that I have to carry around the image that nature has clothed me with?’ Did he have to consent to leave behind a longer-lasting image of this image as if it were something worth looking at? Since he made it clear that, for this reason, he would refuse to sit for a portrait, Amelius got Carterius – the best painter of his generation, who happened to be his friend – to come to Plotinus’ seminar and meet him. (Anyone who wanted was allowed to attend these seminars.) Amelius had him concentrate on looking at Plotinus so that, over time, he acquired a clear mental image of him; he then drew a picture of the image thus laid down in his memory. Amelius corrected the sketch to make it as true to life as possible; and in this way, the skill of Carterius furnished us with a very close likeness of Plotinus and Plotinus knew nothing about it.

§2. He often suffered from bowel trouble, but would not tolerate having an enema; he said it was not appropriate for an old man to undergo that sort of therapy. He would not agree to take medicines derived from wild animals either; he did not, he said, want to derive nourishment from the bodies even of domesticated animals. He stayed away from the baths, but used to be rubbed down daily at home until, during a severe outbreak of plague, the people who rubbed him down were among those who died. He gave up the treatment then, but soon afterwards became afflicted with terrible throat infections. While I was with him he never showed symptoms of anything of the sort, but after I went away he got the illness so badly that, when I got back, Eustochius – a friend who was with him until he died – told me that he lost the clarity and depth of his voice, his sight...
was blurred, and his feet and hands ulcerated. This meant that his friends, of whom he always wanted to ask questions, had to be turned away, so he left the city for Zethus’ estate in Campania. (Zethus was an old friend of his who had died.) His needs were supplied from Zethus’ estate, or brought from that of Castricius in Minturno (Minturno was where Castricius had his property). When he was on the verge of death, Eustochius was slow in getting to him (as he told us) because he was staying in Puteolii: ‘I have been hanging on for you,’ said Plotinus. He breathed his last with the words ‘Try to elevate the god within us to the divine in the universe’; and a snake slid under the bed in which he lay and disappeared into a hole that happened to be there in the wall. It was towards the end of the second year of Claudius’ reign, and he was 66, so Eustochius said. When he died, I, Porphyry, happened to be residing in Lilybaeus; Amelius was in Apamea, in Syria, and Castricius was in Rome. Only Eustochius was with him.

Counting backwards 66 years from the second year of Claudius’ reign [ce 270], Plotinus’ birth falls in the thirteenth year of the reign of Severus [ce 204]; but he never revealed to anyone the month of his birth, or when his birthday was, since he did not think that anyone should sacrifice or hold a feast for him – although he would himself sacrifice and hold feasts for his companions on the traditional birthdays of Plato and Socrates, when he would require those who could to read out a discourse in front of everyone present.

§3. He, however, often quite spontaneously offered information about himself when he was in company, such as the fact that he used to go to his nurse, bare her breasts, and ask to suckle even when he was 7 years old and going to school. He was, however, shamed into stopping when she once called him an obnoxious brat. He was attracted to philosophy at the age of 27, and went to the best regarded philosophers in Alexandria, but he came away from their lectures depressed and miserable. He told one of his friends what was wrong, and the friend, who understood what his soul was yearning for, took him off to hear Ammonius, whom he had not yet tried. When Plotinus saw and heard him he said to his friend: ‘This is the man I was looking for!’ From that day, he remained with Ammonius.

3 The phrase ἀπὸ στόματος is here often taken to mean that Plotinus greeted his friends ‘with a kiss’; but other attestations are always to do with delivering oneself orally (e.g. Pl., Euthyd. 276C); and the associated verb ἀποστοματίζει regularly means ‘interrogate’ or ‘catechize’ (e.g. Luke 11:53).
constantly. He acquired such a philosophical disposition that he became keen to try and learn the philosophy practised among the Persians, too, and the system perfected by the Indians. When the emperor Gordian was about to lead a campaign against the Persians, he signed up for it and went with him. He was 38 then, having been studying with Ammonius for eleven years. Gordian was wiped out in Mesopotamia, and Plotinus only just escaped to safety in Antioch. Philip took power, and Plotinus, then aged 40, went up to Rome. Erennius, Origen, and Plotinus had made pacts not to reveal the doctrines that Ammonius expounded in his lectures, and Plotinus, although he took pupils of his own, took care to keep the doctrines of Ammonius to himself. Erennius was the first to violate the pact, and once he had done so Origen followed suit – though Origen wrote nothing except the treatise *On Daemons*, and a treatise dedicated to Gallienus called *That the King is the Only Creator*. Plotinus wrote nothing for a long time, though he gave talks based on his seminars with Ammonius. And so he spent ten whole years running seminars of his own, but writing nothing. Since he encouraged those who attended to ask questions, his talks were, as Amelius told us, very disorderly and unstructured. Amelius went to Plotinus in the third year of Philip’s reign [ce 245/6] and stayed until the first year of Claudius’ [ce 268/9] so that he was with him for 24 whole years. When he arrived, he had a disposition shaped by the seminars he had taken with Lysimachus; but he was more hardworking than any of his contemporaries, shown by the fact that he had written out and assembled pretty well the whole of Numenius – and learnt most of it by heart. He wrote commentaries based on Plotinus’ seminars, and composed a hundred or so books of notes, which he bestowed upon Hostilianus Hesychius of Apamea, his adopted son.

§4. In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus [ce 262/3], I, Porphyry, came from Greece with Antony of Rhodes, and got to know Amelius, who was by then in his eighteenth year with Plotinus. (He had not yet found the ambition to write anything except the notes, and they did not yet extend to 100 books.)

In the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, Plotinus was around 59. When I, Porphyry, first met him, I was 30. Plotinus had turned to writing on topics that occurred to him in the first year of Gallienus’ reign; by the tenth year of Gallienus’ reign, when I, Porphyry, first got to know him, he had written 21 books. I found out that even they had not been circulated widely. At this time, he did not find it an easy matter to give out copies. He felt a sense of responsibility, and would not do it
just like that, without a second thought, but only after a careful assessment of the recipients.⁴

He did not give these works titles, and they were known by various titles given by different people. The following are the generally accepted titles (I shall also give the opening words of the books, so that each of the books listed here will be easily recognized from its opening):

1. On Beauty (1.6): Beauty is found for the most part in what is seen . . .
2. On the Immortality of the Soul (4.7): Whether each one of us is immortal . . .
3. On Fate (3.1): All things that come into being . . .
4. On the Substantiality of the Soul (4.2): It is in the intelligible cosmos that true Substantiality is to be found . . .
5. On Intelect, Ideas, and Being (5.9): All human beings, when they are born . . .
6. On the Descent of Souls into Bodies (4.8): Often, after waking up to myself . . .
7. How That Which is After the First Comes From the First, and on the One (5.4): If there is something after that which is first . . .
8. On Whether All Souls are One (4.9): Is it the case that . . .
9. On the Good or the One (6.9): All beings are beings due to unity . . .
10. On the Three Primary Hypostases (5.1): What can it be, therefore, that has made the souls . . .
11. On the Generation and Order of the Things Which Come After the First (5.2): The One is all things . . .
12. On the Two Kinds of Matter (2.4): All who have arrived at a conception of so-called matter . . .
13. Various Considerations (3.9): Intecl, Plato says, sees the Ideas . . .
14. On the Circular Motion (2.2)⁵: Why does it move in a circle?
15. On Our Allotted Daemon (3.4): While some real existents . . .
16. On Existing From the Body (1.9): You shall not expel your body so that it does not go . . .
17. On Quality (2.6)⁶: Are Being and Substance different?
18. On Whether or not There are Ideas of Individuals (5.7): Is there an Idea of each individual?

⁴ See Pl., Phdr. 275E for the danger inherent in texts that they will take their arguments to people incapable of making good use of them.
⁵ The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On the Motion of Heaven.’
⁶ The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On Substance or on Body’.
20. On Dialectic (1.3): So what craft or procedure . . .
21. How the Soul is Said to be a Mean Between Undivided and Divided Being 2 (4.1)7

These are the 21 works that he was found to have written when Porphyry first came to him. Plotinus was then 59.

§5. I, Porphyry, was with him for this year and the following five years without a break – for I came to Rome a little before the end of Gallienus’ first ten years in power. (It was summer, and Plotinus was not working; but he still held gatherings.) In these six years, we explored many topics in our seminars. Amelius and I asked him to write, and he wrote:

22, 23. That Being, One and Identical, is Simultaneously Everywhere Whole – Two Books (6.4–5):
1. The first of these opens: Is soul present everywhere . . .
2. The second opens: That that which is one and identical in number . . .

He went straight on to write the next two [5.6; 2.5]:

24. The first of these was: On the Fact That That Which Transcends Being Does not Think and on What the Primary Thinking is and What is Secondary (5.6): There is one type of thinking which is by a subject that is other than its object . . .
25. The second was: On ‘Potentially’ and ‘Actually’ (2.5): One thing is said to be potentially . . .
26. And next in turn: On the Impassibility of Things Without Body (3.6): Let us say that acts of sense-perception are not affections . . .
27. On Soul 1 (4.3)8: Concerning the soul, the right course . . .
28. On the Soul 2 (4.4)9: What, then, will he say . . .
29. On the Soul 3 (4.5)10: Since we have earlier postponed . . .
30. On Contemplation (3.8)11: If, before attempting to be serious . . .
31. On the Intelligible Beauty (5.8): Since we are saying . . .
32. On Intellect, and That the Intelligibles of are not Outside the Intellect, and on the One (5.5)12: The true and real Intellect . . .

7 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On the Substantiality of the Soul 2’.
8 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On Problems of the Soul 1’.
9 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On Problems of the Soul 2’.
10 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On Problems of the Soul 3’.
11 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is: ‘On Nature, Contemplation, and the One’.
12 The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect, and on the One’.
33. Against the Gnostics (2.9): So, since the simple nature of the Good appeared to us . . .

34. On Numbers (6.6): Is multiplicity . . .

35. On How it is That Distant Things Appear Small (2.8)\(^{13}\): Do things that are far away appear smaller . . .

36. On Whether Happiness Increases With Time (1.5): Does being happy increase with time?

37. On Complete Blending (2.7): Regarding the so-called complete blending . . .

38. How the Multiplicity of Ideas Came to Exist, and on the Good (6.7): When god sent the souls to come to be . . .

39. On the Voluntary (6.8)\(^{14}\): Can one so much as raise the question . . .

40. On the Cosmos (2.1): When we say that the cosmos has always existed . . .

41. On Sense-Perception and on Memory (4.6): Since we maintain that acts of sense-perception are not ‘imprints’ . . .

42. On the Genera of Being 1 (6.1): How many beings there are and which they are . . .

43. On the Genera of Being 2 (6.2): Since we have conducted an investigation . . .

44. On the Genera of Being 3 (6.3): We have said what we think about Substance . . .

45. On Eternity and Time (3.7): When we say that eternity and time . . .

These works, 24 of them, he wrote in the six-year period when I, Porphyry, was with him, taking his topics from questions he was engaged with at the time, something I made clear in my key-point summaries for each work. Added to the 21 works he wrote before we arrived, that makes 45 in all.

§6. While I spent time in Sicily (I went there around the fifteenth year of Gallienus’ reign [AD 267/8]), Plotinus wrote these five works [1.4; 3.2; 3.3; 5.3; 3.5], and sent them to me:

46. On Happiness (1.4): If we suppose that living well and being happy . . .

47. On Providence 1 (3.2): Handing over the substantiality and constitution of this universe to spontaneity . . .

\(^{13}\) The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On Seeing, or on How it is That Distant Things Appear Small’.

\(^{14}\) The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On the Voluntary and the One’s Wishing’.
48. On Providence (3.3): So, what is our view on these issues?
49. On the Knowing Hypostases and on That Which is Transcendent (5.3): Must that which thinks itself be variegated . . .
50. On Love (3.5): On the question of love, whether . . .

So he sent me these in the first year of the reign of Claudius. At the beginning of the second, shortly before he was to die, he sent these <four> [1.8; 2.3; 1.1; 1.7]:

51. On What Evils Are (1.8)\(^\text{15}\): Those who are seeking to discover where evils come from . . .
52. On Whether the Stars are Causes (2.3): The revolution of the stars . . .
53. What is the Living Being (1.1)\(^\text{16}\): Pleasures and pains . . .
54. On Happiness (1.7)\(^\text{17}\): Could one say that the good for each thing is different . . .

The first two blocks make up 45 works, bringing the number to 54. Some of them, then, were written when he was young, others when he was at the height of his powers, and others when he was physically unwell. The power of the books reflects this. The first 21 are somewhat lacking in power, not powerful enough to have real impact. But the middle period of published works clearly reveals the height of his power. These 24 works could not (apart from the short ones) be better. The last nine were written when his power was already on the wane – and more so the final four than the five before them.

\section{7} He had a large following, and people with a thirst for philosophy gathered around him. They included Amelius of Tuscany, whose family name was Gentilianus. Plotinus preferred to call him Amerius, with an ‘r’: he said that it was more appropriate for him to be called partless [amerios] than careless [amelios].

There was a doctor from Scythopolis called Paulinus, whom Amelius nicknamed Mikkalos, because he always struck the wrong note.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{15}\) The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On What Evils are and Where They Come From’.

\(^{16}\) The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On What is the Living Being and What is the Human Being’.

\(^{17}\) The title of the treatise in the body of the text is ‘On the Primary Good and the Other Goods’.

\(^{18}\) The name seems to be chosen partly for a pun between the Latin \textit{paulus} and Greek \textit{μικρός} (both meaning ‘small’). The name might suggest his hitting the ‘wrong note’ either through a further pun on the Greek \textit{μη καλῶς} (‘not well [said]’), or perhaps in
There was another doctor, Eustochius of Alexandria, who got to know him towards the end of his life and stayed in his service until his death, studying only with Plotinus’ circle. He acquired the disposition of a true philosopher.

There was also with him Zoticus, the critic and poet, who edited the text of Antimachus, and rendered the story of Atlantis into verse, very poetically. He lost his sight and died shortly before Plotinus. (Paulinus also died before Plotinus.)

One of his companions was Zethus, an Arab by extraction. He had married the daughter of Theodosius, who was friends with Ammonius. He, too, was a doctor, and devoted to Plotinus. He was interested in politics, and had political inclinations, which Plotinus tried to check. They were like family, and Plotinus used to stay with him at his estate, which was some six miles this side of Minturnae. Castricius, known as Firmus, had bought it. He was the greatest connoisseur alive during our lifetime, and revered Plotinus. He was also a good servant to Amelius, serving him in all things; and he was attached to me, Porphyry, and treated me in all matters like a brother. He too revered Plotinus, then – even though he had chosen a political life.

Quite a few Senators attended his lectures: Marcellus Orrontius and Sabinillus in particular worked at philosophy. Another Senator was Rogantianus who came to reject this life to such an extent that he gave up his possessions, dismissed his slaves, and resigned his position. He was due to be inducted into the office of Praetor – the Lictors were even there. But he not only refused to go on, he resigned all public office. After he relinquished the management of his own household as well, he would dine and sleep at the houses of various friends and acquaintances, only eating every other day. As a result of his renunciation and abstinence he recovered from his gout, which had been so severe that he used to be carried about in a chair; and whereas before he could not stretch out his fingers, he became more agile than craftsmen used to working with their hands. Plotinus took him into his inner circle and was full of praise for him – eventually adducing him as a good example for philosophers.

Serapion of Alexander was with him, too – originally an orator, but afterwards also interested in philosophical argument. But he did not stay the course. He found himself unable to renounce his possessions and give up usury.

oblique reference to the musical Mikkalos who appears in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics (47b30ff.).

19 It may be relevant to note that in recounting the story of Atlantis, Plato tells us that Solon had intended to write such a poem, but never found the time. See Pl., Tim. 21C.
Life of Plotinus

I, Porphyry of Tyre, was also a friend of Plotinus, admitted to his inner circle. He asked me to edit his writings, §8. for he himself, once he had written something, could not bear to revisit it a second time. Indeed, he could not even read it through once, since his eyesight made reading difficult. He wrote without aiming for beauty in the individual letters, without keeping syllables distinct, and without any concern for spelling. All he minded about was the meaning. And he kept writing until his death, which amazed us all. He would go through the whole issue by himself, from beginning to end, then he would commit his argument to writing, getting down what he had worked out in his soul without hesitation, as if he were copying the writing out of a book. He could conduct a conversation with someone about another issue, and keep on top of the conversation without ever taking his mind from the matter he was thinking about. When the person he was talking to left, he would not read over what he had already written – as I said, his sight was not up to reading. He would simply move to the next point, continuing the text as if the conversation had been no interruption at all. So he kept his own company at the same time as being with others, and never relaxed his attention to himself, or his constant reversion to intellect. (If he did so it was only when he slept; and he did that very little thanks to his modest diet – often he would not eat any bread.)

§9. Plotinus also attracted women who were devoted to philosophy. There was Gemina, in whose house he lived, and her daughter, who like her mother was called Gemina; and there was Amphicleia, who was the wife of Ariston, son of Iamblichus, also devoted to philosophy. Furthermore, a number of men and women of the highest social order brought their male and female offspring to him when they were about to die. They would entrust them to him along with what remained of their property, treating his protection as sacred and god-like. For this reason, Plotinus’ house was full of boys and girls – among them Potamo, whose education he took such pains over that he would often listen even to revisions of his compositions. He would minutely scrutinize the accounts submitted by their trustees, and insisted that as long as they did not take up philosophy their possessions and revenues should remain untouched and secure. Plotinus, then, although he never relaxed his mental concentration so long as he was awake, undertook his share of responsibility for the lives and concerns of other people – many of them. He was, to those who had any dealings with him, kind and accessible. For this reason, although he lived for 26 whole years in Rome, and acted

25

HS² unnecessarily begin a new section at this point.
as arbiter in many cases of personal dispute, he never made a single enemy in his public life.

§10. Among those with pretensions to philosophy it was different: Olympius of Alexandria, who had studied with Ammonius for a while, wanted to be pre-eminent as a philosopher and hated him. He used magic to attack him, trying to get him star-struck. When he realized that the attempt had only rebounded on himself, he said to his acquaintances that the power of Plotinus’ soul was so great that he could deflect attacks made against him onto those who were trying to do him harm.

Plotinus for his part was aware of Olympius’ efforts, and said that his body then felt like ‘a purse being drawn shut’ [Symp. 190d], his limbs being pressed together. Olympius saw that he would suffer much worse things himself than anything he could hope to do to Plotinus, and gave up trying.

Plotinus did indeed have some natural endowment that set him apart. An Egyptian priest once came to Rome and met him through a mutual friend. Wanting to give a demonstration of his wisdom, he invited Plotinus to come and see him summon his guardian daemon. Plotinus readily agreed, and the invocation took place in the temple of Isis, since the Egyptian said that this was the only pure place he could find in Rome. When he called upon Plotinus’ daemon to appear, it was a god that came, rather than a member of the genus of daemons. As the Egyptian said: ‘You are blessed, since you have a god as your daemon, and are not accompanied by a member of the lower genus.’ They were not able to ask or learn more while it was there, since one of their friends, who was watching with them, strangled the birds he was holding as protection – whether deliberately, through envy, or in a moment of panic. In any case, the fact that Plotinus was accompanied by a daemon of superior divinity led him to raise his god-like vision towards it. This is why he wrote the book On Our Allotted Daemon [3.4], in which he tries to explain why different people have different guardians.

Amelius was fond of sacrifices, and used to busy himself with rites of the new moon, and rites to allay fears. He once tried to get Plotinus to participate with him, but Plotinus said: ‘They must come to me, not I to them.’ We did not know what consideration led him to make such a grand pronouncement, and did not have the nerve to ask him.

§11. He was possessed of an extraordinary degree of insight. Once, when Chione had a very valuable necklace stolen (Chione was a pious widow who lived with him along with her children), the slaves were brought before his view. He looked at them all: ‘This is the thief!’ he said, pointing to one of them. The man was whipped, and for a long time...
denied it; but eventually he confessed, fetched what he had stolen, and returned it. Plotinus would foretell how each of the children living with him would turn out. For example, he said what Polemo would be like: amorous and short-lived; and so he was. And once he saw me, Porphyry, when I was thinking about ending my life. He suddenly presented himself to me while I was spending time at home, and said that this desire of mine was not the product of considered thought, but of pathological melancholy; and he told me to leave town. I obeyed him, and went to Sicily, since I had heard that a well-known man called Probus was staying near Lilybaeum. I was cured of my urge, but was prevented from being with Plotinus for the rest of his life.

§12. Gallienus the emperor and his wife Salonina honoured and revered Plotinus greatly. On the strength of his friendship with them, Plotinus asked them to rebuild a certain city in Campania, once said to have been a city of philosophers, which had fallen into ruins. He asked them to bestow the surrounding countryside on the city once it had been repopulated. The idea was that the inhabitants would live according to Plato’s laws, and the city would be called Platonopolis. Plotinus promised that he and his companions would move there. And the philosopher would very easily have had his wish, were it not that some of the emperor’s court stood in his way – whether through envy or resentment or some other unworthy cause.

§13. In our seminars, Plotinus was a fluent speaker, and very good at thinking through problems and finding ways through them, but sometimes he got words wrong. He would not say ‘remember’ but ‘merember’ – and there were other oddities of pronunciation which he replicated in his writing, too. When he spoke, his intellect was manifest even in the way it lit up his face. He was handsome to look at, but even more beautiful in those moments. He perspired a bit; he exuded kindliness; his face looked gentle but also intellectually rigorous when he was questioned. For three days I, Porphyry, questioned his account of the sense in which the soul was ‘in’ the body, and he patiently went through the arguments. Someone called Thaumasius, who was studying universal propositions, joined the seminar and wanted to hear Plotinus speaking on texts: he could not stand Porphyry’s responding and questioning. However, Plotinus said: ‘But if we cannot solve Porphyry’s difficulties when he asks them, how will we be able to say anything at all when faced with a text?’

21 The details of this incident are variously rendered. For Plotinus’ custom of speaking ‘to texts’, cf. infra 14. For the relative difficulty of engaging with a text rather than a human interlocutor (the point with which this passage concludes in the translation), see Pl., Phdr. 275D.
§14. Plotinus’ writing is concise, but packed with meaning; brief and more abundant in ideas than in words, inspiring and passionate about almost everything; a combination of personal insight and respect for tradition. Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines are blended into his writings, though they are not obvious; and it contains the concentrated essence of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. No so-called ‘geometrical’ or ‘arithmetical’ theorem evaded him, nor those of mechanics, optics, or music – though he himself was not specially trained to work in these areas.

In our seminars, he would have commentaries read out, those of Severus, Cronius, Numenius, Gaius or Atticus; or (from the Peripatetics) those of Aspasius, Alexander, and Adrastus – and whoever was to hand. None of these was given the last word: he always had his own view. His way of thinking was distinctive, and he adopted Ammonius’ mind-set in his enquiries. It was not long before he had heard enough to find a profound issue to apply his mind to. Once Longinus’ *On First Principles* was read for him, and his *Antiquity Lover*: ‘Longinus is a philologist,’ he said, ‘but not at all a philosopher.’ On another occasion, Origen appeared at a seminar. Plotinus blushed deeply and wanted to leave. Origen asked him to keep speaking, but he said that all desire to do so is crushed when the speaker sees that he is speaking to those who know what he is going to say. And so he said a little, and left.

§15. I read a poem called *The Holy Marriage* at the Feast for Plato, and because a lot of it was expressed obliquely, in the mystical language of inspiration, someone said ‘Porphyry is mad!’ In everyone’s hearing, he said to me: ‘You proved yourself to be at once poet, philosopher, and priest.’ The rhetor Diophanes read out a piece justifying Alcibiades as he appears in Plato’s *Symposium*, arguing that as a price for an education in virtue, a pupil should make himself sexually available if his teacher wanted it. Plotinus kept starting up to leave the gathering, but refrained from doing so. After the lecture broke up, he charged me, Porphyry, to write a counter-argument. Diophanes did not want to give me his text, so I based my response on my memory of his lines of argument. When I read it to a gathering of the same audience, Plotinus was so happy with me that in our seminars he would constantly add: ‘Shoot like this, if you want to illuminate men.’

Eubulus, Plato’s successor in Athens, sent Plotinus treatises concerning certain questions of Platonic interpretation. He caused them to be given to me, asking me to think of answers, and to let him know what I thought.

22 The danger of slipping from one into the other is already remarked by Seneca, *Ep.* 108.35.

Plotinus dealt with astronomical tables, though not in great technical detail. He addressed the efficacy of horoscopes more closely, and in the many places where he saw something unwarranted in what the treatises claimed he did not hold back from refutation.

§16. During his lifetime, Christianity attracted a diverse popular following, as did movements which drew on ancient philosophy. Followers of Adelphius and Aquilinus got hold of most of the writings of Alexander of Lybia, Philocomus, Demostatus, and Lydus, and published the revelations of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nicotheus, Allogen, and Messus. There were others of the sort. They deceived many people – indeed, they were themselves deluded. As if Plato had not come to grips with the profundity of intelligible substance! Plotinus himself refuted them on many points in the course of our seminars, and he wrote a book which we called Against the Gnostics [2.9]; but he left it to us to judge the rest. Amelius managed to write 40 books against the Book of Zostrianus. I, Porphyry, composed a continuous series of arguments against the Book of Zoroaster, proving beyond doubt that it is a recent forgery, fabricated by the sect’s adherents to give the impression that the doctrines they themselves approve are those of the ancient Zoroaster.

§17. Some people from Greece said that Plotinus had been presenting as his own the doctrines of Numenius. Trypho, the Stoic and Platonist, told Amelius this and Amelius wrote a book which he called On Plotinus’ Doctrinal Distance from Numenius. He dedicated it to ‘Basileus’, meaning me. (‘Basileus’ is another way of referring to me, instead of ‘Porphyry’. In my native language I am called Malkus, which was also the name my father had; but malkus translated into Greek is basilus [‘king’]. This is why Longinus, when he dedicated his On Impulse to Cleodamus and me, Porphyry, wrote ‘To Cleodamus and Malkus’. So Amelius translated my name, and just as Numenius changed Maximus [‘Greatest’] to Megalos [‘Great’], so he changed Malkus to Basileus.) This is what he wrote:

‘Amelius to Basileus: greetings. You know very well that I would not have said a word just because certain fine gentlemen have been spreading the view that the doctrines of our friend derive from Numenius of Apamea – a view which you say has reached your own hearing. It is too obvious that it is an example of the sort of glib and specious position they revere so much. First of all, they say that he is a complete fool, then they say that he is a plagiarist, and finally they accuse him of dealing with trivialities. It is obvious that their attacks are just satire. But you think that we should use the occasion of their attack to set down our own beliefs, to make them easier for us to recall, and at the same time to make
both them and the name of our friend, the great Plotinus, more widely
known – though they have for a long time been in the public domain.
For this reason, I hereby present my account, worked up in three days,
as you already know. You must forgive me for the fact that I have not
been guided by his own writings in my composition or in the selection of
topics, but went back to when we used to meet, and put things down in
the order they happened to arise. The main reason I did this was that
Plotinus has been brought to trial here by certain people for an outlook
which he shares with us, an outlook which it is not easy to pick up from
his published work because of his tendency to treat of the same topics in
different ways in different places, as he sees fit. I am sure that, if I end up
defacing any of the doctrines, all of which I have gone to our shared
philosophical home to find, you will be kind enough to put me right. As
the tragedy says somewhere, I felt like a “meddler, correcting and
disclaiming”\footnote{The origin of this quotation is unknown.} when faced with an account of our leader’s doctrines
which is so far from the truth – but that only shows how great was my
wish to please you completely. Farewell!"

§18. I decided to set out this letter to substantiate the claim that there
were those who, during his lifetime, thought that Plotinus made his
reputation by passing off Numenius’ doctrines as his own. I also did it
to show that they thought him a ‘complete fool’, being contemptuous
of him because they did not understand what he said, and because he
avoided boastful rhetorical displays. They thought that he treated his
seminars like social gatherings, and was slow to spell out the logical
steps of his argument. I, Porphyry, got a similar impression when I first
heard him – that is why I published a work against him in which I tried
to show that the intelligible lies outside the intellect. Plotinus made
Amelius read it out and, when he had done so, laughed and said: ‘Your
job is to solve the problems into which he has fallen because he does
not know what we think.’ Amelius wrote quite a large work \textit{Against the
Difficulties Raised by Porphyry}; I replied to this, and Amelius responded
in his turn. At the third go, I, Porphyry, finally managed to understand
what he was saying, and wrote a retraction, which I read out in a
lecture. From then on, I put my faith in Plotinus’ books, and encour-
gaged a desire in him, as my teacher, to set out his views in writing at
greater length. He made Amelius keen to write as well.

§19. Longinus’ opinion of Plotinus, which was largely based on what I
told him myself in my letters to him, can be seen from the following
extract of a letter which he wrote to me. He was asking me to leave Sicily
and go to him in Phoenicia, bringing the books of Plotinus, and this is what he said:

‘Send them, as soon as you think best; or, better still, bring them – for I am not going to stop asking you again and again to take the road that leads to me rather than the road that leads away. If for no other reason – for what wisdom could you expect to find here? – then come for old time’s sake, and for the air, which is ideal for the physical infirmity you speak about. You may have something else in mind, but don’t expect to find anything at all new here – nor, for that matter, those things from the past you say you have lost. There is such a scarcity of writers here that I have, by the gods, only just managed to get hold of the remaining works of Plotinus by taking my copyist away from his usual work, and setting him to work on this single task. And I have acquired what appears to be everything, including everything that you have been sending; but what I have is half-finished, for it has more than the usual number of errors. I thought our friend Amelius would remove the scribal errors, but he had other more urgent matters to attend to. So I do not know how I can get to grips with them. I am very keen to examine *On the Soul* and *On Being*, but these are more corrupt than any. I would dearly like to get accurately written copies from you – just for checking, then I would send them back. Or, again, I shall make the same argument: don’t send them, but I would much rather you bring them yourself, these and anything else that Amelius might have missed. I have been careful to acquire everything he brought: would I not want to keep his commentaries, worthy as they are of all reverence and honour? I told you, when you were here, and a long way away, and spending time around Tyre, that I have not been able to go along with many of his suggestions; but I am impressed by the character of the writing, by the density of the man’s thoughts, and by the extraordinarily philosophical disposition of the enquiries. I love them, and I would say that seekers ought to consider his books among the most outstanding.’

§20. These things I repeat at length from the greatest critic of our lifetime, a man who discussed almost everything written by all of his other contemporaries. It shows how he came to view Plotinus – although at first, influenced by the ignorance of others, he had been disdainful of him. He thought that the books he had got from Amelius were corrupt because he did not understand the man’s usual form of expression. (Amelius’ copies of Plotinus had certainly been corrected by comparison with the autographs.)
To give a full picture of Longinus’ assessment of Plotinus, Amelius, and his other contemporaries, so that one can see what one of the best-known and leading critics thought of them, it is necessary to quote from his book. The book is called *Longinus against Plotinus and Gentilianus Amelius: On the End*, and this is the preface:

‘There have, Marcellus, been many philosophers in my time, not least in the early days of my youth. It is impossible to describe their rarity in this field now, but when I was still a boy there were quite a few outstanding philosophers – all of whom, it so happens, I got to see because from a very young age I travelled widely with my parents; and I got to know those who lived long enough by having a lot to do with their tribes and cities. Some of them tried to treat of their views in books, leaving to their successors something from which they could derive their help; but others thought it enough to lead their pupils to grasp them for themselves.

The first group includes the Platonists Euclides, Democritus, the Proclinus who spent time in the Troad and, among those still living in Rome, Plotinus and Gentilianus Amelius his friend; the Stoics Themostocles and Phoebio, and Annius and Medius, who flourished until recently; and the Peripatetic Heliodorus of Alexandria. The second group includes the Platonists Ammonius and Origen, with whom we spent most of our time, men who were more than a little superior to their contemporaries in understanding, and the successors in Athens, Theodotus and Eubulus.

There were things written by these men – Origen wrote *On Daemons*, and Eubulus *On the Philebus and the Gorgias and Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato’s Republic* – but not enough to make them count as writers: it was an occasional activity for them, and not their principal interest. Stoics in this second group include Herminus and Lysimachus, and Athenaeus and Musonius, who lived in town; Peripatetics include Ammonius and Ptolemy, outstanding in their day as philologists, especially Ammonius (no one as learned as him was ever born). They didn’t write any technical manuals, but poems and epideictic speeches – and I don’t think any of those would have survived if it had been a matter of their own wishes, for they would not have been able to bear the idea of finding fame later on for books like this, when they had not gone to the trouble of preserving their views in more serious writings.

Among this group of writers, some wrote little more than compilations and transcriptions from the writings of their predecessors – so Euclides, Democritus, and Proclinus. Others tried to write on the same topics as the ancients, but focused on very minor aspects of their enquiries. They include Annius, Medius, and Phoebio – the latter preferring to be known for the words he used rather than the
organization of his thought. One might place Heliodorus in their company too, because he added little to what his teachers had said, beyond correcting their language.

But there were others who manifested their eagerness to write, both in the number of questions which they tackled and their individual manner of thinking about them. They include Plotinus and Gentilianus Amelius, whose account of what seemed to be Pythagorean and Platonic principles made for clearer exegesis than any of their predecessors. The writings of Numenius and Cronius and Moderatus and Thrasylus could not touch those of Plotinus for clarity. Amelius chose to follow in his footsteps and held most of the same beliefs, but was his antithesis in the expansive way in which he worked through them and in the roundabout style of his expression.

These are the only people whose writings I think are worth considering. As to the rest: why should one be bothered with them at the expense of those works on which they rely, and to which they add nothing – not a single line of argument, let alone any substantive point. They simply collect the opinions of the majority, or the judgements of the superior. This is something I have said already elsewhere – for example, in answering Gentilianus on Plato’s view of justice, or in examining Plotinus’ On Ideas. Our mutual Tyrian friend Basileus, who has himself written a few works in the manner of Plotinus, for whom he left our school, wrote a work in which he tried to show that Plotinus held a better view about the ideas than the one I hold. I think I wrote a suitable response, showing the flaws in his decision to leave my school, and at the same time dispatching many views held by these men. Likewise in my letter to Amelius, which is the length of a monograph, and addresses everything that he wrote to me from Rome. He himself called this letter On the Manner of Plotinus’ Philosophy, but I prefer to know it just by its common title: “Letter to Amelius”.

§21. So, when he wrote this, he agreed that of all those active during his lifetime, Plotinus and Amelius most ‘manifested their eagerness to write, both in the number of questions which they tackled, and their individual manner of thinking about them’; that Plotinus did not pass off Numenius’ doctrines as his own, and that rather than having most regard for the doctrines of Numenius he actually pursued and took up the doctrines of the Pythagoreans; and that ‘the writings of Numenius and Cronius and Moderatus and Thrasylus could not touch those of

26 Probably 6.7.
Plotinus for clarity’. Of Amelius he says he ‘chose to follow in his footsteps and held most of the same beliefs, but was his antithesis in the expansive way in which he worked through them and in the round-about style of his expression’. He also mentions me, Porphyry, then still at the beginning of my attendance at Plotinus’ seminars. ‘Our mutual Tyrian friend Basileus,’ he says, ‘has himself written a few works in the manner of Plotinus.’ He wrote this because I was careful to avoid the unphilosophical prolixity of Amelius’ writings, and was keen to write in the style of Plotinus. What this great man, unsurpassed for his work as a critic and commentator, wrote about Plotinus is impressive enough; and he would have had nothing at all to say against him if I, Porphyry, had been able to go and see him when he asked me to and put him right about the doctrine of Plotinus.

§22. ‘But what is all this about oak and rock,’ as Hesiod says? If we are looking for witnesses from among the number of the wise, no one could be wiser than god, the god who said: ‘I know the number of the sand and the measure of the sea, and I understand the deaf and hear the dumb.’ Amelius asked Apollo where the soul of Plotinus had gone – Apollo who simply said of Socrates: ‘Socrates is the wisest of all men.’ Listen to what he said, and at what great length, about Plotinus:

‘The hymn I shall play is fit for the gods: its subject is a kindly friend; its tune a tapestry of honey-hues; it is played on a lyre with a golden pick. And I summon the Muses to join my song, to cry Iachae! with all their might and overwhelm with their music – as they did when summoned to start up the dance for Aiacides, with the frenzy of the gods and the songs of Homer. Muses come to the sacred dance! Together we’ll sing to the limits of song: you, and I surrounded by you: I, with my hair flowing, Phoebus. Daemon, that were a man before, entering now a diviner rank: you became a daemon, when you loosed the chain of necessity that is the human being’s lot; and from the tempestuous waves of embodiment had strength to swim, to reach the headland’s shores, far from the shoals of the sinful. You set your foot on the sinuous path laid out for the pure in soul, where the light of the gods and their laws show the way, innocent of, rising above, the lawlessness of the sinful. While twisting to flee the bitter waves, where blood sustains and whirlpools menace, mid-torrent, amid deafening confusion, the god-sent goal would often be made to seem near. Often the darts which your intellect fired were borne by their very strength along

27 See Hesiod, Theog. 35. 28 See Herodotus, 1.47. 29 This line, also attested at D.L., 2.37, is in the chief ‘speaking’ metre of Greek tragedy, the iambic trimeter. Apollo’s normal medium, used in the response to Amelius, is the much grander dactylic hexameter.
deviant paths: the gods then, shone focused rays of light which helped you to see from the gloomy shade, and raised you straight to the circling, the deathless path. The pleasure of sleep never wholly took hold of your eyes, the heavy bolt of its mist not allowed to seal your lids, so that, borne through the whirlpools, your eyes remained open to many and joyful things, things sought with difficulty by men who go after wisdom.

But now that you have struck your tent, and left the grave of a daemon-soul, you come among the assembly of daemons refreshed by the lovely breezes: where love is, where beautiful yearning is, full of pure joy, always replenished by deathless streams from god. From here come the reins of loves; from here the sweet breeze and calmness of aether. Here live the brothers of the golden generation of great Zeus: Minos and Rhadamanthus. Here lives the just Aeacus; here are Plato’s holy strength, and the beautiful Pythagoras, and those who started the dance of immortal love and won for themselves a common lineage with the most blessed daemons. Here the heart in good cheer is always warmed and cheerful. Oh blessed one, how many contests you have endured! Go now among holy daemons, your turbid lives the crest on your helmet.

Let us start the song, and the wheeling dance, for Plotinus, O Muses, who pleases us: no less for the blessed from my golden lyre!’

§23. These verses say that he was ‘kindly’: gentle, very kind, and charming, which we knew him to be. And they say that he did not sleep, kept his soul pure, and was always striving for the divine which he loved with his whole soul, and that he did everything to transform himself, to ‘flee the bitter waves’ of this life ‘where blood sustains’. So it is that this divine ‘daemon’ of a man ascended in his thought to the first, transcendent god many times, travelling the roads described by Plato in the *Symposium*: and to him appeared that god who has neither shape nor form, who has his seat above Intellect and every intelligible thing. (I. Porphyry, now 67 years old, once drew near this god and was unified with him.) Anyway, ‘the goal appeared near’ Plotinus: his aim or goal was to be unified and to be present to the god that is set over all things. This goal, an indescribable state of perfection, he achieved some four times while I was with him.

Because he was borne along ‘deviant’ paths, the gods often put him straight by sending ‘focused rays of light’: so one might consider what he wrote as written under their protection and supervision.

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30 See Pl., *Symp.* 210 211.
As Plotinus watched the world unseeing, so his inner eye never slept, and this is why Apollo says ‘your eyes remained open to many and joyful things, things sought with difficulty’ by men who apply themselves to philosophy. Human contemplation can transcend the merely human, but when it is compared to the knowledge of the gods it is, graceful perhaps, but not able to plumb the depths as they do.

So much, then, for what the oracle shows about Plotinus’ actions and achievements while still in the body. After being freed from the body, it says that he came to the ‘assembly of daemons’, where ‘love’ and ‘yearning’ are citizens, and that love which is kindled by god; as well as the so-called ‘soul judges’, those children of god, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus. He passes before them, not to have judgement passed on him, but in order to join them in the company of all the other great men. Plato and Pythagoras are among the sort of people there, and others who started the dance of immortal love: and there the ‘most blessed of the daemons’ have their birth, and enter a life characterized by fulfilment and joy. They live out this life being made happy by the gods.

§24. Such is our account of the life of Plotinus. He turned over to us the task of arranging and correcting his books, and I promised him while he was alive that I would do this, and gave undertakings to his other associates too. So I decided first of all not to leave his books as they were, in the chronological order of their publication. In this I followed the example of Apollodorus of Athens and Andronicus the Peripatetic: the former collected the works of Epicharmus the comic poet in ten volumes; the latter divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, bringing related topics together. For my part, I hit on the pleasing idea of dividing the 54 books of Plotinus into six ‘enneads’ – groups of nine multiplied by the perfect number 6. I collected related topics together in each ennead, putting the less weighty questions first in the final order. The first ennead, then, contains the following treatises, dealing with more ethical matters.

[Here follows a list of the titles and first lines of the treatises in Ennead 1]:

So the first ennead comprises these treatises, which embrace more ethical topics. The second is a collection of physics, embracing works concerned with the cosmos and things contained within the cosmos. They are the following [here follows a list of the titles and first lines of the treatises in Ennead 2]:

The third ennead, which also deals with works on the cosmos, encompasses the following works, dealing with enquiries about the cosmos [here follows a list of the titles and first lines of the treatises in Ennead 3]:

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§25. These three enneads were put together and organized in one volume. We included *On Our Allotted Daemon* in the third ennead because it deals with matters concerning daemon in general, and the question is related to those he addresses concerning the birth of human beings. Similarly with *On Love*. *On Eternity and Time* we included here because time is a topic discussed here. *On Nature, Contemplation, and the One* is put here because of its treatment of ‘nature’, indicated by its title.

The fourth ennead follows the works on the cosmos with writings on the soul. It contains the following [Here follows a list of the titles and first lines of *Ennead 4*]:

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So the fourth ennead contains all these topics, which concern the soul itself. The fifth contains those dealing with the intellect, and includes all those books which deal with what lies beyond, with the intellect in the soul, and with the ideas. They are the following [here follows a list of the titles and first lines of *Ennead 5*]:

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§26. We put the fourth and fifth enneads together as a single volume. The final, sixth, ennead makes another volume, so that Plotinus’ works amount to three volumes, of which the first contains three enneads, the second two, the third one.

The contents of the third volume, which is the sixth ennead, are the following [here follows a list of the titles and first lines of *Ennead 6*]:

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This, then, is how we disposed Plotinus’ 54 books in six enneads. We set down notes for some of them – not systematically, but just as and when friends asked for something written down to help them understand a point.

We also wrote key-point summaries of all of the books (except *On Beauty*, which we did not possess), based on the chronological order of their publication. But it is not only the substantive points of each book that are included in this, but their lines of argument too, which are numbered in the same way as the summaries.

But now it is our task to go through each of the books with an eye to establishing punctuation and correcting any mistakes there might be in the language. The work itself will show what has been done.
Ennead One
I.1 (53)

What Is the Living Being
and What Is the Human Being?

Introduction

In this very late treatise, Plotinus considers the relation between the person or self and the human being, composed of body and soul. He is, as always, trying to follow Plato as he understands him but also, especially here, to draw on Peripatetic insights. Plotinus will identify the true self with the immortal, undescended intellect and the embodied subject of psychical activities as its image. This distinction between immortal and mortal kinds of soul, drawn from Timaeus, will provide the basis for his explanation of punishment and moral responsibility: it is only the embodied self that can be held responsible.

This treatise is placed first by Porphyry since in a way the entire structure of Plotinus’ philosophy begins with our personal reflections on identity.

Summary

§1. What is the subject of embodied states and activities?
§2. What is the soul? Is it itself a composite or is it form?
§3. The various ways in which the soul has been conceived of as related to the body.
§4. The soul imparts life to the body without being mixed with it.
§5. How can the states of the body be transmitted to the soul?
§6. In what sense is the soul actively involved with the body and in what sense is it impassive?
§7. It is not the soul itself that endows the body with life, but its activity.
§8. Relation of the embodied soul to Intellect.
§9. Vice is attributed to the living being, not to the soul itself.
§10. The ambiguity of ‘we’ between embodied and disembodied self.
§11. The psychical status of children and animals.
§12. Moral responsibility belongs only to the embodied self, the image of the true self.
§13. In Again, the ambiguity in the reference to the subject of intellectual activity.
What Is the Living Being and What Is the Human Being?

§ 1.1.1. Pleasures and pains, feelings of fear and boldness, appetites and aversions and feelings of distress – to what do these belong?¹

In fact, they belong either to the soul or to a soul using a body² or to some third thing that arises from a combination of these. And this can be understood in two ways: either as a mixture or as something different that arises from the mixture. It is the same for what arises from these states, namely, actions and beliefs. So, then, we must investigate discursive thinking and belief to determine whether they belong to that to which the states belong or whether some of them are like this and some are not. And we should also reflect on how acts of intellection occur and to what they belong, and indeed what is the thing which is itself considering the investigation of these questions and making the judgement. But before that, we should ask: what is the subject of sense-perception? It is appropriate to begin from there, since the [above] states are either acts of sense-perception or else they do not occur without sense-perception.³

§ 1.1.2. First, we need to understand if it is the case that soul is one thing and the essence of soul another.⁴ For if this is so, soul will be something composite, and there will at once be nothing absurd in its being the subject, I mean, of these kinds of states and, in general, of better and worse habits and dispositions, that is, assuming the argument will turn out this way.

In fact, however, if soul and the essence of soul are identical, soul would be a certain form incapable of being subject of all these activities that it imparts to something else, but would have the activity that is natural to itself in itself, whatever the argument reveals this to be. In this case, it will be true to say that the soul is immortal, if indeed

¹ See Pl., Rep. 429C D; 430A B; Phd. 83B; Tim. 69D; Lg. 897A; Ar., DA 1.4.408b1 29.
² See Plato [?], Alc. 1.129E.
³ See Pl., Tim. 61C8 D2.
⁴ See Ar., Meta. 7.6.1037a17 b3, 8.3.1042b2 3.
that which is immortal and indestructible must be incapable of being affected. It would somehow give what belongs to itself to another while receiving nothing from anything else – or only so much as is present in the things prior to itself, things from which it is not cut off, since they are superior to it.

Now what would something of this sort fear, since it is not subject to anything outside it? So, that which is afraid is that which is capable of being affected. So, it does not feel courageous either, for how can courage belong to those things to which what is fearful cannot be present? And how can it have appetites, which are satisfied by means of the emptied body being filled up, since that which is emptied and filled up is different from it?

And how could soul be the product of a mixture?

In fact, its essential nature is unmixed. How could other things be introduced into it? If this were to occur, it would be on the way to not being what it is. Being distressed is even more remote from it. For how can something be pained except in regard to something? But that which is simple in substantiality is self-sufficient inasmuch as it is stable in its own substantiality. And will it be pleased if something is added to it when there is nothing, not even any good, that can augment it? For what it is, it is always.

Further, it will perceive nothing nor will there be discursive thinking or belief in it. For sense-perception is taking on a form or also a corporeal state, and discursive thinking and belief supervene on sense-perception.

Regarding intellection, if we are going to understand this as being in soul, we should examine how this happens; and regarding pleasure, I mean pure pleasure, whether it has this when it is by itself.

§ 1.1.3. But as for the soul that is in the body, we should also examine whether it exists prior to this or [only] in this, since it is from the combination of body and soul that ‘the entire living being is named’.

If, then, on the one hand, it uses the body as an instrument, it does not have to be the subject of states that come through the body, just as craftsmen are not the subjects of the states of their instruments.

5 See Ar., DA 3.4.4129a15 on the impassivity of soul; 430a23 on its immortality; and 2.2.413b26 on the indestructibility of intellect which Aristotle variously treats as a ‘part of soul’ and a ‘genus different from soul’.

6 Referring to Intellect and to the One.

7 See Pl., Phil. 59C4. The soul is unmixed like the Forms.

8 See Ar., DA 2.12.424a18.

9 See Pl., Phil. 52C, 63E3.

10 See Pl., Phdr. 246C5.

11 Cf. 1.4.16.22 28, 4.3.23.8 9; 4.7.1.20 24. See Pl. [?], Alc. 1 129C5 130A1; Phd. 79C3; Tht. 184D4.

12 See Ar., EE 7.9.1241b18 23.
On the other hand, perhaps it would necessarily be a subject of sense-perception, if indeed it must use this instrument for cognizing the states arising from sense-perception of what is external. Seeing is, after all, the use of the eyes. But there are injuries associated with seeing, so that there are also pains and distress, as is generally the case for everything that happens to the body. So, too, there are appetites in the soul seeking care for this instrument.

But how will the states go from the body into the soul? For though body will transfer its own states to another body, how will body transfer anything to the soul? For this would be equivalent in a way to saying that when one thing experiences something, another thing experiences it. For so long as what uses the instrument is one thing and the instrument it uses is something else, each is separate. At least, anyone who posits the soul as using the body separates them.

But prior to their separation by the practice of philosophy, how were they disposed?

In fact, they were mixed. But if they were mixed, it was either like a blend or like an ‘interweaving’, or like a form not separated from the body; or the form controlled the body like the pilot of a ship; or one part of it was one way and another part the other. I mean that one part was separated – the part that uses the body – and the other was somehow mixed with it, that is, it belongs among the ordered parts of that which is used. Thus, what philosophy would do is to turn this part towards the part that uses the body, and to divert the part that uses the body – to the extent that its presence is not entirely necessary – away from what it uses, so that it does not always use it.

§1.1.4. So, let us suppose that they have been mixed. But if they have been mixed, the inferior element, the body, will be made better, and the superior element, the soul, will be made worse. The body will be made better by participating in life, and the soul will be made worse by participating in death and non-rationality. Indeed, how could that which has to any extent been deprived of life acquire the added power of sense-perception? On the contrary, the body, by receiving life, would be what is participating in sense-perception and the states that arise from sense-perception. So, it is the body that will desire – for this is what will enjoy the objects of its desires – and fear for itself. For it is this that will fail to acquire pleasures and will be destroyed.

We should also investigate the way the mixture occurs to see if it is perhaps impossible, as it would be if someone said that a line was mixed

with white, that is, one nature mixed with another of a different sort.\textsuperscript{17} The concept of ‘interweaving’\textsuperscript{18} does not imply that the things interwoven are affected in the same way. It is possible for that which is interwoven to be unaffected, that is, for the soul to pass through and not have the states of the body, just like light, especially if it is in this way woven through the whole. It will not, then, have the states of the body just because it is interwoven.\textsuperscript{19}

But will it be in the body in the way that a form is in matter?\textsuperscript{20} If so, then first, it will be like a form that is separable, if it is indeed a substance, and even more so if it is that which uses the body. But if we assume it to be like the shape of an axe that is imposed on the iron, and the complex that the axe is will do what iron so shaped will do, because of its shape, we would in that case be even more inclined to attribute to the body such states as are common – common, that is, to this sort of body – to the ‘natural instrumental body having life potentially’.\textsuperscript{21} For Aristotle says that it is absurd to claim that ‘the soul is doing the weaving’\textsuperscript{22} so that it is also absurd to claim that it has appetites and is in pain; these belong rather to the living being.

§1.1.5. What we should say is that the living being is either a certain kind of body or the conjunction of body and soul, or some other third thing that arises from both of these.\textsuperscript{23} But whatever is the case, either one must preserve the soul’s unaffected state while it is the cause of the other part of the conjunction being affected, or else it must be affected along with the body. And in the latter case, its affection is identical to the body’s or it is affected in a manner that is somehow the same – for example, if the living being’s appetites are other than the acting or being affected of the faculty of appetite of the soul. The body that is of this kind should be examined later.\textsuperscript{24}

But how, for example, is the complex able to feel pain?\textsuperscript{25} Is it because the body is disposed in this way and the state penetrates up to sense-perception, which has its culmination in the soul? But it is not yet clear how sense-perception works. And whenever the pain takes its origin in a belief or judgement of some evil being present either to oneself or to something one cares about, is there then a painful change in the body

\textsuperscript{17} See Ar., \textit{GC} 1.7.323b25 27.\textsuperscript{18} Cf. \textit{supra} 3.19.\textsuperscript{19} Cf. 4.3.22.1 7. See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 36E.\textsuperscript{20} See Ar., \textit{DA} 2.1.412b10 13.\textsuperscript{21} See Ar., \textit{DA} 2.1.412a27 28.\textsuperscript{22} See Ar., \textit{DA} 1.4.408b12 13.\textsuperscript{23} The term τὸ κοινόν (literally ‘that which is common’; here ‘conjunction’) is probably synonymous with the term τὸ συναμφότερον (‘the complex’) used in the following lines. Cf. \textit{infra} 11.1 where the term τὸ σύνθετον (‘the composite’) is used.\textsuperscript{24} See \textit{infra} 7.\textsuperscript{25} See Pl. [?], \textit{Alc.} 1 130A9; \textit{Phil.} 33D 34A; \textit{Tim.} 43C, 45D.
and, generally, in the entire living being? But it is also not yet clear what is the subject of belief, the soul or the complex.

Next, the belief about some evil does not include the state of pain. For it is possible that when the belief is present, the feeling of pain is completely absent; or, again, it is possible for the feeling of anger not to be present when the belief that we have been slighted is present; or, again, for a belief about what is good not to move one’s desire. How, then, are states common to body and soul?

In fact, it is the case that appetite belongs to the soul’s faculty of appetite, and spiritedness belongs to the soul’s faculty of spiritedness, and, generally, the inclination towards something belongs to the soul’s faculty of desire. In this way, though, they will no longer be common, but belong to the soul alone. But, in fact, they belong to the body as well, because blood and bile must boil, and somehow the body must be disposed to move desire in the direction of, for example, sexual objects.

Let us agree that the desire for the Good is not a common state but belongs to the soul [alone], as is the case with some other states – no account will attribute all of these to both in common. But the human being who has the appetite will be the one having the desire for sexual objects, though in another way it will be soul’s faculty of appetite that has the appetite. How? Will the human being initiate the appetite and will the faculty of appetite follow after? But, in general, how could a human being have an appetite when the appetitive faculty has not been moved? In that case, it will be the faculty of appetite that initiates it. But where will it start from if the body is not first disposed in this way?

§ 1.1.6. Perhaps it is better to say generally that it is due to the presence of powers that things that have these act according to them, while these powers are themselves immobile, providing to the things that have them the ability to act. But if this is so, when the living being is affected, the cause that endows the complex with life is itself unaffected by the states and activities that belong to that which has them. But if this is so, living will in every way belong not to the soul, but to the complex.

In fact, the life of the complex will not be that of the soul. And the power of sense-perception will not perceive, but rather that which has the power. But if sense-perception is a motion through

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26 See SVF 3.459 (= Plutarch, De virt. mor. 3). 27 See Ar., DA 2.3.414b2.
28 Cf. 4.4.20.
29 Among the ‘powers’ or ‘faculties’ meant are: τὸ ὑπάρχον (‘growth’), τὸ ὀποιοτέρον (‘perceptual’), τὸ ὀριστικόν (‘desiderative’), τὸ κινητικόν κατά τόπον (locomoitive’), and τὸ διανοητικόν (‘discursive thinking’). See Ar., DA 2.3.414a31 32.
30 See Alex. Aphr., De an. 23.18 24.
the body having its culmination in the soul,\(^{31}\) how will the soul not perceive?

In fact, when the power of sense-perception is present, it is by its presence that the complex perceives what it perceives. If, though, the power will not be moved, how will the complex still perceive when neither the soul nor the psychical power are counted together with it?

§1.1.7. In fact, assume that it is the complex that perceives, due to the presence of the soul, which is not the sort of thing that can make itself a part of the complex or of the other part,\(^{32}\) but which can make something else from a body of this type and a kind of light emitted from itself, namely, a different nature, that of the living being, to which sense-perception and other states proper to a living being are said to belong.\(^{33}\)

But then how is it that we perceive?

In fact, it is because we are not released from such a living being, even if other things more honourable than us are present in the complete substantiality of the human being, which is made of many parts. But the soul’s power of sense-perception should not be understood as being of sensibles, but rather of the impressions that arise from sense-perception and which are graspable by the living being. For these are already intelligible. So, sense-perception of externals is a reflection of this [grasp of impressions], whereas this [grasp of impressions] is truer in substantiality, since it contemplates only forms, without being affected. Actually, from these Forms,\(^{34}\) from which soul alone has already received its leadership over the living being, come thoughts, beliefs, and acts of intellection. And here indeed is where we are.\(^{35}\) The things that are prior to these acts are ours,\(^{36}\) while we ourselves, controlling the living being are, actually, located here and higher up. But there is nothing against calling the whole a ‘living being’, with the lower parts being mixed in, although the true human being begins about there [with thought]. Those lower parts are the ‘lion-like’ and, generally, the ‘multi-faceted beast’.\(^{37}\) Given that the human being coincides with the rational soul, whenever human beings engage in calculative reasoning, it is we who are reasoning because the results of these acts of reasoning belong to the soul.

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\(^{31}\) See Pl., Phil. 34A4 5; Tim. 43C4 7, 45D1 2. \(^{32}\) I.e., the body.

\(^{33}\) This is Plotinus’ position, explained at length in 4.4.18. The ‘light’ refers to the psychical powers of the living being.

\(^{34}\) Here Plotinus is taking the Aristotelian doctrine of cognition of forms without matter and combining it with the Platonic doctrine of Forms, the true paradigms of the forms in and apart from matter.

\(^{35}\) Cf. 4.4.18.11 15. \(^{36}\) Prior in time. Sense perception precedes higher thought.

§1.1.8. But how are we related to the Intellect? By ‘Intellect’ I do not mean that condition that the soul derives from the entities\(^{38}\) that accompany the Intellect, but the Intellect itself.

In fact, we have this even though it transcends us. But we have it either collectively or individually, or both collectively and individually.\(^{39}\) We have it collectively, because it is indivisible and one, that is, everywhere identical; we have it individually, because each one of us has the whole of it in the primary part of the soul.\(^{40}\) We have the Forms, then, in two ways: in the soul, in a way, unfolded and separated, but in Intellect ‘all together’:\(^{41}\)

But how are we related to god?\(^{42}\)

In fact, it is ‘astride the intelligible nature’,\(^{43}\) that is, over real Substantiality,\(^{44}\) whereas we are in third place, being made, Plato says, from the ‘indivisible Substantiality’, which is above us, and from the ‘divisible substantiality found in bodies’:\(^{45}\) We should actually think of [souls] as divided within bodies because soul gives itself to corporeal magnitudes, however large each living being may be, even as, being one, it gives itself to the whole universe; or else because it is imagined to be present to bodies as shining on them, and makes living beings not out of itself and body, but, while remaining in itself, by giving off reflections of itself, like a face in a multiplicity of mirrors.

The first reflection is sense-perception, which is in the composite. Next after this is what is said to be ‘another type of soul’,\(^{46}\) each always coming from the previous one. It ends in the generative and growth faculties or, generally, in what produces and is perfective of something other than what productive soul makes, given that productive soul is directed to its own product.\(^{47}\)

§1.1.9. So, the nature of that soul of ours will be released from being responsible for the evils that a human being does and suffers. These belong to the living being, the composite, that is, composite in the manner stated.\(^{48}\) But if belief and discursive thinking belong to the

\(^{38}\) Perhaps a reference to our undescended intellects. Cf. 3.4.3.24; 4.3.5.6, 12.3 4; 4.8.1. 1 11, 3.9 10, 8.1 3; 5.3.3.23 29; 6.7.5.26 29, 17.26 27; 6.8.6.41 43.

\(^{39}\) Cf. 5.3.3.26 29. 40 I.e., our embodied intellects.

\(^{40}\) See Anaxagoras, fr. B 1 DK.

\(^{41}\) Here ‘god’ refers to the One or Good; elsewhere, ‘god’ refers to Intellect. The One is ‘above οὐσία’ See Pl., Rep. 509B8.

\(^{42}\) See Pl., Tim. 35A1 3.

\(^{43}\) See Numenius, fr. 2 Des Places. 44 See Pl., Soph. 248A11.

\(^{44}\) These are the mortal parts of the soul, the spirited and appetitive faculties, housed in the chest and belly. See Pl., Tim. 69C7.

\(^{45}\) The ultimate product that does not produce is matter. 48 Cf. supra 1.5 7.
soul, how is it inerrant? For belief can be false, and many evils are committed on the basis of false belief.

In fact, evils are done when we are overcome by what is inferior in us – for we are many – either appetite or spiritedness or an evil mental image.

That which is called ‘thinking of falsities’ is imagination that has not waited for the judgement of the faculty of discursive thinking. But in that case, we acted under the persuasive influence of something inferior. It is just as in the case of sense-perception, when we see falsely by our common faculty of sense-perception before the discursive faculty makes a judgement. But the intellect has either been in contact with its object or not, so that it is inerrant.

In fact, we should say that we are, in this way, either in contact with the intelligible which is in Intellect or we are not. Actually, we are in contact with the intelligible in us. For it is possible to have it, but not to have it at hand.

We have indeed distinguished what belongs to the composite and what are properties of soul; what belongs to the composite are the things that are corporeal or do not exist without a body, whereas what does not need a body for its activity is a property of soul. Discursive thinking, when it makes a judgement on the impressions that come from sense-perception, is at that moment contemplating forms, that is, contemplating them with a sort of self-awareness; this is, at any rate, principally the case for the discursive thinking of the true soul. For true discursive thinking is an actualization of acts of intellection, and there is often a sameness or commonality between things external and internal. The soul, then, will be no less quiet and turned inward, that is, to itself. The changes and the tumult in us coming from the things that are entangled with us – from the states of the composite, whatever exactly that is – are as we have said.

§ 1.1.10. But if we are the soul, and we have these experiences, the soul would have them and, again, it will do what we do.

In fact, we said that the composite belongs to us, especially when we are not yet separated from it, since we say that we experience the states of our bodies. The term ‘we’, then, is used in two ways, referring either to that which includes the beast or to that which is at the same time

49 See Pl., Lg. 626E2 627A2.

50 See Ar., DA 2.6.418a7 20 with 3.3.428b19 20 where the common faculty of sense perception is more open to error than is sense perception of proper sensibles.

51 See Pl., Rep. 477E6; Ar., DA 3.6.430a26 28; Meta. 9.10.1051b17 33.

52 See Pl., Tht. 198D5 8. See Ar., DA 1.1.403a4.

53 Cf. supra 1.7; Pl., Phd. 66D6; Tim. 43B6 where the ‘tumult’ is due to embodiment.
above this. The beast is the body that has been vivified. But the true human being is other, purified of these corporeal states and possessing the virtues that are found in the activity of thinking that is actually situated in the separated soul, 55 separate and separable even when it is in the sensible world. 56 For whenever it removes itself completely, the inferior part of the soul that receives its illumination goes away, too, following after it. But the virtues that do not belong to thought apply to the custom and training of the composite. 57 For the vices belong to this, since occasions of envy and jealousy and compassion do so, too. What do occasions of love belong to?

In fact, some belong to the composite, and some belong to the 'interior human being'. 58

§ 1.1.11. When we are children, the faculties of the composite are active; there is little illumination of it from the things above. Whenever they are inactive in us, they are acting in relation to that which is above. But they act in us whenever they reach what is in the middle. 59

What, then? Is not the ‘we’ prior to this middle ground, too? 60 Yes, but there has to occur an apprehension of what is prior. For we do not always use that which we have, but we only do so when we arrange the middle, either in relation to that which is above or in relation to the opposite of this, or in relation to such potencies or dispositions we take steps to actualize.

But how do beasts have animality? 61

In fact, if the souls in them are, as it is said, 62 human souls which have erred, the separable 63 part of the soul does not belong to the beasts. It is there, but it is not there for them. Rather, what they have self-awareness of is the reflection of the soul that goes with the body. Actually, such a body has been in a way made by a reflection of soul. On the other hand, if the soul of a human being has not entered it, it becomes the kind of living being it is due to the illumination coming from the soul of the cosmos. 64

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55 These are the purificatory virtues. Cf. 1.2.3 6.
56 Cf. infra 11.2 8; 2.9.7.4 10; 4.3.12.3 8.
58 Cf. 5.1.10.10. See Pl., Rep. 589A7 B1.
59 Referring to the faculties of embodied cognition. Cf. 5.3.3.32 46.
60 Cf. supra 7.9 18; 4.8.8.9 11; 5.3.3.32 46.
61 The term is τὸ ζῷον which is usually translated ‘animal’ or ‘living being’. Here, the sense seems to be the generic property of ‘animality’.
62 See Pl., Pbd. 81E2 82b7; Pbdtr. 249B3 5; Rep. 618A3, 620A2 D5; Tim. 42C1 D8.
63 The word is χωριστῶν which may also mean ‘separate’. In that case, Plotinus is referring to the undescended intellect.
64 Cf. 4.7.14.1 5.
§1.1.12. But if the soul is inerrant, how can there be punishments for it? Yet this line of reasoning is inconsistent with every argument that says that the soul errs or acts correctly and undergoes punishments, both in Hades and via reincarnation. One ought to associate oneself with whichever line of reasoning one wishes – but perhaps we can discover a way in which they do not conflict.

The line of reasoning that makes the soul inerrant assumes that it is one and totally simple, claiming that soul and the essence of soul are identical. The one that allows that the soul can err interweaves and adds to it another form of soul which is in these terrible states. The soul, then, is a composite of all these things and is actually affected as a whole, and it is the composite that errs; and it is this which undergoes punishment, not the other. Hence, Plato says, ‘we have gazed upon soul like those who have seen the sea-god Glaucus’. But if someone really wants to see its nature, he says, he must ‘knock off the accretions’ and look at ‘its philosophy’ to see ‘what it adheres to’ and ‘what it owes its kinship to’ such that it is the sort of thing it is. The life and other activities of the soul, then, are one thing; what is punished another.

The withdrawal and separation of the soul is not only from this body, but also from its accretions. For the accretion occurs during generation. In fact, generation belongs to another form of soul entirely. How the generation takes place has already been explained. It is because of the soul’s descent, when something else arises from it due to its declination. Does it, then, abandon its [embodied] reflection? And how is the declination itself not a moral error? For if the declination is an illumination of what is below, it is not a moral error, any more than what remains in shadow is. What is illuminated is responsible; for if that did not exist, the soul would not have anything to illuminate.

To descend or to decline, then, means that what is illuminated by it is so because it shares its life with it. The soul, then, abandons its reflection if there is nothing nearby to receive it. But it abandons it not by being cut off, but because the reflection no longer exists. And it no longer exists if the whole soul is looking to the intelligible world. The poet seems to be separating the reflection in the case of Heracles when he puts it in Hades, but places Heracles himself among the gods. Maintaining both stories, namely, that Heracles was among the gods

65 Cf. supra 2.1 2. 66 See Pl., Tim. 69C7 D1. 67 See Pl., Rep. 611B5.
69 See Pl., Rep. 611E1 612A4. 70 Possibly a reference to 4.8 or to 6.4.16.
71 A reference to matter. 72 This is the ‘vivified body’ at 1.1.10.6 7.
73 See Homer, Od. 11.601 602.
and that he was in Hades, he then divided him. Perhaps the account would be plausible if the idea is actually that Heracles had practical virtue and was thought worthy of being a god due to that excellence, but because his virtue was practical and not theoretical – in which case he would have been entirely in the intelligible world – he is above, though a part of him is also still below.

§1.1.13. That which has investigated these matters: is it we or the soul? In fact, it is ‘we’, but by means of the soul. How have we done this by means of the soul? Is it by having that which was being investigated, namely, soul?

In fact, it is insofar as we are soul. Is it, then, in motion?

In fact, we should attribute to it the sort of motion that is not corporeal but belongs to its life. And intellection is like this for us, because the soul is intellectual, and intellection is its better life – when the soul thinks, or when intellect is active in us. For this is also a part of us, and it is to this that we ascend.

74 See Pl., Lg. 897D3 on ‘intellectual motion’ (κίνησις νου).
1.2 (19)

On Virtues

INTRODUCTION

This treatise springs from a commentary on Plato’s *Theaetetus* 176A, in which Socrates urges his interlocutors to escape from this realm and, by cultivating virtue, to assimilate oneself to the divine. Reflecting on this passage leads Plotinus to an account of grades of virtue, especially a distinction between the practical and the theoretical, and an argument that the latter is in an important sense higher than the former. Although this fact could be taken to suggest the unimportance of practical ethics for Platonists, Plotinus takes pains to show that the possession of the higher virtues entails the possession of the lower, even if the practice of the lower is not an end in itself.

SUMMARY

§1. How can the practice of virtue bring about assimilation to the divine when the gods themselves do not practise virtue?
§2. Discussion of different senses of ‘being likenesses of’.
§3. Virtues as purifications.
§4. The results of purification.
§5. The effects of purification on the soul.
§6. Purification and assimilation.
§7. Whether the higher and lower virtues imply each other.
§1.2.1. Since evils exist in the sensible world and ‘of necessity circulate in this place’,1 and the soul wants to flee evils, it should flee from the sensible world. What, then, is this flight? Plato says that it is assimilating oneself to god. And this would occur if we were to become ‘just and pious with wisdom’2 that is, generally, if we were in a virtuous state. If, then, it is by virtue that we are assimilated to god, are we assimilated to one who has virtue? Moreover, to which god will it be? Would it be, then, to one who seemed to have these virtues more, that is, to the soul of the cosmos, and to that part of it which governs, in which there exists a marvellous wisdom?3 For it is reasonable that, because we live in the sensible world, we should assimilate ourselves to this god.

First, however, it is questionable if all the virtues exist in this god, for example, whether it has self-control or4 courage as one to whom there is nothing fearful.5 For there is nothing outside it. Nor could something pleasurable which it does not already have present itself as an object of appetite for it to have or want to have. But if it is in a state of desiring the intelligibles which our souls desire, too, it is also clear that the cosmos and the virtues in us come from the intelligible world.

Is it the case, then, that the divine has these virtues?

In fact, it is not reasonable that it should have the civic virtues,6 I mean, wisdom in the faculty of calculative reasoning, courage in the spirited faculty, self-control in the agreement or concord of the spirited faculty with the faculty of calculative reasoning, and justice consisting in each faculty of the soul doing its own job of ruling and being ruled.7 If this is so, then it is not according to the civic virtues that we are

1 See Pl., Tht. 176A5 B3; Ar., EN 10.7.1177b33, 8.1179b27.
2 See Pl., Tht. 176B2 3.
3 Τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν (‘the governing or leading part of the soul’) is the Stoic term. See SVF 1.529 (= Sext. Emp., M. 9.8).
4 Inserting ἢ between σωφρονί and ἀνδρεῖο with Kirchhoff.
5 See Ar., EN 10.8.1178b10 23.
assimilated, is it, but rather according to those which are greater though they bear the identical name?

But if it is according to other virtues, is the assimilation not according to the civic virtues at all?

In fact, it would be irrational to maintain that we are not in any way assimilated according to these – legend at least has it that those who practised these are divine, too, and should be said somehow or other to be assimilated according to them – but that the actual assimilation is according to the greater virtues. At least, it follows either way that god possesses virtues even if not these. If, then, someone concedes that, even if god does not have these, it is possible to assimilate oneself to god, and we are in different states with regard to different virtues, nothing prevents us, even if we are not assimilated with regard to virtues, from assimilating by our virtues to that which does not possess virtue. How? In this way.

If something becomes hot by the presence of heat, is it also necessary that that from which the heat comes be heated? And if something is hot by the presence of fire, is it necessary that the fire itself should be heated by the presence of fire? In regard to the first point, one might say that in the fire there is heat, though it is intrinsic. The consequence of this, if the analogy holds, is that virtue has to be added to the soul but is intrinsic to that which the soul imitates. In regard to the point about fire, one might reply that then the divine just is virtue. We, though, judge it to be greater than virtue. But if that in which the soul participates were identical with that from which it comes, it should have been expressed in that way. Now, though, we are saying that the divine is one thing and virtue another. For the sensible house is not identical with the intelligible house, even though it is made to be like it. And the sensible house participates in order and arrangement, whereas in the intelligible world, in the house’s expressed principle, there is not order or arrangement or symmetry. In the same way, then, we participate in order and arrangement and consonance coming from the intelligible world, and these, when in the sensible world, are virtue; but Beings in the intelligible world do not themselves need consonance or order or arrangement, so that they also have no need for virtue. Nonetheless, we are assimilated to the things in the intelligible world because of the presence in us of virtue.

So much for the fact that there is no need for virtue in the intelligible world even if we are made to be assimilated by virtue. But one should add persuasion to the argument and not rely on its force alone.

8 See Alcinous, Didask. 181.44 45.
9 The ὁμοίωσις (‘assimilation’) comes from the verb ὁμοιόωσθαι (‘to be made like’).
§ 1.2.2. So, first, we need to grasp the virtues according to which we claim to be assimilated in order that, again, we may discover the very thing whose imitation in us is virtue, but which in the intelligible world is a sort of archetype and not virtue. This will show how there are two types of assimilation: the first requires that there be something identical in the things that are the same, such that their sameness derived equally from that which is identical. But in cases where one thing is assimilated to another, but that other is primary, the relationship is not reciprocated, and the primary thing is not said to be the same as the other. In this case, the assimilation should be taken in another sense, not requiring the identical form, but rather a different one in each case, if indeed it is assimilated in this other sense.

What, then, is virtue exactly – universally and in particular? The argument will be clearer if we consider each particular virtue, for in this way what is common to them, that according to which they are virtues, will easily be made evident.

So, the civic virtues, which we have spoken of above, do really give order to us and make us better; they limit and give measure to our appetites and, generally, give measure to our affective states and remove our false beliefs by means of that which is generally better and by imposing limits on us and by the fact that that which is measured is placed outside the things that are unmeasured and unlimited. And these virtues, which are themselves limited insofar as they are measures in ‘matter’, that is, soul, are assimilated to the measure that is in the intelligible world and they have a trace of the best that is there. For matter, being in every way unmeasured, is unassimilated to everything. But insofar as it participates in form, to that extent is it assimilated to that formless reality [the Good]. Things that are closer participate more. Soul is nearer than body, and more closely related. Due to this, it participates more, so that, having appeared to us as a god, it deceives us into thinking that it is the entirety of god. Those, then, who are virtuous in this way are assimilated to god.

§ 1.2.3. But since Plato reveals the other type of assimilation as belonging to a greater virtue, we should speak about that. In this account, the substantiality of civic virtue will also be made even clearer, as well as the substantiality of the greater virtue, and, generally, the fact that there is a type of virtue different from the civic. Given that Plato is indeed saying that assimilation to god is a flight from the sensible world, and does

10 On virtues as measures see Pl., Prot. 356D1 357B3; Sts. 284A8 E8; Soph. 228C1 D4; Phil. 64D9 E7.
11 Cf. 5.5.6.4 5; 6.7.32.9; 6.9.3.43 44 on the Good as ἀννεῖδεος (‘formless’).
12 See Pl., Tht. 176C4 D1; Lg. 716D1 E3.
13 See Pl., Tht. 176B1 8.
not name the virtues of civic life unqualifiedly ‘virtue’ but adds the qualification ‘civic’, and given that elsewhere he says that all the virtues are purifications, it is clear that he maintains that there are two sorts of virtue, and does not think that assimilation is according to civic virtue. In what sense, then, should we say that virtues are purifications, and, once we are purified, in what sense are we assimilated to the highest degree?

In fact, since the soul is evil when it is enmeshed in the body, and has come to experience the same things as it, and has come to believe the same things, it would be good, that is, it would have virtue if it were not to believe these things, but were to act alone – which is what thinking and being wise is – and not feel the same things as the body – which is what self-control is – and not fear being separated from the body – which is what it is to be courageous – and if reason or intellect were to lead it, with the appetites not opposing it – which is what justice would be. Indeed, as for such a disposition of the soul, one in which one thinks and is unaffected in this way, if someone were to say that it is a kind of assimilation to god, he would not be mistaken. For the divine is pure and this is its sort of activity, so that someone who imitates it has wisdom.

Why, then, is the divine not disposed in this way?

In fact, it does not have a disposition; disposition belongs to soul. And the soul thinks in one way, but, among the things in the intelligible world, one sort [Intellect] thinks in a different way, and the other [the One] does not think at all. But, again, we may ask if the word ‘thinking’ is equivocal? Not at all. But there is a primary type of thinking and one derived from it, which is different. For as a spoken word is an imitation of a word in the soul, so a word in the soul is an imitation of something in something different. As, then, that which is in an utterance is divided from that which is in the soul, so, too, is that which is in soul divided, being an interpretation of that which is prior to it. Virtue belongs to soul, not to Intellect nor to that which transcends it.

§ 1.2.4. We should, then, examine if the purification is identical with this sort of virtue, or if the purification comes first and then the virtue follows, that is, whether the virtue lies in the process of being purified or in the state one is in once one has been purified.

Virtue in the process of being purified would be less complete than in the state one is in once having been purified, for having been purified is in a way already a completion. But to have been purified is the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{14} Cf. 3.6.5.13 29. See Pl., Phd. 69C1, 82A11.}\]
elimination of something alien, whereas that which is good is different from this.

In fact, if the good were there prior to the impure state, then the purification would do the job; but if the purification will do the job, what remains will be that which is good, not the purification.

And what it is that remains should be examined. For perhaps the nature that remained would not be that which is good after all; for it would not have been there in the [unpurified] evil. Should we, then, say that this nature is Good-like? 

In fact, we should say that it was not up to staying in a truly good state, for it was naturally inclined to both good and evil. Its good, then, will be associating with what is akin to it, and its evil associating with the opposite. It will be associating, then, once it has been purified, but it will be doing so having turned itself around. Does it turn around after the purification, then?

In fact, after the purification it has already turned around. Is this, then, its virtue?

In fact, its virtue is what comes to it from turning around. What, then, is this? A seeing and an impression of that which has been seen embedded in it and now active – like seeing in relation to the object seen.

Did it, therefore, neither have them nor recollect them?

In fact, it had things that were not active, but dispersed and unilluminated. If they are to be illuminated and it is to know them as being present, it must impel itself towards that which does the illuminating. And it did not have the things themselves, but impressions. It must, then, harmonize the impressions with the true Beings of which they are impressions. And perhaps it is in this sense that this nature ‘has’ them, because the Intellect is not alien to it, especially not when it looks towards the Intellect. If this were not so, the Intellect would be alien even when it is present. For even areas of scientific understanding in which we are not wholly engaged are alien.

§1.2.5. But the extent of purification should be addressed. For in this way, it will be clear what the assimilation is to and with what god we are identified. And we should especially examine purification in regard to anger and appetite and the rest, pain and related feelings, and to what extent separation from the body is possible. Perhaps the soul actually collects itself in some sort of place apart from the body, where it is incapable of being affected, producing only those perceptions of

16 These are the intelligible objects of which the one purified is now aware.
pleasures that are inevitable, using them as treatments and relief from pain so that it should not be disturbed – eliminating pains, and, if that is not possible, bearing them easily and lessening them by not suffering alongside the body. It would also eliminate anger as much as possible and, if possible, entirely, but if not, at least not flaring up along with the body, but treating it as the involuntary act of something else, and reckoning what is involuntary to be small and weak. It eliminates fear altogether. For it will be fearful of nothing – though the involuntary is here, too – except when fear serves as a warning.

And what about appetite? Clearly, it will not be for anything base, and the soul itself will not have the appetite for food and drink needed for replenishment. Nor will it have appetite for sexual pleasures.\(^17\) If it does have appetite, it will be for natural things, I think, and will not be involuntary. But if it does have this, it will only have it to the extent of a spontaneous impression in the imagination, and no more.

In general, the soul will be pure of all these, and it will want to make the non-rational pure, too, so that it is not disturbed. But if it is, it will not be disturbed excessively; rather, its disturbances will be few, and immediately dislodged by the proximity of the [faculty of calculative reasoning]. It is just as if someone with a wise person living nearby should benefit from the proximity of wisdom, either becoming like him or being ashamed of daring to do something that the wise person would not want him to do. There will, then, be no conflict. For it is sufficient that reason is present, which the inferior element will so stand in awe of that the inferior element itself will be disgusted if the soul were to be moved at all because it did not remain still when the master was present, and will reproach itself for its own weakness.

§1.2.6. There is, then, no moral error in anything of this sort for a human being, but only [the occasion for] morally perfect acting.\(^18\) The focus is not on being exempt from moral error, but on being god. If, then, there were to remain anything involuntary in their actions, a human being in this state would be a god or a daemon by being double, or rather by having with himself someone else with another virtue. If he had nothing of this sort, he would be only a god, a god among those following the first god.\(^19\) For he himself is a god who came from the intelligible world, and what he is in himself, if he remains as he was when he came, is in the intelligible world. But as for the one with whom he dwells when he came here, he will assimilate this one to himself as much

\(^{17}\) See Pl., *Phdr.* 246E5.\(^6\)

\(^{18}\) See SVF 3.500 (= Stob., *Ed.* 93.14), 501 (= Stob., *Ed.* 96.18), 502 (= Stob., *Ed.* 97.5) on ἁμαρτία (‘moral error’) and κατόρθωσις (‘morally perfect acting’).

\(^{19}\) See Pl., *Phdr.* 246E5.\(^6\) The first god is Zeus.
as he is able so that, if possible, he is impervious or at least incapable of doing those things that do not seem right to the master.

What, then, are the particular virtues for such a person?

In fact, theoretical and practical wisdom consist in the contemplation of that which Intellect possesses, though Intellect has them by touching. Each of these is twofold: one is in Intellect, one in Soul. And in the intelligible world, there is no virtue; virtue is in the soul. What, then, is in the intelligible world? Its own activity, that is, what it really is. But in the sensible world, when what comes from the intelligible world is found in another, that is virtue. For neither Justice itself, nor any of the others, is a virtue, but rather a paradigm. That which comes from it in the soul is a virtue. For virtue is someone’s virtue. But that which is in itself belongs to itself, and not to something else.

But if justice is indeed taking care of one’s own affairs, is it always found in a multiplicity of parts?

In fact, the virtue is in a multiplicity when the parts are many, but taking care of one’s own business is wholly present even if there were to be a unity. Indeed, true Justice itself belongs to a self-related unity in which there are no parts. So, the justice in the soul that is greater is activity in relation to intellect, and the greater self-control is a turning inward towards intellect, and the greater courage is a lack of affection inasmuch as there is an assimilation of itself to the unaffected nature towards which it is looking. This assimilation comes from virtue, and ensures that the soul does not share affections with the inferior element with which it lives.

§1.2.7. The virtues themselves in the soul are, then, mutually implicating just as are their paradigms prior to virtue in Intellect. For intellect in the intelligible world is scientific understanding or theoretical wisdom, and being self-related is self-control, and taking care of one’s own affairs is one’s proper function, and courage is in a way the immaterial state of remaining pure in oneself. In soul, then, theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom in relation to Intellect are the act of seeing. These are virtues belonging to it, for it itself is not these virtues, as is the case in the intelligible world. And the others follow similarly.

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20 See Pl., Pbd. 79D6; Symp. 212A4; Tim. 37A6; Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b21.
22 On the Stoic doctrine of the mutual implication of the virtues, see SVF 3.295 (= D.L., 7.125), 299 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1046e).
23 The word ἀμμάτης (‘immaterial [state]’) is a hapax in Plotinus and is perhaps odd in this context, although it is the reading of all the mss. Porphyry, Sent. 32.29.6, reads ταυτότης (‘identical [state]’), presumably indicating the identity discussed in the previous section.
And as for purification, if indeed all the virtues are purifications, in the sense that they are states of having been purified, purification necessarily produces all of them; otherwise, none would be complete.

Whoever has the greater ones will have the lesser in potency, too, necessarily, though one who has the lesser will not necessarily have the greater. This is actually in a nutshell the life of the virtuous person. Whether he who has the greater has the lesser in actuality, too, or has them in another manner, should be investigated in each case. For example, consider practical wisdom. If it requires the use of other principles, how will it still be there when it is not active? And if one virtue by nature consists in being in a state to a certain extent and another to another extent, and one sort of self-control imposes measure on feelings, will the other type eliminate them entirely? But the identical question arises for the other virtues generally once it has been raised for practical wisdom.

Should we state, at least, that the virtuous person will know them and how much he will have of them? Perhaps he will act according to some of them if circumstances demand. But advancing on to the greater principles, and the other measures, he will act according to those. For example, he will not locate the act of self-control in imposing a measure, but in separating himself entirely as far as possible, absolutely not living the life of the good human being, which civic virtue values, but leaving this, and opting for another, the life of the gods. For assimilation is to the gods, not to good human beings. Assimilation to good human beings is making an image of an image, one from another. But the other assimilation is like making an image according to a paradigm.
INTRODUCTION

This treatise, following thematically on the previous one turns to the question of how philosophy is essential to the purification that consists in ascending from the lower to the higher virtues. Plotinus draws on Phaedrus and Symposium to shape his account of ascent, and Republic, Phaedrus, and Sophist for his understanding of the practice of dialectic. He explains the difference between dialectic and Aristotelian and Stoic formal logic.

SUMMARY

§1. What is the nature of ascent to the Good? Plato’s philosopher, musician, and lover. Two stages of ascent. The musician.
§2. The lover.
§3. The philosopher.
§4. The nature of Platonic dialectic.
§5. The principles of dialectic and its relation to logic.
§6. The relation of dialectic to natural philosophy and to ethics.
1.3 (20)

On Dialectic

§1.3.1. So, what craft or procedure or practice will lead us up to that place where we must journey? Where, then, we must arrive, that is, at the Good or the first principle, we can take it as agreed and shown by means of many arguments. Moreover, the means by which this was shown was a kind of ascent. What must the person be like who is to ascend? Must he not be at least, as Plato says, ‘one who has seen all or most Beings, who in his first birth as a human child will be a philosopher, a musician, or a lover’? The philosopher certainly ascends by his nature, while the musician and the lover must be led. What, then, is the manner of this ascent? Is it, then, one which is identical for all of these or is there a certain one for each?

The journey is really twofold for everyone, whether they are ascending or already arrived. For the first journey starts at things here below, whereas the second is for those who have already arrived in the intelligible world and have in a way made tracks there, but who must necessarily travel until they arrive at the furthest place, which is indeed ‘the end of the journey’, when someone would be at the pinnacle of the intelligible world. But let that wait. We should try to speak first about the ascent.

First, one must actually distinguish among these men, beginning by speaking about the nature of the musician. We should certainly posit him as someone easily moved and transported in the direction of that which is beautiful, but less able to be moved by Beauty itself. He is, though, ready to respond to what are in a way impressions of Beauty that he encounters, and just as the fearful are towards noises, so is he primed for sounds, that is, for the beauty in these, always fleeing the inharmonious and the absence of unity in melodies and in rhythms and pursuing good rhythm and musical form.

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1 See Ar., EN 1.1.1094a1. The ἀναγωγή (‘ascent’) here refers to the allegory of the cave in Rep. 517A5, 521C2, 533D2.

2 Cf. 5.9.1.1 21. See Pl., Phdr. 248D1 4.

3 See Pl., Rep. 532E3. The second journey refers to dialectic.
So, after hearing these sensible sounds and rhythms and patterns, he should ascend in the following way. Setting aside the matter from the proportions and expressed principles in the beauty which is present, he should ascend, or be instructed that the things to which he is transported are the intelligible harmony and the beauty which is in it and, generally, Beauty, not the beauty of some one thing alone; and he should have instilled in him philosophical arguments from which he should ascend to confidence that he possesses that of which he is ignorant. What these arguments are is for later.\(^4\)

§1.3.2. The lover – into whom the musician would be transformed and, having been transformed, either remains as such or continues on his journey – has some sort of memory of Beauty. Since Beauty is separate, he is unable to grasp it, though he is amazed by visible beauties and he is transported to them. He should be instructed, then, not to fall for one body and be transported by it, but he should be led on to all bodies by an argument showing that it is the identical beauty in all bodies, and that this beauty is different from the bodies, and that it should be said to come from elsewhere, and that there is more of it in other things, showing him, for example, beautiful practices and beautiful customs – for this is habituating him to find his beloved among incorporeals – and that beauty is in the crafts and in types of scientific understanding and in the virtues.\(^5\)

Next, these beauties should be reduced to one, and he should be taught how Beauty comes to be in all these things. And from virtues he should then ascend to Intellect, to Being. And there in the intelligible world, he should be made to journey upward.

§1.3.3. The philosopher is he who is ready by nature and who is in a way ‘winged’\(^6\) and is not in need of separation like these others. He has moved himself in the upward direction, and is only at a loss for someone to show him the way. He should be shown, then, and liberated since he is willing, having been by nature released for a long time. The mathematical studies should actually be given to him that will habituate him to having a grasp of and confidence in the incorporeal – for he will receive this easily given that he is a lover of learning.\(^7\) And as he is by nature virtuous, he should be led to the perfection of virtues, and after the mathematical studies, dialectical arguments should be given to him and he should be made into a complete dialectician.\(^8\)

§1.3.4. What is this dialectic that should also be given to those previously mentioned? It is actually the capacity to say what each thing is, and in what way it differs from other things, and what it has in common with them, and in what and where each of these is, and if it is what it is, and how many Beings there are and, again, how many non-Beings there are, different from Beings. Dialectic converses about what is good and not good, and such things as are classified under the good and such things as are classified under the opposite, and, clearly, about what is everlasting and what is not so. It does this by means of scientific understanding about everything, not belief. It ceases to wander in the sensible world and is ensconced in the intelligible world and there it has its business, letting go of falsehood and nourishing the soul in Plato’s ‘plain of truth’, using his method of division for discerning the Forms, and indeed using it to get at what each thing is, and using it also for the primary genera, and for those things that are woven from these by the use of intellect until it has gone through all of that which is intelligible, and picking up the analysis again, it arrives back at the starting point. Then, it remains still, in stillness to the extent that it is in the intelligible world, no longer busying itself with many things, but having become one [with its objects], it just looks.

It gives over the so-called logical technique regarding premises and syllogisms to another craft, just as it would leave knowing how to write. It thinks some crafts are necessary and come before this one, but it judges these as it does other things and it thinks some of them to be useful but others superfluous and belonging to a procedure which cares to occupy itself with these matters.

§1.3.5. But where does this scientific understanding get its principles from?

In fact, Intellect gives clear principles, if one had the ability to grasp them with the soul.

Next, the soul puts together and relates and distinguishes the things that follow until it arrives at the perfect [activity] of Intellect. For, Plato says, dialectic is ‘the purest part of the activity of intellect and wisdom’. Of necessity, then, since it is the most honourable of those of our intellectual habits which have to do with Being, which is the most honourable object, wisdom is concerned with Being and the intellect is concerned with that which transcends Being.
What, then? Is not philosophy the most honourable? Or is philosophy identical with dialectic? It is the more honourable part of philosophy. For indeed dialectic should not be thought to be a tool of philosophy. For it is not concerned with bare theorems and rules, but it is concerned with real things and, in a way, has Beings as its material. It approaches them methodically, having real things in view at the same time as it has the theorems. It recognizes accidentally falsehood and sophistry when someone else produces them, judging that which is false as alien to the truths in itself, and when someone adduces a falsity, it recognizes it as something contrary to the rule of truth. It does not, then, know a proposition – for it is just letters – but in knowing that which is true, it knows what they call a proposition, and knows in general the motions of the soul, what it affirms and what it denies, and if it affirms the very thing it denies or something else, and if things are different or identical. And it directs itself in a way analogous to the way in which sense-perception operates, though it gives over to another discipline the minute examination of the details it cares about.

§1.3.6. It is, then, the more honourable part of philosophy. For philosophy has other parts. It theorizes about nature, too, getting assistance from dialectic, just as the other crafts use arithmetic, though the philosophy of nature is provided with more from dialectic since it is nearer. And in the same way, moral philosophy theorizes with principles from the intelligible world, adding the habits and exercises from which the habits arise. The intellectual habits have dialectical principles as if these were their own properties from the start. These principles, however, come from the intelligible world even though the majority of the habits have a material basis. And while the other virtues involve calculative reasoning concerning particular states and actions, practical wisdom is a kind of meta-calculative reasoning, concerned more with the universal and whether things are mutually implied, and if one should hold back from acting either now or later, or whether something wholly different would be better. Dialectic and theoretical wisdom, moreover, provide all universal and immaterial considerations that are for use by practical wisdom.

Is it possible for the lower virtues to be present without dialectic and theoretical wisdom? Yes, but imperfectly and deficiently. Is it possible for someone to be wise and a dialectician without these virtues?

18 Perhaps Plotinus here has the contrasting Stoic view in mind. See SVF 2.49 (= Ammonius, In Ar. APr. 8.20).
19 See Ar., DA 3.7.431a1 2. 20 See Ar., APr. 1.24a16. 21 I.e., formal logic.
22 See Pl., Rep. 522c1 6. 23 See Ar., EN 2.7.1107a27 33.
Enneads 1.3.6

In fact, this would not happen, but they must have been there previously or they must grow up simultaneously. And perhaps someone could have natural virtues, from which the perfect ones arise when theoretical wisdom arises.\(^{24}\) Theoretical wisdom comes, then, after the natural virtues.

Next, the virtues of character become perfect. Or is it the case that both of them grow and are perfected at the same time when the natural virtues are present?

In fact, as one advances, it perfects the other. For, generally, natural virtue is imperfect both in vision and in character, and the principles from which we have natural virtue and wisdom are the most important thing for both.

\(^{24}\) See Ar., EN 2.1.1103a24.
On Happiness

I N T R O D U C T I O N

In this treatise, Plotinus draws upon Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean accounts of happiness to compare them with that of Plato. He draws on elements of the former in order to demonstrate that the best life for a human being is ascent to and immersion in the intelligible world. Happiness, as the Platonists understand it, is the result of the assimilation to the divine. At one level, Plotinus has an affinity to the Stoic view that virtue, properly understood, is sufficient for happiness. And yet the Stoics, owing to their materialism and their denial of the immortality of the soul, are in no position to justify their discounting of the travails of embodiment and so to defend the identity of the person with the intellect.

S U M M A R Y

§1. If Aristotle is right that the best life is the achievement of something’s function, then even non-rational animals and plants can be happy.

§2. The unsustainability of the Epicurean position that identifies happiness with the pleasant life. The Stoic position, that happiness is the rational life, is better, but not if rationality is understood as following nature.

§3. The happy life can only be the life of the Intellect in relation to the Good.

§4. The happy life is not only found in Intellect but it requires the recognition of our true identity with our intellects.

§5. Peripatetic objections to the Platonic position based on the role of externals in the happy life.
§6. Responses to the Peripatetics. Externals make no contribution to our happiness.
§7. Not even great personal misfortunes, whether our own or those of others close to us can detract from our happiness.
§8. Bodily pains do not detract from happiness.
§9. Do we need to be conscious to be happy?
§10. Primary intellectual activity is beyond mental representations.
§11. Externals do not increase happiness.
§12. The unique pleasure of the intellectual life.
§13. The happy person is impervious to fortune.
§14. The happiness we are talking about refers only to the real person, the intellect.
§15. The truly happy person is indifferent to the state of the embodied individual, although this does not require disregard for the body.
§16. The focus of the happy life is only the Good.
§1.4.1. If we suppose that living well and being happy are identical, will we in that case be endowing other living beings with these, too?1 For if it is natural for them to live their lives without impediment, what prevents us from saying that they also live well?2 Also, whether one supposes that living well is being in a good state or performing the function appropriate to oneself, both alternatives will apply to other living beings as well.3 For it would be possible to be in a good state or to perform one’s function by nature; for example, musically disposed animals, who are otherwise in a good state, certainly sing naturally, and have a life that is in this respect choice-worthy for them.

So, if we suppose that being happy is a certain goal,4 that is, the ultimate goal of natural desire,5 we would in that case be endowing with happiness those who achieve this ultimate goal, where, for those who arrive there, the nature within them rests having been present their entire life and having been fulfilled from beginning to end. Someone might disapprove of extending happiness to other living beings — for to do this is to endow with happiness even the basest living beings,6 and plants, too, since they are themselves alive, that is, they have a life that also unfolds in the direction of a goal.

But, first, will it not seem absurd for him to be saying that other living beings do not live well because they do not seem to be worth much to him? And one would not be forced to attribute to plants what one attributes to living beings in general, because they have no sense-perception.7 And then, one might include plants if indeed they are alive, too; there is life that is good and life that is the opposite, which in the case of plants is being in a good state or not, for example, bearing fruit or

1 See Ar., EN 1.8.1098b21; SVF 3.17 (= Michael of Ephesus, In EN 598.30–32).
2 See Ar., EN 7.14.1153b11. 3 See Ar., EN 2.5.1166a23; 10.7.1177a16–17.
4 See Ar., EN 10.6.1176a31 32; Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 152.17 22.
5 See SVF 3.65 (= Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 162.32 163.36).
6 See Sext. Emp., M. 11.07, where the objection is directed against Epicureans.
7 See Ar., EN 1.6.1097b33 1098a2.
not bearing fruit. If, then, pleasure is the goal and living well consists in this, it is absurd for someone to deny that other living beings live well. If freedom from disturbance is the goal, the same applies. And it applies to ‘living according to nature’ if one were to say that this is living well.

§1.4.2. Those who do not include plants because they do not have sense-perception will by that token not including all living beings, for if they say that sense-perception is this – being not unaware of one’s state – then the state should be good prior to being aware. For example, being in a natural state is good even if one is not aware of being in that state, and similarly being in one’s proper state, even if one is not yet cognizant that it is proper and that it is pleasurable – for it should be pleasurable. So, if the state is good and it is present, that which has it is thereby living well. So, why should we add sense-perception? We should not, unless in response they attribute good not to a state or condition that has come to be, but to the cognizance, or sense-perception, of this.

But if they say this, they will be saying that it is the sense-perception itself that is good, that is, the actuality of the perceptual life regardless of what things are apprehended. But if they attribute good to the combination of both, so that it is the sense-perception of a certain type of object, how can they say that the combination is good when each member of the combination is neutral? But if it is the state that is good, and living well is the condition wherein someone is cognizant that the good is present to him, we should ask them if such a one lives well just by being cognizant that this is actually present to him, or if he should also be cognizant not only that its presence is pleasurable but that it is good, too.

But if he must be cognizant that it is the good, living well is at once no longer the function of sense-perception but of an ability different from and greater than sense-perception. So, living well will not belong to those who are experiencing pleasure, but to one who has the ability to recognize that the good is pleasure. But then the cause of living well will actually not be pleasure, but being able to discern that pleasure is good. And that which does the discerning is better than that which is in the state, for that is reason or intellect whereas pleasure is a state, and nowhere is the non-rational superior to reason.

8 See SVF 3.178 (= D.L., 7.85).
9 Probably, given the above, a reference to the Epicurean view.
11 See SVF 1.183 (= Plutarch, De comm. not. 1069f); 3.16 (= Stobaeus, Ed. 77.16).
12 See Ar., EN 10.9.1178b28. 13 See Pl., Phil. 33D8 9.
How, then, will reason, excluding itself, suppose something else located in a contrary genus to be superior to it? For it seems that those who deny that plants live well and those who claim that living well consists in a certain type of sense-perception lack awareness that they are seeking living well in something greater and that they are supposing the better life to consist in a life of greater clarity.

Those who say that living well is found in the rational life, not simply in life, nor even perceptual life, would perhaps be correct. But it is appropriate to ask them why they thus place happiness only in the rational living being: ‘Do you add the qualification “rational” because reason is more efficient and more easily able to discover and procure the basic natural needs, or would you still do this even if it were not able to discover or procure these? But if you say this because reason is better able than anything else to discover these, happiness will belong even to living beings without reason provided they are able to acquire the basic natural needs. And then reason would become subordinate and would not be choice-worthy in itself, nor in turn would its perfection, which we say is what virtue is. But if you say that reason is more honourable not because it is better at meeting the basic natural needs, but because it is desirable in itself, you should say what other function it has and what its nature is and what makes it perfect.’

For it should not be contemplation of these basic natural needs that makes it perfect, but something else of another nature that makes it perfect, and it is itself not one of these basic natural needs, nor does it come from the source from which these basic natural needs arise, nor, generally, is it of this kind, but it is better than all these. In fact, I do not see how they will account for its being honourable. But until they find a nature better than those things at which they are now stopping, let them remain at this level, where they want to remain, being at a loss to say how living well belongs to those capable of attaining this by meeting these basic natural needs.

§1.4.3. But as for us, let us state from the beginning what we take happiness to be. Having indeed supposed that happiness is something that is found in life, if we made ‘living’ univocal in all cases, we would be claiming that all living beings are capable of acquiring happiness, and that those that are actually living well are those in which is present some identical thing, something which all living beings are capable of acquiring by nature. In doing this, we would not be endowing rational beings with the ability to live well while denying it to non-rational beings.

14 See Ar., EN 1.6.1098a3 7; SVF 3.687 (= D.L., 7.130).
15 Reading προσλαμβάνετε with Armstrong.
16 See Ar., Phys. 7.2. 247a2.
17 Cf. 5.9.1.10 16.
18 See Ar., Meta. 9.8.1050b1 2.
beings, for life was assumed to be something common to both and something which, by being receptive of the identical thing, was intended to be capable of achieving happiness – if indeed happiness was to be found in any sort of life.

Hence, I think that those who say that happiness occurs in a rational life, by supposing that it is not found in life in general, do not realize that they are preserving that being happy is not just living. They would be forced to say that the rational capacity in which happiness consists is a quality of life. But for them, the substrate of this quality was a life that is rational, for happiness consists in the whole [rationality plus life], so that it consists in some other ‘form’ of life [and not just life].

I mean this not in the sense of a logical distinction within a genus, but in the sense in which we speak of one thing being prior and another being posterior.\footnote{\textit{See Ar., Cat. 13.1.43} 1541; Meta. 2.3.999a6 7.}

So, the term ‘life’ is spoken of in many ways, differentiated according to the primary way, the secondary way, and so on in order. The term ‘living’ is said equivocally, that is, it is said in one way of a plant and in another of a non-rational animal, according to the clarity and dimness of the lives they have.\footnote{\textit{See Ar., D.A 1.5.410a13} where the question of homonymy regards ‘soul’, not ‘life’.} Analogously, it is clear that ‘living well’ is said homonymously, too. And if one sense of the term ‘living’ is a reflection of another, it is also clear that one sense of ‘living well’ is a reflection of another.

If, then, living well\footnote{Reading \textit{εὖ} with HS\textsuperscript{4} to pick up the question initiating the treatise.} belongs to something living fully – meaning to something that is in no way deficient in life – being happy will belong only to one living fully, for the best will belong to this, if indeed that which is really best in life, that is, the perfect life, is something that exists. For in this way, the goodness that exists in happiness would not be something superadded nor will something else from somewhere else provide the substrate for its being good. For what, added to a perfect life, would turn it into the best life? But if someone will say that what does this is the nature of the Good,\footnote{\textit{See Pl., Phil. 60B10.} Cf. 6.7.15.1 10; 6.6.18. See Pl., Soph. 248E6 249A1.} that is a congenial argument to us, but now we are not seeking the cause of goodness, but that in which it exists.

It has been said many times that the perfect life and the true and real life is in that intellectual nature and that the other sorts of life are imperfect and reflections of life and do not exist perfectly or purely, and are no more lives than the opposite of this.\footnote{\textit{Cf. 6.7.15.1 10; 6.6.18. See Pl., Soph. 248E6 249A1.}} And now let it be said summarily that so long as all living beings are from one source and they
do not have life in the same way that it does, it is necessary that the source is the primary life, that is, the most perfect life.

§ 1.4.4. If, then, it is possible for a human being to have the perfect life, a human being who has this life is happy. If not, one would suppose happiness to be found among the gods, if such a life is found among them alone. So, since we are now saying that this happiness is found among human beings, we should examine how this is so.

What I mean is this: it is clear also from other considerations that the fact that a human being has a perfect life does not mean that he only has a perceptual life, but rather that he has a faculty of calculative reasoning and a genuine intellect as well. But is it the case that he is one thing and this life is another?

In fact, he is not a human being at all if he has this neither in potency nor in actuality, where we actually locate happiness. But will we say that he has this perfect form of life in himself as a part of himself?

In fact, one who has it in potency has it as a part, whereas the one who has actually achieved happiness is this in actuality and has transformed himself in the direction of being identical with this. Everything else is just something he happens to be wearing, which no one would actually suppose to be a part of him, since he does not want to wear these things. They would be parts of him if they were connected to him according to his will.

So, what is the good for this human being?

In fact, it is, for him, what he possesses. And the transcendent cause of goodness in him which is good in one way, is present to him in another. Evidence for the fact that this is so is that one who is like this does not seek anything else. What else would he seek? It would, of course, not be something worse; the best is already in him. The way of life of one living in this way, then, is self-sufficient. And if he is virtuous, he has what he needs in order to be happy and to possess the good, for there is no good that he does not have.

What he seeks he seeks as something necessary, and not for himself but for one of the things that belong to him, for he is seeking something for the body that is attached to him. And even if that body is alive so that what belongs to it belongs to a living being, namely, this body, it does not belong to such a human being. He knows these things [what the body needs] and gives what he gives to it without taking anything away from his own life. So, his happiness will not be diminished by adverse fortune, for this sort of life remains as it is. And when relatives and friends are dying, he knows what death is; the dying themselves do, too.

if they are virtuous. Even if the dying of relatives and close ones causes pain, it does not pain him, but only that in him which is apart from intellect, that whose pains he will not accept.

§1.4.5. What, then, about pains and illnesses and things generally that prevent us from acting? And what if the virtuous were actually not even consciously aware? For this could happen as a result of drugs or illness. How, in all these cases, would one actually be able to live well and be happy? Poverty and loss of reputation should be set aside, although with regard to such things, someone might bring up above all the notorious misfortunes of Priam.²⁶ For if he bore them, and even bore them easily, at least he did not will them. But the happy life should be willed.²⁷

Then, they²⁸ might object that the virtuous person is not identical with just the soul, given that we are not counting his corporeal nature as part of his substantiality.²⁹ For they might say that they are ready to accept our position so long as states of the body are referred to him and so are his acts of choosing and avoiding arising in him due to the body. But if pleasure is counted as a part of the happy life, how could someone be happy who has grief due to misfortunes and pains, even if the person to whom these things were happening were virtuous? On the contrary, [they will say] such a happy and self-sufficient condition belongs to the gods, whereas since human beings have an additional inferior element, it is necessary to look for happiness in the whole that comes to be, and not just in a part. If one part is in a bad state, it would force the other and better part to be impeded in its own affairs because the affairs of the other part are not in a good state. If this is not the case, one ought to cut off the body or even the body’s sense-perception and in this way seek the self-sufficiency needed for being happy.

§1.4.6. But if the argument conceded that being happy consists in not suffering or being sick or experiencing bad fortune or falling into great upheavals, it would not be possible for anyone to be happy when any of the contrary states was present. If, however, happiness consists in the possession of the true good, why should we set this aside and not look to this in judging the happy person but seek other things which are not counted in being happy? For if happiness were found in a jumble of goods and necessities or even things not necessary, though they are said to be good, one would have to seek to make these present, too. But if the goal is some one thing and must not be many – for in that case, one would be seeking not a goal but several goals – one must have that alone

²⁶ See Ar., EN 1.10.1100a8, 1101a8.
²⁷ See Alex. Aphr., De am mant. 159.18.
²⁸ I.e., Peripatetics.
²⁹ See Ar., EN 1.8.109b14.
which is final and most honourable and which the soul seeks to envelop in itself.\(^{30}\)

This search and the will are not for that which does not belong to the final goal. For these things are not in the soul’s nature, but since they are merely present, calculative reasoning flees them and manages to get rid of them or seeks to acquire them. The soul’s desire is for that which is better than itself, by which, when it arrives, the soul is satisfied and at rest, and this is really the life that is willed. Will would not be for any of the necessities to be present, if one considers ‘will’ in the principal sense, and does not misuse the term as when we do think it worthwhile for these things to be present, too. We do, generally, avoid evils, but this kind of avoidance is not, I suppose, willed. For what is willed is rather not to need this avoidance.\(^{31}\)

These necessities provide evidence of this whenever they are present, for example, health and absence of pain. What is compelling about these? Indeed, when health is present we have disdain for this, and the same thing goes for the absence of pain. When they are present, they are not compelling nor do they add anything to being happy; but when they are absent, due to the presence of pains, they are sought, reasonably enough, as necessities, although we should not say that they are goods.\(^{32}\)

So, they should not be counted with the goal, but when they are absent and their contraries are present, the goal must be preserved uncontaminated by them.

§1.4.7. Why, then, does the happy person want these things to be present and avoid their opposites?

In fact, we will say that it is not because of their contribution to being happy, but because of their contribution to existence. They avoid their contraries either because they contribute to non-existence or because they are an impediment to the goal when they are present – not in the sense of eliminating it, but because one who has the ideal wants only to have this, not something else along with it, something whose presence does not eliminate the ideal but is nevertheless present along with it. Generally, it is not the case that, if a happy person wants something not to be present, though it is, something of his happiness is diminished.

In fact, if this were not so, he would alter or diminish in his happiness each day, for example, if he lost a slave or, indeed, any one of his possessions. And there would be thousands of things which turn out other than the way he would have liked, but do not at all displace the goal when it is present to him.

\(^{30}\) Reading αὐτῇ. \(^{31}\) See Ar., EN 3.4.1111b26 28. \(^{32}\) See Pl., Lg. 858A1 5.
It is, rather, a question of significant matters, they say, not trivial ones. But what would significant human matters be such that they are not disdained by one who has ascended to a realm higher than all these and is no longer dependent on anything below? Since he does not think that occurrences of good fortune would be significant, no matter how great they may be – for example, kingship or the rule of states and tribes, or the colonization and founding of states, even if that should come about by him – why should he think that the fall from power or the destruction of his state would be something great? But if he actually thought that these were great evils, or evil at all, his belief would be ridiculous, and he would no longer be virtuous, thinking that pieces of wood and stone and, by Zeus, the deaths of mortals are great matters – he who, we say, ought to hold the belief that death is better than life with a body.

If he himself should be sacrificed, will he think that his death is evil because he has died at the altars? Even if he is not buried, his body will, I suppose, completely decay whether under the earth or on it. And if he thinks it is a bad thing if he is buried anonymously and without lavish expense, not having been thought worthy of a lofty monument, what pettiness! But if he is captured, ‘before you the road is open’ if it is not possible to be happy. If members of his family are captured, ‘his daughters-in-law and daughters dragged off’, well, what would we say if he died not having seen anything like this? Would he then exit with the belief that none of these things could possibly occur? That would be absurd. How could he believe that it is not possible that such things should befall his family? If this is so, then, why would he believe that, if such things should occur, he would not be happy?

In fact, even while believing these things he is happy, so he is happy when they actually happen, too. For he would know in his heart that the nature of this universe is such that it brings with it such events, and it is necessary that we submit. And, anyhow, many people will actually act better having become prisoners. And if they are oppressed by this, they can depart this life. If they remain, they either do so reasonably and there is nothing frightening in this, or they do so unreasonably when they should not, and they are responsible. For it is actually not because of the folly of others, even relatives, that he will fall into evil, nor is it on the good and bad fortunes of others that he will depend.

§1.4.8. And as for his own sufferings, when they are excessive, so long as he is able to bear them, he will bear them. But when they are unbearable,
they will take him away. And his suffering will not be pitiable, but the light in him will continue to shine like the light of a lantern when the wind is blowing outside in a great fierceness of rain and winter storm. But what if he loses conscious awareness or the suffering continues to increase so that, though it is excessive, it does not kill him? If it continues, he will consider what he must do, for his autonomy would not be removed in these circumstances. It is necessary to realize that such things do not appear to the virtuous person as they appear to others, and that none of these nor any other things reaches the interior of this person, neither sufferings nor pains.

And when pains strike others? Granted, there would be a susceptibility in our soul. And evidence of this is that we think it a gain if the suffering of others is concealed from us and, should we die first, we think it a gain to have died first, not considering the suffering of those left behind, but only the fact that an end is brought to our own. And right here is where our susceptibility lies, something we should eliminate, but not allowing ourselves to be afraid lest they come to pass. If someone were to say that it is our nature to be like this, so as to be pained at the upheavals of our family, let it be acknowledged that not everyone is like this, and anyway that, contrary to the many, it belongs to virtue to lead that which is common to our nature to the better and more beautiful. And it is more beautiful not to give in to those things commonly considered to be fearful. For one should not ward off amateurishly the blows of chance but be ready like a great athlete who knows it is in the nature of some to find these things intolerable, whereas for him they are bearable and unthreatening rather like the things that frighten a child. Does he, then, want these things?

In fact, even when things he does not want are present, he faces them with virtue, which makes his soul hard to be moved or affected.

§1.4.9. But what about when the virtuous person has lost conscious awareness having been overwhelmed either by sickness or by magic crafts? But if they will maintain that he is virtuous in this state and in a way like someone asleep, what prevents him from being happy? Well, they do not deny him happiness when he is asleep or argue away this time and say that he was not happy for his entire life. But if they will say that he is not virtuous, they are no longer making the argument

18 See Epicurus, fr. 447.
19 Reading ἔσται καί ἐν τῷ ἀλγεῖν, ὀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῶ [καὶ ἐν τῷ] ἐνδον γέγον γίνον with HS. See Pl., Rep. 496D6 8 with Empedocles, fr. B84.1 6 DK.
20 Plotinus is referring to the Stoic position. This position contradicts Ar., EN 1.13. 1102b5 7; 10.6.1176a33 35.
about the virtuous person. We, however, suppose him to be virtuous and are considering if he is happy, so long as he is virtuous.

Then let him be virtuous, they say. If he is neither perceiving this nor acting according to virtue, how would he be happy? But if he does not perceive that he is healthy, he is nonetheless healthy, and if he does not perceive that he is handsome, he is nonetheless handsome. If, though, he does not perceive that he is wise, would he be any the less wise? He would be, I suppose, unless someone were to say that perceiving must be part of wisdom, and that conscious awareness must be present to him; for being happy resides in the actualization of wisdom.

This argument, then, would perhaps be asserting something reasonable if practical wisdom and wisdom were things added from outside. But if the real existence of wisdom is in some substance or, rather, in the substantiability of the person, the substantiability itself is not destroyed in one who is asleep or, generally, in a state where he lacks what is called conscious awareness. The very activity of the substance is in him, and since such activity has nothing to do with sleeping, he would be active and, insofar as he is like this, at that time virtuous. The activity itself would not elude him completely, but only some part of him. For example, in the case of the activity of the faculty of growth, an apprehension of this activity does not come to the rest of the human being through the faculty of sense-perception. Yet if we were indeed our faculty of growth, we would be active. As it is, this is not what we are; we are the activity of thinking such that when that is acting, we are acting.

§1.4.10. Perhaps we are not aware of the activity of thinking because it does not concern anything sensible. For it seems that sense-perception is like an intermediary in regard to sensibles when the activity of thinking is about them, too. But why will the intellect itself not be active along with the soul that attends it – the soul which is prior to sense-perception and to self-awareness generally? For the result of the act should be prior to apprehension if indeed it is the case that ‘thinking and Being are identical’.41 And the apprehension would seem to exist or to occur when the thought bends back upon itself and the activity which is the life of the soul is in a way reflected back just as in a mirror which has a smooth, bright, and still surface.42

In these circumstances, then, when the mirror is present, the image occurs, but when it is not present or the circumstances are not right, that

41 Cf. 3.8.8.8; 5.1.8.17 18; 5.6.6.22 23; 5.9.5.29 30; 6.7.4.18 and numerous paraphrases elsewhere. See Parmenides, fr. 28 B 3 DK.
42 See Pl., Tim. 71A5 B5.
of which the image is an image is still present. In the same way, for the soul, too, when this sort of thing in us in which images of discursive thinking and of intellect are reflected is still, they are seen and, in a way, like sense-perception, known with the prior knowledge that it is intellect and discursive thinking that are active. But when this situation is shattered by a disturbance in the harmony of the body, discursive thinking and intellect think without an image and then there is intellect without imagination. So, thinking comes to be in this way when something is thought with imagination, even though thinking itself is not imagination.  

Someone could find that when we are awake there are many beautiful activities, types of contemplation, and actions such that when we theorize and when we act, they do not make us consciously aware of them. For it is not necessary for one who is reading to be consciously aware that he is reading – indeed, it is especially then that he reads intently. Nor is the man consciously aware that he is being brave and that he is acting according to bravery when he is acting. And there are thousands of other cases like this. So, the acts of conscious awareness risk making weaker the very activities which we are consciously aware of performing, whereas only when they are purified do we act more fully and live more fully and, I suppose, it is indeed in such a state that those who have become virtuous live more fully, not dissipated in sense-perception, but collected in the identical thing, in oneself.

§1.4.11. If some should say that this is not living, we will reply that it is living, though the happiness of this person escapes them just as does his life, too. If they are not persuaded, we think they should imagine someone living and being virtuous in this way, and to enquire whether he is happy, not to diminish what living is in order to seek what living well is, nor to eliminate the human being to seek human happiness, nor conceding that the virtuous person has reverted to his internal life, to seek to discover it in external activities, nor, generally, to seek to discover what he wills in external things. For in this way, there would really exist no happiness if one were to say that the externals are willed and that the virtuous person wills these, for he would want all human beings to do well and not experience evil in anything. But this does not happen, though he is nevertheless happy. But if someone were to say that it would be making him irrational if he wanted these things – for it is not possible that there should not be evils – it is clear that he will be conceding to us that the will of the virtuous person reverts to the interior.

43 See Ar., DA 3.7.431a16 17, 8.432a12 14. 44 See Epictetus, Disc. 1.4.18.
§1.4.12. And when they ask about that which is pleasurable in such a life, they will not think it right to ask whether the pleasures of the licentious or the pleasures of the body are present – for it is impossible for these to be present; they do away with being happy. Excessive joy, too – for why should this be present? But they are asking only about those pleasures that go along with the presence of goods, so pleasures not found in motions nor in the coming to be of anything.\(^{45}\) For the goods are already present, and he is present to himself. And that which is pleasurable is stable and this is contentment. The virtuous person is always content and his state is one of tranquillity, his disposition is lovable, and no one of the things said to be evil disturbs him, if he is virtuous. If, though, someone seeks to discover some other form of pleasure in the virtuous life, he is not seeking the virtuous life.

§1.4.13. Nor would the activities of the virtuous be impeded by fortune, but they change as fortunes change, though they are all, nevertheless, beautiful and perhaps all the more beautiful as they are circumstantial.\(^{46}\) As for theoretical activities, those that are concerned with particulars might be impeded, for example, those that require enquiries and investigations. But ‘the greatest study’\(^{47}\) is always available to the virtuous and always with him, and all the more so even if he were inside what is called ‘the bull of Phalaris’, which, no matter how many times it is claimed to be ‘pleasurable’, is hardly so.\(^{48}\) For according to them, that which says this is that which is in pain, whereas according to us, that which is in pain is one thing, but that which accompanies this is another, and even if he by necessity accompanies it, he would not be bereft of the vision of the universal Good.

§1.4.14. Evidence that the human being, especially the virtuous human being, is not the complex [of body and soul] is found in his separation from the body and in his disdain for the so-called goods of the body. Thinking that happiness extends to the life of the human being is ridiculous, given that happiness is living well, something which is bound up with the soul. This is an activity but not of the entire soul – it is, actually, not found in the faculty of growth, which would put it in contact with the body, for being happy is indeed not found in the size of the body or its robustness – nor is it found in having good sense-perception since an abundance of these goods can weigh down

\(^{47}\) See Pl., Rep. 505A2. 
\(^{48}\) See SVF 3.386 (= Gregorius Nazianzenus, Epist. 32); Seneca, Ep. ad Luc. 66.18 (on Epicureans). Seneca claims that Epicurus conceded that the wise person will say that it is a pleasure to be inside the bull of Phalaris. See Cicero, Tusc. 2.7.17.
the human being and draw him to them. There arises in the virtuous a sort of compensatory weight on the other side towards the best which diminishes corporeal goods and makes them inferior, in order that this human being can show himself to be other than the things outside him.

Let the human being who lives in the world of corporeal goods be beautiful and tall and wealthy and the sort of ruler over people that one can be here,\(^49\) yet he ought not to be envied for these things, since he was deceived by them. But the wise person would perhaps not even have these to begin with, though if he did, he will lessen their impact, if indeed he cares for himself. He will lessen their impact and extinguish the advantages of the body by his lack of interest in them, and he will let their power over him die. Although he will protect the health of his body, he will not wish to be altogether inexperienced with sickness, nor indeed inexperienced with pains. On the contrary, if these do not come to him when he is young, he will wish to learn about them, and when he is already old, he will not be disturbed either by pains or pleasures, or by anything of this world whether it be pleasant or the opposite, in order that he should not pay attention to the body. But when in a painful state, he will deploy the power of containment that is in him against the pain, nor will he take there to be any addition to his happiness in pleasures and healthy and carefree states, or a removal or diminution of it in their opposites. For since one contrary does not add to his happiness, how can the other remove it?

§1.4.15. But if there were two wise persons, one in whom were present so-called natural goods and one in whom were present the opposite, will we say that the happiness that is present in them is equal? We will say yes, if indeed they were equally wise. But what if the body of one were beautiful and he possessed all the goods that are not conducive to wisdom or, generally, to virtue and to the vision of the best or to that which is best, what do we say about this? Well, the person who has these cannot flatter himself that he is happier than one who does not have them. For the surfeit of them wouldn’t even serve the goal of knowing how to play the flute.

Actually, we are considering the happy person with our own weakness, reckoning things to be frightening and dangerous which the happy person would not. Indeed, he would not be wise or happy who was not rid of the imagination of all such things and who did not have confidence in himself that he had become someone else in a way because he will

\(^{49}\) See Pl., *Tht.* 176A7 8.
never have any evil. For in this way he will also be fearless in regard to all
things.

In fact, if he is afraid at all, he is not perfect in virtue, but will only be
halfway there. And when there is an involuntary fear in him or it occurs
in him prior to his making a judgement, if this should happen with his
mind elsewhere, the wise person, attending to it, will drive it away from
himself, and he will put a stop to the pains of what is in a way the child
acting up in himself, either by threats or by reasoning; but it will be
a threat made in an unaffected state like a child shocked into silence by
a severe look. Such a person is not unfriendly or unfamiliar. For such
a person is like this in regard to himself and in his own affairs. Then,
giving to his friends such things as he gives to himself, he would be
especially a friend, one in possession of Intellect.

§1.4.16. If anyone will not place the virtuous person aloft here in this
Intellect, and instead brings him down into chance events and fears that
they will happen to him, he is not attending to the virtuous person such
as we judge him to be, but rather the equitable human being, giving him
a mixture of good and evil, and giving to such a person a mixed life of
some good and evil, a life such as does not occur easily.⁵⁰ This person, if
he should come to be, would not be worthy to be named ‘happy’ since he
does not have greatness, neither that found in the value of wisdom nor in
the purity of goodness. It is not possible, then, to live happily in the
composite of body and soul. For Plato, too, rightly judged it appropriate
that one who intends to be wise and happy should receive his good from
the intelligible world above and, looking at that, to assimilate himself to
that and to live according to that.⁵¹

He should, then, have this alone as a goal, and change other things as
he changes places; not because he acquires any advantage with regard to
being happy from the place he occupies, but in a way guessing about his
circumstances if he were, for example, to establish himself in one place
rather than another. He must give to this embodied life what it needs,
insofar as he can, he himself being other than it, and not be prevented
even from abandoning this life. Indeed, he will abandon it at the right
natural moment, being sovereign, too, in deliberating over this. So, for
him, some deeds will contribute to happiness, whereas some are not for
the sake of the goal and, generally, did not come from him but from that
which is yoked to him, which he will tend to and endure as long as he is
able, like a musician his lyre, as long as it may be useful. If he cannot, he
will change it for another, or he will abandon the use of lyres and will

⁵⁰ See Pl., Phil. 22D6.
⁵¹ See Pl., Thet. 176B1; Symp. 212A1; Rep. 365B1, 427D5 6, 613B1.
cease to play it, having another job that requires no lyre and will let it lie unregarded while he sings without an instrument. ⁵² And after all it was not in vain that the instrument was given to him in the first place. For he has already used it for himself many times.

⁵² See Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 112.25  113.2.
On Whether Happiness Increases with Time

INTRODUCTION
In this short treatise, Plotinus takes up the question of whether the length of one’s life has an effect on one’s happiness. Plotinus is in substantial agreement with the Stoics that happy people are not happier if they live longer. But his explanation for this is sharply different from that of the Stoics and distinctively Platonic. Plotinus argues that the life of Intellect is eternal or outside of time. Accordingly, participation in this life makes temporality irrelevant to happiness.

SUMMARY
§1. Happiness is always in the present, not the past or future.
§2. This is so even if our activity is always future-oriented.
§3. Increase in the time spent contemplating does not increase happiness.
§4. Increase in pleasure does not increase happiness.
§5. Comparisons of periods of happiness in different lives are illicit.
§6. Unhappiness may increase in time, but not happiness.
§7. Happiness transcends time.
§§8–9. Memory of previous happiness or of pleasure does not add to happiness.
§10. Virtuous deeds are the result, not the cause of inner happiness.
§1.5.1. Does being happy increase with the time that one is happy given that being happy is always considered to be in the present? For it is not the memory of having been happy that would make a difference, nor is it in talking about it, but rather being happy is in being disposed somehow.¹ But the disposition is in the present, that is, in the activity of living.

§1.5.2. But if, because we always desire to live and to act, someone were to say that being happy increases the more we attain this, first, tomorrow’s happiness will in this way be greater and that of the next day more again than the previous one, and being happy will no longer be measured by virtue.

Next, even the gods will now be more happy than before, and still not perfectly happy nor ever about to be so.

Next, desire, attaining its end, has attained that which is present and is always what is present, and it seeks to have happiness for as long as it exists.² But the desire for living, since it seeks existence, would belong to what is present, if existence is in what is present. If the desire is for that which is in the future and what is next, it wants what it has and what exists, not what it was or what it will be, but it wants there to exist what already is, not seeking that which will last forever, but that which is already present to be present.

§1.5.3. Why, then, does one say: ‘he has been happy for more time and he saw the identical thing with his eyes for more time’? For if he saw more accurately the more he looked, the time would have done something more for him. But if he saw the same way continuously, that will be equivalent to someone who sees it once.

§1.5.4. ‘But the other person took pleasure in it for a longer time.’ But one would not be correct to count this towards being happy. If, though,

¹ See Ar., EN 10.6.1176a33 b6. ² Eliminating the quotation marks in HS².
someone were to say that the pleasure is an unimpeded activity,\(^3\) he would be saying that pleasure is identical with what we are investigating. And even the pleasure which is greater is only in the present; its past has gone.

§1.5.5. What, then? If someone is happy from beginning to end, but someone else only at a later time, and someone else changed from being happy to not being happy, are they equal?

In fact, the comparison here is not between people all of whom are happy; it is between those who are unhappy, when they are unhappy, and those who are happy. If, then, the one who is happy has more, he has this in the way one who is happy has it in relation to those who are not, by which it also follows that he has it more than they do in the present.

§1.5.6. What, then, about someone who is unhappy? Does his unhappiness not increase the more he has it? And do not the other troubling things increase the misfortune the longer they go on, such as chronic illnesses and pains and all things of this sort? But if these cause the evil to increase with time in this way, why do not their opposites do the same for being happy, too?

In fact, one could say with sorrows and pains that time increases them, for example, when sickness lingers. For a settled state arises and the body is worsened with time, but if the state were to remain identical and the hurt were not to be greater, here, too, it is the present that will always be painful, unless the past is added in taking into account its origin and its persistence. And with the unhappy state, the evil, when it is extended in time, will increase by its continuation. At least, it is with the addition of a greater evil, not by more of the same, that one comes to be more unhappy. But that which is greater does not exist all at once nor, generally, should that which is no longer actually be counted in with that which now exists. The extent of happiness has a boundary or limit and that is always identical. But if someone says here, too, ‘it increases with time’, so that one is more happy to the extent that one is more virtuous, his praise does not consist in counting the number of years of happiness, but is for the increase in happiness, when it is increased.

§1.5.7. But why, if we should only consider the present and not count with it the past, should we not also do the identical thing with time; after all, we count the past with the present and say that there is more time? Why, then, do we not say that there is as much happiness as the time it lasts? And then we would be dividing happiness according to the

\(^3\) See Ar., EN 7.14.1155b10 12; Alex. Aphr., Prob. eth. 23.143.9 144.4.
divisions of time, too. But if, again, we measure it by the present, we will make it indivisible.

In fact, it is not absurd to count time even when it is no longer, since we could also produce a numbering of things that have been, though they no longer exist, for example, of those who have died. But it is absurd to say that when happiness exists no longer, it still is, and there is more of it than there is at present. For being happy requires that it occur, while the time of which there is more than at present no longer exists. And generally, while time is some one thing existing in the present, it implies a greater dispersal. For this reason, it is plausibly said that ‘time is an image of eternity’, meaning that it makes the stability of eternity disappear in its dispersal.

It follows that if the image removed the stability from eternity and made it its own, it would destroy it; the image is preserved by eternity in a certain way, though it would be destroyed if eternity should entirely come to be in the image. If indeed, then, being happy is found in a good life, it is clear that it should be located in the life of something that exists. For it is the best life. It should not, therefore, be counted by time, but by eternity. But this does not admit of the more nor less, nor does it have any extension, but rather it is non-dimensional and not temporal. So, Being should not be connected with that which is non-Being, nor eternity with time, nor the everlasting temporal with eternity nor should the extended be connected with the unextendable, but one must grasp it as a whole, if you are going to grasp it at all, grasping not the indivisible part of time [i.e., the present] but the life of eternity which is not made up of many temporal periods, but is at every period of time altogether present.

§1.5.8. But if someone should say that the memory of things past continuing in the present provides more time for one who has become happy, what would they mean by ‘memory’? If, in fact, it is memory of a prior act of wisdom, what he would be saying is that he is now wiser, and he would not be sticking to his hypothesis. Or if it is the memory of pleasure, it is as if the happy person will be in need of additional enjoyment and will not be satisfied with that which is present. And what would be pleasurable in the memory of pleasure? For example, if someone were to remember that yesterday he was pleased at seeing something. It would be even more ridiculous if it were a time later. So, too, with wisdom: the memory that he was wise last year.

4 See Pl., Tim. 37D5. 5 Restoring της αἰώνα from HS.
6 Cf. 3.7.3-36 37, 11.41 47; 6.5.11.15 18. 7 See Pl., Phil. 65D8.
8 See Epicurus, frs. 68, 138, 436 439, 453 Usener; Cicero, De fin. 1.21.41; 17.57; Tusc. 5.96.
§1.5.9. But if the memory is of beautiful things, would someone who said this not be saying something here? But this would only mean something for a human who lacks beautiful things in the present, and in not having them now is seeking the memory of those that have been.

§1.5.10. But a long time produces many beautiful things, in which someone who has been happy for a short time has no share, if one must say, generally, that one is happy not because of many beautiful things.

In fact, one who says that being happy comes after much time and many actions is constructing happiness from things that no longer exist but from a number of things which are past and one thing that is present. For this reason, we placed being happy in the present and next we sought to discover if being happy increases with time.

Next, we should investigate if being happy for a long time also increases with more actions. First, then, it is possible to become happy even without performing actions, and to be not less but more happy than one who has acted.

Next, the actions do not by themselves endow one with happiness, but one’s dispositions make the actions beautiful, and the practically wise person enjoys the fruits of the Good even in acting not because he acts nor from the circumstances of the action, but from that which he has. One’s country might, after all, be saved thanks to a bad person, and that which is pleasurable in its being saved could be found in the practically wise person even when another did it. So, this is not that which produces the pleasure of the happy person, but the settled state produces the happiness and whatever is pleasurable comes through that. To place being happy in actions is to place it in externals rather than in the virtue of the soul. For the activity of the soul is in thinking and in being active internally.⁹ And this is acting happily.

⁹ Cf. 4.4.4.25 32.
On Beauty

INTRODUCTION

This treatise is listed as first in Porphyry’s chronological ordering of the Enneads. Although the work has frequently served as a relatively accessible introduction to Plotinus’ difficult systematic thought, there is no reason to believe that Plotinus intended it as such. The work focuses on the nature of physical beauty and its relation to moral and intellectual beauty. It relies heavily on Plotinus’ understanding of Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus. Treatise 5.8 (31), ‘On the Intelligible Beauty’, provides a companion argument. One central theme of this work is the in separability of aesthetic and ethical considerations. Beauty is here presented as hierarchically ordered manifestations of a property of intelligible reality, namely, its attractiveness to us.

SUMMARY

§1. What is the nature of beauty and what causes things to be beautiful? Criticism of the Stoic view.
§2. Something is beautiful owing to the presence of intelligible form.
§3. The beauty of shapes, colours, and sounds and the means to their recognition.
§4. The beauty of virtue.
§5. The relation between the beauty of virtue and the intelligibles.
§6. The process of purification leading to the recognition of intelligible beauty.
§7. The ascent to the Good.
§8. The method of ascent.
§9. The development of interior sight through the practice of virtue.
§1.6.1. Beauty is found for the most part in what is seen, although it is also found in sounds, when these are composed into words, and in all the arts generally. For songs and rhythms are beautiful, too. And beauty is also found by those who turn away from sense-perception towards the higher region; that is, practices, actions, habits, and types of scientific understanding are beautiful, to say nothing of the beauty of the virtues. If there is some beauty prior to these, this discussion will show it.

What, then indeed, is it that has actually made us imagine bodies to be beautiful and our sense of hearing incline to sounds, finding them beautiful? And as for the things that depend directly on the soul, how are all of these beautiful? Is it because all of them are beautiful by one identical beauty, or is it that there is one sort of beauty in the body and another in other things? And what, then, are these sorts of beauty, or what is this beauty?

For some things, such as bodies, are not beautiful due to their substrates, but rather by participation, whereas some things are beautiful in themselves, such as the nature of virtue. This is so because bodies themselves sometimes appear beautiful and sometimes do not since what it is to be a body is distinct from what it is to be beautiful. What is it, then, that is present in bodies that makes them beautiful? It is this that we must examine first. What is it, then, that moves the eyes of spectators and turns them towards it and draws them on and makes them rejoice at

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1 The word μουσική ('art') is, literally, all that is governed by the Muses, including poetry, literature, music, and dance. Later these came to include philosophy, astronomy, and intellectual practices generally.
2 The word ἐπιτηδεύματα ('practices') here refers to habitual activities that lead to the acquisition of moral virtue. See Pl., Rep. 444E; Lg. 793D.
4 See Pl., Hipp. Ma. 288A8 289D3; Pbd. 100C1o 103C1; Symp. 211B21 25.
5 See Pl., Symp. 211A3.
6 The word ἐπιστρεφέιν ('reverting to', here 'turns') is a central semi technical term in Plotinus for the (re)orientation of the soul in the direction of the One. Cf. 1.2.4.16; 2.4.5.34; 5.2.1.10.
the sight? By finding this and using it as a stepping-stone, we might also see the rest.

It is actually said by everyone that the symmetry of parts in relation to each other and to the whole added to fine coloration makes something beautiful to see. And, generally, in regard to the objects of sight and all other things, their beauty consists in their symmetry or measure. For those who hold this view, no simple thing will be beautiful; necessarily, beauty will exist only in the composite. The whole will be beautiful for them, while each of the parts will not have its own beauty but will be a contributing factor in making the whole beautiful. But it should be the case that if the whole is indeed beautiful, the parts are also beautiful. For beauty is indeed not made up out of ugly things; all of its parts are beautiful.

For these people, the beauty of colours, for example, and the light of the sun, since they are simple, do not have proportion and so will be excluded from being beautiful. Indeed, how [on this view] is gold beautiful? And how about lightning in the night and the stars, which are beautiful to see? And as for the beauty of sounds, the simple ones will be eliminated for the same reason, although it is frequently the case that in the beauty of a whole composition, each sound is itself beautiful.

Further, when the identical face sometimes actually appears beautiful and sometimes not, though the symmetry remains identical, would we not have to say that beauty is other than the symmetry and that the symmetry is beautiful because of something other than itself?

But if they actually pass on to beautiful practices and discourses and attribute their beauty to symmetry, what does it mean to say that there is proportion in beautiful practices or customs or studies or types of scientific understanding? For how could theorems be proportional to each other? If it is because they are in concord, it is also the case that there is agreement or concord among bad theorems. For example, to say ‘self-control is stupidity’ and ‘justice is laughable nobility’ is to say two things that are in concord, or in tune, or agree with each other.

Further, then, the beauty of soul just is its virtues and a beauty that is truer than the previous ones. But how are these proportioned? It is not

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7 See Pl., Symp. 211C3.
8 This is in particular the Stoic view, although it was widely held by others as well. See SVF 3.278 (= Stob., Ed. 62.15); 279 (= Cicero, Tusc. 4.13.30); 472 (= Galen, De plac. Hip. et Plat. 5.3). Also, Pl., Tim. 87C4 D8; Ar., Meta. 13.3.1078a36 b1.
9 Cf. 6.7.22.24 26.
10 See Pl., Symp. 210C3 7, 211C6.
11 See Pl., Rep. 348C11 12, 560D2 3; Gorg. 491E2.
as magnitudes or numbers that they are proportioned. And since there are several parts of the soul, what is the formula for the combination or the blending of the parts or of the theorems? And what would be the beauty of Intellect taking it in isolation?

§ 1.6.2. Taking up the matter again, let us say what, then, is the primary beauty in bodies. There is, of course, something that is perceived at first glance, and the soul speaks about it as it does about that with which it is familiar, and takes it in as something that it recognizes and, in a way, is in concord with it. But when it encounters the ugly, it holds back and rejects it and recoils from it as something with which it is not in harmony and as something that is alien to it.\(^{12}\) We indeed say that the soul, having the nature it does, and finding itself among Beings in the presence of the greater Substantiality,\(^{13}\) when it sees something to which it has a kinship\(^{14}\) or something that is a trace of that to which it has a kinship, is both delighted and thrilled and returns to itself and recollects itself and what belongs to itself.

What sameness is there, then, between the things here and the things that are beautiful in the intelligible world? For if there is a sameness, then we assume that the things are the same. How, then, are things here and there both beautiful? We say that these are beautiful by participation in Form. For everything that is shapeless but is by nature capable of receiving shape or form, having no share in a expressed principle or form, is ugly, and stands outside divine reason.\(^{15}\) This is complete ugliness.\(^{16}\)

But something is also ugly if it has not been mastered by shape and an expressed principle due to the fact that its matter has not allowed itself to be shaped completely according to form.\(^{17}\) The form, then, approaches the matter and organizes what is going to be a single composite made from many parts, and guides it into being a completed unity, and makes it one by the parts’ acceptance of this; and since the form is one, that which is shaped had to be one, to the extent possible for that which is composed of many parts.

Beauty is, then, situated over that which is shaped at the moment when, the parts having been arranged into one whole, it gives itself to the parts and to the wholes. Whenever beauty takes hold of something that is one and uniform in its parts, it gives the identical thing to the

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\(^{12}\) See Pl., Symp. 206D6.

\(^{13}\) Substance in the intelligible world is greater than substance in the sensible world. When the soul finds itself among Forms and undescended intellects, it finds itself in the presence of Substantiality.

\(^{14}\) See Pl., Phd. 79D3; Rep. 611E2; Tim. 90A5 7. \(^{15}\) See Pl., Tim. 50D7.

\(^{16}\) Cf. 1.8.9.14 18; 3.6.11.15 27. \(^{17}\) See Ar., GC 4.3.769b12, 4.770b16 17.

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whole. It is, in a way, like craftsmanship, that sometimes gives beauty to a whole house along with its parts, but sometimes it is like the particular nature that gives beauty to a single stone. Thus, a body actually comes to be beautiful by its association with an expressed principle coming from divine Forms.

§1.6.3. The power in the soul that has been made to correspond to beauty recognizes it, and there is nothing more authoritative in judging its own concerns, especially when the rest of the soul judges along with it. Perhaps the rest of the soul also expresses itself by bringing into concord the beautiful object with the form inside itself, using that for judgement like a ruler used to judge the straightness of something.

But how does the beauty in the body harmonize with that which is prior to body? How can the architect, bringing into concord the external house with the form of the house internal to him, claim that the former is beautiful?

In fact, it is because the external house is – if you consider it apart from its stones – the inner form divided by the external mass of matter. Being in fact undivided, it appears divided into many parts. Whenever, then, sense-perception sees the form in the bodies binding together and mastering the contrary nature, which is shapeless – that is, whenever it sees an overarching shape on top of other shapes – it gathers together that which was in many places and brings it back and collects it into the soul’s interior as something without parts, and at that moment gives it to that which is inside as something which has the harmony and concord that is dear to it. This is just as when a good man sees in the fresh face of a youth a trace of the virtue that is in harmony with the truth that is inside himself.

The simple beauty of a colour resides in shape and in the mastery of the darkness in matter by the presence of incorporeal light and of an expressed principle or form. This is the reason why fire, above all the other bodies, is beautiful; it has the role of form in relation to the other elements, highest in position, finest of the other bodies, being as close as possible to the incorporeal, and is alone not receptive of the other elements, though the others receive it. For it heats them, but is itself not cooled, and is primarily coloured, whereas the others get the form of colour from it. So, it shines and glows as if it were form. That which fades in a fire’s light, unable to dominate the matter, is no longer beautiful, since the whole of it does not partake of the form of the colour.

18 Presumably, the nature that is the ensouled earth. Cf. 6.7.11.17 36.
19 See Ar., GC 2.8.335a18 21. 20 Reading ὅλον with Kalligas.
As for the non-sensible harmonies in sounds that make the sensible ones, they make the soul grasp them so as to have comprehension of beauty in the same way, showing the identical thing in another way. It is logical that sensible harmonies be measured by numbers, though not by every formula but only by one that serves in the production of form for the purpose of dominating the matter. And so regarding sensible beauties, which are actually reflections and shadows that come to matter as if they were making a dash there to beautify it and thrill us when they appear, enough said.

§1.6.4. Regarding the more elevated beauties not given to sense-perception to see, soul sees them and speaks about them without the instruments of sense-perception, but it has to ascend to contemplate them, leaving sense-perception down below. But just as in the case of the beauties perceived by the senses it is not possible to speak about them to those who have not seen them or to those who have never grasped them for what they are, for example, those who have been blind since birth; in the same way, it is not possible to speak about the beauty of practices to those who have not accepted their beauty nor about types of sciences and other such things. Nor can one speak about the ‘splendour’ of virtue to those who have not even imagined for themselves the beauty of the visage of Justice and Self-Control, ‘not even the evening nor the morning star as so beautiful’. But such a sight must be reserved for those who see it with that in the soul by which it sees such things, and seeing it are delighted and shocked and overwhelmed much more than in the previous cases, inasmuch as we are now speaking of those who have already got hold of true beauties. For these are the states one should be in regarding something which is beautiful: astonishment, and sweet shock, and longing, and erotic thrill, and pleasurable excitement. It is possible to have these emotions, and practically all souls do have them in regard to all the unseen beauties, so to say, but in particular those souls who are more enamoured of these. It is the same with regard to the bodies that all can see, though not everyone is ‘stung’ equally by their beauty. Those who are stung especially are those who are called ‘lovers’.

21 See Heraclitus, fr. 22 B 54 DK.
22 See Pl., Symp. 210B6 D1; Alcinous, Didask. 157.16 20, 165.27 30.
23 See Pl., Phdr. 250B3.
25 Cf. 6.7.36.4, 39.19; 6.9.4.27. See Pl., Symp. 206D8, 212A4 5; Phdr. 259B8; Rep. 572A8, 600C6, 608A7.
26 See Pl., Phdr. 251D5.
§1.6.5. We should next ask those who are indeed enamoured of the beauties not available to the senses: ‘What state are you in regarding the practices said to be beautiful and in regard to beautiful ways of being in the world and to self-controlled characters and, generally, to products of virtue or dispositions, I mean the beauty of souls?’ And ‘When you see your own “interior beauty”, what do you feel?’ And ‘Can you describe the frenzied and excited state you are in and your longing to be united with yourselves, when extricating yourselves from your bodies?’ For this is how those who are truly enamoured feel.

But what is it that makes them feel this way? It is not shapes or colours or some magnitude, but rather they feel this way about soul, it being itself ‘without colour’ and having self-control that is also without colour and the rest of the ‘splendour’ of virtues. You feel this way whenever you see in yourselves or someone else greatness of soul or a just character or sheer self-control or the awe-inspiring visage of courage or dignity and reserve circling around a calm and unaffected disposition with divine intellect shining on them all.

We then love and are attracted to these qualities, but what do we mean when we say that they are beautiful? For they are real and appear to us so, and no one who has ever seen them says anything other than that they are real Beings. What does ‘real Beings’ mean? In fact, it means that they are beautiful Beings. But the argument still needs to show why Beings have made the soul an object of love. What is it that shines on all the virtues like a light?

Would you like to consider the opposites, the ugly things that come to be in the soul, and contrast them with the beauties? For perhaps a consideration of what ugliness is and why it appears as such would contribute to our achieving what we are seeking. Let there be a soul that is actually ugly, one that is licentious and unjust, filled with all manner of appetites and every type of dread, mired in fear due to its cowardice and in envy due to its pettiness, thinking that everything it can actually think of is mortal and base, deformed in every way, a lover of impure pleasures, that is, one who lives a life in which corporeal pleasures are measured by their vileness. Shall we not say that, just as in the case of something beautiful added to the soul, this very vileness supervenes on the soul, and both harms it and makes it impure and ‘mixed with much evil’, no longer having a life or sense-perceptions that are pure, but rather living a murky life by an evil adulteration that

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33 Presumably, a reference to our undescended intellects.

includes much death in it, no longer seeing what a soul should see, no longer even being allowed to remain in itself due to its always being dragged to the exterior and downward into darkness.\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Phd.} 79C2 8.} This is indeed what I regard as an impure soul, dragged in every direction by its chains towards whatever it happens to perceive with its senses, with much of what belongs to the body adulterating it, deeply implicating itself with the material element and, taking that element into itself due to that adulteration that only makes it worse, it exchanges the form it has for another. It is as if someone fell into mud or slime and the beauty he had is no longer evident, whereas what is seen is what he smeared on himself from the mud or slime. The ugliness that has actually been added to him has come from an alien source, and his job, if indeed he is again to be beautiful, is to wash it off and to be clean as he was before.

We would be speaking correctly in saying that the soul indeed becomes ugly by a mixture or adulteration and by an inclination in the direction of the body and matter. And this is ugliness for a soul; not being pure or uncorrupted like gold, but filled up with the earthly. If someone removes that, only the gold is left, and it is beautiful, isolated from other things and being just what it is itself. Indeed, in the identical manner, the soul – being isolated from appetites which it acquires because of that body with which it associates too much – when it is separated from other affections and is purified of what it has that is corporeal, remains just what it is when it has put aside all the ugliness that comes from that other nature.

§ 1.6.6. For it is indeed the case, as the ancient doctrine\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Phd.} 69C1 6.} has it, that self-control and courage and every virtue is a purification and is wisdom itself. For this reason, the mysteries correctly offer the enigmatic saying that one who has not been purified will lie in Hades in slime, because one who is not pure likes slime due to his wickedness. They are actually like pigs that, with unclean bodies, delight in such a thing.\footnote{See Heraclitus, fr. 22 B. 13 DK; Sext. Emp. \textit{PH} I 56.}

What would true self-control be, besides not having anything to do with the pleasures of the body and fleeing them as impure and as not belonging to one who is pure? And what is courage but the absence of fear of death? But death is the separation of the soul from the body.\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Phd.} 64C2 65A3.} And this is not feared by one who longs to be alone. And greatness of soul\footnote{See Ar., \textit{EN} 2.7.1107b22, 4.7.1123a34 b4.} is actually contempt for the things here below. And wisdom is the intellation that consists in a turning away from the things below, leading the soul to the things above.
The soul, then, when it is purified, becomes form, and an expressed principle, and entirely incorporeal and intellectual and wholly divine, which is the source of beauty and of all things that have a kinship with it. Soul, then, being borne up to Intellect, becomes even more beautiful. And Intellect and the things that come from Intellect are soul’s beauty, since they belong to it, that is, they are not alien to it, because it is then really soul alone. For this reason, it is correctly said that goodness and being beautiful for the soul consist in ‘being assimilated to god’, because it is in the intelligible world that Beauty is found as well as the fate of the rest of Beings. Or rather, Beings are what Beauty is and ugliness is the other nature, primary evil itself, so that for god ‘good’ and ‘beautiful’ are identical, or rather the Good and Beauty are identical.

In a similar way, then, we should seek to discover that which is beautiful and good and the ugly and evil. And first we should posit Beauty, which is the Good from which Intellect comes, which is itself identical with Beauty. And Soul is beautiful by Intellect. Other things are beautiful as soon as they are shaped by Soul, including examples of beauty in actions and in practices. Moreover, bodies that are said to be beautiful are so as soon as Soul makes them so. For inasmuch as it is divine and, in a way, a part of Beauty, it makes all that it grasps and masters beautiful insofar as it is possible for them to partake of Beauty.

§ 1.6.7. We must, then, ascend to the Good, which every soul desires. If someone, then, has seen it, he knows what I mean when I say how beautiful it is. For it is desired as good, and the desire is directed to it as this, though the attainment of it is for those who ascend upward and revert to it and who divest themselves of the garments they put on when they descended. It is just like those who ascend to partake of the sacred religious rites where there are acts of purification and the stripping off of the cloaks they had worn before they go inside naked. One proceeds in the ascent, passing by all that is alien to the god until one sees by oneself alone that which is itself alone uncorrupted, simple, and pure, that which is beyond Beauty because it is beyond Substantiality (cf. 6.2.18.1 3; 67.32.22) and identical with Beauty because it is the cause of all that is beautiful, that is, the Forms.

41 Or ‘Form’. Cf. 5.7 on Forms of individuals.
42 See Pl., Rep. 613B1; Tbt. 176B1; Lg. 716C6 D4.
43 The Good is both beyond Beauty because it is beyond Substantiality (cf. 6.2.18.1 3; 67.32.22) and identical with Beauty because it is the cause of all that is beautiful, that is, the Forms.
44 The unusual term here is ἡ καλλονή who appears as a goddess in Plato’s Symp. 206D. Cf. 6.2.18.1 3; 67.33.22.
45 See Pl., Rep. 517B4 5.
46 See Pl., Gorg. 523C E.
47 Cf. 5.1.6.11 12; 6.7.34.7 8; 6.9.11.51. See Pl., Symp. 211E1.
upon which everything depends, and in relation to which one looks and exists and lives and thinks. For it is the cause of life and intellect. And, then, if someone sees this, what pangs of love will he feel, what longings and, wanting to be united with it, how would he not be overcome with pleasure?

For though it is possible for one who has not yet seen it to desire it as good, for one who has seen it, there is amazement and delight in beauty, and he is filled with pleasure and he undergoes a painless shock, loving with true love and piercing longing. And he laughs at other loves and is disdainful of the things he previously regarded as beautiful. It is like the states of those who have happened upon apparitions of gods or daemons after which they can no longer look at the beauty of other bodies in the same way.

What, then, should we think if someone sees pure Beauty itself by itself, not contaminated by flesh or bodies, not on the earth or in heaven, in order that it may remain pure? For all these things are added on and have been mixed in and are not primary; rather, they come from the Good. If, then, one sees that which orchestrates everything, remaining by itself while it gives everything, though it does not receive anything into itself, if he remains in sight of this and enjoys it by assimilating himself to it, what other beauty would he need? For this, since it is itself supremely beautiful and the primary Beauty, makes its lovers beautiful and lovable.

And with the Good as the prize the greatest and ‘ultimate battle is indeed set before souls’, a battle in which our entire effort is directed towards not being deprived of the most worthy vision. And the one who attains this is ‘blessed’, since he is seeing a blessed sight, whereas the one who does not is luckless. For it is not someone who fails to attain beautiful colours or bodies, or power or ruling positions or kingship who is without luck, but the one who does not attain this and this alone. For the sake of this, he ought to cede the attainment of kingship and ruling positions over the whole earth, sea, and heaven, if by abandoning these things and ignoring them he could revert to the Good and see it.

48 Cf. 3.8.10.1 4; 5.3.16.35 38; 6.7.18.16 31. See Ar., DC 1.9.279a28 30; Meta. 12.7.1071b14.
49 Reading ἄν <ὅκ> ἐκπλαγεῖν with HS4. Cf. 6.7.27.24 28.
50 See Pl., Symp. 211A8, 211D8 E2.
52 See Pl., Phdr. 250B6.
53 Or: ἄτυχός δὲ <ὁντως> ‘truly’ luckless, according to the emendation of Vitringa, endorsed by Kalligas.
§1.6.8. How, then, can we do this? What technique should we employ? How can one see the ‘inconceivable beauty’ which remains in a way within the sacred temple, not venturing outside, lest the uninitiated should see it? Indeed, let him who is able go and follow it inside, leaving outside the sight of his eyes, not allowing himself to turn back to the splendour of the bodies he previously saw. For when he does see beauty in bodies, he should not run after them, but realize that they are images and traces and shadows, and flee towards that of which they are images. For if someone runs towards the image, wanting to grasp it as something true, like someone wanting to grasp a beautiful reflection in water – as a certain story has it, hinting at something else, in an enigmatic way, I think, who then falls into the water and disappears – in the identical manner, someone who holds on to beautiful bodies and does not let them go plunges down, not with his body but with his soul, into the depths, where there is no joy for an intellect, and where he stays, blind in Hades, accompanied by shadows everywhere he turns.

Someone would be better advised to say: ‘let us flee to our beloved fatherland’. But what is this flight, and how is it accomplished? Let us set sail in the way Homer, in an allegorical way, I think, tells us that Odysseus fled from the sorceress Circe or from Calypso. Odysseus was not satisfied to remain there, even though he had visual pleasures and passed his time with sensual beauty. Our fatherland, from where we have actually come, and our father are both in the intelligible world.

What is our course and what is our means of flight? We should not rely on our feet to get us there, for our feet just take us everywhere on earth, one place after another. Nor should you saddle up a horse or prepare some sea-going vessel. You should put aside all such things and stop looking; just shut your eyes, and change your way of looking, and wake up. Everyone has this ability, but few use it.

§1.6.9. What, then, is that inner way of looking? Having just awakened, the soul is not yet able to look at the bright objects before it. The soul must first be accustomed to look at beautiful practices, next beautiful works – not those works that the crafts produce, but those that men who

56 Cf. 5.8.2-14, 35. 57 See Homer, Il. 2.140.
58 The word αἰνίττεσθαι (often rendered ‘to riddle’, ‘to speak enigmatically’) seems to be rendered best in the above manner.
59 Πατήρ (‘father’) sometimes refers to the One and sometimes to Intellect. Cf. 5.1.1.1; 5.8.1.3.
60 Cf. 4.3.24. 61 Cf. 5.8.10,4. 8. See Pl., Rep. 515E1 516A8.
are called ‘good’ produce – next, to look at the soul of those who produce these beautiful works.\(^\text{62}\)

How, then, can you see the kind of beauty that a good soul has? Go back into yourself and look. If you do not yet see yourself as beautiful, then be like a sculptor who, making a statue that is supposed to be beautiful, removes a part here and polishes a part there so that he makes the latter smooth and the former just right until he has given the statue a beautiful face. In the same way, you should remove superfluities and straighten things that are crooked, work on the things that are dark, making them bright, and not stop ‘working on your statue’\(^\text{63}\) until the divine splendour of virtue shines in you, until you see ‘Self-Control enthroned on the holy seat’.\(^\text{64}\)

If you have become this and have seen it and find yourself in a purified state, you have no impediment to becoming one in this way\(^\text{65}\) nor do you have something else mixed in with yourself, but you are entirely yourself, true light alone, neither measured by magnitude nor reduced by a circumscribing shape nor expanded indefinitely in magnitude but being unmeasured everywhere, as something greater than every measure and better than every quantity. If you see that you have become this, at that moment you have become sight, and you can be confident about yourself, and you have at this moment ascended here, no longer in need of someone to show you. Just open your eyes and see, for this alone is the eye that sees the great beauty.

But if the eye approaches that sight bleary with vices and not having been purified, or weak and, due to cowardice, is not able to see all the bright objects, it does not see them even if someone else shows that they are present and able to be seen. For the one who sees has a kinship with that which is seen, and he must make himself the same as it if he is to attain the sight. For no eye has ever seen the sun without becoming sun-like,\(^\text{66}\) nor could a soul ever see Beauty without becoming beautiful. You must first actually become wholly god-like and wholly beautiful if you intend to see god and Beauty.

For first, the soul in its ascent will reach Intellect, and in the intelligible world it will see all the beautiful Forms and will declare that these Ideas are what Beauty is.\(^\text{67}\) For all things are beautiful due to these; they are the offsprings of Intellect and Substantiality. But we say that that which transcends\(^\text{68}\) Intellect is the Idea of the Good, a nature that holds

\(^{62}\) See Pl., Symp. 21o B C. \(^{63}\) See Pl., Phdr. 252 D7. \(^{64}\) See Pl., Phdr. 254 B7.

\(^{65}\) Cf. 1.3.4.18. See Pl., Rep. 443 E1.

\(^{66}\) Cf. 2.4.5.10; 5.3.8.19 25. See Pl., Rep. 508 B3, 509 A1.

\(^{67}\) Plotinus uses ἔδη (‘Forms’) and ἰδέαι (‘Ideas’) synonymously as, apparently, does Plato. Cf. 5.8.10.

\(^{68}\) See Pl., Rep. 509 B9; Simplicius, In Cat. 485.22 (= fr. 49 Rose³, p. 57 Ross).
Beauty in front of itself. So, roughly speaking, the Good is the primary Beauty. But if one distinguishes the intelligibles apart, one will say that the ‘place’ of the Forms is intelligible Beauty, whereas the Good transcends that and is the ‘source and principle’ of Beauty. Otherwise, one will place the Good and the primary Beauty in the identical thing. In any case, Beauty is in the intelligible world.

69 See Pl., Rep. 517B5; Ar., DA 3.4.429a27 28.
70 See Pl., Phdr. 245C9.
71 See Pl. [?], Alc. I 116C1 2.
1.7 (54)
On the Primary Good
and on the Other Goods

I N T R O D U C T I O N
This is apparently the last treatise Plotinus wrote before his death. It is a sort of addendum to 1.4 (46), ‘On Happiness’, focusing on the metaphysical foundation of his ethical philosophy. Here he insists, against Aristotle, that this foundation must be an absolutely transcendent Idea of the Good.

S U M M A R Y
§1. The primacy of the Good and its priority to the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle.
§2. The way in which all things share in the Good.
§3. The problem of evil in relation to living and dying.
§1.7.1. Could one say that the good for each thing is different, or rather that it is the activity of the life according to nature? In addition, if a thing is composed of many parts, is the good for this thing the proper activity of the better part in it and of that which is according to nature and never missing anything? Yes, the activity of soul is its natural good. And if something were to act for what is in fact the best, not only is the best the good for it, but it is itself unqualifiedly the Good. If, then, something were to act not for something else, since this is the best among Beings, or transcending them, and since it is in relation to it that the other things act, it is clear that this would be the Good because of which it is possible for the others to partake of good.

Other things which have the Good like this, have it in two ways, by assimilating themselves to it, and by directing their activity towards it. If, then, desire and activity towards that which is best is good, the Good must not look to something else nor be desirous of something else, but be in tranquillity, ‘the spring and source of activities’ according to nature, and make other things Good-like not by an activity in relation to them, for it is they that are active in relation to it. It is not due to activity or thinking that it is the Good, but by remaining in itself. And because it transcends Substantiality, it also transcends activity and transcends Intellect and thinking. For, once more, we must posit the Good to be that upon which all things depend, whereas it depends on nothing. For in this way it is true that it is ‘that which all things desire’.

1 Stobaeus Ed., 130.19 21; Alex Aph., Prob. etb. 143.18 23.
2 See Ar., EN 1.8.1098b14 16, 10.7.1177a12 17.
3 See Pl., Rep. 526E3 4 where the Good is said to be ‘the happiest among Beings’.
4 Cf. 1.1.11.2 8, 12.1 2. See Pl., Phdr. 245C9.
7 See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b14. See Ar., EN 1.1.1094a3.
It must, then, remain, and all things must revert to it, like the centre of a circle from which all the radii come. And the sun is also a paradigm of this, like the centre of the circle in relation to the light coming from it, and dependent on it. For the light is really everywhere with it and is not cut off from it. Even if you wanted to cut it off at one end, the light remains with the sun.

§1.7.2. But how are all the other things related to the Good?

In fact, things without soul are related to Soul, and Soul is related to it through Intellect. And things have something of it by each of them being one in a certain way, and by existing in a certain way. And they partake of form, too. And as they, then, partake of unity, being, and form, so they partake of the Good. They, therefore, partake of an image. For what they partake of are images of Being and the One, and their form is likewise. But living is by Soul, which comes immediately after Intellect, and it is nearer the truth [than inanimate things], and it is Good-like by means of Intellect. It could have the Good if it were to look to it. But Intellect comes immediately after the Good. So, life for whatever is living is that which is good, and intellect for whatever shares in Intellect is that which is good for it. So, whatever has life along with intellect is related to the Good in two ways.

§1.7.3. If life is indeed a good, does this belong to everything that is living?

In fact, it does not. For the life of the bad limps, like an eye that cannot see clearly. For it is not doing its job.

Actually, if our life, mixed as it is with evil, is good, how is death not an evil? But for whom? For the evil has to belong to someone. But for what is existing no longer or, if it exists, is deprived of life, there is no evil any more than there is evil for a stone. But if there is life and soul after death, there would then be good in it, to the extent that the soul actualizes more what belongs to it without the body. But if it becomes part of the universal Soul, what evil would there be for it when it is in the intelligible world? And, generally, just as with the gods there is good but nothing evil, so there is no evil for the soul that preserves its purity. But if it were not to preserve it, it is not death that would be an evil for it, but life. Even if there are punishments in Hades, again, its life will be evil there, too, because it is not simply life.

But if life is a joining together of soul and body and death is their dissolution, soul will be receptive of both of these. But if life is good, how will death not be an evil?

11 See Pl., Tim. 44C2 3.
12 See Pl., Gorg. 524B2 4; Phd. 67D4 5; Alcinous, Didask. 177.39 41.
In fact, life is good for those for whom it is good, not insofar as there is a joining with the body, but because evil is avoided through virtue. But death is more of a good.

And in fact, it should be said that the evil comes from life in a body, whereas the soul comes to its good by virtue, not when it lived in the composite, but as soon as it has separated itself from that.
In this treatise, Plotinus addresses the problem of the existence of evil given the omnipotence of the Good. He argues against the interpretation of Plato according to which evil is somehow a principle independent of the Good which would establish what Plotinus takes to be an unjustifiable dualism. He argues here extensively for the identification of evil with matter, crucially rejecting Aristotle’s distinction between potency and privation. Matter is both pure potency and unqualified privation which disqualifies it from being a separate principle although at the same time making it an inevitable result of the outflow of the universe from the Good or the One. Where all trace of intelligibility ceases, there matter must be.

SUMMARY
§1. What is evil and how is it known?
§2. There can be no evil in the intelligible world.
§3. It must, therefore, be absolutely bereft of intelligibility and measure.
§4. Bodies are evil only in the element of unintelligibility which they necessarily possess and souls are evil only insofar as they associate with the evil in bodies.
§5. Matter is unqualified privation and so evil.
§6. Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus 176A in relation to the problem of evil.
§8. Evils in the soul are vice and they arise from the association with matter.
§9. How can that which is utterly unintelligible be known?
§10. Matter is evil because it is without any qualities.
§11. Evil does not belong to the soul.
§12. Evil is not partial privation.
§13. The distinction between evil and vice.
§14. Vice is psychical illness.
§15. Evil and the Good.
§ 1.8.1. Those who are seeking to discover where evils come from – whether they belong among beings in general or to a particular genus of beings – would be making an appropriate start to their search if they first offered a hypothesis as to what evil is, that is, what its nature is. For in this way it would also be known where evil comes from and where it is located and in what sort of thing it occurs, and, in general, some agreement could be arrived at as to whether it is something that exists.

But if it is the case that we understand each thing by being the same as it, we would be at a loss to know by what capacity we know the nature of evil, for intellect and soul, being forms, would produce the knowledge of Forms, and would have a desire for these. Yet how could one imagine that evil is a Form, when it is situated in the absence of every good? If, however, the scientific understanding of one contrary is identical to the scientific understanding of what is contrary to it, and evil is contrary to good, the scientific understanding of good will be of evil, too; so, it is necessary for those who intend to know evils to comprehend good, since the better precedes the worse, that is, among Forms, and some of the worse are not Forms but rather a privation of Form. It is, all the same, a matter for investigation how good is contrary to evil, with perhaps one a beginning and the other an end, or the one as Form the other privation. But these questions will be addressed later.

§ 1.8.2. Now we should say what the nature of the Good is to the extent that is appropriate for the present discussion. The Good is that upon which all beings depend and that ‘which all beings desire’; they have it as their principle and are also in need of it. It itself lacks nothing, being

1 See Ar., DA 1.2. 404b17 18, 405.b15 19; 3.8.432a2 3. In knowing Forms, we are cognitively identical with them.
2 See Pl., Phd. 97D4 5; Ar., Pr. An. 1.24a21 22. 3 Cf. infra 3 and following.
4 See Pl., Phil. 20D8; Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b14; EN 1.1.1094a3.
sufficient unto itself and in need of nothing. It is also the measure and 
limit of all beings, giving from itself Intellect and Substantiality and 
Soul and Life and the activity of Intellect. And all of these up to the 
Good are beautiful, but it itself is above Beauty and is the transcendent 
ruler of all that is best, all that is in the intelligible world.\(^5\) Intellect there is not like the intellects we are said to have, intellects that are filled with 
propositions and are capable of understanding things that are said and of 
calculative reasoning and so observing what follows, intellects which 
consequently observe beings that they did not formerly possess, since 
they were empty before learning them, despite being intellects.

Intellect there is actually not like that; rather, it has all things and is all 
things and is present with them when it is present to itself and has all things 
while not having them, for they are not one thing and it another. Nor is 
each thing separate in it. For each is the whole, and everything is every-
where. Yet they are not mixed up, but each is in its turn separate. At least, 
that which shares in it does not share in all of them in the same way, but 
rather in the way that it is able to share. Intellect is the primary activity that 
comes from the Good,\(^6\) and the primary Substance that comes from it, 
while it remains in itself. But Intellect is active with reference to the Good, 
in a way living around it.\(^7\) Soul dances outside this, looking at it and, in 
contemplating its interior, looks at god through Intellect.

And ‘this is the life of the gods’,\(^8\) carefree and blessed, and evil is 
nowhere here. And if [the procession] had stopped here, there would be 
no evil but only the first and the second and the third order of goods. ‘All 
things are around the king of all, and that is the cause of all beauties, and 
all things come from that, and second things are around the second, and 
third things around the third.’\(^9\)

§1.8.3. Indeed, if all that exists were these Beings and what transcends 
them, evil would not exist among Beings, or in what transcends them. 
For these Beings are good. So, it remains that if indeed evil does exist, it 
exists among non-beings as a sort of form of non-being and is involved 
in some way with that which is mixed or associated with non-being. ‘Non-being’ does not mean ‘that which is absolutely non-existent’ but 
only something different from being.\(^10\) Nor does it refer to the non-
being that Motion and Rest have in relation to Being but rather to an 
image of Being or to something that has even more non-being than that.\(^11\) This non-being belongs to every sensible object and every state

\(^{5}\) See Pl., \textit{Rep.} \textit{509B}9. \(^{6}\) Cf. \textit{5.3.5.36}; \textit{6.7.40.18}.

\(^{7}\) Cf. \textit{6.9.9.17}. See Ar., \textit{Meta.} \textit{12.7.1072b}19 \textit{23.9.1074b}21 \textit{1075a}5.

\(^{8}\) See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} \textit{248A}1. \(^{9}\) See Pl. [?], \textit{2nd Ep.} \textit{312E}1 \textit{4}.

\(^{10}\) Cf. \textit{2.4.16.1} 4. See Pl., \textit{Parm.} \textit{162A}4 \textit{B}3; \textit{Soph.} \textit{257B}3 \textit{4} \textit{258E}7 \textit{9}.

\(^{11}\) See Pl., \textit{Soph.} \textit{240B}11.
sensible objects are in, whether as something posterior to or accidental to them or as a principle of these or as some one of the elements that together comprise being of this sort.

On this basis, someone might immediately arrive at a conception of evil as a sort of absence of measure as opposed to measure, or absence of limit as opposed to limit, or absence of form as opposed to what is productive of form, or what is always in need as opposed to what is self-sufficient; always indefinite, in no way stable, absolutely passive, insatiable, and completely impoverished. And these properties are not accidental to it, but in a way its substantiality. Whichever part of it you look at, it, too, is all these things. All other things that partake of evil and are assimilated to it become evil, though they are not essentially evil.

What, then, is the sort of existent in which these properties are present, not as being something different from it, but as being identical with what it is? For indeed if evil occurs in something else, it must be something prior to that occurrence, even if it is not a substance. For just as the Good itself is one thing and the property of being good another, so evil is one thing and the property of being evil, which immediately derives from that, another.

What, then, is absence of measure if it is not just whatever is in that which is without measure? But just as there is measure that is not in that which is measured, so there is absence of measure that is not in that which is without measure. For if it is in something else, either it is in that which is without measure – but this thing does not need to partake of the absence of measure, since it is unmeasured – or it is in that which is measured. But it is not possible for that which is measured to have absence of measure, just to the extent that it is measured.

And then, there must be something that is absence of limit in itself and, again, absence of form in itself and all the other properties mentioned above which characterize the nature of evil. And if there is something like it that comes after it, either it has evil mixed in with it, or it looks towards evil and so is like it, or it is productive of this sort of thing. So, the substrate of figures and forms and shapes and measures and limits and whatever is ordered by an ordering alien to it, not having good from itself, but being like a reflection in relation to beings – that is actually the substantiality of evil, if indeed something can be the substantiality of evil. The argument has found this to be primary evil or evil itself.

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12 Plotinus will identify this with matter. Cf. 3.6.7.23 30.
13 This is ‘secondary evil’, that is, anything mixed with primary evil (i.e., matter). Cf. 2.4.12.8 10.
§1.8.4. It is the nature of bodies, insofar as they partake of matter, to be evil, but not to be primary evil. For bodies have some form, though it is not genuine, and they are deprived of life, and they destroy each other, and their motion is disordered and they are an ‘impediment’\(^\text{14}\) to the soul in regard to its own activity, and they flee substantiality inasmuch as they are continually in flux, and so they are secondary evil.

But soul in itself is not evil nor, again, is all soul evil. What is the evil soul? It is the sort of thing Plato is referring to when he says: ‘those who have been enslaved by the part of the soul that naturally brings evils to it’,\(^\text{15}\) because the non-rational form of the soul is receptive of evil, that is, of absence of measure, and of excess and defect, from which also come licentiousness and cowardice and the other evils of the soul, and involuntary states which produce false beliefs, and the thinking that evils and goods are what it is actually fleeing and pursuing.

But what is it that produces this evil, and how will you connect it to its principle or cause?\(^\text{16}\)

In fact, first, this type of soul does not transcend matter, nor does it exist in itself. It has, then, been mixed with absence of measure and is without a share in the form that orders it and connects it to measure, for it is mixed up with a body that has matter.

Next, the faculty of calculative reasoning, if it is harmed, is prevented by these corporeal states from seeing, and by being darkened by matter and inclined to matter and, generally, by looking not towards substantiality but towards becoming, whose principle is in this way the nature of matter. Being evil, it fills with its own evil even that which is never in it, but is only looking at it. For since it is absolutely without a share of good and is a privation or unmixed lack of it, it assimilates to itself everything that comes into contact with it in any way.

The soul, then, that is perfect and inclines towards Intellect is always pure and turns away from matter and all that is indefinite and without measure and neither sees evil nor approaches it. It, then, remains pure when it is absolutely made definite by Intellect. That which does not remain like this but proceeds from itself by not being perfect or primary is like a reflection of that pure soul, due to its deficiency, just to the extent that it is deficient, and is filled up with indeterminateness and sees darkness and at that moment acquires matter and looks at that which it does not see – in the sense that we talk about seeing darkness, too.

\(^{14}\) See Pl., Phd. 65A10. \(^{15}\) See Pl., Phdr. 256B2 3.
§1.8.5. But if the lack of that which is good is the explanation of seeing and consorting with darkness, evil would consist in the lack that is in the soul and would be primarily there – let the darkness be evil secondarily – and the nature of evil will no longer be in matter but in that which is prior to matter.

In fact, evil consists not in any particular type of lack but in absolute lack. At least, that which is slightly lacking with respect to that which is good is not evil, for it is still able to be perfect according to its own nature. But when something is absolutely lacking – which is what matter is – this is really evil, having no share of good.\(^\text{16}\) For matter does not even have existence, which would have allowed it to partake of good to this extent; rather, we say that ‘existence’ is said of it equivocally, so that the true way to speak of it is as non-existent.\(^\text{17}\)

Lack, then, amounts to not being good, but evil is absolute lack. The greater lack consists in being able to fall into evil and thereby being evil already.\(^\text{18}\) Accordingly, it is necessary to think of evil not as a particular evil, such as injustice or some other kind of vice, but as that which yet is none of these, since these are in a way species of evil specified by their own additional \(\text{[differentiae]}\). For example, wickedness in the soul and its species are differentiated either by the matter with which they are concerned or by the parts of the soul or by one being a sort of seeing and one an impulse or state.

But if someone were to suppose that things outside the soul, like sickness or poverty, can be evils, how will he connect it to the nature of matter?

In fact, sickness is a lack or excess in the materialized bodies that do not maintain order or measure.\(^\text{19}\) Ugliness is matter not conquered by form, and poverty is a lack or privation of that which we need due to the matter to which we are joined, a nature that has neediness.

If this is indeed rightly stated, the principle of evils should not be supposed to be in the evils that are within ourselves but to be prior to us. Whatever evils take hold of human beings, they take hold of us unwillingly.\(^\text{20}\) Indeed, there is a ‘flight from evils in the soul’\(^\text{21}\) for those who are able, though not all are able.

Though matter is present to the sensible gods,\(^\text{22}\) evil is not present, I mean the vice which human beings have, because that is not even

\(^{16}\) See Pl., \textit{Phil. 20D1}, 54C10, 60B4.

\(^{17}\) Cf. \textit{supra} 3.6 7; \textit{infra} 15.1 3; 2.4.11.1 12,28.

\(^{18}\) Following the punctuation of HS\(^1\) with a full stop before τη.

\(^{19}\) See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 81E 82B.

\(^{20}\) See Pl., \textit{Gorg.} 488A3; \textit{Prot.} 345D8, 358C7, 358E2 359A1; \textit{Rep.} 589C6; \textit{Tim.} 85D2, E1; \textit{Lg.} 73C2, 860D1 9. The evils are the types of wickedness mentioned \textit{supra} ll. 17 19.

\(^{21}\) See Pl., \textit{Phd.} 107D1. \textit{These are the heavenly bodies.}
present in all human beings. For these gods master matter – though the
gods in whom matter is not present are better – and they master it by
that in them which is not enmattered.

§1.8.6. We should investigate, too, what it means to say that evils are
not eliminable, but exist of necessity and why they do not exist among
gods but always inhabit ‘the mortal nature’ and ‘this region’. Does Plato mean that whereas heaven is always purified of evils – being borne
around in a regular manner and in order, and there being nothing of injustice there, nor of any other vice, nor do the heavenly bodies do injustice to each other since they are borne around in order – on earth there is injustice and disorder? For this is what he
means by ‘the mortal nature’ and ‘this region’. But when he says ‘fleeing from here’, he must no longer mean ‘fleeing from things on earth’. For the flight, he says, is not the removal of oneself from earth, but, being on earth, to be just and pious with wisdom, so that
what is meant is that one must flee evil, and what is evil for him is vice
and the things that result from vice. And when one of his interlocutors
remarks that evils are eliminable if Socrates were to persuade human
beings of what he says, he replies that ‘this is not possible, for evils
exist of necessity, since there must be something contrary to that
which is good’.

As for the vice which is in a human being, how is it possible for it to be
the contrary of the Good? For this is actually contrary to virtue, whereas
virtue is not the Good, but a good, which allows us to master matter. But
how could something be the contrary of the Good, for it actually has no
quality?

Next, what necessity is there that wherever there is one of the
contraries, there is the other? Suppose it is possible; indeed, let it be
the case that when one contrary exists, the other one exists, for example,
given that health exists, that it is possible that sickness exists. But it is
still not the case by necessity.

In fact, Plato does not say it is necessary in the case of every contrary
for this to be true, though he does say it about the Good.

But if the Good is Substance, or transcends Substance, how could there be a contrary of it? That there is no contrary substance in the
case of a particular substance has been shown securely by induction,
but this has not been shown generally for substance. What, then, will
be universally contrary to substance and, generally, to the primary
ones?

26 See Pl., Rep. 509B7 8; Ar., Cat. 5.3b24 25; Meta. 14.1.1087b2 3.
In fact, it is non-substance that is contrary to substance, and it is the
35 nature and principle of evil that is contrary to the nature of Good. For both are principles, the one of evils and the other of goods and every-
thing within each nature is a contrary of the other. So, wholes are 
contrary, and more contrary to each other than are the other contraries.
For the others are contraries either within the identical species or within
the identical genus, that is, with there being something common in
which they participate.\footnote{See Ar., Cat. 11.14315 16.}

But things that are separate, where one is the contrary by being the
30 complement of that which the other is, and where the contraries are in
different things, would they not be contraries most of all – if indeed
\textquoteleft those things are contraries that are most distant from each other\textquoteright?\footnote{See Ar., Cat. 6.6a17 18.}
Indeed, for limit and measure and everything else that is in divine
nature, these are contraries of lack of limit and lack of measure and
40 everything else that the nature of evil has. So, the whole is contrary to 
the whole. And evil’s existence contains something false, which is pri-
marily and really false; but the existence of the divine is true existence so 
that, just as false is the contrary of true, what is not in accordance with
substantiality is contrary to what is in accordance with it. So, we have
shown that it is not the case that there is no contrary to substance
anywhere.

Besides, even in the case of fire and water, we would allow them to be
45 contraries if they did not have matter in common in which hot and cold
and wet and dry turned up as accidents. But if, in their case, they had
only that which comprises the substantiality of each without the com-
mon matter, there would also have come to be a contrariety here, that of
substance to substance. Things, therefore, that have been separated and
50 have nothing in common and stand at the greatest distance from each
other in their natures are contraries. For their contrariety is due, not to
some quality or, generally, to their being members of some genus, but
exists insofar as they are separated from each other as much as possible
and is constructed from their being placed opposite to each other and
this produces the contraries.

§1.8.7. But how, then, is it necessary that, if the Good exists, so does
55 evil? Is it, then, because there must be matter in the universe? This
universe is indeed of necessity made of contraries.

In fact, these would not exist if matter did not. For ‘the nature of this
universe is a mixture of Intellect and of necessity’,\footnote{I.e., Intellect (the Demiurge) working on necessity. Cf. 3.2.5.25 32; 3.3.7.1 3. See Pl.,
Tim. 47E5 48A1.} and the things that
come into it from god are good, whereas evils come from ‘the archaic
nature’, meaning the material substrate before it has been ordered by some god. But how is Plato using ‘mortal nature’ given that by ‘this region’ he means the universe?  

In fact, the answer comes in the words ‘since you were generated, you are not immortal, but neither will you be destroyed by me’. If this is actually so, then it would be correctly stated that evils will never be destroyed. How, then, can we flee from them? Not by going to a different region, he says, but by possessing virtue and distancing oneself from the body. For in this way, one distances oneself from matter. At least, whoever consorts with the body is consorting with matter. Plato somewhere makes clear what separating oneself and not separating oneself means. ‘Being among the gods’ means being among the intelligibles. For these are the immortals.

It is also possible to grasp the necessity of evil in this way. Since the Good is not alone, there is necessarily in the procession which comes from it – or, if one wants, in the eternal descent and removal from it – a last point, and after this it would not be possible for anything else to come to be; and this is evil. That which comes after the first necessarily exists, so that the last must necessarily exist, too. But this is matter which has nothing more of the Good. And this is the necessity of evil.

§1.8.8. If someone were to say that it is not because of matter that we become evil – on the grounds that neither ignorance nor bad appetites are because of matter; and further, that if these conditions were to arise because of a defective body it would not be because of matter that they arise, but it is the form that does it, for example, heat, coldness, the bitter, the salty, and all the other humours, and in addition, saturations and purgations, and not simple saturations, but saturations of a certain sort, and, generally, a certain sort of quality producing the difference of appetites and, if you like, errors in beliefs, so that it is the form more than the matter that is evil – this person would be compelled no less to concede that matter is evil. For what quality does in matter, it does not do when it is separate, just as the shape of an axe does nothing without the iron.

Next, too, the forms in matter are not identical with what they would be if they existed by themselves, but rather are enmattered expressed principles corrupted and infected by that nature. For it is not fire itself that burns nor any of the other things that exist by themselves that do what they are said to do when in matter. For matter, being authoritative

31 See Pl., Tht. 176A7 8.  
33 See Pl., Tht. 176A5.  
34 See Pl., Phd. 67C5 7.  
35 See Pl., Tht. 176A6 7.  
36 See Ar., PA 1.1.642a10 11.  
37 Cf. 2.3.16.50 52; 3.6.12.1 6.
over that which shows up in it, corrupts and destroys it, juxtaposing its
own nature which is contrary, not by adding cold to heat, but by bring-
ing along its own formlessness to the form of heat, and the shapeless to
the shape and excess and deficiency to the measured, until it makes it its
own instead of belonging to itself, just as, in the nourishment of living
beings, that which is introduced is no longer what is digested, but
becomes the blood of the dog and entirely canine, and all the humours
of the one who has received it. Indeed, if the body is the [proximate]
cause of evils, matter would be the [ultimate] cause of evils.

But one must dominate it, someone else might say. However, that
which is able to dominate does not do so perfectly if one does not flee.
And the appetites become stronger in such a mixture of bodies, and the
appetites of some are stronger than those of others, so that they are not
able to dominate that which is in each of them, whereas others are duller
and they are chilled and blocked in their ability to discern the evil that
comes through bodies. The contrary corporeal appetites render them
feckless. Differences in our own habits at different times bear witness to
this. When we are full we are different in our appetites and in our
thoughts than when we are hungry; and some people are one way
when they are full, and others another.

Let it indeed be the case that, whereas the unmeasured is the primary
evil, that which, having come to be in that which is unmeasured either by
assimilation or by participation, which is accidental to it, is a secondary
evil. And the primary evil is darkness, the secondary is darkened in this
way. Indeed, vice, being ignorance and lack of measure in the soul, is
a secondary evil and not evil itself. For virtue is not the primary Good,
but something which is assimilated to or participates in it.

§ 1.8.9. With what, then, do we know good and evil? First, with what
do we know vice? For we know virtue with intellect itself or with
intellectual virtue; for it recognizes itself. But how do we know vice?

In fact, just as we know the straight and the not straight with a ruler,
thus we know that which does not harmonize with virtue. Is it by
looking or by not looking, I mean, that we know vice?

In fact, as for absolute vice, it is by not looking, for it is unlimited.
We know by abstraction, then, that which is in no way virtue. As for that
which is not absolute vice, we know it by that which it lacks. If we see
one part of a thing, then we grasp along with the part that is present that
which is absent – which is in the whole form, but is absent from there.
It is, we say, the same with vice, leaving in the indefinite that which is

38 See Ar., D.I 1.5.411a6.
39 Presumably, equivalent to evil or matter. Cf. infra 13.1.16 20.
deprived of form. Moreover, looking at matter like some ugly face, with the expressed principle not dominating in it, so that the ugliness of matter is hidden, what appears to us is ugly by its lack of form.

But what about that which in no way has encountered form, how do we know that?

In fact, we know it by taking away all form; that in which this is not present, we call matter, and we grasp it in ourselves as shapeless by taking away form from it, if we want to think about matter. For this reason, too, this is an alternative intellect that is not intellect, daring to see things that are not its own. Just as an eye removes itself from light in order that it might see the darkness – though it does not see; it leaves the light so that it can see the darkness, because it could not see it with the light; on the other hand, it cannot see without the light, so it does not see; it does this, then, so that it can ‘see’ the darkness. In this way, intellect, too, leaving the light that is internal to it, and proceeding in a way outside itself, comes to that which does not belong to it. It does not bring along its own light, and it experiences the contrary of what is, so that it can see that which is contrary to itself.

§ 1.8.10. These questions are resolved in this way. But how is matter, being without qualities, evil?

In fact, it is said to be without qualities by itself not having in itself the qualities which it receives and which will be in it as a substrate, not in the sense of having no nature. If it actually has some nature, what prevents this nature from being evil, but not evil in the sense of being qualified, seeing that ‘being qualified’ refers to something other than the quality that is qualifying? The quality, then, is an accident in something else, whereas the matter is not in something else, but is the substrate, and the accident is in this. Not having the quality that has the nature of an accident, then, it is said to be without quality. So, if the quality itself is without quality, how would matter, which is not receptive of the quality, be said to be qualified? It is, therefore, rightly said to be without quality and evil. For it is not said to be evil by having quality, but rather by not having quality, so that it would probably not be evil if it were a form, rather than a nature that is contrary to form.

§ 1.8.11. But the nature that is contrary to all form is privation. And privation is always in something else and is not itself a real existent. So,

40 See Pl., Tim. 52B2. 41 Reading τούτου with Dodds.
42 Cf. 2.4.8.1 3. See SVF 1.85 (= D.L., 7.134, 139). 43 See Ar., Cat. 8.8b25.
44 Reading ἄ. 45 This is a Peripatetic objection to Plotinus’ identification of privation and matter. Cf. infra 14.17 28. See Ar., Phys. 1.7.19ob27, 9.192a1 6.
if evil is found in privation, evil will be in that which is deprived of form. So, it will not exist by itself. If, then, evil will occur in a soul, the evil will be privation in it and it will be its vice, and nothing external. Indeed, other arguments eliminate matter entirely, or take it not to be evil, though it exists. We should not, then, seek evil elsewhere but, being posited in the soul, to posit it thus as the absence of Good.

But if privation comes about through the absence of some form, if there is [thus] a privation of Good in the soul and the privation produces vice in the soul, then the soul has no good by definition [of ‘privation’]. So, the soul, though it is soul, does not have life either. The soul, therefore will be soulless, if indeed it does not have life. So, being soul, it will not be soul. Since soul, therefore, has life by definition, it does not have the privation of the Good in its own nature. It is, therefore, Good-like, having something good, a trace of Intellect, and it is not evil in its own nature. It is, therefore, not primary evil nor does it have primary evil accidentally, for the Good is not altogether absent from it.

§ 1.8.12. What, then, if someone says that vice or evil in the soul are not absolute privation of Good, but partial privation of Good? But if this is so, since one part has it and one is deprived of it, it will have a mixed disposition and will not have evil unmixed and we will not yet have found primary and unmixed evil. And that which is good in the soul will be in its substantiality and evil will be something accidental in it.

§ 1.8.13. If, therefore, evil in the soul is not like this, perhaps it is like an impediment to seeing in the eye. But if it is like this, evil will be productive of evil in the things in which it is present, and being thus productive of evil as some other thing, it will be something different from evil. If, then, vice is an impediment to soul, it is productive of evil, but vice will not be evil. And virtue will not be the Good, but will function as a catalyst; so, if virtue is not the Good, neither is vice evil.

Next, too, virtue is not Beauty itself nor Good itself. But we have said that virtue is not Beauty itself nor Good itself because Beauty itself and Good itself are prior to virtue and transcend it; it is good and beautiful by some sort of participation.

As, then, one ascends from virtue to Beauty and the Good, so one descends from vice to that which is evil itself, starting from vice. To the contemplator there is, on the one hand, the contemplation 46 Cf. 1.4.3.24 40.
of whatever evil; on the other, there is the participation in it for someone who becomes it. For he finds himself altogether in the ‘region of lack of sameness’, and sinking into the participation in evil there, he will be walking into a ‘muddy darkness’. And if the soul were to fall absolutely into absolute vice, it no longer has vice, but changes itself into a different and worse nature. For vice mixed with its contrary is still human nature. It dies, then, as much as a soul can die, and death for it while still immersed in the body is to be sunk into matter and to be filled with it and, when it leaves the body, to lie there until it should turn away and lift up its gaze from the mud. And this is what it means to ‘come to Hades and fall asleep there’.

§1.8.14. If someone should say that vice is a weakness in the soul – at least, that the bad soul is easily affected and easily moved, borne about from every kind of evil into every other, easily moved to appetite, easily roused to anger, precipitous in acts of assent, and giving way easily to clouded fantasies, those which are the most feeble of the things made by craft or by nature, which suffer destruction easily from winds or by the sun’s heat – it would be worthwhile enquiring what this weakness in the soul is and where it comes from. For indeed weakness in the soul is not like weakness in bodies. But the incapacity for function and the good state of the body has by analogy the same name as weakness in the soul – unless it is the case that matter would be the identical cause of the weakness in the soul [and the weakness in the body].

We should, though, attend more closely to the argument, which concerns what the cause is of the so-called weakness in the soul. For it is indeed not density or rarity or thinness or fatness or sickness, some fever, for example, that makes the soul weak. Actually, such weakness in the soul is necessarily found in its absolute form either in separated souls or embodied souls or in both. But if it is actually not in those separate from matter – for all these are pure and are said to be ‘winged and perfect’ and their function unimpeded – what is left is that the weakness is in fallen souls, which are neither pure nor purified, and their weakness would not be the removal of something, but the presence of something alien, just like phlegm or bile in the body.

Grasping more clearly the cause of the soul’s fall, and grasping it in

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47 See Pl., Sts. 273D6 E1. Plotinus reads τόπον (‘region’), which is in all the Plato mss; modern editors, following Proclus’ conjecture, read πότον (‘sea’).
48 See Pl., Phd. 69C6.
50 See Pl., Rep. 534C7 D1.
51 See Pl., Gorg. 477B3 4; Rep. 444C1 2.
52 See Pl., Phdr. 246B7 C1.
the appropriate way, the weakness of the soul that we are seeking will be more evident.

Matter is among things that exist and soul exists, and there is one sort of region for them. For the region of matter is not separate from the region of soul – say, matter on earth and soul in the air – but the region for the soul that is separate is not being in matter, that is, not being united with matter. This means that a unity does not come to be out of soul and matter. And this means that soul is not in matter as in a substrate. And this is what being separate means. The soul has many faculties, and soul has a beginning, a middle, and an end. But matter, when it is present, begs and in a way importunes and wants to come into soul, but ‘the place is holy’ and there is nothing which is without a share of soul. Throwing itself under soul, then, it is illuminated, and it is not able to receive that by which it is illuminated. For that cannot sustain matter, though it is present, because it does not see it due to its evil. Matter darkens the illumination and the light there by mixing with soul and has made it weak, presenting generation to it and the explanation for its coming into matter. For it would not have come into that which is not present.

And this is the fall of the soul; to come in this way into matter and to be weakened, because all of its faculties are not present in the activity, matter preventing their presence by occupying the region that soul inhabits and in a way making it ‘contract itself’, and what it seized by a kind of theft it makes evil, until soul can lift itself up again. So, matter is the cause of weakness in the soul and the cause of vice. This evil, therefore, is prior evil, that is primary evil. For even if the already affected soul itself generated matter, and if it associated with it and became evil, matter is the cause of it by its presence. For soul would not have come to be in it if it were not by the presence of matter that soul’s generation occurred.

§1.8.15. If someone says that matter does not exist, he must be shown the necessity of its existence based on the many points made in the [previous] discussions of its real existence. Further, if someone were to say that there is absolutely no evil in beings, he must necessarily also eliminate the Good and say that it is not desired and doesn’t exist; so, desire and avoidance and intellection would not exist either. For desire is for good, avoidance is of evil, whereas intellection and practical wisdom is of good and evil, and is itself one among goods. There must be, then, Good, that is, unmixed Good, whereas that which is mixed

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54 See Pl., Symp. 203B4. 55 See Sophocles, Oed. Col. 54. 56 See Pl., Symp. 206D6. 57 Cf. supra 3.6 7; 5.9 12; 2.4.11.1 12, 28.
already presupposes evil and good as ingredients, and participating in more evil thereby contributes to the totality of evil, whereas participating in less evil, insofar as it is diminished, contributes to the totality of good.

What, then, is evil in the soul? Or, in which soul could it exist if the soul were not in contact with the nature of that which is worse? For if it were not, there would be no appetites or pains or bouts of anger or fears. For fears are in the composite, lest it be dissolved, and pain and suffering are in the process of dissolution. But appetites come to be when there is something bothering the composite – or, if someone is planning a remedy for this, they are for not being bothered. Imagination is an external blow by that which is non-rational. And the soul receives the blow because it is not indivisible. And it has false beliefs by coming to be outside the truth; but it is outside the truth by not being pure. The desire directed towards Intellect is something else: for it should consort with Intellect alone and be situated in it, not inclining to the worse.58

Because of the power and nature of Good, evil is not just evil; since it appeared of necessity, it is bound with certain beautiful chains, like prisoners bound with golden chains, hidden by these, so that, being like this, it is not seen by the gods, and human beings do not always have to look at evil. But whenever they look, they are accompanied by images of Beauty to recollect.

58 Cf. 1.1.5.8 26; 4.4.19.1 4.
INTRODUCTION

In this very brief treatise – or perhaps note – Plotinus addresses an issue that arises throughout the history of ancient philosophy, namely, the justifiability of suicide. Plotinus’ view is, not surprisingly, in line with the argument in Plato’s *Phaedo*, but it also adds reflections on how, if at all, Peripatetic and Stoic doctrines might affect the prohibition of suicide. In the *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer there is appended to this treatise an excerpt from the *Introduction to Philosophy* by Elias, a student of Olympiodorus, purporting to cite Plotinus on suicide. Henry and Schwyzer subsequently rejected the authenticity of this fragment although, as Armstrong suggests, it could come from Plotinus’ oral teaching.

SUMMARY

Violent withdrawal of the soul from the body is unjustifiable. This sort of withdrawal burdens the departing soul with the bodily passions. Suicide also deprives human beings of the possibility of moral progress.
1.9 (16)

On Exiting from the Body

§1.9.1. You shall not expel your soul from the body, so that it does not go [bearing a burden].\(^2\) For if it is expelled, it will have something with it in order that it may exit, and the exit means transferring into another region.\(^3\) But the soul waits for the body to leave entirely from it, when it does not need to go with it, but is completely external. How, then, is the body to leave? When the soul is no longer bound to it, with the body unable to bind it any longer, and its harmony is no longer present. When it had this it held the soul.

What, then, if someone contrived to free himself from the body? In fact, he has used violence and he himself departed, and he did not let the body go. And when he frees himself he is not unaffected; there is revulsion or sorrow or anger. He should not do this. What if, then, he perceived that he was starting to lose his mind? Perhaps, in fact, this is not going to happen to a virtuous person. But if it should happen, he could count this among the necessities of life, and, in the circumstances, choice-worthy, though not unqualifiedly choice-worthy. For departure by means of drugs designed for the soul’s exit is perhaps not beneficial for the soul. And if there is an allotted time that is given to each person, it is not a good idea to go before this, unless, as we said, it is necessary. But if each one’s rank in the intelligible world depends on how he exited from here, the soul should not exit while there is an opportunity for progress.

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1 See *SVF* 3.757 (D.L., 7.130), 758 (= Stob., *Ecl.* 110.9), 764 (= Alex. Aphr., *De an. mant.* 168.1).

2 Perhaps, as Kalligas suggests (p. 244), this possibly corrupt line is missing one or more words after ἐξή (“exit”) indicating, as the next line suggests, the ‘baggage’ that a wilfully separated soul would bear. As Armstrong notes, according to Michael Psellus, this line echoes a passage in the *Chaldean Oracles*.

3 As opposed to the desired separation from everything corporeal. Cf. 3.2.6.72 76.
Fragment: *Plotinus on Voluntary Death*, by Elias¹

Plotinus writes a treatise in one book on the reasonableness of exiting from life and does not accept any one of the five reasons given for this.² For he says that just as god does not stop being providential for us, but we make ourselves unfit and believe that god is far from us when he is equally present to us, as those who are purified make clear, having seen god themselves and consorted with him; and just as the sun shines its light equally to all, although bats, unfit for the light, flee it and are not illuminated by it, believing that the sun is darkness and not the source of light, so the philosopher should imitate god and the sun, not being careless of the body just because they care for the soul, but taking providential care of it until such time as it becomes unfit, distancing itself from its association with the soul. For it is absurd to exit before one’s time, which is when the one who joined the body and soul together loosens the bond.

¹ This fragment comes from Elias, *Proleg. philos. 6.15.23 16.2*.
² Cf. 1.4.7-43 45; 1.9. See *SVF 3.768* (= *Excerpta philos. Cod. Coislin. 387 Cramer Anecd. Paris Vol. 4.403*).
Ennead Two
2.1 (40)
On the Cosmos

**Introduction**

In this treatise, Plotinus considers the everlastingness of the universe, the heavens, and the heavenly bodies. In earlier treatises he had already established that the everlastingness of the universe follows from the metaphysics of procession and reversion, but now he needs to show how this is compatible with the universe and the heavens having bodies, given that all body appears to be in flux. Plotinus is convinced that external material flux – that is, matter flowing out of a body – must ultimately undermine the diachronic identity of a composite living thing, and so he sets out to show that there is no such external material flux in the case of the universe, the heavens, and the heavenly bodies. This, in turn, leads him to consider what the elemental constitution of the heavens and heavenly bodies must be if no external flux is to take place.

**Summary**

§1. Plotinus rules out two purported explanations of universe’s everlastingness as inadequate: the will of god and there being nothing outside of the universe.

§§2–4. The soul is the cause of the everlastingness of the universe and the heavens, but the body must cooperate.

§5. Why the celestial living things (stars and planets) are everlasting, while sublunary living things (e.g. human beings) are not, even though both are only parts of the universe.

§§6–7. The elemental constitution of the heavens and the heavenly bodies.

§8. There is no external flux in the heavens, nor do the heavens require any nourishment.
§2.1.1. When we say that the cosmos, although it has a body, has both always existed and always will exist, if we should refer the cause of its everlasting existence to the will of god, first, although we might possibly be saying something true, we would not be providing any clarity. Next, the transformation of the elements and the destruction of the living beings on earth preserve their respective forms. This will perhaps suggest that the same thing is occurring in the case of the universe, too, since the will of god is capable of this – even though a body is always fleeing and in flux – that is, capable of placing the identical form at one time in one thing and at another time in another, and consequently of always preserving its unity in form, though not its unity in number. For why would some things possess everlastingness in this way only in form, while the things in the heavens and heaven itself possess individual everlastingness?

If we are going to attribute the cause of the cosmos’ not being destroyed to its enveloping all things, and to there being nothing into which it will effect a transformation, and to there not being anything outside of the cosmos that could attack and destroy it, we will, on the basis of this account, be granting to the whole, that is, the universe, that it would not be destroyed. But the sun and the substantiality of the other stars – because they are each parts and none is a whole or a universe – will not by this account possess the assurance that they will persist for all time but only that permanence in form shall be theirs, just as fire and such would seem to have only this sort of permanence.

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1 This is the title given by Porphyry in his VP (5.47 and 24.40) as well as by Philoponus and Simplicius, though the mss give the title ‘On Heaven’.
2 See Pl., Tim. 41B4; Atticus, fr. 4.95.
3 See Ar., Meta. 5.6.1016b31 32; GC 2.11.338b13.
4 Cf. 6.5.10.36 39; 2.9.17.54. See Pl., Tim. 33B2 4; Ar., DC 1.9.279a23 28.
5 Reading μηδὲ τῖ with HS.
6 See Ar., DC 1.9.279a6 7 and fr. 19 Rose (= Philo, De aeternitate mundi 21); Ocellus Lucanus §13 (p. 13.26 Harder).
And this applies to the cosmos itself as a whole, too. For even if the cosmos is not being destroyed by anything outside itself, there is no reason why it could not destroy itself by virtue of its parts destroying each other, and while having an everlasting destruction persist only in form; that is, if the nature of its substrate is always in flux and something else is providing its form, there is no reason why the identical thing cannot happen in the case of the universal living being that happens in the case of human being and horse and the others. For human beings and horses always exist, but not the identical ones. So, it will not be the case that one part of the cosmos, for example, the heaven, is always persisting, whereas the parts around the earth are undergoing destruction; rather, all things will behave in like manner, with the only difference between them being the temporal duration of their existence. For we can grant that the heavenly bodies have a longer duration.

If, then, we end up conceding that this is the manner of everlastingness in the case of the universe and in the case of its parts, the difficulty of this opinion would be diminished. We might, though, get completely clear of this difficulty, if the will of god could be shown to be sufficient to hold the universe together in this manner. If, however, we should say with respect to any part of it, that it is individually everlasting, then it must be shown that god’s will is sufficient to do this; and further, the difficulty still remains of why the one things persist in this way and the other things do not but only in form; and finally, how it is that the parts in heaven themselves persist, since that would seem to be the manner of persistence of the universe itself as well.

§2.1.2. If, then, we accept this view and say that heaven and all the things in it possess everlastingness with respect to their individuality, but that the things in the sublunar sphere possess everlastingness with respect to their form, we must show how heaven, despite possessing a body, will possess its individuality in the sense of strict identity, as a particular that remains the same, despite the nature of body always being in flux. For this seems right both to others who have discussed nature and especially to Plato himself, and not only concerning the other bodies but even for the heavenly bodies themselves. For how, asks Plato, could things that have bodies and

7 See Pl., Lg. 721C2 6; Ar., GC 2.11.338b8 9. 8 See Pl. [?], Epin. 982A2 3.
9 See Ar., Polit. 7.4.1326a32 33; SVF 441 (= Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 223.25), 442 (= Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 224.14), 448 (= Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 131.5), 449 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1053f), 473 (= Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 216.14).
10 Reading κατά with Igal and HS5. 11 See Ar., DC 1.9.278a9 13.
are visible be unchangeably the same?\footnote{12} He is clearly in agreement with Heraclitus on these matters, who said that even the sun is always coming to be.\footnote{13}

This would not be a problem for Aristotle, if anyone should accept his hypothesis concerning the fifth body.\footnote{14} But for those who do not accept this hypothesis, as the body of heaven is composed of the same elements that the living beings in the sublunary region are composed of, how could heaven possess its individuality [always]? And still more importantly, how could this be the case for the sun and all of the bodies in heaven, given that they are parts?\footnote{2}

Given that every living being is actually composed of soul and the nature of body, it is necessary that heaven, if it is indeed to be numerically everlasting, be numerically everlasting either through both of these components or through one or the other of them, that is, soul or body.

If someone actually grants indestructibility to body, soul would not be required for this purpose,\footnote{15} except that it would have to always be together with soul in order to constitute a living being. But the one who says that body is \textit{per se} destructible and who attributes the cause of its indestructibility to soul must attempt to show that the condition of the body is not opposed to its constitution\footnote{16} and to the persistence of the constitution, that there is naturally no discord in these living beings so constituted, but that it is appropriate even for the matter to be agreeable to the will of the one who completed it.

§2.1.3. How, then, could the matter, that is, the body of the universe, even though it is always in flux, be a contributing factor to the immortality of the cosmos?

In fact, we could say it is because the flux it is undergoing is internal; for it is not undergoing external flux. If, then, the flux is internal and is not an outflow from itself, it should remain identical and neither increase nor decrease. So, it does not age, either.\footnote{17}

And one must observe that the earth has from eternity always remained in the identical shape and mass. And the air never runs out, nor does the nature of water. So, to whatever extent the elements transform, this does not change the nature of the whole living being. For in our case, too, while our parts are always transforming and departing into what is exterior to us, each of us persists for a long while. But for that which has no exterior, the nature of its body would

\footnote{12} See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 530B2. \footnote{3} See Atticus fr. 6.11 21.
\footnote{13} See Heraclitus, \textit{Meteor.} 2.2.355a13 \footnote{14} Pl., \textit{Rep.} 498B1. \footnote{15} This is the hypothetical fifth element, aether. Cf. 2.5.3.18 19. See Ar., \textit{DC} 1.3.27b21 22.
\footnote{16} See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 30B4 5. \footnote{17} Cf. 2.9.17,52 54.
not be discordant towards its soul, as far as its being the identical living being and its always persisting is concerned.

Fire is piercing and swift because it does not remain down here, just as earth [has certain qualities] because it does not remain above. But when fire arrives to where it must stop, then one must think that it, now seated in its proper place, is not such as to seek position in both directions, as is the case with the other elements. But fire could not be borne any higher – for there is no more place – and it is not its nature to go downwards. It remains for it to be easily led and due to a natural attraction to be drawn by soul to a very good life in a beautiful place and to move in soul.

For if anyone fears that heaven might fall, he should be of good courage. For the revolution that its soul leads it in outstrips every downward tendency so that the soul masters the heavenly fire and keeps it up in heaven. And if heavenly fire does not per se even have any inclination to move downwards, it remains up there without resistance.

When our parts, then, have come to be formed, since they do not retain their constitution, they demand portions of other things in order to persist. But if there is no external flux from heaven, it has no need of nourishment. If, however, fire does flow out of heaven by being extinguished, some other fire must be kindled, and if heaven partakes of some other element and this also flows out from it, it will require, instead of fire, more of that other element. But because of this, the universal living being would not remain numerically identical even if the universe could carry on in this manner.

§2.1.4. But we must examine this issue on its own terms and not just relative to the present object of investigation. Does anything flow out of heaven so that even the heavenly bodies require ‘nourishment’ – though not in the proper sense of the term – or is it that once the heavenly bodies have been put in order they naturally persist and experience no external flux? Further, is fire alone there, or is fire only predominant, that is, is it possible for the other elements to be held up and suspended on high by that which masters them? For if someone were to add the most sovereign cause, the soul, together with the bodies which are pure and so thoroughly superior – for even in other living beings nature selects the superior bodies for their sovereign parts – one would obtain a solid view on the immortality of heaven. For even Aristotle rightly

18 See Pl., Tim. 56A5.
19 See Pl., Tim. 57C3; Ar., DC 1.9.279b1 3, 2.3.268b2 269a10.
says that flame is a kind of ‘boiling’ and fire that, in a way, runs wild because of its excessiveness, but the fire in heaven is uniform and gentle and amenable to the nature of the stars.

But the greatest argument is this: seeing that in heaven the soul is situated next to the best things and moves with a marvellous power, how will anything, once it has been placed in it, escape from it into non-existence? And thinking that soul, which has been set in motion by god, is not mightier than any bond, is a fallacy of human beings who are ignorant of the cause that holds everything together. For it would be absurd if soul, which has been given the power to hold things together for any stretch of time, did not do so always, as if it held things together by force and the natural state of things were different from the one that now obtains in the nature of the universe and in the things that have been beautifully placed, or as if there was something that was going to overpower and dissolve its constitution – overthrowing the nature of soul as if from a sort of monarchy or political rule.

And the fact that the universe never had a beginning – for we already said that this would be absurd – gives us a reason to be confident about its future, too. For why should there be a time when the universe no longer exists? For the elements have not been worn out, as wood and such things have been, and given that they persist always, the universe persists. Even if the elements are always undergoing transformation, the universe persists. For the cause of the elemental transformation is also persisting. And [the hypothesis] that soul ‘repents’ has been shown to be void because its administration is without toil or harm. And even if it were possible that all body be destroyed, it would make no difference to soul.

§ 2.1.5. How, then, do the heavenly parts persist, while the sublunary elements and living beings do not persist?

In fact, Plato says that the former have come to be from god, but the sublunary living beings from the gods generated from that god, as it is unlawful for things that came to be from that god to be destroyed.

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21 Cf. 2.9.2.10 18, 8.30 36, 18.16; 4.4.42.23 26. See Ar., GC 2.3.330b25 29; Meteor. 1.3.340b23, 1.4.341b22.
22 Reading ἀρίστος κειμένην δυνάμει δυσμαστὴ κινούμενην with HS4. The soul of the cosmos is derived from the hypostasis Soul, which is in turn derived from Intellect and the One.
23 Cf. 4.8.2.14 19, 8.13 16. 24 Cf. 2.9.3.7 14, 7.1 2; 5.8.12.19 21.
25 Cf. 2.9.4.17 18, 6.2 3. See Pl. [?], Epin. 982C7 D3; Ar., On Philosophy fr. 21 Rose3.
26 Cf. 2.2.1.37 39; 2.9.7.13 15; 18.14 17; 3.2.2.40 42; 4.8.2.49 53. See Pl., Lg. 904A; Ar., DC 2.1.284a14 18; Ar. [?], De mun. 6.400b9 11.
27 Cf. 2.9.7.24 27. 28 See Pl., Tim. 69C3 5. 29 See Pl., Tim. 41A7 8.
This amounts to saying that the heavenly soul\textsuperscript{30} comes next after the Demiurge, and our souls, too, and that a reflection of the soul of the universe goes out from it and flows out, in a way, from the higher beings and creates the living beings on earth.\textsuperscript{31} Although this sort of soul, then, is imitating the heavenly soul, it lacks power because it is using worse bodies for its production and is in a worse place, and because the elements that have been received for constituting [bodies] are not willing to persist; and so, the living beings in the sensible world cannot persist forever, and their bodies are not mastered in the same way they would be if another soul ruled over them directly.

Since, however, the whole of heaven had to persist, its parts – the stars in it – had to persist as well.

In fact, how could it persist if these did not similarly persist? For the sublunary bodies are no longer parts of heaven; otherwise, heaven would not extend only as far as the moon. We, by contrast, were formed by the soul given from the gods in heaven and from heaven itself, and it is by this soul that we are joined to our bodies. For the other soul, by which we are ‘we’, is the cause of our well-being and not of our existence.\textsuperscript{33} At any rate, it is only after the body has already come to be that the higher soul, by means of calculative reasoning, comes to make a minor contribution\textsuperscript{34} to its existence.\textsuperscript{35}

§ 2.1.6. But we must still examine whether fire alone exists in heaven, whether there is external flux from heaven, and whether nourishment is required.\textsuperscript{36} From Timaeus’ having, then, made the body of the universe out of earth and fire in order that it might be visible due to the fire and solid due to the earth,\textsuperscript{37} it seemed to follow that he made the stars not entirely but mostly of fire,\textsuperscript{38} since the stars obviously possess solidity. And Timaeus might just be right, since Plato also judges this opinion likely.\textsuperscript{39} For judging by our sense-perception – both in terms of sight

\textsuperscript{30} Here, the phrase οὐρανος ψυχή, literally ‘heavenly soul’ is used to refer to what Plotinus usually calls ‘the soul of the universe’.

\textsuperscript{31} A reference to nature, the lowest part of the soul of the universe. Cf. 2.2.3.1 10; 2.3.18.10 13; 3.8.4.15 16, 5.1 6; 4.4.13.1 11; 5.9.6.19; 6.2.22.29 35.

\textsuperscript{32} Correcting the typographical error σε in HS' to τε.

\textsuperscript{33} Cf. 1.1.10.1 7; 1.4.14.1 14; 2.3.9.6 18; 4.7.1.22 25.

\textsuperscript{34} Reading συλλαμβανομενη with HS.'

\textsuperscript{35} The major and primary contribution to the mere existing (as opposed to the flourish ing) of humans comes from nature. Cf. 1.4.16.13 23; 2.9.18.14 17; 4.3.6.13 15. See Alcinous, Didask. 178.33 35.

\textsuperscript{36} See Atticus, fr. 6.3 21.

\textsuperscript{37} See Pl., Tim. 31B4 8.

\textsuperscript{38} See Pl., Tim. 40A2 3; Pl. [?], Epin. 981D7 E1; Timaeus Locrus, De natura mundi et animae 39 41.

\textsuperscript{39} See Pl., Tim. 29D4 5, 56D1.
and in terms of tactile apprehension – most or all of the universe appears to be of fire, but for those who rationally consider whether solidity could arise without earth, heaven should consist of earth, too. Still, what need would heaven have of water and air? For it would seem odd to have any water among so much fire, and as for air, if it is present in heaven, it should transform into the nature of fire. If, however, two mathematical solids that have the rank of extremes require two intermediates, one might be at a loss as to whether the same is also true of physical solids. For someone might mix earth with water without having any need of an intermediate. If we reply that the other elements are already present in the earth and water, we would perhaps seem to have a point, but someone might respond that [even if fire and air are already present in earth and water] they are not there in order to bind together the two elements when they come together. Nevertheless, we shall maintain that earth and water are immediately bound together because each contains all of the elements.

But we must investigate whether earth is not visible without fire, and whether fire is not solid without earth. For in that case none of the elements would have its own substantiality independently; rather, all of the elements would be mixed and each would be named according to the element that predominates in the mixture. For they say that not even earth can be constituted without moisture, since water’s moisture is a cohesive agent for the earth. But even if we grant this, it is still odd for one who maintains that each element is something not to grant it an independent constitution, but that its constitution is achieved together with the other elements, as if each element were itself nothing. For how could there be any nature or essence of earth if no bit of earth exists without water being present for its cohesion? How could the water serve as an agent of cohesion, if there is no magnitude of earth for it to attach to another neighbouring bit? For if there is any magnitude at all of earth itself, there will be earth by nature even without its partaking in water; otherwise there will be nothing for water to make cohere.

And what need would a mass of earth have of air for its existence, if the air keeps on being air before transforming? And concerning fire, it was not said to be there in order for earth to exist but in order for earth and all the other elements to be visible. For, actually, it is reasonable to

41 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 A4 1 DK (15, 19 20) and B 12 DK (39, 3 7). Perhaps Numenius is here the target. See Numenius, fr. 51 (= Proclus, *In Tim.* 2.9.4 5). See also SVF 2.561 (= Philo, *Quaest. et solut. in Exodum* 2.81).
42 See Philo, *De opif. mun.* 38; Plutarch, *De primo frigido* 952b.
43 Cf. 5.6.3.15 21.
44 See Pl., *Tim.* 31B5.
concede that visibility derives from light. For one cannot say that darkness is seen but that it is not seen, just as soundlessness is not heard. But there is no necessity for fire to be present in earth. For light is sufficient. In any case, snow and many very cold things are bright without fire. But, someone will say, fire was in these cold things and coloured them before departing.

And one should be puzzled about water, too, whether there is no water unless it partakes of earth. And how could one say that air, even though it is easily dispersed, partakes of earth? As for fire, does it have need of earth because it does not per se possess continuity or three-dimensional extension? Why wouldn’t solidity – not in the sense of three-dimensional extension but clearly in the sense of resistance – belong to it qua natural body? It is hardness that belongs to earth alone. For the density of gold, which is [a form of] water, is increased not because earth is added to it but because of the property of density or freezing.

And why shouldn’t fire, since soul is present to it, be independently constituted by the power of soul? After all, there are fiery living beings among the daemons. If we say this, however, we will be undermining the claim that the entire living universe is constituted of all the elements. Or else one will say that this claim is true on earth but that to lift earth up into heaven is unnatural and contrary to nature’s orders. And it is not credible that the fastest motion would lead earthy bodies around, and they would also be an impediment to the brightness and whiteness of the fire there.

§2.1.7. Perhaps, then, we should listen more closely to Plato when he says that in the entire universe there must be this sort of solidity, namely, resistance, both in order that the earth, which is seated in the middle, might be a steady platform for the things that have been poised upon it, and in order that the living beings upon it might possess this sort of solidity of necessity. But the earth has the quality of being continuous per se and is illuminated by fire, and it partakes of water so as not to be dry and so as not to prevent its parts from being joined together, and air lightens earth’s masses. And it is not in the sense of being in the constitution of the stars that earth is mixed with the superlunary fire;

45 Cf. 4.5.1 7 on seeing and light. 46 See Ar., DA 2.8.420a8.
47 See Pl., Tim. 59B1 4; Ar., Meteor. 4.10.380a7 9.
48 Cf. 3.5.6.38 43. See Ar., GA 3.11.761b16 23; Xenocrates, fr. 15.
49 See Pl., Tim. 59D6; Ar. [?], De mun. 2.391b13.
50 See Timaeus Locrus, De natura mundi et animae 31. 51 See Pl., Tim. 31B5 6.
52 See Pl., Tim. 32C2 8. Reading μετέχειν δε ύδατος προς το <το> μη αὐχηρον δεχει τε και.
53 See Pl., Tim. 60E4.
rather, because each of them is in the cosmos, fire derives some benefit from earth, just as earth derives some benefit from fire and each of the elements from each of the others – not because the element deriving a benefit is constituted of both itself and the one it is partaking of, but rather on account of being part of that association in the cosmos which is to take possession not of the element itself but of something belonging to the element. Earth, for example, takes possession not of air but of air’s softness and of fire’s brilliance. It is the mixture that provides everything, and the complex – and not only earth and the nature of fire – then creates this solidity and fieriness.54

And Plato gives evidence of this when he says ‘god kindled a light in the second revolution from the earth’,55 meaning the sun, and somewhere else he calls the sun ‘most brilliant’,56 and he calls the same thing ‘most white’.57 By doing so he discoursages us from considering the sun to be anything other than of fire, and indeed not any of the other forms of fire but light, which he says is different from flame, as it has only a gentle warmth.59 This light is a body, and it gives off an equivocal light, which we maintain is incorporeal.60 This incorporeal light is supplied from that corporeal light, shining forth from it as if it were the brightness and bloom of that light, which is the really white body. Whereas we tend to understand earthiness with respect to what is worse, Plato understands earth in terms of solidity; we, in any case, call some one thing earth, while Plato distinguishes varieties of earth.62

Actually, given that the kind of fire that produces the purest light is situated in the upper region and has its natural seat there,63 we must assume that sublunary flame is not mixed up with the fire up there; rather, it is extinguished as soon as it reaches a certain height and encounters a great deal of air, and since it goes up together with earth it falls down, being unable to pass the threshold into the superlunary region; rather, it stops beneath the moon and consequently makes the air in that region lighter, and if any flame remains, it loses its strength and becomes more gentle and does not have enough brightness for ‘boiling’ but only enough to be lit up by the upper light.

But as for the light in the heavenly region, some of it is variegated in proportions in the stars so that it produces a difference in their colours just as in their magnitudes. The rest of the heaven is itself, too, of this

54 Reading πυρότητα with HS3.
55 See Pl., Tim. 39B4 5.
56 See Pl., Tht. 208D2; Rep. 616E9.
57 See Pl., Rep. 617A3, though Plato is not describing the sun here.
58 Reading οὐδέτερον with HS3.
59 See Pl., Tim. 43B4 6, 58C5 7.
60 Cf. 4.3.17.13 15; 4.5.6.30 33; 5.3.9.10 13; 6.4.9.26 27.
61 See Pl., Tim. 31B6.
62 See Pl., Tim. 60B6 61C2.
63 Cf. 1.6.3.19 23.
sort of light, but it is not visible due to the non-resistant fineness and transparency of its body, just as is the case with pure air, as well. And their distance should also be added to these factors.

§2.1.8. Since this sort of light has indeed remained above in the place it was ordered to be – pure in the purest\(^{64}\) – what manner of flux from it could come about? For this sort of nature does not actually have the natural constitution to flow out to the lower region, nor again is there anything there that could push it down by force. Every body with a soul is different and not identical to what it was without soul, and the body there is of this sort and not body without soul. And what borders upon it is either air or fire, and what could air do to it? And not a single kind of fire is suited to do this, nor could it even establish contact in order to act on it, both because it would change direction by its downward force before the heavenly light could suffer anything and because the fire [just beneath heaven] is weaker and not equal to flames on earth.  

Next, for fire to act is for it to heat, and what is to be heated must not be warm \textit{per se}. And if something is going to be destroyed by fire, it must first be heated and in being heated it must come to be in a state contrary to its nature.\(^{65}\)

So, heaven does not require another body in order to persist, nor again in order for its revolution to be natural.\(^{66}\) For it has not yet been shown that its natural motion is to go straight. For what is natural for heavenly bodies is either to remain motionless or to be borne around in a circle. The other motions would belong to them only if they were forced. So, one must not say that the heavenly bodies require nourishment, either, nor should one make any statements about them based on bodies down here, as they do not have the identical soul holding them together, nor do they occupy the identical place, nor will one find the cause present up there due to which the things down here nourish themselves – since they are composites that are always in flux – and these bodies undergo transformations away from themselves because another nature looks after them. And on account of its weakness, this other nature does not know how to keep them in existence, though in coming-to-be and generating it imitates the nature prior to itself. It has, however, already been said\(^{67}\) that they do not remain absolutely the same, as do the intelligibles.\(^{68}\)

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\(^{64}\) See Pl., \textit{Phd.} 109B7 8; Ar. [?], \textit{De mun.} 6.400a6.

\(^{65}\) Cf. 1.2.1.31 36. See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 57A3 5.

\(^{66}\) I.e., contra Aristotle, a fifth element is not required.

\(^{67}\) Cf. 2.9.2.2 3, 3.11 15.

\(^{68}\) Cf. e.g., 3.6.6.19 20; 4.3.8.22 24; 6.7.13.47 51.
2.2 (14)

On the Motion of Heaven

INTRODUCTION

This short early treatise is dedicated to explaining the circular motion of the heavens as an imitation of intellection – a thesis familiar from Plato’s Timaeus and Laws – though its dialectical approach makes assessing its conclusions difficult. This is also a topic to which Plotinus returns again and again throughout his career (see 2.1 (40); 3.13–30; 3.2 (47); 3.28–31; 3.7 (45); 4.29–33; 6.4 (22); 2.34–49; 4.4 (28); 16.20–31) and so any results discerned here must be seen in light of these later remarks.

SUMMARY

§1. Although the natural motion of all bodies would appear to be straight, the circular motion of the heavens can be explained by appealing to its desire for soul, which is everywhere in the heavens, and to the limited size of the universe. Soul’s own motion, which is not spatial, is due to its imitating Intellect.

§2. The primary circular motion of the souls of celestial things is spiritual, moving around god, and this becomes a spatial circular motion because their bodies are easily led by their souls.

§3. The spatial motion of the universe results from the non-spatial motion of the soul of the cosmos, which may be analysed in terms of its higher and lower parts.
§2.2.1. Why does it ‘move in a circle’?\(^1\) Because it is imitating Intellect. And what does this motion belong to – soul or body? Is it, then, that soul is in and related to motion? Does soul strive to be in motion? Is soul in motion without being in continuous motion?\(^2\) Or is it that, as soul is borne along, it bears [body] along with itself? But if the soul is bearing [body] along with itself, it should no longer be bearing it but instead should have borne it, that is, it should rather have made it come to a stop and not always go in a circle, just as\(^3\) soul itself will have stopped. Or if the soul is in motion, it is certainly not in motion in a spatial manner. How, then, does soul move body in a spatial manner, if it itself is in some other kind of motion?\(^4\)

Perhaps the circular motion in question is also not spatial, or if it is, then only accidentally. What, then, is this motion like? It is directed to itself, involves both perceptual and intellectual self-awareness, is vital,\(^5\) and is nowhere outside itself or anywhere else\(^6\) on account of its having to encompass all things. For the sovereign part of the living being is encompassing and what makes it one. But if it remained still, it will not encompass it in a vital manner, nor will it, since it has a body, preserve the things within it. For the life of the body is motion.\(^7\) If, then, this motion is also spatial, it will be in motion as it is able and not only as a soul but as an ensouled body\(^8\) and as a living being. As a result, the motion will be mixed from corporeal motion and soul-motion; body being borne by nature straight ahead and soul containing it, and what results from these two is both borne and remains still.\(^9\)

\(^1\) In his \textit{VP} Porphyry twice gives the title of this treatise as \textit{On the Circular Motion} (4.49 and 24.42).

\(^2\) Cf. 3.2.3.30; 6.9.8.1 8. See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 34A4; Lg. 898A5 B3; Ar., \textit{DA} 1.3.406b26 407b11; Alex. Aphr., \textit{Quaestiones} 40.18 21, 63.1 2, 63.20 21.

\(^3\) Reading ἥ with Harder in line 6 and removing the full stop after κύκλω.

\(^4\) See Ar., \textit{DA} 1.4.408a28 35.

\(^5\) Cf. 4.4.8.42 45.

\(^6\) Reading δύσλοθι κατὰ with HS\(^4\), and following HS\(^4\) in changing the question mark after περιλαμβάνειν to a raised dot.

\(^7\) Cf. 3.2.4.12 13.

\(^8\) See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 30B9.

\(^9\) Cf. 6.3.24.11 13.
If the circular motion is said to belong to body, how could this be the case, given that every body and especially fire moves in a straight line? Either fire moves in a straight line until it reaches the place where it was ordered to be; for fire appears both to come to a natural stop just as it was ordered to do, and to be borne to where it was ordered to be. Why, then, does it not remain still once it has got there? Is it because fire’s nature is to be in motion? If it does not, then, move in a circle, it will be dispersed in a series of straight lines. It must, therefore, move in a circle. But this is [the work] of providence, yet it exists in the fire from providence. As a result, if fire comes to be there, it moves in a circle of its own accord. Or else, fire desires to go straight on but does not have any more place to go, so it turns back – slipping around, in a way – within the places it is able to move. For it has no place beyond itself, since this is the outermost place.

It runs, then, in the place that it has – and heaven is itself this place – not in order that, having come to be there, it might remain still, but that it might be borne in motion. The centre of the circle naturally remains at rest, but if the outer periphery should remain at rest, it would just end up being a big centre. It will be more appropriate, then, for a body that is alive and in its natural state to be moving around the centre [at the periphery]. For this is its manner of contracting to the centre, not by collapsing into the centre – for this would destroy the circle – but rather, since collapsing isn’t an option, by rotation. For this is the only way for it to satisfy its desire.

But if soul is leading it around, it does not involve any toil on its part. For it does not drag it, nor is this motion contrary to its nature. For nature is simply what has been ordered by the soul of the cosmos.

Further, as soul is everywhere as a whole and as the soul of the universe is not divided part by part, it allows heaven, too, to be everywhere to the extent that this is possible, and it is possible for it by passing through or traversing all things. For if the soul had come to a stop at any point, heaven, having come to that point, would come to a stop there, too. But as it is, since the soul is of the entire cosmos, fire will desire it everywhere. And so? Will it never attain it?

In fact, this way it is always attaining it, or rather the soul is always leading it to soul and by always leading it is always moving it, and soul is not moving it to another place but to itself in the identical place, and by leading it not in a straight line but in a circle, soul gives it possession of itself at rest. For the circle is the way in which soul is everywhere and with itself.

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10 See Ar., DC 1.2.268b20 269a7, 269a17 18.
11 See Ar., Phys. 4.4.211a4 5, 5.212b33 34. I.e., lose its unity.
12 See Pl., Crat. 398C1 7.
14 See Pl., Crat. 398C1 7.
15 Cf. 2.1.3.14 17. See Ar., DC 1.9.279a17 18.
16 I.e., fire has a propensity to be where the soul is, namely, everywhere. Reading πάσα ἐστιν, αὐτῆς πάντη ἔφεσεν with HS4. Cf. 5.1.2.29 39; 6.4.2.39 43.
soul wherever it happens to be. But if soul remained still, as if occupying in heaven only the place where each heavenly body remains, heaven would come to a stop. If, then, soul is not only at some particular place in heaven, the heaven will be borne in motion everywhere and not outside. Therefore, it goes in a circle.

§2.2.2. What about the other [heavenly bodies], then? In fact, each one is not a whole but a part contained in a particular place, whereas heaven is a whole and is place, in a way, and there is nothing to stand in its way. For it is the universe. What about human beings, then? In fact, insofar as they derive from the universe, each is a part, but insofar as they are themselves, each is its own whole.

If, then, [the heavenly bodies] have soul wherever they are, why must [they] move around? Because they do not only have it there. If the power of this soul is directed towards the middle, this would also explain the circular motion. But ‘middle’ must not be understood to mean the same thing when used of body and of soul; in the case of soul, the middle is that from which the rest of the soul derives, whereas a body’s middle is to be understood spatially. ‘Middle’, then, must be understood analogously. For just as in the former case, so, too, must there be a middle in the latter case, which alone is the middle of body, that is, of spherical body. For just as the former is around its middle, so, too, is the latter. If there is indeed a middle of soul, soul, by running around god, is embracing him with love and surrounding him to whatever extent it can do so. For all things depend on him. Since, then, it is not possible to go to him, it goes around him.

How, then, is it that all souls do not move in this manner? In fact, each moves in this manner wherever it is. Why, then, do not our bodies also move in this manner? Because the kind of body that is attached to our souls moves in straight lines, and because our impulses are directed at other objects, and because our spherical part [the head] is not set to run smoothly. For it is earthy. But in heaven [the body of fire], being light and easily moved, follows along with the soul’s motion. For why would it ever bring any motion of the soul to a stop? But perhaps even in our case there is a body that does this [viz. follows along with the

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17 The subject is unclear, but it appears to refer to any and all heavenly bodies. One alternative would be ‘heaven’; another would be ‘fire’.

18 See Homer, Il. 16.192.

19 This is the Good, here referred to as a god, but often referred to impersonally. Cf. 1.6.7.10 12; 1.7.1.20 22; 3.2.3.33 36; 6.8.7.8 9. See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b13 14, 19 24 for whom the first principle of all is the Unmoved Mover.

20 Cf. 4.4.26.23 27. See Ar., GA 2.3.736a30 737a1.

21 Reading λεπτὸν <δόν> καί with HS. Cf. 4.4.26.26 27.
soul’s motion], namely, the breath surrounding the soul. For if god is in all things, the soul that wants to be with him must come to be around him. For he is not in any place. And Plato not only attributes to the stars the spherical motion that they share with the whole heaven; he also grants each star the motion around its own centre. For each, right where it is, encompasses god and gives praise, not as the result of an act of calculative reasoning, but by the necessities of nature.

§2.2.3. And let us assume that things are as follows: there is a certain faculty of the soul that is the ultimate faculty and that begins from the earth and is ‘woven’ throughout the whole; and there is the natural faculty of sense-perception and that of rational belief, and this faculty keeps itself directed to what is above in the spheres, riding upon the former faculty and giving it from itself a more vital faculty for production. The lower faculty, then, is moved by the higher faculty, which encompasses it in a sphere and is seated upon however much of the lower faculty has run up into the spheres. While the higher faculty, then, encompasses the lower one in a sphere, the lower one converges and reverts towards the higher, and its reversion leads the body around in which it is interwoven.

For if an individual part of the sphere is moved at all, and if it remains in the sphere as it is moved, then it shakes the whole of which it is a part and motion results for the sphere. For in the case of our bodies, too, while the soul is moved in some other mode – in joy, for example, or in something’s appearing to be good – the motion of the body that results is spatial. And especially, when [the lower] soul comes to be up there, in a good [place], and has become more perceptive, it is moved towards the Good and shakes the body in the spatial manner that is natural to it there. And the faculty of sense-perception also receives the Good in turn from what is above it, and it delights in its own delights, and by pursuing the Good that is in all places, it is borne along to all places. And this is the manner of the Intellect’s motion. For it is at rest and in motion. For it is moving around the Good. In this way, then, the universe, too, is moving in a circle and at rest.

22 The pneumatic or astral or ethereal body. See Pl., *Phdr.* 246B2, 247B2; *Tim.* 41E1 2, 75A5 E2.
25 Or: ‘power’ (δύναμις). Plotinus here seems to be applying the Aristotelian faculty psychology to the soul of the cosmos.
26 The growth faculty, including reproduction, nourishment, and increase in size.
29 Cf. 2.1.5.8; 2.3.18.10 13; 3.8.4.15 16, 5.1 16; 4.4.13.1 11; 5.9.6.19; 6.2.22.29 35.
30 Retaining the ei μένων κινώτατο of the mss.
31 Cf. 1.7.1.23 24; 3.9.7.2 3; 4.4.16.23 31.
32 Cf. *supra* 1.8 19; 5.1.4.35 37. See Pl., *Parm.* 146A7.
On Whether the Stars Are Causes

Introduction

Porphyry likely had this treatise in mind when, in his Life of Plotinus (§15), he related that Plotinus investigated the theory and methods of contemporary astrologers – albeit not in any mathematically rigorous manner – and concluded that their practices and beliefs are seriously flawed. Yet this brief report is potentially very misleading. Plotinus is indeed very critical of astrological beliefs, both in this treatise and elsewhere in the Enneads, but he is far from rejecting astrology tout court as a pseudo-science (cf. 2.9.13; 3.1.5–6; 3.2.10.12–19; 3.4.6; 4.3.12.21–30; 4.4.31.10–16; 4.4.33–35 and 38–39). As we see in this treatise, Plotinus not only accepts that the stars and planets can signal future events, he even concedes that they have a significant causal role to play in sublunary goings-on. His criticism of his contemporary astrologers is directed at the manner and scope of such astrological influence, as well as at its implications for human freedom and responsibility. Plotinus wants to show that, when understood correctly, astrology is compatible both with human responsibility and with the divinity and goodness of the stars and the universe.

Summary

§1. A synopsis of the views of the astrologers, and some problems with those views.

§2. Regardless of whether the astrologers say the stars have souls or not, there are problems with their thesis.

§§3–6. It is unreasonable to think that the stars are forced to affect us in specific ways as a result of emotions they supposedly experience at certain points in their movements.
§§7–8. A first presentation of Plotinus’ own view. The stars signal future events by performing their own functions as parts of the universe, which is a single living thing.

§9. Regarding human beings, the higher self must be distinguished from the lower self, and only the latter is directly influenced by the stars.

§§10–11. Stars do not merely signify, but their causal powers are not as potent as the astrologers suppose.

§12. As all parts of a whole can affect other parts, so do the stars have some limited influence on the outcome of human reproduction.

§13. Inanimate beings, ensouled beings, and rational human beings are susceptible to the influence of the stars in differing degrees.

§14. The role of the stars in accounting for wealth, reputation, power, and marriage.

§15. An exegesis of the daemon and the lots in Plato’s myth of Er, and how this doctrine does not rob the soul of its autonomy.

§§16–17. Plotinus explores the possible scope and manner of the rational administration of the sensible universe by the soul of the cosmos.

§18. Even so-called evils make some positive contribution to the universe. A brief review of the genesis of the sensible universe according to emanation theory.
§2.3.1. We have already stated elsewhere\(^1\) that the revolution of the stars signifies the future for each thing, but without causing everything to happen, as the masses suppose. And that discussion provided some reasons for confidence, but let us now discuss the matter more carefully and extensively. For it is no small matter to think that things are one way or the other.

Now they [astrologers] actually claim that as they move, the planets\(^2\) not only produce states of poverty and wealth and health and sickness and such but even ugliness and beauty, and indeed, most importantly, states of vice and virtue; and even the particular actions that stem from these states at critical moments, just as if they were angry at human beings for things that these humans did without fault, since they were rendered in such a state by the planets; and that the planets grant the so-called goods not because they are delighted with those who receive them, but because they are themselves either distressed or benefited in accordance with their locations in their revolutions, and because they themselves become different in their thoughts when they are at the centres and when they are entering other cadent locations.\(^3\) Most importantly, they describe some planets as evil and others as good, and yet the ones that are called evil grant goods, and the ones called good can be maleficent.\(^4\)

Further, when the planets see one another they cause one thing, and if they don’t they cause something else,\(^5\) as if they lacked integrity and

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\(^1\) Cf. 3.1.5 6. Also 2.9.13.20 25; 4.3.12.22 24; 4.4.31.33 58, 33.26 34.27, 39.17 23.

\(^2\) ‘Planets’ here and in what follows refers to the sun, the moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. As these are the ‘wandering’ stars, Plotinus also refers to them as ‘stars’.

\(^3\) See Sext. Emp., M. 5.14. The four centres or angles are the ascendant, midheaven, descendant, and anti midheaven. Our thanks to Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum for many helpful suggestions on the translation of astrological terminology here and throughout this treatise.

\(^4\) See Sext. Emp., M. 5.29 30; Ptolemy, Apotelesmatica 1.5; Paul of Alexandria, Elementa Apotelesmatica 34.90.1 91.23.

\(^5\) See Paul of Alexandria, Elementa Apotelesmatica 8.21.5.
were altered depending on whether they see each other or not. And if a planet sees one planet, it is good, but if it sees another, it changes. And they see differently depending on the sightline from the aspect. And the combination of all of these together is different, just as the mixture of different fluids is different from its ingredients. Since, then, they maintain views such as these, it is fitting for us to examine and discuss each one, and the following would be a fitting starting point.

§2.3.2. We must consider whether these things moving [through heaven] are ensouled or without souls. For if, on the one hand, they are without souls, they furnish nothing other than heat and cold – if, that is, we actually conclude that any of the stars are cold. But then their contribution will be limited to the nature of our bodies, namely, when their corporeal influence reaches us; and the resulting variation in the bodies here will not be great, given that the flux from each of the heavenly bodies actually remains the same and especially that they are all mixed together into one on earth, so that the only differences concern our own locations resulting from our relative distances to the stars, with the cold heavenly body contributing to the difference in the same way.

But how does this account for the fact that some people are wise, others uneducated, others literate, and some are rhetoricians, others cithara-players and others pursue other skills, and further that some are wealthy and others poor? And how does it account for all the other things whose causes of their coming to be are not attributable to the mixture of the elements in the body? I mean, for example, having this kind of brother, father, son and wife, and being prosperous now, and becoming a general or king?

If, on the other hand, they are ensouled and do these things by choice, what have they suffered at our hands such that they willingly do us harm, even though they are situated in a divine region and are themselves divine? For the things that make us human beings become evil do not pertain to them, nor does it make any difference to them one way or the other whether we are doing well or poorly.

§2.3.3. But [they will say] the planets are not doing this willingly; rather, they are forced to do so by their locations and configurations. But if they were forced, all of them would surely be causing the identical effects when they come to be in the identical places and configurations. But in fact, what change has this planet

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6 The term σχῆμα is used technically by astrologers for the geometrical arrangements of the zodiac.
7 See D.L., 1.11.
8 Cf. 4.4.38.7 13; 39.28 29.
9 Cf. 4.4.31.22 48.
10 See Ptolemy, *Apotelesmatica* 1.2.3.
11 Cf. 4.4.34 35.
experienced when it passes by this or again that section of the zodiac? For, it does not actually even come to be in the zodiac itself, as it is situated rather far beneath the zodiac, and regardless of which section it should come to be in, it is still in heaven.

In fact, it is ridiculous for some planet to become different and to provide different gifts depending on which particular section it passes by, and to become different when it is on the ascendant and when it is at a centre and when it is declining from a centre. For it is not delighted at one time, namely, when it is at the centre, but at other times is in pain, namely, when it is declining, or else is idle, nor again is one planet angry when it is ascending, but gentle when it is declining, while another of them fares even better when it is descending.

Surely, each of them is always at the centre for some locations on earth and declining for others, and if it is declining for some it is at the centre for others, and the identical planet is surely not rejoicing and distressed and angry and gentle all at the same time. And surely it is unreasonable to say that some of the planets rejoice in the descendants while others rejoice in the ascendant positions? For in this way, a planet will end up being simultaneously delighted and distressed.

Next, why should their pain cause us harm? In general, one should not grant that they are either distressed or delighted at select moments, but that they are always propitious and delight in the goods that they have and in the goods that they see. For each has a life by itself, and the good life for each lies in its activity, which has nothing to do with us. And because they are living beings that do not associate with us, their relationship to us is accidental and not their primary activity. And if – as with birds – they accidentally provide us with signs, their works are still not directed at us in the least.

§ 2.3.4. This claim is also unreasonable – that this planet delights in seeing that one, but when another planet sees that one the opposite happens. After all, what animosity is there between them, and concerning what? And why is the same planet differently disposed when it sees a planet in a triangular aspect, and when it sees it in the opposite sign or in a quartile aspect? And, if it sees a certain planet in one configuration, why does it not see it when it is in the next sign and even closer to it? And in general, in

12 See Sext. Emp., M. 5.15. Idleness obtains when the planet is in a place that makes no aspect to the ascendant (the sixth or seventh place).
14 Cf. supra 1.8 19; 3.1.5.33 37, 6.18 24; 4.4.8.16 54.
15 Plotinus is questioning why one planet’s being two (quartile aspect), three (triangular aspect), or five (opposite sign) zodiacal signs away from another is supposed to be astrologically significant, but not being one or four signs away.
what manner will they cause what they are said to cause? How does each
do so independently, and further how do all of them together cause
another effect collectively? For it is certainly not by forming agreements
with one another and in this way acting on us as they agreed to, with each
giving up some of its effect, nor again is it by compulsion that one planet
prevents another’s gift from coming about, nor again is it by persuasion
that one gives in and allows another to act. And if one planet delights in
coming to be in the [regions] of the other, then why doesn’t the other
behave similarly when it comes to be in that one’s [regions], as if someone
supposing that two men are mutual friends should then say that the one
man is friends with the other, but the other for his part hates the first man?

§ 2.3.5. When they say that one of them is cold\(^\text{17}\) and that it is better for us
when it comes to be farther away from us, they are locating its harmfulness
towards us in its coldness. And yet it should be good for us when it is in the
opposite signs of the zodiac.\(^\text{18}\) And when a cold planet comes to be in
opposition to a hot one, both are said to become terrible. And yet there
should be some blending of their powers. And they say that this planet
delights in the daytime and is good towards us when it is warmed, while that
planet delights in the night time,\(^\text{19}\) even though it is fiery, as if it were not
always daytime – I mean light outside – for them, or as if the latter could be
overtaken by the night although it is far beyond the shadow of the earth!

And regarding their claim that the moon’s coming together with this
or that planet is good if it is indeed full but bad if it is waning, if anything
the reverse should be true. For when it is full from our perspective, it
would be completely dark to that planet, which is on the other side of the
moon and exposed to its other hemisphere, and when it is waning for us,
to that planet it appears full. Therefore, when the moon is waning for us,
it should be doing the opposite, since it is seeing that planet with its light.
It should, then, make no difference to the moon itself what phase it is in,
since it always has one hemisphere illuminated. It might perhaps make
a difference to the planet if it is warmed, as they claim, but it should be
warmed when the moon is completely dark in relation to us. If it is good
in relation to the other planet during its darkest phase in relation to us,
this is when it is full in relation to that other planet.

\[^{12.12}\] But the darkest phase of the moon in relation to us is
directed at the living beings on earth and does no harm to what is


\(^{20}\) We follow Ficino and many editors in taking 12.12 ff. to be a direct continuation of the
discussion in §5 and therefore include it in the translation here. Unlike others, how
ever, we believe that 12.24 32 should be kept as part of §12.
above it. And since that other planet is making no contribution to us on account of its great distance, the absence of the moon’s light seems even worse, whereas when the moon is full, its light [12.15] suffices for the things beneath it, even if that planet is far away.

But with respect to the fiery planet [Mars], it has been thought to be beneficial for the moon to have its dark side facing us, since then the moon’s cooling effect counteracts the effect of that planet, which is more fiery than it can stand. Yet the bodies of the ensouled things moving through heaven differ from each other in terms of being more or less hot, but none of them is cold, [so this appeal to counteracting is not well-founded]. And their [12.20] location is evidence of this. The one which they call ‘Zeus’ [Jupiter] is composed of fire in a well-balanced mixture, and so, too, the Morning Star [Venus]. For this reason, these are thought to be harmonious on account of their sameness, but they are thought to be unfavourably disposed to the Fiery Star [Mars] on account of its mixture and to Kronos [Saturn] on account of its distance. And Hermes [Mercury] is indifferent to all of them, as they think, being the same as all of them. [12.24 continued in chapter 12.]

§2.3.6. And to call this planet ‘Ares’ [Mars] and that planet Aphrodite [Venus] and to claim they cause acts of adultery if they should be in such and such a position, as if from the licentiousness of human beings they were satisfying their mutual needs, how is this not total nonsense? And how could anyone accept that if they should see each other in such and such a position that this sight that they have of one another is pleasurable to them, but that otherwise nothing is [pleasurable] to them? And given the uncountably many living beings that exist and are coming to be, what kind of life would the planets have if for each living being the planets had to always grant the fulfilment of life’s details – bestowing reputations on them, making them wealthy and poor and licentious, and granting the fulfilment of the activities of each? Indeed, how is it even possible for them to cause so much to happen?

And the view that the planets are awaiting the ascension of the signs of the zodiac and only then granting the fulfilment of these things, and that the number of years they have to wait corresponds to the number of degrees they have ascended – as if they were counting on their fingers when they are to act and it was impossible for them to act before these times; and in general, not to assign the sovereignty over the administration of the cosmos to any single principle and to attribute everything to the planets – as if one principle were not in charge from which the

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21 See Paul of Alexandria, *Elementa Apotelesmatica* 2.4, 68.3. 22 Cf. supra 5.19 20.

23 Reading τῷ in l. 17 with Beutler Theiler. 24 See Vettius Valens, 2.37.118.10 11.

25 Reading πέρα with Igal and HS4. 26 Reading ἀναμονῆς for ἀναφορᾶς with HS4.
universe is suspended and which grants to each to achieve fulfilment in accordance with its own nature and to perform its own actions, in union with that principle – these are the views of one who is ignorant of the nature of the cosmos and does away with it when, in fact, it does have a principle and a first cause that reaches all things.

§2.3.7. How, then, could these not be signs by analogy? But if these planets are signalling future events – just as we say many other things are indicative of the future – what would be the agent responsible for this? And how does this system arise? For the planets could not signal the future if individual events did not come to pass in a systematic manner.

So, let us suppose that the stars are like letters always being written in heaven – or rather, already written and set in motion. They would be performing some other function, but let the significations that they give follow from this function, just as from a single principle in a single living being one might understand one part from another part. For one might even know someone’s character, and the dangers he presents as well as means of guarding against them, by looking at his eyes or some other part of the body. The stars, then, are parts, and we are, too. Some parts, then, will be understood by means of other parts. Everything is full of signs, and the one who understands one thing on the basis of another is a wise man of sorts. There are at present many things that happen routinely which are known to all.

What, then, is this single system? For the existence of a single system makes reasonable the prediction by means of birds and all the other living beings by which we predict individual events. All things must indeed depend on one another – and it is not only in the unified whole of particular living beings that one finds what has been nicely called ‘a single united breath’, but especially and in a prior manner in the universe – and a single principle must make the universe a complex unitary living being, one from all. And just as in an individual unified living whole the parts have each received some single function to perform, so, too, must the parts in the universe each have individual functions to perform; this is even more true of the universe to the extent that its parts are not merely parts but also wholes and greater. Each thing proceeds from a single principle while performing its own work.

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27 This sentence appears in the manuscripts at the end of §5, but nearly all editors agree that it seems to belong at the beginning of §7.
28 See VP 11.1 8; 4.3.18.19 20.
29 Following the punctuation of HS4.
30 See Ps. Hippocrates, De alimento 23; Galen, De fac. nat. 1.13 (2.39 Kühn); SVF 2.543 (= D.L., 7.140). Plotinus is here referring to what he elsewhere calls ‘cosmic sympathy’.
31 See Pl., Tim. 30D3 31A1; Heraclitus, 22 B 10 DK.
with one contributing to the work of the other. For they are not cut off
from the whole.

Moreover, they act on and suffer at the hands of others, and one
approaches and causes pain or pleasure to the other.\textsuperscript{32} But they do not
proceed from this single principle randomly or by chance. For some-
thing else comes to be from them, and next another thing, in accordance
with nature.

§\textsuperscript{2.3.8}. And the soul has indeed been set in motion to perform its own
function – for soul, having the status of a principle,\textsuperscript{33} produces every-
thing – and it may keep its course or be diverted – and in the universe
justice follows upon the actions performed, since otherwise the universe
would be dissolved.\textsuperscript{34} But the universe remains since the whole of it is
always being set straight by the systematic order and power of the ruling
principle. And the stars, being contributing factors to the whole, are no
small parts of the heaven and so they are conspicuous and suited for
giving signs.\textsuperscript{35} They signal, then, everything that happens in the sensible
world, but they are causing other things, whatever it is that they may be
observed to be causing. And we naturally perform the soul’s functions as
long as we have not stumbled amidst the multiplicity of the universe,
and once we have stumbled, we pay the just price both in the fall itself
and in experiencing a worse fate afterwards.

Wealth and poverty, then, are due to the chance encounter of exter-
nal factors, but what about virtues and vices? Virtues are due to the
ancient state of soul,\textsuperscript{36} but vices to the soul’s chance encounter with
external factors. But we have already discussed these issues elsewhere.\textsuperscript{37}

§\textsuperscript{2.3.9}. But now, let us recall ‘the Spindle’,\textsuperscript{38} which for the ancients was
spun by the Fates, though for Plato the Spindle is both the wandering
component and the unwandering component of the revolution, and the
Fates and their mother Necessity turn the Spindle and spin a fate when
each living being comes to be, and it is by going through Necessity
that the engendered enter the domain of generation. And in \textit{Timaeus} the
god who is the producer of the cosmos provided ‘the soul’s principle’,
and the gods moving in heaven provided the ‘terrible and necessary
passions, anger’ and appetites and ‘pleasures’ and ‘pains’, and ‘another
form of soul’ from which these passions stem.\textsuperscript{40} These principles bind
us to the stars, since we receive soul from them, and they subject us to

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\textsuperscript{32} Cf. \textit{4.4.32.32 52}. \textsuperscript{33} Cf. \textit{infra 15.20 21. See Pl., Phdr. 245C D}.
\textsuperscript{34} See Pl., \textit{Tim. 41A8}. \textsuperscript{35} See Homer, \textit{Il. 8.555 556}.
\textsuperscript{36} Cf. \textit{4.7.9.8; 6.5.1.16; 6.9.8.14 15. See Pl., Symp. 192E9; Rep. 611D2; Tim. 90D5}.
\textsuperscript{37} Cf. \textit{1.8.12.5 7}. \textsuperscript{38} See Pl., \textit{Rep. 616C4}. \textsuperscript{39} See Pl., \textit{Rep. 620E7}.
\textsuperscript{40} See Pl., \textit{Tim. 69C5 D3}. This is the mortal part of the soul.

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necessity when we come to the sensible world. So, our characters derive from the stars as do our characteristic actions and passions that stem from a passionate disposition.\footnote{Cf. 2.1.5.18 20; 2.3.13.40 45; 4.3.27.1 3; 4.4.32.9 11; 34.1 3; 43.1 5; 4.9.3.23 29; 6.3.15.8 17.}

And so what is left, which is ‘we’?

In fact, ‘we’ are what we truly are, the ones to whom nature provided the possibility of ruling over our passions.\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 617E3.} For even among these evils that we have received through the body, god has nevertheless provided for ‘virtue to have no master’.\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Thet.} 176A8 B1.} For it is not when we are in a tranquil state that we require virtue, but whenever there is a danger, in the absence of virtue, of being among evils. For this reason, ‘we must fly from here’\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Phed.} 67C6.} and ‘separate\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 611D4.} ourselves from our accretions\footnote{Cf. infra 18.9 22. A distinction between the higher soul of the cosmos and nature, the lower soul.} and not be the ensouled composite body, in which the nature of body, which has received a trace of soul,\footnote{HS\textsuperscript{5} marks this text as \textit{nondum sanatum}. The translation follows the suggestion advanced in HS\textsuperscript{3}.} is more in command, since the life common to body and soul belongs more to the body. For everything that belongs to this common life is related to the body.

But to the other soul that is outside the body belongs the motion to the higher world and to what is beautiful and what is divine, of which no one is master. Either one makes use of it in order to be it himself and, having withdrawn from the sensible world, to live by it; or else, if one comes to be bereft of this soul, one lives in the domain of fate, in which case the stars do not merely signify for this person; rather, he himself becomes a part, in a way, and complies with the whole of which he is a part.

For each of us is double; one is a sort of complex, and the other is the self.\footnote{Cf. 1.1.7.14 18, 10.5 10.} And the cosmos as a whole, too; the one cosmos is the complex of body and some soul that has been bound to body, and the other is the soul of the universe which is not in body but which shines forth a trace of itself to the soul in body.\footnote{Cf. 4.4.18.1 4; 29.50 55; 6.4.15.15 18.} And the sun and the other heavenly bodies are actually also double like this; they allow nothing objectionable to reach their other, pure soul, but what comes into the universe is from them in so far as the star’s body, though ensouled, is still a part of the universe, and the body\footnote{Cf. 1.1.10.5 10; 3.3.4.1 4.} gives as one part to another, while the star’s power of choice, that is, its genuine soul, is looking towards what is best.

And a sequence of other consequences necessarily follows for it, or rather not for it, but for its environment, just as heat from fire goes out

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{41} Cf. 2.1.5.18 20; 2.3.13.40 45; 4.3.27.1 3; 4.4.32.9 11; 34.1 3; 43.1 5; 4.9.3.23 29; 6.3.15.8 17.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{42} Cf. 1.1.7.14 18, 10.5 10.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{43} See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 617E3.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{44} See Pl., \textit{Thet.} 176A8 B1.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{45} See Pl., \textit{Phed.} 67C6.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{46} See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 611D4.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{47} Cf. 4.4.18.1 4; 29.50 55; 6.4.15.15 18.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{48} Cf. 1.1.10.5 10; 3.3.4.1 4.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{49} Cf. \textit{infra} 18.9 22. A distinction between the higher soul of the cosmos and nature, the lower soul.}\n\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{50} HS\textsuperscript{5} marks this text as \textit{nondum sanatum}. The translation follows the suggestion advanced in HS\textsuperscript{3}.}
to the whole environment, and perhaps something passes from one soul to another soul that is akin to it. But the disagreeable consequences are due to the mixture. For ‘the nature of the sensible universe is indeed mixed’, and if someone were to separate the separable soul from the universe, what remained would not be much. This universe, then, is a god when that soul is taken into account, but the remainder, as Plato says, is a ‘great daemon’, and the passions that take place in it are those of a daemon.

§2.3.10. If this is so, then we must admit even now that the stars signify the future.

As far as causal powers are concerned, we should not grant these to them in all ways nor to them in their entireties; rather, only the affections of all things in the universe are caused by them and even these are caused only by their [lower] remainder. And we must admit that the soul, even before it entered the world of becoming, arrived bearing something from itself. For it would not go into body unless it had some large component subject to affections. And we must admit that acts of chance affect the soul that is entering the world of becoming, and we must also admit that the revolution of the universe acts of itself, as it is a contributing factor and is filling in on its own what the universe must complete, with each of the bodies in motion having received the role of a part in the system.

§2.3.11. And we must take this, too, to heart; how the influences coming from the stars are not received in the way that they are sent forth. For example, if it is fire, the fire here is dim in comparison, and if it is a disposition to friendship, it becomes weak in the one who received it and the friendship it produces is not particularly beautiful, and indeed, spiritedness, not being received in due measure so that one becomes courageous, produces either rage or faintheartedness, and the disposition of being in love with honour and concerned with its beauty produces a desire for things that appear beautiful, and what flows out from intellect produces clever trickery. For even clever trickery wants to be intellect, but it is not able to achieve what it desires. Each of these dispositions, then, comes to be bad in us, although they were not bad in the heavenly region. For not only are they not what they were there, they do not even remain such as they were when they arrived, since they become mixed with bodies and matter and one another.

51 Cf. 1.8.7.4; 3.3.6.12. See Pl., Tim. 47E5 48A1.
52 The expression τὸ λοιπὸν (‘remainder’), here and in 10.3, refers to the body plus the lower parts of the soul.
54 See Pl., Rep. 411B C.
§2.3.12. Moreover, the influences of the stars actually combine into a single whole, and each of the living beings that come to be acquires something from this concoction, so that what it already is becomes something of a certain quality, too. For the heavenly bodies do not produce the horse, but they do give something to the horse. For horses come from horses, and human beings from human beings. Yet the sun is a contributing factor. The human being comes into being from the human being’s expressed principle, but sometimes the external influence harms or helps. For the offspring is like the father, but the external factors often combine for the better, though sometimes for the worse. Yet they do not make it depart from its underlying nature. But when the matter dominates, the nature of the offspring does not, so that the offspring does not become perfect, as its form has been compromised. [12.12–24 translated in chapter 5] But all [parts] contribute to the whole.

It follows that they contribute to one another in the way that they contribute to the whole, just as each of the parts in an individual living being is observed to do. For the components of the body are most of all for the sake of this whole – bile, for example, contributes to the whole and is directed to what is next to it. For it has to stir up our faculty of spiritedness and keep both the whole and its neighbour from excess. And indeed in the body of the universe something like bile is required as something else that is excited to produce something pleasurable. And other things must serve as its eyes. But their analogous role to individual living beings makes clear that they are all subject to cosmic sympathy. For this is how there is one [living being and one unifying harmony].

§2.3.13. So, since some things derive from the revolutions of heaven and other things do not, we must divide and distinguish them and say in general what the source of each thing is.

And this should be our starting point: Soul is certainly managing this sensible universe in accordance with a rational plan; just as in the individual living being there is the internal principle from which the parts of the living being are each formed and organized in relation to the whole whose parts they are – and this principle is entirely present in the whole, whereas in the parts it is present proportionately to each. And concerning the things added to the individual living being from the outside, some oppose the will of nature while others are amenable to it. But all things, inasmuch as they are parts of the whole, have been
organized for the whole, since they have received the nature that the universe has and yet by an impulse of their own fill in the details of the universe’s whole life. Of the things in the universe, then, the ones without soul are entirely instruments and are, in a way, pushed towards action from outside. The others are ensouled, and of these some have an undetermined manner of motion – like horses pulling a chariot before the charioteer has determined their course for them inasmuch as they are actually ‘driven with his whip’.

But the nature [i.e. soul] of the rational living being has its charioteer from itself. And if it has one who is in possession of scientific understanding it goes straight, otherwise, it often goes in random directions. But both are within the universe and contribute to the whole. And those of them that are greater and in a position of greater dignity perform many great actions and help perfect the life of the whole, as they have a role in the system that is more active than passive. Others continue passively, having little power to act. And still others are between these two, being affected passively by some things but performing many actions themselves and having from themselves a principle for action and production.

And the universe attains a perfect life when its best [parts] are performing the best activities, insofar as the best part is in each of them. And each must actually place its best part under the command of the commander of the universe, like soldiers under the command of a general, and these beings are indeed said to be ‘following Zeus’ as he hastens towards the intelligible nature.

And the living beings that have been furnished with a lesser nature are of second rank in the universe, just like the second-ranking parts of soul in us. And the other living beings in the universe are analogous to our parts. For not even in us are all parts of equal rank. All living beings, then, follow the universe’s comprehensive plan – both all those in heaven and all the others that are dispersed in the whole – and none of these parts, not even a great part, has the power to effect an essential alteration in the expressed principles or in the living beings that come to be in accordance with these expressed principles. It can effect a qualitative change in both directions – for the worse and for the better – but it cannot make anything depart from its own nature. It makes it worse either by giving weakness to the body, or by becoming

59 Reading τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ <τά> πάντα ἄτε μίρη δύνα σύντοι [τά πάντα] with the corrections of HS.

60 Cf. 3.2.2.23 33; 4.4.38.14 39.2.

61 See Heraclitus, 12 B 11 DK.

62 See Pl., Phdr. 246A B, 253C 255E.

63 See Pl., Tim. 77B6 7.

64 Cf. 3.3.2.3 15. See Ar. [?], De mun. 6.399a35 b10, 400b6 8.

65 See Pl., Phdr. 246E6.
an accidental cause of badness in the soul that is in sympathy with it and that was sent into the lower world by it, or if the body is poorly constructed by impeding \textit{via} the body the soul’s activity\textsuperscript{66} that is directed towards it. It is like a lyre that has not been constructed in such a way that it can receive precise attunement for the rendering of musical sounds.

§2.3.14. And what about poverty, wealth, reputation, and positions of power?

In fact, if the wealth comes from the parents, the stars signify the wealthy man, just as they only reveal the noble man who comes from noble parents and owes his reputation to his family. But if the wealth comes from manly virtue, then, if the body was a contributing factor, and those who provided the body’s strength made a contribution – this is primarily the parents, and next, if the body has derived anything from its locations, the heavenly bodies and the earth. But if virtue is responsible without the body, then we must grant the majority of the credit to virtue alone, and whatever comes from those who rewarded this virtue was a contributing factor. And if those who gave the rewards were good, then the case must be referred back to virtue and thus virtue is the cause. But if the givers were bad and yet gave the rewards justly, then this occurred because it was the best part in them that was acting.

If, though, the man who became wealthy was wicked, then his wickedness and whatever\textsuperscript{67} caused him to be wicked are the principal cause, and to this one must add that those who gave the wealth are likewise contributing causes. And if the wealth comes from hard work, for example, from farming, then the cause is to be referred to the farmer, with the environment being a contributing factor. And if he discovered a buried treasure, then something from the universe must have contributed, and if so, it is signalled by the stars. For everything [in the universe] is without exception connected. For this reason, everything is without exception signalled by the stars.

And if someone loses his wealth, then, if the wealth was stolen, the cause is referred to the one who stole it, and this person is in turn referred to his own principle. But if the wealth was lost at sea, then the circumstances were responsible. And fame can come about justly or not. In the former case, then, the fame is due to one’s works and to the better part in those who hold him in high esteem. But if he is not justly famous, his fame is due to the injustice of those who honour him.

And the identical account applies to positions of power. For these were either bestowed fittingly or not. In the former case, the position is

\textsuperscript{66} See Pl., \textit{Phd.} 65A10. \textsuperscript{67} Reading καὶ <ὁ> τι with HS\textsuperscript{4}. 
to be referred to the better part of those who selected him or to him himself for what he had accomplished; in the latter case, the position was achieved by favouritism or in some other manner. And concerning marriages, it is either choice or chance and circumstance deriving from the universe. And the generation of children follows upon marriages, and the body of the child was either formed according to their expressed principle [in the seed] if nothing got in its way, or else it was worse if there was some internal impediment, either because of the woman herself who was pregnant with this child or else because the environment was disposed in a way that was incongruous with this particular pregnancy.

§2.3.15. Prior to the revolution of the Spindle, Plato had given the souls lots and choices, and he subsequently gave them the beings on the Spindle as contributors in order to bring the souls’ choices to accomplishment without exception. For the daemon, too, is a contributor to the fulfilment of these choices. But what are these ‘lots’? Well, coming to be when the universe is such as it was when the soul went into the body, and going into this body and having these parents and coming to be in such places and in general, as we said, the external factors. And that all things are connected and, in a way, spun together, is revealed through one of the so-called Fates [Clotho], both in the case of individuals and in the case of the whole. Lachesis reveals the lots, and Atropos necessarily brings these circumstances about without exception. And some human beings give themselves over to these external factors deriving from the universe, as if under their spell, and are hardly, if at all, themselves. But other human beings get the upper hand over these factors and transcend them with their heads, in a way, directed at the upper world, and they keep the best part of their soul, that is, the ancient part of its substance, outside. For we must certainly not think that Soul is such as to have as its nature whatever should affect it from outside, and that it alone of all things does not have its own nature. Rather, Soul must be much prior to the rest, inasmuch as it has the rank of a principle, and it must have many faculties of its own for its natural activities. For, being a substance, it would actually be impossible for a soul not to possess, along with its existence, desires and actions and an orientation towards its own well-being. Since, then, the complex derives from the complex nature, it is of a certain sort and has certain sorts of functions. But if there is a soul that

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68 Reading διαπραξάμενον, <έτερον δὲ> ἐταίρων with HS.
69 See Pl., Rep. 617D E, 620D E.
70 Cf. 12.5 7, 13.8 10.
71 Cf. 4.3.17.26 28; 4.4.40.1 6, 43.18 24, 44.25 37.
72 See Pl., Phdr. 248A2.
74 Cf. 3.1.8.4 8; 3.3.4.6 7; 4.7.9.6 13.
separates itself, it performs its proper and separate activities, and does not consider the affections of the body as belonging to it, inasmuch as it immediately sees that these are two distinct things.

§2.3.16. But what is mixed and what is not mixed, and what is separable and inseparable, when the soul is in the body? And in general what is the living being? We must examine these questions later, by taking up another starting point. For not all men have the identical opinion on this matter. But at present let us say what we mean when we assert that the soul administers the universe in accordance with an expressed principle. Is it that (1), the soul produces each [species] in sequence, in a way – human being, next horse, and some other living being including even wild animals, but fire and earth beforehand – and then watches these things interact as they destroy one another or even benefit one another, simply watching the tapestry being woven from them and the subsequent events that are always coming about, but not itself contributing anything else to what follows, except by again producing the generations of the original species of living beings and giving them over to what they experience at each other’s hands? Or else (2), do we mean that soul is also a cause of what occurs in this manner, because it is things generated by soul that produce the subsequent effects? Or (3), does the expressed principle even include the fact that this individual does or experiences this – not randomly nor by chance nor under these conditions, but rather as a matter of necessity?

Are, then, the expressed principles themselves doing these things? No, rather there are expressed principles, though they are not there as productive agents but as knowers, or rather it is the soul that possesses the generative expressed principles that knows what comes about from all its works. For when the identical things happen or come about, it is entirely fitting that the identical effects be produced. Indeed, the soul, either taking these things in or foreseeing them, completes the subsequent effects and connects the latter to the former, so antecedents and consequences are completely connected, and to these the soul completes and connects the subsequent effects as antecedents to further consequences, starting from the present conditions.

And perhaps because of this, the subsequent effects are always worse. For example, men today differ from the men of old, because the expressed principles give way to the affections of matter on account of the distance between the men of old and us and ever-present necessity.

75 See Ar., DA 1.1.403a11.  76 Cf. supra 9.43.
77 A reference to the subsequent treatise 1.1 [53].
78 Cf. supra 13.3 4. See Pl., Phdr. 246C1 2.
79 See Philo, De opif. mun. 140 141; Pl., Phil. 16C7 8; Porphyry, De abs. 4.2.
The soul, then, always inspecting different things and being consciously aware of the misfortunes of its works, has a corresponding kind of life and is not delivered from fretting about its work, as it would be had it brought its work to a close, once and for all fixing things so that they will be in good order; it is rather like some farmer who, having sown seeds or even planted a tree, is always setting all the things right that winter rains and sustained frosts and wind-storms have damaged. But if this is absurd, then must we say that the destruction and the effects deriving from vice were already known or even contained within the expressed principles? But if so, then we will end up saying that the expressed principles produce these vices, even though in the crafts and in their expressed principles there are no errors, nor is there what is contrary to the craft, nor the destruction of what is in accordance with the craft.

But at this point someone will object that there is nothing that is contrary to nature or bad for the whole universe, though he will nevertheless concede that there is better and worse. Why, then, if what is worse also makes a contribution to the whole universe, shouldn’t we say that everything is good? For even the contraries help towards completion, and there would be no cosmos without them. For this is also how things stand with particular living beings. The expressed principle forms and compels the better things to exist, but whatever is not such lies potentially in the expressed principles but actually among the things that come to be. And soul no longer needs to produce nor stir up its expressed principles since matter is already making the things that derive from it, that is, the worse things, due to the shaking that results from the antecedent expressed principles, and yet matter is nonetheless dominated for the better. And so there is ‘one from all’ where all come to be as either better or worse things, but exist again in a different manner in the expressed principles.

§2.3.17. Are these expressed principles in the soul thoughts? But how will the soul produce according to its thoughts? For the expressed principle produces in the matter, and the principle that produces in the manner of nature is not intellection nor even seeing, but a power to manipulate matter, and it does not know what it is doing but simply does it, like an impression or a figure in water, where something other than the so-called faculty of growth and generation puts into it what is needed to do this. If so, then the controlling principle in the soul will produce by manipulating the enmattered and generative soul.

80 See Pl., Tim. 43C3. 81 See Pl., Rep. 342B3. 82 See Pl., Tim. 52E1 5 and 88D6 E3; Alcinous, Didask. 169.4. 15. 83 See Heraclitus, 22 B 10 DK. 84 HS4 cautions: locus fortasse nondum sanatum.
Will it, then, manipulate by having previously engaged in acts of calculative reasoning? But if it did do so, it will have made a prior reference either to something else or to what is in it. But since it is referring to what is in it, there is no need of calculative reasoning. For it will not be acts of calculative reasoning that manipulate but the faculty of the soul that has the expressed principles. For this is more powerful and is able to produce in the soul. The soul, therefore, makes in accordance with Forms. So, it must be that it, too, gives what it has received from Intellect.

Indeed, Intellect gives to the soul of the universe, and Soul – the one after Intellect – gives from itself to the soul that comes after it by illuminating it and impressing form upon it, and this soul immediately produces as if under orders. It makes some things without hindrance, while in making others it is obstructed. But inasmuch as its power to produce is derived and it is filled with expressed principles that are not the primary ones, it will produce living beings not only in accordance with the form that it has received, but something will also come to be from soul itself, and this thing is clearly worse. This thing [that comes from soul itself] is indeed a living being, but a rather imperfect one, and one which finds its own life disgusting inasmuch as it is the worst, ill-conditioned and savage, made of worse matter, this matter being a sort of sediment of the prior realities, bitter and embittering. And the soul provides this to the whole universe itself.

§2.3.18. Are, then, the evils in the universe necessary because they follow from antecedent causes?

In fact, it is because, if these evils did not exist, the universe would also be incomplete. For many or even all of them provide some benefit to the universe – poisonous snakes do, for example, though in most cases why they benefit the universe escapes us. For even vice itself is of great use and is productive of many beautiful things, for example, all craft beauty, and it moves us towards practical wisdom, since it does not allow one to sit back and relax in safety.

If what has been said is actually right, then the soul of the universe must contemplate the best objects [of thought], always hastening

85 Deleting χειρος with Müller. Cf. supra 13.40 45; 14.30 33; 4.3.10.22 24.
86 Perhaps a reference to bile. Cf. supra 8.35; 12.27. See Pl., Phd. 109C2; SVF 1.105 (= Schol. in Hes., Theog. 117).
87 Cf.1.8.7.17 23. Following the punctuation of HS5.
88 See SVF 2.1172 (= Lactantius, De ira 13); 2.1152 (= Porphyry, De abs. 3.20); 2.1163 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1044c).
towards the intelligible nature and god, and as it is being filled – indeed, has been filled, in a way, right up to the brim – its reflection and final projection proceeds from it to what is below, and this is the productive principle. This, then, is the last producer. And over this is the part of soul that is primarily filled from Intellect, and over all things is Intellect, the Demiurge, which gives to the Soul coming after it, and traces of these [gifts] are in the third principle. 90 This cosmos, then, is plausibly said to be an image, always remaining dependent on its source. 91 The first and the second principles are at rest, and the third is itself at rest but is also accidentally in motion in the matter. For as long as Intellect and Soul exist, the expressed principles will flow out into this form of soul; 92 in the same way that, as long as the sun exists, there will be all the light that flows out from it.

90 Presumably, a reference to nature.
91 Cf. 2.9.4.25 26, 2.9.8.16 18, 28 29; 5.8.12.11 22; 6.4.10. See Pl., Tim. 92C7.
92 See Pl., Tim. 69B7.
On Matter

Introduction

In this early treatise, Plotinus works out his signature account of matter, by which he distinguishes himself not only from his Presocratic, Aristotelian, and Hellenistic predecessors but also ultimately from subsequent Neoplatonists. As the alternative title ‘On the Two Kinds of Matter’ given by Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus (§4 and §24) already indicates, Plotinus divides his attention here between intelligible matter (§§2–5) and sensible matter (§§6–14). Particularly distinctive is Plotinus’ identification of sensible matter with privation and non-being, and especially with evil, which Proclus was to reject centuries later in his treatise On the Existence of Evils.

Summary

§1. Everyone agrees that matter is the substrate of forms, but there is disagreement about whether matter is corporeal or not, whether it is substantial or not, and whether there is intelligible matter.

§2. Plotinus begins his investigation into intelligible matter. Some preliminary obstacles to the existence of intelligible matter are stated.

§3. Indefiniteness is not an obstacle to the existence of intelligible matter, since matter in the intelligible world will always have all forms.

§4. Intelligible matter would seem to be necessary in order to account for the fact that the intelligible cosmos is both many and one, and for the fact that its image, the sensible cosmos, has both form and matter.

§5. Those who declare matter to be substantial are correct in a way. For intelligible matter may be considered to be substantial insofar as it is illuminated and possesses intellectual life. Intelligible matter is eternal but generated.
§6. Plotinus turns to examine sensible matter. Reflecting on the generation and destruction of sensible bodies shows that there must be sensible matter.


§§8–9. Sensible matter is incorporeal and without quality. Neither does it possess quantity or magnitude, which are delivered to matter by whatever form it receives.

§10. Despite matter’s lack of determination, we do have epistemological access to it. This is possible by a kind of dim thinking or spurious reasoning.

§11. Matter is not to be confused with mass, even if it appears to be mass when we try to imagine it.

§12. Although actions are in the sensible world without requiring matter, matter is required for quality, magnitude, and corporeality.

§§13–14. Matter is not a quality. Matter and privation are one in substrate but two in account.

§15. Both intelligible and sensible matter are unlimitedness, and not merely in an accidental manner, and sensible matter is more truly unlimited than intelligible matter.

§16. Whereas intelligible matter is Being, sensible matter is poverty of goodness and exceedingly evil.
2.4 (12)

On Matter¹

§2.4.1. All who have arrived at a conception of so-called matter are maintaining a shared view when they declare a nature of this kind to be some ‘substrate’² and a ‘receptacle’³ of forms, and up until this point they are all travelling along the identical path. But they go separate ways once they start considering the issues that come next, namely, what this underlying nature is and how it is receptive as well as of what.

 Those men [the Stoics] who posit only bodies as beings and that substantiality is to be found among these bodies maintain that matter is one and serves as a foundation for the elements and that matter itself is substance,⁴ and that everything else is, in a way, an affection of matter — and that even the elements are matter disposed in a certain way.⁵ Indeed, they dare to trace⁶ matter all the way to the gods and ultimately to proclaim that even god himself is matter disposed in a certain way.⁷ And they even give a body to matter, since they declare it to be unqualified body and also magnitude.⁸

 Others say that matter is incorporeal, and some of them say that matter is not one, yet even these men maintain that this matter that the first group was discussing does serve as the foundation for bodies but that there is another prior matter among the intelligibles serving as a foundation for the Forms there, that is, for the incorporeal Substances.⁹

¹ In Porphyry’s VP (4.45 and 24.46) an alternative title is given: ‘On the Two Kinds of Matter’.
² See Ar., Phys 1.8.192a31. ³ See Pl., Tim. 49A6; 51A5.
⁴ Cf. infra 5.20 23. See SVF 1.85 (= Calcidius, In Tim. 290); 87 (Stob., Eds. 1.132.26); 2.316 (= D.L., 7.150).
⁵ See SVF 2.309 (= Sext. Emp., M. 10.312); 326 (= Simplicius, In Ar. phys. 227-23).
⁶ Reading αὐτὴν with HS⁴. ⁷ See SVF 2.1028 1048.
⁸ Cf. infra 11.1 13; 6.1.27.8 18; 6.1.29.10 16. See SVF 1.85, 493 2.299 (= D.L., 7.134 135); 2.300 (= D.L., 7.139); 1.88 (= Calcidius, In Tim. 292); Calcidius, In Tim. 293; 2.301 (= Sext. Emp., M. 9.10); 2.309 (= Sext. Emp., M. 10.312); 2.326 (= Simplicius, In Phys. 227-23ff); 1.86 (= Calcidius, In Tim. 290).
⁹ See Ar., Meta. 7.10.1036a9 11, 8.6.1045a33 35 on intelligible matter. At 1.6.987a18 21, Aristotle says that Plato identified the Great and the Small (= the Indefinite Dyad) as matter for the One.
§2.4.2. For this reason, we must first investigate this second kind of matter – whether it exists as well as what it turns out to be, and also the manner of its existence. To be sure, if its manner of existence must be indefinite or shapeless, and if there is nothing indefinite or shapeless among the things in the intelligible world, as they are the best things, then there will not be any matter there, either.

Further, if every intelligible is simple, there will be no need of matter in order for the [putative] composite [to be composed] of this matter plus something else. Matter is required for things that are coming to be and being made from one thing into another – it is from such considerations that we derived our conception of the matter of sensible things – but it is not required for things that are not coming to be.

And whence did matter come and begin to exist? For if it came to be, it also did so by the agency of something. If, on the other hand, it is eternal, there will be more than one principle and the primary Beings will owe their existence to chance. And further, if form is added to matter, the resulting composite will be a body, with the result that body will exist in the intelligible world.

§2.4.3. First, then, it must be said that what is indefinite is not in all cases to be considered as an object of contempt – and the same goes for whatever is intrinsically shapeless – if it is going to give itself over to the things ranked above itself, that is, to the best things. Even soul, for example, is naturally oriented towards intellect and reason and is shaped by them and brought into a better form. And among the intelligibles there is another manner of compositeness than that of bodies. For expressed principles are themselves composites, and by their activity they make composite the nature that is directing its activity to form. If this nature is directing its activity to one thing and derives its nature from another, then it is composite to a still greater degree [than the expressed principles]. And whereas the matter of things that are subject to generation is always taking on different forms, the matter of the eternal things is always identical and always has the identical form.

But perhaps things are the other way around with sensible matter. For in the sensible world, matter is all things in turn but one thing at any given time. For this reason, nothing remains in matter when one form forces another form out, for which reason it does not always have the identical form. But in the intelligible world, matter is all things at once. For this reason there is nothing for it to transform into, because it already has everything. Intelligible matter is, then,
never shapeless in the intelligible world, since not even the matter in the sensible world is ever shapeless, but the manner of shapelessness is different in each case.

As for the issue of whether matter is eternal or generated, this will become clear once we have understood what it is.\(^{12}\)

§2.4.4. Let us assume for now that Forms exist, since this has been shown elsewhere,\(^{13}\) and allow the argument to proceed on this basis. If, then, there are many Forms, it is necessary that there be something that is common in all of them and, especially, some property by which each one differs from the others. This property, that is, the difference that separates them, is actually the Form’s own shape.\(^{14}\) And if there is a shape, there is also that which is being shaped, in connection with which there is a difference. There is, therefore, also matter that receives the shape and is always the substrate.\(^{15}\)

Further, if there is an intelligible cosmos there,\(^{16}\) and this sensible cosmos is an imitation of that one, and this one is a composite that includes matter, then matter must be in the intelligible world, too.

In fact, how could you even call it a ‘cosmos’\(^{17}\) without having a form in view? And how can you have a form in view without accepting that there is something on which the form [is imposed]? For although it is absolutely and in every way partless, there is still some sense in which it is divisible. And if [as in the case of the sensible cosmos], the parts are torn apart from one another, this splitting and tearing is an affection of matter. For it is the matter that has been split. But if [as in the case of the intelligible cosmos], it is indivisible while being many, then the many are in one and matter is the one they are in, themselves being its shapes. So, think of this one as variegated or multi-shaped.\(^{18}\) It is itself, then, shapeless prior to being variegated. For if you think away the variegation or shapes, or the expressed principles or the intelligible content, you are left with what preceded these, which is shapeless and indefinite and none of the things that are on it and in it.

§2.4.5. But if one objects that since this shapeless and indefinite element always possesses them all together, it and they are both one and it is not matter, then there won’t be matter for bodies in the sensible

\(^{12}\) Cf. infra 5.24 39.  
\(^{13}\) Cf. 5.9.3 4.  
\(^{14}\) The term used, μορφή, synonymous with εἰδός (‘form’), is being used metaphorically for the Form’s intelligible structure.  
\(^{15}\) See Ar., Meta. 5.28.1024b8 9.  
\(^{16}\) On the intelligible cosmos cf. infra 2.9.4.30, 5.30; 3.3.5.17; 3.4.3.22 23; 3.8.11.36; 5.9.9.7; 6.2.22.37; 6.9.5.12 21.  
\(^{17}\) The Greek κόσμος can also have the sense of ‘decoration’ or ‘ornament’.  
\(^{18}\) See Alex. Aphr., De an. 85.23 24.
world, either. For neither is sensible matter ever without a shape; rather, there is always a whole body – and, surely, a composite one no less.

Intellect discovers the duality\(^{19}\) of the composite body. For it divides until it arrives at something simple that cannot be decomposed any further. Yet as long as it is able, intellect dives into the depths of its object, and at the bottom of each object is matter. For this reason, too, matter is also thoroughly dark, because the light is the expressed principle, and intellect is an expressed principle. For this reason, intellect sees the expressed principle in each thing and believes that its underside, since it is beneath the light, is dark, just as the eye, being a luminous principle,\(^{20}\) brings potential colours, which are themselves forms of light, to light and declares what is underneath these illuminated colours to be dark and material, being hidden by the illuminated colours.

But this dark underside among the intelligibles is different from the dark underside among the sensibles, and their matter is different, too – indeed, different to the same extent as the form that lies upon each of the two is different. For once the divine matter has received that which defines it, it possesses a definite and intellectual life. The sensible matter, by contrast, does become something definite, but it has neither life nor intelligence. It is rather a decorated corpse.\(^{21}\) And the sensible shape, too, is a mere image. So, the substrate must also be an image. By contrast, in the intelligible world the shape is a true one, and so the substrate must also be true. For this reason, even those\(^{22}\) who say that matter is substance should be taken to be speaking correctly, if they were talking about intelligible matter. For the substrate in the intelligible world is Substance – or rather, it is Substance when it is thought of together with the [Form] that is upon it and when it is illuminated in its entirety.

And we must investigate whether the intelligible matter\(^{23}\) is eternal in the same manner in which one might investigate whether the Ideas are eternal. For the Forms are generated in the sense of having a principle from which they derive their being, but they are ungenerated because they do not have this principle in a temporal sense. Rather, they are always derived from another – not in the sense of always coming to be, like the sensible cosmos, but in the sense of always being, like the intelligible cosmos. For the Difference in the intelligible world that produces the matter exists always. For this is the principle of matter,

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\(^{19}\) This is the duality of the Indefinite Dyad and of its imitations.


\(^{21}\) Cf. 3.8.2.32. \(^{22}\) The Stoics. Cf. supra 1.9.

\(^{23}\) See Ar., Meta. 7.10.1036a9 11, 10.3.1045a34.
this and the first Motion. For this reason, Motion has been said to be Difference, since Motion and Difference were engendered together. The Motion and Difference that are proceeding from the first are indefinite, and they require the first to be made definite, and they are made definite when they have reverted to it. And matter, too, is previously indefinite insofar as it is different and not yet good and still unilluminated by the first. For if the light derives from the first, then what receives this light, prior to having received it, had always been without light, and it has light as something other than itself, if indeed the light derives from another.

And with this we have already disclosed more about the matter in the intelligibles than the present circumstances require.\[^{26}\]

§2.4.6. But regarding the receptacle of bodies, let the following be said.\[^{27}\] That, then, there must be something that underlies bodies and is different from them is made clear by the mutual transformation of the elements. For the destruction of the element undergoing transformation is not total, since otherwise there will be some substance that vanishes into non-being. Nor again did the element that came to be come into being from total non-being. Rather, there is a transformation of one form from another. Yet what has received the form of the generated element and cast off the other one persists.

And this is, then, also made clear by considering destruction more generally. For destruction is of a composite, and if this is so, then each thing that undergoes destruction consists of matter and form.\[^{28}\] And induction bears witness to this, since it shows that what undergoes destruction is composite. And so does decomposition, for example, if a bowl is decomposed into gold, and gold into water, then when water is destroyed it, too, must have something analogous to decompose into.

And it is necessary that the elements be either form or prime matter or

\[^{24}\] I.e., the One. For Motion, Difference, and the other ‘greatest genera’, see Pl., *Soph.* 256C5 E3; *Tim.* 57D7 58A1, 74A5 7; *Parm.* 146A3 7. Also, see Ar., *Phys.* 3.2. 201b19 28. Perhaps the greatest genera Motion and Difference are equivalent to the Indefinite Dyad (= Intellect in its initial stage) prior to its reversion to the One and its production of Forms, thereby making itself the matter of the Forms.

\[^{25}\] Reading ὡλη καθ’ ἐπερον with HS\(^{4}\).

\[^{26}\] This is seen by some scholars to be a reference to the pact made by Plotinus, Origen, and Erennius not to disclose the teachings of their teacher Ammonius Saccas (see *VP* 3.2.aff.), though Plotinus might simply mean that it is time to bring the discussion back on course to the examination of sensible matter.

\[^{27}\] §6 presents Aristotle’s theory of sensible matter, and §7 presents a critique of Presocratic theories of matter that appears to be derived from Aristotle. See *GC* 2.7; *Phys.* 1.4. 7 9; *Meta.* 12.1 2.

\[^{28}\] See Ar., *Phys.* 1.7.190b20.
composed of form and matter. But they cannot be form. For how could they have mass and magnitude without matter? Nor can they be prime matter, since they undergo destruction. They are, therefore, composed of matter and form. The form corresponds to the quality or the shape, and the matter to the substrate, which is indefinite because it has no form.  

§2.4.7. Empedocles posits the elements in the rank of matter but has to deal with the fact that they are destroyed, which contradicts this posit.  

Anaxagoras makes the mixture matter, and he says that it is not merely suitability for receiving everything; rather, it possesses everything in actuality. But he cancels out the intellect that he introduces by making it neither the bestower of shape or form nor even prior to matter, but simply simultaneous with matter. But it is impossible for them to be simultaneous. For if the mixture participates in Existence, then Being is prior. But if the mixture and the Intellect are both Being, then there will have to be some third Being over both of them that they both participate in. If, then, the Demiurge is necessarily prior, why must microscopic forms be in matter only to have intellect then go to the endless trouble of distinguishing them again, when it would have been possible, if the matter were without quality, for the Intellect to distribute quality or shape over all matter? And how could it possibly be that ‘everything is in everything’?  

As for the [philosopher Anaximander] who posits the unlimited as matter, let him tell us what this could possibly be. If he means ‘the unlimited’ in the sense of ‘untraversable’, then it is clear that there is nothing like this among things that exist, neither pure unlimitedness nor as belonging to another nature like that which is accidental to some body. There cannot be pure unlimitedness because then even a part of it would necessarily be unlimited [which is absurd], nor can it exist as something accidental because whatever it is accidental to would not be intrinsically unlimited and would be neither simple nor matter anymore.  

But neither will atoms have the rank of matter, since they don’t even exist. For every body is entirely divisible.  

29 See Ar., DC 3.8.306b17. 30 See Empedocles, 31 A 32 DK.  

31 See 59 B 1 DK; Ar., Meta. 1.7.988a27, 12.2.1069b20 22; Phys. 1.4.187a22 23.  


34 Plotinus is here supposing that Anaxagoras accepts Plotinus’ own conception of Intellect and Being.  

35 See 59 A 41, 45, B 6, 8 DK. 36 See 12 B 1 DK.  

37 See Ar., Phys. 3.5.204a8 34, 7.207b27 29.  

38 Perhaps Epicurus is the main target here. Cf. 4.7.8-18 20; 6.2.4.18 21. See Ar., Phys. 3.6.206a27 29.
Moreover, the continuity of bodies could be cited against this hypothesis, and liquids, too, and that it is impossible for individual bodies to exist without Intellect and Soul which cannot be composed of atoms and that it would be impossible to create from atoms another nature apart from the atoms, since no demiurge will make anything out of matter that is not continuous. These and countless other objections could be and have been voiced against this hypothesis, and for this reason, it is pointless to waste time on ones like them.

§2.4.8. What, then, is this one matter that is said to be both continuous and without quality? If it is indeed without quality, it is clear that it cannot be a body, since then it would possess a quality. For we say that it is the matter of all sensible things, and not matter for some of them while being form with respect to others, as clay is matter for the potter, though not unqualified matter. And since we say it is indeed not like clay but rather is matter for all things, we do not want to attach anything to its nature that is perceived to be among the sensible things. If this is indeed the case, we do not want to attach qualities such as colours and warmth and coldness, but also not lightness or heaviness, nor density, nor rarity, and not even figure. And then certainly not magnitude. For what it is to be magnitude is different from what it is to have acquired magnitude, and what it is to be a figure is different from what it is to have acquired a figure. Matter, though, should not be composite but rather something that is by its own nature simple and one, since this is how it will be devoid of all properties.

And the bestower of shape will be bestowing shape as something other than matter, as well as magnitude and everything else, supplying them, in a way, from the realm of Beings. Otherwise, he would end up being subservient to the magnitude that matter already has and making it – not as large as he wants – but whatever quantity the matter wants to be. But to make his will follow the course set by matter’s magnitude is ridiculous. If the producing principle is prior to matter, then matter will be exactly as the producing principle wants, that is, it will be easily led to possess all of its properties, so including magnitude. And if it were to have magnitude, it is necessary that it also have a figure, and so it would be even less manageable.

So, when form comes to matter it brings everything to it. Form has everything: magnitude and whatever else accompanies the expressed

40 Cf. 5.9.3.11 14, 24 33. See Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* (= D.L., 10.67). 41 Cf. 3.1.3.
42 The results of this chapter are summarized in 3.6.16. Cf. 1.8.10.2 11; 2.4.1.8. See Ar., *Phys.* 1.7.191a12 13; *Meta.* 5.6.1016b27 28; Alex Aphr., *De mixt.* 1.213.16.
43 See Alex. Aphr., *De mixt.* 1.213.16; *De an.* 4.18.
principle and is determined by this. For this reason, in the case of the individual genera [of living beings] the quantity is determined along with the form. For there is one quantity [i.e, size] for human being, and one for bird and for this kind of bird. Is supplying a quantity to matter as something other than matter any stranger than adding a quality? And it is not the case that quality is an expressed principle while quantity is not, since quantity is form and measure and number.

§2.4.9. How, then, can anyone admit that there is any being that does not possess a magnitude? Actually, this is the case with everything that is not identical with quantity. For, of course, being and quantity are not identical, and there are lots of other things that are distinct from quantity. And in general we must posit that every incorporeal nature is without quantity, and matter, too, is incorporeal. For even Quantity itself does not have a quantity; rather, it is what partakes of it that has one. So, it is clear from this, too, that Quantity is a Form. A thing, then, became white by the presence of Whiteness, and yet that which was responsible for making the white colour – and indeed all the other variegated colours – in a living being was not a variegated colour, but rather a variegated expressed principle, if you will. And, similarly, that which produces the particular quantity is not that particular quantity; rather it is Quantity or its expressed principle that is the maker of a particular quantity. So, when Quantity approaches matter, does it unfold matter into a magnitude? Not at all. For matter was not just coiled up in a minute state. Rather, [an expressed principle] provided a magnitude that was not there before, just as it provided a quality that was not there before.

§2.4.10. How, then, should I think of the absence of magnitude in matter? Well, how do you think of the absence of any quality? And what will this thinking, that is, this apprehension of discursive thinking amount to? In fact, a state of indefiniteness. For if something is known by that which is the same as it, then what is indefinite must be known by what is indefinite. A rational account, then, of what is indefinite would be definite, but a direct apprehension with respect to it should be indefinite. If each thing is known by reason or by an act of thinking; and if in the sensible world, whereas reason expresses whatever it expresses about

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44 The expressed principle determines the quality, quantity, etc. of the composite. Cf. 3.8.2.24 25.
45 Cf. 6.4.8.19 22.
46 See Ar., Phys. 4.2.209b9; GA 4.10.778a6; Meta. 7.11.1037a27, 9.7.1049b1.
47 See Empedocles, 31 B 109 DK; Philolaus, 44 A 29 DK; Democritus, 68 B 164 DK.
matter, this direct apprehension, although wanting to be an act of thinking, is not that, but rather, in a way, a lack of thinking; then, its representation of matter should be more spurious and not genuine, as it is composed of that difference that is not true \(^{48}\) together with another kind of reason. And perhaps it was with an eye to this that Plato said it was to be apprehended by a ‘spurious act of calculative reasoning’.\(^ {49}\)

What, then, is this indefinite state of the soul? Is it utter ignorance like an absence of thought?\(^ {50}\)

In fact, the indefiniteness consists in a kind of affirmation. And just as with the eye, when colour is impossible to see, we see darkness, which is the matter of every colour, so too, then, with the soul; when the soul has stripped off all that lies upon sensibles like light, it is no longer able to make what remains definite, and this is comparable to seeing in the dark, since, in a way, it is made identical to what it, in a way, ‘sees’. Is it seeing, then? It sees in the way that one might see an absence of form or an absence of colour or something lacking illumination or especially something that has no magnitude. Otherwise, the soul will already be endowing it with form. Then, is this experience identical to the one the soul has when it thinks nothing? No. Whenever it thinks nothing, it expresses nothing – or rather it experiences nothing.\(^ {50}\)

By contrast, when soul thinks matter, it has an experience like an impression from something that lacks shape. For even when it thinks things that have acquired shape and magnitude, it is thinking them as composites, since it is thinking of them as things which have acquired colour and, more generally, quality. The object, then, of the soul's thought is the whole and the composite of both [matter and form]. And whereas the thinking or sense-perception of the properties which are added to the matter is clear, that of the substrate – of what is without shape – is dim, since it has no form. Whatever, then, in the whole and composite the soul receives along with the properties added to the matter, once it has deconstructed these properties and separated them off, this is what reason has no access to, and this is a dim object that the soul thinks dimly, a dark object that it thinks darkly, and that it thinks without thinking. And since not even this matter remained shapeless but has received shape among the [sensible] things, the soul for its part immediately projected the form of things onto the matter, as if it were distressed by matter’s indefiniteness – out of the fear, in a way, of being outside beings and not bearing to stay in non-being for long.

\(^{48}\) True Difference for Plotinus refers to intelligible matter. Cf. supra 5.24 39.  
\(^{49}\) Pl., Tim. 52B2.  
\(^{50}\) Matter is not unqualifiedly non existent; it is not nothing. Cf. 1.8.3.6 7.
§2.4.11. And why is anything else beyond magnitude and all the qualities required for the constitution of bodies? There is a need for that which is going to serve as a receptacle for all these things. This is, then, the mass. If this is mass, then it presumably has magnitude. If it does not have magnitude, then it will not even have a place where it would receive, and what could something that is devoid of magnitude contribute, if it contributes neither to the form and the quality, nor to the extension and the magnitude, which in fact appears to come to bodies from matter wherever it is present? And just as, generally speaking, actions, producing, times, and motions are included among things that exist without having any material foundation in them, neither must the first [elemental] bodies necessarily possess matter. Rather, these individual bodies can be what they are as wholes, while being more variegated because they are constituted out of a mixture of several forms. Thus, ‘matter’s lack of magnitude’ is just an empty expression.

First of all, then, what serves as a receptacle for any kind of thing is not necessarily mass, except when magnitude is already present to it. For soul, too, receives all things but it has them all together. Yet, if soul happened to possess magnitude it would have them all in separation from one another in magnitude. What matter obtains, by contrast, it receives in extension, on account of the fact that it is receptive of extension.

Likewise, when animals and plants increase in size, they acquire the quality that corresponds to their quantity, and when their quantity contracts, so, too, does their quality. But if, on account of the fact that in these biological cases there pre-exists some magnitude that is a substrate for the shaping agent, you were to demand [some pre-existing magnitude] in the case that we are concerned with here, you would be making a mistake. For the matter in the biological case is not unqualified matter but the matter of this [living being]. By contrast, unqualified matter must get magnitude, too, from another source. So, what is going to receive the form need not be mass; rather, the generation of mass can occur together with the reception of the remaining qualities.

In our faculty of imaginative representation, matter does indeed have the appearance of mass since it has, in a way, the initial suitability for

51 Cf. 1.8, 15, 1ff.  
52 Cf. infra 11.13 43.  
53 Cf. infra 12.1 13.  
54 Cf. infra 12.13 23. The interlocutor appears to be a Stoic, for whom matter is to be identified with magnitude (cf. supra 1.13 14). Matter so conceived would come very close to being space something that has extension but lacks all qualitative properties. Cf. 3.6, 18, 36 38. See Pl., Tim. 52A8ff.  
55 Cf. 3.7, 11, 23 27.
receiving mass, but it is a mass that is empty or void. Hence, some have identified matter and void. And I say ‘imaginative representation of mass’ because the soul, too, not being able to impose any determination when it mingles with matter, spills itself out into an indefinite state, neither being able to circumscribe it nor being able to arrive at a point. For in that case the soul would already be imposing determination. For this reason, one must not say that matter is exclusively great or again exclusively small, but rather ‘great and small’. And it is in this sense that it is mass and in this sense that it is without magnitude, because it is the matter of mass and it, in a way, runs through the mass as it is contracted from great to small and increased from small to great.

And matter’s state of indefiniteness is mass in the sense that it is the receptacle of the magnitude that comes to be in it. But in the appearance of matter in one’s faculty of imaginative representation, it is mass in that other sense. For of the other things that lack magnitude whichever of them are forms are determinate. So, in this case, there is no conception of mass. But matter, being indefinite and not yet established by itself, and being borne this way and that way to every form, and being so utterly easily led, becomes multiple by being led to all things and becoming all things, and in this way it acquired the nature of mass.

§ 2.4.12. Matter, then, contributes greatly to bodies. For the forms of bodies are in magnitudes, and they do not come to have a connection to magnitude except by having a connection to that which has acquired magnitude. For if these forms had a connection to magnitude but not to matter, then they would be equally lacking magnitude and a material foundation; they would simply be expressed principles – but these exist in connection with soul – and there would be no bodies. The many forms here [in the sensible world], then, must come to be in connection with some one thing, namely, with what has acquired magnitude, and this is other than magnitude itself. Furthermore, whichever things intermingle here come to the identical place [where they can intermingle] because they have matter, and they do not require anything else in connection with which [their intermingling would take place] because each of the intermingling things arrives bearing its own matter. But there is a need for some single thing that is going to receive them like

56 See Ar., Phys. 4.7.21413 14.
57 Aristotle reports that Plato spoke of a material principle called ‘the Great and Small’. See Phys. 1.4.18717, 3.4.20316; Meta. 1.6.987b20, 7.988a26.
58 Following the punctuation of HS⁴.
a vessel or a place. But place is posterior to matter and to bodies, so that bodies should have a prior need for matter.\textsuperscript{59}

Nor is it the case that, just because producings and actions are immaterial, bodies are also immaterial. For bodies are composites, and actions are not. And as far as the agents performing the actions are concerned, when they act, matter gives them the substrate for their actions by remaining in them, but it does not give itself to the performance of the action, which the agents would not want to happen anyway. Nor is it the case that one action transforms into another action, in which case they would have matter. Rather, it is the agent who switches from one action to another. So, the agent is the matter of the actions.

So, matter is necessary for quality and for magnitude, and therefore also for bodies. And it is not an empty expression; rather, there exists some substrate even if it is invisible and lacking magnitude. Otherwise, the same argument would force us to say that qualities and magnitude do not exist either. For each of these sorts of things might be said to be nothing when taken alone all by itself. But if qualities and magnitude do exist, even if the manner of their individual existence is dim, then so much more ought matter to exist, even if its existence is not self-evident as it is not picked up by our senses. After all, it is not picked up by our eyes, as it lacks colour. Nor by our hearing, since it is not a sound. Nor are there any flavours in matter, and for this reason, neither our nose nor our tongue can sense it. Is it, then, picked up by touch? No, because it is not a body. For touch pertains to body, because it picks up on the dense or the rare, hard and soft, wet and dry. And none of these exists in connection with matter. Rather, it is grasped by a type of reasoning that does not come from intellect, but one that operates vacuously, and for this reason it is called ‘spurious’, as was said above.\textsuperscript{60}

Nor is there even corporeality in connection with matter. If corporeality is an expressed principle, it is other than matter. Matter, then, will be something else. And if corporeality informs\textsuperscript{61} the matter and is, in a way, mixed into the matter, the result would obviously be body and not simply matter.

§2.4.13. Now if some quality which is common to each of the elements is the substrate, one would have to say, first, what this quality is, and

\textsuperscript{59} Cf. \textit{infra} 11.4 7.  \textsuperscript{60} Cf. 2.4.10.11.  
\textsuperscript{61} Reading εἴδοσοιήσσασα which draws some textual support from ms Q, which has εἴδη ποιήσασα. Also, taking the subject to be corporeality, even though HS\textsuperscript{2} in the critical apparatus says the subject is ὄλη (‘matter’).
next, how a quality is supposed to be a substrate. And if the substrate has
neither matter nor magnitude, how are we to conceive of something
qualified in what lacks magnitude?

Next, if the quality is determined, how could it be matter? And yet if
it is something indefinite, it is not a quality but rather the substrate and
the matter that we are searching for.

Why, then, should we not say that it is bereft of qualities because by
its nature it partakes of none of the other qualities; and yet, due to this
non-participation, it is qualified because it has some unique property
and thus differs from everything else, namely, a certain privation of
those? For the man who is deprived of something is qualified, for
example, the blind man. If, then, there is a privation of these things in
connection with matter, how is it not qualified? And if there is indeed
complete privation, then it is qualified even more so, at least if privation
is indeed qualitative.

Whosoever actually says this turns everything into nothing other
than qualified things and qualities. As a result, even quantity would
turn out to be a quality, and substance, too! And if it were qualified,
a quality would belong to it. But it is ridiculous to turn what is not
qualified or different from what is qualified into something qualified.
If it is supposed to be qualified because it is different, then it is either
difference itself, in which case it would not be [different] in the sense of
being something qualified. Or else it is merely something which is
different, in which case it is different – not intrinsically – but due to
difference, and identical due to identity.

And privation is in fact neither a quality nor something qualified,
but rather an absence of quality or of something else, just as sound-
lessness is not a quality of sound or of anything else. For privation is
a negation, whereas what is qualified is found in affirmation. And
matter’s [unique] property is not shape. For because it is not quali-
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fied, it also does not possess any form. It is certainly strange to say that
because it is not qualified, it is qualified; this would be just like saying
that by the very reason of its lacking magnitude, it has magnitude.
Matter’s property, then, is nothing other than the very thing that it is,
and this property is not something that is added to it but rather
obtains in its relation to other things, namely, that it is other than
them. And the other things are not simply other; rather, each one is
also some thing, like a form. Matter, by contrast, could appropriately
be said to be simply ‘other’. Or perhaps it ought to be said to be
‘others’, in order that you not define it in some singular manner by
using the singular ‘other’ but rather by using the plural ‘others’ you
indicate its indefiniteness.
§2.4.14. But that is the issue that must be investigated, whether matter is a privation or whether privation simply occurs in connection with matter.\(^{62}\) So, the argument that states that both are one in substrate but two in account has an obligation to teach us what the account is that must be given of each – both the account of matter that will define it without attaching any privation to it, and, similarly, the account of privation. For either [a] neither is in the account of the other, or [b] each is in the account of the other, or [c] only one of them is in the other account. If, then, [a] each excludes and does not require the other, they will be two and matter will be other than privation, even if privation should have an accidental relation to matter, and one should not be able to observe the one being even potentially in the account of the other. If, though, [b] they are like snub nose and snubness, then each will be double or two.\(^{63}\) And if [c], they are like fire and heat, where heat is in fire but fire is not given in heat, and if matter is privation just as fire is hot, then privation will be, in a way, a form of matter and the substrate will be something else, and this must be matter. In this case, too, the accounts are not one.

Is this, then, the manner in which they are one in substrate but two in account: the privation does not signal that something is present but rather that something is not present, and that the privation is a kind of negation of beings? It would then be just like when someone says ‘not being’ – for the negation does not make an addition but says that something is not. And the manner of privation is the manner of not-being.\(^{64}\) If, then, privation is not-being, because it is not what is, but being other is a kind of being, there will be two accounts, the one capturing the substrate and the other clarifying the relation of privation to other things.

Or perhaps the account of matter clarifies its relation to other things just as the account of the substrate also clarifies its relation to other things, but the account of privation, if it clarifies matter’s indefiniteness, possibly captures matter itself. But either way, they are one in substrate and two in account. Yet, if matter is identical to the essence\(^{65}\) of indefiniteness and of unlimitedness and of qualitylessness, then how can there still be two accounts?

§2.4.15. We must then once again investigate whether unlimitedness and indefiniteness belong accidentally to matter as a distinct nature, as well as the manner of this accidental belonging, and whether privation is

\(^{62}\) See Ar., Phys. 1.9.192a3 4.  
\(^{63}\) See Ar., Meta. 7.5.1030b30 31.  
\(^{64}\) See Ar., Phys. 1.8.191b15 16, 1.9.192a5. Plotinus denies that matter is unqualified not-being.  
\(^{65}\) Reading 76 with HS5.
accidental to matter as well. If whatever is number and an expressed principle is indeed beyond limitlessness – for boundaries and order and being ordered come to everything else from these, and it is not what is ordered that orders these; rather, what is ordered is different from what orders, and what orders is limit and boundary and expressed principle – then what is ordered and defined is necessarily what is without limit. And matter is ordered, and whatever is not matter is ordered by participation in it or by having the rank of matter. So, matter is necessarily what is without limit, and not without limit in an accidental sense, that is, in the sense that unlimitedness belongs to matter accidentally. For, first, what belongs to something accidentally must be an expressed principle, and unlimitedness is not an expressed principle.

Next, what is it that unlimitedness will belong to? Limit and what has been limited. But matter is not something that has been limited nor is it limit. In addition, when unlimitedness approaches what has been limited it destroys its nature. So, unlimitedness does not belong to matter accidentally; and so, matter is itself unlimitedness.

For even among the intelligibles, matter is unlimitedness and might well be generated from the limitlessness of the One – limitlessness either in terms of its power or in terms of its ‘everlastingness’ – though the limitlessness is not in the One; rather, the One creates it. How, then, is unlimitedness both in the intelligible world and in the sensible world?

In fact, unlimitedness is double. And how do they differ? Just as an archetype and an image differ. The image, then, is less unlimited? No, more. For the more an image has fled from existence and truth, the more unlimited it is. For there is a greater degree of limitlessness in what is less defined, since the decrease in the good is an increase in evil. The unlimitedness in the intelligible world, then, since it has more being, is unlimited qua image, but the unlimitedness in the sensible world, having less being to the extent that it has fled existence and truth, and having sunk into the nature of an image, is more truly unlimited.

Are, then, unlimitedness and the essence of unlimitedness identical? In fact, where there is both expressed principle and matter, they are distinct, but where there is only matter, one must say that they are identical, or better still, say that there is no essence of unlimitedness at

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66 Deleting οὐδε τάξις after τεταγμένον with HS.
67 I.e., secondary or proximate matter. 68 See Anaximander, 12 B 1 DK.
69 The word ἀεὶ (‘everlasting’) is rarely used of the One which is, strictly speaking, not even οἰκείον (‘eternal’), but above or ‘before’ eternity. See 6.8.20.24 25.
70 Reading postpositive ὡς with HS. 71 See Ar., Phys. 3.5.204a23.
all in that case. For the essence of unlimitedness would be an expressed principle that causes unlimitedness by not being in what is unlimited. Actually, one must say that matter is intrinsically unlimited due to its organizational opposition to expressed principles. For, just as an expressed principle is an expressed principle without being anything else, so, too, must we say that matter, being organizationally opposed to an expressed principle thanks to its limitlessness, is unlimited without being anything else.

§2.4.16. Is, then, matter identical to Difference?

In fact, it is not; rather, it is to be identified with a part of Difference that is organizationally opposed to Beings in the principal sense, and these are expressed principles. For this reason, even if matter is not-being, it is still being in a way and is identical to privation, if privation is opposition to what is contained in an expressed principle.

So, will not the privation be destroyed when that of which it is a privation approaches? Not at all. For it is a receptacle of a state and not the state itself but a privation, and the receptacle of a limit is not itself what has been limited nor limit, but what is unlimited just insofar as it is unlimited.

Why, then, would not 73 the approach of limit destroy the nature of the unlimited itself, and this even though it is not accidentally unlimited?

In fact, if it were unlimited in quantity, it would be destroyed. But this is not in fact the case; on the contrary, it preserves it in existence. For it leads what it naturally is to activity and perfection, just as the unsown is led to perfection when it is sown. Likewise, whenever the female desires 74 the male, the female is not destroyed; rather she is made still more feminine. That is to say, it becomes more what it already is.

Is, then, matter still evil if it is participating in good?

In fact, it is because it was in need of it, since it was not in possession of it. For what is in need of something but possesses something else might be in between good and evil, if it is balanced in some way between the two. But what is in possession of nothing inasmuch as it is in a state of poverty – or rather, because it is poverty 75 – is necessarily evil. For this is not poverty of wealth, but poverty of wisdom, poverty of virtue, of beauty, strength, shape, form, and quality. How, then, could it not be unsightly? How could it not be downright ugly? How could it not be

72 See Pl., Soph. 258E2 3.
73 Retaining οὐκ with HS4.
74 Reading τοῦ ἀρσενοῦ <έφισται> [καὶ] οὐκ ἀπολλυται with O’Brien 1999: 70. See Ar., Phys. 1.9.192a20 34.
75 See Pl., Symp. 203B4.

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downright evil? But the matter in the intelligible world is Being. For what is prior to it transcends Being. But here in the sensible world what is prior to matter is being. It itself is, therefore, not being, being different from being and exceedingly evil.

77 Reading ἕτερον ὄν, πρὸς τῷ κακῷ, τοῦ ὀντός with Igal and HS4.
In introduction

Translating Plotinus’ Greek is never entirely straightforward, but this short treatise presents the translator with particular difficulties. As the title indicates, the entire treatise is dedicated to the examination of the concepts ‘actually’ and ‘potentially’. ‘Actually’ is the standard translation of the Greek expression ἐνεργεία (ι), which is the dative of ἐνέργεια, which, however, is usually translated as ‘activity’, but here we have elected to translate it with ‘actuality’ in order to make more transparent the connection that is exercising Plotinus. Likewise, ‘potentially’ is the translation of the Greek expression δύναμις, which can also have the sense of ‘power’ or ‘faculty’. (Hence, Plotinus’ question about whether a potentiality is a creative power at §1.23–26.) Here again we have preserved the linguistic connection by translating δύναμις with ‘potentiality’. This treatise is thematically very closely related to the preceding 2.4 On Matter, with Plotinus resuming his examination of matter under a new rubric.

Summary

§§1–2. A preliminary discussion of two senses of ‘potentially’ and ‘potentiality’, one relating to things that persist through a transformation and another relating to things that are destroyed, and how ‘actually’ and ‘actuality’ are related to each.

§3. All things in the intelligible world are actually and actuality. §§4–5. Potentiality and actuality in the sensible world.
§2.5.1. One thing is said to be ‘potentially’ and another ‘actually’. And there is something called ‘actuality’ among things that exist. We must, then, investigate what ‘potentially’ means, and what ‘actually’ means. Is actuality identical with ‘is actually’, and if something is actually, is this also actuality?¹ Or are the two distinct, and what is actually is not necessarily also actuality? It is clear, then, that ‘is potentially’ is found among sensibles, but we must investigate whether it is also found among intelligibles.

In fact, there is only ‘is actually’ in the intelligible world. Even if there is ‘is potentially’ there, it is always that alone, and if it is always there, it—by being removed from the forces of time²—will never go over into actuality.³

But we must first say what ‘potentially’ means, if indeed ‘potentially’ should not be spoken of without qualification. For it is impossible to be potentially nothing. ‘The bronze’, for example, ‘is potentially a statue’.⁴ For if nothing was going to come from it or be added to it or it was not going to be something after what it was, and it was not possible for it to become something other than what it was, then it would just be what it was. And what it was was already present and not to come. Then, what else was it potentially subsequent to its present self? In that case, it was nothing potentially. So, what is potentially must be said to be potentially because it is already one thing and is potentially something else afterwards, either by persisting in conjunction with producing that thing or else by giving itself up to that which it can become by being destroyed.⁵ For in one sense, ‘the bronze is potentially a statue’,⁶ and in another sense the water is potentially bronze and the air fire.⁷

¹ Reading ἐστιν ἐνέργεια [...] καὶ ἐνέργεια with HS⁴.
² Reading σῶτο τῷ in line 9 with Igal and HS⁵. See Ar., Cat. 10.13a30 31.
³ Cf. 5.3.5.38 43; 5.9.10.14.
⁴ Cf. 5.3.15.32 35. See Ar., Phys. 3.1.201a30; Meta. 11.9.1065b24. ⁵ Cf. 3.9.8.5.
⁶ See Ar., Phys. 3.1.201a30; Meta. 11.9.1065b24. ⁷ Cf. 2.4.6.12 13.
If this is indeed the kind of thing that ‘being potentially’ is, should we also call it a potentiality relative to what will be? For example, is the bronze a statue-potentiality?

In fact, we should not if potentiality is understood as productive. For potentiality understood as productive would not be said to be potentially. But potentiality should be potentially, if it is said not only relative to being actually but also relative to actuality. But it is preferable and clearer to speak of being potentially relative to being actually, and potentiality relative to actuality. What is potentially is indeed like a kind of substrate underlying affections, shapes, and forms that it is going to receive and is of a nature to receive.

In fact, it even strives to arrive at them, and arriving at some of them is to its great benefit, while arriving at others is for the worse and to the detriment of each of those things that are actually different from what is arrived at.

§2.5.2. We must investigate matter, whether matter is potentially its respective forms while being actually something else, or whether it is actually nothing; and, in general, regarding the other things that we say are potentially and persist after the reception of the form, whether they become actually, or will ‘actually’ be said only of the statue, that is, the actual statue in contrast to the potential statue, and not be predicated of that of which ‘potentially a statue’ was said. If this is indeed the case, what is potentially does not come to be actually; rather, what is actually subsequently came to be out of what was previously potentially. For again, what is actual is the complex, and not matter here and the form imposed on it there. And this is so if a different substance comes into being, for example, if a statue comes to be out of bronze. For the statue as the complex is a different substance.

Now as for things that do not persist at all, it is clear that what was potentially was something else entirely. But when the potentially literate person becomes actually literate, how could we not have a case here where the identical thing, namely, what was potentially literate, comes to be actually so? For the potentially wise Socrates is the identical man who becomes actually wise. Is the one who, then, lacks scientific understanding also a knower? This person was, after all, potentially a knower. The uneducated person becomes a knower in an accidental sense. For he is not, *qua* uneducated, a potential knower; rather, being uneducated was accidental to him. He is a knower due to his soul, and his soul was that which was potentially knowing, since it is intrinsically suited to knowing.9

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8 See Ar., Meta. 4.12.1019a15 20, 9.1.1046a26 27. 9 Cf. 3.9.5.3.
Does he, then, continue to preserve ‘being potentially’? Is a person who is already literate also potentially literate?

In fact, there is nothing to prevent this from being true according to a different sense of ‘being potentially’. Before he was only potentially literate, but now the potentiality is in possession of the form of literacy. If, then, the substrate is that which is potentially, and the complex – the statue – is that which is actually, then what should the form that is imposed on the bronze be said to be? It is not absurd to say that the shape or form is the actuality by which the composite is actually and not merely potentially; it is not, however, unqualified actuality but the actuality of this thing. For we might perhaps more properly say that there is another actuality, one that corresponds to the potentiality that brings about an actuality. For what is potentially gets to be actually from another, but this potentiality can bring about its actuality by itself. For example, a settled state and the actuality said to correspond to this settled state – courage and acting courageously. So much, then, for these matters.

§2.5.3. But the discussion of these matters was preliminary to our main goal, and now we must say how exactly ‘actually’ is said among intelligibles, and whether each intelligible simply is actually or is also an actuality, and whether all are an actuality, and whether ‘potentially’ is also to be found in the intelligible world.

If there is indeed no matter in the intelligible world, which is where ‘potentially’ is, and if none of the things there is about to become what it is not already, and if there is no transformation into something else – either by one thing persisting while generating something else or by one thing departing from its own nature and so allowing something else to exist in its stead – then that in which ‘potentially’ is will not be there where the Beings possess eternity and not time.

Regarding intelligibles, then, if someone were to ask those who place matter in the intelligible world, too, whether ‘potentially’ is not also there on account of the matter there – for even if the matter is there in a different manner, there will nevertheless be in each Being one component that serves as matter, another that serves as form, and the complex – what will they say?

In fact, even the component that serves as matter is a form there, since the soul, too, although it is a form, can be matter for something else. Is it, then, potentially with respect to that?
In fact, no. For its form was there, and the form did not come in later nor is it separate except in thought, and it has matter in the sense that it is conceived of as double, though both are a single nature. Even Aristotle, for example, says that the fifth body is immaterial.  

What, though, are we to say about the soul? For it is potentially a living being whenever it is not yet a living being but going to become one, and it is potentially musical and all the other things which the soul comes to be but is not always. So, [on this line of reasoning] ‘potentially’ is also found among intelligibles.

In fact, these things do not exist potentially; rather, soul is the potentiality of them. 

And how is ‘actually’ in the intelligible world? Is it in the manner that the complex statue is actual, because each intelligible being has received its form?

In fact, it is because each intelligible being is form and is what it is perfectly. For Intellect does not go from a potentiality for being able to think to the actuality of thinking – for this would necessitate another, prior Intellect that does not start from a potentiality – rather, the whole intelligible content is within it. For that which is potentially wants to be induced to actuality by the approach of something else in order that it might become something actually, but what itself possesses its eternal identity from itself, this would be actuality.

All the first principles, then, are actuality. For they possess what they should possess, from themselves and always. And Soul is indeed like this, too, I mean the one that is not in matter but in the intelligible region, while the soul that is in matter is a different actuality, for example, the growth soul. For what this soul is is actuality, too. But granting that all intelligibles are actually in this manner, are they all actuality? Why is this a problem? If that intelligible nature was indeed rightly said to be sleepless and life and the best life, then the most beautiful actualities will be in the intelligible world. All things in the intelligible world, therefore, are actually and are actuality, and all

13 Aristotle does not say that the fifth body is immaterial. See Meta. 8.4.1044b6 8. HS point to DC 1.3.26b29 31, 270b1 3 as passages that might have motivated this view. See also Atticus, fr. 5.71.74; Origen, C. Cels. 329.13 115. Plotinus himself does not think that the heavenly body is immaterial, cf. 2.1. It is possible that Plotinus is relying on Ar., Meta. 8.5.1044b27 29, 12.6.1071b21, 14.2.1088b14 28 which suggest that the eternal is immaterial. If that which is composed of a ‘fifth element’ is eternal, it is at least not material in a narrower sense. Then, by extension, the eternality of the intelligible world would have no matter.

14 Cf. supra 2.33 36. 15 See Pl., Tim. 52B7; Ar., EN 10.8.1178b19 20.
things there are lives, and the place there is the place of life and
principle and source of true Soul and Intellect.\(^{16}\)

§2.5.4. Everything else, then, that is potentially one thing is also actu-
ally something else that is already a being and that is said to be poten-
tially with respect to the other. Yet what about so-called matter, which
we say is potentially all beings? How can we say that it is actually any of
the beings? For in that case it would not be all beings potentially. If,
then, matter is none of the beings, it is necessarily not even a being.
How, then, could it be anything actually, if it is none of the beings?
True, it might not be any of those beings that are added to it, but
nothing is to prevent it from being something else, if indeed not all
beings are added to matter. Indeed, insofar as it is none of those things
added to it, and those are beings, matter would be non-being. And since
it is indeed represented as being something formless, it would certainly
not be a Form. So, it would not be counted among those intelligible
Beings, either. In this way, too, therefore, it turns out to be non-being.
Since it is, therefore, non-being on both sides, matter turns out to be
non-being even more.

If matter has indeed taken flight from the nature of the true Beings,
and if it is not even able to achieve the status of the things falsely said to
be because it is not even a reflection of an expressed principle as they are,
in what mode of existence could matter be captured? And if it is
captured in no mode of existence, what could matter be actually?

§2.5.5. How, then, are we to speak of matter? How is it the matter of
beings?

In fact, it is because it is [those beings] potentially. So, given that it is
already potentially [the beings], is it, then, already just as it is going to
be? Rather, its existence is only a profession of what is to come. Its
existence is, in a way, deferred to that which is going to be. So, its being
potentially is not anything; it is rather everything potentially. And it is
not anything actually, since it is nothing in itself; rather, it is what it is –
matter. For if it is to be anything actually, it would actually be what that
ingood is and it would not be matter. It would not, then, be absolutely
matter, but like bronze.\(^{17}\)

This, then, should be non-being, but not in the sense of being
different from Being, as Motion is.\(^{18}\) For Motion rides upon Being, as
if it were coming from Being and in Being, but matter is, in a way, cast
forth from Being, and absolutely separate from it, and not able to
transform itself, but whatever it was originally – and this was non-

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\(^{16}\) Cf. 6.9.9.17. See Pl., Phdr. 245C9. \(^{17}\) Cf. 2.4.8.3 10.

\(^{18}\) Cf. 1.8.3.7 9; 2.6.1.1ff. See Pl., Soph. 256D5 6.
being – this is how it always remains. And it was neither originally anything actually since it was removed from all the beings, nor did it become anything [actually]. For it could not be stained by the things that it wanted to slip under; rather, it remained directed to something else since it is potentially for subsequent things; and once those beings had come to an end, matter appeared, and it was seized by the things that came into being after it, and it was established as the last even of these. Since, then, it was seized by both, it could not actually be either one of them, and it remained for it to exist only potentially, as a kind of weak and dim image that cannot be formed.

So, it is actually an image; and so, actually a falsehood. And this is identical to saying that it is a ‘true falsehood’, and this is ‘real non-being’. If, then, it is actually non-being, it is non-being to a greater degree, and therefore real non-being. Since, therefore, it has its truth in non-being, it is far from actually being any of the beings. Since, therefore, it must exist, it must not exist actually in order that, having departed from true being, it might have its being in non-being. For when you have stripped what is false from the beings that exist in a false manner, you have stripped them of whatever substantiality they had, and for those things that have their existence and substantiality potentially, by introducing actuality you have destroyed the explanation of their real existence, because existence for them consisted in being potentially. Since, therefore, we must keep matter safe from this destruction, we must keep it as matter. We must, therefore, say, as it seems, that matter exists only potentially, in order that it might be what it is, or else these arguments must be refuted.

Cf. 3.6.11.18.
Matter is the end point, really ‘beyond’ the end point of the emanation from the One.
The beings that come ‘after’ it are bodies formed by the combination of matter and sensible form.
Cf. 6.2.1.29 30. See Pl., Rep. 382A4; Soph. 254D1.  See Pl., Tim. 52A2.
On Substance or On Quality

INTRODUCTION
This early treatise contains Plotinus’ first attempt to confront Aristotle’s account of the categories, and in particular his distinction between substance and quality as well as between essential qualities (differentiae) and non-essential qualities, with Plato’s highest genera of the *Sophist*. The treatise is very terse and at times difficult to follow, and it would seem that not even Plotinus himself was completely satisfied with it, since he revisits the topic in *Ennead* 6.1–3, where it receives a much more thorough treatment. Yet some of the points that Plotinus is working towards here are found again in the later treatment, for example, that the Platonic highest genera pertain to the intelligible world and that qualities are activities of expressed principles (λόγοι).

SUMMARY
§1. In the intelligible world all things are together, and all things are Substance (οὐσία), so that there would seem to be no place for qualities. In the sensible world we distinguish between essential qualities (differentiae) and non-essential qualities, but these are in fact the identical quality. A discussion of how these sensible qualities relate to Substance.
§2. If so-called sensible substances may be analysed into matter plus expressed principles (λόγοι), then essential qualities (differentiae) should be understood as activities proceeding from the expressed principles.
§3. Even non-essential qualities should be seen as activities. So, all so-called qualities, both sensible and intelligible, are in fact activities, though the former are traces and images of the latter.
§2.6.1. Are Being and Substance different, and is Being isolated\(^2\) from the other [greatest genera] while Substance is Being together with the others – Motion, Stability, Identity, and Difference – and are these [five genera] elements of Substance?\(^3\) The whole, then, is Substance, and one of those individual components is Being, another Motion, and another something else. Motion, then, is accidentally being, but is it also Substance accidentally, or is it rather an essential component of Substance?

In fact, it is neither; rather, both Motion and all the other [highest genera] in the intelligible world are Substance.\(^4\)

Why, then, does this not hold of the sensible world, too?

In fact, this holds in the intelligible world because there all things are one,\(^5\) but in the sensible world the images have been separated from one another and the one is distinct from the other. It is just like with the seed, where everything is together\(^6\) and each is everything and there is not a hand nor a head existing separately, but then [after conception, the parts] are separated from one another because they are images and no longer genuine.

Shall we say, then, that qualities in the intelligible world, given that they apply to Substance or Being, are differentiae of Substance, and that they are differentiae that make Substances different from one another and thus make them fully Substances? It is not absurd to say this of the intelligible world, but it would be odd to say this of the qualities in the sensible world, where some qualities are said to be

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1. In his VP Porphyry provides two alternative titles to this treatise: *On Quality* (4.55) and *On Quality and Form* (24.50).
3. Cf. 5.9.10.10 14; 6.2.7 8. See Pl., *Soph.* 254D4 E5.
4. See Ar., *Meta.* 1.9.99b34 991a1. Deleting ἡ οὐσία in l. 7 and inserting ἡ before οὐσία in l. 8 with Kalligas and HS\(^5\).
5. See Heraclitus, 22 B 50 DK.
6. Cf. 3.2.2.18 23; 3.7.11.23 27; 4.7.5.42 48; 4.9.5.9 11; 5.9.6.10 24. See Anaxagoras, 59 B 1 DK.
differentiae of substances, for example, biped and quadruped, while others are said not to be differentiae of substances but simply qualities.\(^7\) And yet the identical item can be both a differentia that completes the essence in one thing and not a differentia in another thing, not completing the essence of its substance but belonging to it accidentally. For example, in a swan or ceruse\(^8\) whiteness completes the essence, but in you it exists accidentally.

In fact, in the first case the whiteness is in the expressed principle completing the essence and is not a quality, while in the second case the whiteness belonging to the surface is a qualification. And, in fact, we should distinguish between two kinds of qualification such that the one is substantial and a kind of property of substance, and the other is a mere qualification by which a substance becomes a qualified substance; in this latter case, the qualification does not transform it into the substance that it is nor from the substance it was; rather, the substance is already there and essentially complete and the quality creates a certain condition from the outside, that is, a supplement that is posterior to the substantiality of the thing, regardless of whether this occurs in connection with the soul or the body.\(^9\)

But in the case of ceruse is the visible white also completing its essence? For in the case of the swan the visible white is not essence-completing, since a swan could become not-white.\(^10\) But in the case of ceruse it is essence-completing, as is heat in the case of fire. But what if someone claims that fieriness is the substantiality of fire and makes an analogous claim for the case of ceruse? Even so, the heat is completing the substantiality of the fieriness\(^11\) of visible fire, and the same holds for whiteness in the other case. So, the identical things are both substantiality-completers and not qualities, and qualities and not substantiality-completers. And it would be absurd to say that those things that complete substances are distinct from those things that do not, when in fact, their nature is identical.

Therefore, are the expressed principles that produced these things wholly substantial, while the products in the sensible world as a result have as a qualification what in the intelligible world is

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\(^7\) See Ar., *Meta.* 5.14.102033 b3.

\(^8\) \(Ψιμόθιον\) is white lead [titanium dioxide] that is used as a pigment. See Ar., *EN* 1.4.1096b2 3.

\(^9\) Adopting the punctuation of Igal and HS\(^4\). Cf. *infra* 2.1 5; 6.1.10.20 27; 6.2.14.14 23; 6.3.15.15 19, 17.8 10. See Ar., *Cat.* 8.9b33 34.

\(^10\) Horace, *Od.* 4.1.10, describes red swans presumably stained by ferrous water.

\(^11\) Reading \(πυρότητα\) for the \(πυρότης\) of the mss in line 35, which most modern editions delete.
Substance? Hence, we are always making mistakes about what something is, slipping up in our investigations into it and settling for what is merely qualifying. For fire is not what we claim it is when we focus on its qualifications. Rather, substance is one thing, and what we now see and what we focus on in ordinary language leads us away from what it is with the result that we end up defining it by its qualifications. And it only makes sense that this happens in the case of sensible things, since none of them is Substance but only affections of a substance.

And this raises the question of how substance comes to be from what are not substances. Now it has been said that what comes to be must not be identical with that from which it comes to be, but, in fact, we really should not say that what comes to be is even a substance. But how was it that we said that there is Substance in the intelligible world that is not from Substance? We shall respond that Substance in the intelligible world, having its being in a purer and more sovereign manner, is – to the extent that this is compatible with differentiae – really Substance, or rather it is called ‘Substance’ only once these activities have been added to it. And while it appears to be the completed perfection of that [One], it is perhaps more deficient due to this addition and by its lack of simplicity, being rather already separated from the [One].

§2.6.2. But we must investigate what in general a quality is. For perhaps once it is known what a quality is, our difficulties will be put to rest more effectively. First, then, we must investigate our previous question, whether we ought to say that the identical thing is sometimes a mere qualification and other times completes the substance, whereby we should not have any misgivings about a qualification completing the substance – or rather the qualified substance. So, in the case of a qualified substance, its substance, that is, its ‘what it is’, must be prior to its being qualified. So, what, in the case of fire, is the substance prior to the qualified substance? Is it body? The genus – body – then, will be substance, and fire will be body that is hot and this whole will not be substance; rather, heat will be in it in the way that snubnosedness is in

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12 The meaning of the words τὰ ἐκ τι (literally ‘the things in the intelligible world are something’), is best conveyed by ‘what in the intelligible world is Substance’. Also, adopting the punctuation of HS.

13 See Pl. [?], 7th Epist. 343c1.

14 Plotinus’ use of the word ‘substance’ here and below has to be understood with the proviso ‘in the Aristotelian sense of that term’. Cf. 6.3.2.1 4.

15 Cf. 6.3.8.30 34. See Ar., Phys. 1.6.189a33.

16 Cf. 2.5.2 3.

17 Substance arises from that which is beyond Substance, that is, from the One.

18 See Pl., Sopb. 248a11.

19 I.e., the activities of all the Forms with which the Intellect is identified. Cf. 5.4.2.32 40.

20 Cf. supra 1.15 29. Plotinus is now referring to the sensible world.
you. So, if its heat is stripped off, along with its brightness and light-
ness – since these in fact seem to be qualifications – its solidity and
three-dimensionality are what is left and matter turns out to be
substance. But this does not seem right, since it is rather form that is
substance, and form is a quality.

In fact, it is not a quality; rather, form is an expressed principle.

What, then, is it that results from the expressed principle and the
substrate? For it cannot be what we see and what burns us, since this is
a qualification. Unless one were to say that burning is an activity that
results from the expressed principle; heating, then, and whitening and
the rest are all productive actions. So, we will not have any place left to
put quality!

In fact, we should not say that those things which are said to complete
the substance are qualities, if indeed those of them that derive from
expressed principles and from substantial powers are activities; rather,
we should say that qualities are what come from outside all substance
and do not appear to be qualities in one case and not qualities in other
cases, and they add something extra to substance, for example, virtues
and vices, ugly and beautiful states, states of health, and being shaped
in this way or that. Triangle and quadrilateral are not per se
qualifications, but being triangular in the sense of having received
a triangular shape should be called a qualification – though not the
triangularity but the shaping. And so also with crafts and adaptive
practices. So, a quality is a certain condition that belongs to substances
whose existence is prior – regardless of whether this condition is
acquired later or there from the beginning – a condition such that,
even if it were not present, the substance would not be diminished.
And this quality can be both easy to change and difficult, so there are
two kinds of it; the kind that is easily changed, and the kind that abides.

§ 2.6.3. We should not, then, consider the whiteness that belongs to you
to be a quality; rather, it is clearly an activity that derives from the power
to make white, and in the intelligible world all of the so-called qualities
are activities, yet they have received the label ‘qualification’ from our
appearance-related approach to them, because each one is a property,
that is, they define the substances with respect to each other and have
their own unique character with respect to themselves.

Why, then, will the intelligible quality be different from sensible
quality? For these, too, are activities.

21 Cf. 2.4.4.18 20, 10.15 17; 6.3.8.14 19. See Ar., Meta. 7.3.1029a16 19; Sext. Emp., PH
3.39.

22 See Ar., Meta. 7.3.1029a29 30.

23 See Ar. Cat. 8.10a14 16.

24 See Ar. Cat. 8.9b33 10a9.
In fact, it is because intelligible qualities do not indicate what sort of thing something is, nor do they indicate a change occurring in the substrates, nor a thing’s character; rather, they indicate no more than the so-called quality, which is an activity in the intelligible world. So, it is immediately clear that this, when it has the status of a property of a Substance, is not a qualification; but whenever our reason separates a property among them, not by removing it from the intelligible world but rather taking hold of it and generating another [in the sensible world], it generated qualification as a kind of part of substance, by taking hold of what appears to it on the surface.

If this is right, then nothing prevents heat, too, since it is connatural to fire, from being a kind of form and activity of fire and not its quality, while again being a quality in other cases, namely, when it is taken all by itself in some other thing and no longer serves as the [defining] shape of the substance but is rather a mere trace and shadow and image, leaving its substance, whose activity it is, behind to be a quality. Whatever things, then, are accidental and not activities nor forms that furnish the [defining] shapes of substances, these are qualities – settled states, for example, and other conditions of the substrates ought to be called qualities – but their archetypes, in which they primarily exist, should be said to be the activities of those things. And the identical thing will not be a quality and not a quality, but what has been isolated from its substance is a quality and what is connected to it is substance or form or activity. For what is in itself and what is by itself in another, having fallen from being a form and activity, are not identical. And certainly, what is never form but always an accident of something else, this and only this is purely quality.

Cf. supra 1.33; 5.3.7.23; 25; 5.4.2.32.
INTRODUCTION

The Stoics advanced the rather counter-intuitive view that two bodies could completely blend with each other, that is, interpenetrate each other in such a way that both end up occupying the same continuous space (see SVF 2.463–481). This view was the object of a lengthy critique by the Peripatetic Alexander, above all in his treatise On Mixture but also elsewhere (esp. Questions and Solutions 2.12 and Mantissa 139.29–141.28), who maintained the impossibility of this interpenetration of matter. We know from Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus (§14) that Plotinus read Alexander, and we may assume that Plotinus’ own discussion here has been informed by On Mixture. Plotinus begins by pitting the Stoic and Peripatetic views against each other (§1) before turning to develop his own views (§§2–3).

SUMMARY

§1. Plotinus dismisses those who maintain that would-be blending is in fact just a case of juxtaposition. He focuses on two other positions: that of those who accept the complete blending of bodies (the Stoics), and the somewhat more nuanced view of those who maintain that the matter of the bodies in question is merely juxtaposed while the qualities are genuinely shared (the Peripatetics). He examines both views in relation to three problems: continuous division, the expansion of blended bodies, and the blending of quantitatively disparate bodies.

§2. Plotinus attacks the Peripatetic position that matter is what prevents blending. Since matter, like qualities, is incorporeal, it should also be capable of passing through a body. This
connection between incorporeality and blending leads to an examination of the nature of corporeality.

§3. A brief investigation into the nature of corporeality, and in particular into whether there exists a λόγος of corporeality.
§2.7.1. We must look into the so-called complete blending of bodies.¹ When one whole liquid is mixed together with another whole liquid, is it possible that each passes through each other or that one passes through the other? Whichever of these is the case doesn’t matter; the question is rather whether complete blending takes place at all.

We can leave aside those thinkers who attribute this to juxtaposition, since they are having the bodies intermingle rather than fusing together;² if indeed blending should make the resulting whole completely homogeneous,³ with even the smallest part being composed of the substances that are said to be blended.

Some thinkers, then, have only the qualities fusing together while juxtaposing the matter of each of the bodies, though allowing the qualities deriving from both bodies to belong to the matter of each.⁴ They might be giving a plausible account insofar as they reject total blending both because (i) the magnitudes of the bodies’ masses will be divided all the way down into divisions [as opposed to parts] if no interval of either body remains [undivided], on the assumption that the division is supposed to be continuous and that one body passes through the other completely;⁵ and especially because of (ii) the cases when the ‘blended’ bodies take up more space than either body going into the blending – indeed, they take up as much space as both combined. And yet, as they point out, if the whole of the one had completely penetrated the whole of the other, the space taken up by the one, which the other charged into, should have remained identical.

¹ See SVF 1.102 (= Stob., Ecl. 1.152.19), 2.471 (= Stob., Ecl. 1.153.24).
² See Anaxagoras, 59 A 54 DK and Democritus, 68 A 64 DK (= Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 214. 19 20).
³ See Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 214.19 20, 231.26 27.
⁴ Plotinus is thinking of the Peripatetics. See Ar., GC 1.10.327a10 12; SVF 2.411 (= Galen, De meth. med. 1.2. Vol. 10.15 16 Kühn).
⁵ Cf. 4.7.8.7 18. See Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 221.34 222.3.
As for those cases in which the space taken up by the body does not increase, they point to the departure of air as the cause, in place of which the other body entered. Further, (iii) how is the small body supposed to be extended within the large one and pass through it completely? And these thinkers advance many other arguments as well.

On the other side are those thinkers who introduce complete blending. (i) They might be able to maintain that the bodies are divided without being annihilated into these divisions, even when complete blending occurs, since they will be able to point to sweat not making divisions in the body or thoroughly perforating it. For even if someone were to concede that nothing prevents nature from having set things up in such a way that sweat goes through the skin, they will still maintain that, in the case of artefacts whose bodies are thin and continuous, one may observe moisture completely soaking them and flowing through to the other side. But given that these are bodies, how can this happen? It is not easy to conceive of it going through without dividing, but if the division is thorough, they will obviously destroy each other.

(ii) And when they say that in many cases expansion will not occur, they are conceding to the other camp the opportunity to point to the departure of air as the cause. And while there are certainly difficulties related to spatial expansion, what is to stop them from saying that this expansion occurs of necessity because each body brings its magnitude along with its other qualities into the blend? For just as the other qualities are not destroyed, neither should the magnitude be destroyed, and just as in the qualitative case another kind of quality is mixed from both, so, too, will there be another magnitude, where the mixing produces the magnitude resulting from both.

But in this case, what if the first camp were to say this to them: ‘If, on the one hand, the matter of the one body is juxtaposed with the matter of the other, and if the mass is juxtaposed with the mass and magnitude accompanies mass, then you would just be giving our account! If, on the other hand, the matter is completely blended along with the magnitude which belongs primarily to the matter, then what would happen would not be like a line being placed next to a line by touching at their end-points – which would in fact be a case of expansion – but it would be like what happens when a line coincides with a line, so that no expansion would result.’

There remains the problem of (iii) a small body passing completely through an entire large body, indeed of the smallest body passing

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6 See SVF 2.479 (= D.L., 7.151).
7 Adding κιόντο <τὸ> κατά with Theiler followed by HS.
8 Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 219.9 22.

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completely through the largest, which should occur in cases where fusion is obviously taking place. For in the non-obvious cases, one can deny that the smaller body reaches every part of the larger body, but at least in those cases where blending has obviously taken place, this problem must be acknowledged. Should they refer to the extensions of the masses, if they maintain that the smallest mass is extended to such a great magnitude, they are not saying anything particularly convincing. For they grant the small mass a larger extension even without having its body undergo any transformation, such as occurs when air comes to be from water.\footnote{Cf. \textit{infra} l. 21.}

§2.7.2. And this must be examined on its own: what happens when that which was a mass of water becomes air? How is it that the greater size in the air came to be? Although both camps make many other points, let this do for now, and let us rather examine for ourselves what one ought to say about the following: which opinion is in harmony with the facts,\footnote{See Alex. Aphr., \textit{De mixt.} 220.13 23.} or does some other opinion beyond the ones we have been discussing present itself?

So, when water flows through wool,\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Symp.} 175D6.} or, when papyrus exudes the water in it, how can it not be that the entire watery body is going through papyrus? Or even when the water is not flowing through it, how are we supposed to have the matter in contact with the matter, and the mass in contact with the mass, and yet only include the qualities in the blending? For the matter of the water will certainly not be outside of the papyrus and juxtaposed with it, nor again will it be in ‘gaps’ within the papyrus. For the papyrus is completely wet, and its matter is at no point devoid of this quality; and if the matter is joined with the quality everywhere, then the water is everywhere in the papyrus. Or perhaps it is not the water, but the quality belonging to water. But in that case where is the water?\footnote{Reading ὄντος with Armstrong and Ficino in l. 16.} Why, then, doesn’t the mass remain identical? Or perhaps what was added to the papyrus extended it. For it received a magnitude from what came into it.

But if the papyrus received a magnitude, some mass has been added to it; and if mass has been added to it, it has not simply been absorbed by the other body; and then the matter of these two bodies must be in two different places. But why can’t we say that, just as one body gives of its own quality and another body receives it, the same thing can happen with magnitudes? Because, when one quality joins another quality, it is not simply the quality it was but is together with another quality, and in being together with the other quality it is not pure and is not entirely the

\footnote{Reading γενόμενος with Beutler Theiler at ll. 5 6.}
quality that it was; rather, it is obscured. But when a magnitude is joined to another magnitude, it is not obscured.

And one might give some attention to how one body going completely through another body is said to make divisions. For our position is that qualities go through bodies without making divisions. This is because they are incorporeal. But if their matter is also incorporeal, why, when both matter and qualities are incorporeal, do not the qualities – if they are such as to be few in number – pass through together with the matter in the identical manner? They cannot pass through solids because they have such qualities as prevent passing through. Or else they cannot do this because there is a bundle of many qualities together with the matter. If, then, this multiplicity of qualities is what makes the so-called dense body, then this multiplicity is the cause. If, on the other hand, density is a proper quality, just as what they call ‘corporeality’ is, this proper quality is the cause. So, it will not be qua qualities that they form a mixture but qua such qualities; and again it will not be qua matter that matter is not included in the mixture, but qua being together with such a quality, and especially if the matter has no magnitude of its own, unless it has not rejected magnitude outright. Let, then, our discussion of these difficulties end here.

§ 2.7.3. But since we have brought up corporeality, we ought to investigate whether corporeality is the composite of everything or whether corporeality is a certain form and certain expressed principle that, when present in the matter, makes a body. If, then, this is what body is, namely, what is composed of all the qualities together with matter, then this is what corporeality would be; and if there is an expressed principle whose addition to matter makes body, then, clearly, this expressed principle possesses and contains all the qualities. But then this expressed principle – if it is not just the definition that indicates a thing’s substantiability but an expressed principle that produces a thing – must not include matter; rather, it must be an expressed principle that relates to matter and that completes the body when it is present in matter. And body must be matter and an inherent expressed principle, while the expressed principle itself must be seen as a bare form without matter, even if it is very much inseparable from matter. For the separable expressed principle is different, namely, the one in the Intellect. And it is in Intellect because it is itself an intellect. But this has been discussed elsewhere.
INTRODUCTION

In his Life of Plotinus (§14), Porphyry reports that Plotinus had immersed himself in optics, among other subjects. Perhaps this report is slightly hagiographical, but this treatise shows that Plotinus was concerned with at least one much-discussed problem in optics: why distant objects appear smaller. He presents us with a total of five solutions to this problem (§1.4–6, §1.6–9, §1.9–12, §1.12ff. and §2 passim), which are likely drawn from his philosophical predecessors, although the terse treatment they receive here makes a definitive identification of some of Plotinus’ sources difficult. Plotinus shows an unmistakable preference for the fourth solution, which is clearly drawn from Aristotle.

SUMMARY

§1. Plotinus goes through four different attempts to explain why distant objects appear small. The fourth of these, which maintains that size is only accidently perceived along with the proper object of sight, colour, is discussed at length and compared to the case of hearing.

§2. A short refutation of a fifth attempt at a solution, which states that distant objects appear smaller due to the restricted angle of view.

1 In his VP Porphyry twice gives a slightly different title: How it is That Things Seen at a Distance Appear Small.
On Seeing, or On How It Is That Distant Things Appear Small

§2.8.1. Do things that are far away appear to be smaller, and do things that are far removed from us seem to be at a short distance from us, while things that are near appear to be as large as they actually are and to have the distance from us that they actually have? Distant things seem smaller to those seeing them because light tends to get contracted to fit one’s sight, that is, to fit the magnitude of the pupil. Or else as the distance between the matter of the object of sight and the pupil is increased, the form arrives as more isolated [from matter], in a way, with even the quantity itself becoming form and quality, so that only its rational content arrives at the pupil. Or else because we perceive a thing’s magnitude through a detailed survey and inspection of how large each of its parts is. It must, then, be present and up close in order for it to be known how large it is.

Or else because it is only accidentally that magnitude is seen, since colour is the primary object of vision. At close quarters, then, one knows how large of a thing has been coloured, but at a distance one knows that it is coloured, yet the parts, because their largeness has been contracted, do not grant us the means to distinguish accurately how large the coloured object is. This is so, since even the colours themselves become dim at a distance. Why is it surprising, then, if things’ magnitudes, too, diminish, just as sounds do, to the extent that their form comes to us in a dim state? For in the case of hearing, too, it is the form that hearing examines, whereas magnitude is perceived only accidentally.

On the topic of hearing, however, one might ask whether magnitude is, in fact, perceived accidentally. After all, to what sense other than hearing does auditory magnitude appear as a primary object, just as visible magnitude appears primarily to touch?

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2 Cf. 1.6.3.9 15; 4.7.6.19 22.
3 Inserting ἢ καὶ with Theiler.
4 Cf. infra 7.26 27. See Ar., DA 2.6.418a11 13.
In fact, hearing perceives a sound’s apparent magnitude not in terms of how large it is but in terms of degrees of more or less, that is to say, the intensity [of its volume], and this is not accidental, just as it is not accidental that taste, too, perceives the intensity of sweetness. But the proper magnitude of a sound is the area it reaches, and this might be indicated accidentally by the intensity [of volume], but not in any accurate way. For each sound has its own intensity that remains identical, but the actual magnitude increases as the sound proceeds to the whole region of its extension. Yet colours become dim with distance, not small; it is magnitudes that become small. What is common in both cases is that what they are is diminished, and for a colour diminution, then, means dimness, while for a magnitude it means smallness, and since magnitude accompanies colour,\(^5\) the magnitude is diminished proportionately.

And this occurs more clearly in the case of objects of sight variegated in colour, for example, mountains having lots of houses and trees and other things on them, since each of these things, if they are seen, gives one the ability to measure the whole on the basis of the individual components of the sight. But if the form of the individual component\(^6\) does not reach the eye, then sight, which knows the whole by measuring the underlying magnitude, is deprived of its knowledge of how large the whole is. And even with objects close by, if they are variegated in colour and our apprehension of them takes place quickly and not all of the forms of the components are seen, the object would appear smaller in proportion to each component that is hidden from view. But when all of the components are seen, we measure them accurately and know their magnitudes. But those magnitudes that are homogeneous and monochrome deceive us with respect to how large they are, since our sight is not able to measure part by part very well, because when it attempts to measure part by part it slips up, since it cannot use the diversity of the individual parts to get a purchase on them.

And objects far away appear close by because the length of the interval separating them from us is shortened for the identical reason. For our sight is not deceived about how large the nearer part of the interval is, and this is for the identical reason. But because our sight does not go out to the far end of the interval, it is not able to declare what kind of thing the object is in terms of its form nor how large it is in terms of its magnitude.

\(^5\) See Ar., DA 3.1.425b8 9.

\(^6\) Reading τοῦ δὲ εἴδους <τοῦ> καθ’ ἐκαστον with Theiler and HS\(^3\) and ἡ ὄψις with Theiler and HS\(^3\) but retaining τοῦ καθ’ ἐκαστον of HS\(^2\).
§2.8.2. Regarding the claim that this phenomenon is due to the smaller angles of sight, it has already been said elsewhere that this is not the case, and here we need only say that the one who claims that things appear smaller due to a smaller angle of sight is not taking account of the fact that the rest of one’s sight is seeing something surrounding that object, either some other object of sight or else whatever it is that generally surrounds objects, for example, air. When, then, sight leaves nothing out because the mountain [that it is directed at] is big – that is, when sight is rather equal to its object and it is no longer possible for it to see anything else, inasmuch as the interval of the field of sight coincides with that of the object of sight, or also when the object of sight exceeds the field of sight both vertically and horizontally – what would one say in this case, where the underlying [magnitude] of the object of sight appears to be much smaller than it really is and yet it is seen by one’s entire sight? Indeed, if one would consider the case of heaven, one would undoubtedly understand. For it is impossible for one to see the entire heavenly hemisphere in one look; not even if sight were to extend as far as heaven would it be able to spread itself out so extensively. But let’s grant this, if someone insists. If our entire field of sight, then, were to encompass the entire hemisphere, and if the magnitude of the object of sight in heaven is in reality many times larger than it appears to us – since it appears to be much smaller than it is – then how could the smaller angle of sight be responsible for distant objects appearing smaller?

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7 See Euclid, Opt. Definition 4.2.10.
8 Such a passage is not to be found in the Enneads.
In this final section of the so-called ‘major treatise’ (Großschrift), Plotinus directs a series of objections to the teachings of the Gnostics. This was no mere academic exercise. As Plotinus himself tells us (§10), at the time of this treatise’s composition some of his friends were ‘attached’ to Gnostic doctrine, and he believed that this attachment was harmful (see esp. §15). So he sets out here a number of objections and corrections. Some of these are directed at very specific tenets of Gnosticism, e.g. the introduction of a ‘new earth’ (§5) or a principle of ‘Wisdom’ (§10), but the general thrust of this treatise has a much broader scope. The Gnostics are very critical of the sensible universe and its contents, and as a Platonist, Plotinus must share this critical attitude to some extent. But here he makes his case that the proper understanding of the highest principles and emanation forces us to respect the sensible world as the best possible imitation of the intelligible world.

SUMMARY

§1. There are only three intelligible principles. In particular, the One or the Good is the single highest principle, and there cannot be more than one Intellect.

§2. In the case of soul, by contrast, higher and lower parts may be distinguished.

1 In his VP 24.56 57, Porphyry provides an alternative title to this treatise: Against Those Who Say That the Demiurge of the Cosmos is Evil and That the Cosmos is Evil. This is the final of four treatises the others being 3.8, 5.8, and 5.5 comprising the so called Großschrift, which Porphyry broke up into separate treatises in order to accommodate his vision of six sets of nine treatises. See VP 16 for the identification of some Gnostics as Christians.
§3. Whatever is part of a necessary chain of emanation, and this includes matter, is everlasting.

§4. It is not due to some regrettable failing of Soul that it produced the sensible world.

§5. A critique of three Gnostic views: (i) that human souls are superior to celestial souls; (ii) that there is a soul composed of the elements; and (iii) that there is a ‘new earth’.

§6. The Gnostics take over much from Plato, but they misunderstand Plato and wrongly accuse Plato and the ancient Greeks of being mistaken about the nature of things.

§7. The relationship of the soul of the cosmos to its body is not entirely analogous to that of an individual’s soul to its body.

§§8–9. This sensible universe is necessary and the best possible imitation of the intelligible universe, despite perceived shortcomings and injustices. It is important to understand the rank of human life in the hierarchy of being.

§§10–12. Objections to the Gnostic account of the relation between the sensible world and the principles responsible for creating it.

§13. The importance of understanding each thing’s rank in the hierarchy of being.

§14. Against the magic practices and theory of the Gnostics, including a criticism of daemons as a cause of disease.

§15. Gnostic doctrines lead to hedonism and egoism, and they have not provided an adequate account of virtue.

§§16–17. Problems surrounding the Gnostic teachings on the gods and providence. Since genuine appreciation of anything entails an appreciation of its likeness, the Gnostics should appreciate the beauty and order of the sensible world.

§18. This appreciation of the sensible world need not make us lovers of body. We should strive to be like the universe and the celestial things by not letting our bodies distract us from contemplation.
2.9 (33)

Against the Gnostics

§2.9.1. So, since the simple nature of the Good\textsuperscript{2} appeared to us also to be first – for nothing that is not first can be simple\textsuperscript{3} – and to contain nothing within itself,\textsuperscript{4} being rather some one thing; and since the nature of what is called the One is identical with the Good\textsuperscript{5} – for the One is not first something else and next one, and neither is this Good something else and next good – [it follows that] when we talk about the One and when we talk about the Good, we should consider their nature to be identical and to say that this nature is ‘one’, though in doing so we are not predicating anything of it but only making its nature clear to ourselves to the extent that that is possible.\textsuperscript{6} And it is in this sense that we call it ‘first’ on account of its utter simplicity and ‘self-sufficient’ on account of its not resulting from a plurality of parts – for if it did result from a plurality of parts it would depend on them\textsuperscript{7} – and we say it is not in another because everything that is in another derives from another.\textsuperscript{8} If, then, it neither derives from another nor is in another, and if it is also not a composition [of parts], it is necessary that nothing be beyond it. So, we should not go looking for other principles; rather, we should take this as our principle, and next after it Intellect, that is, the primary thinker, and next after Intellect Soul, since this is the natural order. And we ought not to posit any more or any fewer principles in the intelligible world. For if anyone posits fewer, they will have to say either that Soul and Intellect are identical,\textsuperscript{9} or that Intellect and that which is first are

\textsuperscript{2} See Pl., \textit{Philo. 60} B10.
\textsuperscript{3} Cf. 3.8.9.39 44; 5.4.1.11 15.
\textsuperscript{4} The claim that the Good contains nothing in itself was the conclusion of the preceding treatise 5.5. Cf. 5.5.10.14, 13-33 34.
\textsuperscript{5} Cf. 6.5.1.13 20; 6.9.1.1 2.
\textsuperscript{6} Cf. 3.8.10.28 31, 11.11 13; 5.3.13.1 33; 5.5.6.11 26; 6.9.3.37 54; 5.31 41.
\textsuperscript{7} Cf. 5.3.13.17; 5.4.1.12 15; 6.7.23.7 8; 6.9.6.16 39. \textsuperscript{8} See Pl., \textit{Parm.} 138A2 3.
\textsuperscript{9} The Stoics. See [Galen], \textit{Phil. hist.} 24 (= \textit{Doxographi Graeci} 615.4 6).
identical, but it has been shown repeatedly that these are distinct from one another.

What remains for us to investigate right now is what other natures besides these three there could be, then, [were we to concede that] there are more than these. For no one could discover any principle that is simpler or higher than this principle of all things as it was just described. For, certainly, they will not maintain that there is one principle in potentiality and another in actuality, because it would be ridiculous to attempt to establish more natures among those things that are immaterial and in actuality by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality.

But neither [could one establish more natures] among the subsequent principles. One cannot pretend that there is one Intellect that is in some state of stillness and another that is, in a way, in motion. For what would Intellect’s stillness be, and what would its motion and procession be, and what would the idleness of the one Intellect and the work of the other Intellect amount to? For Intellect just is as it is; always the same and established in a steady state of activity. By contrast, motion towards and around Intellect is already Soul’s work, and it is an expressed principle proceeding from Intellect into Soul that makes Soul intellectual, and not another nature between Intellect and Soul.

And surely one cannot attempt to produce more than one Intellect by saying that there is one Intellect that thinks and another Intellect that thinks that it thinks. For even if thinking in the sensible world is distinct from thinking that one is thinking, there is still a single act of apprehension that is not unaware of the results of its own acts. Indeed, it would be ridiculous to make this assumption of the true Intellect; rather, the Intellect that was supposed to be thinking will certainly be identical with the one thinking that it is thinking. Otherwise, the one will only think, and the other that thinks that it is thinking will belong to something else and not to the one that was supposed to be thinking.


Arguments for the distinction between the One and the Intellect can be found in 3.8. 9 11; 5.1-5 7; 5.4; 5.5-3 5; 5.6-4; 6.9.2 5. For arguments against the identity of Intellect and Soul, cf. 5.1.3 and 5.9.4.

Perhaps a reference to Aristotle’s distinction between active and passive intellects. See *DA* 3.4.429b27 5.430a25.

See Numenius, fr. 12 and 15, and Plotinus’ student Amelius *apud* Proclus, *In Tim.* 2.103.18ff. It is clear that many Gnostics followed Numenius in making such a distinction.

Cf. 5.3. See Sext. Emp., *M.* 10.255.
And if they should say that this distinction is merely conceptual, they would have, first of all, given up on establishing multiple hypotheses, and next, they should consider whether their conceptual distinctions can even accommodate an Intellect that only thinks without being consciously aware of itself as a thinking subject. If this disjunction of self-awareness were to occur in human beings, who, if they are even moderately virtuous people, are always looking after their impulses and thinking processes, they would be guilty of a lack of mindfulness. Actually, though, when the true Intellect thinks itself among its intelligible thoughts and its intelligible object does not come from outside itself but rather it is itself its intelligible object, then it necessarily includes itself in its thinking and sees itself. But in seeing itself it does not see itself as unthinking; rather, it sees itself thinking. Accordingly, Intellect’s thinking that it is thinking should be included in its primary act of thought as a single being; in the intelligible world, thinking is not even conceptually double. And if it is always thinking what it is, how could the conceptual distinction that attempts to separate its thinking from its thinking that it is thinking be accommodated?

Indeed, if in addition to the supposed doubleness, which said that Intellect thinks that it is thinking, one introduces another conceptual distinction that says that Intellect thinks that it is thinking that it is thinking, the absurdity will become clearer still. And why would this not lead to an infinite regress?

And if someone makes an expressed principle from Intellect and next another expressed principle from that one comes to be in Soul, so that the former principle would be intermediate between Intellect and Soul, he will be depriving the Soul of thinking, since Soul would not be getting its expressed principle from Intellect but from this other, intermediate principle. And Soul would have an image of an expressed principle instead of the expressed principle itself, and it would not know Intellect at all nor would it think at all.

§ 2.9.2. So, we ought not to posit any more principles than these nor any superfluous conceptual distinctions among them that they do not admit; rather, we must posit there to be one Intellect, unchangeably self-identical, without any inclination towards what is below it, and imitating its father as much as it can. This is in contrast to our soul, whose one part is always near those intelligible beings, while another part has a relation to these sensible things, and another is in between these

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15 ‘Lack of mindfulness’ translates ἀφροσυνή (‘thoughtlessness’ or ‘folly’). The idea here appears to be that human beings have a moral obligation to be aware of their own mental activities, and so we should expect nothing less from the Intellect.
two. For our soul is a single nature in a plurality of powers, and sometimes the entire soul follows the best part of itself and of being, but sometimes its worse part is dragged down and drags down the middle part along with it. For it is not licit for the worse part to drag the entire soul down.

This experience happens to the soul because it did not remain in the finest region, where the soul remained that is not a part, which is to say that it did not remain within the soul of which we are still a part. This soul of the universe granted to the body of the universe the possession of as much of it as it can possess, and it itself remains without care, without using discursive thinking to administer it or to correct its course at all; rather, it is by looking to what is before it that it sets the body of the universe in order due to its astonishing power. For the more it is focused on this vision, the finer and more powerful it is. And receiving from this source, it gives to what comes after it, and just as it illuminates, so, too, is always receiving illumination.

§2.9.3. Since it is always in a state of illumination, then, and possesses this light unceasingly, the soul [of the universe] gives to its successors, and they are always maintained and watered by this light and enjoy as much life as they can. It is like a fire positioned somewhere in a central area that warms whoever is able to be warmed. The fire in this example, however, is located in a measurable position. By contrast, when powers are at issue that have not been put in a measurable position and have not been removed from Beings, how could they exist without anything partaking of them? Rather, it is necessary that each give of itself to another; neither would the Good be Good, nor would the Intellect be Intellect, nor would Soul be that which Soul is, if it were not the case that with the primary act of life there is something living in a secondary manner as long as the primary act of life exists.

16 The threefold division is: (1) the undescended intellect, cf. 3.4.3.24; 3.8.5.10 15; 4.7.13.12 13; 4.8.8.1 3; 5.1.10.22 23; (2) the faculty of discursive thinking, cf. 1.1.11. 2 8; 4.8.8.10 11; 5.3.3.35 40; (3) the faculties of sense perception and growth, cf. 1.1.6. This part is inseparable from the body.

17 Cf. 1.1.11; 5.3.3.35 40.

18 This is the soul of the cosmos.

19 Cf. 4.3.10 where it is shown that we are not parts of the soul of the cosmos. Alternatively, Plotinus might be referring to the undescended intellect (cf. 4.8.8.1 3). That part of our soul, like the entire soul of the cosmos, remains in Intellect. Therefore, we would have remained indirectly within the soul of the cosmos if we had not descended.

20 A reference to the distinction between primary and secondary ἐνεργεία (‘the activity of’ and ‘the activity from’). Cf. 5.1.3.10 12, 6.38 39; 5.4.2.28 29, etc. The secondary life of Soul includes the life of the universe and the lives of living beings.
So, it is necessary that all things be always in succession, and those other than that which is first are generated in the sense that they derive from others. So, the intelligibles that are said to be ‘generated’ did not come into being; rather, they were and will be constantly coming into being.\footnote{Cf. 2.4.5.25 28; 5.1.6.19 22.} And they will not pass away, except those things that have something to pass into; but what does not have something to pass into will not pass away.

Now if someone says that these things pass away into matter, why does not matter pass away, too? And if he should say that even matter passes away, we shall respond by asking whether matter’s coming to be was necessary. If they should say that matter’s generation necessarily followed from what came before it, then it necessarily follows now, too. If, on the other hand, matter alone stands outside this chain, then the divinities will not cover the whole range and will be rather set apart in a certain domain and will be, in a way, walled-off from matter.\footnote{See Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. Haer.} 1.4.1 2; Aristophanes, \textit{Birds} 1576.} But if this is impossible, matter will be illuminated by them.

§2.9.4. If they should say that soul produced the sensible world as if it had ‘lost its wings’,\footnote{Cf. \textit{infra} 11.21. See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 246C2; Clem. Alex., \textit{Strom} 5.11.75.3 and 4.13.90.1; Tatian, \textit{Orat. ad graec.} 20.1.4 5. Plotinus is here interpreting Gnostic doctrine using Platonic images.} the soul of the universe does not suffer this loss.\footnote{Cf. supra 2.4 15.} And if they should say that the soul of the universe produced the universe after having fallen, let them tell us the cause of this fall as well as when this fall occurred. For if it was from eternity, then by their own argument the soul remains always in a fallen state, and if it began to fall at some point, why did it not fall earlier?

We, for our part, say that it is not an act of declining but rather its not declining that accounts for the producing. If it did decline, the producing is due to its having forgotten the things in the intelligible world, but if it forgot, how does it create? For what source is there for its production other than the Forms which it saw in the intelligible world? But if it is by recollecting these that it produces, it was not declining at all, for it did not decline even if it had the Forms murkily. Even if its recollection is murky, would it not rather incline towards the intelligible world in order not to see murkily?\footnote{Following the punctuation in HS\textsuperscript{4}, but retaining the question mark after ἶδῃ.} For if it has any memory whatsoever, why wouldn’t it be wanting to go back? For what could it be thinking to gain for itself by producing the cosmos? For it is absurd to say that it did this in order to gain honour, as this is a false analogy based
on sculptors in the sensible world. And then if it produced the universe by discursive thinking and this act of production was not part of its nature and its power was not the productive power, then how did it produce this sensible cosmos?

And when will it destroy the cosmos? For if it has come to regret this production, what is it waiting for? And if it has not come to regret it yet, then it is not going to because it has already grown accustomed to the production and with time has become more well-disposed towards it. And if it is waiting for the individual souls, by now they should have stopped proceeding into generation since they had already experienced the evils of this world in the previous generation. So, they should have given up on proceeding into generation by now.

And one must not insist on the badness of the sensible cosmos’ generated state on account of its having many disagreeable parts. For this view [that the sensible world should not have any disagreeable parts] belongs to men whose conception of the sensible world is too grand, if they are putting it on a par with the intelligible world rather than with an image of it. What other image of the intelligible world could there be that is finer than this one? For what other fire could be a better image of the intelligible Fire apart from sensible fire? And what other earth apart from sensible earth could come next after the Earth in the intelligible world? And what sphere could be more precise, more dignified, and more well-ordered in its revolution after the one in the intelligible world that contains the intelligible cosmos? And what other sun after the intelligible Sun could be ranked ahead of this visible sun?

§2.9.5. It is outrageous that these men who have bodies such as human beings have, as well as appetites, pains, and anger, insist on their own power and claim that they can be in contact with the intelligible, but then deny that in the sun there is a power more unaffected than our own, even though it is more ordered and less subject to change, and deny that the sun’s wisdom is superior to our own, even though we only recently came into being and there are so many deceptive obstacles preventing us from reaching the truth! And outrageous to say that our soul – even the soul of the basest of human beings – is immortal and divine but that the entire universe and the stars up there, though they are composed of much better and purer elements, do not have a share in an immortal soul, when they see for themselves the order, grace, and regularity in heaven and especially when they condemn the lack of order here in the sublunary region, as if the immortal soul chose the worse location as

16 See Pl., Tim. 92C7.
fitting to itself and wanted to concede the better location to the mortal soul!

And their introduction of that other soul that they compose out of elements makes no sense. For how could the composition of elements have any kind of life? For the mixture of elements makes something hot or cold or a mixture of the two, and dry or wet or a mixture from these. And how can soul be the principle that holds the four elements together if it has subsequently come to be from them? And what is one to say when they attribute apprehension, will, and countless other things to this mixture?

But they do not honour this creation or this earth, claiming that for them a ‘new earth’ came to be and that they will actually pass away from here to there, and that this ‘new earth’ is an expressed principle of the cosmos. But why do they feel the need to come to be there – in the paradigm of a cosmos that they despise? And where does this paradigm come from? According to them, immediately after the paradigm was produced its creator inclined towards the sensible world. If, then, there was present in the creator himself a great concern to create another cosmos after the intelligible cosmos that he possesses – and why should there have been? – and if the paradigm was there before the sensible cosmos, what is the point of creating it? [They will say:] in order to put the souls on their guard. How, then, does that explain anything? The souls were not put on their guard, and so it was created in vain. If, on the other hand, after the sensible cosmos already existed, the creator drew the paradigm from the sensible cosmos by stripping off the form from the matter, for those souls that had already been tested, there would have already been an adequate test for putting them on their guard. And if they maintain that the form of the cosmos is received in our souls, then why this novel way of speaking?

§ 2.9.6. And what do they mean with the other hypostases that they introduce – ‘sojourns’, ‘impressions’, and ‘repentings’? For if, when the soul is in a state of ‘repenting’, they mean these are affections of the soul, and that there are ‘impressions’ whenever, in a way, souls are contemplating images of Beings and not yet the Beings themselves, then this is just the jargon of men trying to market their own school.

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27 Reading ψυχῇ ἐφιεμηνης with HS.
28 See Clement of Alexandria, Excerpta ex Theodoto 48.2 50.1.
29 See Pl., Phd. 86B; Ar., DA 1.5.410b11 12.
31 Plotinus uses his own term to refer to the putative principles of the Gnostics.
32 These are terms used by the so-called Sethian Gnostics.
It is as if, having never been exposed to the time-honoured language\textsuperscript{33} of the Greeks, they make this vocabulary up, though the Greeks had clear knowledge of these things and spoke of ascents from the cave\textsuperscript{34} without any pompous language, as the souls proceed little by little to a vision that is truer and truer.

For, in general, these men have drawn some of their material from Plato, while the rest consists of innovations introduced to establish their own brand of philosophy, but these were discovered by leaving the truth behind. For the judgements,\textsuperscript{35} the rivers in Hades,\textsuperscript{36} and reincarnations\textsuperscript{37} are all drawn from Plato, and putting a multiplicity in the intelligible world – Being, Intellect, a Demiurge distinct [from Being and Intellect], and Soul\textsuperscript{38} – this was extracted from what was said in \textit{Timaeus}. For Plato says, ‘The creator of this sensible universe, then, rationally planned that it should have all of the Forms that Intellect observes as contained in the real Living Being’,\textsuperscript{39} and, not comprehending Plato, they assumed that there is one Intellect in stillness and containing all Beings within it, and another Intellect, distinct from that one, that contemplates, as well as the [Intellect] that rationally plans – frequently ‘demiurgic Soul’ is found by them in place of the rationally planning Intellect – and they think that this is Plato’s Demiurge, though they are far from knowing who the Demiurge is.\textsuperscript{40}

And, in general, they are wrong about the manner of creation and about much else of Plato’s thought, and they give feeble distortions of our man’s views, as if they were the ones who had a clear grasp of the intelligible nature while Plato and the other divinely gifted men did not. And by naming a multiplicity of intelligibles, they think they will appear to have discovered the precise truth, but by this very multiplicity they are downgrading the intelligible nature by making it the same as the inferior, sensible nature. What they should do is to aim at the smallest possible number in the intelligible world and to remove multiplicity by attributing all these Beings to what comes after that which is first, since all these Beings are what comes after that which is first: the first Intellect

\textsuperscript{33} Understanding φωνῆς as the implicit referent of τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἑλληνικῆς following Igal and HS\textsuperscript{4}.
\textsuperscript{34} Cf. 4.8.1.30 36. See Pl., Rep. 514A1 529D.
\textsuperscript{36} See Pl., Phd. 111Dff.; Rep. 621A.
\textsuperscript{37} See Pl., Phd. 81Eff. and 111Dff.; Phdr. 248Dff.; Lg. 903D; Tim. 42B D and 90Eff.; Rep. 619Bff.
\textsuperscript{38} See Numenius, fr. 22.
\textsuperscript{39} Following the punctuation of HS\textsuperscript{4}. See Pl., Tim. 39E7 9.
\textsuperscript{40} See Pl., Tim. 28C3 5.
or Substance and all the other beautiful things that come after the first nature.

And the form of Soul should come third. And they should look to find the differences among souls in their affections or natures, without disparaging these divine men, but rather considerately adopting their views, since they are more time-honoured and since the fine parts of their own doctrine are all drawn from them: the immortality of the soul, the intelligible cosmos, the first god, soul’s need to flee its communion with the body, soul’s separation from the body, and its fleeing from becoming to Substance. For these things are found in a clear manner in Plato, and they would do well to state them as he does.

There are no hard feelings if they tell us in which respects they intend to disagree with Plato, but they shouldn’t promote their own ideas to their audiences by disparaging and insulting the Greeks! Rather, whatever strikes them as their own distinct views in comparison with the Greeks’, these views – as well as the views that contradict them – should be forthrightly set out on their own in a considerate and philosophical manner and with an eye on the truth, they should show that they are right, and they should not be chasing after fame by criticizing men who have long been judged – and not by men of modest abilities – to be good [philosophers], and thus claiming themselves to be better than them. For what was said by the ancients about the intelligibles was said in a learned and much better manner, and those who are not deceived by their fast-talking trickery will easily recognize what these men have subsequently taken over from the ancients and appended certain ill-fitting additions to, since these are the points on which they intend to oppose the ancients by introducing absolute generations and destructions, making this universe blameworthy, blaming the soul for its association with the body, censuring the [Intellect] for taking care of this universe, reducing the Demiurge to being identical to Soul, and granting Soul the identical affections that belong to particular souls.

§2.9.7. It has, then, already been stated that this sensible cosmos neither started existing nor will stop existing; rather, it always exists as

46 Following the punctuation of HS4.
47 Reading γνωσθήσεται τῶν ὑστερῶν with HS4.
48 Reading ἐν γε οἷς with HS4.
49 Cf. *supra* 3.7 14. Cf. also 2.1.4.29 30; 2.3.18.19 22; 5.8.12.20 26; 6.6.18.46 47; 6.9.9. 10 11.
long as those intelligible principles exist. And these men were not the first to say that our soul’s association with the body is not the preferred [mode of existence] for the soul. And making assumptions about the soul of the universe based on our soul is analogous to the case of someone censuring an entire well-administered city on account of assumptions made on the basis of the guild of potters and smiths. Still, one should acknowledge the differences in the manner of the soul of the universe’s administration, since its manner of administration is not identical, nor is it bound to its body.

For, again, in addition to the countless other differences that were mentioned elsewhere, one should also take this one to heart, namely, that we are bound by body only because this bond already pre-existed. For it is only because the nature of body is already bound within the entirety of soul that it binds whatever it embraces. But the soul of the universe itself could not be bound by the things that are bound by it. For it is the one in control, and for this reason, it is unaffected in the presence of these things, whereas we are not sovereign over them.

And however much of this soul is directed towards the divine heights remains unmixed and unimpeded, and however much of it gives life to body does so without being influenced by body. For, in general, if one thing is in another, it necessarily receives that thing’s affections, without itself passing on its own affections to that thing, since that thing has its own life. For example, if some shoot is grafted onto another plant, and this plant suffers some affection, the shoot suffers along with it, but if the shoot itself becomes parched and withered, it does not affect the base-plant and its life. For neither is fire in its entirety extinguished when the fire in you is extinguished since even if all fire should be destroyed, the soul in the case of the universe would not suffer anything; rather, only the constitution of the body would be affected. And if it was possible that some cosmos continues to exist because of the remaining elements, this would not concern the soul in the case of the universe. For the constitution is not the same in the universe and in an individual living being. Rather, in the former case the soul, in a way, runs along the surface as it orders the elements to remain, but in the latter case the elements are bound by a second bond because they are trying to escape to their own ranks. But in the former case there is nowhere for them to flee to.

50 See Pl., Lg. 828D4 5; 959A B; Rep. 611B D; Phd. 67C D. 51 Cf. 4.8.2.45 49.
52 Cf., e.g., 2.1.4 5; 4.3.1ff.; 4.8.2 3; 4.8.8.13 23.
53 See Pl., Phd. 67D1 2; Tim. 73B3 4; D5 6.
54 Cf. 2.1.4.16 17. See Pl., Tim. 36D9 E1; 38E5. 55 Cf. 2.1.4.32 33.
55 Cf. 2.1.3.10 12.
In the case of the universe, then, the soul neither has to contain them from within nor push and squeeze them in from without; rather, its nature keeps them whenever it originally intended them to be. And if in some place one of its parts is subject to a natural motion, those parts for which this motion is not natural will be affected, but *qua* parts of the whole they are nevertheless moved properly. And those parts which are not able to carry out the commands of the whole perish. This is comparable to the case of a great company of dancers moving in order with a tortoise being stranded in the middle of the procession; if it is not able to flee the ordered company of dancers, it will be trampled, but if it itself adopts their order of motion, it, too, will not suffer anything from them.\(^57\)

§2.9.8. To ask why Soul has created the cosmos is identical to [their] asking why there is Soul and why the Demiurge has created,\(^58\) and this line of questioning belongs to those who, first, assume that what always exists has some beginning and who, next, suppose that the cause of creation was an agent who changes or undergoes an alteration from one state to another. We must, then, teach these men, if they will kindly suffer our teaching, what the nature of these things is, so that they might refrain from railing against what ought to be honoured, which they unscrupulously do instead of allotting to these things the high degree of reverence that would be fitting to them.

For it would not be right for one to blame the administration of the universe, since it, first of all, indicates the magnitude of the intelligible nature. For if it has come into life in such a way that its life is not broken up – this is the case with the smallest living beings in it that are always being generated night and day by the life within it – but if its life is rather continuous, self-evident, great, ubiquitous, and indicative of extraordinary wisdom, how could anyone deny that it is a fine and self-evident ‘statue of the intelligible gods’?\(^59\)

And if, as it imitates the intelligible, it is not the intelligible itself, that is precisely what is natural to it. For otherwise it would no longer be an imitation. And it would be false to say that it is an imitation bereft of sameness. For none of the things of which it can obtain a fine and natural image has been left out.\(^60\) For it was necessary that this imitation not be the result of discursive thinking and contrivance, since it is not possible that the intelligible be the final product. This is so since its activity had

\(^{57}\) Cf. 4.4.32 *passim*, esp. 43 44. \(^{58}\) Cf. *supra* 6.21 24, the Gnostic view.

\(^{59}\) See Pl., *Tim.* 37C6 7, 92C7. HS’ mark this as a quotation, though Plato uses the term ‘everlasting’ (αἰώνιον) instead of ‘intelligible’ (νοητόν).

\(^{60}\) Cf. *infra* 16.48 56; 3.2.13.18 14.6; 4.8.6.23 28. See Pl., *Tim.* 30C 31A. The Gnostics hold that this cosmos is a bad imitation of the intelligible world.
to be double – the activity in itself and that proceeding into another.\textsuperscript{61} There, then, had to be something after it. For if there is only the intelligible, there is nothing further beneath it [in the order of procession], which is the least possible of all [views]. Also, in the intelligible world there runs an astonishing power, from which it follows that it also made a product.

If another cosmos better than this one actually exists, what is it? But if a cosmos is necessary and there is no other cosmos, then our cosmos is the one that preserves the imitation of the intelligible one. For the entire earth is indeed filled with all kinds of living beings including immortal ones, and everything up to heaven is full of them. Why are not the heavenly bodies in lower spheres and the stars in the highest region gods, given that they are transported in order and revolve around the cosmos? Why wouldn’t they possess virtue? What could prevent them from acquiring virtue? For things that do indeed make people bad in the sublunary region are not present in the heaven, nor is the badness of body, troubled and troubling, present there.

And why, in this untroubled state, are they not always in a state of comprehension, taking god and the other intelligible gods in with their intellects? Why should our wisdom be superior to that of these heavenly things? What man of sound mind would maintain such views? For if our souls arrived here because they were compelled by the soul of the universe, how could souls subject to compulsion be superior? For among souls the one that is in control is the greater one. And if they descend willingly, why do you blame the cosmos that you willingly entered and that allows anyone who is not satisfied to escape from it?\textsuperscript{62} But if this universe is actually such that we can be in it and have wisdom and while being here live according to those intelligible principles, why wouldn’t this bear witness to its dependence on those intelligible principles?

§ 2.9.9. And if someone should complain of wealth and poverty,\textsuperscript{63} that is, of the inequality of their distribution to all people, then this person, first, fails to understand that the virtuous person is not interested in equality in these matters, nor does he think that those who have a lot of possessions are better off than those who do not, nor that those in positions of power are better off than private citizens,\textsuperscript{64} and that he rather leaves concerns\textsuperscript{65} of this kind to others. And the virtuous person

\textsuperscript{61} Plotinus is referring to the doctrine of the two \emph{ἐνέργειαι} (‘activities’). Cf. \emph{supra} 3.11; 5.1.3.10 12; 5.4.2.27 36; etc.

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. 1.4.7.31 42 and 1.9 passim. \textsuperscript{63} See Pl., \emph{Rep.} 618B4 5, C8.

\textsuperscript{64} Cf. 1.4.6.7 10, 17.17 22. See Pl., \emph{Rep.} 618D2, 620C6.

\textsuperscript{65} The Greek term for ‘concern’ (σπουδή) is related to the term that is here translated as ‘virtuous’ (σπουδαῖος).
is fully aware that there are two kinds of life here – that of the virtuous person and that of the human masses – and for the sage life is aimed at the highest peak and pinnacle, while the life of the all-too-human has again two forms – the one life involves the recollection of virtue and participating in some good, while the common mob is there, in a way, to do the manual work necessary to provide for the better kind.

If someone commits a murder or is overcome by pleasures due to an inability to control himself, is it surprising that these moral errors are committed not by an intellect but by souls that are like immature children? And if in a training ring there are both winners and losers, why should this not be true in life as well? If you are wronged, what danger is there to your immortal part? Even if you are murdered, you got what you wanted. And if you are now set on complaining about the world, there is no necessity for you to remain a citizen in it. And it is agreed that there are penalties and punishments here, so how can it be right to complain about the world-city that gives to each what he deserves? Here in this world-city virtue is honoured, and vice receives the dishonour that befits it, and there are not merely statues of gods but gods themselves beholding the world from above, who ‘easily elude’ the responsibility that human beings attribute to them, putting all things in order from beginning to end and, in the exchange of lives, giving each the lot that he deserves in accordance with his previous lives. And the human being who fails to recognize this lot is of the more impetuous kind with a crude view of divine matters.

He ought, rather, to try to become the best human being he possibly can, and he shouldn’t think that he alone is able to become excellent – for if he thinks like this he is not yet excellent – but that other human beings can become excellent, too, and further that there are good daemons and, what is more, gods – both those that are in the sensible world while looking to the intelligible world and most of all the controlling principle of the sensible universe, a soul most blessed. And from there one ought then to sing the praises of the intelligible gods, and then above all of these, of the great king of that world whose greatness is revealed most especially in the multiplicity of the gods. For what those

66 Cf. 1.2.7.12 13. 67 See Heraclitus, 22 B 117 DK. 68 Cf. 3.2.8.16 38. 69 That is to say, your soul has been freed from the sensible world. 70 Reading κατ᾽ ἀξίαν with HS4. 71 See Pl. [?], Epin. 983E5 984A1. 72 See Pl., Rep. 616B4, 617B5; Pbd. 110B6. 73 Here Plotinus cites an unidentified poet. 74 See Pl., Rep. 617E3 5. 75 Cf. 2.3.16. See Pl., Rep. 617D E, 619D5 7. 76 Cf. 5.5.3.9. See Pl., Phdr. 246E4 6. Reading ἐνδεικνύον in l. 35. The ‘great king’ here is the One or Good.
who understand god’s power do is not to reduce divinity to a single
god but to show that divinity is as profuse as god himself shows it
to be when he, while remaining who he is, creates all the numerous
gods who depend on him and derive their existence from him and
through him.  

And this sensible cosmos also exists through that god and looks to
the intelligible world, and this cosmos as a whole and every god
preach god’s decrees to us humans and proclaim what pleases them.
And if these gods are not what that god is, this is only natural. But if
you insist on despising these gods and exalt yourself as being no worse
than that god, then, first, we reply that the more excellent you are the
the more considerately you should behave towards all, and to human
beings, too.

Next, one must reject the crude view [of divinity] by respecting the
hierarchy and ascend by going as far as our nature allows us to go, and
one ought to believe that there is a place beside god for the others, too,
and not rank himself alone next after god – as if by some flight of
fancy! – thereby depriving oneself of becoming a god even to the
extent that this is possible for a human soul. And it is possible to
the extent that Intellect leads it. But wanting to go beyond Intellect is
already to have fallen outside Intellect.

Foolish people are sold on accounts such as these as soon as they
hear ‘You will be superior not only to all human beings but even to the
gods!’ For there is a great deal of arrogance in human beings. Even the
man who was previously a humble and moderate private citizen is sold
if he hears: ‘You are the son of god, but other men whom you used to
admire are not sons of god and neither are the beings that they worship
in accordance with the tradition of their fathers; you, however, are
even greater than heaven without even having struggled to be so’,
and then others join in the chorus. This is comparable to a group of
men who do not know how to count; if one of them in his ignorance
hears of a thousand cubits but only has a vague idea that a thousand is
a large number, why would not this man think himself to be – what
else? – a thousand cubits tall while thinking other men to be five cubits
tall?

77 Perhaps an attack on forms of monotheism that refuse to acknowledge additional,
albeit subordinate, gods.
Further, why should God pay this providential favour to all of you while neglecting the entire cosmos in which you yourselves reside? If it is because God is too busy to pay attention to the cosmos, then it is not licit for Him to be paying attention to anything that is beneath Him. And if God is paying attention to them, why wouldn’t He be directing His attention outwardly and in particular paying attention to the cosmos in which they reside? But if God does not direct His attention outside of Himself and so does not watch over the cosmos, then He is not paying attention to them, either.

But they will object that they have no need of God! Yet the cosmos does need God and knows its own station, and the beings in the cosmos know both how they are in the cosmos and how they are in the intelligible world. And as far as human beings go, those who are dear to God know this, too, and they bear the cosmos’ influence on their lives lightly, should the revolution of the universe impose any constraining force upon them. For one should not be focused on one’s heart’s desires but on the whole universe. Such a man gives other individuals the honour due to them and always strives for that object towards which all things capable of striving are directed – He knows that there are many things striving to be in the intelligible world; some things succeed and are blessed, while other things get as far as they can and receive the lot that they deserve – and He doesn’t grant this ability to Himself alone. For one does not have something by its being declared that one has it. Rather, there are many people who know themselves not to be in possession of what they claim to have, and who think they possess what they do not possess, even believing themselves to be the sole possessors of that which they alone do not possess.

§ 2.9.10. One could, then, scrutinize many other of their claims, or rather all of them, and have no problem showing how things stand with each argument. But we shall refrain from doing so because we have some sense of compassion for some of our friends who encountered this doctrine before our friendship began and – don’t ask me how – remain attached to it. And they say the very things that the Gnostics say either because they want their views to appear plausible or else because they even believe that their views are true. But we are not
addressing the Gnostics themselves – for there is no other means left to persuade them – rather, we have been addressing these things to our own acquaintances so that they might not be troubled by these Gnostics who provide no demonstrations – and how could they? – but only audacious claims. For if someone were attempting to defend himself against those who dare to demolish the views beautifully and truthfully advanced by ancient and god-like men, then a rather different style of writing would be required. Let us, then, leave aside that manner of examination. For those who have carefully followed the points we made above will also be in a position to understand how things stand with all the other claims.

But our examination should be put aside only after this one point is addressed, a point that actually exceeds all others in its absurdity, if it is fair to call the following an absurdity. They claim that soul fell down as did a certain Wisdom – regardless of whether soul started it, or whether Wisdom was the cause of the soul’s fall, or whether they want both expressions to refer to the identical thing – and they claim that the other souls, as ‘limbs of Wisdom’, went down, too, and put on bodies, for example, human bodies. But then they go back and say that the very thing for whose sake these souls descended did not itself descend in the sense of falling down after all but that it merely illuminated the darkness, and that from this an image subsequently came to be in matter. And next, by fashioning an image of the image somewhere in the sensible world, through matter or materiality or whatever they want to call it – they distinguish between matter and materiality, and introduce many other terms to make their meaning obscure – they generate what they call the Demiurge, and by making him reject his mother, they drag the cosmos which derives from him down to the last of the images. Whoever wrote this did so just to be contemptuous!

§2.9.11. First, then, if it did not go down but merely illuminated the darkness, how can it be right to say that it fell? For if something like light streamed out from it, it is not right to speak of it as, for that reason, having fallen, unless I suppose the darkness was located somewhere in the lower region and soul moved towards it spatially and only illuminated it after it had drawn near. But if soul illuminated the darkness while remaining by itself without having to have done anything in preparation, then why did only soul illuminate the darkness and not any of the things that exist that are more powerful than soul? And if it is

88 See Tatian, Orat. ad Graec. 13 (14.22); Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.2.2, 1.4.1, 1.7.1.
89 See Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.5.1.
90 Reading αὐτοῦ ἡλκουσιν ἐπ’ with Theiler and HS.
due to its having in itself the result of an act of calculative reasoning regarding the cosmos that soul was able to illuminate the cosmos on the basis of this calculation, why didn’t it simultaneously illuminate and produce the cosmos instead of waiting around for the images to be generated?

Next, even this rational conception of the cosmos, which they call ‘the foreign earth’ and which was brought into being by superior beings, as they claim, did not lead its creators to incline downward.

Next, how is it that matter, when illuminated, produces soul-images rather than the nature of bodies? For an image of soul would require neither darkness nor matter; rather, once it comes into existence, if it does come to exist, it would be inseparably connected to its creator and will remain joined to it.

Next, is this image a substance or, as they say, a thought? For if, on the one hand, it is a substance, how does it differ from its source? If it is another form of soul, and if its source is a rational soul, then this image would presumably be a growth or generative soul. If so, how could it still be the case that it created in order to be honoured, and how could its act of creation be due to ‘pretension’ and ‘audacity’? And, in general, their claim about creation proceeding through representation and, what is more, through rational planning, will be undone. And why, moreover, was it necessary to produce the creator out of matter and an image? If, on the other hand, it is a thought, then they have first of all to tell us where it gets its name from, and next, how this is possible without granting thoughts the power to create. But putting this fictional possibility aside, how does the creation work? They say that this comes first, and something else comes next, but they are just speaking arbitrarily. Why was fire created first?

§ 2.9.12. And how does this [Demiurge] which has just come to exist set to work? By its memory of what it had seen. But neither it nor the mother that they granted to it existed at all prior to their generation, [though they would have had to exist] in order to have seen anything.

Next, is it not extraordinary that they themselves came down into this cosmos not as images of souls but as genuine souls, and scarcely one or two of them escape from the cosmos and achieve recollection, barely recalling the things they had once seen, and yet this image which has just

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91 Cf. supra 5.24. See Philo, De agric. 65; Hermæ Pastor, Simil. 1.1.
95 Cf. supra 10.30 31. See Irenæus, Adv. Haer. 1.5.2.
96 See Irenæus, Adv. Haer. 1.7.1. 97 Inserting καὶ before ἔλθοντες with HS.
come to exist is nevertheless, so they claim, able to form a conception, albeit a dim one, of those things – and its mother, a material image, can, too – and not only does it form a conception of those things and acquire an idea of that cosmos\textsuperscript{98} but it also learns what things the cosmos could come to be from?

Why exactly did it make fire first? Did it think that fire had to be first? Why not another element? If it was able to create fire because it had a conception of fire, why, given that it also had a conception of the cosmos – for it had to conceive of the whole first – did it not immediately create the cosmos? For those elements were included in its conception of the cosmos.\textsuperscript{99} For the act of its creation was in all ways more natural, and not as in the crafts, since crafts are posterior to nature and to the cosmos. For even concerning the particular things which are presently generated by natures,\textsuperscript{100} there is not first fire, and next each of the other elements, and next a mixing of these, but rather a sketch or blueprint of the entire living being impressed upon the menses.\textsuperscript{101} Why, then, in the case [of natural cosmogony] was the matter not impressed with a sketch of the cosmos, which would contain earth, fire, and all the rest? But perhaps they themselves would have created the cosmos this way, since they are in possession of genuine souls, but that Demiurge of theirs did not know how to!

And further to foresee the magnitude of the cosmos – that is its exact magnitude – the obliqueness of the zodiac [with respect to the ecliptic], the revolution of the stars beneath it, and the earth – and all in such a way that it is possible to state the causes why they are this way – this is not the work of an image but rather altogether that of the power that proceeds from the best beings, which even these men grudgingly admit. For if they examined their ‘act of illumination into the darkness’ closely,\textsuperscript{102} they would concede the true causes of the cosmos. For why did this illumination have to take place, if it did not absolutely have to? For this illumination necessarily takes place either naturally or unnaturally, and if this illumination is natural, then it will have always been going on in this manner. But if it is unnatural, then what is unnatural will already be present in the intelligible world, and evil will be prior to this sensible cosmos, and it won’t be the cosmos that is responsible for evil; rather, the things in the intelligible world will

\textsuperscript{98} Reading καὶ κόσμου ἱκίνου λαβεῖν ἐννοιαν [κόσμου ἱκίνου] with HS\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{99} See Clement of Alexandria, \textit{Excerpta ex Theodoto}, 7.1 3; Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. Haer.} 1.2.4, 1.3.4, 1.4.1, 1.5.1, 1.14.7.

\textsuperscript{100} Plotinus is referring to what we would say ‘biological’ processes that are executed by individual natures.

\textsuperscript{101} See Ar., \textit{GA} 2.4.740a28 29, 2.6.743b20 24, 4.1.764b30.

\textsuperscript{102} Cf. \textit{supra} 10.25 26.
provide evil to the cosmos, and evil will not come to the soul from the sensible world; rather, evil will come to the sensible world from soul.

And this argument will result in tracing evil\textsuperscript{103} back to the first principles. And if [evil is indeed traced back to the first principles], so is matter, from which [evil] appears. For the soul that fell saw, they claim, and illuminated the darkness that was already there. So where did this darkness come from, then? If they should say that the soul that fell created the darkness, clearly there will have been no place for the soul to fall, and neither will the darkness be the cause of the falling; rather, the cause will be the soul’s own nature. But this is identical to attributing the cause to the preceding necessities; consequently, the cause is traced back to the first principles.

§2.9.13. The person, therefore, who complains about the nature of the cosmos does not know what he is doing, nor does he realize where this insolence of his is leading him. This is because they do not know the ordered sequence of what comes first, second, third,\textsuperscript{104} and so on, continuously until the final things are reached, and because one should not be contemptuous of the things that are worse than the first;\textsuperscript{105} rather, one should graciously allow each thing to have its own nature, while oneself pursuing the first things, having left behind the tragic drama of the terrors as [the Gnostics] consider them – in the cosmic spheres, though these spheres actually ‘render all things gentle and kind’ for them.\textsuperscript{106} For what is so terrifying about the spheres that they terrify people who are inexperienced in argument and who have not been privy to the proper, cultivated ‘gnosis’? For if their bodies are fiery,\textsuperscript{107} they should not be feared, since their relationship to the universe and to the earth is a balanced one, and [the Gnostics] should focus their attention on the heavenly bodies’ souls, since it is surely on account of their own souls that they consider themselves to be honourable. And yet even the heavenly bodies differ [from sublunar bodies] in magnitude and in beauty, and they cooperate and contribute to the things that are generated in accordance with nature, which could never fail to be generated, as long as the first Beings exist, and they are major parts of the universe and secure the plenitude of the universe.

And if human beings occupy an honourable rank in comparison to other living beings, the heavenly bodies are still more honourable, as they are in the universe – not in order to reign cruelly over everything

\textsuperscript{103} Reading τὸ κακὸν for τὸν κόσμον with Heigl and Beutler Theiler.
\textsuperscript{104} See Pl. [?], Ep. 2.312E3 4.
\textsuperscript{105} Cf. supra 10.32 33.
\textsuperscript{106} Pindar, Olympians 1.30; 1.48.
\textsuperscript{107} Cf. 2.1.6 7; 2.3.2.2 10, 5.27 41.
else – but rather because they provide order and ornament. As for what is said to come from the heavens, one should hold that they give signs of what will happen in the future, and yet generated living beings turn out differently on account of chance – since it is impossible that the identical events happen to every individual – as well as on account of the different moments of their generation, the far-removed places [where they were conceived or born], and the states of their souls.

And again they must not demand that all human beings be good nor, because this is not possible, should they be so eager to censure the things here in the expectation that they should differ in no way from those higher things; and they should simply think of ‘evil’ as a deficiency in wisdom, that is, an inferior and always diminishing good, just as one might say that nature is ‘evil’, because it is not sense-perception, and that the faculty of sense-perception is ‘evil’, because it is not reason. Otherwise, these men will be forced to say that evil exists in the intelligible world, too. For in the intelligible world, Soul is worse than Intellect, and Intellect is also inferior to something else.

§2.9.14. But this is far from being the only way that they contaminate the Beings in the intelligible world. For whenever they compose ‘charms’ in the belief that they are addressing those higher Beings – not only Soul but even the beings that transcend Soul – what else are they doing but making magical spells and enchantments and acts of persuasion, claiming that these higher beings are led by and obey our words, provided one of us has the required proficiency to speak these charms and, in the same fashion, the vocal tones and sounds, and breathings and hissings, and so on, which, according to their writings, have a magical effect on the intelligible world? And if this is not what they want to claim, then how do incorporeals obey our speech acts? It follows that those who make words appear more dignified than the incorporeals themselves have – by these very words – unwittingly done away with the dignity of the incorporeals.

And when they claim that they purge diseases, if what they mean is that purging is due to self-control and an ordered way of life, then they would be right, since this is just what philosophers say. But in fact they just assumed that diseases are daemons and they claim to be

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108 See Pl., Tim. 40A6; Gorg. 504A D. 109 Cf. 2.3-7 8, 10 15; 4.4.30 45. 110 Reading λέγουσιν ὡς with HS5. 111 Following the interrogative punctuation of HS5.
able to exorcize them with words, and by professing this they produce
the appearance of being holier-than-thou among the masses, who are
amazed at the powers at the disposal of these ‘enchanters’. Those,
however, who consider the matter carefully will not be fooled into
thinking that diseases have any other causes than exhaustion, excess,
and deficiency of nourishment, decay, and in general processes that
have their starting point either inside or outside of the body.

And the treatment of diseases makes this clear. For the disease is
passed down and out of the body when the stomach is emptied or a drug
is administered, and so, too, when blood is let, and fasting has also cured
patients. So if the daemon is famished and the drug turns the contents of
the stomach into liquid, does it at that point immediately withdraw from
the body or does it remain? If it still remains inside, why is one no longer
sick even though the daemon is still lurking inside? And if it withdrew,
why? What affected it?

In fact, it was presumably because it was feeding on the disease.
In that case the disease was something distinct from the daemon.

Next, if the daemon enters the body without any [physiological]
cause, why aren’t we always ill? And yet, if there was such a cause,
what’s the use of positing a daemon to explain disease? For this
cause can account for the fever all by itself. And it’s ludicrous to
suggest that the [physiological] cause appears simultaneously, as if
the daemon was ready to go and then supervened upon the cause.
Indeed, both the manner of their claims and the motivation behind
them are clear, and it is not least for this reason that we brought up
these daemons.

I leave it to you to examine their other claims by reading their
writings and especially to contemplate this issue thoroughly. The kind of philosophy that we pursue brings out, in addition to all
of its other benefits, simplicity of character together with a pure
manner of practical thought; it promotes not arrogance but dignity,
and it gets its prowess from reason and from great carefulness, rever-
ent caution, and immense circumspection. You should compare the
other kinds of philosophy to our kind. For the kind of philosophy
pursued by others is set up the other way around throughout. So,
I would not like to say any more, as it would be fitting to leave our
discussion of them as it stands.

§2.9.15. Yet this one item should really not escape our notice: what
effect these doctrines have on the souls of those who hear them and are
persuaded to disdain the cosmos and its contents. There are two schools
of thought concerning the achievement of life’s goal. One of them
advances pleasure of the body as the goal, and the other chooses beauty
and virtue, where for the members of this latter school the desire for these goals comes from god and leads back to god, but this needs to be examined elsewhere.\textsuperscript{112}

Now Epicurus did away with providence and prescribes the pursuit of pleasure and enjoying oneself,\textsuperscript{113} since this is what is left without providence, but this [Gnostic] doctrine criticized the sovereign lord of providence and providence itself in a still more sophomoric manner; it belittled all of the laws of this world, and ridiculed the virtues uncovered over the course of history and practical wisdom, too, so that there is actually not a glimpse of anything beautiful existing here. It has even\textsuperscript{114} done away with the justice intrinsic to human character that is achieved through reason and training and, in general, with all that by which a human being becomes virtuous. As a consequence, they are left with pleasure and self-interest and that which one doesn’t share with one’s fellow human beings but what merely serves one’s own advantage, unless, that is, one is by one’s own nature better than these doctrines suggest.

For none of these goals counts as beautiful for them; rather, what they eventually set about pursuing is something else. If, however, they are already in possession of their ‘gnosis’, then they ought to be pursuing this something else here and now, and in doing so they ought first to correct their behaviour here below, seeing as how they originate from a divine nature. For it belongs to this divine nature to take notice of beauty and to think little of the pleasure of the body. But those who have no part in virtue would not be moved at all towards these goals.

And there is this evidence against them. They have given no account of virtue, i.e., they have completely neglected addressing the following issues: saying what virtue is, how many parts it has, which of the many beautiful aspects of virtue were contemplated in writings of the ancients, from what virtue results and is acquired, how the soul is to be taken care of and how it is to be purified. For simply saying ‘turn your attention to god’ actually achieves nothing of consequence unless one also explains how one turns one’s attention to god. After all, someone might ask, what is to stop one from turning his attention to god without abstaining from pleasure or controlling his temper, thus calling to mind the name ‘god’ while also being afflicted by all these passions and not even trying to purge oneself of any of them?

\textsuperscript{112} The intended reference is unclear; perhaps, it is to 1.2.

\textsuperscript{113} Cf. 1.4.1.26 30; 1.5.8.6 10; 6.7.24.18 30. See Epicurus, \textit{Ep. Men.} (= D.L., 10.129).

\textsuperscript{114} Deleting τε τό σωφρονέω with HS\textsuperscript{4}.
In fact, it is virtue that leads one to the goal and that reveals god, when it is present in the soul together with practical wisdom,\textsuperscript{115} but when uttered without true virtue, ‘god’ is just a name.

§2.9.16. But again to have disdain for the cosmos, the cosmic gods, and its other beautiful parts is not to become good. For anyone who is evil would already be disdainful of the gods. And supposing that he was not disdainful [of the gods] before, that is, if there were some respect in which he was not evil, then by becoming disdainful of them he would have become evil in all respects.

For even their professed respect for the intelligible gods turns out to be lacking affection. For he who bears love towards anything at all also embraces everything that is akin to the object of his love,\textsuperscript{116} especially the children whose father he loves. And all soul derives from that god as its father, and the souls in these cosmic gods are intellectual and good and in much closer contact to the gods in the intelligible world\textsuperscript{117} than our souls are. For how could this cosmos exist, if it were cut off from that principle? And how could the cosmic gods exist? These problems were dealt with before,\textsuperscript{118} but now we are saying that if they have disdain for that which is akin to the gods in the intelligible world, then they do not even know the latter, except verbally.

And how reverent is the claim that providence does not extend to this region or not to every part of it? Doesn’t this claim lead to contradictions for them? For they say that providential care extends to them and to them alone. Does it extend to them when they were in the intelligible world or even when they are down here? If the former, how was it that they left the intelligible world? If the latter, why are they still here and why is not god himself also here? For how else will god know that they are here? And how will god know that when they are here, they haven’t forgotten him and become evil? But if he knows the ones who have not become evil, he also knows the ones who have, in order to be able to distinguish the former from the latter. God will, then, be present to all, and he will be in the sensible cosmos, in whatever manner that might be. So, the cosmos will also participate in god. But if god is absent from the cosmos, he will also be absent from all of you [Gnostics], and you would not have anything to say about him or the beings that come after him.

But regardless of whether providence extends from above to you [Gnostics] or to whatever else you want to claim, at the very least the cosmos receives providential care from above, and neither was nor will

\textsuperscript{115} See Pl., \textit{Tht.} 176B1 2.
\textsuperscript{116} See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 474Cff., 485C6 8.
\textsuperscript{117} Deleting ὅτι with HS\textsuperscript{3}.
\textsuperscript{118} Cf. supra 3.19 20.
be abandoned. For providence is much more concerned with wholes than with parts, and participation in god belongs much more to the soul of the universe [than to particular souls]. This is revealed both by the fact that the cosmos exists as well as by the intelligent mode of its existence. For who of those mindlessly high-minded men is as well-ordered and intelligent as the universe?

In fact, the comparison is ridiculous and utterly outlandish, and whoever is not making the comparison just for the sake of argument would hardly be escaping impiety.

Nor is enquiring into these issues the occupation of the intelligent man but of one who is simply blind and bereft of sense-perception and intelligence and who is far removed from the vision of the intelligible cosmos, as he is not even seeing this sensible cosmos. For what musical man, who beholds the harmony present in the intelligible world, would not be moved upon hearing the harmony found in sensible sounds? And what man experienced in geometry and numbers would not be delighted upon seeing symmetry, proportion, and order with his eyes? For even with pictures, those who see these works of art with their eyes do not see the identical things in the same way; rather, those who recognize in the sensible [image] an imitation of someone they have stored in their thought are provoked, in a way, and proceed to recall the true original.119 And this is actually the experience by which feelings of love are also kindled.120

But if one who beholds a good semblance of beauty in a face is conveyed to the intelligible world,121 who will be so lethargic and unresponsive in his sensitivities that, upon seeing all the beauty in the sensible world, and its symmetry and its great state of order, and the pattern122 made visible among the stars, even though they are so far away, he does not thereupon take notice and be seized by reverential awe of how marvellous things these are, and how marvellous their source is? Such a person, therefore, neither understood the former, nor was he really seeing the former.

§2.9.17. BUT IF THEY HAVE COME TO DESPISE THE NATURE OF BODY BECAUSE THEY HEARD PLATO DISPARAGING BODY FOR THE MANY WAYS IN WHICH IT OBLITERATES THE SOUL123 — AND PLATO DID SAY THAT THE WHOLE OF CORPOREAL NATURE IS WORSE — THEY OUGHT TO HAVE STRIPPED AWAY THE CORPOREAL NATURE [FROM THE COSMOS] IN AN ACT OF DISCURSIVE THINKING AND EXAMINED WHAT REMAINS, AN INTELLIGIBLE SPHERE124 THAT INCLUDES THE FORM IMPOSED UPON THE COSMOS, AND THE SOULS ARRANGED IN ORDER AND SUPPLYING MAGNITUDE

119 See Pl., Phd. 73Dff. 120 Cf. 6.7.33.22ff.
123 See Pl., Phd. 65A10. 124 See Parmenides, fr. 28 B 8.43 DK.
without bodies and\textsuperscript{125} leading the intelligible forth into extension in such a way that what is brought into existence is, by means of its magnitude, made equal to the partless [magnitude] of the paradigm,\textsuperscript{126} as far as this is possible. For greatness there is in terms of power, whereas in the sensible world it is in terms of mass. And regardless of whether they preferred to think of this sphere as being in motion, being led in its revolution by god, who possesses the beginning, middle, and end of all of its power,\textsuperscript{127} or as being stationary – on the view that there is not yet another thing for it to manage – they would have done well to direct their attention to thinking about the soul that is managing the sensible world.

But as soon as they put body into soul,\textsuperscript{128} they should think about the cosmos in this way, namely, that soul would not be affected but simply gives to another\textsuperscript{129} each and every thing that can be received – for grudging is not licit among the gods\textsuperscript{130} – and they should give as much power\textsuperscript{131} to the soul of the cosmos as necessary for it to make the nature of body, which is not in itself beautiful, participate in beauty, to the extent that it was possible for it to be made beautiful.

And it is this beauty that moves souls, since they are divine. If, then, the [Gnostics] themselves should claim that they are not moved by beauty, they must not be perceiving beautiful bodies any differently from ugly bodies. But then neither would there be any difference in the way they perceive beautiful and shameful ways of life, nor beautiful objects of study, and so they would not engage in acts of contemplation of them, and so [they would not contemplate] god either.\textsuperscript{132} For the primary beauties are what account for these derivative objects of beauty. So, if the derivative objects of beauty do not move these men, neither will the primary beauties. The beauty of the derivative objects, then, is subsequent to that of the primary.

Yet, when they claim to disdain the ‘beauty’ of the sensible world, they would be doing well if they disdained the beauty of boys and women, so as to avoid submitting to licentiousness. But one should bear in mind that they wouldn’t be exalting themselves if they disdained an ugly or shameful thing; rather, they exalt themselves because they

\textsuperscript{125} Reading καὶ with Kirchhoff.
\textsuperscript{126} Reading τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ἄμερῷ τῷ with Kirchhoff, Theiler, and Armstrong.
\textsuperscript{127} See Pl., Lg. 715E8 716A1; Ar., Phys. 8.9.263a27 b8. In Plato’s Timaeus an extended soul and motion are created prior to body. See Tim. 34B1off.
\textsuperscript{128} See Pl., Tim. 36D9 E1. \textsuperscript{129} Deleting ἐχεῖν as suggested by HS\textsuperscript{5}.
\textsuperscript{130} Cf. 3.2.11.8; 4.8.6.10 14; 5.4.1.34 36; 5.5.12.44 45. See Pl., Phdr. 247A7 and Tim. 29E1 2.
\textsuperscript{131} Reading τὸ σοῦτον with HS\textsuperscript{5}. \textsuperscript{132} See Pl., Symp. 211C4 8.
now despise what they originally called ‘beautiful’. Just what is their attitude [to sensible beauty, then]?

Next, beauty in a part is not identical to beauty in a whole, nor is beauty in all parts [individually] identical to beauty in everything taken together. And then [they ought to recognize] that in sensibles and particulars – in daemons, for example – there is such beauty that one has to marvel at the one who produced them and to believe that they derived from the higher world, and hence to conclude that the ‘Beauty’ there is ‘extraordinary’ – not that this person clings to the beautiful objects here; rather, he, without reproaching them, advances from these to those.

And if something is beautiful on the inside, we say that its interior and exterior are in harmony, and if it is poorly on the inside, we mean that its interior parts are inferior to better ones on the outside. But perhaps it is impossible for something that is really beautiful on the outside to be ugly on the inside. For whatever is beautiful in its entirety on the outside, is something whose inside has dominated it. And those men who are ugly on the inside but who are called ‘beautiful’ possess an exterior beauty that is fake. And if someone should claim to have seen human beings who are really beautiful on the outside but ugly on the inside, I suspect that he has not really seen such human beings, and that he rather thinks some other people are the beautiful ones. If, however, such people do exist, then it must be that ugliness belongs to them as an acquired attribute, and that they are beautiful in their natures. For there are many obstacles in this world to achieving perfection.

But what obstacle was there preventing the universe, which is beautiful, from being beautiful on the inside, too?

Further, it might perhaps arise that those things which nature did not make perfectly complete from the start do not achieve their perfection, and as a result they can turn out poorly, but there was never a time when the universe was incomplete like a child, nor was any kind of addition added to it and appended to its body. For where could it have come from? The universe, after all, contained all things. Nor should one imagine that anything was appended to its soul. But if, then, someone perhaps were to grant them that there is this addition, it would not be anything bad.

§ 2.9.18. But perhaps they will maintain that those arguments of theirs make us flee the body and hate it from a distance, whereas our arguments bind the soul to the body. But this would be just like the

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133 Cf. 1.6.8.2. See Pl., Rep. 509A6. 134 Reading προστιον τι with HS. 135 See Pl., Thet. 176A9; Phd. 65D1, 80C4.
following scenario: there are two people occupying the identical house, a beautiful house, where one of them censures its construction and its builder but nevertheless keeps living in it, and the other does not censure him and says rather that the builder made it most proficiently, and yet he is waiting for the time to come when he will be released from the house and will no longer require it. In this scenario, the former considers himself to be wiser and in a better position to leave the house because he knows enough to say that its walls are constructed from lifeless stones and boards and that it is a far cry from a genuine abode, but he doesn’t realize that the only difference between him and his housemate is that he cannot bear the necessity of having to live in the house, if indeed he is not just pretending to despise it while silently adoring the stones’ beauty.

But as long as we have a body, we must remain in the houses constructed for us by our sister-soul, a good soul that has a mighty power to create without toil. Or do they think it right to address the most common of men as ‘brothers’ while pronouncing with their ‘raving mouths’ the sun and the heavenly gods, and the soul of the cosmos, too, to be unworthy of the title ‘sibling’? If the [heavenly beings] are base, it is unlawful, then, to connect them to the family of the soul of the cosmos, but [they should be included] if they are good and are not bodies but souls in bodies and are able to dwell in bodies in a manner that best approximates that of the dwelling of the soul of the cosmos in the body of the cosmos. This manner involves not coming into collision, and not allowing themselves to be shaken by pleasures attacking them from outside or by the things they see coming at them, even if it is something hard. The soul of the cosmos, then, remains unfazed, since there is nothing that could faze it.

But we who live down here can repel the fazing blows through virtue, some of them being rendered smaller thanks to the greatness of our intellectual focus, and others being rendered such as to not even faze us thanks to our strength. And once we have gained this proximity to the unfazed, we would be imitating the soul of the universe and that of the stars, and once we have made it to this vicinity of sameness our endeavours would be directed at the identical goal, and within us and within that goddess things would be identical, inasmuch as we ourselves would be fine-tuned both in terms of our natures and in terms of what we care about. But the stars and the universe are like this from the beginning.
And if they should actually claim that they alone are capable of contemplation, this doesn’t make them contemplate more, nor would this result from their claim that they are able to leave the universe behind when they die, whereas the stars cannot, since they must always keep heaven in order. For their claim would be due to their lack of understanding of what the term ‘outside’ really means as well as of the manner in which the soul of the universe cares for everything that is soulless. It is possible, then, not to be lovers of the body, and to become pure, and to disdain death, and to know the higher beings and pursue them, and not to begrudge others who are also capable of pursuing them and do always pursue them by claiming that they do not do so, and not to fall victim to the identical error as those who think that the stars do not course through the sky because their sense-perception is telling them that the stars are standing still. This is why [the Gnostics], too, don’t believe that the stars see what is outside the cosmos because they themselves fail to observe that the stars’ souls are outside the cosmos.

Ennead Three
This early treatise is a fairly conventional defence of human freedom. Plotinus begins by rejecting the causal explanations of Epicureans, Stoics, and astrologers. He then gives a brief statement of the Platonic view which asserts the pre-eminence of soul as a causal force which maintains human freedom when active but is passive when it yields to external factors (fate).

**Summary**

§1. All things are caused except the first.

§2. The Epicureans posit corporeal causes, the Stoics a single principle (fate), others the heavenly bodies (a kind of fate).

§3. Rejection of the Epicurean theory especially as an explanation of cognitive and behavioural processes.

§4. Rejection of the Stoic theory of the soul of the cosmos that leads to a denial that we are responsible for our own actions.

§5. Rejection of the view of the astrologers who also remove human responsibility.

§6. The heavenly bodies have some causal influence on the maintenance of general cosmic order, but are not responsible for individual traits and characteristics.

§7. Rejection of the Stoic theory of a single causal principle interpenetrating the universe.

§8. Soul, in Platonic doctrine, is in control in proportion to its perfection, but under constraint when it yields to the external.

§9. Soul acts voluntarily only when it acts according to reason.

§10. Things are caused by soul and by externals (fate). Soul is passive when yielding to externals, active when using reason.
§3.1.1. All things that come into being and all Beings either come into being – those that come into being – or exist – those that are Beings – through a cause,¹ or both are without a cause. Or, for each case, some are caused, others not caused. Or the things which come into being are all caused, while of Beings some are caused, others not. Or none of them is caused. Or, conversely, all Beings are caused, while of the things that come into being some are caused, others not caused, or none of them is caused.

Now in the case of eternal Beings,² it is not possible to trace those of them that are first to other causes, since they are the first, whereas we grant that those which depend on the firsts³ have their existence from them. And when we assign each of their activities, we should refer them back to their Substantiality since the assignation of a particular activity is a thing’s essence.⁴

But in the case of things that come into being or exist always but do not always perform the identical activity we should say that they are all caused and should not admit an absence of cause, by granting any room either for meaningless ‘inclinations’⁵ or the sudden motion of bodies which comes about through no preceding cause or for a capricious impulse of the soul, when nothing has moved it, to do something which it was not doing before.

In fact, the absence of causality of this sort involves the soul in the even greater necessity of not belonging to itself but being borne along in motions of a kind that are unwilled and uncaused. For what is willed – whether this is either inside or outside the soul – or what is

¹ See Pl., Tim. 28A4 5.
² ‘Eternal Beings’ (τὰ αἰώνια), include both things that have no beginning or end in time and are indestructible (e.g. the heavenly bodies) and things that are outside of time altogether (e.g. Forms).
³ The use of the plural here may be hypothetical. For Plotinus, the One is uniquely ‘first’.
⁴ This is the ‘primary’ ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας from which follows the ‘secondary’ ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. The essence (τὸ ἐίναι with a pronoun in the dative) of intelligibles is virtually identical to their Substantiality (οὐσία). Cf. 5.1.6.30 39; 5.4.1.27.34, etc.
⁵ Or ‘swerves’. See Philodemus, De signis 36.13; Epicurus, fr. 280.
desired moved it. Or if there was nothing which it desired to move it, it wouldn’t have been moved at all.\(^6\)

But if all things come to be because of a cause, it is easy to grasp the immediate causes or to trace them back to these, for example, the cause of going to the agora is the thought that one must see someone or collect a debt.\(^7\) And, in general, the cause of choosing this or that and of going for a particular thing is that it seemed good to this individual to do this. And the cause of some things can be traced back to particular crafts; the cause of being healthy is medicine and the doctor, of being wealthy, the discovery of treasure, a gift from someone, through work or the application of a craft. The cause of the child is the father and any other external contributory factor towards procreation coming from elsewhere, such as particular food or, a little more remotely, seed which is easy flowing for procreation or a woman suited to childbirth.\(^8\) And in general the cause may be traced back to nature.

§3.1.2. If someone gives up after going only so far and is unwilling to go higher, it is probably a sign that he is lazy and paying no attention to those who ascend to the primary and transcendent causes. For why is it that when the identical conditions are present, for example, if there is a clear moon, one man steals and another does not? And when the same influences come from the environment, one man falls ill and another not? And one man becomes rich, another poor from the identical activities? And different behaviour, characters, and fortunes do indeed require us to go to more remote causes.

And it is actually for this very reason that philosophers have never stopped just there. Some\(^9\) have posited corporeal causes, such as atoms, through whose motion, collisions, and conjunctions they make individual things both be and become how they are in accordance with the way the atoms come together, act and are acted upon, and they make our own impulses and dispositions be in whatever state those motions make them, and so introduce into beings the sort of necessity which is also a product of the atomic motions. And anyone who suggests other bodies\(^10\) as principles and that everything comes into being from them is making beings subservient to the necessity derived from them.

Others\(^11\) who go back to the principle of the universe and derive everything from it, saying that it permeates everything as a cause which

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\(^6\) See Ar., \textit{DA} 3.10.433a27 28; \textit{Meta.} 12.7.1072a26 27; \textit{De motu an.} 8.700b23 24.

\(^7\) See Ar., \textit{Phys.} 2.5.196b33 34.

\(^8\) See Pl., \textit{Lg.} 740D6.


\(^{84} 94, 98^{104} 104, 241^{242} 242.\)

\(^{10}\) E.g., the four elements, earth, air, fire, and water.

\(^{11}\) E.g., Stoics. See \textit{SVF} 2.945 (= Alex. Aphr., \textit{De fato} 191.30 192.26).
not only moves but also produces each thing, claim that this is fate and
the principal cause and is itself all things. And they say that not only the
other things that come into being but also our thoughts come from its
motions, just as each of the parts of a living being is moved not by itself
but by the controlling principle in each living being.

Others,\(^\text{12}\) claiming that the motion of the universe contains and
produces everything by means of its motion and the patterns and mutual
relationships of the planets and fixed stars to each other, think that these
are the cause of things coming into being, since they trust in the
predictions coming from them.

Further, anyone\(^\text{13}\) who maintains the interweaving of causes with
each other, the chain of causation coming from above, that what comes
later always follows from what is before and that they can be traced back
to what comes before, since they come into being through them and
wouldn’t come into being without them, and that the consequents are
always subservient to what goes before, is clearly introducing fate in
another way.

One would not be too far from the truth in dividing all these philo-
sophers in turn into two groups, for some of them derive everything
from a single principle, others do not. But we will discuss this later.\(^\text{14}\)
For the moment we must turn our discussion to the first group we
mentioned. After that we must examine the theories of the others in
order.

§3.1.3. To entrust everything to bodies, then, whether atoms or the so-
called elements and to generate order, reason, and the rational soul
through the disorderly motion which derives from them is in both
cases absurd and impossible; but more impossible, if one may say so,
in the case of derivation from atoms. Many true statements have already
been made about these. But if one actually posits principles of this kind,
universal necessity or fate in any other sense would not, even so, neces-
sarily follow.

For, first of all, grant that atoms exist; so, some will move in
a downward direction – granted that there is a down – others sideways
in a random way, others in other ways. Nothing indeed will move in an
ordered way, since there is no order, yet the world that is produced, once
it is produced, is entirely ordered! On this view, neither prophecy nor
mantic could exist at all, nor what is produced from a craft – for how
could there be craft in things that have no order? – nor what is produced
by divine possession and inspiration;\(^\text{15}\) for in these cases, too, the future
must be determined.

\(^{12}\) Certain astrologers. See Ptolemy, Apot. 1.1.1 2. \(^{13}\) See Heraclitus, fr. 22 A 8 DK.
\(^{14}\) Cf. infra 7. \(^{15}\) See Pl., Phdr. 244C.
And while bodies will of necessity be affected as they are struck by the atoms whatever effect the atoms may have on them, to what motions of atoms is one actually going to trace back the actions and affections of the soul? For with what blow of the atoms whether in a downward motion or colliding in some way will the soul find itself involved in particular acts of calculative reasoning or impulses or in a general way in acts of calculative reasoning, impulses or motions that are necessary or just generally in acts of calculative reasoning, impulses or motions? And what about when the soul actually opposes the affections of the body? By what motion of atoms is a man compelled to be a geometer, another to study arithmetic and astronomy, and another to be a philosopher? For our own function and our essence as a living being will be altogether destroyed as we are carried along where these bodies push and drive us like soulless bodies.

And the identical objections can also be made against those who posit different bodies as the causes of everything and that these can make us hot and cold and can destroy what is weaker than them, whereas none of the things that the soul can do could come from them; rather, these must come from another principle.

§3.1.4. But does a single soul permeate everything as it moves through the universe, while each thing is moved by it as a part in the way in which the whole leads it? And if the subsequent causes come from it, must we call the consequent continuous chain of causes fate, just as if one were to say that when a plant has its starting point from the root, the directing power which originates in the root and spreads to every part of the plant and the power that binds the parts to each other, both in their actions and affections, is a single directing power and a sort of fate for the plant?

But firstly this extreme form of necessity or of fate described in these terms itself does away with fate and the chain and interweaving of causes. For since it is illogical to say that our own parts when moved by our controlling part are moved by fate – for there is no difference between the instigator of motion and that which receives it and makes use of the impulse from it, but the controlling part is what directly moves the leg – in the identical manner, if in the case of the universe, too, that which moves it and undergoes motion is to be one and not one thing from another in a relationship of causes that can be continuously traced back to something else, it will not actually be true that everything comes about through causes, but everything will be one. And in this case neither will we be ourselves nor will any deed be ours.

16 See Pl., Phd. 94C1. 17 See Ar., Phys. 8.2.252b21 24.
Nor [on this view] do we engage in calculative reasoning ourselves; rather, our considered views are the acts of calculative reasoning belonging to something else. Nor is it we who act just as it is not our feet that kick, but we who kick by means of our feet which are parts of ourselves. But the truth is that each thing must be separate and our own actions and acts of thinking must exist; and both the good and bad actions of each person come from each individual himself; at least, one should not trace back to the universe the producing of shameful actions.

§ 3.1.5. But perhaps individual things are not brought about in this way and the motion which directs the universe and the revolution of the stars arranges each thing in accordance with their relationship to each other brought about by their aspects and risings, settings and conjunctions. It is from these that they give prophecies through divination about what is going to happen in the universe as well as to each individual, what sort of fortune, and even what sort of thoughts he is going to have. They say they can see other animals, too, and plants growing and diminishing as a result of their sympathy with the stars and being affected by them in other ways, and that the regions of the earth differ from each other according to their relationship to the universe and particularly to the sun; that it is not only the rest of animals and plants that accord with their region but also the form, stature, colour, dispositions, desires, practices, and characters of human beings. Therefore, the revolution of the universe is sovereign over everything.

In answer to this, it has first to be said that the one who claims this, too, though in a different way, attributes to these principles what belongs to us, our wishes, affections, vices and impulses, and by allowing us nothing leaves us to be stones that are rolled along rather than human beings whose function has its source in themselves and their own nature. But we must grant to ourselves what is ours while admitting that some things come from the universe into what is ours, which is already something and is our own; and we must distinguish what we do ourselves, what we undergo as a result of necessity, and not ascribe everything to the stars.

We admit also that things come to us from regions and differences of environment, for example, heat and cold in our constitution, and also from our parents. For we are at least the same as our parents in many respects such as our external appearances, as well as in certain aspects of the soul’s non-rational affections. But yet, even if they are the same in appearance corresponding to their regions, a very great diversity is observed in their characters and thoughts, so that this sort of thing

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18 See Ptolemy, *Apot.* 1.3.10 12.
comes from a principle. Acts of resistance to our corporeal constitution and to our appetites could properly be mentioned here, too. But if they conclude that events are caused by the stars from the fact that they foretell what happens to individuals by looking at the relationship of the stars, birds, too, would be causes of what they signify and all the things which the diviners look to when they make their forecasts.

And you could investigate this subject in yet greater depth from the following considerations, too. What one can foretell by looking at the spatial relations which the stars exhibit when an individual was born, also derives, they say, from the stars, which not only signify, but also act as causes. So, whenever they say of nobility that it comes from famous fathers and mothers, how is it possible to say that these things are caused by the stars when they pre-exist in the parents before the particular spatial relations from which they make the prophecy have come about?

Further, they speak of the fortunes of parents from the birth of their children and the sort of dispositions the children will have and the fortunes they will encounter from their fathers, speaking of children not yet born; and they foretell the deaths of men from the horoscopes of their brothers and the fate of husbands from the horoscopes of their wives and, vice versa, the fate of wives from their husbands’ horoscopes. How, then, could the particular spatial relations of stars at the birth of each individual cause what is already admitted will be the case as a result of their fathers’ horoscopes? For either the prior astrological relations will be the causes, or if they are not, the ones at the birth of the child will not be either.

Further, the sameness in external appearances to the parents suggests that beauty and ugliness come from the family and not from the motion of the stars. It is also reasonable to suppose that all kinds of animals and human beings are born at the identical times or simultaneously. And all that are born under the identical arrangement of stars must share the identical fate. How then could men and the animals be born simultaneously due to the causation of the arrangement of stars?

§ 3.1.6. Indeed, individual things come about through their own natures; a horse comes into being because it comes from a horse, a human being because it comes from a human being, and each particular kind of thing because it comes from that kind.19 We grant that the revolution of the universe can also cooperate – even though it concedes most of its contribution to the parents;20 granted, too, that the stars contribute physically to most aspects of the body, heat and cold and the consequent

19 See Ar., Phys. 2.7.198a26 27; Meta. 7.7.1032a25 26.
20 Reading τοὺς γενέμοις with HS.
corporeal mixtures, how, then, do we account for characters and prac-
tices and particularly those things that don’t seem to be subservient to
corporeal mixture, such as a person being literate, a geometer, a dice-
player, or a discoverer of these skills? And how could wickedness of
character be an endowment from divine beings? And, in general, how
could the evil influences come about which they are said to give when
they are ill-disposed because they are setting and going under the earth,
as if they undergo some remarkable experience when they set in relation
to us and are not always making their way through the heavenly spheres
and maintaining the identical relationship to the earth?

Nor must we say that when one god sees another in a different spatial
relation, he becomes better or worse, so that when they are in a good
state they benefit us and if the opposite do us harm. We should rather
say that their motion contributes to the preservation of the universe as
a whole as well as providing another service, that of enabling those who
look at them like letters and who know this kind of writing to read the
future from their configurations and trace what they signify by analogy,
for example, if one said that when a bird is flying high, it signifies some
lofty actions.

§3.1.7. It remains to look at the principle, assumed to be one, which
interweaves and in a way links together all things with each other and
brings about the state of each thing, and from which everything is
brought about in accordance with the seminal principles. This belief,
too, is close to the one which states that every motion and relation, both
of ourselves and of everything else, comes from the soul of the universe,
even if the intention is to allow to ourselves as individuals something
that enables us to do something on our own initiative. It entails the
notion of universal necessity and, since all the causes are contained in it,
it is not possible for each particular thing not to happen. For there is
nothing to prevent a thing or make it happen in a different way, if all
causes are included in fate.

And if all things are such as to spring from a single principle there will
be left to us nothing but to be carried along wherever they propel us. For
even our imaginative representations will depend on antecedent causes
and our impulses in turn on them; and something being ‘up to us’ will be
just words. For an action will no more be ours just because we are the
ones who act if the impulse is generated in accordance with antecedent
causes. And any act of ours will be like that of other living beings and of
children who proceed by blind impulse, and even like that of people out

21 See Pl., Rep. 374C6. 22 Cf. 3.3.6.17 38.
23 Cf. 4.4.39.5 11. See SVF 2.1027 (= Aetius, Plac. 1.7.33).
24 See Alex. Aphr., De fato 182.20 24.
of their mind; for they, too, act on impulse. And, by Zeus, fire, too, has such impulses and all the things which are subservient to their own constitution are moved in accordance with it. Besides, everyone sees this and does not dispute it, but looks for other causes of this sort of impulse and does not stop here as though this were the only cause.

§3.1.8. What other cause, then, occurs to us besides these causes, which leaves nothing uncaused, preserves consequence and order, and allows us to be something without abolishing prophecy and divination? Now Soul is indeed another principle which we must add to Beings, not only the soul of the universe, but the individual soul in partnership with this, as a principle of no small importance; and one which weaves everything together, without itself coming into being from ‘seeds’ like other things, but which is a cause that acts in a primary way. When it is without body it is most in control of itself, free and outside the influence of cosmic causality; but when it is carried into body it is no longer in control of everything insofar as it is linked with other things.

For the most part, chance events direct the environment into the midst of which the soul has fallen on its arrival, so that it does some things because of these and directs other things where it wants when it is itself in control. The superior soul controls more, the inferior less; for when the soul yields something to the corporeal mixture, it is forced to act on the basis of appetite or anger, to be pitiful in poverty, proud when wealthy or tyrannical in its exercise of power. But the soul which displays resilience in the identical circumstances, the soul which is naturally good, manages even to change them rather than be changed so that it changes some things and yields to others when it can do so without falling into vice.

§3.1.9. Those things that come about through a mixture of choice and chance events are, then, necessary. What else could they be? And when all the causes are taken together, everything comes about altogether by necessity. Even if something is brought to completion as a result of the revolution [of the cosmos], it is to be included in external causes. And so whenever the soul does something when changed by external things and moves under impulse engaging in a kind of blind motion, one must not claim that its action and disposition are voluntary. The same is also true whenever it becomes worse through its own action when it employs impulses that are not altogether correct and guided by reason. But when its impulses are due to its having as its own a controlling principle that is pure and unaffected, only then can you say that its impulse is ‘up to us’, that is, voluntary. And only then can you say that this is our own action,

25 See Pl., Phdr. 245C9 D7; Lg. 896E8 897B3.
one that does not come from any other source but from within, from a soul that is pure, from a principle that plays a primary, controlling, and authoritative role rather than from ignorance which undergoes error or subjection at the violent hands of desires which approach, lead and drag it off, and no longer permit it to be the source of deeds but rather only of affections.

§3.1.10. The conclusion of this account certainly tells us that everything is presaged and comes about through causes, but that these are twofold: some are caused by the soul, others by causes in the world around us; that when souls act, whatever actions they do in accordance with right reason they do of themselves, when they do them, but since they are hindered in anything else they do, they are passive rather than active.\textsuperscript{26} And so there are causes other than the soul for not thinking properly. And it is perhaps right to say that they do this in accordance with fate, at least in the eyes of those who think that fate is an external cause.

But the best actions come from us; for this is our nature when we are alone. And virtuous people at least perform beautiful deeds that are up to them, whereas the rest of people perform beautiful deeds when they have a breathing space and are allowed to, but don’t actively acquire their thinking from some other source, when they do think, but by simply not being hindered.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} Cf. 5.9.6.5; 6.8.6. See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 46D7 E2. \textsuperscript{27} Cf. 3.8.6.32 36.
INTRODUCTION

Originally one treatise, 3.2–3 was divided by Porphyry to fit into his pattern of enneads (sets of nine treatises). A product of Plotinus’ mature thought, it raises the issue of divine providence. Plotinus attempts from many angles to demonstrate the relative goodness of the physical universe and to explain how both natural and human evil can be reconciled with providence which assures that the world reflects, though in a necessarily inferior way, its intelligible archetype. This leads Plotinus to develop more extensively here than elsewhere the concept of λόγος (‘expressed principle’) as the dynamic vehicle of ordered devolution from Intellect through Soul to the physical world.

SUMMARY

3.2 (47)
§1. This earthly cosmos is an imperfect product of the transcendent intelligible cosmos where everything is properly ordered and perfect.
§2. The earthly cosmos is multiple with conflicting components. What is unified in the intelligible cosmos is divided by matter in this cosmos.
§3. It is not, however, to be criticized for it is a necessary product of the intelligible and, even if deficient in its parts, is beautiful as a whole.
§4. Destruction and change in this world as well as evil acts play a necessary role in the maintenance of cosmic order.
§5. Natural and moral evil often lead to some good.
§6. How can we reconcile evil befalling the good and vice versa with providence?
§7. We must admit that this cosmos is inferior since it is a mixture which includes body. But even so, what is most inferior in it is endowed by providence with an appropriate beauty.

§8. Misapprehensions about injustice in the world are partly due to an exaggerated view of man’s status. In fact, he lies between gods and beasts and can turn in either direction.

§9. Providence provides a framework within which men can progress by using their own initiative.

§10. The universal control of providence still leaves room for individually chosen actions.

§11. Not everything in the world is good, but what is not good also contributes to the overall plan.

§12. The variety of the world reflects the variety of the expressed principle and of the intelligible world.

§13. That variety also includes past and present. What appears to be an injustice now may be countered by some future event.

§14. The universe cannot repeat the same perfection as its intelligible model, but this does not preclude its striving for ever greater perfection.

§15. The apparent injustices of conflict in the universe are part of a larger plan of universal harmony reflecting the variety of the intelligible model. The transitions of life on earth are like those of actors in the theatre; they do not affect the inner human being.

§16. Even if this is all part of the intelligible plan, it does not abolish injustice, for the expressed principle of the universe is itself inferior to its intelligible source and introduces a conflict of parts and contraries within the universe.

§17. And as in a play where the author has determined the plot and the script, the actors may play well or badly, so in life the soul may act well or badly in the situation in which it finds itself.

§18. But we must not allow our actors to add to and alter the play, as if it were deficient. But should their performance also be included in the expressed principle? This raises further problems.

3.3 (48)
§1. The expressed principles subsume good and bad deeds, just as universal Soul subsumes individual souls, so that the conflict of contraries is resolved and unified at the higher level.

§2. Even ‘chance events’ are included in the overall plan.
§3. Individual choice is also included insofar as our basic nature is already determined and is also necessarily of a less perfect order since there is a necessary hierarchy of perfection from Intellect downwards to the multiplicity of this world.

§4. But a human being may still be held responsible since he has a higher and lower self, the former being what is free; although it is not outside providence and the divine plan, its freedom is exercised by acting in conformity with it.

§5. The workings of the plan in this world is what we call fate, in the intelligible world providence. All good in this world derives from providence, but evil is not produced from providence, but from necessity (fate) by us as agents.

§6. Diviners interpret signs provided by cosmic interrelationships but without understanding their causes.

§7. Diversity, inequality, and evil are necessary characteristics of a universe.
§3.2.1. Handing over the substantiality and constitution of this universe to spontaneity or to chance is irrational and is indicative of a man who uses neither the intellect nor the faculty of sense-perception that he possesses.¹ So much is clear, I think, even before we begin our discourse and has been demonstrated by many adequate arguments that have been published.² But there is an issue about the way in which individual things come into being and are produced which presents a problem about providence in the universe when some things do not turn out properly; it occurs to some to say that there is no providence,³ while others say the universe has been made by an evil Demiurge.⁴ We ought to investigate this by starting our treatment right from the beginning. So, let us leave aside the kind of providence concerned with the individual, the sort which is a kind of calculative reasoning before action as to how something is likely to turn out or not turn out in the case of things that aren’t likely to be done or how we might attain or not attain something. Rather, let us place before ourselves for discussion the kind of providence which we say is universal, and piece together its implications.

If we said that the universe came into being at a particular time without pre-existing, we would have posited in our definition the identical kind of providence as we said occurs in the case of particulars, a sort of divine foreseeing and calculative reasoning as to how this universe would be and how it might be as good as possible. But since we claim⁵ that this universe always existed and there never was a time when it was not, we would be correct and logical in saying that universal providence consists in the existence of the universe in accordance with Intellect and that Intellect is prior to it, not being prior in time but because its existence depends on Intellect and Intellect is prior by nature and is its cause. Intellect is, in a way, an

¹ See Ar., Phys. 2.4.195b31; Meta. 1.3.984b14 18.
² Perhaps a reference to the Stoics. ³ E.g., the Epicureans. Cf. 2.9.15.8.
⁴ E.g., the Gnostics. Cf. 2.9. ⁵ Cf. 2.9.3.7 14; 3.7.6.50 54; 5.8.12.19 21.
archetype and model of this universe which is an image that always really exists because of it in the following way.\(^6\)

The nature of Intellect and Being is the true and primary cosmos, one that is not separated from itself and is not weak because of division nor deficient, even with respect to its parts, inasmuch as each part is not torn off from the whole. But the entire life of this true cosmos and Intellect entire, since it lives and thinks together in unity, ensures that the part is the whole and everything is in friendship with itself without one thing being cut off from another or becoming different in isolation and estranged from the rest. Hence, one does not commit injustice against another even if they are opposites.

And since it is everywhere one and perfect at every point, it remains stable and does not entertain any alteration. For it does not produce in the manner of one thing acting on another. For what reason would it have to produce anything when it is not in any way deficient? Why would an expressed principle fashion another expressed principle or an intellect another intellect? Rather, the ability to produce something by itself belongs to what is not completely in a satisfactory state but produces and moves itself precisely where it is itself inferior. Indeed, for those that are entirely blessed, it is totally sufficient to remain in themselves and to be that which they are, whereas officious interference is dangerous since it deflects them away from themselves. For the [true cosmos] is blessed precisely because it achieves great things by not producing, and produces no small contribution by remaining in itself.

§ 3.2.2. It is from that true and one cosmos that this cosmos, which is not truly one, comes into existence. It is in fact multiple and divided into a multiplicity, one thing separated from another and becoming different; and there is no longer only friendship, but also hostility because of separation; and one thing is of necessity at war with another due to their deficiency. For the part is not sufficient to itself; rather, because it is preserved by another, it is at war with that other to which it owes its preservation.

And this universe has come to be not through any calculative reasoning that it must come to be, but because there had to be a secondary nature; for that true universe was not such as to be the last among Beings; for it was primary [among Beings] and in possession of much, indeed all power – a power, then, to produce something else without seeking to produce it.\(^7\) For, if it were to seek, by that very fact it would

\(^6\) Cf. 2.3.18.16 17; 2.9.4.25 26; 4.3.9.12 19; 5.8.12.11 22; 6.4.10. See Pl., Tim. 28C; 29D, 92C7.

\(^7\) Cf. 2.9.3.7 12, 8.21 26.
not have the power of itself, nor would it come from its own substantiality, but it would be like a craftsman who does not have the power of producing from himself but from outside, as something he has acquired from learning. So, Intellect, while giving something of itself to matter, fashioned everything while remaining undisturbed and quiet. And what it gives is the expressed principle which flows from Intellect, for that which flows from Intellect is an expressed principle; and it is always flowing as long as Intellect remains present among Beings.

But just as in the expressed principle in a seed everything is together in the identical place, and nothing is vying or at odds with or hindering anything else, yet once something develops into a mass, different parts could be in different places and one part could actually hinder another, and one thing could consume something else, so, too, this universe has actually arisen from a single Intellect and the expressed principle which flows from it and has been divided, of necessity some things friendly and well-disposed, others hostile and at war, some willingly, others even unwillingly harming each other, some things destroyed to effect the generation of others; and yet the universe imposes a single harmony on the things that are producing and undergoing these effects as each of them utter its own notes and the expressed principle effects harmony on them and a unified order on the totality.

For this universe is not like Intellect and the expressed principle there, but something that shares in Intellect and the expressed principle. For this reason, it had need of the harmony produced by the coming together of ‘Intellect and necessity’, the latter, inasmuch as it is not an expressed principle, dragging it towards what is inferior and leading it to irrationality, while Intellect still manages to control necessity. For the intelligible universe is only an expressed principle and there could not be any other universe that is only an expressed principle. But if something else exists it must be less than it and not an expressed principle, nor again a sort of matter. For matter is unordered. The universe is, therefore, a mixture. It ends up by being matter and an expressed principle and starts from soul which supervises the mixture, soul which one should not think of as suffering harm but as organizing this universe with great ease by a kind of presence.

§3.2.3. And it isn’t reasonable for anyone to find fault even with this world as not being beautiful or the best of things that are accompanied

8 Reading γένσειν ἄλλοις with HS and Harder. 9 See Pl., Tim. 48A1 2.
10 The soul of the universe or cosmos is meant. Cf. 4.3.9.22 36.
by body or again to be critical of that which caused it to exist, when, first, it exists of necessity and did not come into being as a result of calculative reasoning, but was generated in a natural process by a better nature to be the same as itself.  

Next, even if what produced it was a process of calculative reasoning, it will not be ashamed of what has been produced. For it has produced something which is beautiful in every way, self-sufficient, and friends with itself and with its parts, both the more important and the lesser which are equally appropriate.

So, the person who finds fault with the whole because of the parts would be off target in his criticism. For one must look at the parts in the context of the whole to see if they are consonant and fit in with it, and when considering the whole one must not look at a few small parts. For this would be to criticize not the cosmos but a few parts of it taken in isolation, as if one were to take a hair of an entire living being or a single toe without looking at the whole human being, and regard it as some extraordinary sight, or by Zeus, to take the meanest of living beings while putting aside the rest or to let pass by an entire genus, for example, of human beings, and put Thersites centre stage.

Since, then, what has come to be is the cosmos as a whole, when considering it you might perhaps hear it saying: ‘A god made me and I came forth from him perfect, comprised of all living beings, complete in myself, self-sufficient, and lacking in nothing because everything is within me: plants and animals, the nature of all things that come into being, many gods and races of daemons, good souls and human beings blessed by virtue.

For indeed it is not the case that earth has been adorned with every plant and all kinds of animals and the power of Soul has reached the sea, while the whole air, aether, and heaven do not share in Soul; there, too, are all good souls which give life to the stars and to well-ordered heaven and to the eternal motion of heaven which wisely circles around everlastingly in the identical course in imitation of Intellect. Do not search beyond this. Everything in me desires the Good and each thing attains it in proportion to its own power. For the whole heaven depends on the Good, as does my entire soul and the gods in my parts; and every animal and plant and anything that appears to be soulless are within me. Some seem to share in existence alone, some in life, others more in the life of

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11 Cf. 5.9.9.8 16. 12 See Pl., Lg. 903B4 904A4.
13 See Pl., Tim. 31C7 31A1. The term is ζωον, which usually means ‘animals’; here it is used generically for all living things as the following line shows. See Pl. [?], Epin. 981C5ff.
14 See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b14; DC 1.9. 279a28 30.

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sense-perception while others again possess reason, and others have life in its entirety. For you must not expect equal attributes in things that are not equal. For you don’t ask a finger to see. This belongs to the eye. You ask something else of a finger, namely, to be what a finger is, that is, to have its own identity.9

§3.2.4. But don’t be surprised if fire is extinguished by water and another element destroyed by fire. For it is something else that brought it into existence; it is not that it brings itself into existence but is destroyed by another; and it came into existence through the destruction of another element; and its destruction, since it happens in this way, does not bring anything terrible to fire: there is another fire that takes the place of the fire that has been destroyed. For in the heaven that is incorporeal each part remains, while in this heaven the whole, that is, all the beautiful and important parts, lives everlastingly, but souls change their bodies and appear in different forms at different times; and, whenever it can, a soul takes a stand outside the process of becoming and is with universal Soul.17

But bodies, too, continue to live as species as well as individual bodies when they remain integrated in the whole, if living beings are indeed to come from them and be sustained by them; for life in the sensible world is in motion, but in the intelligible world it is unmoved. But motion must come from absence of motion and from that life which exists in absence of motion the life which comes from it has become another life, a sort of breathing and gently moving life, the breath of that life which is in repose.

These attacks on and destructions of animals of each other are necessary, for they did not come into being forever but came into being because an expressed principle embraced the whole of matter and contained everything in itself, since they are there in the higher heaven. For where would they have come from if they were not there? Human injustices against each other, however, might have as their cause the desire for the Good, when through their inability to attain it, human beings turn against other human beings. But the evildoers pay the penalty when they are corrupted in their souls by their vicious actions and are assigned to an inferior place; for nothing can ever escape what is laid down within the law of the universe.19

15 This last class is perhaps a reference to the heavenly bodies.
16 See Pl., Phdr. 246B6 C4. The incorporeal heaven is the intelligible world and ‘this’ heaven is the sensible world.
17 I.e., the hypostasis Soul. Cf. 3.3.1 4; 4.8.45 7. 18 I.e., the intelligible world.
19 See Pl., Lg. 905A C.
For order does not exist because of disorder nor law because of lawlessness, as one philosopher thinks, so that they come into being and appear because of what is inferior, but they do so because of order which is something brought in from outside. And disorder exists because there is order; and it is because of law and reason, that is, because reason exists, that lawlessness and irrationality exist; it is not that the better has made the worse, but those things that ought to receive what is better are not able to receive it because of their own nature or chance or by others preventing them. For what enjoys order from outside might not achieve it either because of itself by its own agency or because of something else through that thing’s action. For many things are affected by others even when their actions are not voluntary and are aimed at another purpose. But living beings which have autonomous motion can incline sometimes towards the better, sometimes towards the worse.

And it is perhaps not worth enquiring further into the origin of the autonomous turn to the worse, for what is at the beginning a slight tendency, as it progresses in the identical direction, makes the moral error ever greater or bigger; and the body accompanies it and appetites, too, must follow. And the sudden start if overlooked and not immediately corrected even produces a choice of that into which a person has fallen. Of course, retribution follows. And it is not unjust that someone who has become that kind of person should suffer the consequences of his disposition; nor should those people demand to have happiness who have done nothing to be worthy of happiness. Only the good are happy and it is for the same reason that the gods, too, are happy.

§3.2.5. So, although it is possible for souls to be happy in this universe, if some are not happy, one should not blame their environment but their own weaknesses which make them unable to compete properly where the prizes for virtue are actually set before them. And if they have not become divine, why is it so terrible that they do not have a divine way of life? Poverty and illness are nothing to good men; to evildoers they are an advantage, and those who have a body must encounter illness.

And not even these things are completely useless in the structural ordering and completion of the universe. For just as when some things have been destroyed, the expressed principle of the universe has made use of what has been destroyed for the birth of other things – for nothing

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20 I.e., Epicurus. 21 Reading παρά τοῦ with HS. 22 Cf. 6.8.3.10 24. See Ar., DC 1.5.271b8 13. 23 See Pl., Lg. 716A2. 24 See Theognis, 526: ‘poverty is advantageous to the evil person’.
ever escapes being taken hold of by it – so, too, when a body has been
wasted and a soul weakened by such experiences, what has been taken
hold of by disease and vice is subsumed under another chain of events and
another order; and some things, such as poverty and illness, make
a positive contribution to the very people who suffer, whereas vice sup-
plies something useful for the whole by becoming an example of retribu-
tion and by directly providing much that is of use. For it keeps men awake
and awakens the intellect and comprehension of those who are opposed to
the ways of wickedness and also makes them learn what a good thing
virtue is by comparison with the evils which the wicked endure. And, as
we have just stated, evils did not come about for these reasons; rather,
when they do occur, the cosmic expressed principle makes use of them for
some needful purpose; 25 and that this is the sign of the greatest power, to
be able to make good use even of evils and be capable of utilizing what has
become formless to fashion into other forms.

In general, then, evil must be considered to be a lack of goodness,
but the lack of goodness must be here because the good is in another.
This other [matter], then, in which the good is, since it is other than
the good, produces the lack. For it is not good. For this reason, ‘evils
will not be done away with’; 26 both because some things are less than
others in respect of the nature of good and these other things which
have the cause of their real existence from the Good are different from
it and have actually become what they are because of their distance
from it. 27

§ 3.2.6. When it comes to what is contrary to one’s deserts, when good
men experience evils and bad men the opposite, just to say that no harm
occurs to the good man and equally no good to the bad man is a correct
way of putting it. But why does what is contrary to nature happen to the
good man and what is in accord with nature to the bad man? How can
this really be a proper sort of distribution? But if what is according to
nature makes no addition to happiness nor equally what is contrary to
nature takes nothing away from the evil found in bad men, what differ-
ence does it make whether it happens this way or that? Just as it makes
no difference even if the bad man is handsome in body and the good man
is ugly. But the fitting, proportionate, and dignified thing would be the
situation which does not now obtain. That would be a mark of the finest
providence.

Further, it is not fitting that the good are slaves, the others are
masters and that evil men are in charge of cities and respectable men

25 See SVF 2.1170 (= Gellius, Noctes Atticae 7.1.7); 1181 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1050f.).
26 See Pl., Tht. 176A5. 27 Cf. 1.8.7; 3.3.3-20 37.
their slaves, even if this makes no contribution to their acquisition of good and evil. And yet the wicked ruler can commit the most lawless crimes; and evil men have power in wars and what shameful acts they commit when they have taken prisoners. Yes, all these things make one question how this can be so if there is providence. For, if someone is going to produce something, even if he has to look to the whole,\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Lg.} 903E4.} he, nevertheless, still has the parts as well to order correctly in their proper place, especially when they are ensouled, have life, and even reason; and providence also reaches over all and its very task is to neglect nothing. If we claim, then, that this universe depends on Intellect and that Intellect’s power has found its way into everything, we must attempt to show how each of these things in the universe is well-ordered.

\section*{3.2.7} So, we must first grasp the fact that in searching for the well-ordered in a mixture we must not demand all the good order that is found in what is unmixed nor look for what comes second in what is first; rather, since the mixture has a body, we should agree that something\footnote{Reading \textit{iēnai} <τι with HS.} comes from this into the universe, too, and demand from the expressed principle only what the mixture is capable of receiving, assuming there is nothing deficient in it. For example, if someone was looking at the most handsome human being in the sensible world, he would not, of course, think he was identical to the Human Being in Intellect, but would, nevertheless, accept him from the creator if, despite being a thing of flesh, sinews, and bones, he had fashioned him with form in such a way as to make these things beautiful, too, and the form capable of blossoming on matter.

So, once we have accepted these principles, we must take the next step for what we are seeking. For it is most likely in them that we will discover the wondrous power of providence from which this universe came into existence. It is, then, not appropriate that we who allow that ‘responsibility lies with the chooser’\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 617E4.} should demand an explanation or an accounting for all the deeds of souls that actually remain in them when they do evil, for example the harm evil souls do to others and to each other, unless providence is even to be held responsible for them being wicked in the first place. For we have said\footnote{Cf. \textit{supra} 4.36f.} that souls must have their own motions and that they are not only souls but already living beings, and that, moreover, it is not surprising that they have a way of life that is appropriate to them. For they have not come here because there was a universe, but before the universe existed, they were able both

\footnotesize{\begin{enumerate}
\item See Pl., \textit{Lg.} 903E4.  
\item See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 617E4.  
\item Reading \textit{iēnai} <τι with HS.  
\end{enumerate}}
to care for it and to bring it into existence, organize it, and make it the way it is, whether by standing over it and giving something of themselves or by descending in different ways. For the point now is not in regard to these details, but that providence should not be blamed for these things however they might turn out.

But what about when one considers the assignment of evils to men of opposite kinds, the good being poor, the wicked rich, and the bad having more of those things that those who are human beings ought to have and being in power and in charge of nations and cities? Can it then be that providence does not reach as far as the earth? But that it also reaches the earth is attested by the expressed principle of the other things that come about. For animals and plants both share in this expressed principle, and in soul and life. But what if it reaches the earth but does not dominate? But since the universe is a single living being, it would be as if one were to say that the head and face of a human being came about through nature and an expressed principle which was in control, but the rest were ascribed to other causes, that is, chance events or necessities, and were created inferior because of this or because of a weakness in nature. But it is neither pious nor respectful to blame the product by conceding that some of its parts are not well-ordered.

§3.2.8. It but remains to enquire how these things are well-ordered and how they share in order or in what way they do not.

In fact, they are not ordered badly. Indeed, in every animal the higher parts, face and head, are more beautiful, the middle and lower parts not to an equal degree. Human beings are located in the middle and lower part of the universe, heaven and the gods in it are above. And the most extensive part of the universe, the gods and the entirety of heaven, are in a circle, while earth is just like a central point even in comparison with one of the stars. Injustice is a source of amazement among human beings because they think that the human being is the valuable thing in the universe since nothing is wiser.

But the reality is that he lies between gods and beasts, and inclines in both directions, and some assimilate themselves to one, some to the other, while the rest, the majority, are in between. Those that are actually reduced to becoming like non-rational living beings or beasts drag down the middle ones and lay violent hands on them. While these are better than those who violate them, they are still overcome by the worse types because they are themselves worse and are not good, nor have they prepared themselves not to succumb to affections. Wouldn’t

32 Cf. 4.3.2.8 10, 4.14 21; 4.7.2.20 21; 4.8.2.24 26; 6.7.26.7 12.
33 The Peripatetic position. See D.L., 5.32.
34 Cf. 2.9.16.1 16.
it, then, be a laughable situation if youths who exercised their bodies but
had become inferior in their souls compared to their physical condition
due to their lack of education, should defeat in a wrestling match those
who had exercised neither their bodies nor their souls, and stole their
food as well as taking their fine garments?

In fact, it would be right for a lawgiver to agree that they suffer
this as paying the penalty for their laziness and indulgence, youths who, after being shown what exercises they should do,
looked idly by as they became fattened lambs, the prey of wolves,
as a result of their laziness and their soft and listless living. But the
first punishment of those who behave in this way is to become wolves and ill-starred men.

Next, there also lies before them the prospect which such men must
endure; for it is not the end of the story for those who have become evil
to die in the sensible world, but reasonable and natural consequences
follow for ever from what has gone before, worse things for those who
are worse and better for those who are better.

But these consequences have nothing to do with the gymnasium; for what goes on there is child’s-play. For if both sets of boys grew
bigger while retaining their folly, they would straightaway have to
gird themselves and take their weapons, and the spectacle would be
finer than that afforded to someone exercising them in wrestling. But
the situation now is that one side is unarmed, the other armed and
dominant. In this situation, a god must not fight in person for the
unwarlike. For the law says that those who are brave, not those who pray, are to come out safe from wars. For it is not those who pray but those who take care of the land who harvest the fruits, nor do those
remain healthy who do not take care of their health. And one should not
also be annoyed if the wicked get larger harvests or if things should go
better in general for those who work their land more.

Next, it would be ridiculous for people to do everything else in
their life in accordance with their own ideas, even if they don’t do it in
the way that pleases the gods, but to be saved by the gods only when
they are not doing the very things which the gods order them to do in
order to be saved. So, death would be better for them than continuing
to be alive in the way that the laws of the universe do not want them to
live. So, if the opposite happened and peace was preserved
amidst every kind of folly and vice, the role of a providence
which allowed what is worse to be really dominant would be one of

35 Intellect is the lawgiver here. Cf. 5.9.26 28. See Pl., Lg. 900E10.
36 See Pl., Rep. 56644. 37 Cf. 3.4.11 30; 6.7.71 6.
38 Reading παλαίστρα with Igal and HS5.
neglect. The wicked only rule because of the cowardice of those who allow themselves to be ruled by them.\textsuperscript{39} For this is right, the reverse is not.

§3.2.9. Providence must certainly not exist in such a way that we are of no account. And if providence was everything and there was nothing but providence, providence, too, would not exist. For what would it still have to provide for? Only the divine would, then, exist. But this does exist right now. And it has gone out towards what is other than it, not in order to destroy that other, but when another approaches it, a human being, for example, it stood over it protecting the human being that it is. And this is what living by the law of providence means, actually doing what its law dictates.

And it dictates that those who are good will have a good life, established now and for the future, while those who are bad will have the opposite. And it is not right that those who are bad should expect others to be their saviours and sacrifice themselves when they offer up prayers. So, it is not right for them to expect gods to rule over every aspect of their lives and abandon their own lives, nor even to expect good men, who are living a life superior to that of human rule, to be their rulers. This is so because they didn’t even themselves ever go to the trouble of ensuring that there were good rulers for their other fellow men to take care of their well-being while resenting it when anyone becomes good by his own efforts. For more people would have become good, if they had made good people their leaders.

So, although men are not the best of living beings\textsuperscript{40} but possess and have chosen a middle rank, still the human race is not allowed by providence to be destroyed in the place in which it finds itself but is always being raised upwards to higher levels by all kinds of expedients which the divine employs to make virtue more influential;\textsuperscript{41} and human beings have not lost their power of being rational, but continue to have a share, even if not an elevated one, in wisdom, intellect, craft, and justice, each at least in the kind of justice that involves mutual relationships. And those they wrong they think they are wronging in accordance with justice, for they think they deserve it.

So, a human being is a beautiful production insofar as he can be beautiful and, being woven into the universe, has a portion better than that of all other living beings on earth. For besides, no one with sense finds fault with the other living beings inferior to human beings which adorn the earth. For it would be ridiculous for someone to find fault with them because they bite human beings as if they had to live their

\textsuperscript{39} See Pl., \textit{Symp.} 182D2. \textsuperscript{40} Cf. \textit{supra} 3.21. \textsuperscript{41} See Pl., \textit{Lg.} 904B3 6.
lives asleep. But these living beings have to exist. And there are some benefits which derive from them that are obvious, others which are not obvious are revealed over time. So, no aspect of their lives is in vain even for human beings. It is also ridiculous that human beings blame many of them for being savage, when even human beings become savage. And if they don’t trust human beings but defended themselves in their distrust, what is so surprising about that?

§3.2.10. But [one might argue] if human beings are unwillingly bad and are the kind of persons they are not willingly, it would be wrong to accuse them of being unjust and to claim that those who suffer wrong suffer it because of them. Indeed, if it is necessary that they are bad in this way, whether this is brought about by the heavenly motion or a first principle which supplies its own consequences, it would be happening naturally. But if an expressed principle itself actually makes them bad, how would such a thing not be unjust?

But the fact that human beings act unwillingly is due to their moral error being something involuntary. This does not, however, abrogate the fact that they are the ones who themselves acted of themselves; but because they acted themselves, for this reason they also are the ones who erred.

In fact, if they did not themselves do it, they would not have erred at all.

The factor of necessity does not imply that an action is caused from outside, but only that it is universally the case.

And the motion of heaven does not result in nothing being up to us. For if every aspect of an action depends on what is outside, it would be just as those who themselves made it wanted it to be. So, if the gods made it to be thus, human beings, even impious ones, could do nothing opposed to them. But in fact the power of performing the action comes from them.

And if it is granted that there is a first principle, the consequences follow and include in their sequence even those which are themselves principles. And human beings, too, are principles. They are moved at least to what is beautiful by their own nature and this principle in them is autonomous.

42 See SVF 2.1163 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1044c).
43 See Ar., DA 3.9.432b21, 12.434a31; DC 2.11.291b13 14; SVF 2.1140 (= Alex. Aphr., De fato 179.24).
44 See Pl., Ap. 37A5; Men. 77B6 E4; Gorg. 488A3; Prot. 345D8, 358C7; Rep. 589C6; Soph. 228D10 11; Tim. 86D7 E1; Lg. 731C1 2.
45 Cf. 3.1.8.4 8.
§3.2.11. Are individual things the way they are because of physical necessities and consequences and are they as well as they can be?

In fact, they are not; rather, an expressed principle produces everything like this by ruling it and wants it to be so and itself produces in accordance with reason what we call evils since it does not want everything to be good, just as a craftsman does not fashion every part of the living beings as eyes. And so an expressed principle, too, did not fashion everything as gods, but some things as gods, others as daemons, a secondary nature, next human beings and other animals in sequence, not because of grudging but because an expressed principle contains a variegated intellectual world.\(^46\)

But we, like those unskilled in the craft of painting, find fault when the colours are not beautiful all over, whereas the craftsman has, because of his skill, assigned what is appropriate to each place.\(^47\) Cities, too, are not composed of citizens who are equal, even those who enjoy a good constitution.

In fact, if someone were to criticize a play because not all of the characters in it are heroes, but one is a servant, one a country fellow who also speaks in a sloppy way, it wouldn’t be a good play, if one expels the inferior characters, since they, too, contribute to its completeness.

§3.2.12. If, then, the expressed principle itself, fitting itself to matter, has fashioned these things, being the thing it is, and not being the same in its parts – a characteristic it has taken from what went before it – this cosmos, too, which has come into being in the way it has come into being could not have another more beautiful than itself. The expressed principle could not have been composed of parts entirely the same or nearly so; this would have been a mode of being to find fault with. Since it is all things, it is different in each part.

But if the expressed principle had brought into the world other things from outside itself, such as souls, and had forcibly fitted them to its production against their nature, many to their detriment, how could that be right? Rather, we must admit that souls are, in a way, parts of it and it fits them in not by making them worse, but by assigning them to places befitting them according to their worth.

§3.2.13. We must, then, also not disregard the argument that states that an expressed principle does not look in each case to the present, but to

\(^46\) The word is νοεράν ('intellectual') rather than the more typical νοητόν ('intelligible') presumably because Plotinus is here thinking of the 'intellectual' endowment of Soul and the soul of the cosmos rather than the 'intelligible' domain of Intellect. I.e., providence involves more than contemplation; it requires active involvement. Cf., e.g., 5.1.3.12.

\(^47\) See Pl., Rep. 420C4 D5.
previous periods and to the future as well, so as to assess their worth from these and make slaves of those who were previously masters if they were bad masters, and that it is to their advantage for this to happen to them, and to make poor those who misused their wealth – poverty is not a disadvantage for good men – and if they previously killed people unjustly, to be killed in turn, an unjust action on the part of the assassin, but one justly deserved by the victim; and an expressed principle brings into contact the one who is going to suffer with the one who has the opportunity to inflict what the former must endure. It is certainly not by chance that a person becomes a slave nor does one just happen to become a prisoner or be abused physically for no reason, but a person who was once the perpetrator of what he now finds himself suffering. Someone who once murdered his mother will become a woman and be murdered by her child and one who has violated a woman will become a woman to be violated in turn. Hence, we have the name ‘Adrasteia’ by divine decree. For this ordering of things is truly Adrasteia and truly justice and a most wondrous wisdom.

From what we see in the universe, we must conclude that the everlasting order of everything is something of the kind to extend to everything and to the most minute thing, and its craftsmanship is most wondrous not only in divine things but also in the things which one might have supposed providence would disdain as being insignificant, for example, the wonderful variegation in every living being one encounters and the beauty of form extending down to the fruits and even the leaves of plants and the effortless beauty of their flowers, their delicacy, and variegation.

And we must conclude that these have not been produced just once and for all and then ceased but are always being produced while the powers above [the stars] vary their revolutions in relation to them. So, the things that change do not change by changing in a random way nor by taking other forms but in accordance with beauty and as is fitting for divine powers to produce them. For all that is divine produces in accord with its own nature. And its nature is in accord with its substantiality which brings forth at the same time in its activities what is beautiful and just. For if these were not in it, where would they be?

§3.2.14. So, the ordering of the universe comes about through Intellect in such a way that it is done without calculative reasoning and is such that if someone could apply calculative reasoning in the best way he

48 See Pl., Lg. 872E2 10.
49 The word ἀδραστὸς means ‘inescapable’ or ‘ineluctable’. See Pl., Phdr. 248C2.
50 Cf. 2.9.8.10 20, 16.48 56; 4.8.6.23 28.
would be amazed that it could not have discovered a way of producing it in any other way; some aspect of this is seen in the nature of individuals, which have been brought to an order which is always more intellectual than any order devised by calculative reasoning.

In the case of each kind of thing, then, that continually comes into being, it is not possible to find fault with the expressed principle which creates them, unless one thinks that each must be like the things which have not come into being but are eternal and always the same both in the intelligible and sensible worlds, and demands a constant increase in goodness rather than thinking that the form given to each is sufficient, for example, that this particular one does not have horns, thus failing to realize that it is impossible for the expressed principle to reach everything, but that the lesser have to exist in the greater, parts in the whole and it is not possible for them to be equal; otherwise, they would not be parts. For in the higher world, everything is all, but in this world each thing is not everything.

Indeed, a human being, too, since he is a part, is an individual and not every human being. But if there happens to be among some parts something else which is not a part, that thing is all, too, because of this. But a human being cannot be expected to be perfect and reach the summit of excellence. For he would then immediately no longer be a part. But the whole would not bear a grudge against the part that achieved greater worth by being better ordered. For it also makes the whole more beautiful when it has become embellished with a greater worth. For a thing acquires this character when it is made to be the same as the whole and is, in a way, permitted to be like it and be aligned with it, that something in it might also shine forth in the region where a human being is, too, like the stars in divine heaven. From here we may perceive a sort of great and beautiful statue, whether it has come into being as something ensouled or by Hephaestus’ craftsmanship, which has scintillating stars on its face and others on its breast and a setting of stars poised where they are going to be seen.

§3.2.15. This, then, is how things are when considered each on their own. But the interweaving of these things that have been created and are forever coming into being can present us with difficulty and confusion by the fact that animals eat each other and human beings attack each other, that war goes on forever and never takes a respite or pause; and it is a real difficulty if the expressed principle has produced such things,

51 A very compressed line, probably meaning that for embodied human beings, their intellects or undescended intellects, their true selves, make each of these human beings an ‘all’ analogous to the way that Intellect is an all in l. 15. Cf. 2.2.2.3 5.

52 See Pl., Tim. 37C7.

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and that this is why they are said to be in order. For this explanation is no longer very helpful to those who make the argument that the cosmos is as good as it can be, though it is in its present state of being less than good because of matter and ‘evils [that] cannot be done away with’, since it really had to be like this and it is good for it to be so; and it is not that matter came along and took control, but matter was introduced for it to be how it is or more precisely matter itself existed the way it does through the agency of an expressed principle. And so an expressed principle is a principle that is everything, both the things which come to be according to it and the things that, having come to be, are in their entirety arranged by it.

Why, then, must there be this undeclared war among animals and among human beings?

In fact, this eating of each other is necessary. These transformations from one animal to another come about because they would be unable to continue on in existence the way they are, even if no one were to kill them. And if at the time when they leave the world, they leave it in such a way that others find some use from them, why must we begrudge that? What does it matter if they are consumed to be born as other living beings?

It is just as on the stage when one of the actors who has been murdered changes his costume for a new one and enters again as a different character. But this person has really died. If his death; too, then is a change of body like the change of costume on stage, or even for some like the casting away of costumes at the final exit of the actor from the stage when he will come back again for another competition, what would be so terrible for animals to be changing into each other, which is much better than their never existing in the first place? For the latter situation would mean the absence of life and the impossibility of life existing in something else. But the real situation is that the life of the universe in its multiplicity produces all things and in its living variegates them and never ceases making beautiful and shapely living toys.

And when human beings, as mere mortals, take up arms against each other and fight in well-ordered ranks and do the kind of things they play at in war dances, they prove that every human concern is childlike and indicate to us that death is nothing terrible and that if they die in war

53 See Pl., *Thet.* 176A5. 54 See Ar., *PA* 1.1.639b15. 55 See Pl., *Lg.* 817B1 8. 56 If, as HS* have it, οὐτὸς refers to a person in the real world, then the text can stand. If, as some, e.g., Igal, argue, it must refer to the actor, then ἄλλα in l. 24 must be modified to read ἄλλα οὐ. 57 See Pl., *Lg.* 644D7 9, 803C4 5.
they anticipate in battle just a little what will happen to them in old age, and that they leave and return again more quickly. If human beings are deprived of property during their life, they might realize that it did not really belong to them before and that its possession by those who stole it is laughable when others take it away from them in turn. And even for those who have not had anything taken away from them, their possession of property is worse than its removal. We must look upon murders and every kind of death, and the capture and plundering of cities as though they were on theatre stages; all of them are transitions, changes of costume, enactments of dirges and lamentations.

For in the sensible world in each aspect of our lives, it is not the inner soul but the outer shadow of a human being that wails and laments and does everything on the stage which is this whole earth as we set up our individual stages in many a place. For these are the deeds of the human being who knows how to live only the lower and external life and does not realize that even when his tears are serious he is still just playing. For only the serious person can be serious in doing serious deeds, whereas the other human being is a plaything. And even playthings are taken seriously by those who do not know how to be really serious and are themselves playthings. But anyone who joins in their play and has that kind of experience, should know that he has fallen into a child’s game and has put aside the garment in which he is clothed. And even if Socrates, too, should join in the game, it is the outer Socrates who is playing. And we should also bear in mind that one should not take tears and lamentation as evidence for evils, since children, too, actually weep and lament over what are not evils.

§3.2.16. But if all this is right, how can there still be wickedness? Where is injustice? And moral error, where is that? For if everything happens in a proper way, how can those who act commit injustice or morally err? And how could men be ill-fated, if they do not morally err or commit injustice? How are we going to maintain that some things are in accordance with nature, while other things are contrary to nature, when everything that happens and is done is according to nature? How could anyone be irreverent even towards the divine, when what is done would be according to nature? It would be as if a poet created an actor in one of his plays who insulted and ran down the author of the play.

So, let us once more state more clearly what the expressed principle is and that it is reasonable for it to be as it is. This expressed principle,

58 The word ὁ σπουδαῖος, usually translated as ‘virtuous person’, is here used in contrast to the frivolous person who does not take life seriously. The closeness of the two senses is reflected in the Latin gravitas.
then – we must dare to state it, for we might just manage to hit on the right description – is not pure intellect nor is it ‘intellect itself’\textsuperscript{59} or even the nature of pure soul, but depends on the latter and is an illumination coming from both Intellect and Soul – Soul disposed according to Intellect – which generated this expressed principle as a life in quiet possession of an expressed principle.\textsuperscript{60}

All life is activity,\textsuperscript{61} even life on a low level; not an activity in the way fire acts, but its activity, even if there is no sense-perception in it, is a motion that is not random. To any of those things which at least share to some degree in the presence of life,\textsuperscript{62} reason is immediately introduced, that is, they are formed, since the activity which is in accord with reason is able to form and to move things in such a way as to form them. So, the activity of life is craftlike, just as someone dancing could be said to be in motion. For the dancer is himself like life which is craftlike in this way and his craft moves him and moves him in such a way because life itself is in some way like this. We have said enough then to show how we should think of any sort of life.

So, this expressed principle, which has come from a single Intellect and a single life, each of which is complete, is neither a single life nor a single Intellect nor complete in every aspect; nor does it give itself whole and entire to those to which it does give itself. And by setting the parts in opposition to each other and making them deficient, it has fashioned a structure and process which are characterized by war and struggle, and this is the way in which it is one single whole, even if it is not one single thing. For although it is at war with itself through its parts, it is one and harmonious as the plot of a play can be; the plot of the play is one though it contains in itself many conflicts. And so the play brings the elements of conflict into a single harmony by creating a kind of entire symphonic narrative of the conflicts.

In the universe, however, the conflict of disparate elements comes from a single expressed principle. And so it would be better to compare it to the harmony which is produced from conflicting notes, and then to

\textsuperscript{59}Cf. 5.9.13.3. The term αὐτονομος (and the parallel term καθαρὰ ψυχή) appear to indicate a nature or essence distinct from its ontological status, e.g., the nature of a Form distinct from the Form. Plotinus wants to show that a λόγος (‘expressed principle’) is not just the nature of intellect or soul even though Intellect exists as a λόγος of the One and Soul is a λόγος of Intellect.

\textsuperscript{60}Plotinus is here apparently identifying the expressed principle of Intellect and Soul with the soul of the cosmos. I.e., the life of the cosmos is the expressed principle, the expression of Intellect and Soul at the cosmic level.

\textsuperscript{61}Cf. 1.4.3.15 24; 3.7.3.12 23. See Ar., EN 10.4.1175a12 13; Meta. 12.7.1072b24 28. The primary activity of Intellect is Life, so whatever partakes of Intellect partakes of Life to some extent.

\textsuperscript{62}Reading ἔνων ζωῆ παρῇ with HS\textsuperscript{3} which follows MacKenna.
enquire after why the conflicts are present in the musical keys. If in music the keys produce high and low notes which come together into a unity, which then, because they are principles of harmony, come together as harmony itself which is another and greater principle, while they remain subordinates and parts, and if in the universe, too, we see contraries like white and black, hot and cold, and indeed winged and not winged, with and without feet, rational and non-rational, and all the parts of a single whole animal, and that the whole agrees with itself while its parts are everywhere in conflict, and yet the totality is in accord with an expressed principle, then this single expressed principle must also be a single expressed principle made from contraries, since it is this kind of contrariety which provides its structure and what we might call its substantiality. For if it was not multiple, it would neither be all nor an expressed principle. But since it is an expressed principle, it contains differences within itself and the most extreme form of difference is contrariety. And if it makes things different from each other at all, it will also produce extreme difference and not just difference to a lesser degree. So, in causing extreme difference it will necessarily produce contraries and will be perfect not merely by making itself differentiated but also by making itself consist of contraries.

§3.2.17. Indeed, since its nature corresponds to its creative activity in every respect, the greater its internal differences, the more will it make its products as contraries. And the visible universe is less united than its expressed principle, so that it is both more of a many and there is greater contrariety and each thing has a greater desire to live and a greater love of unification. But those that love also destroy what they love, when they are perishable, as they hasten towards their good; and the desire of the part for the whole draws into itself what it can. And so there are good and bad people, just like the contrary motions of a dancer who derives both from the identical craft. We say that there is one part that is ‘good’ and the other ‘bad’, and this combination makes it a good performance.

But, then, the wicked are no longer wicked.

In fact, their being wicked is not done away with, but only that they are not wicked of themselves. Perhaps, though, the wicked may be forgiven. But it is the expressed principle that causes our forgiveness or not, and the expressed principle does not cause us to be forgiving in such cases.

\[\text{See Ar., Meta. 10.4.1055a4 5.}\]

\[\text{Intellect is a one many; Soul is a one and many; the visible universe is more of a many than its soul.}\]
Enneads 3.2.17

But if one part is a good man and the other a wicked man, and the wicked man extends over more parts, it will be just as in a play where the author assigns some characteristics to the actors, but also uses them just as they are. He does not appoint them as leading actor, second or third actor, but by giving each of them appropriate words has already given to each the place to which he must be assigned. In the same way, then, there is a place for each, one for the good man, and another that fits the bad man. Each of them, corresponding to his own nature and the expressed principle, goes to his own proper place which he has chosen. Then, he begins to utter words and perform deeds, one man irreverent words and wicked deeds, the other the opposite. For even before the play, they were actors of a particular kind when they gave themselves to the play.

In human dramas, then, the author provides the words while each of the actors has it from himself to perform well or badly. For this is their task after the words have been provided by the author. But in the real drama of life, which human beings with the gift of poetry imitate in a limited way, it is the soul which acts out the part it has received from the author to act; just as the actors in the play take their masks, garments, saffron robes, and rags, so, too, the soul itself takes up its fortunes but not in a random way. These, too, are in accordance with the expressed principle. And when the soul has harmonized these aspects of fortune, it becomes attuned to the play and has inserted itself into its structure and into the whole rational plan [for the play].

Next, it gives utterance, in a way, to its actions and the other things that a soul can do according to its character, like a sort of ode. And the sound and deportment of the actor are good or bad and either embellish the play or, by adding the faultiness of his own voice, he reveals how ungainly he is though it does not make the play other than it was; the playwright, performing the act of a good critic, rightly lowers his assessment of the bad actor and dismisses him, but introduces the good actor to higher honours and, if they are available, to finer plays, and the bad actor to any inferior plays he might have. This is the way in which the soul enters this universal production, making itself a part of it and bringing to it its own personal skills and weaknesses in acting. Once assigned its place on its entrance [to the world stage] and in receipt of everything except its own nature and its own deeds, it has its appropriate rewards and punishments.

And there are further considerations regarding these actors inasmuch as they are acting in a greater environment than on the limited dimensions of a stage; and the playwright of everything has put them

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65 See Pl., Rep. 617E; Lg. 904C. E.
in control of all their actions and their capacity for going to many different kinds of place is greater; and they define their own rewards and punishments because they themselves assist in the rewards and punishments; each place suits their characteristics since it agrees with the expressed principle of the universe, and each of them is brought into harmony in a just way with the parts which have received them, just as each chord is arranged in its proper and appropriate position in accordance with the laws of sound as far as each is able to fulfil these.

For the fitting and beautiful is found in the whole if each is placed where he should be, including the one who will be in darkness and Tartarus if he utters ill sounds. For it is there that these sounds are beautiful.

And this whole universe is beautiful, not if each of us is a Linus, but if each by contributing his own voice helps to bring to perfection a single harmony, giving vocal expression to his own life, which is inferior, worse, and less perfect. It is like the pan-pipes where there is not one single note but also a note that is worse and less clear that contributes to the perfection of the harmony in the whole instrument, because harmony is divided into unequal parts and all the sounds are unequal, the single complete sound being composed of all of them. Moreover, the universal expressed principle is actually one, but is divided into parts that are not equal.

Hence, there are also different places in the universe, some better and some worse, and souls are not all equal and fit into places which are not equal. And here, too, it happens that places are not all the same and souls are not identical but in their inequality occupy places that are also not the same like the absence of sameness of the pan-pipe or any other musical instrument, and are in places which are themselves different from each other as each in its own place gives voice to its own music in harmony with those places and with the whole.

And their discordant sounds are subsumed in the beauty of the whole and what is contrary to nature will be in accordance with nature in the whole even though the individual sound will be an inferior one. But the emission of such a sound has not made the whole worse, just as the public executioner, to use another image, though he is a rogue, does not make a well-ordered city worse. For this person, too, is needed in the city – there is also often need of a person of this kind – and he, too, is part of the good order.

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66 Reading τοῦ ποιητοῦ <τοῦ> παντὸς ποιοῦντος κυρίως according to the conjecture of Creuzer which avoids putting human beings in control of the cosmos.

67 A mythical figure, said to be a son of Apollo, associated particularly with a certain type of ritual music.
§3.2.18. Some souls are better and worse for various reasons, others are, in a way, not all equal from the start. For they, too, analogously to the expressed principle, are unequal parts, since they have separated themselves. We must consider, as well, the second and third elements of soul and the fact that the soul does not always act with all its parts.

But we must say again, on the other hand, as follows, for the argument calls for a great deal more clarity. We must certainly not introduce the kind of actors who utter words other than those of the playwright as though they were themselves completing some inadequacy in the play which in itself is incomplete and the writer had left empty sections in the middle of his play, with the result that the actors will no longer be actors but a part of the playwright who knows in advance what they are going to say so as in this way to be able to attach together the rest of the play and its consequences. For in the universe, the expressed principles bring together the consequences and what follows evils in deeds and do so in a planned way. For example, from adultery there may come children in the course of nature and, perhaps, better men, or from the leading away of captives other cities better than those that have been plundered by wicked men.

If the introduction of souls, some of which will actually do wicked deeds, some beautiful deeds, is not absurd – in fact, if we deprive the expressed principle of wicked deeds we will be depriving it of good ones, too – what is to prevent us making the performances of the actors into parts of the universal expressed principle, just as on stage they may be made into parts of the play, and include in it performing well or badly, so that to each of the actors there comes much more from the expressed principle itself as the universal drama is more perfect [than the human play] and everything comes from the expressed principle?

But what is the purpose for doing evil? And will the more divine souls be of no further account in the universe, but all just parts of the expressed principle? And, then, either the expressed principles are all souls or why should some be souls and others just expressed principles when every one of them belongs to a soul?

68 See Pl., Tim. 41D7. 69 Reading εἰ <ὡὐκ> ἄτοπος with HS1.
§3.3.1. So, what is our view on these issues?

In fact, it is that the universal expressed principle contains both wicked and good deeds and includes even the former as its parts. The universal expressed principle does not, of course, generate evils but accompanies them. For the expressed principles are an activity of a universal Soul, the parts an activity of parts. And the expressed principles are analogous to one Soul which has different parts so that their deeds, too, which are their final products, are different from each other.

But souls are concordant with each other and so, too, are their deeds. And they are concordant insofar as unity derives from them even if it comes from contraries. For when all things are set in motion from a single principle they come together in a unity by natural necessity so that although things grow different and become contraries, they are still drawn together into a single structured order by the fact that they originate from a unity. For just as, among the species of animal, there is one genus for horses, whether they fight, bite each other, want to gain victory over each other and are subject to jealous anger, and similarly all the other animals that can be said to form single genera, so must we certainly suppose the same to apply to human beings, too. So, we must again bring all these species back together under the one ‘living being’ as their genus.

Next, those that are not living beings must be classed by their species, and then into the single genus of ‘non-living beings’.

Next, you can put both together, if you wish, under existence, and then under what provides existence. And when you have attached everything to this one genus, descend again by dividing them and seeing the unity dissipated by reaching out to all things and embracing them together in a single order so that it is a single diverse multiple living

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1 This treatise, which is clearly a continuation of the previous one, was set off by Porphyry to fit into his ninefold division of each Ennead.

2 Cf. 4.3.2.55 59.
being in which each of the parts acts out its own nature while still remaining in the whole itself; for example, fire burns, a horse performs horse deeds, and each human being acts in the way he is naturally disposed and different ones do different things; and their living, both good and bad, follows from their natures and their deeds.

§ 3.3.2. Chance circumstances are of prime importance for the good life, yet even they follow from what has gone before and run their course interwoven into what follows. The ruling principle weaves all together, each side making its contribution in accord with nature, just as in armies the general is the one who rules while the soldiers in the ranks breathe in unison.\(^4\) Everything has been arranged by the general’s providence which keeps an eye on actions and experiences and what must be there, food and drink and indeed all the weapons and mechanical aids; and all that flows from the interweaving of these activities has been foreseen so that their consequences have their place in good organization; and every order comes from the general in a well-planned way, although what his opponents were intending to do is outside his control. But if he was able to control the enemy camp as well, if he were actually the ‘great leader’\(^5\) whose sway is over everything, what would be left unorganized, what would not be fitted into his plan?

§ 3.3.3. What if someone says ‘I am in control of choosing this or that’? But what you are going to choose has already been planned because your choice is not just something adventitious to the whole but you have been counted just as you are.

But what is the source of a human being as he is? There are two questions which our enquiry must explore: whether one should trace the cause of the quality of each person’s moral character back to the creator,\(^6\) if there is one, or to the product itself, or whether one should not assign blame at all, as one doesn’t in the case of the generation of plants for their not having sense-perception or in the case of the other living beings for their not having \[the same faculties\] as humans. For it is identical to asking ‘why do human beings not have the same faculties as gods?’ For why is it reasonable in these cases to blame neither the creatures themselves nor the one who has created them, but to do so in the case of human beings because they are not better than they are?

For if we assume that it was possible for a human being to become more beautiful than he was,\(^7\) then if it was from his own efforts of adding

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3 A sketch of Plato’s method of collection and division. Cf. 1.3.4.10 19.
4 See Ar., Meta. 12.10.1075a14 16; Ar. [?], De mun. 6.399a35 b10.
5 See Pl., Phdr. 246E4. 6 See Pl., Lg. 904B6 D4.
7 Reading τούτου with Heintz and Kalligas.
something to himself that he became better, the man who didn’t do this would be himself responsible for his own state. But if the addition had to come not from himself but externally from the one who generated him, it would be odd to demand from him more than he had been given, just as it would be to make the same demand in the case of the other living beings and plants, too. For one must not try to find out if one is inferior to another but if a thing is sufficient as it is. For all things did not have to be equal.

Did the creator, then, measure them out with the intention that all things should not be equal? Absolutely not. But it was natural that things should be so. For the expressed principle of the universe is dependent on another Soul, this Soul is dependent on Intellect and the Intellect is not any one of the things here, but all things. And all things are many; and since they are many and not identical, some are going to be first in worth, too, some second, and some following after these.

So, living beings that come into being are not only souls, but diminutions of souls, a sort of trickling away as they proceed ever further. For the expressed principle of the living being, even if it has a soul, is a different soul and not the one from which the expressed principle came. And this whole expressed principle does indeed become less as it hastens into matter and what is produced from it is more imperfect. Look carefully at how far the product has distanced itself and is still something amazing.

So, if what is produced is inferior, that which precedes it does not have to be like this. For it is superior to everything that comes into being, is beyond reproach, and is the more to be admired because it has allowed something to be after it and its traces are of such a wondrous kind. But if it has actually given more than they can take hold of, that is all the greater reason for acknowledging it. So, it turns out that blame should rest on people who have come into being and that the work of providence is greater than this.

§3.3.4. Now if a human being is simple – by ‘simple’ I mean that he is just that which he has been created to be, and acts and experiences accordingly – he would bear no responsibility in terms of moral opprobrium just as in the case of the other living beings. But as it is, only a human being, when he is bad, is deserving of blame and this is, I think, reasonable. For he is not only what he has been made to be but he possesses another principle which is free although it is not outside

8 The human being is, in fact, not simple but complex, including undescended intellect, embodied soul, and body. Cf. 1.1.10.5 10; 2.3.0.30 31.
providence or the expressed principle of the whole cosmos.\textsuperscript{9} For what is there is not separated from what is here, but the superior illuminates the inferior and the superior is perfect providence.

And there is one expressed principle which is productive, and another which connects what is superior with the world of becoming; and what is higher is identical with the providence which acts from above, but there is another providence which is derived from the one above; and the one expressed principle is connected with the other,\textsuperscript{10} and the whole product of interweaving and providence in its entirety come about from both. Human beings, then, have another principle, although not all human beings use everything they possess, but some use one principle, others another or different ones that are inferior. Those higher principles, too, are present to them even if not acting on them, although they are not in themselves in any way inactive. For each of them performs its own function.

But, someone might say, what is responsible for them not acting on these human beings when they are present? Or are they not present? Yet we affirm that they are present everywhere and that nothing is deprived of them.

In fact, they are not present in those cases in which they do not act. Why, then, do they not act on all human beings, if indeed they are also parts of them? I mean the principle [of freedom] which we have been talking about. It is because in the case of the other living beings, this principle does not belong to them, while in human beings it does not belong to all of them.

Is this, then, not the only principle that does not belong to all of them? Why should it not be the only one? In those who are its sole possessors, life is lived in conformity with it while the rest is as necessity requires. For whether a human being’s constitution is such as to cast him, in a way, into troubled waters, or his appetites control him, we must still say that the cause lies in the substrate. At first sight, however, it will appear to be no longer in the expressed principle but rather in matter; and matter, not the expressed principle, will dominate and the substrate will be next insofar as it has been shaped.

In fact, the substrate of the principle [of freedom] is the expressed principle and what comes from the expressed principle and is in accordance with it. Thus, it will not be matter which dominates and the shaping comes next.

\textsuperscript{9} This is the hypostasis Soul, the expressed principle of Intellect.

\textsuperscript{10} Lit. ‘and the other expressed principle is connected with that’. It is disputed what ‘that’ refers to.
And one might trace back an individual’s character to his previous life, his expressed principle becoming, in a way, dim in comparison with his former expressed principle as a result of his actions in the previous life, as though the soul had become weaker. But it will shine forth again later. And let us assert that the expressed principle also has in it the expressed principle of matter and by this it will fashion matter giving it quality in accordance with itself or finding it already consonant. For it is not the case that the expressed principle of the ox is imposed on any other matter than that of the ox. Hence, Plato says that a soul enters into other living beings, in a sense becoming different and its expressed principle altered, so that what had before been a human being might become the soul of an ox. And so the inferior human being justly becomes an ox.

But why did the inferior human being come to be inferior from the beginning and how did he fall? We have often said that not all things are first, but that what come second and third have a nature inferior to that of those before them, and a small inclination suffices to divert something from its straight course. And the interweaving of one thing with another is like a blending where a third thing comes into being from both and it is not the case that the third thing existed first and was then diminished. Rather, its inferiority was there from the beginning and what it has become, inferior, is in accord with its own nature. And if it experiences the consequences [of its own nature], it experiences what it deserves. And it is to the events of previous lives that we must trace back the calculation insofar as what happens subsequently depends on them.

§3.3.5. So, providence comes about from its beginning to its end in a descent from above which is not equal in a numerical sense, but proportionately different in each place like a single living being which depends on its principle to its end, each part having its own function, the better part having the better part of its activity, while the part directed below is already both active in its own way and experiences the affections appropriate to it with respect both to itself and to its coordination with anything else.

Moreover, if they are struck in a certain way, the speaking parts utter an appropriate sound while the other parts experience it in silence and the resulting effects are set in motion; and from all the sounds, affections, and results of the acts there is produced in the living being

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11 Cf. 3.2.8.28 31, 13.1 17. 12 See Pl., Tim. 42C2 D2. 13 Cf. supra 3.23 24. 14 See Pl., Tim. 41D7. 15 I.e., from Soul and Intellect. 16 Reading πληγντος with HS5. 17 See Pl., Tim. 64Aff.
a single voice, in a way, a single life and way of living. For the parts are
different and have different activities; the feet do one thing, the eyes,
discursive thinking, and intellect other things.

There is, though, a unity arising from all of them and a single
providence. Fate commences from the inferior part while what is
above is just providence. For everything in the intelligible universe
is an expressed principle and beyond an expressed principle; for Intellect
and Soul are pure. But what derives from there to this sensible cosmos,
insofar as it comes from there, is providence, including what is in pure
Soul and whatever comes from there to living beings. But an expressed
principle when apportioned does not come equally to all. And so it does
not make things equal, as in the case of individual living beings.

The consequence is that here actions result from providence and
follow from it whenever anyone does what is pleasing to the gods. For
the expressed principle of providence is pleasing to god. And so evil
deeds are linked with good ones, but are not brought about by
providence. If, though, any good turns out in the things that have
happened, whether they have happened through human beings or
through anything which is either a living being or soulless, it is sub-
sumed again under providence, so that virtue everywhere is in control
since what has gone wrong is changed and encounters correction, just as
in a single body when health has been bestowed through providence’s
care of the living being, when there is a cut or wound of any kind the
expressed principle which organizes it once more fixes, brings together,
heals, and rights the painful part.

The result is that evil deeds are the consequences [not of providence
but] of necessity. For they come from us as their cause, not as compelled
by providence, but we ourselves link our deeds with the deeds of
providence and those which derive from providence although we are
not able to link what follows with the will of providence but with that of
those who act or with some other thing in the universe which has acted
or produced some state in us which is not in accord with providence. For
everything does not have the identical effect on everything else with
which it comes in contact, but the identical thing has a different effect
on different things.

For example, Helen’s beauty had one effect on Paris, whereas
Idomeneus did not experience the identical thing; and a handsome
person who is licentious has one effect when he meets his like and the

\[\text{18 Cf. 3.4.6.31 36; 4.3.15.10 15. See Ps. Plutarch, De fato 572f 573b; Apuleius, De Plat. 1.12.} \]

\[\text{19 Reading τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα with HS following Heintz and Harder.} \]

\[\text{20 See Homer, Il. 3.230 233.} \]
handsome person who is self-controlled has a different effect on his like, or the self-controlled handsome person has one effect on his opposite, and the licentious handsome person again a different effect on his opposite. And the action which comes from the licentious person is not done by providence, because the deed of the self-controlled person is not done by providence, though it is done by him himself, and it is done according to providence. For it is consonant with the expressed principle, just as what a human being does to maintain his health he does according to the instructions of the doctor. For this is something the doctor has given him from his medical expertise which deals with sickness and health. But whenever a human being does something which does not promote his health, he does it himself and has acted contrary to the doctor’s providence.

§3.3.6. What, then, is the cause of diviners also foretelling adverse events and foretelling them by looking at the motion of the universe in addition to other forms of prophecy?

In fact, it is clear that it is because all contraries, such as form and matter, are woven together. For example, in the case of a living being which is a composite, it is clear that one who sees the form and the expressed principle also sees the thing that is formed. For one does not see an intelligible living being and a composite living being in the same way, but one sees the expressed principle in the composite shaping what is inferior. Since the universe is actually a living being, one who looks at things generated in it sees simultaneously what it is made of and the providence expended on it. The latter is actually extended over the entire universe including the things that come to be; and these things that come to be consist both of living beings and their actions and mixed dispositions, ‘reason mingled with necessity’. And so he sees what is mingled and is continually being mingled. And he is by his own efforts unable to distinguish clearly providence itself from what is according to providence, nor, too, the substrate from the contribution it makes from itself to what rests on it.

A man cannot distinguish these, unless he is wise and god-like.

In fact, one might say ‘only a god could have this privilege’. For it is not the role of the diviner to indicate the cause, but only the fact that something is so. And his skill consists in reading the letters written in nature, which indicate an order and never deviate into disorder or, to be

21 The meaning of λόγος here.
22 Reading ὅντος ὅτι <ὅ> following Creuzer where, as HS notes, ὅτι (= δὴ λογον ὅτι).
24 Reading δόκαντον ἔτοι ἔτει ἐτέκειμεν διὰ γνώσεως with HS.
more precise, in reading the motion of heaven which bears witness to
and brings to light the nature of each person and their actions even
before they are made manifest by themselves. For things here are carried
along with heavenly phenomena and the latter with things here as they
simultaneously contribute to the formation and eternity of the universe,
but for the observer it is by correspondence that the one provides signs
of the other, since the other forms of divination also operate by corre-
spondence. For all things must not be separated from each other, but
they had to be assimilated to each other in some way.

And this is perhaps the meaning of the saying\(^\text{26}\) that proportion-
ality holds everything together. And proportionality is the following
sort of thing: the inferior is related to the inferior as the better is to the
better; for example, as eye is to eye, so is foot to foot, one thing to the
other, and, if you wish, as virtue is to justice, so is vice to injustice. So,
if there is proportionality in the universe, it is possible to foretell
events. And if heaven acts upon things here, it does so in the way that
the parts in every living being act on each other, not as one thing
generating another – for they are generated simultaneously – but each
thing experiences in accordance with its own nature whatever con-
tributes to its own nature and because a thing has a particular nature,
what it experiences is of this nature, too. For in this way the expressed
principle, too, remains one.

§3.3.7. And because there are better things, there are also worse. How
could there be something worse in what has many forms unless there
was something better and how could there be something better if there
was not something worse? And so we must not criticize the inferior
element in the better but embrace the better because it has given some-
thing of itself to the worse. And, in general, those who think it right to
remove the worse in the entire universe are getting rid of providence
itself. For what would be the object of providence? Certainly, not itself
nor what is better, since even when we are referring to the higher
providence we are speaking of its relation to what is below.\(^\text{27}\) For the
bringing together of all things into a unity is the principle in which
everything is together and all are a whole.

And as it is, all individual things proceed from this principle while it
remains within, as though from a single root which itself remains
established in itself. And they blossomed forth into a divided multi-
plicity, each one bearing an image of the higher principle and when they
came to be in the sensible world each was in a different place, some near

\(^{26}\) See Pl., *Tim.* 31C3, 32C2.

\(^{27}\) See *SVF* 2.1169 (= Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 8.1), 1170 (= Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 7.1.7).
to the root, others going forth and splitting up even so far as to form, in a way, branches, twigs, fruit, and leaves. And while some of them always remained, others, the fruit and leaves, were always coming into being.28 And those that were always coming into being have within them the expressed principles of the things above as though they want to be miniature trees. And if they produced before they were destroyed, they only produced something near to them. And the spaces between
the branches were filled by secondary shoots which also grew from the root even if they grew in a different way. And the tips of the branches were affected by these in a way that makes one think that the affection came only from what is close. But in accordance with the principle, one was affected and the other acted and the principle, too, was itself dependent on something else. For the things which act on each other are different because they come from afar, but in the beginning they are from the identical source, like brothers who have an influence on each other because they are the same as each other having sprung from identical parents.

28 See Pl., Tim. 27D6 28A1.
3.4 (15)
On Our Allotted Daemon

INTRODUCTION

Plotinus takes a number of Platonic texts referring to a personal daemon to illustrate his own theory of the way in which a human being can move through the different levels of his own soul until he identifies himself with the intelligible universe and even beyond.

SUMMARY

§1. Soul imbues body with the faculties of growth and perception.
§2. Our soul has many different levels of activity. The level at which a person lives during his life determines the level of his reincarnation.
§3. The Platonic daemon is twofold, one representing the level which we attain, the other on the next level, the intelligible world, drawing us up to it. In this sense we are an intelligible universe.
§4. The soul of the universe is always at this higher level without body and sense-perceptions.
§5. Interpretation of the daemon in Republic 10 and Timaeus 90a.
§6. There are different levels of daemon corresponding to the different levels we choose to be dominant in our lives, the highest levels being gods.
§3.4.1. While some real existents are generated even though [their causes] remain unmoved, we have already said that Soul is moved when it generates both [the faculty of] sense-perception which is itself a real existent and nature [that is, the faculty of growth], which reaches as far as plants. For even the soul which is in us has [the faculty of growth], but the soul dominates it since it is only a part of us. But whenever it occurs in plants, the faculty of growth dominates since it occurs in a way on its own.

Does this faculty of growth, then, not generate anything? It generates something completely different from itself. For there is no further life after it, but what is produced is lifeless. What can it be then?

In fact, just as everything which was generated before this, was generated as something formless, but then received form by reverting to that which generated it in order to be nurtured by it, in a way, so, too, in this case, what is generated is actually no longer a form of soul – for it is no longer alive – but is total indefiniteness. For if there is indefiniteness even in what is before it, it is an indefiniteness which receives form; for it is not total indefiniteness but one relative only to its completion. But what we have here now is total indefiniteness. But when it is brought to completion, it becomes a body by taking a form which is appropriate to its potential, acting as a receptacle for that which has generated and has nurtured it. And only this form in body is the last [manifestation] of the things above in the last part of the cosmos here below.

§3.4.2. And the sentence ‘all soul cares for what is without soul’ applies particularly to the faculty of growth. The other faculties of

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1 See Pl., *Phd.* 1067D6 7. On the topic of daemons generally see *Lg.* 713C5–E3.  
2 The verb here is μενεῖν which indicates the ‘internal activity’ of a real, that is, extra mental, existent (or: ‘hypostasis’) antecedent to any ‘external’ activity. Both Intellect and Soul have internal and external activity, but for Soul, the generation of its external activity requires self motion. On this motion, cf. 1.1.7.1 6 and 3.7.11.23 30.  
3 Cf. 5.2.1.13 21.  
4 This is matter. Cf. 3.2.15.12; 3.9.3.7 14.  
soul do the same but in different ways. ‘Soul traverses all of heaven differing in form from one place to another’, either under the form of sense-perception, rationality, or growth. For the part of it that dominates does what is appropriate to it while the other parts are inactive since they are external. But in the case of a human being, the inferior parts do not dominate but accompany the other parts. Indeed, the better part does not always dominate. For these other parts, too, are there with their particular location. For this reason, we also live as beings that use our faculty of sense-perception; for we have organs of sense-perception. And in many respects we live like plants; for we have a body that grows and reproduces. And so all the parts work together, but it is due to the better part that the form of the whole entity is a human being. When the soul leaves the body, however, it becomes that which predominated in it.

For this reason, ‘we must escape to the higher world’ to avoid falling to the level of the faculty of sense-perception by following sensible images or to the faculty of growth by following the desire for procreation and ‘the luxuries of good food’, but rise to the intellectual faculty, to Intellect, and to god.

And so those who maintain their humanity will return again as human beings, while those who lived by sense-perception alone will return as animals. But if their sense-perceptions are accompanied by passion, they will return as wild beasts. And the difference in their dispositions determines that which decides what kind of animal they become. Those who combine the life of sense-perception with appetite and the pleasure which is found in the appetitive part of the soul will become the sort of animals that are licentious and voracious. But if they fail even to combine sense-perception with these, but only a dim form of sense-perception, they will even become plants. For it is only or predominantly the faculty of growth which is active in them and this was practice for becoming trees. And those who loved culture but were pure in other respects will turn into singing birds, while those who were foolish kings will turn into eagles, so long as no other vice was present. Those who pursued astronomy and were always raising themselves to heaven, but without wisdom, will become birds that soar high in flight. The human being who practises civic virtue will become a human being, but one who shared to a lesser degree in civic virtue will become a social animal, a bee or similar creature.

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6 See Pl., Phdr. 246B6 7.
7 Cf. 1.1.10.7 10.
8 See Pl., Tht. 176A8 9.
10 See Pl., Phd. 82B7.
12 See Pl., Phd. 81E6.
13 See Pl., Phd. 67E5.
15 See Pl., Tim. 91D6 8.
16 See Pl., Phd. 82A11 B8.
§3.4.3. Who then will become a daemon? The one who is one in the sensible world. Who will become a god?

In fact, it is the one who is one in the sensible world. For that which is active in each person will direct him [after death] inasmuch as it is also that which leads him in the sensible world.

Is this, then, ‘the daemon, to which the person was allotted when he was in the sensible world’? 17

In fact, it was not; rather, it was the one before this one. For this one stood over him without acting but the one who comes after him is active.

If the active part of us is that by which we make use of our faculty of sense-perception, our daemon is the rational faculty. If we live according to our rational faculty, our daemon is that which is stationed above this in inactivity but consenting to the part which is active. This is why it is rightly said that ‘we will choose’. 18 For we choose the daemon that is above us by the choice of lives we make.

Why, then, does that daemon ‘lead’ 19 us?

In fact, it is not possible for the daemon to lead him once he has lived his life. But it does lead him before when he was alive. When he has ceased from this life, he hands over this activity to another, since he is dead as regards the life which concerned the activity of his daemon. This daemon, then, wants to lead and when it has gained control, lives in its own right while at the same time possessing another daemon for itself.

But if it is weighed down by the strength of an inferior way of life, that constitutes its punishment. In this way, too, the bad person is reduced to the life of a wild beast when he inclines to what is inferior in imitation of what was active in him during his life.

But if he can follow the daemon which is above him, he comes himself to be above, living that daemon’s life, and putting to the fore the superior part of himself to which he is led and after him yet another until he reaches the heights. For the soul is many and all things; both what is above and what below to include the whole of life. And we are each of us an intelligible universe, connected to the world below by the lower parts of our soul, but to the intelligible world by our higher parts, that is, by our cosmic parts. 20 And we abide with all the rest of the intelligible parts above, but are tied to the sensible world below by our lowest part by giving to what is below a kind of outflow from the intelligible part or, better said, an activity, while that part remains undiminished. 21

17 See Pl., Phd. 107 D 6. Plotinus here distinguishes the demythologized ‘daemon’ which is the part of the human soul that dominates in his life, and the daemon that is separate.
19 See Pl., Phd. 107 D 7.
20 Cf. 2.9.2. 5; 4.3.12.1 3; 4.8.8.1 3; 5.1.10.13 19; 6.4.14.16 22; 6.7.5.26, 6.27 30.
21 See Pl., Symp. 211 B 4.
§3.4.4. Is this lower part always in body?
In fact, it is not. For if we revert to the intelligible world, this reverts to it as well.\(^2\)

What about the soul of the universe? Will its lower part also depart from body when it reverts?
In fact, it will not. It didn’t even incline with its lowest part. For it neither came nor descended, but while it remained, the body of the universe attached itself to it and was, in a way, illuminated, without its troubling or causing concern to the soul since the universe rests secure.

How is that? Does it not employ any kind of sense-perception? It does not have sight, according to Plato,\(^3\) because it doesn’t have eyes. And it clearly doesn’t have ears, nostrils, or tongue.

Well, does it have self-awareness as we do of what is within it?\(^4\)
In fact, there is in it a quietness like things which are in conformity with nature, but no pleasure. And so the faculty of growth as well as that of sense-perception are present without being present. But we have dealt with the universe in other treatises.\(^5\) For now we have said as much about it as concerns our problem.

§3.4.5. But if a human being in the intelligible world chooses his daemon and his life [in the sensible world],\(^6\) how is he still in control of anything?
In fact, choice, too, as it is spoken of in the intelligible world, is an allegorical\(^7\) way of referring to the intention and disposition of the soul for life generally and everywhere.\(^8\)

But [one might object] if the intention of the soul is authoritative, and if whatever part of the soul that was dominant in previous lives now has control,\(^9\) the body is no longer responsible for any evil caused to the person. For if the soul’s character precedes the body and it has the character which it has chosen and does not change its daemon, as Plato says,\(^10\) then neither the virtuous nor the worthless human being can exist in the sensible world.

Is a human being, then, potentially one or the other [in the other world], but becomes good or bad in actuality [in this world]? What will

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\(^2\) Cf. 4.4.18.6 21.
\(^3\) See Pl., Tim. 33C1 3.
\(^4\) Cf. 4.4.24.21 22.
\(^5\) Cf. 2.1.3 2.
\(^7\) The word αἰσθασθαι (often rendered ‘to riddle’, ‘to speak enigmatically’) seems to be rendered best in the above manner.
\(^8\) Plotinus distinguishes between αἴσθησις (‘choice’) and προαιρέσις (‘intention’). The former general term refers primarily to particular choices or selections from among alternatives in life; the latter to the basic choice of lives. Plotinus is here employing a Stoic distinction. See SVF 3.173 (= Stob., Ed. 2.87.14).
then happen if the person who is virtuous happens to get a worthless body or the reverse?

In fact, the characters of either kind of soul can form either kind of body to a greater or lesser degree, since even other external chance events do not turn a person’s intention entirely from its course. But in saying that the lots come first, next the models of lives, and then what happens by chance and that they choose their lives according to their characters from [the possibilities] before them, Plato is giving the control rather to the soul, which arranges what has been given them to their own characters. For in Timaeus, he bears witness that this daemon is not entirely outside, but only in the sense that it is not bound together with us and not active, but is ours, if we are talking about the soul, but not ours if we are human beings of a particular kind leading a life which is subject to it.

If his words are understood in this sense, they will contain nothing contentious, but they would contain a discord if the daemon is understood in another sense. And the phrase ‘fulfiller’ of what anyone has chosen is also in accord. For the daemon who is seated above does not allow a person to sink down much lower into evil. For only that part of us is active which is below it. And it doesn’t allow us to go above it or to the same level. For one cannot become other than the level where one is.

§ 3.4.6. What, then, is the virtuous person?

In fact, he is the person who is active with his better part. And, in fact, he would not have been the virtuous person he is if he had the daemon working alongside him. For it is intellect which is active in this person.

In fact, then, he is himself a daemon or on the level of a daemon and his daemon is a god.

Is the daemon, then, above intellect? If that which is above intellect is his daemon, why wasn’t it the case from the beginning?

In fact, it is because of the disturbance that comes from birth. But, nevertheless, there exists in us even before reason is present the internal motion which desires what is proper to itself.

Does the daemon, then, bring us entirely to our proper end?

In fact, it does not entirely, if the soul is indeed of such a disposition that it has the intention to lead a particular life according to the way it finds itself in particular situations. And yet this daemon about whom we are talking is said to be no longer the identical one who leads the person to Hades, unless the soul chooses the identical things again.
But how is it before this? The leading to judgement actually means that the daemon takes on the identical form after the soul’s departure from this world that it had before its birth. Then, as if from a new beginning, it is present to the souls that are being punished in the time before the next birth.

In fact, this is not a life for them, but a sentence.

But what happens to the souls which enter the bodies of wild beasts? Is their guardian something less than a daemon?

In fact, it is certainly a wicked or stupid daemon.

And what about those who go up out of Hades?

In fact, of those who are above, some are in the sensible world, others outside it. The souls in the sensible world are either in the sun or another of the planets, others are in the sphere of the fixed stars, each one according to the degree of reason exercised in its earthly life. One should think that there is also a universe in our soul, not only an intelligible one, but a state like that of the soul of the universe. And that just as the soul of the universe, too, has been distributed amongst the fixed stars and the planets according to its different powers, the powers in us are also of the same kind as these powers; and we should think that an activity comes from each of our souls and, once freed, our souls come to a star which is consonant with the character and power which was active and alive in them. And each will have as god and daemon either its appropriate star or what is above this power. But this requires more examination.

And those that come to be outside the universe have transcended the nature of the daemon and the entire fate involved in generation and altogether what is in this visible world. And so long as they are in the intelligible world along with that part of their substantiality which loves generation, they are taken up with it. This part is rightly to be identified with ‘the divisible soul which comes into being around bodies’ and which multiplies and divides itself amongst bodies. It is not, however, divided in magnitude. For it is present identical and entire in all, and as one, too.

And many living beings are born from a single creature when soul is ‘divided’ in this way, just as many plants are generated from a single plant. For the plant soul, too, is divisible among bodies. And sometimes it gives further life while remaining in the identical body, as, for

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36 See Pl., Tim. 42C3. 37 See Pl., Phd. 80E 82C.
38 See Pl., Tim. 41D6 42D1.
39 Reading καὶ τοιοῦτο θεό καὶ δαίμονι with HS following Theiler.
40 Reading αὐτῷ τοιοῦτο χρῆσται with HS, referring to αὐτῷ from l. 27.
41 See Pl., Phd. 114B6 C5; Phdr. 248C3 5. 42 See Pl., Tim. 35A2 3.

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example, in plants, but when it has departed it has sometimes given new
life before it departs as in plants that have been pulled up and dead
animals when many others are generated from their decomposition.
And the soul which comes from the soul of the universe also contri-
butes its particular power which is identical to that which is here.

43 But if the soul returns again to the sensible world, it has either the
identical or another daemon depending on the life which it is going to
make for itself. And so with this daemon, it first of all makes its way in
this universe as on a boat; next, when the so-called nature of the
‘spindle’ takes it in hand, it assigns it a seat under a certain fortune
as though assigned a seat on a ship. And when the sphere of heaven
drives round like a wind, the person who is sitting or moving around on
this ‘ship’, numerous sights, changes, and events occur, as they do, too,
on a real ship either because of the tossing of the ship or due to the
person himself being moved by any of the impulses he might personally
possess since he is on the ship in his own particular way. For not every
person is moved or wills or acts in the same way in the same circum-
stances. Different things, then, happen to different people either from
the identical or different occurrences or the identical things happen to
different people even if the occurrences are different. For this is what
fate is like.

43 Retaining την with HS’ and Guyot.  44 See Pl., Rep. 616C4, 620E.
3·5 (50)  
On Love

INTRODUCTION
This treatise is an exercise in interpreting the apparently conflicting statements in Plato on Love as a god or daemon. Plotinus interprets love as a dynamic driver of the soul’s desire for beauty and the good, beginning in this world (earthly love) and culminating in the intelligible world (heavenly love). It is through the power of love working in us that we yearn to make the return to our divine source.

SUMMARY
§1. Is love a god, a daemon, or an affection of the soul? Love as an affection of the soul.
§2. Earthly love and heavenly love.
§3. Love is a substance, the product of Soul and looks to what is above him. The earthly Love is a product of the Soul of the universe, is in the world, is concerned with marriage and human love and helps to turn the soul back to the higher world.
§4. The individual soul also possesses its own loves, related to the universal Loves and responsible for the desire for what is beautiful and good. The higher is a god, the lower a daemon.
§5. This daemon is not identical with the universe.
§6. Love as the son of Plenty and Poverty. The difference between gods and daemons, the former being without affections, the latter with affections and occupying a mid position between men and gods.
§7. Earthly love is prior to earth, and is a mixed being, rational and irrational, with a desire which is never fulfilled, but which leads
to the Good. Love which is contrary to nature is a pathological state (of passive affections).

§8. Zeus (Symposium) is Intellect if we take Phaedrus and Philebus into account. Aphrodite is Soul.

§9. Plenty, which is attached to Soul, is the ‘garden’ of Zeus which is to be interpreted as the expressed principles (λόγοι) flowing from the intelligible. Myths like this express in temporally separated sequence Beings which in themselves are together.
§3.5.1. On the question of love, whether it is a god or a daemon or an affection of the soul, or whether in one sense it is a god or a daemon, and in another an affection, and what sort of thing each of these is, it is worth investigating the ideas of persons that one encounters as well as the ideas on these questions that have occurred in philosophical discussion, especially the opinions of the divine Plato, who indeed also wrote a good deal about love in different places of his own works. He actually said that it is not only an affection which occurs in souls,¹ but says that it is also a daemon² and has discoursed on its origin, how, and from what source it came into being.³

No one is, I suppose, ignorant of the fact that the affection for which we say love is responsible occurs in souls which desire to be closely connected with beauty of some kind and that this desire is found in one form in self-controlled people who have been made to have an affinity with beauty itself, but in another form which seeks to find its consummation in the performance of some base act. Where each takes its rise is a proper topic to pursue here in a philosophical way.

If one were to posit as its origin the desire for beauty itself which is already present in human souls, their recognition of it, kinship with it, and non-rational grasp of their affinity for it, one would, I think, hit on the truth about its cause. For what is ugly is opposed both to nature and to god. For nature produces by looking towards beauty and it looks towards what is defined, which is ‘in the column of the good’.⁴ But the indefinite is base and in the other column. Nature comes into being from the intelligible world, from the Good and, clearly, from Beauty. If anyone is in love with and akin to anything, he is drawn also to its images.

But if anyone does away with this cause, he will be unable to say what manner the affection is and what its causes, even in the case of those who

¹ See Pl., Phdr. 252B2, 252C1.
³ See Pl., Symp. 203B C.
⁴ See Pythagoras apud Ar., EN 1.4.1096b6; Meta. 1.5.986a22 26.
love in the sexual sense. For these, too, want to ‘beget in beauty’, since it would be absurd for nature that wants to generate beautiful things to want to beget ‘in ugliness’. Indeed, for those moved to generate in this world, it is enough to have what is beautiful in this world, a beauty present in images and bodies, since the archetype which is the cause for them loving even what is in this world is not present to them. And if they come to a recollection of the archetype from the beauty of this world, the latter continues to be admired as an image, but if they do not recollect because of their ignorance of what is happening to them, they imagine that the beauty here is true beauty.

And for those who are self-controlled, the affinity with what is beautiful here is not a moral error whereas a collapse into involvement with sex is a moral error. And the person whose love of beauty is pure, will love beauty alone whether he has recalled the archetype or not, while the man whose love is mixed with another desire, that of ‘being immortal as far as is possible for a mortal’ seeks what is beautiful in the ‘forever’ and everlasting, and as he proceeds according to nature, he sows and generates in beauty, the sowing being to perpetuate the species; it is done in beauty because of the kinship of beauty and eternity. For eternity is certainly akin to beauty and the eternal nature is the first to be beautiful and all that proceeds from it is beautiful. And so that kind of love which does not want to generate anything is more self-sufficient in beauty, whereas the kind that desires to produce something beautiful wants to produce it because of a need and is not self-sufficient. And if indeed it should produce this, it thinks it is self-sufficient so long as the production takes place in beauty.

But those who want to generate illicitly and contrary to nature, take their start on the natural course, but as they begin to veer off-course, lie there in collapse as though they had slipped off the proper road, without understanding where love has led them or their desire for generation or the right use of beauty’s image or what beauty is in itself.

But, to return to the point, those who love beautiful bodies, but not for sexual reasons, love them because they are beautiful and there are also those who have the love – which is called mixed – for women in order to perpetuate the race, but if it is love for other than women they are making a mistake. The first group are better, but both the first and

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11 I.e., Intellect. Cf. 1.6.9.34. 42.
12 Reading καλὸν [καὶ] <μὴ> διά with HS following Ficino’s original emendation.
13 See Pl., Lg. 837B4. 6. This love is mixed because it can have both sensual and intellectual elements.
the second are self-controlled. But while the latter reverence earthly beauty, too, and find it sufficient, the former reverence beauty in the other realm insofar as they have recalled it and yet do not disdain beauty here, given that it can be a fulfilment of beauty there and its playful expression. These, then, are concerned with beauty without ugliness, but there are those others who fall into ugliness even though it is on account of beauty. For the desire for the Good often involves the fall into evil. These then are what we mean by the affections of the soul.

§3.5.2. But we must especially devote some philosophical reflection to the love which not only the rest of humankind propose as a god, but also the theologians and Plato who calls him ‘Love the son of Aphrodite’ and says that his task is to be the ‘guardian of handsome boys’ and to move souls towards beauty in the intelligible world or to increase the impulse, already present in us, to that other world.

Moreover, we should also certainly bring into consideration what was said in Symposium where Plato says that Love was not born as the son of Aphrodite, but ‘from Poverty and Plenty during the birthday party of Aphrodite’. It looks as if our discourse will require us to say something about Aphrodite, too, as to whether Love was born from her or at the same time as her.

First, then, who is Aphrodite? Next, how was Love born, from her or at the same time as her or could it happen in some way that he was born at the same time from her and at the same time as her? We say that Aphrodite is actually double; the one who is heavenly we say is the daughter of Heaven and the other born of Zeus and Dione, who has to do with marriages in this world as their overseer. The former is ‘motherless’ and transcends marriages because there are no marriages in heaven. The heavenly Aphrodite, who is said to be the child of Kronos, who is Intellect, must be a most divine soul born pure directly from him who is pure and remaining above, since she does not come into this world nor does she want to nor is she able to; it is not in her nature to come down to this world because she is a separate real existent and a Substance and has no share in matter. This is the reason why they say allegorically that she is ‘motherless’. One would certainly be right to call her a god rather than a daemon since she is unmixed and remains pure by herself. For what is born directly from Intellect is also itself pure inasmuch as it is in itself strong due to its proximity to Intellect, and

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16 See Pl., Symp. 203C3 5.

17 The first alternative is that of Phaedrus; the second, that of Symposium.

18 The word αἰνιττεῖσθαι (often rendered ‘to riddle’, ‘to speak enigmatically’) seems to be rendered best in the above manner.
inasmuch as her desire and foundational state are directed towards her producer who is strong enough to maintain her on high. Hence, Soul, which is dependent on Intellect, would be much more likely not to fall away than the sun which is able to maintain the light it sheds around it, light which comes forth but is dependent on it.

Actually, in pursuit of Kronos, then, or, if you prefer, Heaven, the father of Kronos, she turns her activity towards him, establishes an affinity to him, falls in love and brings forth Love. And together with Love she looks towards Kronos. And her activity has fashioned a real existent, that is, a Substance. And both of them look to the intelligible world. And the mother who gave him birth and beautiful Love who has come into being as a real existent that is always ranged towards another beauty, having its existence in this other beauty, in a sort of mid position between the one longing and the one longed for; he is the eye of the one longing and by means of its eye provides the lover with the sight of what is longed for, while Love himself runs ahead and is filled with the vision before providing the lover with the power of seeing through the organ of visual perception. He is ahead, not like a person seeing by fixing his gaze on the object of his longing, but by himself plucking the fruit of the vision of beauty while it runs past him.

§3.5.3. It is not appropriate to disbelieve that Love is a real existent, that is, a Substance produced from a Substance, less than the producer, but still a Substance. For that higher Soul, too, was a Substance that came to be from the activity and got its life from that which was prior to it, that is, from the Substance that consists of Beings both because it looked towards that which was primary Being and looked at it with great intensity. And this was its first object of sight and it looked at it as to its own good and rejoiced in the sight; and the sight was the sort of thing to ensure that which sees makes its gaze not into an attendant activity but so as to produce, by means of pleasure and reaching out to it and intensity of gaze, something from it that is worthy of it and of the sight. And so from that which is intently active about what is seen and from a kind of out-flowing from the thing seen, the eye was filled, just as physical seeing is found along with the image [of the thing seen], and Love came into being.

19 On the identity of Kronos with Intellect cf. 5.1.4.8 10. So, his offspring Aphrodite is Soul. Cf. 5.8.13.15 16; 6.9.9.31. But cf. 5.1.7.30 37; 5.8.12.3 13.2 where Zeus, son of Kronos, is identified with Soul.

20 Restoring the words καὶ ζῶσα which are bracketed in HS. The life that is Soul is a λόγος of the life of Intellect and the 'external' activity of it. Cf. 5.3.5.37 39; 6.7.13. 37 42; 49.

21 The hierarchy is, then, Intellect, Soul, and Love.
He perhaps also acquires his name from this process because he has his real existence from seeing, since the affection of love probably gets its name from him, if indeed it is the case that Substance is prior to non-Substance – yet the actual affection is called ‘loving’ – and if indeed we say ‘love for this person possesses him’, but one would not use the word ‘love’ [as an affection] in an unqualified way. Now the Love of the higher soul would indeed be of the kind described; he would himself see above inasmuch as he is an attendant of the goddess and was born from and along with her and finds satisfaction in contemplating the gods. And since we say that that soul which casts light over heaven in a primary way is separate, we will also make her Love separate, however much we call the soul heavenly. For even if we say the best in us is in us, we nevertheless make it separate, provided it is found only where the pure soul is.

And since there had also to be a soul for the universe, the other Love had to be with this soul from the beginning as its eye, born, too, through desire. And this Aphrodite who belongs to the universe and is not only soul nor simply soul gave birth to the Love who is in this world and who from the start concerned himself with marriages and to the degree to which he is personally linked to the desire for what is above, moves the souls of the young and turns back the soul to which he is attached insofar as it is itself naturally disposed to recall the things above. For every soul desires the Good, both the mixed soul and the soul of the individual, since it follows on from and is derived from the higher soul.

§3.5.4. Does each individual soul then, too, possess a Love like this, a substance, that is, a real existent?

In fact, if it does not, why will universal Soul and the soul of the universe have a Love which has a real existence, but our individual souls and the souls, too, in all other living beings do not?

And is this Love the daemon which they say accompanies each of us, our personal Love? If it is, this would also be the daemon who imbues us with the natural appetites that belong to each soul, as each soul strives to attain what is proportionate to its nature and creates the Love that is proportionate to its worth and its substantiality. We should certainly

22 ἔρως (‘love’) derived from ὄρας (‘seeing’).  
23 See Aeschylus, Supplices 521.  
24 Because its light is incorporeal. The higher soul, both for individuals and the cosmos, is the intellectual soul. The lower soul for individuals is that which animates the body and for the cosmos, it is nature.  
25 I.e., mixed with corporeality.  
26 The conjectured personification of love in each individual indicates that a capital ‘L’ should be used.  
27 I.e., the hypostasis Soul, here distinguished from the soul of the cosmos or universe. Elsewhere, the distinction is not so clear.
grant that the universal Soul has a universal love and that individual souls each have their own Love. And to the extent that each soul relates to the universal Soul by not being cut off, but embraced by it, so that all souls are one, so, too, each Love will relate to the universal Love. Furthermore, the individual Love shares its being with the individual soul, that great Love with the universal Soul and the Love in the universe with the universe everywhere in it. And this one Love becomes and is multiple, appearing everywhere in the universe where it wants, taking on shapes in its parts and making appearances at will.²⁸

And we must think that there are many Aphrodites, too, in the universe, becoming daemons in it along with Love, all flowing from a universal Aphrodite, many partial Aphrodites depending on the universal Aphrodite along with their individual Loves, if indeed soul is the mother of Love, and that Aphrodite is soul and Love the activity of soul which strives for the Good. So, this individual Love leads each soul to the nature of the Good; the Love of the higher soul would be a god who always binds the soul to the Good, while that of the mixed soul would be a daemon.

§3.5.5. But what is the nature of this daemon and of daemons in general, a subject also dealt with by Plato in Symposion, both of other daemons and that of Love himself, when he recounts how he was born from Poverty and Plenty, son of Cunning, at the birthday celebrations of Aphrodite?²⁹ To suppose that Love is meant by Plato to indicate this [sensible] cosmos,³⁰ rather than that the Love that grows up in the universe is just a part of it, presents many contradictions of interpretation, since the world is said by him to be a ‘happy god’ and ‘self-sufficient’³¹ whereas the Love of which we are speaking is agreed by him to be neither a god nor self-sufficient, but for ever wanting.³²

Next, if indeed the cosmos consists of soul and body and for Plato, and Aphrodite is the soul of the cosmos, Aphrodite must be the most important part of Love, or, if Love’s soul is the cosmos, just as a human being’s soul is a human being,³³ Love will be identical with Aphrodite.

Next, why will this Love, which is a daemon, be the universe, whereas the other daemons – for it is clear that they are from the identical Substance – will not themselves be the cosmos, too? And the cosmos will be simply a combination of daemons. But how could Love, who is described as being the ‘guardian of handsome boys’,³⁴ be the cosmos?

³⁰ See, e.g., Plutarch, On Isis and Osiris 374c e. ³¹ See Pl., Tim. 34B8; 33D2.
³² See Pl., Symp. 202D. ³³ Cf. 4.7.2. See Pl. [?], Alc. 1 130C3; Lg. 959A7.
³⁴ See Pl., Phdr. 265C2 3.
And how would Plato’s description of him as ‘bedless’, ‘unshod’, and ‘homeless’ fit except in a slipshod and discordant way?

§ 3.5.6. What indeed must we say about Love and his fabled birth? It is certainly clear that we must grasp who Poverty is and who is Plenty, and how these parents fit in with him. It is also clear that we must fit these in with the other daemons, too, if indeed daemons share a single nature or substantiality as daemons, unless they are going to possess just a common name. So, we must grasp how we manage to distinguish gods from daemons. Even if we also often call daemons gods, on those occasions, at any rate, when we do speak of them as being of different kinds, we actually speak and think of the race of gods as incapable of being affected, while we assign affections to daemons, adding that they are eternal, next in order after the gods but already inclining towards us, between gods and our race.

Moreover, how did these daemons not remain incapable of being affected, and how did they descend in their nature towards what is inferior? Indeed, we must also enquire whether there is not even a single daemon in the intelligible world and there are daemons only in the sensible world and god is limited to the intelligible world or ‘there are gods in the sensible world, too’ and the universe is a ‘third god’ as the saying goes and beings as far down as the moon are each of them a god. But it is better to call nothing in the intelligible world a daemon; rather, if there is there a daemon in itself, this, too, is a god. And equally in the sensible world, the visible gods down to the moon are secondary, after and related to those higher intelligible gods, dependent on them like the ray of light around each star.

But what are the daemons? Are they just the trace of each soul that comes to be in the cosmos? But why of only the soul in the cosmos? We claimed that it is because the pure soul generates a god and the god belonging to this soul is Love.

First, then, why are not all daemons Loves? Next, how is it that these, too, are not purified of matter?

In fact, those are Loves which are generated from soul which desires the Good and Beauty and the souls in this world all generate this daemon. But these other daemons come also from the soul of the

35 See Pl., Symp. 203D1 2.
36 On gods as not susceptible to being affected, cf. 1.2.6.26; 3.6.4.34 35. On daemons as susceptible, cf. 4.4.43.12 16.
37 See Heraclitus, fr. 22 A 9 DK (= Ar., PA 1.5. 645α1). 11.
38 See Numenius, fr. 21 (= Proclus, In Tim.1.304.1).
39 The word is αὐτόδοξης, that is, a paradigm of the daemonic nature.
40 Cf. 3.3.5.4.24.
universe, although they are generated by different powers which fulfil and share in administering each thing for the universe in accordance with its needs. For the soul of the universe had to make sufficient provision for it by generating the powers of daemons, powers that are also beneficial to the universe, which belongs to it.

But how and in what kind of matter do they participate? Certainly, not in corporeal matter; otherwise, they will be sensible living beings. For even if they acquired airy or fiery bodies, they would, however, have had at least to be different beforehand in their nature so as to share in body at all. For what is pure does not immediately mingle completely with body. And yet many people think that the substantiality of a daemon as daemon is accompanied by a body of some kind, either airy or fiery.

But why does one kind of being mingle with body, another not, unless there is some cause for its being mingled? What, then, is the cause? One must suppose the existence of intelligible matter in order that what shares in that can come by means of it into the matter which belongs to bodies.

§ 3.5.7. For this reason, too, Plato says that at the birth of Love ‘Plenty was drunk with nectar as wine did not yet exist’, meaning that Love came into being before the sensible world and Poverty shared in the nature of the intelligible world, not in an image of the intelligible or in a reflection of it, but by being there and mingling with it and giving birth to the real existent which is Love made of form and indefiniteness; this the soul had before it encountered the Good, yet could divine something of it present in the guise of an indefinite and limitless semblance.

And so an expressed principle which came to be in what was not an expressed principle but an undefined desire and a dim reality rendered what came to be neither perfect nor sufficient but defective inasmuch as it came into being from an indefinite desire and a [self-]sufficient expressed principle. And this Love is an expressed principle which is not pure inasmuch as it has in itself a desire that is indefinite, non-rational, and unlimited. For it will not be fulfilled as long as it has within it the nature of indefiniteness. And it depends on soul since it came into being from soul as its principle, a mixture of an expressed principle which did not remain in itself but was mixed with indefiniteness; however, it was not the expressed principle itself that was mixed with indefiniteness but what came forth from it was what was mixed with indefiniteness.

43 The word is ἵκανος (‘sufficient’), here indicating the contrast with that which is indefinite in itself.
And Love is like a ‘sting’\(^4^4\) resourceless by his very nature. For this reason, even when he attains his goal, he is once more resourceless. He cannot be fulfilled since what is a mixture cannot be fulfilled. For only that can be fulfilled which is fulfilled in its own nature. But what desires because of a deficiency that is inherent, even if for the moment fulfilled does not retain it. So, then, his powerlessness\(^4^5\) is due to his ‘deficiency’,\(^4^6\) his resourcefulness to the expressed principle in his nature.

One should consider the entire genus of daemons to be like this and to come from such parents. For each is resourceful with regard to what he is set over, is desirous of it, and is akin in this way also to Love and is not itself full but desires one of the individual things which he regards as good. Hence, we must suppose, too, that the good persons in the sensible world focus their love on what is unqualifiedly and really good and not on any particular love, but that those who are placed under other daemons are placed under this or that daemon and, letting go as inoperative for them the daemon they naturally had, become active under the guidance of the other daemon which they chose as being consonant with that part of their soul which was active in them. But those who desire evil things have put in chains all the loves in them by the desires that have grown in them just as they have also enchained the right reason which is innate in them by the evil beliefs which have supervened on them.

The loves, then, which are natural and in accordance with nature are fine. And those of a lesser soul are less, proportionate to their worth and power, others are greater, but all possess substantiality. But the loves of those who have fallen into ways contrary to nature are all pathological states\(^4^7\) and certainly not substances or real existents, as they are no longer something generated from soul but have come into being with the vice of a soul which forthwith produces things that are of the same kind as those in the dispositions and habits in it.

For, in general, true goods are likely to be substances when the soul acts according to nature within the limits of what is defined, but the things that are other than true goods the soul does not seem to produce from itself; rather, they seem to be nothing other than pathological states, just like false thoughts which have no substantiality to support them as really true thoughts do which are eternal and defined and possess thinking, the intelligible, and existence together, not only in what is unqualifiedly Intellect, but also in each individual intellect when

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\(^{4^4}\) See Pl., *Phdr.*, 240D1.  
\(^{4^5}\) Reading ἀμηχανον with Kirchhoff and HS\(^4\).  
\(^{4^6}\) See Pl., *Symp.*, 203D3.  
\(^{4^7}\) The word is πάθη having here a clearly pejorative connotation.
it concerns itself with what is really intelligible. This is so, supposing that the individual intellect in each of us is also both intellection and intelligible in a pure state – even if we ourselves are not this either by being one with it or unqualifiedly so. This is also the source of our love for what is simple; for our acts of intellection are from there, too. And if they are of some particular thing, it is accidental, in the same way as if you think of the particular triangle as having angles totalling one hundred and eighty degrees, it is so insofar as it is simply a triangle.\(^{48}\)

§ 3.5.8. But who is this Zeus into whose ‘garden’, he says, ‘Plenty entered’\(^{49}\) and what is this garden? For Aphrodite was Soul for us and Plenty was said to be the expressed principle of all things.\(^{50}\) But what should we make of these, Zeus and his garden? For we shouldn’t take Zeus as Soul since we have already taken Aphrodite as this. Indeed, in this case, too, we should understand Zeus from Plato, from \textit{Phaedrus}, when he says explicitly that this god is ‘a great leader’\(^{51}\) but elsewhere he says, I think, that he is ‘third’.\(^{52}\) But more clearly in \textit{Philebus} when he says that ‘in Zeus there is a royal soul and a royal intellect’.\(^{53}\)

If, then, Zeus is a great intellect and soul and is ranged among the causes, and we must rank him as more powerful both for other reasons and because he is described as a cause\(^{54}\) but one that is also ‘royal’ and ‘leading’, he will be at the level of Intellect, while Aphrodite, since she belongs to him, is from him and with him, will be placed at the level of Soul, having acquired the name of Aphrodite because of her beauty, splendour, innocence, and delicacy of soul. For if we rank the male gods at the level of Intellect and say that the female gods are at the level of their souls, since a soul accompanies each intellect, in this way, too, Aphrodite would be the soul of Zeus, an interpretation witnessed by priests and theologians, who identify Hera and Aphrodite and assign the star of Aphrodite in the heavens to Hera.\(^{55}\)

§ 3.5.9. Plenty, then, since he is the expressed principle of what is in the intelligible and in Intellect and is more diffused and, in a way, unfolded than they are, could be said to be around Soul and in Soul. For what is in Intellect is contracted and does not take into itself anything from outside, whereas Plenty when drunk had his fulfilment from outside.\(^{56}\) But what could it be that filled him in the intelligible world with nectar other than an expressed principle as it fell from a higher to a lower principle?

\(^{48}\) See Ar., \textit{Meta.} 5.30.1025a32. \(^{49}\) See Pl., \textit{Sypth.} 203B5\, 6.  
\(^{50}\) Cf. supra 5.12; 7.9. \(^{51}\) See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 246E4. \(^{52}\) See Pl. [?], \textit{2nd Ep.} 312E4.  
\(^{53}\) See Pl., \textit{Phil.} 30D1\, 2. \(^{54}\) See Pl., \textit{Phil.} 30D3.  
\(^{55}\) See Ar. [?], \textit{De mun.} 2.392a28. Thus, Zeus would be the intellect of the soul of the cosmos or simply Intellect. Cf. 5.9.13.15\, 25.  
\(^{56}\) I.e., Plenty represents discursive intellect outside of which are the intelligibles.
It is in the Soul, then, that this expressed principle takes its place as it comes from Intellect, flowing into his garden at the time when Aphrodite is said to be born.

And every garden is a glorious display and ornamental expression of wealth, but the domains of Zeus are brilliant with reason and his ornaments are the glories that enter into the Soul from Intellect itself. What could the garden of Zeus really be except the glorious images of his person? And what could his glories and adornments be other than the expressed principles which flow from him? The expressed principles taken together are identical with Plenty, his abundance and wealth of beautiful things already revealed.

And this is what is meant by being drunk with nectar. For what is nectar for the gods other than that which the divine secures. And what is beneath Intellect [i.e., Soul] secures reason for itself, but Intellect possesses itself in satiety and is not drunk through its possession, for it does not have anything imported from outside. But an expressed principle, because it is a product of Intellect and a real existent coming after Intellect and no longer belonging to itself, but vested in another, is said to lie in the garden of Zeus and to be lying there at precisely the moment when Aphrodite is described as coming into existence among Beings.

But myths, if indeed they are going to be myths, must separate temporally their narrative and divide from each other many Beings which exist together, but are distinct from each other by rank or powers, in the same way that rational accounts, too, produce generations for the ungenerated, that is, separating out what is together. And when they have instructed as best they can, they allow someone who has understood them at once to put them together again.

The reassembly of our myth is as follows. Soul, which is with Intellect and takes its real existence from Intellect and is then filled with expressed principles and, being already beautiful, is adorned with beautiful things and filled with abundance, so that it is possible to see in it many glorious things and images of all kinds of beautiful things, is in the totality of these aspects to be understood as Aphrodite. And all the expressed principles in Soul are abundance and Plenty, just as the nectar above flows from on high. And the glories in Soul, since they are set in the life [of soul], are said to be the ‘garden of Zeus’, and Plenty is said to ‘fall asleep’ there ‘weighed down’ by the things with which he has been filled. And when life has appeared and is forever among the Beings, the gods are described as ‘celebrating a feast’, which signifies that they are in a state of great happiness.

Reading αὐτοῦ with HS.  
57See Pl., Symp. 203B5 7.  
58I.e., Soul/Aphrodite.  
60303
And so Love has of necessity always existed as a result of Soul’s desire to attain what is superior and good, and he was always there ever since Soul, too, existed. And he is a mixed thing sharing in deficiency, in that he wants to be filled, but not without a share in abundance insofar as he seeks what is missing from what he has. For that which is completely devoid of good would actually never search for the Good.\(^6\)

And this is why he is said to be born from Plenty and Poverty in that deficiency and desire and the memory of the expressed principles come together and generate in soul the activity directed towards the Good and this activity is love. And his mother is Poverty because desire always belongs to what is in need. And Poverty is matter because matter is in need in every respect and the indefinite aspect of the desire for the Good – for there is neither form nor expressed principle in that which desires this – makes what desires even more akin to matter insofar as it desires. And what is turned towards itself\(^6\) is form alone remaining in itself. But if it desires to receive as well, it makes what is going to receive into matter for what comes to it. And so then Love is a material entity and he is a daemon born from soul insofar as soul lacks the Good but desires it.

\(^{61}\) Cf. 1.8.4.22. \(^{62}\) Reading πρὸς αὐτό.
3.6 (26)

On the Impassibility of Things without Bodies

**Introduction**

This treatise attempts both to explain how the soul, as an incorporeal reality, is unaffected by the physical while at the same time not excluding the notion that it can undergo change in the moral and spiritual sense. The second part of the treatise introduces a completely different kind of impassibility, that of matter which is also incorporeal but in a way quite different from soul.

**Summary**

§1. How can we explain vice if the higher part of the soul is unchangeable?

§2. The theory of harmony does not provide an explanation. Virtue and vice are due to the exercise or failure to exercise reason.

§3. The physical manifestations of emotions are caused by the soul which remains unmoved.

§4. The case of the lower soul is similar. Emotions, etc. are not in the lower soul. The ‘affective’ faculty of soul is a kind of form but it is the matter in which the soul is present which is subject to affection, e.g. the faculty of growth does not itself grow. It is an activity rather than a movement.

§5. ‘Purification’ is turning away from images to what is above.

§6. Is matter subject to affections? The nature of true being. 

The more something becomes body the more it is subject to affections.

§7. Matter is incorporeal but unlike Intellect and Soul is unlimitedness and is true non-being. It remains unaffected.

§8. Affections destroy and replace each other, but matter is not destroyed.
§9. Different meanings of being present to or in, or being affected by something. Affection occurs to opposites by their opposites. The simple cannot be subject to affections.

§10. Matter is in itself unalterable.

§11. Matter remains unaffected, evil, and ugly even when form, goodness, and beauty are present to it.

§12. Plato teaches that matter is unaffected.

§13. Interpretation of various Platonic phrases including ‘matter flees’ and matter is ‘receptacle and nurse’. Forms in matter are like the images in an invisible mirror.

§14. Matter is a prerequisite for a visible universe. In reflecting form and being it ‘shares’ in it in a way, but without being in any way united with it, like reflections fleeting over a surface.

§15. Matter does not mix with what appears ‘in’ it, nor do they mix with it, like the things which are illuminated by the sun or the soul when entertaining mental images.

§16. Even size is projected onto it from outside and does not really belong to it.

§17. Matter is not magnitude, which is a form, but takes on only the appearance of size.

§18. Matter just because it is not in itself affected by form can receive and reflect all forms.

§19. Matter, like a mother, is only a passive receptacle of form. It is like the eunuchs of Cybele in its impotence, whereas the forms are generative like Hermes.
§3.6.1. Let us say that acts of sense-perception are not affections but rather activities and judgements about the states resulting from affections.¹ If affections involve something else, for example, a qualified body, whereas judgement involves the soul, since judgement is not an affection – for in that case there would have to be a further judgement and an infinite regress – we are still left with the further problem of whether judgement as judgement possesses nothing of the thing being judged.

In fact, if it has received an impression, it has been affected. But it is still possible to say regarding what are called impressions² that their operation is very different from what has been supposed, since it is similar to what is also found in instances of thinking which are also activities which can know without experiencing any affection.

In general, our theory and intent is not to submit the soul to changes and alterations like the warming and cooling of bodies. And it is the so-called passive element of it that we must look at and investigate whether we are to grant that this, too, is unchangeable or agree that this alone may experience affections.

But we must examine this later and for the moment look at the problems relating to the higher parts of the soul. For how can the part of soul above that which experiences affections and the part above sense-perception and in general any part of soul, be unchangeable when vice, false beliefs, and ignorance occur in connection with the soul? In addition, acts of appropriation and alienation occur in the soul when it feels pleasure and pain, when it is angry, jealous, acquisitive, desirous,³ and in general when it is not at all still but moves and changes in response to each thing that impinges on it.⁴

¹ See Pl., Tht. 186B6 9, C2 3; Ar., DA 2.6.418a14 16.
² See Pl., Tht. 191C8 E1; Tim. 71A2 B5; SVF 1.141 (= Eusebius, Pr. ev. 15.20.2), 484 (= Sext. Emp., M. 7.228).
³ See Ar., DA 1.4.408b2. ⁴ See Pl., Tim. 43B5 C5, 65E7 66A1.
But if the soul is a body and has magnitude, it is not easy, indeed rather altogether impossible, to demonstrate that it is unaffected and unchangeable with respect to any of the things which are said to take place in it. If, however, it is a substance without magnitude and must also have the quality of indestructibility, we must be careful to avoid giving it the sort of affections we have mentioned, in case we inadvertently admit that it is destructible.

Moreover, if the substantiality of soul is actually a number or an expressed principle as we say it is, how could an affection occur in a number or an expressed principle? But we must rather consider that non-rational expressed principles and unaffecting affections supervene on the soul and that these, which are transferred from bodies and in a way analogous to the corporeal, must each be understood as contraries and that the soul possesses them without possessing and is affected without being affected. And we must look carefully in what way such things occur.

§3.6.2. First, concerning vice and virtue, we must say what exactly happens when vice is said to be present in the soul. For we do talk about having to ‘remove’ evil, as though there were some evil present in the soul, and ‘put in’ virtue, order it, and instil beauty in place of the ugliness that was previously present.

When we say, then, that ‘virtue’ is a ‘harmony’ and ‘vice a discord’, would we be expressing an idea that appealed to the ancients and would this statement add something significant to the object of our search? For if virtue is to be described as the parts of the soul having been brought naturally into harmony with each other and vice when they have not been brought into harmony, nothing would be imported from outside or from something else, but each would enter into a harmonious arrangement as it is and would not so enter in the case of discord, remaining just as it is; this would be exactly like the members of a chorus who dance and sing with each other, even if they are not all singing the identical part, one singing solo when the others are not singing and [when all are singing together] each one singing in his own

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5 See SVF 1.142 (= Iamblichus, De an. apud Stob., Ed. 1.49.33), 518 (= Nemesius, De nat. hom. 2.32), 2.780 (= Galen, Def. med. 19.355), 790 (= Nemesius, De nat. hom. 2.46.8).
6 Cf. 6.5.9.13 14 and 6.6.16 where Xenocrates (= fr. 60) is said to hold this and Plato is said to hold it, too, based presumably on the testimony of Xenocrates. Also, 4.3.8.22 and 5.1.5.9. See Pl., Tim. 36E6 37A1, where the harmony of the soul of the cosmos is due to its construction along mathematical lines.
7 The words λόγους ἀλόγους (‘non rational expressed principles’) and ἀπαθῆ πάθη (‘unaf ecting affections’) emphasize the paradoxical nature of the transfer of the intelligible structure of the non cognitive, material world to cognitive agents, that is, to souls.
8 Cf. 1.2.2.13 20; 1.8.4.8 32. See Pl., Phd. 93E8 9.
9 See Pl., Phd. 93C3 8, E8 9; Rep. 430A3 4.
way. For not only must they sing together, but each one must also sing with the others while at the same time singing his part with his own musical skill. And so, too, in the case of the soul there is harmony when each part plays its own role. Now prior to this harmony, there must actually be another virtue belonging to each part and prior to the discord of parts with each other, another vice belonging to each part. What is it that has to be present to make a part evil?

In fact, it is vice. And to make it good?

In fact, it is virtue.

In saying that foolishness$^{10}$ is, perhaps, the vice of the faculty of calculative reasoning, one would also, perhaps, say that foolishness in the negative sense is not the presence of something. But whenever false beliefs, too, are in the soul, things which are certainly a cause of vice, surely one is going to say that they have come to be in the soul and that for this very reason this faculty of the soul has become different. And is not the faculty of spiritedness in one state when it is cowardly and in another when brave? And is not the faculty of appetite also in one state when it is licentious and in another when self-controlled?$^{11}$

In fact, [one might conclude] they have been affected.

In fact, whenever each faculty is in a virtuous condition, we will say that it is acting in accordance with its substantiality insofar as each faculty is attentive to reason; and the faculty of calculative reasoning receives reason from Intellect and the other faculties from the faculty of calculative reasoning. Now, listening to reason is like seeing, not like a shape that is imparted, but the actual seeing when it sees. For just as sight, while being both potential and actual, remains identical in its substantiality, and its activity is not an alteration, but at the same time approaches what it has and exists in a state of knowing and has got to know without being affected,$^{13}$ so, too, the faculty of calculative reasoning behaves in the same way towards Intellect and sees it and this is its power of thinking, without any seal-impression$^{14}$ in it; rather, it has what it saw and in another sense does not have it. It has it because it knows it and it does not have it because there is not anything stored up in it from the act of seeing, like a shape in wax.

And it must remember them not because memories are described as being of things that are stored away in us$^{15}$ but because the soul puts into action its power [of memory] in such a way that it has what it does not have.

$^{10}$ The word, here ἄνοιαν, must have the sense conveyed by the phrase ‘not using one’s head’.

$^{11}$ Cf. infra 37 41, 54 63; 2.9.2.4 10; 4.3.28.4 6; 6.1.12.5 8 on tripartition of the soul.

$^{12}$ See Pl., Tim. 70A2 7.  

$^{13}$ Cf. 4.4.19.1ff., 26 27.

$^{14}$ The term σφηγίς is Stoic. See SVF 2.56 (= Sext. Emp., M. 7.227).

$^{15}$ The Stoic view. See SVF 2.847 (= Plutarch, De comm. not. 1085b).
Well, isn’t the soul different before it remembers like this and afterwards, when it remembers? Do you want to call it ‘different’? But, then, it isn’t altered, unless one were to call the transition from potentiality to actuality an alteration. But nothing is added to it; rather, it just does exactly what it is by nature. For, in general, the activities of immaterial things occur without the immaterial things being subject to alteration; otherwise, they would be destroyed. Quite the opposite is the case: they remain, but it is the activity of things with body that are affected. By contrast, if something incorporeal is affected, it does not have anything in which to remain. Just as in sight when seeing is active, the eye is what is affected, so beliefs are like acts of seeing.

But how is the faculty of spiritedness cowardly? And how is it brave? In fact, it is cowardly either by not looking towards reason or by looking towards reason when it is in a slack state or by some deficiency of the organs, for example, by the loss or physical impairment of the corporeal equipment, or because its activity is prevented or not stirred when apparently provoked. And it is brave, if the opposite occurs. In these situations, there is no alteration or affection. And the faculty of appetite when acting on its own produces what we call licentiousness. For it is doing everything on its own and the other parts, whose task it would be, if present, to control and give it instructions, are not present. And if it could see them it would be different, not doing everything, but perhaps also taking some time off by looking at the other parts as best it could. But perhaps in most cases what is termed the vice of this part of the soul is a bad state of the body and virtue the opposite, so that in neither case is there any addition to the soul.

§ 3.6.3. And what about acts of appropriation and alienation? And how can it be that feelings of pain and anger, pleasures, appetites and fears are not changes and affections found as motions within the soul?

We must certainly make a distinction amongst these, too, as follows. To deny that alterations and intense perceptions of them occur in the soul is the sign of a person contradicting what is clearly the case. But while accepting this, we must search for what it is that undergoes change. For when ascribing these things to soul, we run the risk of making an assumption similar to that of saying that the soul blushes or becomes pale again, without realizing that these affections are ones that occur through the agency of soul but arise in connection with the other structure [the body].

See Ar., DA 417b5 11. 17 See Pl., Tim. 86E1 87A7.
18 Cf. 1.1.1 2. See Pl., Rep. 429C D, 430A B; Phd. 83B5 E4; Tim. 42A3 B2, 69C5 D6; Ar., DA 1.4.408b2.
19 Cf. 4.4.18.19 28. See Ar., DA 1.4.408a35 b18.
Now shame is in the soul when a belief about something base occurs to it, but the body, which the soul in a way possesses – not to be carried astray by words – and which is under the control of soul and not identical with the inanimate, is changed in terms of the blood which is easily moved.

And what we call fear has its origin in the soul but the paleness comes from the blood withdrawing into the interior of the body.

And the suffusion of pleasure, which also reaches to sense-perception, takes place in the body, while that aspect of it that involves the soul is no longer an affection. The same is the case with pain. Appetite, too, when it remains in the soul which is the source of our desiring, goes unnoticed, but when it comes out from the soul, sense-perception cognizes it. For whenever we say that the soul is moved in its appetites, acts of calculative reasoning, and beliefs, we don’t mean that it does these things by being shaken; rather, we mean that these motions arise from it. And so when we say that its life is motion, we do not mean that it is altered; rather, the natural activity of each part is life which does not stand outside itself.

The following is an adequate summary. If we agree that the activities, lives, and desires are not alterations and memories are not seal-impressions stamped on the soul or imaginative representations like imprints in wax, we must agree that everywhere in the case of all so-called affections and motions, the soul remains the same in substrate and substantiality and that virtue and vice do not occur as do black and white in a body or like warm and cold, but in the way we have described, in both cases [soul and body] being completely opposite in every respect.

§ 3.6.4. We must now enquire about that faculty of soul that is said to be subject to affections. Now this issue has in a way already been mentioned in what was said about all the affections involving the faculties of spiritedness and of appetite, and how each of them arises. All the same, we have to say a little more about it and begin by asking what sort of thing is meant by the faculty of the soul subject to affections.

It is indeed generally said to be the faculty where affections appear to come to exist. And these are the affections which have pleasure and pain

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20 Reading ἀλλοιοῦμεν with Theiler, Fleet, Kalligas, and Laurent.
21 See SVF 1.484 (= Sext. Emp., M. 7.228); 2.53 (= D.L., 7.46), 65 (= Sext. Emp., M. 7.242), 458 (= Philo, Leg. alleg. 2.22).
22 Plotinus here appears to understand the faculty of affection as do the Stoics, that is, as belonging to the governing, rational part of the soul. See SVF 3.459 (= Plutarch, De vir. mor. 441c).
23 Cf. supra 2.54 67.
as consequences. Some affections come to exist as a result of beliefs, as when someone who thinks that he is going to die feels fear or someone who thinks something good is going to happen to him feels pleasure; here, the belief is in one thing, the affection that is brought into motion is in another. Other affections themselves take the lead and without our intention put belief in the faculty of the soul able to form beliefs. Now it has already been said that belief actually leaves unmoved the faculty of soul which has beliefs whereas the fear which comes from the belief at a higher level derives from the belief a sort of comprehension which it gives to the faculty of the soul which is said to be afraid.

What is it that this fear produces? They say it produces disturbance and shock at the expected evil. And it should be clear to anyone that the semblance is in the soul, both the first one which we actually call belief and the one following from these which is no longer a belief; rather, it is a sort of unclear belief and uncritical semblance of what is below like the activity which is present in what is called nature by which it makes each thing, as they say, without a semblance. And what ensues from this is now sensible, the disturbance which occurs in the body and the trembling and shaking of the body, paleness, and inability to speak. For these are indeed not in the psychical ‘part’ [under discussion].

In fact, in that case we would have to say that it [the psychical part] is corporeal, and if it was what experienced these things, these affections would not even have reached the body if what was sending them was no longer effecting the sending because it was constrained by affection and was no longer itself.

But this ‘part’ of soul, the faculty of affection, is not a body but a kind of form. The faculty of appetite, however, is in matter as well, of course, as is the faculty of nutrition, the faculty of growth, and the faculty of generation, which is the root and source of the appetitive and passive form. No form, however, can have disturbance or any affection at all present in it; rather, it must stand its own ground while its matter is involved in affection, whenever that occurs, with the form present as its moving cause. For the faculty of growth certainly does not grow when it causes growth nor does it increase when it causes increase nor, in general, when it causes motion, is it moved with the sort of motion which it imparts; it is either not moved at all or it is another kind of motion or activity. And so the very nature of form must be an activity

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24 See Pl., Tim. 64A2; Phil. 32C3ff.; Ar., EN 2.4.1105b21 23; Rhet. 2.3.1381a6.
25 Cf. supra 3.2.49 50; 3.22 25. 26 See SVF 3.386 (= Aspasius, In Ar. EN 44.12).
27 The word used here is φαντασία (‘imagination’). We would normally expect φαντάσμα (‘semblance’).
28 Cf. 4.4.18.9. See SVF 2.458 (= Philo, Leg. alleg. 2.22); Pl., Phil. 33E11.
and it must make things happen by its presence, just as if harmony were to set the strings in motion from itself.

So, the faculty of affection will be the cause of affection either when the motion comes from the faculty as a result of the semblance furnished by sense-perception or when it comes without it. We must also consider whether the affection occurs as a result of a belief taking its starting point from a higher level; but the faculty of soul remains [unmoved] like the harmony. The causes of motion are like the musician. What is struck because of the affection would be comparable to the strings. For in the musical instrument, too, it is not the harmony which is affected but the string. Indeed, the string would not have been moved, even if the musician wanted it, if the harmony had not told it to move.

§3.6.5. Why, then, must we seek through philosophy to make the soul unaffected when it is unaffected to begin with?

In fact, since the semblance, so to speak, that enters the soul at the level of the faculty said to be subject to affections, creates the ensuing affective state, the actual disturbance, and the image of the expected evil that is linked with the disturbance, reason thinks that it should entirely get rid of this sort of thing which we call an affection and not allow it to be in the soul; it thinks that when it is present, the soul is not yet in a good state, and when not present the soul is unaffected, since the cause of the affection, what is seen in the soul, is no longer in it.\(^{19}\) It is as if someone who wanted to get rid of the semblances in dreams were to wake up the soul which was experiencing the representation, and said that the soul had created the affections, meaning that the sort of visions that come from outside are affective states of the soul.

But what could be meant by the ‘purification’ of the soul when the soul is never stained, and what is meant by ‘separating’ it from the body?\(^{30}\)

In fact, purification would be leaving it alone and not with others or not looking at something else and in consequence not having beliefs which are alien to it – whatever is the nature of the beliefs or of the affections, as has been said – and not looking at images or making affections derived from them. But if there is a turning in the other direction to above from below, surely, this is purification, or even separation, in the case of the soul which is no longer in the body as to belong to it, but which is like a light which is not in murkiness? And yet the light in the midst of gloom still remains unaffected.

The purification of the faculty of soul subject to affections is its awakening from absurd images and its not seeing these; its being

\(^{19}\) See Pl., Rep. 571C3 7. \(^{30}\) See Pl., Phd. 67C5 6.

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separated comes about by not inclining much and not entertaining semblances of the things below. But separating it could also be understood as removing those things from which it is separated when it is not set over the breath which is murky because of gluttony and excess of impure flesh, but that in which it resides is lean, so that it rides on it in tranquillity.

§ 3.6.6. It has already been said that intelligible Substance, which is indeed in its entirety classed as Form, should be thought of as incapable of being affected. But since matter, too, is one of the things without body, even if in a different way, we must consider in what sort of way it is incorporeal, whether it is subject to affections, as is maintained, and changeable in every respect or whether one must think of it, too, as incapable of being affected, and, if so, we must further consider what kind of freedom from affections it has. But before setting out on this enquiry and stating what sort of nature it has, one must first of all grasp that the nature of being or substantiality, and existence are not as most people think.

For the being that one would truly call being belongs to real Being. And this is what is totally real and it is that which ‘gives away’ nothing of its existence. Since it is perfectly real, it needs nothing to conserve itself and to be, but for the rest of things which have the appearance of existence [i.e. as Beings], it is the cause of the appearance of that existence. Indeed, if we are correct in stating this, Being must also be alive, that is, having a perfect life; otherwise, if it is less than this, it will be no more being than non-being. And it is, then, Intellect and wisdom in the fullest sense. And so it must be defined and limited; and there is nothing that does not depend on its power, even if only on a specific power; otherwise, it would be deficient. For this reason, it is eternal, stable, never receives anything and nothing enters it. For if it were to receive anything, it would receive something that was other than itself. And this would be non-being. But Being must be Being through and through. And so it must come into existence having everything from itself. And it is all things together and a unity that is everything.

If we actually define Being in these terms – and we should, otherwise Intellect and Life would not come from Being, but these would be

31 The word ‘rides on’ (ὀχεῖσθαι) probably refers to the pneumatic or astral or ethereal body (ὀχήμα). Cf. 2.2.2.21 22; 4.3.15.1 4. See Pl., Phdr. 113D4 6; Phdr. 246B2, 247B2; Tim. 41E1 2, 75A5 E9.
32 Cf. e.g. supra 1 5; 6.5.2.12 16.
33 Cf. 2.4.8. See SVF 2.309 (= Sext. Emp., M. 10.312); Alex. Aphr., De an. 5.19 22.
34 See Pl., Parm. 144B2. 35 See Pl., Soph. 248E 249A.
36 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK; Parmenides, fr. 28 B 8.5 10 DK.

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brought to Being from outside and they will not exist (since they would come from what is not) and Being will be lifeless and mindless and what is truly non-being will have intellect and life with the consequence that these would have to be located among what is inferior and posterior to Being; for what is prior to Being provides these with their Being, while it has no need of them – then, if Being is like this, it cannot itself be a body or the substrate for bodies, but the existence of these must be that of things that are not Beings.

And how can the nature of bodies be not beings; how, too, matter on which these are based, mountains, rocks and the entire solid earth, and everything that has resistance and things that force by their impacts the things struck by them to witness their own substantiality?

But suppose someone were to say ‘how can things that apply no pressure, force or resistance and are not even visible, that is, Soul and Intellect, be Substances? And in the case of bodies, how can what is more mobile and less heavy and what is above this [possess being to a greater degree] than the earth which is stable? And indeed how is this true of fire which practically escapes the nature of body?’

But I think that those that are more self-sufficient obstruct the others less and are less injurious to them, but the heavier and more earthy, insofar as they are deficient and falling and unable to raise themselves, as they fall through their weakness, cause blows through their downward motion and sluggishness. And then amongst bodies, those that are lifeless are less pleasant to fall against and possess force in their blows and do harm, whereas ensouled things, which share in being, are more agreeable to what is near them, the more they share in it. Motion, too, was in bodies as a kind of life and, with its image of life, is more present to those things which have less body, as though the very deficiency of being makes that which lacks it more of a body.

And from the so-called affections one could discern more clearly that the more something is a body the more it is affected, earth more than the other [elements], and the others in the identical proportion. For the others come together into one again when they are separated if there is nothing to prevent them, but when every kind of earthy thing is cut, each bit remains everlastingly separate. Just as things which are failing in their nature, once a small blow occurs, remain just as they are struck and perish, so the thing that has most fully become body since it has most fully approached non-being, is too weak to bring itself into unity again. Heavy and severe blows, then, cause collapse, but bodies inflict this on each other; the weak attacking what is weak is strong against it, a non-being against non-being.

37 See Pl., Sopb. 246A8 B3.
These arguments are aimed at those who place Beings among bodies, putting their trust in the truth of this through the evidence of pushings and the semblances given through sense-perception, like dreamers who believe that the things which they see in their dreams as actual when they are only real in their dreams. For that which is involved in sense-perception belongs to a soul which is asleep inasmuch as any part of soul that is in body is asleep. But real awakening is a rising up from the body, not with it.\textsuperscript{38} For rising up with the body is change from one sleep to another like going from one bed to another, whereas true rising up is to be totally free from bodies which, since they are of the opposite nature to that of soul, are opposed in respect of substantiality. And evidence of this is their coming to be, flux, and destruction which do not belong to the nature of being.

§3.6.7. But we must return both to the underlying matter and\textsuperscript{39} to the things said to be added to matter from which both matter’s non-existence\textsuperscript{40} and its incapacity for being affected will be ascertained. Matter is, then, incorporeal since body is later and is a composite and matter together with something else [being] makes body. For this is how it acquired the identical designation [as being] with respect to incorporeality because each, being and matter, is different from body.

Yet it is neither soul nor intellect nor life nor form nor expressed principle nor limit – for it is unlimitedness – nor power – for what does it produce? But since it falls outside all of these, it would not even correctly receive the attribution of being; rather, it would more appropriately be termed non-being, not in the sense that motion is non-being or rest is non-being, but true non-being,\textsuperscript{41} an image or semblance of mass, a desire for real existence, something static but not stable, invisible in itself and escaping whatever wants to see it; something that comes to be whenever anyone is not looking, but is not seen when they are intent

\textsuperscript{38} The critical allusion to ή ἀνάστασις μετὰ σώματος (‘rising up with a body’) is perhaps referring to Christian or Gnostic beliefs concerning resurrection.

\textsuperscript{39} Reading καὶ τὰ with Volkmann and Kalligas.

\textsuperscript{40} The phrase is τὸ μὴ ἔσται, indicating the non-existence as a real being. The phrase does not indicate absolute ‘nothingness’ or unqualified ‘non-existence’. Matter exists and has a nature. Cf. 1.8.10.3, 16; 15.2. See Pl., Soph. 237B 239C on absolute vs. relative non existence. Cf. infra 14.20, τὸ δὲ πάντη μὴ ἐστὶν (‘that which is altogether non being’), which is Plotinus’ way of referring to absolute non existence. Also, see Alcinous, Didask. 189.22 24.

\textsuperscript{41} The non-being or non-existence of matter is thus situated between unqualified non-being and the ‘relative’ non-being of motion and stability (probably Motion and Stability. See Soph. 250C1 4) which are non being only by being ‘other than’ or ‘different from’ Being and from each other.
on it, with contraries always appearing on it—small and large, less and more, both deficient and excessive, an image that does not remain nor is able on the other hand to flee. For it doesn’t even have the strength for this inasmuch as it took no strength from Intellect but came to be deficient in every aspect of being.

For this reason, everything which it announces is a lie; and if it appears large, it is small, if more, it is less, and its apparent being is not being but a sort of plaything that escapes us. Hence, even the playthings that seem to come to be in it are no more than images in an image, just as in a mirror what actually exists in one place is imaged in another. It seems to be filled and though possessing nothing appears to be everything.

“The things which enter and leave are imitations of the Beings and images going into shapeless image, and because of matter’s shapelessness they appear to be seen acting on it, though they do nothing. For they are fleeting, weak, and present no resistance. But matter does not resist them either as they pass through without cutting it as though through water or as if someone somehow launched shapes in the so-called void. For, again, if the things seen in it were of the same kind as the things from which they came into it, one might perhaps give them some of the power belonging to those that sent them and suppose that matter was affected by them when the power reached it. But as it is, the things that cause the appearances are one thing, while those that are seen in [matter] are of a different kind; and from this one may learn the falsity of the affection since what is seen in [matter] is a lie and bears no resemblance at all to what caused it. Since it is indeed weak and a falsity and falling into a falsity, as in a dream or water or a mirror, of necessity it leaves matter unaffected. And yet at least in the examples we have mentioned, there is a sameness between what is seen and what causes the reflections [in the mirror].

§3.6.8. In general, whatever is subject to affections must be the sort of thing that possesses powers and qualities opposite to those of the things that enter and cause the affections. For in the case of warmth in something, alteration comes from what cools it and in the case of wetness in something, alteration comes from what dries it; and we say that the substrate is altered whenever it becomes cold from being warm or wet from being dry. Evidence for this is found also in the so-called destruction of fire because there is a change into another element. For it is the fire that is destroyed, we say, not the matter. So, too, affections

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42 See Pl., apud Ar., Meta. 1.6.987b20. 43 See Pl., Tim. 50C4. 5. 44 See Ar., GC 1.7.324a1f.
occur with respect to that which also incurs destruction; for the reception of affection is the way to destruction; and what is being destroyed is that which is affected.

But it is not possible for matter to be destroyed.\textsuperscript{45} For into what [would it be destroyed] and how? How, then, when matter takes in itself cold states, hot states, and in general countless thousands of qualities, and is beset by them and, in a way, possesses them as natural to it and confused with each other – for each of these is not separate – can it itself, though set apart in the middle, not itself, too, be affected along with the qualities which are affected by the way in which they are mixed by and against each other? It does, of course, unless one is to put it completely outside their influence. Yet, in a substrate everything is present to the substrate in such a way as to give it something of itself.

§ 3.6.9. Actually, one must first grasp that there is not just a single way in which one thing is present to another or is in another. There is one way in which by being present something makes a thing better or worse along with an alteration, as is observed in the case of bodies, at least in the case of living beings. But there is another way in which a thing makes something better or worse without the thing being affected, as was said happens in the case of the soul;\textsuperscript{46} a further way is when someone applies shape to wax, where there is neither affection, in the sense of making the wax become something else while the shape is present, nor deficiencies when the shape is gone. Light is a particularly good example since it doesn’t even cause an alteration of shape in what it illuminates. And indeed a stone, when it becomes cold, what does it have from the coldness, since it remains a stone? And in what way would a line be affected by colour?\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, not even a surface could be so affected, I think.

But perhaps the substrate is a body? And yet how could it be affected by colour? For one must not call having something present or even putting on shape ‘being affected’. If someone were to say that mirrors or transparent surfaces in general are not in any way affected by the images seen in them, he would be furnishing an example that makes the same point. For the things in matter, too, are images, and matter itself is even more incapable of being affected than mirrors. Actually, states of warmth and cold come about in it, but without warming it; for being warmed and being cooled are due to quality which causes the substrate to go from one state to another. We should, though, consider whether coldness is perhaps a deficiency or a privation. But when the qualities come together into matter, many of them act against each other, or

\textsuperscript{45} See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 52A8. \textsuperscript{46} Cf. supra 2. \textsuperscript{47} See Ar., \textit{GC} 1.7.32.3b25ff.
rather those that are opposed to each other do; for how would fragrance work on sweetness or colour on shape or a quality of one kind on that of another?

Hence, one would be very much inclined to believe that it is possible for one thing to be in the identical subject as another or one thing to be in something else while not troubling by its presence that with which or in which it is. Then, just as a thing which suffers damage is not damaged by any chance encounter, so, too, that which is altered and affected would not be affected by just anything, but affection occurs to opposites by their opposites while the rest remain unaffected by the others. Indeed, what has no opposition would not be affected by any opposite. So, it is necessary that, if anything is to be affected, it is not matter but must be a complex or in general a plurality gathered together. And that which is ‘alone and deserted’ by all and is completely simple would be unaffected by everything and set apart in the midst of all the things which are acting against each other, just as when people are hitting each other in the identical house, the house itself and the air in it remain unaffected.

Let the things which come together in matter do to each other what is in their nature to do, but let matter itself remain unaffected much more so than any qualities in it which by not being opposites are unaffected by each other.

§ 3.6.10. Next, if matter is affected, it must possess something from the affection, either the affection itself or a disposition different from what it had before the affection entered it. So, when another quality advances after that one, it will no longer be matter which is the thing that receives it but qualified matter. But if this quality, too, should retreat, leaving something of itself by its activity, the substrate would become to an even greater degree something else. And if it goes on in this way, the substrate will be something other than matter, something varied and multiform. This would result in it no longer being the ‘all-receiver’ since it would obstruct many things entering it, and matter would no longer remain, nor would it be indestructible. So, if there must be matter, then matter must for this reason always remain exactly identical to what it was in the beginning, since to assert that it alters is not an option for those who want to maintain matter itself.

Next, if in general everything that is altered must while being altered retain the identical form, [being altered] accidentally and not in itself, and if what is altered must actually remain and that which remains is not the part of it which is affected, one or the other of these consequences

48 See Pl., Rep. 608C1ff. 49 See Pl., Phil. 63B7 8. 50 See Pl., Tim. 51A7.
must follow: either the matter is altered and abandons its nature or it does not abandon its nature and is not altered.\(^5\)

But if someone were to say that it is not altered insofar as it is matter, first, he will not be able to say in what respect alteration will take place and next, he will also agree in this way that matter is not altered. For just as it is not possible for the other things which are Forms to be altered in their substantiality since their substantiality is to be what they are, so, too, since existence for matter is existence as matter, matter cannot be altered insofar as it is matter, but remains; and just as in the intelligible world Form in itself is unalterable, so, too, in the sensible world matter is unalterable.

§3.6.11. Hence, this is why I think that Plato, too, thought this issue through and expressed it correctly when he said that ‘the things that enter and leave are imitations of Beings’\(^5\) not gratuitously saying that they enter and leave, but wanting us, by a scientific approach, to understand the manner of participation. And it turns out that the problem of how matter participates in the Forms is not the same one that the majority of those before us conceived of, namely, how they entered into it, but rather of how they are in it. For it seems to be quite remarkable how matter remains identical, unaffected by Forms when they are present in it and moreover when the very things entering it are themselves affected by each other.\(^5\) But it is also remarkable how the very ones that enter push out each of the preceding ones and that the affection is in the composite and not in every composite but in the one which needs something to approach and to leave and which is deficient in its constitution by the absence of something but perfected by its presence. But matter does not gain anything extra for its constitution from anything coming to it; for it does not become what it is at the time when something approaches it, not does it become less when something departs, for it remains what it was from the beginning.

Some things that have need of order and arrangement require being ordered and the ordering could be done without alteration as if we were casting clothing around them. But if someone is so ordered that it is part of his nature, there will be need of an alteration in what was ugly before and the ordered which has become different will need to be beautiful by

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\(^5\) See Pl., Tim. 50B7.  
\(^5\) See Pl., Tim. 50C4.  
\(^5\) Perhaps a reference to Middle Platonic philosophers such as Plutarch and Atticus who interpreted Timaeus as maintaining temporal creation. But also see Ar., GC 2.9.  
\(^5\) See Pl., Phd. 100D5, where the term παρουσία (‘presence’) is suggested as one way to describe how a Form explains an attribute of a sensible. Plotinus does not mean that the Forms themselves are affected but rather their sensible instantiations. These are the ‘imitations of Beings’ of 1. 3.
an alteration from being ugly. So, if matter which is ugly became beautiful, its being ugly, which existed before, exists no more. And so in its becoming ordered it will lose its nature as matter, particularly so if it was not accidentally ugly. But if it was ugly insofar as it was ugliness, it would not participate in order, and if it was evil precisely because it was evil, it would also not share in Good. And so its participation is not, as people think, the participation of something affected, but of a different kind, in a way only appearing to be affected.

Perhaps in this way, too, the problem might be solved of how, while being evil, matter desires the Good, since it does not by participating lose what it was before. But if the so-called participation is of this manner – remaining identical without being altered but always remaining what it is, as we claim – it is no longer remarkable how it participates though being evil. For it does not abandon its nature but, because it is necessary that it participates, it participates in some way as long as it is what it is; but because the manner of its participation keeps it being what it is, it is not harmed in its existence by what gives to it in this way; and it turns out that, for this reason, it is no less evil because it always remains what it is. For if it really participated in and was altered by the Good, it would not be evil in its nature. And so if anyone says that matter is evil, he would be telling the truth if he means it is unaffected by the Good. But this is identical to being incapable of being affected.

§3.6.12. Now Plato has this notion of matter and proposes that participation is not to be understood as a Form coming to be in a substrate and giving it shape so that it becomes a single composite of form and substrate brought together and somehow mixed and affected by each other. He wants to show that he doesn’t mean it in this way; rather, in looking for an example of unaffected participation to show how matter itself has the Forms while remaining unaffected – it isn’t easy to illustrate in any other way exactly the sort of things that are present while preserving the substrate so that it remains identical – he generated many problems in his haste to find what he wanted and in his desire to point out as well the dearth of real existence in sensibles and how great is the extent of appearance. And so by proposing that matter produces affections by means of shapes imposed on ensouled bodies, whereas matter itself has none of the affective states thereby produced, he demonstrates its persistence, allowing us to conclude that matter itself does not possess affection and alteration even from the shapes [present to it].

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55 Cf. 1.8.5.5 9, 23 24. 56 See Pl., Tim. 50B7 8. 57 Reading θητω with Armstrong and Fleet. 58 See Pl., Tim. 51A7 B2. 59 See Pl., Tim. 61C4 62C4.
For one might be inclined to say that in the case of those bodies which receive one shape in place of another an alteration has taken place, the change of shape, claiming that ‘alteration’ is equivocal. But if matter has no shape or magnitude, how could anyone claim that the presence of shape in whatever way is alteration even equivocally? If someone, then, were to cite ‘colour by convention’ and ‘other things by convention’⁶⁰ because the underlying nature does not ‘possess’ them in the usual sense, he would not be wide of the mark. But how does it have the Forms if we are not happy with it even having shapes? Yet Plato’s theory does provide an indication of the lack of affection in matter and the apparent presence of images of some kind which are not really present.

Before we go any further we must make another point about its lack of affection in pointing out that we must not think that it is affected because of our conventional use of words – for example, when Plato says that the identical matter is ‘set on fire and moistened’ – if we consider what follows this, namely, that ‘it receives the shapes of air and water’.⁶¹ For the phrase ‘receives the shapes of air and water’ tones down the mention of being ‘set on fire and moistened’; and ‘receives the shapes’ indicates not that it has been shaped but that the shapes are present just as when they entered; and ‘being set on fire’ is not meant literally but rather that matter has become fire; for to become fire and to be set on fire are not the identical thing; for being set on fire requires an agent and also involves a subject which is affected. But how could what is itself a part of fire be set on fire? For that would be like saying that the statue takes a walk through the bronze, if one says that the fire makes its way through the matter and in addition sets it on fire. Furthermore, if it is an expressed principle which approaches, how could it set it on fire?

What if it is a shape that approaches? But the thing which is set on fire is set on fire by what is already both parts of the composite. How is it, then, acted on by both if a single thing has not come to be from both? Even if a single thing has come to be, it has not come to be from things that do not affect each other reciprocally but produce their affects on others. Do both cause affections?

In fact, one prevents the other from escaping. But when a body is divided, why isn’t the matter itself also divided? And if the body is affected by being divided, how is it that the matter, too, has not experienced the identical affection?

In fact, by this identical line of reasoning what prevents [matter] from being destroyed if we ask, why if the body is destroyed isn’t matter also destroyed? In addition, it should be said that body is something

⁶⁰ See Democritus, fr. 68 B 9,125 DK. ⁶¹ See Pl., Tim. 51B4 6, 52D5 6. 322
qualified and is a magnitude, but what is not a magnitude does not possess the affections of a magnitude. Indeed, in general, the affections of bodies do not occur in what is not body. Those who, therefore, make matter subject to affections should also agree that it is a body.

§3.6.13. But they still need to take a scientific approach to the question of what they mean by saying that matter flees from Form. For how could it flee from stones – the things that surround it – and rocks? For they are certainly not going to say that it does and sometimes does not flee. For if it flees by its own will, why doesn’t it always do so? And if it remains by necessity, there is no time when it is not in some Form. But we must enquire into the reason why each bit of matter does not always have the identical Form, but is rather in those that enter it.

What, then, is meant by ‘fleeing’? In fact, it does so by its own nature and always. But what could this mean other than that it never loses its own identity and possesses Form in a way that it never possesses it? Otherwise, they will not be able to make anything of the phrase which they use ‘the receptacle and nurse of all coming into being’. For if [matter] is the receptacle and nurse, and if coming to be is something different from it and what is altered is included in coming to be, then, since matter is prior to coming to be, it will also be prior to alteration. ‘Receptacle’ and still more so ‘nurse’ imply keeping matter unaffected in its existing state, as do ‘in which each thing appears to come to be and again from there’ goes forth and ‘space’ and ‘seat’. And the expression, which is also criticized, where Plato calls it the ‘place’ of Forms does not mean that it has affections, but is an attempt to find another way [of describing matter]. What is this way?

Since this nature of which we are speaking must be none of the Beings but has fled the substantiality of Beings and is totally different from them – for they are expressed principles and really Beings – it is indeed necessary that it guards the self-preservation which it possesses by this difference; and it must not only be not receptive of what is, but also take no share of any imitation of them in pursuit of its appropriation. For if it did this, it would be totally different.

In fact, if it appropriated any Form, by becoming something else with that Form, it destroys its being different [from everything], being space for everything, and being a receptacle of absolutely everything. But it

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62 Plotinus continues to refer to those interpreters of Plato whom he opposes.
63 ‘In some Form’ (ἐν ἐδοικία τινι) in the sense that it is within the purview of some Form.
64 See Pl., Tim. 49E2.
65 See Pl., Tim. 49A5 6.
66 See Pl., Tim. 49E7 8.
67 See Pl., Tim. 52A8 B1.
68 See Ar., Phys. 4.2.209b33 210a2.
69 Pl., Tim. 52B4.
must remain identical when the Forms enter it and unaffected when they leave, so that something can always enter and leave it. Actually, what enters enters as an image and as something untrue into what is not true.

Does it enter truly? And how could it, when it is not licit to partake of truth because it is a falsity? Does it, then, enter falsely into a falsity and is it similar to something entering a mirror, where the images of the faces seen in it are seen just as long as they look into it? For in the case of matter, too, if you remove the Beings, none of the things now visible in the sensible world would ever at any time appear. But then the sensible mirror is visible itself, for it is also itself a sort of form, whereas matter, since it is not a form, is itself not visible — for it would have to be visible in its own right before [it received anything] — but it experiences something like air which is invisible even when it is illuminated because it was not visible even without being illuminated.

For this reason, then, the images in mirrors are not believed to exist or to exist to the same degree because what they are in is visible and remains when the images go away. But in the case of matter it is not visible both with and without the images. Yet, if it was possible for the images with which the mirrors are filled to remain while the mirrors themselves were invisible, we would not doubt that the images were true [beings]. If, then, there is anything in mirrors, we should allow sensibles to be in matter, too, in the same way. But if there is not anything in mirrors, but only appears to be something, we must say that in the case of matter things appear on matter and give as the cause of their appearance the existence of Beings in which beings always participate really, whereas non-beings do so in a non-real manner, since non-beings must not be such as they would have been, if Being did not exist and non-beings did.

§3.6.14. Well, then, if matter did not exist would nothing have come to exist?

In fact, nothing would have come to exist. Nor would an image have existed if there had been no mirror or something like it. For that whose nature is to come to be in something else would not come to be if that other thing did not exist. For this is the nature of an image, to come to be in something else.\(^7\) For if something separated from the producers, it could exist without there being anything for it to be in. But since the producers remain unchanged, if a semblance is made in another, that other must exist and provide a seat for what does not come to it, whereas for its part it makes a violent attempt to seize it by its presence, audacity

\(^7\) See Pl., *Tim.* 52C2 4.
and a kind of begging and poverty, and is deceived by its failure to seize it so that its poverty may remain and it may forever beg. For since it is established as something grasping, the myth makes it into a beggar in revealing its nature as bereft of goodness.

And the beggar asks not for what the giver has, but is in love with whatever he can get, so that this, too, shows that what is imaged in matter is different and its name [Poverty] shows that it is not full. And by its union with Plenty, Plato shows that it is united neither with Being nor with fullness but with a resourceful thing; this shows the craftiness contained in the semblance. For, since it is not possible for whatever exists somehow outside it absolutely not to partake of Being – for this is the nature of Being, to act on Beings – and since total non-being is unmixed with Being, it is a wonderful thing that what does not partake partakes and how it somehow has something from its being, in a way, a neighbour to Being, although by its own nature it is incapable of being, in a way, stuck to it. What it might have seized slips away as though from an alien nature, like an echo from smooth, level surfaces. Because it does not stay there, for this very reason the illusion is created that it is there and comes from there.

But if matter was something that participated and received Forms in the way one thinks, what approaches it would be swallowed up and sink into it. Yet, as it is, it simply appears, because it is never swallowed up but matter remains identical, receiving nothing; rather, it checks the approach as a base which repels and a ‘receptacle’ for the things which come to the same point and mix there, like the smooth surfaces which people set up towards the sun in order to produce fire – or fill things with water – so that the ray is prevented from passing through by the resistance of the inside, but concentrates on the outside. The cause of coming to be, then, is like this and the things that are constituted in matter do so in this way.

§ 3.6.15. And, then, in the case of the things which gather around themselves the fire emanating from the sun, inasmuch as they take from a sensible fire the ignition which occurs around them, they themselves are also sensible. For this reason, it also appears that what is gathered together is outside them, next to and near them, touches them, and that there are two edges. But the expressed principle imposed on matter possesses externality in a different way. For the difference of its nature is enough, in that it has no need whatsoever of two edges, but it is much more completely alien to every kind of edge because it cannot be mixed [with matter] by reason of the difference of substantiality and total lack of kinship with it.

71 See Pl., Symp. 203B4. 72 See Pl., Symp. 203B8 C1. 73 See Pl., Tim. 52C2.
And the reason for matter remaining [unaffected] in itself is this, namely, that that which enters it gets nothing from matter nor does matter get anything from it. But it is like what happens with beliefs and imaginative representations which are not mixed in with the soul but each one goes away again, being only what it is, without dragging in or losing anything because it was not mixed [with the soul]. And being external does not mean that [the form] lies on matter; that on which it lies is [understood to be] different not by sight but because reason declares it so.

In the case of the soul, then, the mental image is a reflection, while the soul’s nature is not that of a reflection, although the mental image seems in many respects to take the lead and lead the soul where it wants, using the soul as nothing less than its matter or something analogous to it, but fails to obscure soul because it is often pushed out of it by activities coming from soul nor does it make soul hidden or into an image even if it comes to it with all its power to make soul have a mental image. For the soul has within itself activities and opposing expressed principles by which it repels what approaches it.

But matter, because it is much weaker in power than soul and possesses nothing of Being whether true or even as its own deceit, does not possess that by which it might appear since it is completely destitute of everything. And yet it is the cause of other things appearing, though it cannot even utter ‘Here I am’. But if some profound reasoning could distinguish it from other beings it would, therefore, appear as something cast apart from all Beings, even from those that later appear to exist, a thing dragged into everything, apparently accompanying them though, again, not accompanying them.

§3.6.16. And when some expressed principle comes to it, leading it where it will, it makes matter have a size by clothing it in magnitude derived from itself, while matter in itself is not sized nor did it ever become so. For it is the size imposed on it which is a magnitude. If, then, someone were to remove this form, the substrate no longer has or appears to have a size. But if what becomes sized were a human being or a horse and the size of the horse came with the horse, if the horse goes away, its size also goes away. If, though, someone should say that the horse comes into existence on a certain sized mass or quantity and the size remains, we will say that is not the size of the horse but the size of the mass that remains there. If, however, this mass is fire or earth, if the fire departs, the size of the fire or earth also departs.

So, the matter would not get anything from the shape or magnitude. In fact, otherwise it will not be something else after being fire, but the matter, while it remains fire, will become something that is not fire.
A further reason is that even now when matter has become in its present state apparently co-extensive with the entire universe, if heaven should cease and all within, magnitude, too, along with all these will abandon matter along with all the rest of the qualities which clearly belong together; and matter will be left as it was, keeping none of what previously was present around it in the way we have described. Yet in things in which there exists the experience of being affected by the presence of certain other things, even when those things go away, there still remains something in those that have received them. But in things that are not affected, this is not the case, as in the case of air, when the light is around it and then goes away.

If, though, someone were to wonder how matter which does not possess magnitude can be something with a size, how can it be something hot if it does not possess heat? For indeed matter and magnitude do not exist in the identical way, if it is the case magnitude is immaterial just as shape is immaterial. If we keep matter as matter, it is all things by participation; and magnitude, too, is one of all those things. And so magnitude is together with the rest in bodies which are composite and certainly not separated off from them, since magnitude, too, is involved in the definition of body. But in matter, not even this magnitude which is not separated is present, for it is not a body.

§ 3.6.17. Nor, again, will matter be magnitude itself; for magnitude is a Form, but not receptive [of form]. And Magnitude exists in itself and is not magnitude in the physical sense. But since it wants to be magnitude when it lies in Intellect or Soul, it has allowed those that somehow want to imitate it, by their desire for it and by their motion towards it, to jostle\(^{74}\) their susceptibility to affection into something else. Size,\(^{75}\) then, as it runs forth in the procession of imaginative representation and actually produces the sizelessness of matter, runs along with it into this very size, and has made that which is not filled to appear to have a size by extending it. For this false size comes about when matter, because it does not itself possess the characteristic of having a size, stretches out towards it and by extending itself is extended to correspond with it.

For since all Beings produce on others or on another a mirroring of themselves and each of those that produce has its own peculiar size, the universe, too, in its entirety has a size for this very reason.\(^{76}\)

\(^{74}\) See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 52E4.

\(^{75}\) The term \(\tau\omicron\mu\omicron\gamma\alpha\), here translated as ‘size’ can also mean ‘largeness’. Plotinus here seems to be making the point that a Form of Magnitude will be instantiated by things having a particular ‘size’, over against which matter, being without magnitude, will seem ‘small’. Hence, the reference to the ‘smallness’ (\(\tau\omicron\mu\iota\kappa\rho\omicron\nu\)) of matter.

\(^{76}\) I.e., each Form contains the \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\omicron\omicron\) of a particular size for its instances, or perhaps a particular range of sizes.
The particular size, then, that of each expressed principle, for example, of a horse and any other thing, and size itself came together; and matter as a whole came to have a size, given that it is illuminated by size itself, and each part of it some size. And it appeared to be all sizes together because it came from the whole Form, on which size depends, and from each individual Form. And it was, in a way, stretched out to correspond both with size as a whole and individual sizes, compelled to be size in form and in mass, insofar as the power [of Form] made what is in itself non-being to be everything.

Just as, by its mere appearance, colour which comes from what is not a colour and quality in the sensible world from what is not a quality take their names equivocally from them, so magnitude comes from what is not magnitude or is [said to be] magnitude equivocally, since these [forms] are seen to lie between matter and the Form itself. They make an appearance because they derive from the intelligible world but are false because that in which they appear does not exist.

Each part of matter is made to have a magnitude by being dragged by the power of the things which are seen in it and which make space for themselves [that is, immanent forms] and is dragged to become all things, though not by force, since the universe exists because of matter. Each one drags matter according to the power it has. And it has this from the intelligible world. And the thing that makes matter appear to have a size does so by planting on it the image of size and this is the thing that is imaged, the size of the sensible world. But matter on which it is imaged is compelled to run along with it and is present as a whole together and offers itself everywhere; for it is the matter of this magnitude, but is not identical with it. What is nothing in itself can become the opposite by means of something else and, having become that opposite, is not really it, for it would then be stable as one thing.

§3.6.18. So, if someone could think of size and our thinking it had the power not only to exist in us, but could, in a way, be transported externally by its power, it would seize upon a nature which was not in the thinker and did not even have any form or trace of size or of anything else.

What would it make with this power? Not a horse or ox; for other things will make these.

In fact, since it comes from a father of size, that which is other [matter] cannot make space for size but will have its image. Since, then, matter is actually not so endowed with size as to have a size, it

77 Cf. 6.2.7.8 14; 6.3.2.1 9. See Pl., Phd. 78C10 D4; Tim. 52A5.
78 See Pl., Tim. 50D3.
remains for it to appear to have a size in its parts insofar as it can. But this means not being deficient, not ceasing to be in many places for many things, having in itself parts that are related and being absent from nothing.

Nor does the image of size [the immanent form], being an image of size, endure being in a small mass and remaining equal to it, but insofar as it longs for the hope of attaining size itself, has approached it as near as it can together with that which runs along with it, unable to be deprived of it. And it has made to appear to have a size both matter which does not have a size even under these conditions and that which in mass is seen to have a size. Yet, matter still preserves its own nature and makes use of size like a cloak which it wrapped around itself as it ran with it when size led it in its course. And if that which cloaked it should remove it, matter would remain identical to what it was by itself or of the same size as the Form could make it when it was present.

Now, the Soul which has the Forms of Beings and is itself a Form possesses everything together and each Form together with itself. When it sees the forms of sensibles, in a way, turning back to Soul and approaching it, it does not put up with them with their multiplicity but sees them with their mass removed. For it cannot become anything other than it is.

Matter, on the other hand, has no resistance, for it has no activity, but since it is a shadow, endures being affected with whatever that which acts upon it wants. And so what goes forth from the expressed principle in the intelligible world already has a trace of what is going to come to be. For when the expressed principle is moved, in a way, in projecting an image, either the motion from the expressed principle is a division or, if it remains one, it would not even be moved but would remain.

And matter cannot accommodate all things together, as Soul does. If it could, it would be one of the intelligibles. And yet it must receive everything, but receive them in a way that is not without division. So, since it acts as place for everything, it must approach everything and encounter everything and suffice for all extension, because it is itself not restricted by extension, but lies open to whatever is going to be. How, then, is it that a single Form entering it has not obstructed the other Forms, which could not be on top of each other?

In fact, there was no first Form, except, perhaps, for the Form of the universe. Thus, all the Forms are there simultaneously, but each individual Form in its own part of it. For the matter of a living being [the

79 Reading ἢ with Theiler, Armstrong, Fleet, and Kalligas.
body] is divided along with the division of the living being; otherwise, nothing would have existed besides the expressed principle.

§ 3.6.19. The forms which actually enter the matter as their ‘mother’ do it no harm or good. The blows they inflict are not really on it, but on each other, because powers affect their opposites, not their substrates, unless one considers them as included with the forms that enter. For warmth stops cold and black stops white or they make another quality from themselves when mixed together. The things that are affected, then, are the things that are overcome and their being affected consists in not being what they were.

And in ensouled things, affections concern their bodies when a change occurs in their qualities and immanent powers or when corporeal structures are dissolved, come together or change, contrary to the nature of the structure; the affections are in their bodies, but in their connected souls they have cognition of them when they grasp the more serious corporeal affections. But if they are not serious, they have no cognition of them. Matter, however, remains unaffected; for it has undergone no affection when cold departs and warmth enters; for neither of them was either congenial or alien to matter.

And so ‘receptacle’ and ‘nurse’ are more appropriate names for it, but ‘mother’ is applied more loosely, for matter does not give birth to anything. But those people seem to call it ‘mother’ who think that the mother takes on the role of matter with respect to her offspring, insofar as she only receives and contributes nothing to the formation of her offspring, since all that is body in the child is formed from the food. But if the mother does contribute something to her offspring, it is not in respect of matter but of form [to which she may] also [be likened], since only the form is productive while the matter is barren.

Hence, I think, the wise men, too, of long ago, speak allegorically in their mystic rites when they make the ancient Hermes with his reproductive organ always ready to work, making clear that what generates the sensibles is the intelligible expressed principle, but revealing through the eunuchs in attendance the barrenness of matter which remains identical. For they have made it the mother of everything, a name which they apply to it precisely because they take it in the sense of substrate. And they give this name to make clear what they intend, since they want to indicate that it is not like a mother in every respect. To those who want to grasp more precisely in what way it is a mother and are not satisfied with a superficial enquiry, they indicated

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80 See Pl., Tim. 50D3, 51A4 5. 81 See Ar., GC 1.7.324a17f. 82 The word αἰνίττεσθαι (literally ‘to riddle’) seems to be rendered best in the above manner.
somewhat obscurely but still as best they could that it is both barren and not even entirely female, but only female insofar as it receives, but as far as generating no longer female, because what attends it is neither female nor able to generate, but cut off from all power of generation, which is present only to what remains male.
On Eternity and Time

**INTRODUCTION**

The importance of this treatise lies not only in its careful discussion of the concepts of time and eternity but also their significance for the philosophical life, which is lived on both levels. Although close attention is given to a rejection of previous views of time, the main emphasis is placed on eternity and the nature of time itself on the basis of Plato’s definition of time as the ‘moving image of eternity’.

**SUMMARY**

§1. The difficulty in defining time and eternity even though we regularly speak of them.

§2. What is eternity? It is related to but different from the intelligible world. Nor is it Stability.

§3. It is the ‘life’ of the intelligible world, without past or future.

§4. It is an essential attribute of the intelligible world.

§5. Its life is not deficient in any way because it has neither past nor future in which it could be increased or diminished.

§6. It is never other than what it is, an activity which remains turned towards the One. The inadequacy of language to describe it.

§7. Although we participate directly in eternity, we exist for the most part in time. Traditional views of the nature of time.

§8. Time is not motion nor any of the components of motion (Stoics).

§9. Nor is it the measure or number of motion (Aristotle).

§10. Nor the accompaniment of motion (Epicurus).

§11. The generation of time from eternity. Time as the life of soul which moves from one thought to another. This universe is ‘in time’.

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§12. Time is unstoppable because the activity of the soul is ceaseless. The heavenly bodies are not time but manifest time.

§13. Perhaps Aristotle was misinterpreted and meant that the heavens are not a measure but an indicator of time. But Plato is clear about the nature of time itself: it is the life of the soul and a moving image of eternity.
§3.7.1. When we say that eternity and time are different from each other, eternity referring to the nature that is everlasting, and time referring to what comes to be and with this universe, we think that we have, spontaneously and as if by acts of concentrated conceptual apprehension, a clear experience of them in our souls, as we are always speaking about them and using these terms on every occasion.

Yet when we attempt to come to a close examination of them and, in a way, draw near to them, we become confused once more again in our thoughts as we consider the different assertions of the ancients about them, sometimes interpreting even these in different ways, and are satisfied with them and think it adequate to state as answers to our questions what they had decided and are happy to free ourselves from further enquiry about them. And although we should consider that some of the ancient and blessed philosophers have said what is right, we ought to examine which ones came closest and how we, too, can attain comprehension regarding these matters.

We must begin our investigation with eternity, what those people think it is who claim that it is different from time. For once we know the stable archetype, the nature of its image, which they actually say time is, would perhaps become clear. But if someone were to imagine what time is before achieving a clear vision of eternity, it would also be possible for him to come to the intelligible world through recollection from this world and see that which time is like, if time does indeed have a likeness to eternity.

§3.7.2. What, then, should we say eternity is? That it is intelligible Substance itself, in the same way that one might say that time is the

1 The terms αἰώνιον ('eternal') and αἰώνιον ('everlasting') seem to be used synonymously by Plotinus. Cf. infra and 3.2. The fundamental property of the eternal is being outside of time. This eternity or everlastingness (αιώνιός) is to be distinguished from that indicated by the term αἰών ('everlasting(ty)', 'always') which is normally used for that which has no temporal beginning or end. But cf. infra 2.28 29.

2 See Pl., Tim. 27D6 28A4.

3 See Pl., Tim. 37D7.
entire heaven, that is, the cosmos? For they say that some hold this latter belief about time. For since we imagine and think that eternity is something most majestic, and what pertains to the nature of the intelligible nature is most majestic, and it is not possible to say that there is something more majestic than either of the two – that which transcends the intelligible nature may not even be termed ‘majestic’ – one might for these reasons come to identify them. And a further reason would be that the intelligible universe and eternity are both inclusive and include the identical things.

But when we say that one set of things [the intelligibles] lies in another – eternity – and predicate eternity of them – for Plato says that ‘the nature of the model happened to be eternal’ – we mean once again that eternity is different from the intelligible nature and, quite the contrary, are maintaining that eternity is related to it or in it or present to it. But the fact that each is majestic does not indicate their identity. For majesty might perhaps also come to one of them from the other. And the inclusiveness of one is of parts, but the inclusiveness of eternity is that of the whole together not as a part but because all things that are such as to be eternal are eternal due to eternity.

Should we say that eternity corresponds to stability in the intelligible world, just as they say that time in the sensible world corresponds to motion? But in that case, it would be reasonable to enquire whether they mean that eternity is identical to stability or, not unqualified stability, but stability as it pertains to Substance. For if it is identical to stability, we will, first, be unable to say that stability is eternal, just as eternity is not eternal; for the eternal is what participates in eternity. How can motion, then, be something eternal? For, on this understanding, it would also be something stable.

Next, how does the conception of stability contain in itself the ‘always’? I don’t mean the ‘always’ of time, but the sort of one we think of when we talk of what is everlasting. But if we think eternity is identical with the Stability which is found in Substance, we will be putting the other genera outside it.

Next, we must think of eternity as involving not only stability but also unity.

4 The Pythagoreans, apud Ar., Phys. 4.10.218b1 2. 5 Reading ἤτι with HS.
6 Reading ὁποτὲροῦ ὦν (‘than either of the two’) according to a suggestion of Kalligas.
7 I.e., the One. 8 I.e., the Forms. 9 See Pl., Tim. 37D3.
10 The five μέγαστα γένη (‘greatest genera’), Soph. 254C 256C: Being, Stability, Motion, Identity, Difference.
Next, it must also be without extension, to avoid it being identical with time. But stability does not, as stability, entail in itself the conception of unity nor that of the unextended.

Next, again, we predicate ‘remaining in unity’ of eternity. It would, then, participate in Stability, but would not be Stability itself.

§3.7.3. What, then, is it which leads us to say that the whole of that intelligible cosmos is eternal and everlasting? And what is everlastingness? Is it identical with eternity or does eternity depend on everlastingness? Must it, then, be a unitary conception but one assembled from many or is it, more than that, a nature, whether following on the things in the intelligible world or with them or seen in them, but that nature which is all these things and is one, though able to do many things and be many things? And anyone who looks carefully at this multiple power will call it ‘Substance’ insofar as it acts as a kind of substrate, and next, ‘Motion’ insofar as he sees life in it, and next, ‘Stability’ with respect to its complete stability, and ‘Difference’ and ‘Identity’ in that these are altogether one.

If, then, you actually assemble them again into one so that there is one life together in them, concentrating Difference together with inexhaustible activity, Identity that is never different, and no intellect or life that goes from one thing to another, but a state of stability and constant lack of extension; when you have seen all this you have seen eternity. It is when you have seen life abiding forever in the identical state and possessing everything in its presence, not now this, again something else, but all at once, and not now some things, now others, but a partless perfection; it is just as in a point where all things are together and none of them ever flows forth but remains in identity in itself and never changes, being always in the present because nothing of it has slipped away or again will come to be, but what it is is what it is.

So, eternity is not the substrate but that which, in a way, shines forth from the substrate itself due to the identity which it proclaims consisting in the fact that it is not going to be but already is, that it is so and not otherwise; for what could come to it afterward that it isn’t already

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13 See Pl., Soph. 254C. 256D. The kind τὸ ὑπὸ (‘Being’), not listed here, is distinct from what is labelled ὁ υἱὸς (‘Substance’). Cf. 2.6.1.1 8. Plotinus is here considering the possibility of identifying eternity with ὁ υἱὸς as the summum genus of the five μέγιστα γένη (‘greatest genera’).
14 Reading εἰς ἐν, <ἀκτίζει> ὃμοιος with HS4.
15 Cf. 2.5.3.36 40; 5.8.4.31 33; 6.5.12.7 9. See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b27.
now? Nor will it come to be later what it isn’t already now. For there is nowhere from which it will come to its present state; for that would be no different from what it is now. Nor is it ever going to be what it does not have now. Nor will it of necessity have anything of ‘was’ about it; for what is there which was for it and has gone away? Nor any ‘will be’; for what will be for it? Indeed, it remains that its essence is for it to be what it is. And so that which neither was nor will be but is only, and has stable existence because it does not change into what will be nor has it already changed, this is what eternity is. So, the life which belongs to Being in its essence, all together, full, and completely without extension, this is what we are indeed looking for, eternity.

§3.7.4. And we should not suppose that eternity has come to that intelligible nature accidentally from outside; rather, eternity is in that nature and is from it and with it. For it exists in it by itself because when we see all the other things, too, which we say are in the intelligible world, existing in it, we say that they are all from its substantiality and with its substantiality. For primary beings must exist along with the primaries and in the primaries; since beauty is in them as well as from them, and truth is in them. And some things are, in a way, in a part of Being in its entirety, others are in the whole, just as this which is truly a whole is not something gathered from the parts, but has itself generated the parts, in order that in this way, too, it may be truly a whole.

And truth, too, is not a concord [of one thing] with another thing in the intelligible world, but belongs to each thing of which it is the truth. Indeed, this whole, which is the true whole, if it is to be a whole, must not only be a whole in the sense that it is everything, but must also possess the whole in such a way as to be deficient in nothing. If this is the case, nothing ‘will be’ for it. For if there will be something, it was deficient in that respect. In that case, it was not a whole. But what could happen to it contrary to its nature? For it is not affected in any way. And so if nothing happens to it, it is neither going to be, nor will it be, nor was it anything. In the case of generated things, then, if you remove ‘will be’ from them, they will immediately lose their existence,

\[\text{Cf. 6.7.1.51.}\]

\[\text{See Pl., Tim. 37E6 38A2.}\]

\[\text{Reading ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἐκείνῃ with Perna and Kalligas.}\]

\[\text{Here beauty, truth, and eternity, ‘primary beings’, are taken to be properties of all Forms, the ‘primaries’. On beauty as a property of all the Forms cf. 1.6.9.35 36; 5.8.9.40 42. On truth as a property of all the Forms cf. 5.5.1.65 68, 2.9 11, 18 20. On the consequent integrated totality of Forms cf. 5.3.15.26; 5.8.4.9, 9.16 17; 6.2.8.7 11.}\]

\[\text{The parts are the Forms.}\]

\[\text{See Ar., De int. 9.19a32; Meta. 6.4.1027b20 23; 9.10.1051b2 5.}\]
inasmuch as they are always in the process of acquiring being, whereas if you add ‘will be’ to ungenerated things, they will disappear from their secure seat of existence. It is clear that their being was not an integral part of their nature, if it was dependent on what they were going to be, become, and later be.

For it looks very much as if substantiality for generated things is their existence from the very beginning of their generation right up to their final hour when they cease to exist; this is indeed their ‘is’ and if one were to take this away, their life would be reduced, and so, too, their existence.

The sensible universe, too, has need of a goal at which it will aim in the same way. For this reason, it hastens to what it is going to be and does not want to stand still as it drags its existence along in its effort to be constantly producing something different and going round in a circle in a desire for Substantiality. And with that we have discovered the explanation for the sort of motion that tends to everlasting existence by means of what is to come.

But the primary and blessed Beings do not even have a desire for what is to come; for they are already the whole and possess all the life which is, in a way, owed to them. And so they are not in search of anything because the future means nothing to them and, therefore, neither does that in which the future lies. The complete and whole Substance, then, is not only that which is in the parts but also that which consists in not ever lacking anything in the future or in having no non-being ever attaching itself to it – for not only must all Beings be present to the whole universe, but there must not be anything that is ever non-being. This disposition and nature would be eternity; for ‘eternity’ [aion] is derived from ‘always being’ [aei on].

§ 3.7.5. But whenever I apply my mind to something and am able to say, or rather, to see, that it is the sort of thing in which nothing at all has ever come to be – for if it had, it would not always be or not always be whole – is this thing, then, by this fact alone everlasting, if there is not also within it the kind of nature to elicit the confidence about it that it is as it is and is not ever to be otherwise, that if you look at it again, you will find it just as it was? What, then, do we say of someone who does not put aside his contemplation of such an object, but stays with it in awe of its nature and is able to do this with his own indefatigable nature?

22 See Pl., Phil. 24D 1 2.
23 See Ar., DC 1.9.279a27 28; SVF 2.163 (= Varro, De lingua lat. 7.11).
In fact, he will be a man racing into eternity and not faltering in his effort to be made the same as it and to be eternal by contemplating eternity and the eternal in himself.

If, then, that which has eternity in this way and always is, not declining in any respect into a different nature, with a life which it already has in its entirety, never having supplemented or supplementing or about to supplement itself, such a thing would be everlasting; everlastingness would be that sort of state in a substrate, existing from and in the substrate; eternity would be the substrate along with the state of the kind that has manifested itself.

Hence, eternity is majestic. And our conception tells us that it is identical with god, meaning this god [Intellect]. And eternity could be well described as god displaying and manifesting itself for what it is, Being, which is unshakeable and identical and, for this reason, also stable in its life. And we shouldn’t be surprised if we say that it is made up from a multitude; for each of the things in the intelligible world is many through its unlimited power. Unlimitedness is not to be deficient and this is unlimited in the full sense of the word, in that it never expends anything of itself. And if one were to call eternity in this way life that is unlimited from the start because it is whole and does not expend anything of itself due to the fact that it has no past and no future – for if it did, it would not be whole – one would be getting close to a definition. [For the addition ‘because it is whole and does not expend itself’ could be taken as an interpretation of ‘is unlimited from the start’].

§3.7.6. Since a nature of this kind is all beautiful and everlasting, in attendance on the One, originating from it and turned towards it, and never falling away from it in any way, but remaining always around it and in it, and living in conformity with it – and which has also, I think, been beautifully described by Plato in profound and careful thought, as ‘eternity remaining in unity’ – to indicate that it not only turns itself back to the One in turning to itself, but is also the changeless life of being around the One – this is what we are indeed searching for. And that which remains in this way is eternity. For what remains like this and remains itself what it is, an activity of a life which remains in itself turned towards the One and in it, an activity that does not falsify its existence and its life, this would possess eternity.

[1] indicates that this line is perhaps a later gloss. See Pl., Tim. 37D6.

Enneads 3.7.5 3.7.6

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24 Intellect is a one many. Cf. 5.3.15.20 26; 5.8.9.23 24; 6.2.21.6 11; 6.5.9.36 40; 6.7.14.11 15. See Pl., Parm. 144E5.

25 See Pl., Tim. 37D6.
For to be truly eternal is for a thing never not to be or to be other than it is, that is, to remain the same as it is, to be devoid of difference. True being, then, does not possess now one thing, now another; and so you cannot separate, unravel, prolong, or stretch it, nor are you able to take any part of it to be earlier or later. If, then, neither future nor past is relevant to it, ‘is’ is the most truthful thing one can say about it, that is, about what it is, and it is so because it exists due to its substantiality or its life, and once again we encounter what we are indeed talking about, eternity.

And whenever we say of it that it is ‘always’ and it is not the case that ‘at one point it is, and at another it is not’, we should suppose that the phrases are employed for our sake, since ‘always’ does not seem to be employed in its proper meaning, but when taken to clarify what is indestructible tends to mislead the soul into thinking of something extending itself more and more and yet still never going to stop extending. Perhaps it would have been better to use only the phrase ‘that which is’. But although ‘that which is’ is an adequate expression for ‘substance’, since they also considered ‘generation’ to be ‘substance’ they required for the sake of teaching the addition of the word ‘always’. For there is no difference between ‘that which is’ and ‘that which always is’ just as there is no difference between ‘philosopher’ and a ‘true philosopher’. But because of the existence of the pretence of philosophy, there came about the addition of ‘true’ to ‘philosopher’. For this reason, ‘always’ is added to ‘that which is’ and when you add ‘always’ to what ‘is’ you get ‘that which always is’ [aei on]. And so one should understand ‘always’ as meaning ‘truly is’ and ‘always’ must be included in the unextended power that needs absolutely nothing in addition to what it already has. But it has everything.

This nature, then, which we have described is everything, is Being, and is not deficient in any way, and it is not complete in one sense, but deficient in another. For what is in time, even if it turns out to be complete in a superficial way, like a body which is sufficiently complete for a soul, is in need of what comes next and deficient in the time it needs; it is incomplete, inasmuch as it goes with time if time is present and runs along with it. And inasmuch as it exists in this way, it could be called ‘complete’ equivocally.

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27 See SVF 2.599 (= Eusebius, Pr. ev. 15.19) and some earlier Platonists interpreting Tim. 35A1 3, e.g., Plutarch, De gen. an. 1013b; Alcinous, Didask. 169.23 26; Apuleius, De doct. Plat. 1.6.

28 Suggesting the etymology ἀεὶ ὁν = αἰών. Cf supra 4.42 43

29 See Parmenides, fr. 8.5, 8.23 24, 8.33, 8.44 48 DK; Pl., Tim. 30C5 31B4.
But something that does not need what comes next, which is not measured in relation to another time or time which is unlimited and will exist unlimitedly, but is in possession of what it must be, this is what our conception is striving for; and its existence is not derived from a particular extent of time, but is prior to particular extent. For it is appropriate to it that it is not of a certain quantity and has no contact at all with quantity to prevent its life being divided into parts and it losing its pure indivisibility and to ensure its remaining indivisible in its life and substantiality.

The phrase ‘he [the Demiurge] was good’ \(^{30}\) refers to the conception of the universe, and indicates that not having a starting point in time applies to the transcendent universe. And so neither did the sensible universe have a beginning in time since it is the fact that it has a cause of its existence \(^{31}\) that suggests something before it. And yet, even if he has spoken in this way for the sake of clarity, he is later \(^{32}\) critical of this expression, too, as not being altogether the right one to use for things which have been accorded what we term and think of as eternity.

§3.7.7. Are we, then, making these statements just to bear witness on behalf of others and conducting this discourse as if it were about things alien to us? How could we do that? For what comprehension could we have of eternity if we were not in direct contact with it? How could we be in contact with what is alien? We, too, then, must participate in eternity. But how is this possible when we are in time?

We could, however, understand how we are in time and how it is possible to be in eternity, once we have discovered what time is. So, we must descend from eternity to search for time and descend to time. For previously, the road led to that which is above, but now let us continue our discourse, not descending entirely but just as far as time has descended.

If ancient and blessed philosophers had never said anything about time, we would have had to link to eternity what follows it from the beginning and to express our views about it, attempting to fit the belief we are expressing to the conception of it which we have acquired. But as it is, we have first to take those things which have been said that are particularly worthy of note to see whether our account is in accord with any of them.

\(^{30}\) See Pl., *Tim.* 29E1.  
\(^{31}\) I.e., the Demiurge which, if eternal, does not act in time.  
\(^{32}\) See Pl., *Tim.* 37E4 6.
One should perhaps, first, divide into three the accounts which have been given of it; for time is what is commonly called motion, or one could say it is that which is moved or something belonging to motion. For to say that it is stable or at rest or something belonging to stability would be far removed from our conception of time, which in no respect remains identical.

Of those who say it is motion, some would say that it is all motion, others that it is the motion of the universe. Those who say it is what is moved would appear to mean the sphere of the universe. And of those who say it is something belonging to motion, some say it is an interval of motion, others that it is the measure of motion, and yet others that which in general accompanies motion, whether that be of all motion or of just ordered motion.

§ 3.7.8. Time cannot be motion whether one takes all motions and, in a way, makes a single motion out of them all or whether one takes ordered motion. For each kind of motion we have mentioned is in time – if there is some kind of motion which is not in time, it would be even more removed from being time – with the result that that in which motion takes place is different from motion itself. And although other arguments are expressed or have been expressed, this would be enough, with the further argument that motion can both cease permanently or be in abeyance for a while whereas time cannot.

And if someone were to argue that the motion of heaven is not interrupted, we would reply that this, too, would go around back to its starting point, if indeed one is referring to the circuit of heaven, in a particular portion of time, different from the time in which half its course would be completed; and the time taken for the whole course would be twice that taken for the half course, even though each of these motions – the one to the identical point from which it began, the other coming back to the halfway point – is the motion of the whole.

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33 Plotinus here implicitly distinguishes the common conception of motion in the sensible world from the sort of motion found in the intelligible world, that is, ἡ κίνησις νου. 34 See Ar., Phys. 4.12.218a30 b20. 35 See Ar., Phys. 4.12.220b6 8. 36 See SVF 2.514 (= Aëtius, Plac. 1.122.7). 37 See Ar., Phys. 4.14.223b21 23. 38 The Pythagoreans. See Ar., Phys. 4.10. 218b1; SVF 2.516 (= Simplicius, In Phys. 700. 19 20). 39 Cf. infra 8.23 69. See SVF 2.509 (= Stob., Ed. 1.106.5), 510 (= Simplicius, In Cat. 350. 15 20). 40 Cf. infra 9. See Ar., Phys. 4.12.220b32. 41 See Epicurus, fr. 294 Usener; SVF 2.509 (= Stob., Ed. 1.106.5). 42 See Ar., DC 2.1.2842 6. 43 Reading καὶ ἀυτὴ περιφέροιτο ἀν εἰς τὸ αὐτό, ἐπερ τὴν περιφοράν λέγοι, ἐν χρόνῳ τινὶ [καὶ ἀυτὴ περιφέροιτο ἀν εἰς τὸ αὐτό], οὐκ with HS following a suggestion of Igal.
And the claim that the motion of the outermost sphere is the most brisk or swiftest supports the argument that its motion and time are different. For it is clearly the swiftest of all because it covers a greater, in fact, the greatest, interval in less time; and the others are slower because they would cover only a portion of it in a longer time. So, if time is not the motion of the sphere, it could hardly be the sphere itself which was supposed to be time precisely because of its motion.

Is time, then, something belonging to motion? If it is interval, we would reply that interval is not identical in all motion, nor even in the same kinds of motion. For even spatial motion is faster and slower; and both intervals would be measured by one thing which is different from them and this is, actually, what one would more correctly designate as time. Indeed, of which of these two motions is time the interval? Or rather, of which of all the motions, because there is an unlimited number of them?

If it is to be identified with the interval of ordered motion, it is not of all ordered motion or even of a particular kind of ordered motion, because there are many of them; and there would then be many times all at once.

But if time is the interval of the motion of the cosmos, if one means by that the interval in motion itself, what could the interval be other than the motion? It is true that this motion is of a certain quantity. This quantity, however, will be measured either by space because it is a certain amount of space that the universe passes through, and this will be the interval – but this is not time, but space – or the motion, by reason of its continuity and its not ceasing but continuing on forever, will itself possess interval. But this would be a multiplicity of motion.

And if you look at it and declare it to be multiple, just as you could if you said that heat is multiple, time would still not manifest itself or occur to you, but repetition of motion, again and again, like water flowing again and again, along with the interval observed in it.\(^4\) And this ‘again and again’ will be number, like two or three, while the interval will be one of mass. And so in this way, time will also be a multitude of motion like ten or like the interval that appears on the apparent magnitude of motion; and this does not correspond to our conception of time. This quantitative element is what comes to be in time; otherwise, time will not be everywhere, but in motion as in a substrate. And we end up again saying that time is motion. For interval would not be outside motion and motion would not be

\(^4\) Perhaps an allusion to something like a theoretical celestial water clock or clepsydra.
instantaneous. But what distinguishes the non-instantaneous from the instantaneous?

In fact, by being in time. And so extended motion and its interval are not themselves time but are in time.

If, though, one says that time is the interval of motion, meaning not the interval of motion itself but that in accordance with which the motion itself possesses extension, running in a way along with it, what this is still remains unexplained. For it is clear that time is that in which motion takes place. But this, namely, what time really is, was the very thing that our enquiry was looking for from the beginning. This, then, is the same as or almost identical to saying in answer to the question what time is that it is an interval of motion in time. What, then, is this interval which you are actually calling time yet put outside the interval which belongs to motion?

For the man who puts it in the motion itself will find it difficult to say where he is to put the extension of repose. For a thing can be in motion for the same length of time as another thing is in repose, and you would say that the time is identical for each of them, and thus obviously different from both. What, then, is this interval and what is its nature? For it cannot be spatial since this, too, is outside motion.

§3.7.9. We must now examine how time can be the number or better, since motion is continuous, the measure of motion.

First, in this question, too, we must express our concern, as we did also in the case of the interval of motion, about referring to ‘every kind of’ motion alike, if it is claimed that it is the measure of every motion. For how could one count motion that is disordered and irregular?

In fact, what would be its number or measure or what standard would apply to this measure? For if one measures with the identical measure each motion and all motion in general, quick and slow, the number and the measure will be just like the ten used to count horses and cattle or the identical measure applied to wet and dry commodities.

If measure is indeed like this, one has stated of what sort of things time is a measure, namely, motions, but not yet what time itself is. But if it is possible to take ‘ten’ and think of the number even without the horses, and the measure is a measure with its own particular nature even if it is not yet measuring, time, too, must have its own nature if it is a measure.

See Ar., Phys. 4.12.221b7 9.

See Ar., Phys. 4.11.21b2; DC 1.9.279a14. Simplicius, In Phys. 789.2 9, reports that the Peripatetic Strato of Lampats, corrected Aristotle’s definition of time from ‘number of motion’ to ‘measure of motion’ because number is a set of discrete units while motion is continuous.
If time is in itself something like a number, how does it differ from the number we have mentioned which is ten or from any other monadic number? But if time is a continuous measure, it will be a measure insofar as it is of a certain quantity, for example, a cubit in magnitude. So, it will be a magnitude like a line which runs, of course, along with motion. But how will this line which accompanies motion measure that which it accompanies? For why should one measure the other, rather than the other way round? And it is better and more plausible to say that it is not the measure of all motion, but of the one which it accompanies. This, though, must be something continuous; otherwise, the line which accompanies it will stop.

One should not understand that which measures as coming from outside or being separate, but as being together with the measured motion. And what will the measurer be?

In fact, that which is measured is the motion, and that which has measured is magnitude. And which of them will be time? Will it be the motion which is measured or the magnitude that did the measuring? For time will be either the motion that is measured by magnitude or the magnitude that measured or that which uses the magnitude as one uses the cubit to measure the extent of the motion. But in all these cases we must take for granted what we said was more plausible, uniform motion. For without uniformity and, in addition to that, unitary motion and the motion of the whole of heaven, the argument becomes more problematic for anyone proposing that time is some kind of measure.

Actually, if time is measured motion and measured by quantity, just as motion, if it is to be measured, must be measured not by itself but by something else, it is in this way necessary that – if indeed motion is to have a measure other than itself, and for this reason we need a continuous measure to measure it – in the identical manner, we need a measure for magnitude itself, so that motion can be measured, since that by which motion’s quantity is measured is itself something which has been accorded a certain quantity. And the number of the magnitude which accompanies motion and not the magnitude that accompanies it, will be the time we are looking for. But what could this be other than monadic number? But we must face the difficulty of how monadic number will measure. Since, if anyone does discover how, he will not discover time measuring but a particular quantity of time. And this is not identical to time. For it is one thing to talk of time, another to talk of

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47 I.e., an abstract multiplicity of units (‘monads’). Cf. 6.3.13.6; 6.6.9.35. See Ar., Meta. 13.6.108b19.
48 See Ar., Phys. 4.11.219b5 8.
a particular quantity of time. For before speaking of the quantity one must say what that is which is of a particular quantity.

But perhaps the number that measured motion from outside the motion is time, for example, ten when applied to the horses but not taken with the horses. But then it has not been said what this number is, which is what it is before it measures, like the number ten. Perhaps it is the number which measured motion in terms of before and after as it accompanied it. But it is still not clear what this number which measures in terms of before and after is. But then the number that measures in terms of before and after, whether it does so by a point or by anything else, will in any case be measuring according to time. And so time on this view will be one which measures by what is before and after while holding on to and being in contact with time in order to measure. For before and after are taken either as spatial, such as the starting point of a stadium, or they must be taken as temporal. For, in general, before and after refer respectively to the time which ends in the ‘now’ and the time which begins from the ‘now’. Time, then, is different from number which measures in terms of before and after not only any kind of motion but even ordered motion.

So, why, when number is added either to what is measured or to the measurer – for it is possible, we repeat, that the identical number both measures and is measured – will there be time, but when there is motion with the before and after fully present to it, there will not be time? It is as if one were to say that a magnitude does not have the magnitude it is unless someone had actually measured it.

And since time is and is said to be unlimited, how could there be number attached to it, unless one took a portion of it and measured the part; but time happened to exist in the part even before it came to be measured?

Why indeed can time not exist even before the soul is there to measure it unless one claims that it owes its generation to soul? For there is absolutely no need for time to owe its existence to the soul’s measuring it. For a thing exists as the size it is, even if no one measures it. But one could say that soul is what makes use of magnitude in order to measure. What relevance, though, does this have to our conception of time?

§3.7.10. To say that time is an accompaniment of motion does not tell us what it is nor does it have any meaning until one says what an

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49 See Ar., Phys. 4.11.219b1 2.
50 See Ar., Phys. 3.8.208a20; 4.13.222a29 30, b7; 8.10.267b25.
51 Cf. infra 11.43 45. See Ar., Phys. 4.11.218b21 219a2, 14.223a21 29.
accompanying thing is. For that might possibly be what time is. We must ask whether this accompaniment is later, concurrent, or before motion, if indeed there is such a thing as prior accompaniment. For however we express it, it is said to be in time. If this is the case, time will be an accompaniment of motion in time.

Since we are not looking for what time is not, but what it is, and much has been said on each theory by many of our predecessors which, if one were to go through them, one would be making something more like an historical enquiry; and since we have sketched out something of their views and it is possible from what we have already said to refute the man\textsuperscript{53} who argued that time is a measure of the motion of the universe and oppose him with the other things that have just been said about the measure of motion – for, apart from those concerning irregular motion, all the rest of the arguments raised against them will fit this case – it would be the appropriate point to say what one should think time is.

§3.7.11. We should actually take ourselves back again now to that condition which we said exists in eternity, that life which is unwavering, all together, unlimited from the very start, which in no way turns downwards, and is stable in its unity and in its direction to the One. Time did not yet exist, or at least did not belong to the intelligibles; but we\textsuperscript{54} will generate time through the expressed principle or nature of what comes after them.

Since, then, these certainly remained still in themselves, one couldn’t, I think, call on the Muses, who didn’t yet then exist, to say just ‘how’ time ‘first actually fell down’.\textsuperscript{55} But, if indeed the Muses did also exist then, one might perhaps call upon time itself, when it had come into being, to report how it became manifest or came to be.

It might speak of itself somewhat as follows: before, when it had not yet actually produced this ‘before’ and not yet been in need of ‘after’, it rested with Being [in eternity], not yet being time; rather, it also itself remained quiet in it [eternity]. But an all too meddling nature,\textsuperscript{56} that wanted to be in charge of itself, to belong to itself, and chose to seek for more than its present state, put itself to in motion, and time put itself, too, in motion, into an everlasting sequence of next, after, and not remaining identical, but moving from one thing to another, and we\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{53} Probably Alex. Aphr. See \textit{De temp.} §10.

\textsuperscript{54} Probably indicating the Platonic position as interpreted by Plotinus.

\textsuperscript{55} See Homer, \textit{Il.} 6.16.112 113.

\textsuperscript{56} Probably a reference to sensible nature, the lowest part of the soul of the cosmos or universe. Cf. 2.3.17.18 25.

\textsuperscript{57} The ‘we’ refers to l. 1 and l. 5 \textit{supra}, the argument of Platonists.
made a long drawn out trail and fashioned time as an image of eternity. For since there was in soul a power that was not quiet and wanted to keep changing into something else what it saw in the intelligible world, it was not willing to have everything present to it all together.

But just as the expressed principle unfurls itself from a dormant seed and makes a transition, as it thinks, to something large, obliterating the largeness by the fact that it has divided itself, and instead of a unity in itself, it squanders its unity no longer in itself and proceeds to a weaker extension; indeed, in the same way, the soul, too, as it produces, in imitation of the intelligible world, a sensible universe which moves not with the motion found in the intelligible world, but one that aims to have the sameness of an image, temporalized itself by creating time in place of eternity.\(^58\)

But next, it ensured that the universe that had come to be should be enslaved to time by making it exist in its entirety in time and encompassing all its processes within time. For since the universe moves in soul – for there is no other place for it, I mean, this universe, than soul – it follows that it moves in soul’s time as well.\(^59\) For because soul presents one of its activities after another, then another again in sequence, it has generated sequence along with its activity and what was not present before comes forth at the same time with one thought after another because discursive thinking was not activated nor was its present life like the one before it. Its life, then, is subject to difference and, as well as that, this ‘difference’ entails a different time. The extension of life, then, involves time, the ceaseless progression of life involves ceaseless time, and life which has passed involves past time.

Would it, then, make any sense to say that time is the life of the soul in its changing motion from one way of living to another? For if eternity is life in stability, identity, and sameness, and is unlimited from the start, and time must be an image of eternity, just as this universe is related to the one above, then instead of the life above we must say equivocally, in a way, that there is another life, that of this power of the soul; and instead of intellectual motion, there is the motion of a part of the soul. And instead of identity, sameness, and remaining in itself, there is not remaining in itself but exercising different actions, instead of the unextended and unity, the image of unity, the unity found in continuity; instead of being unlimited from the start and whole, there is the progression to infinity leading to continuous succession, and instead of the whole being gathered together, the whole which will and will forever be is going to exist, part by part. For in this way, it will imitate what is whole from the

\(^{58}\) Cf. 4.3.9-34; 4.4.15.12 19. See Pl., Tim. 36D9 E1.

\(^{59}\) Cf. infra 13.30 66.
start, together and unlimited from the beginning, if it wants to be always gaining something in its existence. For in this way, its existence will imitate that of the intelligible world.

We should not understand time as coming from outside the soul, just as eternity in the intelligible world is also not outside Being, and it is not an accompaniment or something coming after it, in the same way that is not the case in the intelligible world, but it is something which is seen to be inside it, that is, is both in it, and belonging to it, as eternity does in the intelligible world [in Being].

§3.7.12. From what we have said, we must think of the nature of time as the extent of the kind of life which consists of changes that are even and uniform in their silent procession, while it maintains continuity of activity.

Indeed, if in thought, we could turn this power back again and cease from the kind of life which it now has, one which is unstoppable and will never fail because it is the activity of a soul which exists always, a soul that is not turned to itself or in itself but engaged in production and generation – if, then, we could imagine it as no longer active but this activity as put on hold and this part of the soul, too, turned back towards the intelligible world and to eternity, and remaining still, what would there be after eternity? How could things differ from each other if everything rested in unity? How could there still be a ‘before’? How an ‘after’ or ‘future’? Where else could the soul cast its gaze other than where it is? Or rather not even here; for it would first have to stand apart from it in order to cast its gaze on it.

Then, not even this [cosmic] sphere would exist; its existence is not primary. For it, too, exists and moves in time and if it halts while soul remains active, we will be able to measure the length of time it is stationary as long as soul remains outside eternity. If, then, it should retreat and become unified and time is abolished, it is clear that the beginning of this motion towards things here and this way of life generate time. For this reason, it is also said that time came to be at the same time as this universe, because soul generated it along with it. For it was in an activity of this kind that this universe, too, was generated. And this activity is time, but the universe is in time.

But if someone says that Plato says that the motions of the stars, too, are times, he should recall that he says that these things take place to display and ‘determine time’ and ‘to be a clear measure’. For since it was not possible for soul to determine time itself or for people to

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60 I.e., time is both an essential part of soul and inseparable from it. So, it is not an ‘accompaniment’.
61 See Pl., Tim. 38B6.
62 See Pl., Tim. 29D1.
63 See Pl., Tim. 38C6; 39B2.
measure by themselves each part of it as it was invisible and could not be grasped and especially because they did not know how to count, the Demiurge made day and night by means of which it was possible to understand ‘two’ from their difference and from there, he says, arose the conception of number.

Next, when they took the quantity from one rising of the sun to the next, it was possible to work out the length of the interval of time since the type of motion on which we depend is uniform, and we make use of that sort of interval as a measure, a measure of time, since time itself is not a measure. For how could it measure time, if it is time, and what would it say as it was measuring, that it is as large as I am myself? Who, then, is this ‘I’?

In fact, it is that in accordance with which the measuring takes place. Since it does not, then, exist in order that it should measure, it is as it says it is and it is not actually a measure. And so the motion of the universe will be measured by time, and time will be, not as it really is but accidentally, a measure of its motion, since it is something else beforehand, and it will provide an indication of the quantity of the motion.

And when one motion taken in a certain length of time is counted several times it leads to the conception of the amount of time that has passed. And so, it would not be absurd to clarify the nature of time by saying that the motion, that is, the circuit of heaven in a way measures time, as far as is possible, by indicating in its own length the amount of time, since it is not possible to grasp or understand the amount of time in any other way. What is, then, measured by the circuit of heaven – that is, what is indicated – will be time, which is not produced, but revealed, by the circuit.

And so the measure of motion is that which has been measured by a motion which is already determined, and being measured by this, is other than it, since if it is one thing when measuring and something else insofar as it was being measured, it is measured accidentally. And to express it in this way comes to the same as saying, when attempting to define magnitude, that it is what is measured by a cubit, without saying what magnitude itself is, and as though one were not able to show what motion itself is because of its being indefinite, but were to declare that it is what has been measured by space; for if you take the space through

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64 See Pl., Tim. 39B6 C2; Pl. [?], Epin. 978D2 4; Ar., Phys. 8.9.265b11 16; DC 2.4. 287a2 24.
65 Reading οὐκοῦν ὅν, ἵνα μετρῇ (‘it does not exist in order that it should measure’) after a suggestion by Guyot.
which the motion passes, one could say the motion was the same amount as the space.

§3.7.13. The circuit of heaven, then, indicates time in which it is.\(^67\) But we must no longer think of time itself as having something in which it is, but in the first place as being what it is; and that other things move and stand still in a uniform and ordered manner in it; and that it is from something ordered that it appears and manifests itself in such a way that we have a conception of it, but doesn’t come into being from the ordered thing, whether that thing is stationary or in motion, though it is manifested more readily from something in motion.\(^68\) For motion rather than stability moves us to understand time and to make the change [from eternity] to time, and the quantitative aspect of a thing’s motion is something more easily understood than that of stability.

For this reason, they were led to call time the measure of motion rather than what is measured by motion\(^69\) and then to add on what it is that is measured by motion, without saying that this occurs accidentally to a part of it, and so putting it the wrong way round. Perhaps, though, they did not put it the wrong way round, but it is we who do not understand them, missing their meaning when they were speaking clearly of a measure in the sense of what is measured.\(^70\) The reason for our misunderstanding is that they didn’t make clear in their writings whether time is measuring or being measured, since they were writing for people who knew and were present at their lectures.

Plato, however, said that the substantiality of time was neither measuring nor being measured by something, but in order to make time manifest, the circuit of heaven was taken as a minimum corresponding to the smallest interval of time\(^71\) so that one could get to know from it the nature and extent of time.

But since he wanted to clarify its substantiality, he says that it came to be simultaneously with heaven with eternity as its model and as an image that is moving,\(^72\) because time, too, does not stand still given that the life, which it accompanies and runs along with, is not still. And ‘simultaneously with heaven’ because it is the kind of life that produces heaven, too, a single life which fashions time and heaven. If this life, then, were to turn back to unity, if that were possible, time, too, would at

\(^{67}\) Reading \(\alpha\nu\tau\eta\) with HS\(^4\) following Kirchhoff.  
\(^{68}\) See Ar., Phys. 4.12.221b22 27.  
\(^{69}\) See Ar., Phys. 4.12.22ob14 16, but also other Peripatetics like Alexander of Aphrodisias.  
\(^{70}\) See Ar., Phys. 4.12.22ob19.  
\(^{71}\) See Pl., Tim. 39B C.  
\(^{72}\) See Pl., Tim. 38B6 C2; 37D5.
the same moment have ceased since it exists in this life, and heaven, too, since it would no longer possess this life.

But if someone were to take the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of motion in this cosmos and call it time – with the claim that it is something that exists – but were to deny existence to that more authentic motion which also has a ‘before’ and ‘after’, this would be most absurd. For in doing this, one is assigning to inanimate motion on its own account the possession of ‘before’ and ‘after’ and time, but not assigning it to the motion to which this lower one, too, owes its existence by imitating it, and from which ‘before’ and ‘after’ were both first constituted; since it is a motion which puts itself into motion and just as it generates each of its activities, so, too, it generates what follows and also, simultaneously with their generation, their transition from one to the other.

Why do we, then, refer this motion of the universe to the soul that contains it and say this motion is in time, and yet not say that the motion of soul which is in it and is in everlasting process is also in time? In fact, it is because what is prior to soul is eternity which does not run parallel or stretch along with soul.

Soul, then, was the first to enter time and generate time and possess time along with its own activity. How, then, can it be everywhere? It can because soul, too, has removed itself from no part of the universe, just as the soul in us has not removed itself from any part of us.

But if someone were to say that time is not a real existent, it is clear that he would have to state that he was making a false statement whenever he says ‘was’ and ‘will be’. For ‘will be’ and ‘was’ have the same existence as that in which he says he ‘will be’. Still, we need another kind of argument to oppose people of this kind.

In addition to what we have said, we must consider this, too, that when one grasps how far a moving human being has gone forward, one grasps also how much is the motion, and when he observes the motion, for example, achieved through the legs, he should observe the quantity of the motion there was in him [that is, motion of the soul] before this motion, if it is the case that it contains the motion of the body for this duration. Indeed, the body, when it is moved, will trace back the specific interval of time to the specific motion – for it is the cause – and the time taken by this motion, and this in turn leads back to the motion of the soul, which is divided in equal intervals. So, to what does the motion of the soul lead back? The thing to which one wants to lead it back is

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73 The motion of the soul of the cosmos. 74 Cf. 4.4.15.12 13.
75 See Ar., Phys. 4.12.221b31f. This is perhaps the Stoic position. See SVF 2.521 (= Plutarch, De comm. not. 1081c). Also, see Sext. Emp., M. 10.190 192.
76 Reading καταθέτειν αὐτὸν with HS4.
unextended from the start. This [motion of soul] then is what exists primarily and is that in which the rest exist, but is not itself in anything; for it will not have anything to be in. And the same applies to the soul of the universe.

Is time then also in us?

In fact, it is in all souls of the appropriate kind and in an equal manner in each soul, and all souls are one. For this reason, time is not scattered apart; for neither is eternity which is present in another manner in all things of the same kind.

77 I.e., embodied souls.
78 Cf. 4.1.2.40; 4.9; 6.4.4.34.
79 I.e., intelligibles.
3.8 (30)

On Nature, Contemplation, and the One

INTRODUCTION

This treatise forms part of a longer work [‘the Grossschrift’] (which includes 5.8, 5.5, and 2.9) which Porphyry split up in his edition. It is his most ambitious discussion of the vital role of contemplation and of all its different forms and intensities at every level of reality. Although he is primarily concerned with the structure of reality itself, the activity of individual human contemplation surfaces frequently throughout.

SUMMARY

§1. Let us suppose in a playful way that all things contemplate.
§2. At the lowest level nature, like a craftsman, works on matter by means of its contemplation and the expressed principle.
§3. Nature’s contemplation produces without being itself affected.
§4. Nature would say that its product flows from its contemplation, just as it flowed from its producer. Its contemplation is only an image of a higher form of contemplation and its product a by-product.
§5. Contemplation at the level of soul.
§6. Action also leads to contemplation.
§7. Contemplation at the level of Being produces active contemplative expressed principles which give form at every level. Failure is due to the progressive weakening of contemplation.
§8. In Intellect contemplation is identical with the object of contemplation. It is the primary life and all life at every level is contemplative.
§9. Intellect is not the first. The One, the Good, is beyond it. We can have access even to this.

§10. The One is not everything but is the productive power and source of everything.

§11. Intellect needs the Good, but the Good is not in need of anything.
§3.8.1. If, before attempting to be serious, we were actually to begin by playing and say that all things aim at contemplation and look to this goal, not only rational but also non-rational animals\(^1\) and nature in plants and the earth which produces them, and that all things achieve it as far as they can in their natural state, but contemplate and achieve it in different ways, and some in a genuine manner, others by acquiring an imitation and image of it, would anyone put up with the oddity of the statement?

In fact, when the issue has been raised amongst ourselves, there will be no harm in playing with what is ours.

Are we, too, then contemplating right now when we are playing?\(^2\)

In fact, both we and all who play are contemplating or at least desire this when we are playing. And, as it happens, whether it is a child or a man that plays or is serious, he is going to be playing or he is being serious for the sake of contemplation; and every action is going to involve a serious tendency to contemplation; compulsory action\(^3\) in a stronger manner,\(^4\) drawing contemplation towards externals, but so-called voluntary action less so while still originating in a desire for contemplation. But we will deal with this later.\(^5\)

For now, let us ask about earth itself and trees and plants in general what contemplation is in their case, how we will trace back what is produced or generated from the earth to the activity of contemplation, and how nature, which they\(^6\) say is without a mental image and reason, both possesses contemplation within itself and produces what it produces through contemplation which it does not have and yet somehow does have.\(^6\)

§3.8.2. It is, I think, clear to everyone that there is no question here of hands or feet or of any instrument, whether acquired from outside or

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\(^1\) See Ar., EN \textit{10.2.1172b10}, on the view of Eudoxus.

\(^2\) Deleting καὶ with Theiler.

\(^3\) Comma inserted here with Theiler.

\(^4\) Cf. \textit{infra} 5 6.


\(^6\) Reading καὶ πως (‘somehow’) with Kirchhoff.
Enneads 3.8.2

built in, but of matter for it [nature] to work on and to which it applies form. And one must also exclude levering from natural production; for what kind of pushing or leverage produces different colours of all shades and shapes? Not even the fashioners of wax models\(^7\) can produce colours without bringing them in to what they are fashioning from elsewhere; and people looked at them and actually thought that nature’s creation is similar.

Those, however, who are making this comparison ought to have considered that just as in the case of those who practise such crafts something must remain in them in accordance with which, while still remaining in them, they produce their artefacts by means of their hands, they must also go back to a similar thing in nature and understand that here, too, all the power that produces not by means of hands must remain and remain entire. For there is, indeed, no need for it [power] to have some parts that remain and others that are in motion, for matter is what is in motion, but nothing in power is in motion; otherwise, it [power] will not be the prime mover, nor will nature be this [the prime mover], but that which is unmoved in the whole [of nature].

Someone might indeed say that the expressed principle is unmoved, whereas nature itself is different from the expressed principle and is in motion. But if they go on to say that nature is entirely in motion, the expressed principle, too, will be in motion. But if any part of nature is unmoved, this would, in fact, be the expressed principle.\(^8\) For nature must be a form and not composed of matter and form;\(^9\) for what need does it have of warm or cold matter?

In fact, the matter which underlies and is worked on comes bringing this, or rather the matter, though not possessing quality, becomes such, when subject to an expressed principle. For it is not fire that has to approach for matter to become fire, but an expressed principle.

This is no minor sign that in animals and in plants expressed principles are what produces and that nature is an expressed principle, which makes another expressed principle, its production, which in turn gives something to the substrate while it itself remains. And so the final expressed principle, which is in the visible shape,\(^10\) is at this stage a corpse and is unable to make another expressed principle, but the one which possesses life, as the brother of the one which made the shape and itself having the identical power, produces something in what has come to be.\(^11\)

\(^7\) See Pl., Tim. 74C6.  \(^8\) Cf. 3.2.4.12 16.  \(^9\) See Ar., Phys. 2.1.193b12, 18.
\(^10\) Cf. 5.8.7.12 16; 5.9.6.20 24.
\(^11\) Here nature is distinguished from its image, which gives ‘shape’ to bodies. The ‘brother’ here probably refers to souls of individual bodies. Cf. 4.3.6; 2.9.18. 14 17. On sensible bodies as corpses, cf. 2.4.5.16 18; 3.4.1.7.
§3.8.3. How, then, while the expressed principle produces, that is, produces in this way, could it attain to any kind of contemplation?

In fact, if it produces while remaining, that is, both remaining in itself and an expressed principle, it would itself be contemplation. For action would occur in accordance with an expressed principle being clearly different from it; but the expressed principle, which accompanies action and looks after it, would not be action. Then, if it is not action but an expressed principle, it is contemplation. And in the case of every expressed principle, the one that is last is derived from contemplation and is contemplation in the sense that it is what has been contemplated, but the one prior to this is all contemplation, though part of it is contemplation in a different way, that is, not as nature but as soul, and the other part is in nature, that is, is identical to nature.

Does nature itself also really derive from contemplation? Yes, entirely from contemplation. But is it itself [produced] by contemplating itself?

In fact, how else? For it is the result of contemplation and of something that has contemplated. But how does nature have contemplation? It doesn’t have it, certainly, from reasoning; by ‘from reasoning’ I mean looking over its own contents. Why, then, is this so given that it is a life, an expressed principle, and productive power? Is it because to ‘look over’ is not yet to possess? But it does possess and it is precisely because it possesses that it also produces.

So for it, being what it is, the act of producing and being something that produces is precisely what it is. But it is contemplation and object of contemplation, since it is an expressed principle. And so by being contemplation, object of contemplation, and an expressed principle, it also produces insofar as it is these things. Its producing has, therefore, been shown by us to be contemplation. For it is the result of a contemplation that remains, a contemplation which has not done anything else but has produced by being contemplation.

§3.8.4. And if someone were to ask nature why it produces, if it were willing to listen and answer the questioner it would say: ‘You should not ask but understand and fall silent yourself, as I am silent and not accustomed to speak. Understand what, then? That what comes to be is my vision, in my silence, an object of contemplation that comes to be by nature, and that since I come to be from this sort of contemplation, it is necessary for me to have a contemplation-loving nature. And my contemplating produces an object of contemplation, just as geometricians

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12 See Ar., *D.I* 3.11.434a16 21. 13 Cf. 3.2.1.34 45. 14 Reading ἐμὸν σχοπώσης with HS4.
draw lines as they contemplate. But without my drawing, while I contemplate, the lines of bodies come to exist as though falling out of me. And my experience is the same as that of my mother and those who begat me.\textsuperscript{15} For they, too, are a result of contemplation and my birth has come about without them doing anything, but since they are greater expressed principles and contemplate themselves, I have come to be.\textsuperscript{16}

What, then, does this mean? It means that what we call ‘nature’ is a soul, offspring of a prior soul having a more powerful life, holding contemplation still within itself not directed to what is above, nor even to what is below, but stationary in what it is, in its own stable position, it saw what comes after it by a comprehension of this kind and a sort of self-awareness\textsuperscript{17} as far as it can and it no longer searched but has perfected a beautiful and graceful vision.

And if anyone wants to grant it some kind of comprehension or perception, it is not what we call perception and comprehension in other cases, but as if someone were to compare awareness in sleep to the self-awareness of someone awake. For it is at rest in contemplating itself as object of contemplation which has come to it from its abiding in and with itself, and from its being an object of contemplation. And its contemplation is soundless, but more clouded.

For there is another type of contemplation clearer than it in its vision, and nature is an image of this other type. Indeed, for this reason, what is generated by it is also completely weak because a contemplation that is weak makes a weak object of contemplation. Human beings, too, when they are weak in contemplation, produce action as a shadow of contemplation and reason. For their faculty of contemplation is not adequate for them due to weakness of soul, and being unable to grasp adequately the object of their vision and because of this not being filled [by it], yet still desirous of seeing it, they are carried towards action so that they can see [with their eyes] what they cannot see with their intellect. Whenever they do succeed in producing something, they also want to see it for themselves and others to contemplate and perceive it, whenever their project is realized as far as it can be in action.

Indeed, everywhere we will find that production and action are a weakened form of contemplation or a consequence of contemplation; a weakness where a person has nothing in mind beyond what has been made, a consequence where he has something prior to this to

\textsuperscript{15} ‘Mother’ refers to the soul of the cosmos and the ‘begetters’ refers to the expressed principles in soul derived from Forms in Intellect.

\textsuperscript{16} On the self contemplation of Forms, cf. 3.9.6; 5.1.4.

\textsuperscript{17} Reading in lines 19 20 καὶ [ὁίον συναίσθησεί] τῇ συνέσει ταύτη καὶ <ὁίον> συναίσθησει with HS. 
contemplate which is superior to what has been produced. For why
would anyone go after the image of what is genuine as their first choice,
if he can contemplate what is genuine? And less intelligent children are
also evidence of this; not being capable of study and theory, they turn to
crafts and manual work.

§3.8.5. But now that, in our discussion of nature, we have said in what
way generation is contemplation, let us go to the soul before this18 and
say how its contemplation, its love of learning, its inquisitive nature,19
the birth pangs from the things it recognized and its completeness have
produced it, so that when it has become entirely an object of contem-
plation, it produces another object of contemplation. It is like the way in
which craft produces; when each craft is complete it produces a kind of
little craft in a toy which possesses a reflection of everything. But in
other respects these visions and objects of contemplation are like things
dim and unable to help themselves.

So the first part of soul20 which is above and is always being filled and
illuminated by what is above remains in the intelligible world, while the
other part, by means of the first participation in it as participant, goes
forth21 in participation.22 For life always goes forth from life, since
activity reaches everywhere and is not absent from anywhere. Yet as it
goes forth, it allows the prior part to remain where it left it; for if it were
to abandon its prior part, it would no longer be everywhere but only at
the last point which it reached. But what goes forth is not equivalent to
what has remained.

If, then, it must be everywhere and there must be nowhere where its
activity is not present and the prior must be different from the posterior,
and if activity derives from contemplation or action – and action did not
yet exist for it cannot precede contemplation – it is necessary that one
activity is weaker than another, but all of it is contemplation. And so the
action which appears to be in accordance with contemplation is the
weakest contemplation; for what is produced must always be of the same
kind [as what produces it], but weaker because it becomes attenuated23
as it descends. Indeed, everything goes forth without sound because
there is no need of any visible and externally originating contemplation
or action, while both the soul which contemplates and that which
contemplates in the way described, inasmuch as it does so externally

18 This is the soul of the cosmos.
19 See Pl., Phdr. 251B5f.
20 Deleting τὸ λογιστικὸν with HS4, following Kirchhoff, which may be a gloss.
21 Reading μεταλαμβάνων <πρόσεις> with HS4.
22 The distinction between the soul of the cosmos and nature is analogous to the distinc-
tion between the undescended and descended parts of the intellect. Cf. 3.2.2.18–33.
23 See Pl., Rep. 497B4, of a seed.
and not in the same way as what went before it, produces what comes after it and contemplation produces contemplation. For contemplation does not have a limit nor does the object of contemplation.

This is why [soul contemplates]; in fact, this is why it is everywhere. For where is it not present since it is also identical in every soul? For it is not circumscribed by magnitude. Yet it is not present in the same way in everything with the result that it is not even present in every part of soul in the same way. For this reason, the charioteer gives the horses something of what he saw, while it is obvious that the horses which have taken it would have a desire for what they saw. For they did not receive all of it. But if they are to act on this desire, they are acting for the sake of what they desire. And that was an object of contemplation and contemplation.

§ 3.8.6. Action, therefore, is for the sake of contemplation and for an object of contemplation. And so contemplation is the goal even for those who are acting, and what they are unable to obtain in a straight line, in a way, they seek to grasp by a circuitous route. For whenever they succeed in achieving the object of their desire, which they want to come to be, not because they want to be ignorant of it, but rather to know and see it present in their soul; in this case, it is clear that it lies there as something to be contemplated. And that is also because they act for the sake of a good. And they do this not so that it should be outside them nor that they should not possess it, but so that they should possess the good that comes from action.

Where is this? In the soul. Action, then, turns back again to contemplation. For what else could that be which someone receives in his soul, which is itself an expressed principle, than a silent expressed principle? And all the more silent the more [the soul possesses it within]. For then it holds its peace and seeks nothing since it has been filled. And contemplation in such a person lies within because he is confident in its possession. And as the confidence becomes clearer, the contemplation, too, becomes stiller, which enables the soul to bring the contemplation into unity. And that which knows insofar as it knows – for now we must be serious – comes into unity with what is known.

For if they are two, the knower will be one thing and the known another, so that they lie side by side, in a way, and this pair is not yet reconciled by the soul, just like expressed principles which although present in the soul produce nothing. For this reason, the expressed principle must not remain external but be unified with the soul of the learner until he discovers what is his own.

24 See Pl., Phdr. 247D1 Ec6. 25 Cf. supra 1.1ff. 26 Cf. 1.3.4.18.
The soul, then, when it has become reconciled to [the known] and disposed [in accordance with an expressed principle], still proceeds to bring it forth and set it to the fore – for it did not possess it in a primary way – and to learn it. And by bringing it forth it becomes, in a way, different from it and, when it reasons, looks upon it as being other than itself. And yet soul was itself an expressed principle and a sort of intellect, but one that is looking at another; for it is not full, but lacking compared with its prior. It, too, however, sees in stillness what it brings forth. For it no longer brings forth what it has brought forth well, but by its very deficiency brings forth for investigation and learns what it has.

But in active persons, the soul fits what it has to the external. And by its greater possession, it is stiller than nature, and by its being fuller it is more contemplative, but because it does not possess perfectly, it desires to have to a greater degree the knowledge of what it has contemplated and the contemplation which is the result of the investigation of it. And when the soul abandons itself and comes into the company of other things, and next is returning once again, it sees with the part which it left behind; but the soul which remains stationary in itself does this less. For this reason, the virtuous person has already completed reasoning when he reveals what is within him to another, but in relation to himself he is vision.\(^{27}\) For this person is already directed towards the One and to stillness not only amongst externals, but also with respect to himself and everything internal.

§3.8.7. That everything, then, comes from contemplation and is contemplation, both the Beings that truly are and those things that come from them when they contemplate and which are themselves objects of contemplation, some for sense-perception, others for knowing or belief; that actions, too, have their goal in knowing and their desire is for knowing and that what is produced from contemplation has its goal in a further form and object of contemplation; that, in general, each thing is an imitation of what produced it and produces [further] objects of contemplation and forms, and the beings that come to exist, being imitations of Beings, reveal that their producers have as their goal not acts of production and actions, but the finished product in order to contemplate it; that both acts of discursive reason and even before them acts of sense-perception, whose aim is to know, want to look upon this; and that before these, nature produces the object of contemplation and an expressed principle in itself, perfecting another expressed principle, all this is, I think, clear, some of it is self-evident, and some again our account has brought back to mind.

\(^{27}\) Cf. 4.4.12.5 18.
This, then, too, is clear, namely, that when the primary Beings are engaged in contemplation everything else, too, of necessity desires this, if indeed for all things their starting point is their goal. Another reason is as follows: whenever living beings generate, the expressed principles that are within them cause the motion, and this is an activity of contemplation and the birth pain of producing many forms and objects of contemplation, and filling everything with expressed principles and a sort of continuous contemplation. For to produce is to make a form exist and this means to fill everything with contemplation. And the failures, both in what comes to be and in actions, are due to the divergence of those that contemplate from the object of contemplation. And the bad craftsman is like someone who produces ugly forms. Lovers, too, are among those who see and hasten on towards a form.

§ 3.8.8. This is our account of the matter. But when contemplation ascends from nature to Soul and from Soul to Intellect, the acts of contemplation are even more fully appropriated by, that is, more unified with, the contemplators. In the case of the virtuous person’s soul, that which is known approaches becoming identical with the substrate which contemplates, inasmuch as it hastens to Intellect. In Intellect, it is clear that the two are already one not by appropriation, as in the case of the best soul, but in Substantiality because ‘thinking and Being are identical’. For there is no longer one thing and another; if there were, there would then be yet another again, which would no longer be one thing and another. It must be, then, that Intellect comprises both as really one.

But this is a contemplation that is alive, not an object of contemplation like that in another. What is in another is living on account of that, but not living for itself. If, then, an object of contemplation or thought is to be alive, it must be a life itself, not the life of the faculties of growth and of sense-perception or of the rest of soul. For other lives are also somehow acts of intellection; but one kind of intellection is that of the faculty of growth, another belongs to the faculty of sense-perception, and another to the soul. How are they instances of intellection? Because they are expressed principles. And every life is intellection of a sort, but one kind more obscure than another, just as life is, too.

This life, however, is more clear and is the primary Life and primary Intellect, and these are one. And so the first life is intellection...
and the second life is a second kind of intellection, and the last life is
a final form of intellection. And so all life is of this kind and is intellec-
tion. People might perhaps say that there are different kinds of life,
though they do not say these are different kinds of intellection, but
rather that some are instances of intellection, others not intellection at
all, doing this because they do not investigate what life in general is. But
we really must point out the following, that our argument demonstrates
once again that all beings are a by-product of contemplation. So, if the
truest life is life with intellection, and this is identical with the truest
intellection, then the truest intellection is alive, and contemplation and
the object of the highest kind of contemplation are alive and are life, and
the two are together one.

If, then, these two are one, how can this one also be many?\(^33\)
In fact, it is because it does not contemplate what is one. Since even
when it contemplates the One, it does so not as one. If this were not so, it
would not become Intellect. But beginning as one, it did not remain as it
began, but, becoming many without noticing it, in a way ‘weighed
down’\(^34\) it unfolded itself in its wish to have everything – how much
better it would have been for it not to want this, for it became second – as
a circle comes to be by deploying itself; shape, plane, circumference,
centre, radii, some parts above, others below. Hence, the starting points
are better, the end points inferior. For the goal is not of the same kind as
the origin-and-goal nor again the origin-and-goal the same as the origin
alone.

And, to express it differently, Intellect is not the intellect of one
particular thing, but Intellect as a whole. And being Intellect as
a whole, it is the Intellect of everything. And so since it is all Beings
and belongs to all Beings even its part must possess all Beings. If this is
not so, it will have some part that is not Intellect and it will be composed
from non-intellects; and it will be a heap gathered up waiting to become
an intellect out of all things. For this reason, it is unlimited in this way
and, if anything comes from it, there is no diminution, neither of that
which comes from it, because it, too, is everything, nor of that from
which it comes, because it was not a composite formed from parts.

\(\S\) 3.8.8. This, then, is what Intellect is like; for this reason, it is not the
first, but there must be what is ‘beyond’\(^35\) it – the previous arguments
also lead up to this – first, because a multiplicity comes after unity. And
while Intellect is Number,\(^36\) the real One is the principle of Number
and Number of this kind. And this Intellect is also at the same time

\(^33\) Cf. 4.8.3.10; 5.1.8.26; 5.3.15.10 22; 5.4.1.20 21; 6.7.14.1 18, etc.
\(^34\) See Pl., Symp. 203B7. \(^35\) See Pl., Rep. 509B9. \(^36\) Cf. 5.1.5.6 17; 5.5.5.2 14.
intelligible,\(^{37}\) so that at the same time there are two. But if there are two, we must grasp what is before the two. What, then, is it? Is it just Intellect on its own? But the intelligible is yoked to every intellect; so if the intelligible is not to be yoked with it, Intellect will not exist either. If, then, it is not Intellect, but shuns duality, what is before these two transcend Intellect.

Why, then, couldn’t it be the intelligible?

In fact, it is because that which is intelligible, too, is yoked to Intellect. Then, if it is to be neither Intellect nor intelligible, what could it be? We will say that it is that from which comes Intellect and the intelligible that is with it. What, then, is this and what sort of thing are we to imagine it to be? For it is certainly going to be either something that thinks or something that is without thought. If, then, it is thinking, it will be Intellect, but if it is without thought it will be ignorant even of itself. What, then, is dignified in that?\(^{38}\) For if we were to say that it is the Good and is the most simple thing, we will still not be saying anything clear and distinct, even if we are saying what is true, so long as we do not possess a firm foundation for our discursive thinking when we speak.

For, again, if knowledge of other things comes about by means of intellect and it is by intellect that we are able to know Intellect, with what sort of concentrated apprehension will that be seized which transcends the nature of Intellect? We shall say to the person to whom we must make clear how this is possible that it is by means of that in us which is the same as it.\(^{39}\) For there is something of it even within us.\(^{40}\)

In fact, there is nowhere where it is not, for those able to partake of it.\(^{41}\) For wherever you place that which is able to possess what is omnipresent, it is from there that you possess it. Just as when a voice fills an empty space or human beings, too, as well as the space, in whatever part of the empty space you place your ear you will receive the voice as a whole and yet not all of it.

What, then, is it that we receive when we apply our intellect?

In fact, the intellect must, in a way, retreat to what is behind it and somehow let go of itself to what is behind it, since it looks both ways, and in the intelligible world,\(^{32}\) if it wants to see the One, it must be not entirely intellect. For Intellect is itself the primary Life since it is activity engaged in its progression through everything, not a progression which is progressing but one which has progressed. If, then, it is indeed both Life and is progression and possesses everything precisely and not in

\(^{37}\) See Ar., *DA* 3.4.430a2 3.

\(^{38}\) See Pl., *Sapb.* 249A1; Ar., *Meta.* 11.9.1074b17 18.

\(^{39}\) Cf. 6.9.4.26 28, 11.30 32.

\(^{40}\) Reading αὐτοῦ τὸ with HS4.

\(^{41}\) Cf. 5.1.11.6 7.

\(^{42}\) Reading κοινο[ν] with Armstrong.
a general way – for it would then possess them imperfectly and in an inarticulate way – it must itself come from something else which is no longer in progression, but is the principle of progression, the principle of Life, the principle of Intellect and of all things. For all things are not a principle, but all things are from a principle. And this is no more all things, nor any of them, to enable it to generate all things and not be a multiplicity, but the principle of multiplicity. For that which generates is everywhere simpler than that which is generated.

If, then, this generated Intellect, it must be simpler than Intellect. And if someone were to suppose that the One itself is everything, either it will be each one of everything one by one or all together. Now, if it is all gathered together, it will be subsequent to everything. But if it is prior to everything, everything will be other than it and it will be other than everything. And if it is itself and everything at the same time, it will not be a principle. It must, however, be a principle and be prior to everything so that everything can exist after it. And if it is each one of all things separately, first any one will be identical with any other and next, all will be together and nothing will be distinct. And for this reason, it is none of all things, but prior to all things.\(^{43}\)

\(\S\) 3.8.10. What indeed is it? It is the productive power of all things.\(^ {44}\) If it did not exist, neither would all things, nor would Intellect be the primary total Life. And that which is beyond Life is cause of Life.\(^ {45}\) For the activity of life which is all things is not primary, but is poured forth as though from a spring. Think of a spring which has no other source, but gives all of itself to rivers while not exhausting itself in the rivers but quietly remaining itself, while the streams which go forth from it are still all together before they flow their separate ways, yet at this point they already know as individual rivers in what direction they will release their waters; or of life in a huge plant passing through its entirety while the source remains as though seated in the root and is not scattered around it all. So, this source presents life in its total multiplicity to the plant, but itself remains non-many. And this is no great wonder.

The wonder is, rather, how the multiplicity of life has come from what is not a multiplicity and how the multiplicity would not exist unless what preceded the multiplicity was a thing that was not a multiplicity. For the source is not divided into the whole, since if it had been so divided it would have destroyed the whole as well; nor would the whole continue to exist if the source did not continue to remain in itself and different.\(^ {46}\) For this reason, in all cases [of multiplicity], the ascent is to

\(^{43}\) Cf. 3.9.4-3 9; 5.2.1.1 2; 5.3.11.14 21, 13.2 3; 5.4.2.39 42; 5.5.13.33 36.
\(^{44}\) Cf. 5.1.7-9 10; 5.3.15.32 35; 5.4.1.36 2; 38; 6.9.5.36. See Pl., Rep. 599B9 10.
\(^{45}\) 1.6.7.11 12; 5.3.16.35 38; 6.7.18.16 31. \(^{46}\) Cf. 5.2.2.13 17.
a one. And there is some one in each case to which you will trace it back; and this whole you will trace back to a one before it, not an absolute one, until you come to the absolute One; and this no longer [goes back] to another one.

But if you take the one of the plant, and this is also its source which remains, the one of a living being, the one of the soul, and the one of the universe, you take in each case the most powerful and valued thing. But if you take the One belonging to true Beings, their ‘principle and source’ and power, are we to lose faith and suppose it to be nothing?

In fact, it is none of the things whose source it is, yet is the sort of thing which, because nothing can be predicated of it, not Existence, not Substantiality, not Life, is a thing beyond them. And if you grasp it after removing Existence from it, you will be amazed. Cast yourself towards it and encounter it taking rest within it; unite your thought with it more and more by knowing it through immediate contact with it and by beholding its greatness through what comes after it and is caused by it.

§ 3.8.11. And you can consider it further in the following way. Since Intellect is a kind of sight and a sight that is seeing, it will be [like] a potency which is actualized. So, there will be its matter and its form, though matter here is intelligible. Besides, actual seeing, too, is twofold; before seeing it was one; then, the one became two and the two one. The completion and, in a way, perfecting of sight, then, comes from the sensible, but for the sight of Intellect it is the Good which completes it; for if Intellect was the Good, what need would it have to see or be active at all?

For other things have their activity with respect to and for the sake of the Good, whereas the Good has no need of anything. And so it has nothing but itself. For this reason, when you have uttered ‘the Good’, don’t make any mental additions. For if you add anything, you will make that to which you have added something deficient. For this reason, don’t, then, even add thinking so as not to make it into something else and make it two, Intellect and Good. For while Intellect needs the Good, the Good does not need Intellect. Hence, even when it acquires the Good it becomes Good-like and is perfected by the Good when the form which comes upon it from the Good makes it Good-like. One should conceive of the archetype as being similar by forming an idea of its true archetype from the trace which comes upon Intellect.

The Good has bestowed its trace upon Intellect to have by seeing it, so that whereas in Intellect there is desire and it both desires and attains

47 See Pl., Phdr. 245C9.
48 Omitting the τὸ in l. 28 with Ficino, Theiler, and Kalligas.
49 Cf. 5.3.16.5 16; 6.7.41.14 17. 50 See Pl., Rep. 509A3.
forever, the Good neither desires – what would it desire? – nor attains, for it did not even desire. So, it isn’t even Intellect. For in Intellect there is desire and convergence with its form.

Indeed, since Intellect is beautiful and the most beautiful of all, and lies in pure light and a ‘pure ray of light’ and embraces the nature of Being, whose shadow and image is also seen in this beautiful universe of ours, and since it lies in total splendour, because there is nothing non-intelligible, dark or unmeasured in it, living a blessed life, awe takes hold of the one who sees it and who, plunging into it in the way he should, becomes one with it. And just as someone who looks up to heaven, as he sees the brilliance of the stars, certainly thinks of their creator and seeks it, so, too, when someone who has contemplated the intelligible world, looked into it, and also marvelled at its creator, therefore must also enquire what it was that brought such a thing into existence or how, a creator who has begotten such a child as Intellect, a beautiful boy, who derived his fullness from it.

For surely there is no way in which the Good can be either Intellect or fullness, but is prior to Intellect and fullness. For Intellect and fullness are after it, since they have need of it to be filled and to complete their thought. And they are close to what has no needs and does not in any way need to think, but they possess true fullness and intellection, because they have it primarily. But what is before them neither needs nor possesses anything; otherwise, it would not be the Good.

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51 See Pl., *Phdr.* 250C’.  
52 A pun on κόρος (‘boy’ and ‘fullness’). Cf. 5.1.4.8, 7.33; 5.9.8.8. See Pl., *Crat.* 396B.
INTRODUCTION
This series of short miscellaneous notes was inserted by Porphyry to make up the ninth treatise in the third Ennead (set of nines). The ideas contained in them may be found in other treatises, although the discussion of the unity of Intellect (3.9.1), while promoting his usual view, does give some consideration to the idea of an Intellect at rest, a concept entertained by Amelius.

SUMMARY
§1. Interpretation of Timaeus 39E7–9. Intellect and its object are a unity.
§2. We are in the intelligible world when we are unified like the theorems of a complete science.
§3. Souls are not in body but rather the opposite. Individual souls, however, do in a certain sense depart from their origin and return, look to what is above or what is below.
§4. Multiplicity comes from the One because the One is everywhere and nowhere.
§5. Intellect is matter for soul.
§6. There is an Intellect at rest prior to our own intellect as thinking.
§7. The One transcends motion, rest, and thinking.
§8. Potentiality and actuality in corporeals and incorporeals.
§9. The One is beyond all activity and thinking.
Various Considerations

§3.9.1. ‘Intellect’, Plato says, ‘sees the Ideas that are in the Living Being’. Then, he says, the Demiurge ‘plans’ that ‘this universe, too, should have’ the things that ‘Intellect sees in the Living Being’. Is he saying, then, that the Forms already exist before Intellect and that Intellect thinks them when they themselves exist? So, we must first investigate regarding the Living Being, whether it is not Intellect but something different from Intellect. For that which contemplates is Intellect.

So [one might say], the Living Being is not itself Intellect, but we will be saying that it is intelligible and we will say that Intellect has what it sees outside itself. It, therefore, has images and not the truth, if the true Beings are in the intelligible world. For Plato says that truth, too, is in the intelligible world in Being, where each thing is itself what it is.

In fact, even if one is different from the other, they [Intellect and Being] are not separate from each other, except by being different.

Next, as far as Plato’s text is concerned, there is nothing to prevent them both being one, but distinguished from each other in thought, only so long as one is seen as being intelligible and the other as thinking. For he says that what it sees is not entirely in something else but in itself because it has the intelligible within it.

In fact, there is nothing to prevent the intelligible from being itself Intellect in its stability and unity and stillness, and that the nature of the Intellect that sees the [other] Intellect [that is, Intellect in stability, etc.] which is within it is an activity coming from that [other] Intellect and one which sees [the other]; and in seeing that Intellect it is, in a sense, its Intellect because it thinks it; and in thinking it, it is itself Intellect and

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1 See Pl., Tim. 39E7 9.
2 See Pl., Pbdr. 247C E.
3 See Pl., Tim. 30C7 8. This passage says that the Forms are in the Living Being, not in the Demiurge. Kalligas suggests that Plotinus might have had a text that read ἐκείνος and not ἐκεῖνο, thus referring to the Demiurge and not the Living Being. Alternatively, see 5.5 for Plotinus’ argument for the claim that he rightly or wrongly takes to be in the Timaeus passage.
intelligible in a different way, that is, by imitation. This, then, is the thing that 'planned' to produce in this universe the four kinds of living beings which it sees in the intelligible world.

Plato, however, seems, cryptically, to be making the thing which does the planning to be different from those two. Others, however, will think that the three are one: the Living Being in itself, Intellect, and that which plans.

In fact, as in many subjects, people will think of different ways in which they are three, to fit in with their different premises. Two of them have been discussed; but what is the third, which itself plans to put into effect, produce, and divide the things seen by Intellect which lie in the Living Being? It is certainly possible that in one sense Intellect is that which divides, in another sense that the divider is not Intellect; for insofar as what is divided comes from it, Intellect is the divider, but insofar as it remains itself undivided and the things that come from it are the things that are divided – and these are souls – Soul is what divides, into many souls. For this reason, he also says that division belongs to the third and is in the third, because planning – which is not the task of Intellect – is done by discursive thinking, and is rather the work of Soul which has a divided activity to match its divided nature.

§ 3.9.2. For just as when the division of one whole branch of scientific understanding into particular theorems does not entail its being scattered and chopped up but each part potentially contains the whole whose principle and end are identical, so also must someone prepare himself so that the principles in him are also ends, and that all and everything is directed to the best in his nature. The person who becomes this finds himself in the intelligible world; for it is with this better part of himself, whenever he is in possession of it, that he makes contact with it.

§ 3.9.3. The soul of the universe never came to be or came to a place; for it never was anywhere, but the body came close to it and took a share of it. For this reason, Plato, too, I think, never says that the soul is in a body, but that the body enters into soul. But the other souls do have a point from which they come – from Soul – and a point of arrival, and they have both a going down and a going with; hence, also a going up. But the soul of the universe is always above where it is natural for soul to

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4 See Numenius, fr. 15. 5 Cf. 2.9.6.16 24; 5.4.2.13 26. See Pl., Tim. 39E10.
6 I.e., the 'planner' or Soul seems to be different from the Intellect contemplating intelligibles.
7 Cf. 2.3.18.15; 5.9.3.26. See Pl., Tim. 35A3.
8 Cf. 5.5.9.29 31; 6.4.16.7 17. See Pl., Tim. 34B3 4. 36D9 E1.
be. What follows is the universe, for example, the part which is close or
the part beneath the sun.

So the partial [i.e. particular] soul is illuminated when it directs itself
towards what is before it; for it encounters Being. But when it directs
itself to what is below it, it enters into non-being.\(^9\) And it produces this
when it turns towards itself; for when it wants to turn towards itself it
produces what is after it into an image of itself, non-being, as if it were
walking on a void and becoming more indefinite.\(^10\) And its most inde-
finite image is entirely dark. For it is completely devoid of reason and of
intellect and stands well apart from Being.\(^11\) Between [Being and non-
being], it is in its own world. But if it looks again with a sort of second
gaze, it shapes the image and enters into it well pleased.

§3.9.4. How, then, does a multiplicity come from One? It is because the
One is omnipresent; for there is nowhere where it is not.\(^12\) And so it fills
everything. And so it is a many or rather it is already all things. For if it
itself were only everywhere, it would be everything. But since it is also
nowhere, while all things come to be due to it because it is everywhere,
they are other than it because it is nowhere. Why, then, is it itself not just
everywhere but as well as being everywhere is also nowhere? Because
there must be One before everything. It must, then, fill and produce
everything without being everything that it produces.\(^13\)

§3.9.5. Soul itself must be like sight; Intellect is what is visible to it, but
it is indefinite before it sees, yet by nature capable of thinking; therefore,
it is matter for Intellect.\(^14\)

§3.9.6. When we are thinking ourselves, we obviously see a nature that
is thinking; otherwise, we would be mistaken in assuming that we are
thinking. If, therefore, we think and think ourselves, we are thinking
a nature that is thinking. Therefore, before this thinking, there is
another thinking which is, in a way, tranquil. And it is actually the
thinking of Substance and the thinking of life. So, before this life and
this being there is another Being and Life. Therefore, these are the
things they see insofar as they are activities. But if the activities which
are engaged in thinking ourselves in this way are intellects, we in our real
state are intelligible. But our thinking brings before us only an image of
ourselves.\(^15\)

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\(^9\) I.e., matter. Cf. 1.8.4.28 32, 9.14 26; 4.3.9.20 23.
\(^10\) Cf. 3.4.1.5 12; 5.2.1.18 21.\(^11\) See Pl., Parm. 144B2.
\(^12\) Cf. 3.8.9.39 54; 5.1.6.4 53; 5.5.9.8 26; 6.5.4.1 24; 6.8.16.1 12. See Pl., Parm.
160B2 3.
\(^13\) See Pl., Parm. 160B2 3.\(^14\) Cf. 2.5.3.14; 5.1.3.12 23; 5.9.4.11 12.
\(^15\) Cf. 5.3.4.4ff.
§3.9.7. The first is the power of Motion and Stability. And so it transcends them. The second is both stable and in motion around the first. And Intellect belongs to the second; for it is one thing but has intellection directed to another, whereas the One does not have intellection. That which thinks is double, even if it thinks itself, and is deficient, in that it has its well-being in its thinking but not in its existence.

§3.9.8. To be in act, for everything that passes from potentiality to actuality, means to retain always its identity, as long as it exists. And bodies, too, can enjoy this sort of completion, for example, fire. But they do not exist for ever, because they are combined with matter. On the other hand, anything which is not composite and is in act, always exists. It is, however, possible for the identical thing that is in act to be in potency in another respect.

§3.9.9. But the first, which transcends Being, does not think. Intellect is the Beings and Motion and Stability are in the intelligible world. The first is not related to anything, but the others are related to it, stable as they rest around it, and in motion, too. For motion is desire and the first has no desires. For what desire could the most lofty thing have?

And so doesn’t it even think itself? Is it not said to think in a general sense, because it possesses itself?

In fact, one cannot say it thinks because it possesses itself, but because it looks to that which is first. But thinking, too, is itself the first actuality. If, then, this actuality is the first, there is no actuality before it. That which causes this actuality transcends it, so that intellection is second after this. For thinking is not the primary majestic thing; nor is all thinking majestic, but only the thinking that has the Good as its object. The Good, therefore, transcends thinking.

But will it be conscious of itself? What, then, does it mean for it to be consciously aware of itself? Of being good or not? For if it is being consciously aware of itself as good, it is already the Good before this conscious awareness. If, on the other hand, the conscious awareness makes it good, the Good would not have existed before this, so that the conscious awareness itself would not exist, since it would not be conscious awareness of the Good.
Well, then, is it not even alive?

In fact, we should not say that it is alive, except in the sense that it gives life. That which is consciously aware of itself and thinks itself is secondary. For it is consciously aware of itself in order to understand itself by this act. If it gets to know itself, it must be the case that it happened to have been ignorant of itself and to be deficient in its nature, but perfected by its thinking. Thinking must then be ruled out. For its addition causes diminution and deficiency.
Ennead Four
On the Substantiality of the Soul

INTRODUCTION

This little essay is a sort of appendix, or follow-up, to the early treatise 4.7 (no. 2 in Porphyry’s chronological list), On the Immortality of the Soul. Plotinus is concerned here to highlight the intermediate nature of soul, between the completely indivisible nature of Intellect and the entirely divisible nature of bodies. In this, he is, as elsewhere, provoked to thought by what he regards as the ‘riddling utterance’ of Plato at Timaeus 35A1–3, that the soul contains an element which is ‘divided about bodies’. To a certain extent, this essay looks forward to the fuller discussion in 6.4–5, where the same preoccupation exercises him.

The essay is placed first in the fourth Ennead by Porphyry himself, but Marsilio Ficino, the first modern editor of Plotinus, chose to place it second, after the little note which follows it, which explains the residual confusion in its numbering.

SUMMARY

§1. The real nature of soul being a recapitulation of the latter chapters (9–14) of 4.7: soul is a divine and intelligible reality, intermediate between the intelligible realm proper, which is the ‘indivisible’ of Tim. 35A, and the physical realm, which is the ‘divisible’, it itself being indivisible of its own nature, but ‘divisible’ insofar as it is incorporated.

§2. A systematic analysis of the claims that the soul is divisible and that it is entirely indivisible, and refutations of both. In fact, the soul is both divisible and indivisible, ‘one and many’.
§4.1.1. In investigating the substantiality of the soul,¹ once we have demonstrated that it is not a body, and that, among incorporeals, it is not a harmony; and rejecting its description as an entelechy as not correct, in the sense in which it is asserted, and as not being indicative of its essence; and, further, when we declare that it is of an intelligible nature and of divine kinship, perhaps then we will have made some clear statement about its substantiality.

However, it seems better now to probe this question somewhat further. Then, after all, we made a simple division, distinguishing the sensible from the intelligible nature, and situating the soul in the intelligible world.² Now, though, let us accept it as given that it belongs to the intelligible; what we need to do next is to track down the precise quality of its nature, by employing a different approach.

Let us specify, then, that there are some things that are primarily divisible and by their very nature subject to dispersion;³ and these are those things that have none of their parts identical either to any other part or to the whole, and in which the part must be less than the totality as a whole. These things are sensible magnitudes or masses, each of which occupies a unique place, and is such as not to be capable of being simultaneously in a plurality of places while remaining identical.

There is, on the other hand, a type of substantiality contrasted with this, which is in no way receptive of division, and is partless and indivisible, admitting of no extension even conceptually, having no need of place nor coming to be in any sort of being either part by part or as a whole; it is, in a way, riding on all beings together, not so as to fix itself upon them, but because the other things cannot — nor indeed do they want to — exist without it, a substance always maintaining the identical state, being common to all those things that follow upon it like the centre in a circle, from which all the lines to the periphery depend;

¹ Cf. 4.7, esp. 8⁴ and 8⁵ to which this little piece is a kind of appendix. The reference throughout is to soul in general, and implicitly to the hypostasis Soul.
² Cf. 4.7.9 12. ³ See Pl., Tim. 37A5.
nonetheless, they allow it to remain alone by itself, though drawing upon it for their generation and [continued] existence; they participate, on the one hand, in the point, and its partlessness is a principle for them, but they have proceeded forth from the intelligible world while yet binding themselves to it.

So, there is indeed this primarily indivisible Being among intelligibles, as guiding principle among Beings, and there is that being among sensibles which is divisible in every way; but prior to the sensible, though contiguous with it and indeed immanent in it, there is another nature, not itself primarily divisible, as are bodies, but yet such as to become divided among bodies; so that, when bodies are divided, the form in them becomes divided as well, yet exists as a whole in each of the divided parts, becoming many and yet staying identical, while each of the many separates entirely from any other, inasmuch as it has become completely divided. It is even so with colours and all qualities and each shape, which can exist simultaneously as a whole in many separated things, while having no part that is affected in the identical manner any other part is affected; for which reason indeed this, too, is to be reckoned entirely divisible.

But again, in addition to that completely indivisible nature, there is another substantiality following next upon this, deriving its indivisibility from that source, but which, through striving in its procession from that towards the opposite nature, finds itself situated between the two, that is to say, the indivisible and primary and that which is divided in bodies, which has immersed itself in bodies – not in the way that colour and quality is in many places identical in its entirety, in a multiplicity of corporeal masses – but that which is in each is entirely separate from any other, inasmuch as one mass is also distinct from any other; and even if the magnitude is one, yet that which is identical in each part possesses no commonality that would contribute to shared experience, because the identity is in fact different in each case; for it is the affection that is identical, not the substantiality itself.

But the substantiality which we say rests upon this nature, while still contiguous with the indivisible Substantiality, is both itself a substantiality and comes to be present in bodies, in which it happens to experience division, while not having suffered this experience previously, before it had given itself to bodies. In the bodies, then, in which it comes to be, even when it comes to be in that which is greatest and all-embracing, having given itself to the whole of each, it still does not itself abandon its unity. For it is not one in the way that a body is one; for a body is one by its continuity, while each of its parts

4 See Pl., Tim. 35A2 3. 5 Cf. 4.3.8.2 4; 5.1.2.35 38.
is different from another and in a different place. Nor is it one in the
way that a quality is. For that nature at once divisible and indivisible
which we want to say that soul is, is not one in the manner of
a continuous entity, which has one part in one place and another in
another; but while it is certainly divisible, in that it is present in all the
parts of that in which it is present, it is nonetheless indivisible,
because it is present as a whole in all the parts, and in any one of
them as a whole also.

And he who beholds this greatness of the soul, and who beholds its
power, will acknowledge how divine a thing it is, and how marvellous,
and how it is among the natures which transcend the physical world.
Though it does not itself possess magnitude, it is present to objects of
every magnitude, and it is present, now here, now there, not with
a different part of itself, but as identical; the result is that it is divided
and yet again not divided, or rather not divided in itself, nor has it come
to be divided; for it remains with itself as a whole, but yet it is divided
among bodies, since bodies are incapable, by reason of their own
characteristic dividedness, of receiving it undividedly. So, divisibility
would be a state of bodies, not of it itself.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Enneads} 4.1.1 4.1.2.}

\textsection{4.1.2. It is clear from this, then, that the nature of the soul should be of
this sort, and that anything different from this cannot be soul, either
something solely indivisible or something entirely divisible, but that it
must necessarily be both of these, in the way described above. For if it
were constituted in the way that bodies are, with one part here and
another there, it would not be the case that, when one part was affected,
another part would have perception of the part affected, but that the
particular soul, let us say of a finger, being distinct and independent,
would have the perception; there would then be, generally,
a multiplicity of souls administering each of us – and indeed it would
not be just one soul that would be directing this universe, but an
unlimited multitude, all separate from one another.

The fact of continuity, after all, if it does not result in unity, is of no
relevance; for we must certainly not accept, as they claim in a state of
self-deception, that acts of sense-perception proceed to the ‘ruling
principle’ by a process of ‘transmission’.\footnote{The Stoics. See \textit{SVF} 2. 441 (= Alex. Aphr., \textit{De mixt.} 223.25), 854 (= Aëtius, \textit{Plac.} 4.23.1); Alex. Aphr., \textit{De mixt.} 223.28 34.} For first of all, the claim that
there is a part of the soul that is a ‘controlling principle’ is made without
due consideration. For how are they going to divide up the soul, and
speak of this part and that, and then the ‘controlling principle’? By what
sort of quantitative criterion, or by what differentiation of quality, will

\footnote{Cf. \textit{Enneads} 4.1.1 4.1.2.}
\footnote{The Stoics. See \textit{SVF} 2. 441 (= Alex. Aphr., \textit{De mixt.} 223.25), 854 (= Aëtius, \textit{Plac.} 4.23.1); Alex. Aphr., \textit{De mixt.} 223.28 34.}
they make the division between each part, when the mass involved is one and continuous?

And [second] will it be only the controlling principle or the other parts, too, that will have sense-perceptions? And if only the former, if a sense-perception falls upon the controlling principle, in what place will the sense-datum be perceived as being situated? If in some other part of the soul, since it is not this part’s nature to perceive, it will not transmit its experience to the controlling principle, and so there will not be a sense-perception at all. And, on the other hand, if it falls upon the controlling principle itself, either it will fall upon a part of it, and when it perceives the item the other parts will not – for there would be no point in that – or there will be a multiplicity of sense-perceptions, and indeed an unlimited number of them, and they will not all be the same; but one will say ‘I was the first to experience that!’, and another will say, ‘I perceived the experience of another part!’; but, except for the first one, each of them will be ignorant of where the experience first arose. Or else each part of the soul will be deceived into imagining that the experience originated where it happens to be.

If, by contrast, not only the controlling principle, but also every other part, is going to be endowed with sense-perception, why would one be the controlling principle and another not? Or why would the sense-perception have to ascend as far as that? And how, in the case of the products of multiple sense organs, such as, for example, ears and eyes, will one single item be cognized?

But if, on the other hand, the soul were entirely unitary, that is to say totally indivisible and one by itself, and if it entirely escapes all multiplicity and division, the result would be that nothing which was occupied by soul will be ensouled as a whole; but as if basing itself around a central point of each living being, it would have left the whole mass of it soulless.

The soul must, therefore, be in this way both one and many, and divided and indivisible, and we should not be incredulous as to the possibility of a thing’s being identical and one in many places. For if we were not prepared to accept this possibility, the nature holding all things together and administering them will not exist. As it is, it is that which encloses all things in one embrace and directs them with wisdom, constituting on the one hand a multiplicity – since there is a multiplicity of beings – but also one, in order that the coordinating force may be one, and while orchestrating life in all its parts due to its multiple unity, exercising a wise leadership due to its indivisible unity. In those things which are devoid of wisdom, the controlling unity imitates this.

8 Cf. infra 53; 4.3.10; 4.9, passim; 6.2.4.30 35, 5.14. See Pl., Parm. 155E5.
This, therefore, is the meaning of the divinely inspired riddling utterance: ‘From the indivisible and ever-unchanging Substantiality and from the divisible substantiality which comes to be in bodies, he mixed from both a third type of substantiality.’

The soul, then, is one and many in this way; and the forms in bodies are many and one; bodies, in turn are many only; and that which is highest is one only.\(^9\)

\(^9\) See Pl., Tim. 35A1 4.\(^\text{10}\) Probably a reference to Intellect, a one many.
On the Substantiality of the Soul

**INTRODUCTION**

This little note, ranked by Porphyry as no. 21 in his chronological listing, also concerns the question of the intermediate nature of soul, and, like 4.1, involves a meditation on *Timaeus* 35A1–3: in what sense can the soul be said to be ‘divisible about bodies’? It would have fitted well as one of the ‘miscellaneous topics of enquiry’ gathered by Porphyry as 3.9, and that is where it seems to have been placed in the archetype of our existing manuscripts, but Porphyry required it to make up his fourth *Ennead*, so he lists it separately in the *Life*, and seems to have placed it at the head of this *Ennead*. Marsilio Ficino, however, in his translation, followed by the *editio princeps*, places it second, and modern editors have followed his lead.
4.2 (4)  
On the Substantiality of the Soul

§4.2.1. It is in the intelligible cosmos that true Substantiality is to be found. Intellect is the best part of it. Souls are also in the intelligible world; for it is from there that they come to be in the sensible world, too. And that cosmos contains souls without bodies, whereas this one contains those which have come to be in bodies and are divided among them. In the intelligible world, Intellect is all together and [its contents are] not separated or divided, and all souls are together in a world of eternity, not one of spatial extension.

Intellect, then, is always without separation and is indivisible, and Soul in the intelligible world is without separation and undivided; it has, though, a natural propensity to be divided. For its propensity to division involves its departure from that world and its coming to be in body. So, then, it is plausibly said to be ‘divided among bodies’, because it departs in this way and is subject to division.

How, then, is it also undivided? The reason is that it does not totally depart, but there is an element of it that has not gone forth, whose nature it is not to be divided. The phrase, then, ‘from the indivisible and ever-unchanging [Substantiality] and from the divisible [substantiality] which comes to be in bodies’ is identical to saying that the soul is composed of that which exists above and that which depends upon the intelligible world, but has flowed forth as far as the sensible world, like a line from a centre. But having come to the sensible world with this part, observe how with this very part it preserves the nature of the whole. Not even in the sensible world, after all, is it solely divided, but it is also undivided; for that in it which is divided is divided indivisibly. In giving itself to the whole body, it is divided even while not being divided, by being whole in all the parts of the body.

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1 Cf. 4.8.8.3.  2 See Pl., Tim. 35A1 3.
3 Deleting καὶ κάτω with Brehier, and adopting ὁ ώς, with the majority of mss.
4 Reading ὁρᾶ ὁς with Igal.  5 Cf. 4.3.19-30 34.
4.3–5 (27, 28, and 29)
On Problems of the Soul 1–3

INTRODUCTION
This is one of the major works of Plotinus’ ‘middle’ period, divided (rather curiously) by Porphyry, in the middle of a sentence, at 4.3.32. Following, as it does, immediately upon 3.6 (26), ‘On the Impassibility of Things Without Bodies’, and not long after 6.4–5 (22–23), ‘That Being, One and Identical, is Simultaneously Everywhere Whole’, it focuses particularly on the possibility and mode of interaction between an immaterial soul and a material body.

SUMMARY
The treatise consists of a sequence of eight aporiai, or ‘problems’, covering between them all of the outstanding issues relative to the human soul, in particular in its relation to the body, and to the passions and sensations arising from that association, but also its relation to Soul the hypostasis, and to the soul of the universe. It is in fact this last problem with which the treatise opens, and the following problems observe a broadly logical sequence.

After a brief introduction (4.3.1.1–16), the problems are set out as follows. Note that the divisions of the argument do not correspond to the sections of the received text.

1. (4.3.§§1–8): The relation of individual souls to the soul of the cosmos.
2. (4.3.§§9–18): How soul comes to be in body; difference between the soul of the cosmos and other souls in their relations to their bodies.
3. (4.3.§§19–23): The manner of the soul’s embodiment.
4. (4.3.§24–4.4.§17): The soul’s departure from the body. What does it remember, and how? To what level or levels of being is memory properly appropriate?

5. (4.4.§§18–29): The joint activities of body and soul. What is the proper subject of the emotions and ‘raw’ sense-perceptions? An excursus (chs. 22–27) on the question of the presence or otherwise of sense-perception in the souls of the earth and of the heavenly bodies.

6. (4.4.§§30–39): The question of the possible effects on us of the activity of the stars and planets; the basis for the efficacy of prayer and magic.

7. (4.4.§§40–45): The workings of cosmic sympathy; the universe as a living organism.
§4.3.1. Concerning the soul, the right course, I feel, would be to conduct our enquiry in such a way as either to arrive at solutions to the relevant problems, or, if remaining in a state of puzzlement on those points, to regard this at least as a gain, that we know wherein lie the problems. On what subject, after all, would one more justifiably spend one's time in prolonged discussion and investigation than on this one?

There are many reasons for this, but particularly that it provides knowledge about both those things of which it is the principle, and those from which it itself derives. In conducting this enquiry indeed we should be obeying the injunction of the god when he enjoins us to 'know ourselves'. Since we want to investigate and find out about the rest of things, it is right that we should investigate what this thing is that does the investigating, longing as we do to lay hold of the desired object of contemplation, which is Intellect. For there is a duality, as we know, in the universal Intellect, and so it is reasonable that in the case of partial instances of it one aspect should take on one role, and another the other. We must also investigate how it is that we receive the gods; but we shall deal with this when we examine how the soul comes to be in the body.

Now, however, let us turn once again to those who say that our souls are derived from the soul of the universe. They will perhaps say that to show that our souls are not parts of the soul of the universe it is not sufficient to hold that our souls have the identical reach [into the sensible world] as does the soul of the universe, and that they are equally intellectual; for even if they concede such equality, they would maintain that parts of wholes can be the same in kind.

1 See Pl., Prot. 343B; [?], Alc. i 129A2 132Cc 10.
2 I.e., as intellection and as intelligibles.
3 Cf. infra 9 23.
4 The Stoics. See SVF 1.495 (= Hermias, In Gent. Phil. 14), 2.774 (= D.L., 7.156); Plutarch, De vir. mor. 441f.; Philo, De mut. nom. 223.
5 Cf. 4.9.1.10 21.
And they will adduce here the doctrine of Plato,\textsuperscript{6} when he, seeking to support the argument that the universe is ensouled, asserts that, even as our body is a part of the universe, so our soul is a part of the soul of the universe.

And they also maintain that the fact that we follow along with the rotation of the universe is something not only asserted but clearly demonstrated,\textsuperscript{7} and also that we take our behaviour and our fortunes from that source, and, coming to be within it as we are, we take our soul from what encompasses us. And even as within us each part of us is a recipient of our soul, so in an analogous way we, as parts of a whole, partake of the soul of the universe as its parts.\textsuperscript{8}

Furthermore, they will say that the statement ‘all soul cares for what is without soul’\textsuperscript{9} makes the identical point, and shows that Plato does not consider any soul other than the soul of the universe; for this is the soul that is put in charge of all that which has no soul.

§4.3.2. Now, in response to these points, it should first be said that in making them the same in kind\textsuperscript{10} – which they do by agreeing that they are in contact with the identical things – they give them the identical common genus and rule them out as parts; rather, it would be more just if they said that they are identical or one, and that each soul is all soul. And by making it one, they cause it to depend on something else, which itself is no longer the soul of this or that body, but belongs to nothing, neither to a cosmos nor to anything else, but which creates that which does belong to the cosmos or to anything that has soul. And indeed it is rightly held that soul should not wholly belong to something, since it does have substantiality, but that there should be Soul which absolutely does not belong to anything, while souls, such as do belong to something, should come to belong to that thing at a given time and accidentally.

But perhaps one should try to grasp more clearly what ‘part’ means in the case of things like this. One sense is certainly as in a part of bodies, whether the body is made up of parts that are all of the same kind or

\textsuperscript{6} See Pl., \textit{Phil.} 30A5 6; \textit{Tim.} 30B8.  
\textsuperscript{7} See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 90C8 D1.  
\textsuperscript{8} The phrase used here is actually \textit{ἡ πᾶσα ψυχή.} This is equivalent to \textit{ἡ ψυχή τοῦ παντός (‘the soul of the universe’}, l. 17 above and 4.8.7.27). Other synonymous expressions used are: \textit{ἡ ψυχή τοῦ κόσμου (cf. 4.3.2.57)}, \textit{ἡ μία ψυχή καὶ ἄλη (cf. 6.4.4.41)}, \textit{ἡ ψυχή τοῦ ἄλου (cf. 4.3.8.3).} The expression \textit{ἡ ψυχή ἄλη} sometimes refers to the hypostasis Soul (cf. 4.3.6.12). Often, \textit{ἡ ψυχή τοῦ κόσμου (‘the soul of the cosmos’)} is used equivalently. See Glossary.  
\textsuperscript{9} See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 246B6.  
\textsuperscript{10} The word is \textit{ὁμοειδή (cf. 1.22).} The point here is not that the parts are members of the identical species but that they are the same in that they are species of the identical genus.
not – that we may leave aside – drawing attention only to this point, that when one talks of a part in the case of things whose parts are all of the same kind, the part is such in respect of its mass, not its form, as in the case, for example, of whiteness; for the whiteness in a part of the milk is not a part of the whiteness in all of the milk, but it is the whiteness of a part, not a part of whiteness; for whiteness is entirely without magnitude and not a quantity.

That is how it is in this case. But when we speak of ‘part’ in the case of things that are not bodies, we would be talking about a part as we do in the case of numbers, like two being a part of ten – let us take it that we are talking here of numbers abstractly – or like a part of a circle or a line, or as a theorem is part of a science. But in the case of units and figures, just as with bodies, it is necessary that the whole is diminished by division into parts, and that each of the parts is smaller than the whole; for since they are quantities and their existence is constituted by their being quantities, not Quantity in itself, they necessarily become larger or smaller.

It is certainly not open to us to talk about a part in this sense in the case of soul. For it is not a thing of quantity in such a way that the whole soul could be a ten and the other, the individual soul, a unit. Many absurd consequences would follow from that, and in particular the fact that the ten would not be a single thing, and each of the units themselves would be a soul, or else the soul will be composed of things which are all without soul; and the fact that the part of the whole soul has been conceded to be of the same kind as it. On the other hand, in the case of a continuum there is no need for the part to be such as the whole is, for example, in the case of a circle or a square, or at least not all the parts are the same in cases where one might take a part, like triangles, which can be parts of triangles, but different ones; but they postulate that all soul is of the same kind. In the case of a line, the part has the characteristic of being a line, but here, too, it differs in magnitude.

In the case of soul, if the difference between the partial soul and the whole were said to be in respect of magnitude, the soul would be a quantity and a body, if it takes its difference, as a soul, from the quantity; but the assumption was that all souls are the same, and are wholes. It is, though, clear that soul is not divided in the manner of magnitudes, nor would they themselves concede that the whole is cut up into parts; for in that case, they will use up the whole soul, and it will become a mere name, unless the soul had once been some original whole, like wine, having been divided into many parts, each part in each jar said to be a part of the whole wine.

Is it, then, a part in the sense that a theorem of a given science is said to be a part of the whole science, which itself remains in existence.
nonetheless, while the division is like a projection or actuality of each part? Actually, in a case like this, each part potentially possesses the whole science, but the science is no less a whole. If the same were indeed to apply to the whole and the others in the case of soul, the whole, of which items of this kind are parts, would not belong to something else, but would be itself by itself; so, it will not even be the soul of the cosmos, but the soul of the cosmos, too, will be one of those which are partial. They will, therefore, all be parts of the one Soul, being of the same kind. But how, then, is the one the soul of the cosmos and the others those of parts of the cosmos?

§ 4.3.3. Are they perhaps parts in the way that one might say that, in the case of the individual animal, the soul in the finger is a part of the complete soul in the whole animal?

But this account would, in fact, either involve no soul existing outside body, or postulate all soul as not in body, and so what is said to be the soul of the universe would be outside the body of the cosmos. This we must investigate in due course; for the moment, however, we must examine how it might be described in terms of this scenario. For if the soul of the universe makes itself available to all the partial living beings, and each soul is a part in this way, if it is divided up it would not be making itself available to each one, but if it remains identical it will be present everywhere as a whole, being one and identical in many living beings at the same time. This would no longer make one soul available as a whole and the other as a part, particularly to things that have the identical power. For where some things have one function and some another, for example, eyes and ears, one must not say that one part of the soul is present in sight and another in the ears – division of this sort belongs to others – but rather that the identical thing is present, even if a different power is active in each, for all the powers are in both of them. It is due to the organs being different that there are different apprehensions, but all of them are of forms, since the soul is capable of being informed by all forms.

This is also shown by the fact that everything must converge on one point of reference, but it is because of the organs through which they

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11 Cf. 3.9.2.1; 4.9.5.7 9; 5.9.6.3 9.
12 The distinction here is between the hypostasis Soul and individual souls, including the soul of the cosmos.
13 See SVF 2.828 (= D.L., 7.110).
14 The line εἰς γὰρ ἐν ὁμορράξις ἄπασι is restored to ll. 17 18 from ll. 13 14 where HS place it.
15 The text is probably corrupt here. The sense of the words εἰς εἰδος πάντα δυνάμενον μορφώσθαι is rendered loosely.
pass that not all are able to receive everything, and the affections differ in correspondence with the organs, while the judgement is made by the identical judge, in a way, who has grasped the words that have been spoken and the actions that have been performed.  

But that the soul is one thing everywhere, even in different functions, has been said above. And if our soul were like the acts of sense-perception [of the soul of the universe], it would not be possible in these acts for each of us to think himself, but only the soul of the universe could do this. If, however, thinking belongs to each soul, each would be on its own. But since the soul is rational, and is said to be rational as a whole, what is being called a part will be identical with, and not a part of, the whole.

§ 4.3.4. What is one to say, though, if the soul is one in this way, when someone carries on the investigation from this point, first raising the difficulty of whether it is possible for the soul to be one in this way at the same time in all things, and next, if this can be so when it is in a body, but some other soul is not in a body. For perhaps it will follow that it is all in body, and particularly the soul of the universe; for it is not said to leave the body, as is ours. And yet some say that our soul will leave this particular body, although it will not be outside body entirely. But if it will not be entirely outside body, how will the one soul leave the body and the other not, when it is the identical soul? In the case of Intellect which is separated in itself by the sharp differentiation of its parts from each other, even though these are always together – for this kind of substantiality is indivisible – such a problem would not obtain; but in the case of soul which is said to be ‘divisible among bodies’, that all of them should be some one thing involves many problems. The problem would remain unless someone were to make the one [Soul] stand on its own and not fall into body, and then make all of the souls come from that one, the soul of the universe and the others, being together in a way, up to a point, and being one by belonging to no one particular body, but linked by their extremes and being together with each other at the top end, and then projecting themselves hither and thither, just as light as soon as it arrives at the earth is actually divided up among physical masses and yet is not divided, but is one nonetheless.

16 See Pl., Thet. 184D3; Ar., DA 2.2.424a18; 3.7.431a1; 3.8.431b26.
17 Cf. supra 9.10.
18 Cf. 5.3.13.12.14.
19 Perhaps the Stoics. Also, perhaps some Platonists. The point is made of Eratosthenes and Ptolemy apud Iamblichus apud Stob., Ed. 1.49.39, but it is something to which Plutarch and Atticus are committed as well.
20 Reading εἰ <ο> with Igal and HS.
21 See Pl., Tim. 35A2.3.
22 Reading ὅγκους, as proposed by HS in the apparatus.
The soul of the universe is always transcendent, because it does not have the property of descending either by its lower part\(^{23}\) or by turning towards the things here, but ours are not, because they have a part cut out for them here, and because they turn towards what requires care. The one is like the soul in a large plant which manages the plant without trouble and silently, being the lowest part of the soul of the universe, but the lower part of ours is as if worms were to arise in a rotten part of the plant; for this is the status of our ensouled body in the universe.

But our other soul,\(^{24}\) which is of the same kind as the higher part of the soul of the universe, is like some farmer were he to become concerned about the worms in the plant and were he to be afflicted with worries in respect of it; or it is as if one were to say that a person who was healthy and lived with other healthy people was occupied with his own pursuits, either living an active life or devoting himself to contemplation, while someone who was ill and attending to cures for his body was concerned with the body and had come to belong to it.

§4.3.5. But how will one soul still be yours, another this person’s and another another’s? Will its lower part still belong to an individual, and its higher part not to that individual, but to that which is above? If that is the way it is, there will be Socrates whenever the soul of Socrates is in a body, but he will perish exactly when he comes to be in the best state.\(^{25}\)

In fact, no Being perishes, since even in the intelligible world the intellects there, just because they are not divided as bodies are, are not lost into a unity, but each abides in its own identity in differentiation from the rest. So, the same applies to souls, too, in their turn, depending as they do each on an intellect, being expressed principles of the intellects, and being more diffused than they are, having in a way become much from little, and being in contact with the little which is, in each instance, less divided than they are. They want to be divided, even though unable to proceed to a full state of division, preserving as they do both identity and difference, and so each remains one, and all together are one.

We have, then, already given a summary of the argument that the souls come from one Soul, and those that are from the one Soul are many in the identical manner [intellects are] in Intellect, being divided and yet not divided in the identical manners,\(^{26}\) and the Soul that remains above is a unique expressed principle of Intellect, and from it come individual expressed principles which are yet immaterial, as it is in the intelligible world.

\(^{23}\) I.e., nature. \(^{24}\) I.e., our undescended intellects. Cf. 3.8.5.9 11. \(^{25}\) I.e., separation from the body. \(^{26}\) Retaining the words κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ of the mss.
§4.3.6. But why has the soul of the universe, though being of the same kind as ours, produced a cosmos, while the individual soul has not, though it, too, has everything in itself? It has already been stated that it is able to come to be and exist in many things simultaneously.\(^{27}\) But now we should say – and perhaps indeed it will become known how the identical thing when it is in different things can produce one thing or another, or be acted on in one way or another, or both; in fact, this must be considered separately on its own – how and why the soul of the universe has produced the cosmos, while the others manage just some part of the cosmos.

In fact, it is not surprising that of those who have scientific understanding of the identical subject some are in control of more parts of it and some of fewer – but one might ask why this should be. One could answer that there are differences in souls. Or rather, it is because the soul of the universe has not departed from Soul, but has the body around itself while it remains above, while our souls have been allotted shares of a body which already exists with their sister soul [the soul of the universe],\(^{28}\) in a way, this soul having also, in a way, previously prepared dwellings for them. And it may be the case that the one looks to the whole of Intellect, while the others look rather to their own partial intellects – and perhaps even these would be capable of producing a universe, but since the other had already done so, it was no longer possible for them, that one having begun it first. The identical question would have been raised if any other one had been the first to take on the role.

The better response, however, is to say that it does so because it is more closely dependent on the Beings above, for the power of the things that have inclined to the intelligible world is greater. For when souls preserve themselves in a safe condition, they produce with the greatest ease, and it is characteristic of a greater power not to be affected by the things that it produces;\(^{29}\) and the power derives from remaining above. Remaining in itself, then, it produces when things approach it, whereas the other souls have to do the approaching themselves. They have, then, departed to the [corporeal] depths.

In fact, a great part of them is dragged down and has with their notions dragged them down with it.\(^{30}\) For one must suppose that the ‘seconds and thirds’\(^{31}\) were so called because they are closer or further away, just as among us there does not exist in all souls the same relation to the things in the intelligible world; some would be united to them,
some would shoot nearer the target in their aim, but others would be less able to do this, insofar as they are not actively using the identical powers; some are active with the first, some with the one coming after that, and others with the third, though all possess all the powers.\(^{32}\)

§4.3.7. So much, then, about that. But what about the passage in \textit{Philebus} which suggests that other souls are parts of the soul of the universe?\(^{33}\) This text, however, does not have the meaning that some might think, but is rather designed to emphasize what was of concern to Plato at that point, namely, to assert that the heaven, too, is ensouled.

He argues for this by saying that it is absurd to say that the heaven is devoid of soul, while we, who have a part of the body of the whole universe, do have a soul. For how could the part have had a soul when the whole has no soul? He makes his position quite clear, however, in \textit{Timaeus} where, when the soul of the universe has come to be, the Demiurge produces the others later, mixing them from the same mixing bowl from which comes the soul of the universe, making the other one the same in kind but contriving the difference by the use of the ‘second and third [levels of purity]’.\(^{34}\)

But what about the passage in \textit{Phaedrus}, ‘All soul cares for what is without soul’?\(^{35}\) For what would it be, other than soul, that manages the nature of the body and either moulds it, structures it, or produces it? There is no indication here that one soul is such as to be able to do this, and another is not.

Well, on the other hand, he says, it is the ‘perfect’ soul, the soul of the universe that ‘ranges on high’ and never sinks down, but rides, in a way, on top, that produces things in the cosmos, and every soul that is perfect manages it in this way. But by speaking of ‘the other which sheds its feathers’,\(^{36}\) he postulates this as another soul distinct from that one.

As for our following the circuit of the universe, and acquiring our character from there and being affected by it,\(^{37}\) this would be no indication that our souls are parts of the soul of the universe. For a soul is able to take on many characteristics from the nature of places and waters and air; and then there is the effect of dwelling in different cities, and the mixtures of which bodies are composed. And we have said that, due to our being in the universe, we have something of the soul of the universe, and we have conceded that we are affected by the circuit of the universe, but we postulated another soul standing apart from these

\(^{32}\) Cf. 6.7.9.18 22. The first power is intellection, the second discursive thinking, and the third non rational or non reflective.

\(^{33}\) See Pl., \textit{Phil.} 30A3 B7.  \(^{34}\) See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 41D4 7.

\(^{35}\) See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 246B7 C5.  \(^{36}\) See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 246B7 C2.

\(^{37}\) See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 90C8 D1.
affections, one that shows itself to be different most particularly due to its opposition.\textsuperscript{38} But as regards the fact that we are generated within the universe, in respect of wombs, too, we declare that the soul which comes in is another one, not that of the mother.

\textsection 4.3.8. This, then, is how it is with respect to the solution of these problems, and the fact of [cosmic] sympathy does not stand in the way of the argument.\textsuperscript{39} Since all souls come from the identical source that the soul of the universe comes from as well, they are in sympathy with one another. Indeed, we have already said that they are respectively one and many. We have also discussed how the part differs from the whole.\textsuperscript{40}

In addition, we have talked, in a general way, about differences among souls,\textsuperscript{41} but let us now add, briefly, that besides exhibiting differences in respect of their bodies, it would be possible for them to differ, most particularly, in their characters, and also in the discursive thinking and as a result of the lives they have lived before, for Plato says that the souls’ choices are made in accordance with their previous lives.\textsuperscript{42}

And if someone were to take the nature of soul in general, the differences in these have been spoken of in the texts where the ‘seconds and thirds’ were mentioned,\textsuperscript{43} and also that all of them are all things, but each soul is what it is according to what is active in it;\textsuperscript{44} that is, by one being actually in a state of unification, another in a condition of knowing, another in a condition of desire, and in the fact that different souls look to different things and are or become what it is that they are looking to; fulfilment or perfection for souls, after all, is not the identical thing for all of them.

But if their whole structure is variegated – for every one expressed principle is multiple and variegated, like an ensouled living being having many forms – indeed, if this is the case, there is a structured ordering, and Beings are not entirely disconnected from one other, nor is there randomness among Beings, seeing as there is none in bodies either, from which it follows that there is some fixed number of them.

For again, Beings must be stable and intelligibles must be self-identical, and each of them must be numerically one; that is how each is an individual. For some things, since because of the nature of bodies their individual character is in a state of flux, inasmuch as their form is extraneous, their existence in accordance with a form is due to imitation of Beings; for these latter, inasmuch as they do not exist as a result of composition, their existence is in what is numerically one, which is there from the start, and they neither become what they were not nor will they

\textsuperscript{38} A reference to the intellectual soul, or intellect. \textsuperscript{39} Cf. 3.1.8; 4.9.3.1 9.
\textsuperscript{40} Cf. supra 2.4 5. \textsuperscript{41} Cf. supra 6. \textsuperscript{42} See Pl., Rep. 620A2 3.
\textsuperscript{43} See Pl., Tim. 41D7. \textsuperscript{44} Cf. supra 6.27 34.
not be what they are, since if there is to be something which produces them, it would not be producing them from matter. And even if that were the case, it would have to add something substantial from itself; so, there will be change affecting that thing itself, if indeed it produces to a greater or lesser extent at a given time. But why is this so at a given time and not always? And what comes to be is not everlasting if ‘to a greater or lesser extent’ applies to it. But we have established that the soul is a thing of this sort.

How, then, can it be unlimited, if it is to be stable?\(^{45}\)

In fact, it is unlimited in power because its power is unlimited, not in the sense that the soul will be divided to unlimitedness. For the god,\(^ {46}\) too, is not limited. So, these souls are also not what each of them is due to an extraneous limitation, for example, as being of such and such a magnitude, but it is of the magnitude it wants to be, and as it proceeds it will never come to be outside itself, but it will reach everywhere – that part of it whose nature is to reach to bodies. It is not detached from itself when it is in the finger or in the foot. Indeed, it is in the universe, wherever it reaches, in the way it would be in one part or another of a plant even if it has been cut off, so that it is in the original plant and in the piece that has been cut off from it. For the body of the universe is one, and soul is in all of it everywhere as in a single thing.

When an animal has rotted, if many things come from it, the original soul of the whole animal will no longer be in the body for the body no longer has the potency to receive it; otherwise, the animal would not have died. But the things that result from its perishing which are suitable for the making of living beings, some of some and others of others, have soul, there being nothing from which it stands apart, but there are some things that are able to receive it and some that are not. And the things that have become ensouled in this way have not increased the number of souls, for they depend on the one soul, which remains one. Just as in us, if some parts are cut off, others grow in their place, so soul has departed from some things and attached itself to others, while the one soul remains as it is. In the universe, of course, the one soul always remains as it is; but of the things within it, some retain soul and some slough it off, while the powers of soul remain identical.

§4.3.9. But we must also investigate how soul comes to be in body. What is the manner in which it does this? For this is no less worthy of wonder and investigation. So, since the ways in which the soul enters a body are two – the one happens to a soul which is already in a body,

\(^{45}\) Or: how will the number of souls be unlimited if Soul is stable?

\(^{46}\) The reference is to Intellect, but it also applies to the One.
either a soul that is changing bodies or one that is coming to an earthy body from an airy or fiery one, which they do not actually call changing bodies because the starting point of the entrance is not clear; while the other is when the soul comes to any body whatsoever from an incorporeal state, which would actually constitute the soul’s first association with body – it would be proper for us to investigate this latter case, asking whatever it is that happens when the soul, having been entirely uncontaminated with body, takes upon itself a corporeal nature.

Concerning, then, the soul of the universe – for it is perhaps fitting, or rather essential, to begin with that – we should certainly take its ‘entry’ into its body and the body’s ‘ensoulment’ as terms used for the purposes of teaching and of clarity. There never was a time, in fact, when the universe was not ensouled, nor when body existed in the absence of soul, nor was there a time when matter existed and was not ordered; but it is possible to conceptualize these things theoretically in separation from each other. For it is possible to unpack any composite in theory, that is, in an act of discursive thinking.

The truth is like this: if there were no body, soul would not proceed forth, since there is no other place where it is its nature to be; but if it is going to proceed, it will produce a place for itself, and thus a body. Soul’s stability is in a way actually reinforced by Stability itself; one might compare the situation to an intense light which sheds its illumination to the furthest limits of the fire, and that beyond there arises darkness; this the soul sees, and since the darkness is there as a substrate, gives it form. For it is not right for whatever borders on soul to be without a share in an expressed principle, if only of the kind that is received, as the saying goes, ‘dimly in the dimness’ of generated being.

Indeed, this [cosmos] has, in a way, come to be like a beautiful and variegated house, which has not been cut off from its creator; then again, he has not given a share of himself to it, though all of it everywhere was considered worthy of beneficial care, both to its existence and to its beauty, insofar as it is actually possible for it to participate in Existence; this involves no harm to the one in charge of it, for he looks after it while remaining above.

It is ensouled in this kind of way, having soul not of itself, but for itself, ruled while not ruling, possessed but not possessing. For it is located in the Soul which holds it up, and nothing lacks a share in it, as if a net, submerged in the waters, were alive, without being able to make its own that in which it is. But the net is extended along with the already

47 Cf. 3.9.3–9 13. 48 Stability is one of the five μέγιστα γένη (‘greatest genera’).
49 Cf. 3.4.1.8 17; 3.6.14.20 23; 3.9.3.2; 6.3.8.36.
extended sea to the limit of its capacity, each of its parts being unable to be anywhere other than where it is.

The soul, however, is, of its nature, so extensive, because it is not itself of any particular magnitude, as to be able to comprehend the whole of body with a single embrace, and wherever the body extends, the soul is there; but if body did not exist, the soul would have no concern for magnitude. For soul is what it is. The universe is of a size which corresponds to where soul is, and it is bounded by its volume, extending to the degree that it has soul itself preserving it in existence. And the soul’s shadow extends as far as the expressed principle that derives from it. And the expressed principle is of such a kind as to produce a magnitude that is as great as the magnitude that its form wanted to produce.

§ 4.3.10. Having completed this exposition, we must turn back to what is always in the state that it is, and grasp it all together as one simultaneity; for example, as air, light, the sun, or the moon and light and the sun again, all together, but having an order as first and second and third things; similarly, in the sensible world we have soul, always stable, then, the first things and the ones that come next, like the ultimate stages of a fire, what follows on the first being thought of as the shadow at the edge of the fire, and then that, too, being illuminated at the same time, so that something like a form runs over what has been put in its path, something that was initially entirely obscure.

It was ordered according to the expressed principle of a soul which potentially had in all of itself the power to order things according to expressed principles; it is analogous to the way that the expressed principles in seeds mould and shape animals, like microcosms. Whatever touches soul is produced in a way that fits the nature of the soul’s substantiality; and the soul does not produce on the basis of a plan that is extraneous to it, nor does it wait for consultation or investigation; for if that were the case, it would produce not according to nature, but according to an extraneous craft. For craft is posterior to soul and imitates it, making obscure and weak imitations, just toys in a way, things of little worth, using many contrivances to produce an image of nature. But soul, by the power of its substantiality, is sovereign over bodies with respect to their coming to be and their being in such states as it directs them to be in, without their ultimate principles being able to oppose its will. At a lower level, there are elements which hinder each

50 Reading εἶτα with the mss and adding <τὰ> before πρῶτα.
51 See Pl., Lg. 889A4 8, C6 D2; Ar., Phys 2.2.194a21 22.
other and are thus often held back from attaining their proper form, which the expressed principle at the microcosmic level wants to produce; but there at the higher level the whole form comes to be under its agency and the things that have come to be have order all at once, and what has come to be attains beauty effortlessly and without hindrance.

Now in the universe, soul has constructed images of gods, habitats for human beings, and other things for other types of being. What, after all, should come to be from soul other than things for which it has the productive power? It pertains to fire to make things hot, and to something else to make them cold; but soul has a part which resides in itself and another that goes out from it to something else. In things without soul, the part that is internal to them is dormant, in a way, but another part which goes out from them to something else assimilates to itself what can be affected by it; and indeed it is common to everything which exists to bring other things to a state of assimilation to themselves.

But the function of soul is something wakeful, both that aspect which is internal to it, and that which goes out to something else. It, therefore, makes other things alive which do not have life on their own account, and live a life of the sort which it itself lives. Living as it does, then, in accordance with an expressed principle, it gives an expressed principle to the body, an image of the one it has itself — for what it gives to the body is only an image of life — and also shapes of bodies, of which it has the expressed principles. And indeed it also has those of gods and of all things; for this reason, the cosmos has everything that it has.

§ 4.3.11. It seems to me that the sages of old who wanted to attract to themselves the presence of the gods, and built temples and statues to that end, looking to the nature of the universe, had in mind that the nature of the soul is a thing that is in general easy to attract, but the easiest way of all to receive it would be if one were to craft something sympathetic which was able to receive some share of it. And that is sympathetic which is in any way imitative of it, like a mirror able to capture some image of it. Indeed, the nature of the universe, having with ease produced all things in imitation of the Beings whose expressed principles it possesses, since each thing came to be as it is as an expressed principle in matter — this expressed principle being formed in accordance with one that is prior to matter — joined it to that god [Intellect] in accordance with which it came to be and to which the soul looked, and which it possessed, in its producing. Indeed, it was impossible for the thing produced to come to be without a share in Intellect, nor again for it [Intellect] to come down into it.

52 I.e., a Form or Forms. 53 Cf. 4.7.13.14 20; 5.8.7.12 16. 54 Cf. 2.1.5.5 8.
That sun in the intelligible world was actually Intellect – let us take that as a model in our discussion – and Soul comes next to it, being dependent on Intellect, maintaining its stability while the Intellect, too, remains stable. Soul actually gives its outer edges, those bordering on this sun in this cosmos, to this sun and, through itself as an intermediary, forges a link with the intelligible world, and becomes, in a way, an interpreter of messages from that sun to this one, and those from this one to that one, insofar as they can reach it through the agency of Soul.

Nothing, after all, is a long way off or far from anything else, and yet again things are far removed from one another due to difference and absence of mixture, but divine things are on their own, and are present to things here while remaining separate. The heavenly beings in this cosmos attain divine status by never standing apart from the gods there; they depend on the original Soul by means of the soul that has, in a way, departed from it, and by means of it, by which they both exist and are what they are called, they look to Intellect, with their souls not looking anywhere other than to the intelligible world.

§4.3.12. The souls of human beings saw images of themselves as though in the mirror of Dionysus and went in that direction, starting forth from the intelligible world, but even so these are not cut off from their own source or from Intellect. For they did not come down with Intellect, but they descended on the one hand as far as the earth, while on the other, their heads are still ‘firmly fixed above the heavens’. However, it happened that they descended to a greater extent than they should have, because their middle part was constrained, since attention was demanded by that to which they had descended. Father Zeus, though, took pity on them in their labours and made their shackles, the focus of their toil, mortal, and grants them periods of respite, making them free from bodies from time to time, so that they, too, can be in the intelligible world where the soul of the universe always is, never turning its attention towards the things of this world.

For what it has is already the universe, and that is and will be sufficient unto itself, and it completes its revolution in stretches of time in accordance with expressed principles which do not change. And the things in it are always brought back to the identical state in accordance with the passage of time, in measures consisting of determined lives, and they are brought to a state of concord with the things in

55 An allusion to the Orphic myth of the seduction of Dionysus by the Titans with a toy provided by Hera, which leads to the dismemberment and devouring of Dionysus, with only his heart saved by Athena.

56 The undescended intellect. Cf. supra 5.6; 3.4.3.24; 4.8.4.30 35; 4.8.8; 6.7.5.26 29, 17.26 27; 6.8.6.41 43. See Homer, Il. 4.443.
the intelligible world, the things here also fulfilling their role in accordance with those there, with everything being ordered according to a single expressed principle in terms of the descents and ascents of souls, and in respect of everything else, too.\(^{57}\)

Evidence of this is the concord of the souls with the order of this universe, souls which are not detached, but in their descent put themselves in touch with it, and with its circuit produce a single concord, so that their fortunes, their lives, and their choices are indicated by the configurations of the stars, and, in a way, give out a single sound that is not out of tune; and this is rather the real meaning of the enigmatic references to musicality and harmoniousness.\(^{58}\) This would not have been so unless the universe acted and was acted upon in accordance with each of those things in measures consisting of periods and orders and passing through lives in their several kinds, lives which the souls pass through, sometimes in the intelligible world, sometimes in heaven, and sometimes turning towards regions here.

Intellect as a whole, for its part, is always above and would never come to be outside its own world; rather, it is established above as a whole and sends [messages] to things here by way of Soul. Soul, since it is nearer to it, is disposed according to the Form that comes from the intelligible world and gives it to the things below itself; to one kind of soul, always in the same way, to another in different ways at different times, while maintaining order in its comings and goings. It does not always descend to the same extent, but sometimes does so more and sometimes less, even if it is descending into the identical kind of [body]; each goes, in fact, to the body that is ready for it by its assimilation to the disposition [of the soul]. For each soul goes there to whatever destination to which it has been likened, one to a human being, another to another kind of living being.\(^{59}\)

§ 4.3.13. For thus are the ineluctable prescription and justice based in a nature\(^{60}\) which forces each thing to go in order to its proper destination, and which comes to be as an image of the model corresponding to its original choice and disposition; all that kind of soul is akin to that in conformity with which it possesses its own disposition; and it does not need the thing that once sent it forth and introduced it to its destination, neither in order to go towards body at a certain time, nor to go to a particular body, but when its time arrives it goes down spontaneously,

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\(^{57}\) See SVF 2.599 (= Arios Didymus apud Eusebius, Pr. ev. 15.19.1), 625 (= Nemesius, De nat. hom. 38.277).

\(^{58}\) See Pl., Rep. 617B4 7.

\(^{59}\) Perhaps in a previous incarnation. Cf. 3.4.2.12 30; 6.7.7. See Pl., Rep. 619B 620D.

\(^{60}\) This is the lowest part of the soul of the cosmos.
in a way, and enters the body it must enter – and there is a different time for different souls, and when this comes up to it, like the summons of a herald, it descends – and it enters the appropriate body, so that the things that come to be are moved and carried about as if by the powers of magicians and strong forces of the sort that pull them. It is like the way in which the development of the living being is brought to perfection in each single body, with the soul initiating and generating each feature, like the growing of beards and the sprouting of horns and impulses at a given moment in this or that direction, and efflorescences on the skin which were not there before, and so, too, in the case of the development of trees which grow at fixed times.

The souls go neither voluntarily nor because they have been sent – or at least their volition is not such as would arise from a choice; it is more like a natural leap, as it might be towards a natural desire for marriage, or in another case towards the accomplishment of some beautiful deeds, not provoked by calculative reasoning. But things of a certain kind always have a fate of a certain kind, for a thing of one kind being realized, perhaps, now, for another later. The Intellect prior to the cosmos has its fate, too, to remain in the intelligible world, and sends forth as much as possible, that is, particular things are sent forth subject to the universal law. For the universal bears down upon each thing, and the law does not derive its power of fulfilment from outside, but it is given to be in things themselves\(^61\) that use it and bear it wherever they go. And if and when the time comes, then what the law wants to happen happens through the agency of the things which instantiate it, so that they bring it to fulfilment inasmuch as they are bearing it, and it derives its strength from being located in them, as though weighing down upon them and producing in them a desire and a pang to go where, in a way, the law in them tells them to go.\(^62\)

§4.3.14. Given that all this has actually occurred, this ordered cosmos, which shines already with many lights and is illuminated by souls, receives further forms of order in addition to the previous ones, deriving one from another, both from the gods there and from the other intellects which produce souls.\(^63\) Such, it seems, is the enigmatic meaning of the myth, which tells how, when Prometheus had fashioned the woman, the other gods, too, adorned her.\(^64\) It says he ‘mixed earth with water’ and put a human voice in her, and made her like the goddesses in appearance, and Aphrodite gave her something and so did the Graces, and other gods gave her other gifts, and they named her

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\(^{61}\) Reading \(\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\) with HS\(^4\) following Kirchhoff.  
\(^{62}\) Cf. 4.8.3 6.  
\(^{63}\) Cf. 6.4.14.18 19.  
\(^{64}\) See Hesiod, *Works and Days* 60 89.
and from all the givers; for all gave their share to this product fashioned by a certain providence. But what could the instruction to Epimetheus to reject the gift mean other than that the choice of what is in the intelligible world is better? And he who fashioned it is himself in bondage because he is somehow still attached to what has come to be through him, and this kind of bond comes from outside. And the liberation by Heracles signifies that he has power within him, such that even so he can free himself.

Now one may interpret this story any way one wants; the important thing is that it is the circumstances of the gift to the cosmos that is the clear subject of this story, and that is in harmony with my account.

§4.3.15. The souls proceed, then, peering out from the intelligible world, in the first instance into heaven, and, taking on a body there, they then pass by means of it to more earthy bodies, to the degree to which they are extended in length. Some go from heaven to the lower level of bodies, while others are inserted from some bodies into others, those, that is, whose power was not adequate to raise them from here because of the considerable heaviness and forgetfulness laid upon them, dragging about with them the burden with which they were laden. They become different either by reason of the variation of the bodies into which they are put, or by virtue of accidents of fortune or upbringing, or because they bring with them differences derived from themselves, or for all of these reasons, or certain of them. And some of them have become entirely subject to the fate that rules the sensible world, and some are sometimes in this state, and sometimes under their own control, and some acquiesce in affection as much as is necessary, although they retain the power to keep under their control the things that are their own proper functions, living according to another law-code that applies to all beings, while submitting themselves to this other dispensation.

This code is constructed from all of the expressed principles and causes operative in this world, and from souls’ motions and the laws that come from the intelligible world, acting in harmony with these latter and taking its principles from there, and weaving together with them what comes after them, while preserving unshaken all the things which can hold themselves in conformity with the disposition of what is above, and taking the rest round as is natural for them, so that the responsibility

65 Based on the etymology of the name ‘Prometheus’ προμήθεια, ‘forethought’.

66 Plotinus now adduces the myth of Prometheus’ binding by Zeus, and freeing by Heracles, from Hesiod, Theog. 521–528.

67 The pneumatic or astral or ethereal body or ‘soul vehicle’. See Pl., Phdr. 246B2, 247B2; Tim. 41E1 2, 75A5 E9.
resides in the souls that have come down, because they have done so in such a way that some have found themselves in one situation, while others are placed in another.

§4.3.16. It is, then, appropriate to attribute to the order of the world the punishments that justly affect the wicked, insofar as it directs things in accordance with what is fitting; but as for the injustices that fall upon good men, such as punishments, poverty or disease, are we to say that these happen because of previous moral errors? For these things are woven into the texture of the whole and indicated beforehand, so that these, too, happen in accordance with reason.

In fact, these are not in accordance with the expressed principles of nature, nor were they among the antecedent causes; rather, they follow on these. For example, when a building collapses, a person who happens to be under it dies, whatever his moral quality, or when a pair of horses are moving in good order, or even a single horse, anything that crosses their path will be injured or trampled upon. Either this injustice, while it is bad for its victim, is useful for the texture of the world or it is actually not unjust, deriving its justification from previous events. For we may not hold that some things have been subjected to the order, while others have been left on a looser rein, in the interests of preserving autonomy.

For if it is necessary that things happen in accordance with causes and natural consequences, and in conformity with a single expressed principle and one order, one should believe that even the smaller things have also been included in the order and woven in with the others. Injustice which is actually done by one person to another is unjust for the perpetrator, and the doer is not released from blame, but as subsumed within the order of the universe it is not unjust within that, not even as regards the victim, but that is how it had to be. And if the victim is a good person, the end of these things is for the good. One should believe that this structured ordering is 'not without god' nor unjust, but is exact as regards the distribution of what is appropriate, while believing, on the other hand, that it has unclear causes and allows grounds for complaint to those who do not know them.

§4.3.17. One might infer that the souls first go from the intelligible world to the region of heaven from such considerations as the following. If heaven is the better part of the sensible region, it would be contiguous with the lowest of the intelligibles. So, heaven is the first thing coming from the intelligible world to be ensouled and to participate in it, as

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68 I.e., reincarnated. See Pl., Rep. 617C5. 69 Cf. 3.1.10.2 10. 70 See Pl., Lg. 904A6 C4. 71 Cf. 3.2.9.31 40. 72 See Homer, Od. 18.353. 73 See Pl., Phdr. 246D6 247E6.
being more suited to doing so. What is earthy comes last, and is of a nature to participate in a lesser soul, and is far from incorporeal nature. All souls actually illuminate the heaven and in a way give the major part of themselves, that is, their first part to it, but light up the rest of the cosmos with their subsequent parts; those which descend further illuminate the lower regions, but it is not better for them to proceed downwards to any great extent.\footnote{A distinction among the soul of the cosmos, nature, its lowest part, and individual souls. These are all parts of Soul. Cf. supra \textit{15.1 7}.}

For there is something like a centre, and in addition to it a circle shining from it, and in addition to these another circle, light coming from light.\footnote{The centre is the One, the first circle Intellect, and the next circle Soul. The remaining circle is the sensible world.} But outside these there is another circle no longer of light; this one needs the brightness that belongs to another, since it is lacking its own light. Let this last one be a wheel, or, actually, a sphere of that kind, which receives from the third one – because it is next to it – the amount of light that that one throws. The great light, then, remains where it is and shines out, and the brightness that comes from it goes through the world in due proportion, and the others join with it in its shining, some remaining where they are, while others are drawn out to a greater extent by the alluring gleam of what they shine on.\footnote{The great light is the soul of the cosmos, the next source of illumination refers to the souls of the heavenly bodies, and the last illuminating and illuminated group are human souls.}

Next, since the things illuminated require more care, so souls – like boats in a storm when helmsmen concentrate to a greater extent on their care for the ships and do not notice that they are neglecting themselves, thereby often risking being pulled down with the wreck of their ships – incline to a greater extent and pull down the things that are theirs.

Next they were held down, shackled by the fetters of sorcery, constrained by their care for [their corporeal] nature. But if each living being were such as the universe is, a perfect and adequate body and one not at risk of being affected, the soul which is said to be present would not have had to be present to it, and would give life to it while remaining entirely in the world above.

§4.3.18. Does the soul use calculative reasoning before it comes, and again on its departure?

In fact, calculative reasoning comes in when the soul is already in difficulty, filled with care, and weaker than it was; the need for calculative reasoning betokens a diminution of intellect in respect of its self-sufficiency – as is the case with crafts, where calculative reasoning is for...
craftsmen faced by difficulties, but when there is no problem the craft itself takes control and does the work.

One might ask, however, if the souls were in the intelligible world without calculative reasoning, how could they still be regarded as rational?

In fact, one might reply, it is because they have the capacity, when the situation demands, to find a good solution by thinking through to it. One should think of calculative reasoning, after all, as something like this: if one takes calculative reasoning as that disposition which constantly derives from Intellect and is always present in souls, a stable activity and something like a reflection of it, then they would be using calculative reasoning even in the intelligible world.

One should not, I think, imagine that they actually use speech when they are in the intelligible world, and at all events, even if they have bodies when they are in heaven, all the things that they would talk about in the sensible world because of needs or disagreements would not exist in the intelligible world. And as they do everything in order and in conformity with nature, they would not be involved in giving instructions or advice, but would know things from each other with a comprehensive grasp. For in the sensible world, too, even without people saying anything, we would know many things from their eyes.

But in the intelligible world all body is pure, and each is like an eye, and nothing is hidden or fabricated, but before one speaks to another, one has come to know the situation just by looking. But in the case of daemons and souls in the air, there is nothing odd about their employing speech; for they are living beings of such a kind as to do this.

§ 4.3.19. Are the ‘indivisible’ and the ‘divisible’ in the identical place, as though mixed together, or is the indivisible in a different place, and corresponding to a different object, while the divisible, in a way, comes next after it, and is a different part of the soul, even as we say that the calculative part is one thing and the non-rational part another?

This question may be resolved by grasping clearly what we mean by each of these terms. Now Plato uses the term ‘indivisible’ unqualifiedly, but ‘divisible’ with a qualification; he says that the soul becomes ‘divisible among bodies’, implying thus that it has not antecedently been divided. We should look at the nature of the body and see what kind of soul it needs to be alive, and what part of soul must be present to body, everywhere and to all of it.

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77 Cf. 2.9.1.30; 4.4.1.35.
78 A reference to the astral or pneumatic body or ethereal body or ‘soul vehicle’ enveloping soul midway between the sensible and the intelligible worlds. Cf. supra 15.1 3.
79 See Pl., Tim. 35A1 3.
The whole faculty of sense-perception, if indeed one perceives throughout the body, comes to be divided; for inasmuch as it is everywhere, it may be said to be divided; but as it appears everywhere as a whole, it would not be said that it is absolutely divided, but rather that it ‘comes to be divided about bodies’. If someone were to say that it is not divided in respect of the other senses but only in that of touch, one must reply that it is necessary that it be divided like this in the case of the others, too, if it is the case that what participates in them is a body, even if to a lesser extent than in the case of touch.

Moreover, the same applies to its faculty of growth or increase; and if appetite functions around the liver, and spiritedness around the heart, the identical account applies to them, too. But perhaps Plato does not include these in that mixture, and perhaps these arise in a different way and supervene on one of the faculties already included.

And calculative reasoning and intellect? These no longer give themselves to body. This is because their function is not performed through an organ of the body. For the body would be an impediment if one were to use it in one’s investigations.

Each of the two, the indivisible and the divisible, is, therefore, a different thing, and they are not mixed together as a single thing, but they are like a whole made of parts, with each of the two pure and separate in its power. Indeed, if what becomes divided among bodies derives its indivisibility from the power above, the identical thing can be indivisible and divisible, as being mixed from itself and from the power that comes to it from above.

§4.3.20. Further, we should address the question whether these and the other so-called parts of the soul are spatially located, or whether these are absolutely not, while the others are, and, if so, where they would be, or whether absolutely no part is spatially located. For on the one hand, if we do not designate a place for each of the parts of the soul, but put none of them anywhere, putting it no more inside the body than outside it, we shall make it have no soul, and we shall be at a loss as to where it would be appropriate to say that the functions of the corporeal organs are exercised, while on the other hand, if we designate a place for some parts and not for others, we shall think that the ones for which we do not

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81 Possibly, the subject of the verb παραλαμβάνει (‘include’) is, as HS take it, τὸ σῶμα (‘body’).
82 Cf. 5.1.10.13 15. See Pl., *Phd.* 65A10 B1; Ar., *DA* 1.4.408b24; 2.2.413b24 29; 3.4.429a22 27.
83 Perhaps a reference to the undescended intellect.
84 Cf. 4.2.1.29 41.
85 See Ar., *DA* 3.9.424a24 432b4.
designate one do not act within us, so that not all of our soul would be in us.

As a general principle, then, we should say that none of the parts of the soul, nor yet the whole of it, is in the body as in a place;\(^86\) for place is a thing that contains something;\(^87\) and specifically a thing that contains body,\(^88\) and where each divided part of something is, there it is, so that it is not in any place as a whole. But soul is not a body, so it is not a thing that is contained any more than a thing that contains. Nor yet is it in a body as in a vessel,\(^89\) for in that case body would become a thing without soul, whether it contains soul as a vessel or as place – unless, after all, it is there due to some sort of transmission from the soul,\(^90\) which remains concentrated in itself, and the amount that the vessel shares in will be lost to it. But place, strictly speaking, is incorporeal and not a body; so why would it need soul?

Further, body would abut soul with its outer edge, not with itself. And there would be many other factors opposing its being in body as in a place. For if that were the case, the place would always be carried round with it, and there will be some other thing which carries the place itself around. And even if place were taken to be bare extension,\(^91\) so much the more soul would not be in body as in a place. For extension has to be a void. But body is not a void; though perhaps that in which the body is will be, so that it would be the body that will be in a void.

Nor yet will it be in the body as in a substrate.\(^92\) For what is in a substrate is a state of what it is in, like colour or shape, and soul, after all, is something separate. Nor will it be in it as a part in a whole; for the soul is not a part of the body. And if someone were to specify, ‘like a part of that whole which is the living being’, first, the identical problem would remain, which is how it would be in it as in a whole; for it is not actually as the wine is in the jar of wine, nor indeed as the jar, nor anything else for that matter, will be in itself. Nor is it in it like a whole in the parts; for it is ridiculous to say that the soul is a whole and the body its parts.

But it is not like a form in matter either;\(^93\) for the form in matter is inseparable, and the form comes later, when the matter already exists. But the soul, being distinct from the form, produces the form in the matter. If they are going to say that it is not the form that comes to be in

\(^86\) See Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 14.17 19.  \(^87\) See Ar., *Phys.* 4.4.212a20 21.  \(^88\) See Ar., *Phys.* 4.5.212b29 30.  \(^89\) See Ar., *Phys.* 2.2.209b1 2.  \(^90\) Cf. 4.2.3.13; 4.7.7-7.  \(^91\) See Ar., *Phys.* 4.4.211b14 29; SVF 2.506 (= Themistius, *In Phys.* 4.4.113.11 12 Shenkl); Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 14.19 20.  \(^92\) See Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 14.24 15.5.  \(^93\) See Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 16.1 5.
the matter, but the form as separate, it is still not clear how this form is in
the body. How, then, is it that the soul is universally declared to be in the
body? In fact, it is because the soul is not a thing that can be seen, but the
body is. Seeing a body, then, and understanding that it is a thing with
soul because it is moved and has sense-perception, we say that the body
has soul. And so it would seem to follow for us to say that the soul is in
the body. If, on the other hand, the soul were something that could be
seen or perceived, encompassed on all sides by life and extending equally
to all the extremities of the body, we should not say that the soul is in the
body, but rather that the thing which is subordinate is in the dominant
being, and that what is held together is in what holds it together, and
that what is in flux is in what is not in flux.

§ 4.3.21. Well then, how is it present? If someone were to ask this, while
offering no suggestion himself, what shall we say? And what if he asked
about all of it uniformly, or if different parts are present in different
ways? So, it is clear that none of the ways of something being in some-
thing else that we have just now been enumerating fits the case of soul in
relation to body. There is, certainly, the suggestion that the soul is in the
body in the way that a helmsman is in his ship, that is helpful in respect
of the soul’s capacity to be separate, but it would not at all provide us
with the manner of its presence, which is what we are now investigating.
This is because as a sailor, the helmsman would be in the ship acciden-
tally, but how would he be in it as helmsman? For he is in any case not in
the whole ship in the way that the soul is in the whole body.

So, should we say that it is like a craft in its tools, for example, in the
helm, if the helm were something with a soul, so that the helmsmanship
which moves it in accordance with its craft would be inside it? But the
difference here is that the craft originates outside. If, then, in accordance
with the example of the helmsman entering into the helm, we were to
propose that the soul is in the body as in a natural tool – for that is how
it moves it in whatever it wants to do – would we be any further along
towards what we are looking for? Will we not rather have a problem
again about how it is in the tool, even if this is a different way of being in
something from those mentioned before? But nonetheless we still
have a desire to find out and come to closer grips with the problem.

§ 4.3.22. Should we say, then, that when soul is present to body, it is
present in the way that fire is present to air? For fire, too, in its turn,

94 See Pl., Tim. 36D8 E5; Ar., DA 2.1.412b12.
95 See Ar., DA 2.1.413a9; Alex. Aphr., De an. 15.9 28.
96 See Ar., DA 2.1.412b12.
97 Cf. supra 3.
while being present, is not present and, while penetrating the air throughout, is yet mixed with no part of it, but stays where it is while the air flows by. And when the air comes to be outside the place where the light is, it departs while retaining nothing, but while it is under the light it is lit, so that it is right to say in this case, too, that the air is in the light, rather than that the light is in the air. Plato, therefore, does well in not locating the soul in the body in the case of the universe, but rather the body in the soul, and he also asserts that there is a part of the soul in which there is body, but another in which there is no body, by which he clearly means the powers of the soul which the body does not need. Moreover, the identical account also applies in the case of the other souls. One should not say that there is a presence of the other powers of the soul to the body, but that those it needs are present, and that they are present not by being located in the parts of the body, nor again in the whole of it, and in particular that for the purpose of sense-perception, the power of the faculty of sense-perception is present to everything that is provided with sense-perception, but for their various activities different parts of it are present to the different parts.

§ 4.3.23. What I mean is this: in the process of the ensouled body’s being illuminated by soul, different parts of the body participate in it in different ways. In accordance with the suitability of an organ for a given function, the soul provides the power appropriate for that function. In this way, we say that the power in the eyes is the power of sight, that in the ears the power of hearing, the power of taste in the tongue, that of smell in the nose, while the power of touch is present in the whole body; for the whole body serves as sense organ to the soul for this type of apprehension. Since the organs of touch are situated at the first points of the nerves, which actually also have the power to move the living being since that is where this kind of power makes itself available and since the nerves start from the brain, they located the principle of sense-perception and impulse and in general of the whole living being here. They assumed that what is going to use them is present where the principles of the organs clearly are – or rather, it is better to say that the start of the activation of the power is there – for it is at the place from which the organ was going to be moved that the power of the craftsman, in a way, which is appropriate to the organ would exert itself, or rather not the power – for the power is everywhere – but the beginning of the activation is at the point where the principle of the organ is.

98 Restoring the καί, the deletion of which by Vitringa is accepted by HS.
99 Cf. 4.7.4-7; 5.5-9.29 30. See Pl., Tim. 34B4, 36D9 E3.
100 I.e., the different senses are active in different parts of the body.
101 Perhaps a reference to discoveries of Hellenistic medical science as well as to Plato.
Since, then, the power of sense-perception and impulse proper to that soul which engages in sense-perception and imagination has reason above it, as a nature\textsuperscript{102} neighbouring on its lower side the thing above which it is, it was located by the ancients at the highest point in the animal, in the head, not in the brain as such, but in this faculty of sense-perception, which was seated in the brain in the way we have mentioned. For one part of the soul had to be granted to the body, and in particular to that part of the body that is receptive of activity; while the other part, which has nothing in common with the body, had need of associating fully with that other entity, which is a form of soul, and of a soul capable of apprehending what comes from reason. For the faculty of sense-perception is, in a way, one that judges,\textsuperscript{103} and the faculty of imaginative representation is, in a way, intellectual,\textsuperscript{104} as are impulse and desire which follow imagination and reason.

The faculty of calculative reasoning, then, is there [in the faculties of sense-perception and imaginative representation], not as in a place, but because what is there profits from its presence. And how the term ‘there’ applies to the faculty of sense-perception has been specified above.\textsuperscript{105}

Again, since the faculty of growth of the soul, that concerned with increase in size and nutrition, is not absent from any of the body but nourishes it with the blood, and the blood that nourishes is in the veins, and the starting point of the veins and the blood is in the liver,\textsuperscript{106} the part of the soul that is the faculty of appetite has been assigned to live there, since this is where this power exerts its force; for what produces generation, nourishment, and increase in size must necessarily have an appetite for these things. But for the blood that is thin, light, active and pure, constituting a suitable organ for [the faculty of] spiritedness, its source, the heart\textsuperscript{107} – this being where this kind of blood is separated off – has been established as a fitting home for the seething of [the faculty of] spiritedness.\textsuperscript{108}

§4.3.24. But where will the soul come to be when it has departed from the body?

In fact, it will not be in the sensible world, where there is nothing that can receive it in any way, nor can it stay on with what is not of a nature to receive it, unless we are to assume that soul, being in a senseless state,
5 retains something of the body which draws soul to it. But if it has some extraneous [corporeal] element, it will be in it, and it follows it to that place where it is this thing’s nature to be or to come to be.

Given that there are many possible places for each such soul, the difference must have come from the respective disposition of each, and also from [natural] justice in things. For one will never escape suffering the due retribution for unjust acts; there is no dodging the divine law, which has inherent in it the execution of the judgement already made. The person on whom it is inflicted is unwittingly borne towards what it is proper for him to suffer, blown about everywhere on an unstable motion in his wanderings, but in the end, as if greatly exhausted by his resistance, he falls into the place appropriate to him, taking on involuntary suffering as a result of his voluntary motion. And it has been specified in the law how much he must suffer and for how long, and again there is a concordance between the release from punishment and the power of escaping upwards from those places, through the power of that harmony which controls everything.

Now when they have bodies, the souls have the capacity to apprehend corporeal punishments; but those of the souls that are pure and in no way drag any part of the body with them will necessarily exist nowhere in body. If, then, they are not anywhere in body – for they have no body – they will be in the intelligible world where there is Substantiality and Existence and the divine, in god, there, and with these, and in god will such a soul be. And if you still look to know where, you must look to the world where those things are. But when you look for them, look not with your eyes, nor as if you are looking for bodies.

§4.3.25. On the subject of memory, it is likewise worth investigating whether the souls themselves, when they have left these regions, have the capacity to remember, or whether some do and some do not, and whether they remember everything or some things, and whether they will continue to remember always, or only for a certain time, close to their departure hence.

But if we are going to conduct a proper investigation into this question, we must first get a clear idea of precisely what it is that

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109 Cf. 1.6.8.21 27. See Pl., Phd. 81C9 D4; Lg. 904A6 905A1.
110 Replacing the typographically erroneous ποθεῦν with παθεῦν.
111 See Callimachus, fr. 23.20 Pfeiffer. 
112 Cf. 4.8.5.8 10.
113 See Pl., Phdr. 248C2 249D3.
114 Probably an allusion to Pl., Rep. 509B5 9, where τὸ ἐἶναι (‘Existence’) and οὐσία (‘Substantiality’) are the direct endowment of the Idea of the Good on the intelligible world. Here the word τὸ ὄν (‘Being’) is used rather than the more frequent τὸ ἐἶναι.
115 I.e., Intellect.
remembers. I do not mean what memory is, but rather in which of the things that are it naturally has its place. The question as to what memory is has been discussed elsewhere, and indeed repeatedly so, but what we need to grasp more precisely now is what it is that has the natural capacity to remember.

Now if memory is of something acquired, either as something learned or something experienced, memory would not exist in those beings which are incapable of being affected or which are not in time. Indeed, one should not attribute memory to a god or to Being or to Intellect; for these have no element of time, but Being is attended by eternity and there is no before and after there; it is always as it is and in the identical state, and admits of no alteration. How, after all, could what is in an identical and uniform condition be involved in memory, since it neither has nor maintains a different state after the one it had before, or a different act of intellection after another one, so that it would be in one state, while remembering the different one that it was in before?

But what prevents it from knowing the changes in other things, such as the circuits of the cosmos, without itself changing?

In fact, this cannot be, because then it would be thinking first one thing and then another, following the changes of what is altered, and remembering is a different process from thinking. And one must not say that it remembers its own acts of thinking. For these did not come to it, so that it would need to lay hold of them to stop them going away; indeed, if that were the case, one would be afraid that its own substantiality would depart from it.

So, on identical grounds neither should we say that the soul remembers things which are parts of its nature although, when once it is in the sensible world, it is possible for it to possess them while not being active in respect of them, particularly when it has just come to the sensible world. But as for its being active, the ancients seem to apply ‘memory’ or ‘recollection’ to souls that activate what they have within them. For this reason, recollection would be another kind of memory; hence, time is not attached to memory in this sense.

But perhaps we are being careless about this question, and deficient in critical sense. For someone might raise the question as to whether this kind of memory or recollection that is cited does not belong to that soul,
but to another more obscure type,\textsuperscript{119} or perhaps to the complex of body and soul, the living being.\textsuperscript{120} If it belongs to another type of soul, when and how does it acquire them? And if it belongs to the living being, once again, when and how does it do so? We must investigate, then, what it is in us that retains memory, which is what we have been investigating from the outset. If it is the soul which remembers, which faculty or part; and if it is the living being, even as some have thought that that is what sense-perception belongs to, how does it do it, and what must we say the living being is, and also if one must posit that it is the identical thing that apprehends sense-data and thoughts, or a different thing for either one?

§4.3.26. If, then, the living being, the complex of body and soul, is involved in sense-perceptions when actualized, perceiving must be something like – and it is for this reason that it is said to be a common function – drilling a hole or weaving, so that the soul would be involved in sense-perception in the role of craftsman and the body in the role of his instrument, since the body undergoes affections and works for the soul, while the soul receives the impressions made on the body, or that which comes through the body, or the judgement which is made as a result of the body’s affection.

So, given the above, sense-perception may actually be termed a common function,\textsuperscript{121} but the corresponding memory would not have to belong to the body–soul composite, since the soul has already received the impression and either retained it or abandoned it\textsuperscript{122} – unless one were to take as evidence for remembering being common, too, the fact that we come to be able to remember or tend to forget the memory of the impression as a result of different mixtures in our bodies. But even though the body could be said to be or not to be an impediment, yet remembering might nonetheless belong to the soul. After all, how will it actually be the body–soul composite but not the soul that remembers things that are learnt?\textsuperscript{2}

Now, if the living being is a complex in the sense of being something different arising from its two components, in the first place it is absurd to say that the living being is neither body nor soul; for the living being will certainly not be some other thing because the two have changed, nor again because they have been mixed together, so that the soul would be in the living being only potentially.

\textsuperscript{119} The contrast is between the undescended soul, which is intellect, and the descended soul.

\textsuperscript{120} See Pl., Tim. 87E5 6; Ar., DA 1.4.408b13 18.

\textsuperscript{121} See Pl., Tht. 186D2 187A6; Ar., DA 1.1.403a3ff.; Alex. Aphr., De an. 84.4 9.

\textsuperscript{122} Reading αὐτὸν with HS\textsuperscript{4}. 
Next, even if this is the case, remembering will nonetheless belong to the soul, just as in the mixture of honey and wine, insofar as there is an element that is sweet, that will come from the honey. \[123\]

What, then, if the soul itself were to do the remembering, but due to its being in the body, and not being pure, it is as if it had acquired a certain quality, and is able to be marked by the impressions that come from sensibles by having, in a way, a base in the body which enables it to receive them, and not have them as if they were to flow past it? \[124\]

But, first of all, one would object that the impressions are not things with magnitude, nor are they like sealings, or resistances to pressure, or the making of impressions, because there is no pressing down, not even as in wax, but the way it happens is like intellection, even in the case of sensibles; while in the case of acts of intellection, on the other hand, what could one mean by resistance to pressure? And what need is there of a body or a corporeal quality which goes along with it? \[125\]

In any case, though, the soul must have memory of its own previous motions, such as the things for which it had an appetite, and what it did not gain the enjoyment of, and how the object of appetite did not reach its body. For how could the body speak of things that did not impinge upon it? Or how will it remember with the aid of the body what the body has no natural capacity for cognizing?

Rather, we should say that some things, which come through the body, come to a stop in the soul, while others pertain to the soul alone, if the soul is to be something, and there is to be a nature and function of soul. And if this is so, there must be desire and a memory of the desire, and, therefore, of attaining or failing to attain its object, since the soul’s nature is not among things that are in flux. For if this is not the case, we shall not be able to attribute to it self-awareness or conscious awareness or any power of putting things together or any sort of comprehension. For it is certainly not the case that it has none of these in its own nature and acquires them in the body, but it has certain activities the operation of whose function requires organs; of some it has come bringing the powers, while for others it brings the activations as well. But for the exercise of memory it finds body an impediment; since even now with the addition of certain things there is forgetting, and with their removal and purification from them memory often emerges again. And since memory is permanent, the nature of body, which is mobile and subject to flux, must be the cause of forgetting, not of memory. So, the ‘river of

\[123\] See Alex. Aphr., De an. 15.5 8.

\[124\] Cf. 4.7.1 8 esp. 6. See SVF 1.484 (= Sext. Emp., M. 7.228), 2.343 (= Proclus, In Parm. 841.2 5 Steel).

\[125\] Cf. 4.6.3.38 63.
Lethe" should be understood in this sense. Let this affection, then, belong to the soul.

§ 4.3.27. But which soul, the one we call the more divine, by which we are who we are, or the other which we have from the world as a whole?  

In fact, we should say that there are memories proper to each of the two, some peculiar to each and some common to both.  

And when the two souls are together, the memories are all together, but when they become separate, if both were to exist and remain, each would have its own memories for a longer time, but also, for a short period, those of the other. In any case, the shade of Heracles in Hades – I think we must consider this shade to be us – remembers all the things that were done in his life, because his life belonged predominantly to the shade. But the other souls which became identified with the complex nevertheless had no more to say; it is merely what belonged to this life that these souls knew about, too, other than perhaps something to do with justice. But what Heracles himself, the one separate from the shade, had to say is not mentioned.

What, then, would that other soul say when it has been freed from the body and is on its own? The one which drags along with it anything corporeal at all would speak about all the things that the human being did or suffered. But, after death, with the progress of time, memories of other things would appear from its former lives, and so it would hold some of the memories of the latest life of little value, and dismiss them. When it has been purified of body to a greater extent, it will pass in review even some things which it did not hold in its memory here. And if it comes to be in another body, and departs from it, it will talk about the things of its external life and about the body which it has just let go, and many things belonging to former lives. But in time it will always forget many of the things that have accrued to it.

But what will the soul actually remember when it has come to be on its own?  

In fact, first we must investigate to which faculty of the soul the capacity for remembering belongs.

§ 4.3.28. Is it the one with which we perceive and with which we learn? Or do we remember objects of appetite with the faculty of appetite, and

126 See Pl., Rep. 621C1 2.
127 A distinction between the higher and lower part of the embodied soul. Cf. 2.15.18 21; 6.7.5.21 26.
128 Cf. supra 6.10 25, 9.29 36, 10.20 29, 12.1 2. 129 See Homer, Od. 11.601 602.
130 See Pl., Phd. 80E1 81A2. 131 See Pl., Phil. 34B6 C2.

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things which caused anger in us with the faculty of spiritedness? For it is not the case, one might say, that one thing will enjoy the perceiving of something, while another will remember the enjoyment of those objects. At any rate, the faculty of appetite will be moved by the things it enjoyed when the object of appetite is seen again, clearly by memory. For why should it not relate to the objects of another faculty, or in a way other than that in which that faculty addresses them? What, then, prevents us from attributing sense-perception of such things as well to the faculty of appetite, and so appetite to the faculty of sense-perception, and all things to all faculties, so that each of them receives its name according to the element predominant in it?

In fact, sense-perception relates to each in a different way; so, for example, sight, not the faculty of appetite, has seen something, but the faculty of appetite is moved by the sense-perception through a kind of transmission, not in such a way that it can announce what kind of sense-perception it has had, but so that it is affected without being consciously aware of it. And again, in the case of anger, sense-perception has seen the man who did the injury, but it is the faculty of spiritedness that bestirs itself, as if, when a shepherd has seen a wolf menacing the flock, his dog, who has not himself seen it with his eyes, were aroused by the smell and the noise. So, let us take the case where the faculty of appetite has enjoyed something, and has a trace of the event deposited in it, not as a memory, but as a disposition or affection; but it is something else that has observed the enjoyment and has retained in itself the memory of what has happened. And evidence of this is the fact that often the memory of things that the faculty of appetite participated in is not pleasant; whereas if it had been in it, it would have been.

§4.3.29. Shall we, then, relocate memory to the faculty of sense-perception, that is, shall we postulate the identity of the faculty of remembering and the faculty of sense-perception? But if the shade is also to have memory, as we were saying, the faculty of sense-perception will be double, and even if it is not the faculty of sense-perception that remembers, but something else, still what remembers will be double. Further, if it is the faculty of sense-perception that remembers, that faculty will also handle branches of study and thoughts. But, in fact, a different faculty must deal with each of these. Shall we, then, make the thing that apprehends them common, and attribute memory of both kinds to that? But if what apprehends sensibles and intelligibles were one or identical in both cases, perhaps that would make some sense.

132 Cf. supra 27.7 8.
133 This is the view of the Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos, according to Porphyry, fr. 251.
If, however, it is divided into two, there would nonetheless still be two faculties; and if we give both to each of the two souls, there would be four.

In general, though, what necessity is there for us to remember with that with which we perceive, and for both to occur by means of the identical power, or for us to remember thoughts with the identical thing with which we think? No, since the identical people are not the best at thinking and at remembering, and those who enjoy a certain level of sense-perception do not remember equally well, and some have a special facility for sense-perception, while others, whose sense-perceptions are not acute, remember well. But again, if each of the two has to be different, and something else will remember things that sense-perception perceived first, must that, too, have perceived what it is going to remember?

In fact, for the person who will remember, there will be nothing to stop the sense-datum from being an imaginative representation, and remembering and retaining the memory will belong to the faculty of imaginative representation, which is a different thing. For this is the point at which the sense-perception terminates, and what was seen is present to it when the sense-perception is no longer there. And if the imagination of what is already absent is in this, it will remember, even if it is present to it for just a short time. But the person to whom it is actually present for a short time will have a brief memory of it, whereas if it is present for a long time people will remember better, with this power being stronger, so that it will not happen that the memory is shaken up and destabilized as a consequence of its being altered.\footnote{134}

Memory, then, belongs to the faculty of imaginative representation, and remembering will be of things of this kind. We shall say that people differ in respect of memory either because their powers are in different states, or because they pay attention or do not, or because they possess certain corporeal mixtures or not, and because these alter or do not, and are, in a way, in turmoil. But we can deal with these matters on another occasion.\footnote{135}

\textsection{} 4.3.30. But what is it that remembers acts of thinking? Does the faculty of imaginative representation remember these, too? If it is the case that a semblance accompanies every act of thinking,\footnote{136} perhaps, if this semblance, which is like an image of the thought, persists, there would in this way be a memory of what has been cognized. If not, we must look to some other solution.

\footnote{134} See Ar., \textit{De mem.} 1.450a12 451a2; Alex. Aphr., \textit{De an.} 68.4 69.2. \footnote{135} Cf. 4.6.3. \footnote{136} See Ar., \textit{De mem.} 1.449b30 450a2; DA 3.8.432a12 14.
Perhaps, for example, we might postulate the reception into the faculty of imaginative representation of a verbal expression of a thought. For the thought has no parts, and when it has not yet, in a way, proceeded to the outside, it remains unnoticed within, but the verbal expression, by unfolding it and bringing it forth from the thought to the faculty of imaginative representation, exhibits the thought as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension of it, and persistence of it, and memory. For this reason, though the soul is always tending towards intellection, it is when it comes to be at the level of the faculty of imaginative representation that we gain apprehension of this. For intellection is one thing and apprehension of intellection another, and we are always thinking, but do not always apprehend that fact; and this is because that which receives acts of intellection receives not only these, but also sense-perceptions on the lower side.\footnote{Cf. 3.8.6.10 36; 5.1.12.11 21.}

§4.3.31. But if memory belongs to the faculty of imaginative representation, and we have said that each soul remembers,\footnote{Cf. 4.2.27.3.} there will be two faculties of imaginative representation. Let us grant that, when the souls are apart, they each have one, but when they are in the identical place, in us, how are there two, and in which of them do the memories happen? If in both, there will always be duplicate imaginations; for it would certainly not be the case that the imaginative representation of the one soul would be for intelligibles, while that of the other was for sensibles – that way there would be two living beings having nothing in common with each other.

If, then, both souls have such a faculty, what will be the difference between them? And then, if so, how do we not recognize such a difference?

In fact, when the one soul agrees with the other, and the two faculties of imaginative representation are not separate, and the higher one is dominant, the semblance becomes one, as if a shadow were following the other, or as if a weaker light were being subsumed into a stronger one. But whenever there is conflict and discord, then the other one manifests itself on its own account, while we do not realize that it is in a different faculty. And, in general, the duality of the souls escapes our notice. For the two of them have come to be one thing, and one of them rides dominant over the other.\footnote{This refers to the entrance of the animal soul over and above the growth soul of the embryo. Cf. supra 27.1 6.} Now this other one has seen everything, and when it has gone out of the body, it keeps some of the things that pertain to the lower soul, and lets others go. It is as when we have at some time taken up associations with a lower class of person, and then
change these companions for others, we remember a few things to do
with the former, but more that pertain to the people who are better.

§ 4.3.32. But, then, what about memories of one’s friends, children or
wife? Or of one’s country, and such things as it would not be out of place
for a cultivated man to remember?

In fact, the faculty of imaginative representation remembers each
thing with feeling, while the cultivated man would have memories of
these in an unaffected way; for one might take it that the feeling is in the
former right from the start, and those of the feelings that are respectable
are in the virtuous soul, insofar as it has association with the other. It is
appropriate, after all, for the inferior soul to aspire to the results of the
acts of memory of the other, particularly when it is respectable itself; for
a given soul could be better from the beginning, or become better by
education received from the superior soul.

But in any case this one should be glad to forget the things that
come from the inferior; one may after all envisage the possibility that,
even when the one soul is virtuous, the other may be worse by its
nature, while being forcibly restrained by the other. Indeed, to the
extent that it strives upwards, it forgets more things – unless perhaps
all its life even in the sensible world was somehow such that it has
memories only of better things. In this connection, the remark about
‘standing apart from human concerns’ is most apt; this necessarily
comprises memories, too.

So, anyone saying that the good soul is forgetful would be right in
this sort of way. For it flees from the many, and brings the many
together into one, thus getting rid of unlimitedness. In this way, it
is not involved with many concerns, but travels light and is focused
upon itself; since even in the sensible world, whenever it wants to be in
the intelligible world, it gets rid of everything that is other than it
while it is still here; and there are few things in the sensible world that
are also not in the intelligible world; and when it is in heaven, it will
get rid of more. For example, the Heracles we spoke of above
would talk about his past brave deeds, but the other Heracles would
think these things unimportant, and when he has been transferred to
a holier place, and has come to be in the intelligible world, and to
a degree surpassing the other Heracles, he prevails in the contests in
which the wise contend.

140 Pl., Phdr. 249C8 D1. 141 See Pl. [?], Epin. 991E, 992B.
142 See supra. 27.7ff.
143 Porphyry has chosen for some curious reason to divide the treatise in two at this point.
§4.4.1. ... what, then, will he say? And, in general, of what things will the soul retain memory when it has come to be in the intelligible world and be with Substance?¹

In fact, it would be logical to say that it contemplates these things and is active in relation to them among which it is, and that otherwise it would not be in the intelligible world.

Will it remember nothing of the sensible world as, for example, that it did philosophy or indeed that while here it contemplated what is in the intelligible world?

But if, when focusing on something while engaging in thinking, it is not possible to do anything other than think it and contemplate that thing — and indeed there is no place in thinking for the concept of ‘having been thinking’, but one could only say this later, if occasion arose, and that would be proper to an entity subject to change — there could be no question of someone purely established in the intelligible world having any memory of things that once happened to him as an individual here. If, further, as seems to be the case, every act of intellect is timeless, the things in the intelligible world being in eternity and not in time, it is impossible for there to be memory there, not only of things in the sensible world, but of anything at all.² Everything in the intelligible world, after all, is permanently present, for there is no discursivity, or passing from one thing to another.

What, then? Is there not going to be any process of division into kinds from above, or from below into the universal or what is above?³ Let us grant that it does not happen in intellect since it is all together in actuality,⁴ but why will it not happen in soul when it is there? Well, what prevents even this [act of] soul from becoming concentrated by apprehension of things that are concentrated? Can there be memory of it as something that is all together?

¹ Cf infra 4.14 20, 5.11 12. ² Cf. 4.3.25.13; 6.5.11.14 21. ³ I.e., Plato’s method of collection and division. ⁴ Referring either to Intellect or to our undescended intellects.
In fact, it is in the way that all acts of intellection are of many things all together. Since the object of contemplation is variegated, the intellection of it is simultaneously variegated and multiform, and the acts of intellection are multiple, like many acts of sense-perception of a face with the eyes, the nose, and the other features being seen simultaneously.

But what happens when it divides up and unpacks some one thing? In fact, it is already divided in Intellect. This kind of thing is rather like having a point to focus on. Before and after in Forms does not consist in time, and the intellection of before and after will not be in time either. But there is before and after in an order, as in a plant there is the order starting from the roots as far as the top, which for the person who looks at it has before and after in order only, as he looks at the whole simultaneously.

But when a soul looks at one thing, and next takes in many things, and the totality of them, how did it have one first and another next? The answer is that the power, which is one, is one in such a way as to be many things when it is in something else, and does not apprehend everything in one act of intellection. The activities take place as a whole, but they are always all there in a potency which is stable; whereas in the rest of reality, when <many things> come to be, <they are not all always actualized>; for already that object of thinking, as not itself being one, was able to receive into itself the nature of the many which were hitherto non-existent.

§4.4.2. But enough of that. How about, though, the remembering of oneself?

In fact, one will not retain memory of oneself, nor will one remember that one is oneself the contemplating agent, as, for example, Socrates, nor that one is intellect or soul. In that connection, one should certainly bear in mind that when one indulges in contemplation in the sensible world, and especially when one does so with maximum clarity, one does not then revert to oneself in the thinking, but while retaining possession of oneself, one’s activity is directed towards that, and one becomes that, making oneself available to it in the role of matter, taking on the form of what one is looking at, and at that time being oneself only potentially.

When a person, then, thinks nothing, is he at that time anything in actuality?

5 Cf. 1.3.4.12 16, 5.1 4. 6 See Ar., Meta. 5.11.1018b26 29.
7 HS indicate that the text is locus nondum sanatus and the present translation is only probable.
8 Cf. 2.5.3.14; 5.1.3.23; 5.9.4.11 12.
In fact, if he is himself, he is empty of everything else whenever he thinks nothing. But if he is himself such as to be everything when he thinks himself, he thinks everything altogether. And so, such a person, with his attention focused on himself and seeing himself in actuality, has everything else included, and with his attention focused on everything, he has himself included.

But if he does this, he is changing his acts of thinking, which we ourselves just now did not allow for. Or should one say that remaining in the same state applies in the case of Intellect, but in the case of Soul, which is situated, in a way, at the edges of the intelligible, this can happen, since it can also advance further inwards. For if something comes into being around a fixed point, it must exhibit difference with respect to that fixed point, while not being itself fixed in the same way.

In fact, we should say that no change takes place when soul moves from what belongs to it to itself, or when it moves from itself to other things. For it is itself all things, and both are one.

But is the soul, when it is in the intelligible world, subject to experiencing different objects in succession in respect of itself and its contents?

In fact, when it is purely in the intelligible world, it, too, has the characteristic of not being subject to change. For the soul is then identical with what it is. For when it is in that place, it must necessarily arrive at union with Intellect, if indeed it has reverted to it. And having reverted to it, it has nothing in between, and when it has come to Intellect, it is fitted to it. And having been fitted to it, it is united with it while not being dissolved, but both are one, while still being two. When it is in this state it could not change, but would be in an unchanging state in relation to intellection, while having at the same time self-awareness, having simultaneously become identical with, insofar as it is one with, the intelligible.

§4.4.3. But when it has departed from the intelligible world and is unable to bear the oneness, but has become attracted to a state of its own, wanting to be other than it was, and in a way poking its head out, it is in consequence of this, so it seems, that it acquires memory. The memory of the things in the intelligible world continues to restrain it from falling, but that of things here carries it in this direction, while that of the things in heaven holds it there, and, in general, according as the focus of its memory alters, there it is and comes to be. Now, remembering is either thinking or imagining, but its imagination does

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9 Cf. supra 15 16. 10 I.e., soul is identical with Being. Cf. 4.8.1.1 11.
11 Cf. 4.8.4.11 21; 5.1.1.5 9.
not consist in possessing something;\textsuperscript{12} rather, its disposition is such as the things it sees; and if it sees sensibles, its level of descent will correspond to the amount of them it sees. Because it possesses all things in a secondary way, and not in a perfect way,\textsuperscript{13} it becomes all things, and being a boundary entity, and having its location in such a place, it is borne in either direction.\textsuperscript{14}

§4.4.4. In the intelligible world, then, it sees the Good through Intellect; it is not obscured in such a way that it cannot penetrate through to soul; for there what is between is not body, so as to be an obstacle. And indeed even when there are bodies in between, it is often possible to arrive at a third level of Being from the first.\textsuperscript{15} But if a soul gives itself to the things below it, it has what it wanted to an extent corresponding to its memory and imagination. For this reason, memory, even if it is of the best things, is itself not one of the best things.

One must think of memory, after all, not only as covering the situation where one, in a way, perceives that one is remembering, but also when one has a disposition in relation to previous experiences or to things previously seen. For it could happen, even when one has no conscious awareness of having a memory, that one has it in oneself more strongly than if one knew that one did. For it could be that when one knows something, one might possess this as something different from oneself, while if one does not know that one has it, one may very well end up being what one has; and this latter experience actually makes the soul fall further.

If, though, on departing from the intelligible world, a soul somehow recovers its memories, it had them there, too. That is, it had them potentially, but the actuality of the things there made the memory disappear. For the memories are not after all like impressions deposited in the soul, in which case what happens would perhaps be absurd; rather, it is a case of a potentiality which was later subsumed into an actuality. When the actuality in the intelligible world, then, ceases to be operative, the soul sees what it had been seeing before it came to be there.

§4.4.5. What, then? Does this power by which remembering takes place bring even those things into actuality now?

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. 4.3.29.31.

\textsuperscript{13} The soul possesses the expressed principles of Forms, not the Forms themselves.

\textsuperscript{14} Cf.4.8.4.32; 7.1 6.

\textsuperscript{15} It is possible to arrive at Soul from the One via Intellect. Cf. 1.8.2.25; 6.8.7.1. See Pl. [?], 2nd Ep. 312E1 4.
In fact, if we did not see them themselves, it does so by memory, but if we did, it does so by that with which we saw them in the intelligible world, too. For this is aroused by the things by which it is aroused, and this is what sees in the sphere of the things we have talked about. One must not give an account of them using guesswork or syllogistic reasoning which has its principles from elsewhere, but it is possible, as was said, to talk about the intelligibles even for those who are here, by means of the identical faculty which has the power to contemplate what is in the intelligible world. For one must see what is there by in a way arousing the identical power, so that one can also arouse it there, too. It is as if someone raising his eye up to some vantage point were to see things which none of those who had not gone up with him could see.

So, memory from what we have been saying, starts in heaven, when the soul has already left the intelligible regions. If, then, the soul has come to be in heaven, from the sensible world, and stops there, there is nothing surprising if it were to have memory of many of the things here, of the kind mentioned, and were able to recognize many of the souls it had known before, if indeed it is necessary for them to have bodies around themselves of similar shape. And even if they change their shapes, making them spherical, they would then recognize them through their characters and the peculiarities of their behaviour; for that would not be absurd. Granted that they have abandoned their affections, their characters are not precluded from remaining. And if they were able to converse as well, they would recognize them that way, too.

But when they come down from the intelligible world, how do they remember?

In fact, they will stir up their memory of the identical things, albeit to a lesser extent than those souls that have remained above; for they will be able to remember other things, and the greater passage of time will have brought about complete forgetfulness of many things.

But if they have turned to the sensible world and fall into the world of becoming, what kind of remembering will they have?

In fact, it is not necessary that they should fall to the lowest level. For in the process of their motion, it is possible to stop when they have proceeded a certain way, and nothing prevents them from emerging again, before they have gone to the lowest level of becoming.

§4.4.6. One would be justified, then, in saying that the souls that move from place to place and change will also remember; for memory is of

16 Cf. 4.3.15.1 7. 17 Cf. 4.3.27.14 22. 18 Following HS we correct the text to ποιησάμενα δρα...γνωρίζοιεν thus changing a question into an assertion.
things that have happened and have become past. But what would the
souls which remain in the identical place or condition remember? Our
enquiry is also directed at the memories of the souls of all the stars and
indeed of those of the sun and moon; it will culminate by going on to
tackle the case of the soul of the universe, too, and will even have the
audacity to concern itself with the memories of Zeus himself. In the
course of investigating these questions, it will look at what their
thoughts or acts of calculative reasoning are, if indeed they have any.
If, then, these souls neither investigate nor have problems – for they
need nothing, and they learn nothing which was not part of their knowl-
dge before – what acts of calculative reasoning or syllogisms or
thoughts would they have? They would not even have thoughts and
contrivances relative to human affairs by which they will regulate things
having to do with us or generally things on earth. For the method of
ordering things well\(^\text{19}\) that comes to the universe from them is of
a different nature.

§4.4.7. What, then? Will they not remember that they saw god?\(^\text{20}\)

In fact, they always see it, and while they see it they cannot say that
they have seen it; for that would be the experience of those who have
ceased to do so.

What next? Will they not remember that they went round the earth
yesterday or last year, or that they were alive yesterday and long ago and
indeed as long as they have been alive?

In fact, they are always alive; and the ‘always’ implies one identical
thing. But distinguishing the ‘yesterday’ and ‘last year’ in their revolu-
tion would be the same as if one were to divide into many a stride
consisting of a single footstep, and made many of the one stride,\(^\text{21}\) one
segment and then another. For in this case, too, there is a single revolu-
tion, but with us there is a reckoning of many and different days, because
they are marked off by nights. But in the intelligible world, since there is
only one day, how can there be many? And so there can be no last year
either.

One might argue, however, that the interval traversed is not identical,
but different, and the section of the zodiac is different. So why will it not
say, ‘I passed through this section, and now I am in another’? And again,
if it looks on human affairs, why not on the changes that pertain to them,
and that they are now other than they were? And if it sees this, it will see
that people, and their affairs, too, were different before. And so there
will be memory.

\(^{19}\) The term εὐθημοσύνη is from Hesiod, *Works and Days* 471.

\(^{20}\) I.e., Intellect. Cf. *supra* 4.3.11.26–27.

\(^{21}\) Reading ἕν with Theiler. The word must be taken with the stride, not the footstep.
§4.4.8. In fact, it is not necessary either to lodge in the memory all the things that one contemplates, or that items that supervene entirely accidentally should ever reach the imagination. However, where intel-
lection and knowledge are operative to a greater extent, if these happen in a way that is available to sense-perception, it is not necessary to let the knowledge of them go and give one's attention to the particular sensible, unless one is dealing with some practical matter, since particulars are included in the knowledge of the whole.

What I mean by each of these points is this. First, that it is not necessary to store up what one sees in oneself. For when it makes no difference, or when sense-perception is stimulated, with no choice involved, by reason of the mere difference between things in one's line of sight, and it is altogether nothing to do with one, then only sense-
ception has had this happen to it, and the soul has not admitted it inside itself, inasmuch as it has no interest in the difference itself, either for its usefulness or for any other benefit. But when the soul's activity is entirely directed to other things, it would not take up the memory of things of this kind when they have passed on, seeing as it did not cognize the sense-perception of them even when they are present.

The second point is that it is not necessary for things that happen entirely accidentally to reach the imagination, and that even if this were to happen, it would not be in such a way that it preserves them and watches over them, but the impression of a thing like this does not produce self-awareness. One would understand this if one were to take what has been said above as follows: if it is never our purpose in moving locally to cut off first this piece of air and next that, or, a fortiori, to pass through it at all, there would be no question of observing it or having a conception of it as we walk along. Since if we had not had the purpose of completing this part of a road, but rather to effect a passage through air, we should not have come to care on which stretch of ground we were, or how much we had traversed; and if we did not have to move for a particular length of time, but only had to move, and we did not refer any other thing we do to time, we would not have placed any succession of times in our memory. It is a recognized fact that when discursive thinking grasps an action as a whole and so assumes that it will be accomplished in its totality, one would not any longer focus on each segment of it as it happens.

Further, when someone always does the identical thing, it would be pointless for him to observe all the details of this identical thing.

If, then, the heavenly bodies, in their revolutions, do so performing their own functions, and not with the aim of passing by all the things they do pass, and their function is not to observe what it is they go past,
or the passing itself, their passage is accidental to them, and their mind is on other greater things, and these things through which they go are always identical, and their time spent in an interval of a given length does not consist in calculating it. Even if their passage is in theory divisible, it is not necessary that there should be memory of the places they pass through, or of the times at which they did so. They have the identical life, since their motion in space is around the identical point, so that their motion is not spatial but vital, being that of a single living being directing its activity at itself, and being stable in relation to what is outside it, but engaged in a motion which consists in the eternal life within it.

Further, if one were to liken their motion to a dance,\(^\text{22}\) if it is to one that at some time comes to a halt, the whole which has been completed from its beginning to its end would be complete, although each single part of it would not be complete; but if one compared it to the kind of motion that is always going on, that is always complete. And if it is always complete, it has no time or place in which it will have been completed. And so it would have no desire for this; so that it will measure what it does neither by time nor space. And so it will have no memory of these.

If, then, these beings live a blessed life, and look on this life with their own souls, with this inclination of the souls themselves to one thing and the illumination that comes from them to the whole of heaven – like strings on a lyre vibrating in sympathy with each other – they would sing a tune in some sort of natural concord. If the whole heaven and its parts were moved like this, with the heaven being moved in respect of itself, and different things moved in a different way with respect to the identical thing because of occupying different positions, then our account would be even more correct, since the life of all of them is one and the same to an even greater extent.

§4.4.9. But Zeus who actually orders and manages and arranges all things for all time, with his ‘royal soul’, his ‘royal intellect’, and providence for all things that will happen, and who, when they are happening, takes charge of them and organizes them, rolls out their many cycles and brings them to completion – how in the midst of all this would he not have memory?\(^\text{23}\) When he contrives and checks and works out how long the cycles have been and what they were like, and how they would occur next, too, he would surely be best of all at remembering, even as he is the wisest craftsman.

\(^{22}\) See Pl., Tim. 40C3 5.

\(^{23}\) Cf. infra 10.1 5 on Zeus as either Intellect or the soul of the universe. See Pl., Phdr. 246e4 5; Phil. 30D1 2.
Now, the memory of the cycles would present a serious problem in itself, about what their number would be, and whether he would have knowledge of this number. If their number is limited, that will involve giving a beginning in time to the universe; but if it is unlimited, he will not know the number of his deeds.

In fact, he will know them as a unity, and that they constitute always one single life – for that is how it is unlimited – and he will know that not externally, but by his very functioning, this kind of unlimitedness being always present to him, or rather following along with him and being contemplated by a knowledge that does not originate in what is external to him. Just as he knows the unlimitedness of his own life, so he will know that his activity directed towards the universe is one, but not that it is directed towards the universe.

§4.4.10. But since what orders the cosmos is double, we speak of one aspect of it as the Demiurge, and the other as the soul of the universe, and when we talk of Zeus we are sometimes referring to the Demiurge and sometimes to the controlling principle of the universe. In the case of the Demiurge, we must remove altogether the notion of before and after and give him one unchangeable and timeless life. But the life of the cosmos which contains the controlling principle in itself still requires discussion, asking whether this, too, does not have its life in calculative reasoning, or in considering what it must do.

For what it must do is already known and is set in order, without having ever been set in order; for things that have been set in order are things that have happened, but what makes them happen is the order itself. This is the activity of a soul which depends on a stable wisdom, of which the order in the soul is an image. And since that higher one does not change, it is necessary that this soul does not change either. For it is not the case that it looks there sometimes, and at other times does not look, for if it stopped doing so it would find itself at a loss; for it is one soul and has one function. For what controls is one and it always rules, not ruling sometimes and at other times being ruled, for where could more controlling principles come from, such as would result in conflict or uncertainty?

In fact, that which is doing the managing is one and always wants the identical thing; for why should it want a succession of different things, so that it would not know what to do in the face of their multiplicity? And yet, even if it were to change, while maintaining its unity, it would still not be at a loss as to what to do. For just because the universe had many parts and oppositions between the parts, it would not thereby be

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24 Cf. 3.9.1.1 5; 5.9.3.25 26.
at a loss as to how to organize them. For it does not begin from the most remote beings, nor from the parts, but from the first principles, and beginning from the first principle, it goes on to everything by a route free from impediments and orders them, and rules them for the reason that it sticks with one identical task, and is itself identical. But if it wanted now one thing and then another, where would the other come from? Then, it will be at a loss as to what it must do, and its work will be weakened as it proceeds in its acts of calculative reasoning leading to a position of doubt about what to do.

§4.4.11. For the management of the universe, as in the case of a single living being, is of two kinds, one which starts from the outside and the parts, but another that starts from the inside and the first principle; it is like a doctor who starts from outside, and works part by part, and often does not know what to do and deliberates, whereas nature starts from the principle and has no need of deliberation. Now the management of the universe and its manager must not, in exercising control, proceed the way the doctor does, but rather like nature. In the management of the universe there is a greater simplicity, insofar as it relates to all things which are included as parts of a single living being. For one nature rules all natures, and these follow, attached to it and dependent on it, and in a way grow from it, as nature in the branches depends on the nature of the whole plant. What role, then, is there for calculative reasoning or counting or memory, when wisdom is always present, working, ruling, and managing all things in the identical manner?

Just because the things that come to be are variegated and different in kind, after all, one should indeed not suppose that what produces them consequently undergoes the changes in what it produces. On the contrary, to the extent that the things that come to be are variegated, to that extent does what makes them remain such as it is. For in an individual living being, the natural developments are many and do not all happen together, such as the different stages of growth, the things that sprout at given times, like horns, beards, and the development of breasts, maturity, and reproduction where the earlier expressed principles are not lost, but others are added; this is at least clear from the fact that the entirety of the identical expressed principle is present in turn in the living being that is engendered. Indeed, it is right to equip it [the soul of the cosmos] with the identical wisdom, and that this should be the universal and, in a way, permanent wisdom of the world, being many and variegated and yet the simple wisdom of one very large living being, not changed by the multiplicity, but a single expressed principle and all together; for if it

were not all things, it would not be that wisdom, but the wisdom of remote beings and parts [of the whole].

§ 4.4.12. Perhaps someone might say that this kind of function belongs to nature, but that the wisdom inhering in the universe necessarily includes acts of calculative reasoning and memories.

That, however, is the position of people who take it that being wise consists in not being wise, and who have come to believe that seeking to be wise is identical to being wise. For what else would calculative reasoning be if not seeking to find wisdom and an account which is true and which hits upon that which is the case? The person who calculates is the same as someone playing the lyre with a view to achieving the art of lyre-playing, or who practises in order to acquire an ability, and generally the same as one who learns with a view to achieving knowledge. For the one calculating is seeking to learn what makes the person who already has it wise; so that wisdom inheres in one who has already come to a halt. The person who has been calculating can bear witness to this; for when he has found what he needs, he has as such ceased calculating; and he came to a stop when he became wise.

If, then, we are going to put the controlling principle of the universe in the position of those who are learning, we must assign it the acts of calculative reasoning, difficulties, and memories of one who compares the present with the past and the future. But if we are going to put it in the position of one who knows, we must believe that its wisdom, in possession of its target, is at rest.

Next, if it knows things in the future – to say that it does not know them is absurd – why will it not know how they will come about? And if it knows how they will come about, what need will it still have of calculating and comparing the past with the present? And knowledge of things in the future, if indeed one grants that it has it, would not be such as prophets have, but such as producers have who are confident that their products will come to be, which is identical to those who are in all respects in control and for whom nothing is doubtful or arguable. Those, then, who have a fixed belief tend to retain it. Wisdom about the future, therefore, is identical in its stability with wisdom about the present; and this is outside the sphere of calculative reasoning.

But if it does not know the things in the future which it will produce itself, it will not produce by knowledge or by looking to some pattern, but will produce whatever comes its way; and that is identical with saying that it is random. That, therefore, according to which it will produce remains. But if that according to which it will produce remains permanent, it will not produce otherwise than in the likeness of the
pattern that it has in itself.\textsuperscript{26} It will, therefore, produce in a single way, and in the same way. It will not produce now in one way and later in another, or what is there to prevent it from failing? But if what is being produced is to be different, it is different not on its own account but because it is subservient to expressed principles. These derive from its producer, so that it followed expressed principles in an orderly way.

So, the producer is in no way forced to wander or to be at a loss or to have problems, as some have thought,\textsuperscript{27} on the assumption that the management of the universe is troublesome. For ‘having problems’, it seems, consists in trying to perform tasks which are not one’s own; that is, relating to things of which one is not in control. But for things of which one is in control, and in sole control, what should such a one need other than himself and his own will? But this is identical with his own wisdom, since for such a one his will is wisdom. Such a one, therefore, has no need for producing, since his wisdom is not alien; on the contrary, he uses nothing extraneous. So, he does not use calculative reasoning or memory; for these things are extraneous to him.

§4.4.13. But how will this kind of wisdom differ from what we call nature?

In fact, it differs because this wisdom is a thing of the first order, and nature of the last; for nature is but a reflection of wisdom, and being the lowest phase of the soul, it has the lowest kind of expressed principle reflected in it, as if in thick wax an impression on the surface were to come through to the furthest wax on the other side, with that on the top being clear, but that on the bottom being merely a weak trace. Hence, it does not know, but merely produces. For giving what it has to what comes next to it, with no choice involved, its giving to what is corporeal or material is just the production, even as, for example, what has been itself heated gives its own form to what is in contact with it and next in order, thus making that hot to a lesser extent.

For this reason, nature does not possess imagination either. Intellection, however, is superior to imagination; and imagination is intermediate between an impression of nature and intellection. The one has no apprehension or comprehension of anything, but imagination has comprehension of what comes from outside; it allows one who has an image to have knowledge of what has happened to him. But intellection is itself a production, that is, an activity that comes from the very thing that exercises the activity.

\textsuperscript{26} See Tim. 29E1 with 30C2 D1 and 39D7 E2.
\textsuperscript{27} See Epicurus, fr. 352 Usener (= Cicero ND 1.52), a critique of the Stoic position. This passage also perhaps contains a critique of certain Gnostic positions.
Intellect, then, possesses it, but the soul of the universe always acquires it, that is, it has always acquired it, and its life consists in this, and what appears to it from time to time is the comprehension of itself thinking. And what is produced from it as an image seen in matter is nature, in which Beings halt their procession, or even prior to this, and these are the last things that belong to the intelligible world; for what comes next is the world of imitations. But nature acts on matter and is affected by it, whereas that soul which is before it and contiguous to it acts but is not affected, and the one that is even higher does not act on bodies or on matter.

§4.4.14. Of the bodies which are said to be produced by nature, the elements are just that, bodies, but are animals and plants produced such that they have nature in them in a way juxtaposed? It is in a way like light; when it has departed, air has none of it, but the light is in a way apart, and air is apart from it as not being mixed with it.

In fact, it is in a way like fire and what has been heated; when the fire has gone, some kind of heat remains, being other than the heat in the fire, a sort of state of what has been heated. For one should say that the shape which nature bestows on what has been shaped by it is a form other than nature itself. But we must consider whether the body has something else apart from this, which is in a way between this and nature itself. What the difference is between nature and what is called the wisdom in the universe has already been stated.

§4.4.15. But there is this problem about everything we have just said. For if eternity relates to Intellect and time to Soul – for we say time has its existence in relation to the activity of soul and derives from it – how, since time is divided up and has a past, would not the psychical activity be divided, too, and in turning back to the past produce memory in the soul of the universe? For, again, we say that identity is characteristic of eternity and difference of time, since otherwise eternity and time will be identical, even if we are not prepared to attribute change to the soul’s activities. Shall we, then, say that our souls, seeing as they admit of change and in particular are characterized by a sense of deficiency, are things of a kind to be in time, but that the soul of the universe generates time, without itself being in time? But assume that it is not in time: what is it that makes it generate time but not eternity?

28 See Pl., Tim. 50C5. 29 Reading [τῶ] σώματα with HS. 30 Cf. infra 18.4 6, 29.1 7. 31 Cf. supra 12 14. 32 Reading <εἰ> τῇ ὑποστάσει with HS according to a suggestion by Igal. Thus, the sense is: ‘for we say that [we understand] time in its existence in relation to’.
In fact, it is because the things it generates are not eternal, but are encompassed by time; for even souls are not in time, but some of their affections and some of their deeds are. For the souls are eternal, and time is subsequent, and what is in time is inferior to time; for time must comprehend that which is in time, just as it does, says Aristotle, that which is in place and in number.\textsuperscript{33}

§4.4.16. But if in soul one thing comes after another and there is prior and posterior in the things that are produced, and if it produces them in time, it will incline to the future as well; if so, then to the past, too.

In fact, prior and past are in things that are produced, whereas in the soul nothing is past; rather, all the expressed principles are there simultaneously, as has been said.\textsuperscript{34} But in things produced there is non-simultaneity, since there is no being together either, though things are together in the expressed principles, like the hands and feet in the expressed principle; in sensibles, however, they are apart. And yet in the intelligible world, too, there is separation in another way; so there is priority, too, in another way.

In fact, someone might say that being separate occurs due to Difference.\textsuperscript{35} But how could there be priority unless that which orders things were to be in charge of this? And being in charge, it will prescribe one thing after another. For why will all things not exist simultaneously?

In fact, they will not if what orders and the order are different, in such a way that it can, in a way, issue prescriptions. But if the first order is what is in charge, it is not yet prescribing, but only produces this thing after that. For if it does issue prescriptions, it prescribes looking to an order. And so it will be other than the order.

How, then, is it identical? It is because what orders is not matter and form, but only form or power, and Soul is a secondary activity after Intellect. And the condition of being one thing after another inheres in things which do not have the power to do everything simultaneously. This kind of soul, however, is a majestic thing, too, like a circle coinciding with its centre and expanded immediately after the centre, an interval with no extension; that is how each of them is.

Now if someone were to put the Good in the centre, he would put Intellect in the place of a circle that is not moved, but Soul in that of a circle that is moved, but moved by desire. For Intellect has immediate possession of what it wants and encompasses it, whereas Soul desires what transcends Being.\textsuperscript{36} But the sphere of the universe, since it has its soul desiring in that way, moves in the way that it desires by its nature.

\textsuperscript{33} Cf. 1.1.4.26. See Ar., Phys. 4.12.221a18, 28 30. \textsuperscript{34} Cf. supra 11.26 27. \textsuperscript{35} Cf. 4.3.4.9 11. \textsuperscript{36} See Pl., Rep. 509B9.
And as a body, its nature is to desire what is external; and this involves embracing it and surrounding it on all sides with itself. And, therefore, it moves in a circle.

§4.4.17. But how is it that the acts of thinking and the expressed principles [of Soul] are not also in us in the same way as they are in the soul of the universe, but rather in the sensible world involved in temporal succession, with the consequent necessity for investigations? Is it because there are many things in us which act as ruling principles and are moved, and there is no one thing that is in control?

In fact it is, and also because now one thing and then another controls our attention, in relation to our needs and to the circumstances, and it is not determined within itself, but always relates to a succession of different things which are external. Hence, our intentions are different and suited to the moment when the need is present and this or that particular thing has happened externally.

And from the fact that there are many things operating as principles in us, it is necessary that our images are many, and extraneous, and each one is unconnected to the other, and get in the way of the motions and acts of each individual. For when the faculty of appetite is moved, the image of what moves it comes as a sort of perception which announces and gives information about the affection, and asks the soul to follow it and provide for it the object of appetite. But the other part of the soul necessarily finds itself with a problem both in the case when it gives in and provides what is asked for, and in the case when it resists. And the faculty of spiritedness, having been moved to call on us to resist, produces the identical problem, and the needs and affections of the body drive us to a series of different beliefs. So, too, do ignorance about goods, and the soul not knowing what to say when it is drawn in all directions, and different beliefs arising from the mixture of these.

But what if it is the best part of us that has different beliefs?

In fact, having difficulties and different beliefs belongs to the composite. The correct reasoning arising from the best part, when conveyed to the composite, is weakened because it is in the mixture; it is not so by its own nature, but it is as when the best of counsellors speaks in the great commotion of an assembly but does not prevail, whereas the worst of those who make a commotion and shout do so, while the other sits in silence, able to do nothing, overcome by the commotion of the worst.

In the worst man, the individual is identified with the composite, and the human being is made up of everything, as in some bad constitution.

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37 Referring to the faculties of appetite and spiritedness.
38 Referring to cases of incontinence (ἀκρασία) and continence (ἐγκρασία).
39 Cf. 4.8.8.13 22. 40 Retaining ἀσθενῆς with Kirchhoff. 41 Cf. 6.4.15.23 32.
In the average human being, as in the city, something good could prevail when a democratic constitution is not out of control. But in the better human being there is the rule of the best, when the person now avoids the composite, and gives himself to better things. But in the best human being, the one who separates himself, the ruling principle is one, and the order in the other parts is derived from this. It is in a way like a city that is double, a higher one and one consisting of the elements below, but ordered in conformity with what is above.

At least we have now explained that in the soul of the universe there is unity and identity and sameness, and that in the other souls the situation is different, and why. So much, then, for that.

§ 4.4.18. Now for the question whether the body possesses anything on its own account, and brings some unique quality of its own to the life bestowed on it by the presence of soul, or whether what it has is simply nature, and this nature is what it is that associates with the body.

In fact, the body itself, in which there is soul and nature, must not be the same kind of thing as what is soulless, or that air is when it has been lit, but rather like air that has been warmed; the body of an animal or indeed of a plant, has something like a shadow of soul, and pain and taking pleasure in the pleasures of the body is the business of the body so qualified; but the pain of this body and this sort of pleasure come to the attention of ourselves for unaffected cognition.

By ‘ourselves’ I mean the ‘other’ soul, inasmuch as even the body so qualified is not another’s, but belongs to us, for which reason it is of concern to us, as belonging to us. For we are not this qualified body, nor yet have we been purged of it, but it depends on us and is suspended from us, whereas we exist in respect of our dominant part; nevertheless, that other entity is ours, though in a different way. For this reason, it is of concern to us when it is experiencing pleasure and pain, and the more so the weaker we are, and to the extent that we do not separate ourselves from it, but hold this part of us to be the most valuable, and take it as the true human being, and, in a way, submerge ourselves in it.

For we must say that affections of this kind are not those of the soul in general, but belong to the body so qualified, that is, of something common to both or complex. When something is a single thing, then it is in a way sufficient to itself. For example, what affection would a body on its own undergo if it had no soul? For if it were divided, it would not be itself that is being divided, but the unity in it. But soul on

42 See Pl., Lg. 756E10. 43 I.e., the intellectual soul. Cf. 1.1.7.6; 4.7.1.22 25.
44 Cf. 1.1.7.14 18. See Ar., EN 9.4.1166a16 17; 10.7.1178a2 3.
45 See Pl., Sts. 273D E.
its own would not be affected even in this way, and being like this escapes every such experience.

But when two things want to be one, since they have this unity as something extraneous, it would be reasonable to say that the origin of pain for them consists in not being allowed to be one. I mean here not two as if there were two bodies, for in that case there is only one nature involved; but when one nature wants to share something with another, that is, a thing of another kind – and the worse takes something from the better, and that cannot take the better itself, but only some trace of it, and in this way, too, it comes to be both two things and one, stuck between what it was originally and what it could not have – it generates a problem for itself, since it has acquired a transitory association which is not secure, but always borne in opposite directions. And as it fluctuates upwards and downwards, on its being borne down it proclaims its pain, and as it moves up its desire for the association.  

§4.4.19. This indeed is what is called pleasure and pain. We say that pain is cognition of the body’s withdrawal as it is being deprived of the reflection of soul, and pleasure the animal’s cognition that the reflection of soul is once again taking its place in the body. The affection is, then, at that level, but the cognition belongs to the perceptual soul which perceives in its position adjacent to that level, and makes a report to the part which is the ultimate recipient of sense-perceptions. It is the body, though, that is pained. By ‘is pained ’ I mean ‘has undergone the affection’ as in the case of a cut; when the body is cut the division is in respect of its mass, but the discomfort is in the mass because it is not just a mass, but a mass duly qualified. The burning is there, but it is the soul that perceives it, taking it to itself because it is in a way located next to it. And the whole soul perceives the affection there without itself being affected; for, receiving the perception itself as a whole, it declares that the affection is there where the wound and the pain are.

But if the soul itself had been affected, being in the whole body, it would not have said or passed on the information that the affection was there, but all of it would have suffered the pain and it would have been hurt as a whole, and would not have declared or indicated that the pain was at that level, but would have said that it was there where it was itself; it is, though, everywhere. As it is, the finger hurts and the human being hurts, and the human being hurts because the finger is the human being’s finger, but we say that the human being hurts in his finger, as we say that the human being is ‘grey’ because of the greyness of his eyes.  

46 Cf. 1.8.15.15 16. See Pl., Tim. 90B C. 47 I.e., the faculty of sense perception. 48 This is either συναισθησις ('self awareness') or λογισμός ('calculative reasoning'). Cf. 3.4.4.10 14; 4.3.26.45.
It is, then, that part that is affected that hurts, unless one takes ‘hurts’ as including the succeeding sense-perception. If one does take it together, though, one clearly means this, that ‘pain’ is to be taken along with the pain’s not failing to come to the attention of sense-perception.

In fact, though, we must call the sense-perception itself not pain, but rather a cognition of pain, and say that since it is a cognition it is unaffected, so that it can cognize and give a sound report. For a messenger who has undergone an affection and has his concentration fixed on that affection either fails to report altogether, or is an unsound messenger.

§4.4.20. It follows that we should make the beginning of corporeal appetites arise from the composite – in the sense we have discussed – and the particular nature of the body. For we must not attribute the beginning of desire and wanting to the body in just any condition, or the quest for salty or sweet things to the soul itself, but to that which is body, but wants to be not just body, but has also acquired motions to a greater extent than the soul, and because of this acquisition is forced to turn in many directions. For this reason, when it is in one state it looks for salty things, and for sweet things when it is in another, and for being heated or cooled; such things would not be of concern to it if it were on its own.

And just as cognition arose from the pain, and the soul wanting to take the body away from what was making the affection produced flight, and the part that first underwent the affection, by its own contraction somehow teaches it flight, so sense-perception has acquired information, and also the soul close to it, which we actually call nature, which gives the trace of soul to the body. Nature learns about the transparent appetite which is the end-product of that which arose in the body, whereas sense-perception sees the image, as a result of which the soul, which is responsible for provision, is either already providing what was desired, or resists and endures and does not pay attention either to the originator of the appetite, or to the part that has taken on the appetite after this.

But why do we talk about two appetites and not say that what has the appetite is only that, the body so-qualified?

In fact, if nature is one thing, and the body so-qualified that has arisen from nature is another – for nature exists before the body so-qualified comes into being, for it produces the body so-qualified by moulding and shaping – it follows necessarily that nature does not initiate the appetite,

49 Cf. 3.6.2.34 37. 50 I.e., the faculty of growth. Cf. supra 18.6, 30.
51 I.e., the living body.
but that what does is the body so-qualified which has undergone a particular affection, and suffers pain as it strives for the opposites of what is happening to it, or alternatively pleasure after the pain and fulfilment after the want. But nature, like a mother, as if it were aiming at what the thing affected wants, tries to put things right and bring it back to itself, and as it seeks for what will cure the condition, it tries to connect its search with the appetite of that which has been affected, and to ensure that the satisfaction of the appetite comes back from that to itself. And so one can say that the appetite comes from the body itself—one might perhaps call it ‘proto-appetite’ or ‘pre-appetite’—but nature derives its appetite from something else and through something else, and that which either sees or does not see to the satisfaction of the appetite is yet another nature.

§4.4.21. That it is in this living body that the origin of appetite is to be found is evidenced by the different age-groups. For the corporeal appetites of children, adolescents, and adults are different, and different again when they are healthy and when they are sick, while the faculty of appetite is identical in all cases; for it is clear that it is due to being corporeal and a body so-qualified as to undergo all kinds of change that it is subject to appetites of all sorts. The fact that the whole appetite is not in every case roused by the so-called pre-appetites, though the corporeal appetite is there right through, and that before calculative reasoning takes place one does want to eat or drink, tells us that the appetite extends to a certain point, to the extent that it is in the body so-qualified, but nature does not join in or attach itself or want to bring it into nature’s purview, as if it were not in accordance with nature, insofar as it would be in charge of what is contrary to nature and what is in accordance with it.

If someone were to object to the previous argument that the body, by becoming different, is sufficient to produce different appetites for the faculty of appetite, he does not adequately deal with the fact that, while it is another thing that undergoes an affection, the faculty has different appetites, and in a different way, since what is provided is not being provided for it. For certainly neither the nourishment, the warmth, nor the moisture, nor the alleviation when the body is emptied, nor the satisfaction when it is filled, relate to the faculty of appetite; rather, they all belong to that of the body.

§4.4.22. In the case of plants, is the sort of faint echo of soul in them one thing and what provides for them another, that is, what in us is

52 See Pl., Phil. 35A2 4. 53 See SVF 3.439 (= Plutarch, De vir. mor. 449a).
54 I.e., the higher soul.
indeed the faculty of appetite but in them the faculty of growth; or is this in the earth, since there is soul in the earth, and a derivative of this in plants? 55

One might first consider what soul is in the earth, whether it comes from the sphere of the universe, to which alone Plato seems to have given soul in the first place as a kind of illumination directed to the earth, or once again, when he says that the earth is ‘the first and most senior of the gods within heaven’ one might consider whether he is giving it a soul such as the one which he gives to the stars. For how would it be a god, if it did not have that soul? And so it turns out that it is difficult to discover how things are in this case, and that the difficulty is increased, or not diminished, as a result of what Plato said happened.

But first let us ask what the reasonable response in this matter would seem to be. That the earth, then, has a faculty of growth one would infer from the things that grow from it. But if many animals, too, are seen to come to be from the earth, why would one not say that it is an animal as well? If, however, it is so large an animal, and no small part of the whole, why would one not say that it has intellect as well, and in this way is a god? And if each of the stars is indeed a living being, why should not the earth be a living being, too, since it is a part of the whole living being? For one should not say that it is actually held together from the outside by a soul that is not its own, and that it does not have one inside, on the grounds that it is not able to have a soul of its own. For why should things made of fire qualify for this, but not what is made of earth? For each of the two is a body, and not even in the stars are there sinews, flesh, blood or fluids. And yet earth is a more variegated thing, being composed of all the elements. And if it is objected that it is resistant to motion, one could say that this relates to its not being moved from its place.

But how does it perceive? Well, how, for that matter, do the stars? Sense-perception is certainly not something that is confined to flesh, nor in general must we give body to soul so that it might perceive, but rather we must give soul to body so that the body may exist and be preserved in existence. Since soul is possessed of judgement, it can look at body and make a judgement about its affections.

What, then, are the affections proper to the earth, and what would its judgements be about – since even plants, inasmuch as they consist of

55 See Pl., Tim. 76E. 77C.
56 Here and, for the most part, throughout the remainder of this treatise, Plotinus uses τὸ πᾶν (‘the universe’) as synonymous with ὁ κόσμος (‘the cosmos’).
57 See Pl., Tim. 36E. 6. 58 See Pl., Tim. 40C. 3.
earth, do not have sense-perception?\textsuperscript{59} What, then, does the earth perceive, and by what means?\textsuperscript{35}

In fact, should we not venture to say that there can be perceptions even without organs? And in any case, of what use is sense-perception to the earth? For it is not for the sake of acquiring knowledge. For perhaps the power of thinking\textsuperscript{60} is sufficient for things that derive no advantage from sense-perception. Yet one might not be prepared to grant this point. For apart from the question of usefulness, there is a kind of cognition in the area of sensibles which is not unrefined, like that about the sun and other things in the sky and about heaven and the earth; sense-perceptions of these things are pleasurable in themselves.

But we may consider this question later.\textsuperscript{61} Now we must again ask whether the earth has sense-perceptions, of what the sense-perceptions might be, and how they would occur.\textsuperscript{62} Before that, however, we must take up the difficulties raised and consider in general whether it is possible to have sense-perception without sense organs,\textsuperscript{63} whether sense-perceptions are useful,\textsuperscript{64} and whether anything else ensues from them apart from the usefulness.

§4.4.23. We should indeed take as a premise that sense-perception is the apprehension of sensibles either by the soul or by the living being, with the soul understanding the quality that attaches to bodies and taking an impression of their forms. So, in fact the soul either apprehends them alone on its own, or together with something else. But if it is alone and on its own, how can it do so? For if it is alone, it will apprehend merely what is within itself, and all that will take place will be intellection. If it apprehends other things, as well, it must first have taken hold of them either by assimilating itself to them, or by consorting with something that has been assimilated to them. But while it stays on its own it cannot be assimilated. For how could a point, let us say, be assimilated to a line? After all, the intelligible line would not even fit with the sensible one, any more than the intelligible fire or human being would fit with the sensible fire or human being, since not even the nature which produces the human being comes to be identical with the human being that has come to be.

But soul on its own, even if it were possible for it to focus on a sensible, would end up with the comprehension of an intelligible, with the sensible escaping it, since it does not have the wherewithal to

\textsuperscript{59} See Ar., DA 3.13.435b1 contra Pl., Tim. 76E 77C.

\textsuperscript{60} The word γνώσις in the phrase ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἴδως γνώσις is probably corrupt. Perhaps δύναμις as understood here, or δύος.

\textsuperscript{61} Cf. infra 24.1 14.

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. infra 26.5 29.

\textsuperscript{63} Cf. infra 23.1 49.

\textsuperscript{64} Cf. infra 24.1 9.
grasp it. After all, when the soul sees a visible object from a distance, even when it has come to the soul as far as possible as a form, although when arriving at the soul it is at first in a way without parts, it ends up as the substrate for colour and shape, when the soul sees everything that is there.

So, there must not be these things only, the external item and the soul; for then the soul would not be affected. But what is going to be affected must be a third thing, and that is what will receive the form. And it must, therefore, share the affections of the objects, that is, have the same affections, and be of one matter, and this must be the affected element, while the soul does the cognizing, and the affections must be of such a kind as to preserve something of what has produced it and yet not be identical with it; rather, inasmuch as it is between what has produced the affection and the soul, it must have its affection situated between the sensible and the intelligible as a proportional mean, somehow connecting the extremes with each other, being at the same time able to receive and to report, and fit to be assimilated to each of the two. For being the instrument of cognition, it must not be identical either with what cognizes or with what is going to be cognized, but suited to being assimilated to each of the two, to the external one by being affected and to the internal one by its affection becoming a form.

If what we are now saying is indeed sound, sense-perception must occur through corporeal organs. For this is a consequence of the fact that soul, when it has come to be completely outside body, apprehends nothing that is sensible. The organ must be either the whole body, or some part of it reserved for a particular function, as in the case of touch, on the one hand, or sight, on the other. One can see, after all, that artificial tools serve to mediate between those making judgements and the things that are being judged, and report to the maker of the judgement the particularity of the substrates; a ruler, for example, connects the straightness in the soul with that in the wood, being placed between the two, and so gives the craftsman the ability to judge the object he is crafting.

But we leave for another discussion\(^6\) the question whether what is to be judged must be immediately connected to the organ, or whether it will judge by means of some medium, when the sensible stands at a distance, for example, if the fire is a long way from the flesh, with what is between not being affected, or whether, if there were some sort of void between the sense of sight and the colour, it would be possible to see so long as the organ is available. However, it is at any rate clear that

\(6\) Cf. 4.5.
sense-perception belongs to soul in body, and happens by means of body.

§4.4.24. The next question is whether sense-perception has to do only with utility, and that merits consideration along the following lines.

If the soul on its own were agreed actually not to have sense-perception, but the senses are related to the body, which is also the source of sense-perceptions, and perceiving would be bestowed upon the soul because of its association with the body, and it would either follow necessarily – which is what happens to the body, with the affection, when attaining more than a certain magnitude, reaching as far as the soul – or it has contrived to take precautions before what produces the affection becomes too great, so that it causes destruction, or even before it comes near. And if indeed this is so, sense-perceptions would be related to utility. For even if it is also related to knowledge, sense-perception is designed for a thing that is not in a state of knowledge, but is afflicted with ignorance due to some unfavourable circumstance, and also so that it should recollect because it has forgotten; it is not for an entity’s utility nor for one subject to forgetting.

But in that case our question should concern not only the earth, but also all the stars, and especially the whole of heaven and the cosmos. For according to our present argument, parts would have sense-perception in relation to other parts which are also subject to affections, but what sense-perception could there be for the whole in respect of itself, when it is, in all parts of itself, unaffected in respect of itself? After all, if one part is to be the organ of what perceives and another part, distinct from the organ, is to be what it perceives, but the body of the cosmos is a whole, it would not have one part through which sense-perception takes place and another which can serve as its object. We may grant it self-awareness, just as we have self-awareness, but we must not give it sense-perception, which is always of something else; just as when we apprehend something in our body alien to what is normal, we apprehend it as something coming from outside.

One might argue, however, that just as in our case there is not only apprehension of what comes from outside, but one part internally apprehends another, what is there to stop the universe seeing the moving sphere with the sphere that does not move, and with this in turn looking at the earth and its contents? And if these things are not unaffected by other states, what is there to stop them having the other sense-perceptions, too, and what is there to stop sight being not only of the fixed sphere in its own right, but being like that of an eye which tells the soul of the universe what it has seen? And even if it is unaffected, why would it not see like an eye, being a luminous being with a soul?
‘But’, Plato says, it had no need of eyes.’ If he said this is because nothing visible had been left outside it, although there was something visible inside, there is also nothing stopping it seeing itself. But if it was because it would have been ‘pointless’ to see itself, let us grant that it did not come to be like this primarily for the purpose of seeing, but that it is a necessary consequence of it being as it is. Why would not such a body, translucent as it is, have the capacity for seeing?

§4.4.25. In fact, having a medium by means of which one can see is not sufficient for it to see or to have sense-perception in general, but its soul must be so disposed as to be oriented towards sensibles. Qua soul, however, it has the characteristic of always being concerned with the intelligible world, and even if it were possible for it to have sense-perception, this would not happen because it is focused on superior things, since sights and other acts of sense-perceptions do not come to our attention either when we are focused on intelligibles, at the time when we are so focused; and as a general rule, if one is concentrating on one thing, other things escape one’s notice. And, after all, to want to apprehend some part with some other part, as if one were to look at oneself, is superfluous even in our case, and if it is not for some purpose, quite pointless. To look at something else because it is beautiful to look at is a sign of being prone to affection or of passion deficiency.

And smelling and tasting flavours might be held to be encumbrances or distractions of the soul. One might say of the sun and the other heavenly bodies, after all, that they see and hear only accidentally. If one suggests that they actually direct themselves to sensibles by means of both senses, such a hypothesis may not be unreasonable. But if they both reverted to them, they will necessarily also have memory of that.

In fact, it is absurd not to remember the good things one does. How, then, do they do good if they do not remember?

§4.4.26. They have knowledge of prayers because they are linked to us by a kind of connection and in accordance with a certain relationship, and their actions in response to prayers comes about in this way, too. In the arts of magicians also everything depends on such connectivity; this is so because of powers that follow according to the rules of sympathy.

If this is so, then, why should we not grant the earth the ability to perceive? But what kinds of sense-perceptions? Why should we not give it touch, in the first place, of part by part, with the sense-perception

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66 See Pl., Tim. 33C 1 2. 67 See Pl., Tim. 33C 4. 68 See Pl., Tim. 33D 4. 69 Cf. infra 26.23 31. 70 Cf. 2.9.17.27 56. 71 Correcting the typographical error, replacing αἰσθῆσαι with αἰσθήσεις.
being sent up to the controlling part of the soul, and then to the whole
the touch of fire and the other elements? After all, even if its body is
difficult to move, nonetheless it is not immovable.

The sense-perceptions, though, will not be of small things, but of big
ones. But why would that be? Because if soul is present in it, the greatest
motions necessarily will not escape its notice. There is nothing, after all,
to prevent perceiving from occurring for this purpose, namely, that it
should order well human affairs, to the extent that human affairs are in
its purview — and it would order them well by a sort of sympathy — or that
prevents it from hearing us pray and assenting to our prayers, albeit not
in the way that we do, or from being affected, in respect of itself, by
other sense-perceptions.

And what about other things, relating to smells and tastes, for
example? The answer is that it perceives the objects of smell by virtue
of the smells of juices and other fluids, for its provision for living
beings and for the constitution and maintenance of its own corporeal
element.72 And one must not require that it have the organs that we do;
for it is not even the case that all animals have identical ones; for
example, not all have ears, and yet those that do not still have appre-
hension of sounds.

But as regards sight, how can it have it, if sight requires light? For we
should not expect it to have eyes. If we were to agree that it has a faculty
of growth, we could agree that it has this either because the faculty of
growth is primarily situated in the breath, or because it is the breath73 —
in which case why should we doubt that is also translucent? Rather, we
must accept that if indeed it is the breath, it is translucent, and, when it is
lit up by the cosmic revolution, it is translucent in actuality. And so there
is nothing absurd or impossible about the soul in the earth seeing. And,
certainly, being the soul of no mean body, it must also have thinking, so
that it is a god. For its soul must always be good in every way.

§ 4.4.27. If, then, the earth gives plants their faculty of reproduction —
whether it gives the faculty of reproduction itself, or the faculty of
reproduction is in it and the one in plants is a trace of this one — the
plants would be like flesh which is already ensouled, and have acquired,
if they possess it, the faculty of reproduction in themselves. Being in
them, it gives the body of the plant what is better in it, that by which it
differs from a plant that has been cut away, and thus is no longer a plant,
but only, say, a piece of wood. But what does the soul give the earth’s
body itself?

72 Perhaps the sense is that earth looks to the repair of the element of earth in bodies.
In that case, we might read αὐτοῖς instead of αὐτῆς.
73 Cf. 2.2.2.21 22.
One should not believe that when an earthen body has been cut off from the earth it is a body identical with the body that it was when it was continuous with it, as is shown by stones which grow as long as they are attached to the earth, but remain at the size that they were when they were cut off and removed from it. One should, then, think that every part of earth has a trace of soul, and that the whole faculty of growth runs over this; it no longer belongs to one part or another, but to the whole; and next, there is the nature of the faculty of sense-perception, which is no longer ‘mixed up with’ body, but rides on top of it. Then, comes the rest of the soul and the intellect. People actually call this soul Hestia and Demeter, employing divine terms and invoking a nature which prophetically reveals things of this kind.

§4.4.28. So much, then, for that. We should, though, go back and consider the faculty of spiritedness, asking whether, just as we situated the origin of the appetites, or pains and pleasures – the affections, that is to say, not the sense-perceptions – in a certain state of body, one that has been in a way infused with life, we should in this way attribute the origin of spiritedness, or the entirety of it, to the body in a certain state, or to a part of the body, for example, the heart in a certain state, or the bile, in a body that is not dead; and also, whether, if there is another source for it, spiritedness derives from the ‘trace’ of soul, or indeed does spiritedness alone constitute this trace, and does not any longer derive from the faculty of growth or faculty of sense-perception. For in that case, the faculty of growth, being in the whole body, gave the trace to the whole body, and pain and pleasure were in all of it, and the origin of the appetite for satisfaction was in all of it. We did not mention the origin of the appetite for sex, but let us assume that it is in the parts which fulfil such appetites. Let us assume that the area around the liver is the origin of appetite, because that is where the faculty of growth, which provides the psychical trace to the liver and the body, primarily exercises its activity. It is there, because it is here that the activity starts.

But as for the faculty of spiritedness, we must ask what it is and what kind of soul is involved, and whether it provides from itself a trace around the heart, or something else which in the end produces a motion in the complex, or whether in this case it does not provide a trace, but is itself the anger.

First, then, we must consider what it is in itself. It is clear enough, after all, that we become angry not only in response to sufferings afflicting our own body, but in response to what happens to someone else connected with us, and in general about any actions committed

74 See Pl., Phd. 66B5. 75 Cf. infra 30.19. 76 See Pl., Tim. 71A 72C.
contrary to propriety; as a result, for the manifestation of anger, there should be sense-perception and a certain degree of comprehension. Hence, anyone looking at these facts would not look for the impulse to anger to arise from the faculty of growth, but rather for spiritedness to derive its origin from some other source.

But when we observe that the proclivity to anger follows from corporeal dispositions, and that those whose blood or bile boil are prone to anger, and those who are said to be without bile and cold are relaxed in respect of anger, and that wild animals have outbursts of anger in respect of their corporeal constitution, and not in response to an appearance that some other person has been wronged, one would again be inclined to attribute outbursts of anger to the more corporeal component, and to the structuring principle of the animal in question.

And again, when the identical persons are more irascible when they are sick than when they are well, and when they have not partaken of food than when they have, such phenomena indicate that anger, or the origins of anger, belongs to the body so-qualified, and the bile or the blood act as if they supplied soul, and provide motions of such a kind that, when the body so-qualified is affected, the blood or the bile are immediately set in motion, and when sense-perception has occurred, the imagination brings the soul into contact with the disposition of the body so-qualified, so that it directs itself to what is causing the pain. But on a higher level, the soul, having recourse to calculative reasoning, when an injury appears to have been committed, even if it does not involve the body, has this angry element, such as we have described it, ready to hand, inasmuch as it is naturally adapted to make war against anything that has been shown to be hostile, and makes it its ally.

There is one kind of anger, then, that is stimulated non-rationally and drags the reason with it by means of the imagination, and the other which starts from the reason and terminates in that the nature of which is to be angry. Both derive from the faculty of growth and faculty of reproduction, which makes the body such as to apprehend things that are pleasant and painful, and that is what causes it to have bile and be bitter. And it is due to the trace of soul being in a body of such a kind that feelings of discomfort and anger are stimulated, and due to its being injured first it seeks itself to injure, in some way, the others as well, that is, to assimilate them in a way to its own situation. Evidence for this having the same substantiality as the other trace of the soul is provided by the fact that those who strive less for the pleasures of the body and in general disdain the body are less prone to anger.

77 Accepting κρασίς, the reading of the mss.
78 Reading κἀν with HS^4.
79 I.e., to make the other soul feel what it is feeling.
One should not be surprised that trees do not experience spiritedness, though they have the faculty of growth; this is because they have no share in blood or bile. If they did have these without sense-perception, there would be only a boiling and a kind of irritation, but if they had sense-perception, there would then be an impulse towards what was doing them the wrong, so as to retaliate.

But if the non-rational part of the soul were to be divided into the faculty of appetite and the faculty of spiritedness, and one of them were the faculty of growth, with the faculty of spiritedness being a trace coming from it, in the area of the blood or the bile, or the complex, this division into two would not be correct, since the one would be prior and the other posterior.

In fact, nothing prevents both being posterior, the correct division being of things supervening from the identical source. The correct division to be made is of things pertaining to desire, qua pertaining to desire, and not of the substantiality from which they have come. That substantiality is not in itself desire, but perhaps we might say that it brings the desire to fulfilment by connecting to it the activity that comes from itself. And it is not absurd to say that the trace that emerges to produce spiritedness is to be found around the heart; for that is not to say that the soul is there, but we may say that the origin of the blood in a certain state is there.

§4.4.29. How, then, if the body is indeed like something that has been heated and not something that has been lit up, does it have nothing that gives it life when the rest of the soul has departed?

In fact, it does for a short time, but that dies away rather quickly, as happens with things that have been heated when they have been moved away from the fire. Evidence for this is that on dead bodies hair grows, and nails grow longer, and animals that have been cut in two can move about for quite a while. This is perhaps due to the part of soul that gives life still being in them. And yet even if it does depart together with the rest of the soul, that is not proof that it is not different from it. For indeed when the sun has departed, it is not just the light which is adjacent to it, derived from it, and attached to it that goes away, but also the light that derives from that light, and is seen on the outside of it in the things near it, which departs together with it.

Does it, then, depart together with the other, or is it destroyed? We must consider this question both in the case of light of this kind

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81 See Pl., Tim. 69C D which appears to express the position of this unnamed interlocutor.
82 See Ar., DA 1.4.409a9; 5.411b19 22.
and also in the case of the life in the body, which we certainly want to say is proper to the body. It is clear that none of the light remains in things that have been lit. But our discussion is asking whether it goes back to what produced it, or simply ceases to exist.

How, then, can it simply not exist, when it existed before? But what, in general, is it? In the case of the light we call colour, it does not exist when the bodies from which it comes have themselves changed – in cases where the bodies are perishable and no one asks where the colour is when the fire has died down, just as they do not ask where its shape is. Indeed, the shape is a kind of relation, like the clenching or extension of a hand, but colour is not like this; rather, it is like sweetness. For what is there to prevent the sweetness not being lost when a sweet body perishes, or the fragrance when a fragrant body dies, and coming to be in another body, but not being sensible because the bodies which have gained a share of them are not of such a kind as to make the qualities that have come to attach to them impinge on the senses?

In this way, then, the light of bodies that have perished remains, but the resistance that derives from them all does not. One might say that we see by convention, and that the so-called qualities do not exist in the substrates. But if this is so, we shall make qualities indestructible and not come to be in the structure of bodies. And we shall say that it is not the expressed principles in seeds that produce colours, as in the case of multi-coloured birds, but that they assemble them when they exist already or produce them, but do so by using in addition those in the air, which is full of such things; for in the air they are not such as they appear to be in bodies, when they come to be in them.

Let us, however, leave this problem at this point. But if when bodies remain as they are, the light is attached to them and has not been cut off, what prevents it being moved elsewhere with the body, when the body is moved elsewhere, both the light contiguous with it and any other that might attach to the contiguous light, even if it is observed going away, just as it does not appear as it approaches?

But in the case of soul, whether the secondary phases of it follow the first one, and those that come next always follow the ones that precede them, either each of these being on its own and deprived of those prior to them which are able to remain on their own or, in general, whether no part of the soul has been cut off, but all souls are one and many, and what is the manner of this, is something that has been discussed elsewhere.

But what about that which is a trace of soul and has already come to belong to a body?

83 See Democritus, fr. 68 B 125 DK. 84 Cf. 4.3.22.1 7; 4.5.7.4 13. 85 Cf. 4.9.
In fact, if it is soul, it will follow along with the soul’s expressed principle, if indeed it has not been cut off from it. But if it is in a way the life of the body, the identical argument applies to it which produced a problem about the reflection of light, and we must consider whether it is possible for there to be life without soul, unless it be by the soul being located alongside and exercising its activity in the direction of something else.

§4.4.30. Now since we posited that acts of memory are superfluous to the heavenly bodies, but accorded them sense-perception, and in particular hearing as well as sight, and have said that they actually hearken to prayers, such as we make to the sun and certain other people indeed also make to the stars; and since there is a conviction that through them many things are brought to pass for suppliants, and indeed so very readily that they not only help in right actions, but even in many wrong ones, we must enquire into these subsidiary issues – for there are very many serious problems pertaining to the stars themselves, and ones that are much discussed among those who are uncomfortable with the idea of the gods being accomplices in, and responsible for, unseemly conduct, and indeed as regards love affairs and licentious assaults – for these reasons, and particularly with respect to the question with which the discussion began, their capacity for memory.

For it is clear that if they do these things in response to people’s prayers, and do them not immediately but later, and very often after some considerable period of time has elapsed, they retain a memory of the prayers that human beings make to them. But our previous discussion did not allow of this. And this sort of question would also arise about the gods’ benefactions to human beings, for example, those of Demeter and Hestia – who here represents the earth – unless one were to postulate that conferring benefits on human affairs belongs to the earth alone.

We, then, should try to show both in what way we attribute memory to them – as far as actually concerns us, and not the views of others who have no problem with granting them memory – and also the events that are regarded as unpleasantly perverse, which it is the function of philosophy to investigate, to see if there is any way of making a defence against the charges brought against the gods in heaven.

Moreover, we must ask about the whole cosmos itself – since this sort of accusation touches it as well – whether we are to believe the assertions of those who say that even the whole of heaven is subject to sorcery worked by the audacity and craft of human beings. In addition, the
discussion will consider daemons, and how they are said to assist in matters of this kind, unless this question is dealt with by means of a solution to the previous problems.

§4.4.31. So, we should undertake a comprehensive survey of all the actions and affections that occur in the whole cosmos, both the ones that are said to come about by nature and those that arise by means of craft; and among the ones that come about by nature, we must say that some are directed from the whole to the parts, others from the parts to the whole, and yet others from parts to parts, while among those that happen by craft, some come about either with the craft culminating, as it began, in the products of the craft, or, when it makes use of natural powers as well for the production of natural functions, or for subjection to them. By the actions and affections of the whole I mean the effects of its revolution as a whole on itself and its parts – for as it moves it puts itself and its parts in a certain state – as well as what happens in the revolution itself and what it gives to the inhabitants of earth. What is done to the parts by the other parts, or what they do, is, in a way, clear to everyone; the sun’s relations to other bodies, to things on earth and to those in the other elements, both of itself and of other things, those on earth and those in other bodies – at each of which we must direct our investigation.

Of the crafts, some produce a house or other artefacts and terminate in something of this sort; while medicine and farming and other crafts of this kind are auxiliary and bring aid to things that come about by nature, so as to be in conformity with nature. But rhetoric, music, and every craft that brings influence to bear on the soul, lead it to the better or the worse by altering it; in their case, we should consider how many crafts there are and what powers they possess. And if it is indeed possible, in the case of all those which relate to our present purpose, we should, as far as we can, focus on the reason why as well.

It is, then, clear from many perspectives that the cosmos’ revolution produces effects, first by disposing itself and its contents in different ways, and indisputably on the things on earth, not only by means of their bodies but also by the dispositions of their souls, and each of its parts has effects on the things on the earth and generally on what is below. Whether things here act on those there we shall discuss later; for now we shall grant what is agreed by all or most people is so, insofar as will be rendered manifest by rational argument, but we must try to explain how the whole process works, starting from the beginning.

88 See Pl., Lg. 889D3 6.
89 Cf. infra 40 42.
90 I.e., the efficacy of astrological predictions needs a rational explanation.
For it is not only hot and cold and things like that, which are actually said to be the primary qualities of the elements, nor the qualities that arise from the mixture of these that we should say act, nor should we say that the sun produces all its effects by heat, and some other heavenly body by cooling – for what would be cold in a fiery heavenly body? – or another by fluid fire. For this way it would be impossible even to grasp the difference between them; indeed, many of the things that happen cannot be attributed to any of these. For even if one were to grant them differences in behaviour according to corporeal mixtures which are such as they are because of the predominance of cold or heat, how would one make them responsible for jealousy, envy, or wickedness?

But even if one could make them responsible for these, how could one make them responsible for worse or better fortunes, those that bring riches or poverty, the nobility of one’s ancestors, or one’s own, or the discovery of treasures? One could list a host of things which would take us a long way from the corporeal quality that comes from the elements and penetrates to the bodies and souls of living beings. Nor indeed should we make the choice of the stars responsible for the accidents befalling individuals below the stars, or the decision of the universe, or their acts of calculative reasoning. For it is absurd that with respect to human affairs they should contrive that some should become thieves, others kidnappers, housebreakers and temple robbers, and that others should become unmanly and effeminate in what they do and what is done to them, and perform shameful acts. Leaving aside gods, no decent men, and perhaps not any kind of men, would contrive and devise such things, from which no benefit at all can accrue to them.

§4.4.32. If, then, we are not to make responsible for whatever comes to us and to other living beings from outside, and, generally, what arrives on the earth from heaven, to either corporeal causes or acts of choice, what reasonable explanation would be left?

So, first, we should say that this universe is ‘one living being encompassing all the living beings inside itself’, having one soul extending to all its parts, insofar as each of them is a part of it; and each thing in the sensible universe is a part of it, as regards its body entirely so, but also to the extent that it partakes of the soul of the universe; to that extent it is a part of it in this way, too. And those that partake only of this soul are parts in all respects, but those that have a share in another soul thereby also have the status of not being altogether parts, but nonetheless

91 See Ar., Meteor. 4.1.378b11 13; GC 330b3 7. 92 See Pl., Rep. 344B3 4.
93 See Pl., Tim. 30D3 31A1.
94 A distinction between inanimate things which depend entirely on the soul of the universe or cosmos and things with their own souls (including plants and animals).
undergo affections from the other parts, insofar as they have something of the whole, and in accordance with what they have.

This unified universe is actually in a condition of sympathy, and is one in the manner of a living being, and the distant parts of it are actually close together, just as in a single particular living being a nail, a horn, a finger or any other of the parts that are not contiguous, but have something in between which is not subject to affection, are affected by what is not near to them. For when things that are the same are not located contiguously, but are set at an interval by other things in between, while being affected sympathetically because of their sameness, what is done by what is not placed alongside it necessarily reaches even to what is at a distance. And since it is a living being and forms part of a unity, nothing is so distant spatially as not to be close enough to the nature of the one living being in respect of being affected sympathetically. For what possesses a sameness to what acts is acted on in a way that is not alien, but when what is acting on something is not the same, then what is acted on undergoes an affection that is alien and not pleasant.

It should not be a matter of wonderment that one part can act harmfully on another, in the case of a living being that is after all one; for in our case, too, in the course of our activities, one part is capable of doing harm to another, since, as it seems, both bile and the faculty of spiritedness can exercise pressure upon and torment another part of us. And indeed there is in the universe as a whole something analogous to spiritedness and bile, as there is to other parts of us. Even in plants, after all, one part can get in the way of another so as even to cause it to die away.

But the universe can be seen to be not just one living being but many; so, insofar as it is one, each is kept in being by the whole, but insofar as it is many, when they come together they often do harm to each other by their difference; one harms another for its own advantage, and actually makes nourishment out of what is at the same time akin to it and different. And since each thing by nature strives for its own advantage, whatever other thing is congenial to it, it takes to itself, while what is alien to it, it annihilates because of its ‘benevolence to itself’.

And when everything performs its own function, it benefits whatever can derive any advantage from its functions, but annihilates or damages what is incapable of withstanding the forward driving of the function, like things that shrivel up when fire comes close to them, or smaller animals that are swept aside or perhaps trampled underfoot, by the onrush of larger ones.

95 Cf. 4.5.1.36. 96 See Pl., Gorg. 485A2, where Callicles is speaking.
Now the generation and destruction of all these things is a form of change for the worse or the better, and produces the life of the single living being that is unimpeded and in accordance with nature, since it was not possible for each one to enjoy the status of isolated individuals, nor can the purpose of the whole be directed to them, since they are parts, but they must look to that of which they are parts, and being different they cannot all have things their own way always when they are included in a single life. It was not possible, after all, for anything to remain altogether permanently in the same condition, if indeed the whole was to remain as it is, having its permanence consist in its being in motion.

§4.4.33. Since there is certainly no element of randomness in the heavenly revolution of the universe; rather, being moved according to the expressed principle of the living being that it is, there had to be a concord between what acts and what is acted on, and some order that assigns a relationship of one to the other, so that in accordance with each configuration of the revolution and of the things that are subject to it there must be a varied sequence of dispositions, as if they were performing a single dance with variegated motions.97

For why, in the case of our dances, too, would anyone bother mentioning the external factors in each of the motions, with the things that contribute to the dance, flutes and songs and the other features connected with it changing in different ways, since these are all clear enough? But the parts of the person who is performing the dance cannot, necessarily, be disposed in the same way for each figure, since the body follows the dance and bends, and of his limbs one is tensed and another relaxed, one is working hard and another is being given a rest in accordance with a different pattern. The purpose of the dancer is focused on something else, but his limbs are affected in a way that follows from the dance and are subordinate to it, and contribute to realizing the whole dance, so that one who has experience of dancing would say that in such a pattern this limb is raised high, this one is bent, this one is hidden, and another comes to be low, with the dancer choosing to do these things not randomly, but because in the whole body’s dance this part of the person who is performing the dance has that necessary position.

So, we should say that the heavenly bodies do what they do in this way, while for other things they provide signs, or rather that the whole cosmos exercises the whole of its life moving the large parts within it and constantly changing their configuration, and produces the relations of

97 See Pl., Tim. 40C3 D3.
the parts to each other and to the whole and their different positions and the other things that follow from this, insofar as they belong to one moving living being; these things are in a certain state in respect of particular relations and positions and configurations, so that those which are configured are not the true agents, but rather that which configures them; and it is not the case that that which configures them acts on something else – for it is not acting on something distinct from itself – but it itself is all the things that eventuate, with the patterns themselves being there in the intelligible world, while the affections that necessarily follow upon the patterns are in the sensible world, in the living being that is moved in this particular way, and again is put together in this way and structured by nature and is affected and acts upon itself by its exigencies.

§4.4.34. When we give up a part of ourselves to be acted on – as much of the universe’s body as is ours – but do not regard the whole of ourselves as belonging to it, we suffer only a moderate degree of domination at its hands. It is like the case of prudent serfs who serve their masters with some part of themselves, but with another are their own men, and thus receive more moderate commands from their master inasmuch as they are not slaves, and not entirely belonging to another.

As for the differences in the configurations of the paths of the heavenly bodies, it is necessary that they should occur as they do now because the bodies that move do not do so at the same speed. But since they are moved, and the different configurations of the living being come about, under the direction of reason, and next, events here are in a state of sympathy with those there, it is reasonable to enquire whether we should say that these here follow in concord with the things there, or whether the configurations have the powers to control what is done, and whether it is the configurations simply, or the ones of particular bodies. For the identical configuration of the identical body, when it relates now to one thing and then to others, does not produce the identical signification or the identical action, since each one, even on its own, seems to have a different nature.

Or is it right to say that the configuration of these does certain things, and is a disposition of a particular sort, but that that disposition of other things which is identical in its pattern is different? But if that is so, we shall no longer be attributing this to the patterns, but rather to those bodies which take on the patterns. Or should we perhaps attribute it to both? For we shall attribute different things to the identical bodies when they have taken on a different position, and even to the identical single

98 Referring to the influence of heavenly bodies on terrestrial events.
body when it occupies a different place. But what? Actions, or significations?

In fact, we should attribute both, actions and significations, to the pair, the configuration of particular bodies, but elsewhere significations only.

So, this account gives some powers to the patterns and others to the bodies that take on the patterns. For to return to the example of the dancers, in their case each of the two hands has a power, and so do the other limbs, but the patterns have a great deal of power, and then there is a third class of things, those that go with the dance, with those who are occupied with the dance bringing along with them their parts, and the constituents of these, like the clenched parts of a hand, and the sinews and veins that share their affection.

§ 4.4.35. How, then, do these powers actually work? We should set out more clearly what is the difference between one triangulation and another, or between this body and that one, and why it works in a certain way, and up to what point. For we did not attribute the actions either to their bodies or to their choices; not to their bodies, because what happened were not only the doings of a body, and not their choices, because it seemed improper for the gods to perform improper acts by choice.

If we remember that we assumed that the universe was a single living being, and that, being such, it had necessarily to be in a state of sympathy with itself, and that the course of its life was in accordance with reason, all of it in concord with itself, and that there was no element of randomness in its life, but one harmony and one order, and that the configurations were in accordance with reason, and that the several parts of it and even the parts of the living being involved in the dance proceeded in conformity with numbers, we must necessarily agree that the activity of the universe is both the configurations that happen within it and the parts of it that are configured, and what follows from these and how, and that the universe lives in this way, and that the powers with which it came into being under the agency of a producer acting according to expressed principles contribute to this.

And the patterns are like proportions of intervals of the living being, and arrangements and relations of the living being in accordance with reason, while the bodies that are set at intervals and are arranged into patterns are different limbs of it. And there are other powers of the living being which are separate from choice and are like parts of it as a living

99 Astrological configurations are here being referred to, which Plotinus alludes to again, in a more hostile manner, in the late treatise 2.3.2–4.
100 Cf. supra 32.4ff.
101 Reading ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν λόγοις with Igal and HS and the mss.
being, since what pertains to choice is outside them and does not contribute to the nature of this living being. For the power of choice of a single animal is one, but its other powers in relation to itself are many.

All the acts of choosing in it, however, are directed to the identical thing as the single power of choice of the whole universe; for the appetite of one thing in it is directed towards another of the things in it; one part of it, being itself deficient, wants to take some part belonging to the others. The anger of one part, too, is directed towards another part when that part does it some damage, growth is derived from another part, and generation is directed to another of the parts as well. The whole produces these effects in these parts, but it is itself seeking the Good, or rather it is contemplating it. So, the correct kind of choice which is superior to feelings seeks this, and in this way it contributes to the identical purpose. For in the case of those who are serfs of another, many of their tasks look to the commands given by their master, but their desire for the Good is directed to the identical end at which their master also aims.

If, then, the sun and the other stars actually direct any activity upon things here, we must conclude that it [the sun] does so while looking upwards – we may focus our discussion on just one of them – but that effects are produced from it, like the process of warming for things on earth, and so if anything further is produced beyond this, it will be through the disseminating medium of soul, to the extent that that is possible for it, since there is a large portion of the faculty of growth operative in it. And we must also believe that any other heavenly body, as though radiating light, gives off some power deriving from itself in the same way, without any exercise of choice. And indeed that all of them, having become one entity configured in a particular way, contribute now one disposition and then again another.

And so the patterns, too, have powers – in one way corresponding to one kind of configuration and in another to another – and something is contributed through the bodies that are themselves configured – one result corresponds to this configuration and another again to another. For even in the case of the patterns in themselves, one can see from what eventuates down here that they have powers. For why do some of the patterns cause fear to those who see them, when those who are struck with fear have suffered no unpleasantness beforehand, while others when seen do not frighten people? And why do some patterns frighten some people and others other people?

In fact, these work on a person of a certain kind, and others on another person, which they would not if they did not have the power to act on their natural object. And something configured in one way
stimulates the sight, while if configured in another way it does not stimulate the identical person. And if someone were to say that it is the beauty which stimulates it, why does a particular beauty move one person and another particular beauty another, if it is not the difference in the pattern that has the power to do so? For why should we say that colours have power and produce effects on that basis, but deny this power to heavenly patterns? Since this is so, it is completely absurd that there should exist something among beings, without it having the power to act. For whatever has being is such as to act and to be acted on; and in the case of some, one must attribute action to them, and to others both action and being acted on.

And further, in the substrates there are powers other than those that derive from the patterns; in the bodies in the sensible world, too, there are many powers which are not produced by hot or cold things, but by things that come to be because of different qualities, are formed by expressed principles, and participate in the power of nature, as the nature of stones and the activities of plants produce many remarkable effects.

§4.4.36. The universe is a thing of maximum variegation, and in it are all the expressed principles and a countless number of variegated powers. It is just as they say that in a human being this bone has one power, and that another, that the bone of a hand has one power, and that of a toe has another, and that there is no part which does not have a power, and yet does not have the identical one – we, of course, do not know the details of this, unless one has studied such things – it is like this in the universe, but much more so; indeed, the parts of our bodies and their powers are a mere trace of those in the universe; in the universe, there is also a wonderful variegation of powers such as cannot be recounted, particularly in those bodies that revolve in heaven. It did not actually have to evolve into an ordered system, like a soulless house, albeit a large and complex one, made of materials easily enumerable by their kinds, as of stone and wood, for example, and some other components; rather, it had necessarily to be awake everywhere, and alive, different parts in different ways, and for nothing to be able to exist which is not a part of it.

For this reason, here, too, there would be a solution to the problem of how there can be something without soul in a living being that has soul. Thus, the argument says that in the whole different parts live differently, but that we do not say that anything is alive which is not perceptibly moved by itself; rather, each part is alive without our

102 See Pl., Soph. 247D8 248C5. 103 Reading δη with Kirchhoff.
noticing, and what is perceptibly alive is composed of things that live but not perceptibly, but provide wonderful powers contributing to the life of this kind of living being. For a human being would not be moved to such an extent if he were being moved by powers within himself that were entirely soulless, nor again would the universe be alive unless each of the living beings in it was alive with its own life, even though it were not endowed with the power of choice; for it produces its effects without the need of choice, inasmuch as its mode of existence elevates it above choice. For this reason, a multitude of things submit their powers to its sovereignty.

§ 4.4.37. Nothing, then, that belongs to the universe can be rejected by it. Since, if any one of those who currently pass for experts were to investigate in what action consists, in the case of fire and everything of the kind that we say acts, he would find himself at a loss, unless he were to attribute this power to them due to their being in the universe, and were to say the same about other things of this sort that are in common use. But we do not think it worth enquiring into familiar things, nor do we have problems about them, but in the case of the other powers which fall outside what we are familiar with, we do have problems about the nature of each particular, and we would add wonderment to our lack of familiarity, though we would also wonder at these things here if, in our inexperience with them, someone were to explain their powers to us by adducing each particular one.

We should, then, grant that each particular thing has a certain non-rational power, having been formed and shaped in the universe and somehow having a share of soul from the whole which is itself ensouled, and is surrounded by a universe of this kind and is a part of what has soul – for there is nothing in the universe which is not a part of it – with some parts having a greater capacity for action than others, both among those on earth and to a greater extent those in heaven, inasmuch as these latter are endowed with a more vivid nature.¹⁰⁴

And many things happen due to these powers, not by the power of choice of those things from which the action appears to derive – for this happens even among things which have no power of choice – nor from things reverting to the source of the granting of the power, even if some element of soul were to derive from that source. For living beings could come from a living being without choice producing them, nor again with the living being from which they come being diminished, or even being consciously aware of what has happened to it; for the power of choice would not have been operative, if it had it, or would not have

¹⁰⁴ Cf. 2.9.7.10 15; 6.7.7.6 15.
been what was producing them. And if a living being did not have the power of choice, *a fortiori* it would not have the capacity for being consciously aware.

§4.4.38. The effects, then, that proceed from the universe when nothing from other aspects of its life sets it in motion, and also the effects that ensue when something else does set it in motion, like prayers, be they simple or sung according to the rules of a craft, are not to be attributed to each individual heavenly body, but rather to the nature of the procedure performed. And all such things as are useful for life or contribute some other advantage are to be attributed to this act of giving, being things that come from a greater part of the universe to a lesser one.

On the other hand, whatever maleficient influence is said to come from the stars to the births of living beings comes either because the substrate is not able to receive what is beneficial to it – for what comes to be does not come to be in an absolute sense, but it affects a particular thing, and in a particular way; and indeed what is affected or is to be affected has some underlying nature of a certain kind – but mixtures of influence also produce many effects, with each heavenly body giving something that is advantageous for life. This could also happen to something because the things that are of their nature beneficial do not manage to help in this case, and the order of the whole does not always give each individual thing what it wants; furthermore, we ourselves add many things to those that are given us.

Nevertheless, all things are woven into a unity and exhibit a wonderful concord, and different effects arise from different influences, even if they come from opposites; for all spring from one source. And even if something of what comes to be is deficient relative to what is better because it has not been completely formed when its matter has not been mastered, it is in a way deficient in respect of nobility, and through its inadequacy in that respect falls into ugliness.

The conclusion is, then, that some things are produced by the heavenly bodies, some contribute their underlying nature to the mix, and others add something from themselves.

§4.4.39. Since all things are always arranged in an ordered system and contribute to a single end, everything is indicated by signs. ‘Virtue has no master’;106 but its works, too, are woven together in the system inasmuch as what is here depends on what is there:107 the things in this universe depend on more divine beings, and this universe, too,

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105 Referring to the heavenly bodies in the universe.
106 Cf. 2.3.9.17; 6.8.5.31. See Pl., *Rep.* 617E3.
107 The heavenly bodies.
participates in those.\textsuperscript{108} So, things in this universe do not come to be due to seminal principles,\textsuperscript{109} but due to expressed principles which include things which are prior to those on the level of seminal principles; for there is nothing in the seminal principles that happens outside the sphere of the seminal principles themselves, nor of the things that derive from matter and contribute to the whole, nor of the mutual interactions that derive from the things that have come to be.\textsuperscript{110}

But the expressed principle of the universe is rather analogous to one that lays down the order and law of a city, knowing already what the citizens will do and why they will do it;\textsuperscript{111} it makes laws with a view to all this and it weaves together with the laws everything that happens to them and everything that they do, as well as the honour and dishonour attaching to their deeds, with everything moving towards concord as if by a path where everything happens spontaneously.\textsuperscript{112} The signification is not for the purpose of signifying things prospectively, but since things happen in a certain order, some things are signified by others; because all things are one and derive from a unity, one thing can be known from another, a cause from what is caused, a consequence from its antecedent, or a composite from one or other of its components, because the universe produces one component and another together.

Indeed, if what we have said is right, the problems would now have been solved, especially the one about the bestowing of evil by the gods.\textsuperscript{113} It is not their choices that produce it.\textsuperscript{114} What comes from there happens by natural necessities, as the effects of parts on parts, consequent on the life of a single living being;\textsuperscript{115} and because many things are added to what has happened by us ourselves;\textsuperscript{116} and also because the things bestowed by each god are not evil, but become so in the mixture;\textsuperscript{117} and because their life is not for the sake of each individual but for that of the whole;\textsuperscript{118} and because that which the underlying nature takes on is one thing and that which it experiences is another, that is, it cannot control what is given to it.\textsuperscript{119}

§4.4.40. But how are we to explain the operations of magic?

In fact, they are due to the operation of sympathy, and because there is by nature a concord of things that are the same and an opposition of

\textsuperscript{108} Referring to the dependence of the universe and all that it contains on the intelligible world.
\textsuperscript{110} Cf. 5.9.6.10 20. \textsuperscript{111} See \textit{Pl.}, \textit{Lg.} 904A 905A. \textsuperscript{112} See \textit{Pl.}, \textit{Sts.} 305E2 6.
\textsuperscript{113} Cf. \textit{supra} 30. \textsuperscript{114} Cf. \textit{supra} 32.48 59. \textsuperscript{115} Cf. \textit{supra} 32 33; 38.5 6.
\textsuperscript{116} Cf. \textit{supra} 38.16, 23. \textsuperscript{117} Cf. \textit{supra} 38.12 13.
\textsuperscript{118} Cf. \textit{supra} 32.25 52, 38.15 16. \textsuperscript{119} Cf. \textit{supra} 38.11 12, 22 23.
things that are not the same, and by the variegation of the many powers that contribute to the one living being. Indeed, many things are attracted and bewitched without any other person contriving it; and, in fact, the real magic is the ‘Love’ in the universe and the ‘Strife’ that accompanies it.\[120\] And this is the primary ‘magician’ and ‘spell-binder’.\[121\] When people have come to have a good understanding of him they use his spells and sorceries against each other. And because men naturally love, and the things that make them love attract each other, the strength of a love craft by means of magic has arisen, with the practitioners applying, by their contacts, different kinds of devices to different people which draw them together and have the power of love inherent in them; and they bring one soul into contact with another, as if they were drawing plants which are separate into contact with each other.

They also use figures endowed with powers, and by working themselves into certain figures effortlessly bring these powers to themselves, being part, as they are, of one living being, and working on one such. After all, if one were to suppose that such a person were outside the universe, he would not be able to exert a pull on others or draw them down by incantations and binding spells;\[122\] as it is, because he is not exerting his power in another world, he can in a way draw others on, knowing how anything in the living being is to be drawn to something else.

This drawing power naturally inheres in the tune and the way the words are sung in incantations, and in the positions taken up by the practitioner. For things of this kind exert a pull, as would positions and utterances evoking pity. It is, however, neither the power of choice nor reason that is charmed by music, but rather the non-rational soul; this kind of magic does not impress those other faculties; and yet people like to be enchanted, even if they do not require this of practitioners of music. And with other kinds of prayers we must not think that it is the power of choice that listens to them. For not even those who are charmed by incantations are charmed in this way, even as when a snake entrances people, the person who is being entranced has no comprehension of this, nor does he perceive it with his senses, but he realizes that he is affected only when he has already undergone the affection; his controlling part [intellect] remains unaffected. When, however, one prays to a heavenly being, something emanates from that being to him or to someone else.

§4.4.41. But there is no question of the sun, or another heavenly body, hearkening to a prayer. What happens in accordance with the prayer

\[120\] See Empedocles, fr. 31 B 17.7 8, 26.5 6 DK. \[121\] See Pl., Symp. 203D8.\[122\] See Pl., Rep. 364C3 E4.
does so because one part has come to be in sympathy with another, as in the case of a single string that is tensed; for when it has been touched at the lower end, it vibrates at the upper end, too. And often when one string is touched another experiences a sort of sense-perception of that due to their being in concord and being tuned to a single scale. But if in one lyre a vibration can be transmitted from another, to the extent that they are in sympathy, so, too, in the universe is there a single harmony, even if it be composed of opposites; yet it is composed of things that are all the same and akin, even when they are opposites.

And all the things that do damage to human beings, like the anger that is drawn down with bile and enters the liver, do not do so with the purpose of doing damage. It is as if someone takes fire from a fire and hurts someone else; *either the one who has contrived this and gone, or the other one who has received the fire does it, by the giving of something which is in a way transferred from the one to the other;*\(^{123}\) the fire that has been transferred does harm if the person to whom it was brought was unable to receive it.

§4.4.42. And so the stars will have no need of memory for this purpose – which is the warrant for the above discussion – nor of sense-perceptions that rise up to them; nor is their responsiveness to prayers of such a kind as to be governed by choice, as some think, but we must grant that something happens coming from them, both with prayer and without prayer, insofar as they are parts, that is, parts of a unified whole. We must also grant that there are many powers not requiring acts of choice and that these work both without contrivance and also with the help of craft, inasmuch as they form part of a single living being. And one part benefits from another or is harmed by it because they are of this nature, and by the skills of doctors or of those who sing incantations, one part is forced to make something of its power available to another.

And the universe gives something to its parts in the same way, both of its own accord and when something else draws it to some part of itself, for it is there for its parts by its own nature, as no part of it is alien to the one that is making the request. And if the person who is making the request is bad, that should be no occasion for surprise; for bad people draw water from rivers, and what gives itself does not know to whom it is giving, but merely gives. Nevertheless, what it gives has also been fitted into the order of the nature of the universe; and so, if someone has taken from what is available to all when he should not have done so, justice will follow him by an inescapable law.

\(^{123}\) This line is corrupt. We try to convey the likely sense.
We should not, then, allow that the universe is affected.

In fact, we must grant that its controlling principle is altogether unaffected, but when affections take place in its parts the affection relates to them, and since no element of the universe as a whole is contrary to nature, it is itself unaffected, so as to be directed to itself. For even the stars, insofar as they are parts, have affections, yet they are unaffected because they, too, have powers of choice which are unaffected, and their bodies and natures are not subject to damage, and because, even if they give something by means of their soul, their soul is not diminished, and their bodies remain identical, and if anything flows away from them, what goes away does so imperceptibly, and what is added, if anything is, goes unremarked as well.

§ 4.4.43. But how does the virtuous person fall under the influence of sorcery and spells?

In fact, he is in his soul unaffected with respect to sorcery, that is, his faculty of calculative reasoning would not be affected, and he would not be subject to changes of mind; but as for the non-rational part in him that comes from the universe,\textsuperscript{124} he would be affected in respect of this, or rather this would be affected. But he would not be affected by impulses of love caused by spells, since loving happens when the other higher soul accedes to the affection of the other. And even as the non-rational part is affected by incantations, so the man himself can undo the forces that come from them by chanting against them and singing counter-incantations. But he might suffer death, disease, or other things that are to do with the body, from such things; for the part of the whole could be affected either by another part of it, or by the whole, but the person himself remains unharmed. And the fact that these things do not happen immediately but only after a lapse of time is not in conflict with nature.

Not even daemons themselves are unaffected, due to their non-rational part; it is not absurd to attribute memories and sense-perceptions to these, and also the capacity to be bewitched when they have physical influences exerted on them, and listening to the calls of those who are nearer than they are to this world, and to the extent that they pay attention to it. For everything that pays attention to something else is liable to be bewitched by that something; the thing that it pays attention to bewitches it and exerts a pull on it. Only that which is focused on itself is immune to sorcery. Every action, therefore, can be subject to sorcery, as can the whole life of the practical person; for he is moved towards those things which bewitch him. Hence, the saying, ‘fair

\textsuperscript{124} I.e., the part that comes from nature.
of face is the people of great-hearted Erechtheus’. Why, after all, does one direct one’s attention to something? It is through being drawn to it, not by magic crafts, but by the crafts of nature, which generates its own mode of deceit, connecting one thing to another, not spatially, but by means of the spells which it has provided.

§4.4.44. It is only contemplation that is left to be immune to sorcery, because no one whose attention is focused on himself is subject to sorcery. For he is one, and the object of his contemplation is himself, and his reason is not open to deception, but he does what he must do, and creates his own life and his proper work. In the practical life, self-concentration does not apply, and it is not reason that produces the impulse, but the premises drawn from affectivity constitute a starting point for the non-rational part. For the care of children and the urge for marriage exert a clear pull, as do all the things that act as a bait to human beings by gratifying their appetites. And certain actions are stimulated non-rationally by anger, and others likewise by appetite, while public affairs and the drive for positions of authority tend to call forth the element in us which likes power. And the actions which are performed to avoid suffering some unpleasantness have fear as their origin, and those done for gain have appetite. Those that are for the sake of needs, seeking to fill a natural deficiency, clearly have as their origin the force of nature which adapts us for life as something that is our own.

But supposing one were to assert that the doing of good deeds is not subject to sorcery, and that otherwise even contemplation, focusing as it does on good objects, is liable to sorcery, one must say that if one were to perform even actions that we say are good as necessary ones, holding the true good to be something else, he is not subject to sorcery, for he recognizes necessity and does not look to what is here, and his life is not directed to other things; but then again, due to the force of human nature and his own concern for the life of others, or even for his own – it may perhaps seem reasonable that because of his affinity he should not distance himself – he does become subject to sorcery.

But if he has come to love the good element in practical actions, and chooses actions because he has been deceived by the traces of Beauty, he becomes subject to sorcery because he is pursuing beauty that attaches to what is below. For, in general, occupying oneself with what resembles the truth and being drawn to it in every way is characteristic of one who is being deceived by those things which drag him to themselves; it is the sorcery of nature which does this. Pursuing what is not good as good,

126 Reading τὴν ἀπάτην with Kirchhoff.
having been attracted by the appearance of it through non-rational impulses, belongs to someone who is being led, in ignorance, where he does not want to go. What else would one call this but sorcery? Only that person is not subject to sorcery who, when he is being drawn by his other parts, says that none of the things are good which they say are good, but only what he himself knows to be good, being neither deceived nor pursuing anything, but possessing it. He would not, then, be dragged anywhere.

§4.4.45. From everything that has been said, then, it should be now clear that each thing in the universe contributes to the whole, and acts or is acted on according to its nature and disposition, just as does each part in the case of a single living being; it contributes to the universe, serves it, and is held to be worth a place in the order and a role in it in accordance with its nature and its structure. Each both makes its own contribution and receives as many things that come from elsewhere as its nature is capable of receiving; and the whole has a kind of self-awareness of the whole. And if each of the parts were actually a living being, it would have the functions of a living being, and they would be other than those of a part.

It has also certainly become clear what our role is in the scheme of things, that we, too, make some active contribution to the universe, not only as regards what a body does to a body, and experiencing also corresponding reactions from elsewhere, but also making a contribution from our other nature, through the linkage deriving from the kindred qualities we possess with what is akin to us in the external world; and indeed we come to be akin due to our souls and dispositions, or rather we are akin, and in relation to our neighbours in the daemonic realm\(^{127}\) and what transcends them we cannot fail to notice what kind of beings we are. So, we do not all give the identical things, nor do we receive the identical thing. For how would we be able to give to another what we do not have—good, for example? Nor again will we be able to acquire any good with what is incapable of receiving good.

Someone, then, who has attached himself to his own wickedness is recognized for what he is, and due to his own nature he is thrust towards what he has made his own in the sensible world, and when he departs from here he is pushed towards another such place by the pull of nature. But for the good person, his acts of giving and receiving and changes of place are of a different nature, since things change their place by the pull of nature as though manipulated by strings.\(^{128}\) So wonderfully does this

\(^{127}\) I.e., presumably, the part of the universe around the moon.

\(^{128}\) See Pl., Lg. 644D\(^7\) E\(^4\).
universe exhibit power and order, with everything happening ‘by a noiseless progress, in accordance with justice’,\textsuperscript{129} which none can escape; the bad man pays no heed to it, and is led unknowingly to the place in the universe where he must be taken. The good man both knows and goes where he should go, and before he does he knows where it is necessary for him to live when he has arrived there, and is of good hope that he will be with the gods.\textsuperscript{130}

Now in a small animal the changes in the parts, and the instances of self-awareness that go with them, are small, and it is not generally the case that its parts are themselves living, except to some small extent in some cases. But in a being in which the distances are so great, and each of the things in it has room for motion, and there are many animals within it, the motions and changes of place involved must be greater. We see, after all, the sun and the moon and the other stars moving about and changing places in due order. So, it is not unreasonable to say that souls change places and do not always retain the identical character, but are ordered in a way analogous to what has happened to them and what they do, some receiving a position in the order like that of a head, while others receive one like that of feet, in concord with the universe; for that, too, exhibits differences in respect of better and worse. But the soul which does not choose what is better in the sensible world, and does not participate in what is worse, changes its abode to another pure place, taking one that it has chosen.

As for punishments, they correspond to treatments of parts that are diseased; some involve styptics, along with drugs, others extractions or modifications, so that the whole may be healthy when each part is disposed where it should be. But the health of the whole comes about when one part is modified and another is removed from its place, because it is diseased where it is, and put where it will not be diseased.

\textsuperscript{129} See Euripides, \textit{Trojan Women} 887-888 where Queen Hecuba is invoking Zeus.

\textsuperscript{130} See Pl., \textit{Ap.} 41C8 9; \textit{Phd.} 63B9 C9, 67B8 C2, 68A1 B1, 81A9.
This treatise is really an appendix to the previous double-treatise, picking up an issue that was raised, only to be deferred, at the end of 4.23 (l. 47–48), specifically whether a medium is necessary for us to exercise the faculty of sight, or whether we could see across a void. This question is here developed into an extended enquiry as to whether a medium is required for either sight, or indeed hearing (§5). Plotinus dismisses this requirement, in favour of a statement of the organic unity of the cosmos, and an argument that, given that fact, we can perceive external objects directly.

Summary

§§1–4. Plotinus addresses the widespread theory that a medium is necessary for sight, whether a ray of some sort, or emanations of images. The views being considered are those of earlier Platonists, Stoics, and Epicureans, and rejects these.

§5. This rejection is extended also to the faculty of hearing, where it might seem more plausible that impact on the intervening air is involved; but how would this explain the differences between the qualities of sounds?

§§6–7. Light should be viewed, not as anything corporeal, but as an incorporeal activity of a luminous body, such as the sun.

§8. A thought-experiment: if there were a body external to the universe, would we within the universe, or even on its outer edge, be able to perceive it? The answer is no, because there would be no cosmic sympathy operating between it and us.
On Problems of the Soul

On Sight

§4.5.1. Since we have earlier postponed the investigation of the question as to whether it is possible to see if there is no medium such as air, or any other type of what is called transparent body, we must now investigate this. Now it has been asserted that seeing and sense-perception in general necessarily take place through the medium of some type of body; for, it is argued, without body the soul would be lodged entirely in the intelligible world. But since sense-perception is the apprehension of things that are not intelligible, but exclusively of sensibles, the soul must somehow come into contact with sensibles through things which are of the same nature as they, and thus produce a certain association of cognition or affection with them.

For this reason, it is through the medium of corporeal organs that cognition occurs; for it is through these, which are, in a way, of the same nature as, or continuous with, sensibles, that the soul, in a way, somehow comes to be united with the sensibles themselves, and there comes to be an affection that has the same character as the sensibles. If, then, there has to be some contact with the objects of cognition, why would one bother enquiring into this in the case of what is cognized by touch? In the case of seeing – whether this applies in the case of hearing may be raised later – that is, in the case of [actual] seeing, we must ask whether there needs to be a body intermediate between sight and colour. Or could one perhaps postulate that the intermediate body impacts on the organ accidentally, but contributes nothing to seeing for those who are seeing?

If, though, such bodies were dense – as, for example, they would be if they were composed of earth, they would prevent seeing, while the more subtle were the bodies between the better we would see – one could

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1 Cf. 4.4.23.43. 2 See Ar., DA 2.7.418b4. 3 Cf. 4.4.23.13–36. 4 See Pl., Tim. 45B2 D6. 5 Cf. infra 5. 6 See SVF 2.864 (= Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 130.14), 866 (= Aetius, Plac. 4.15.3) for the Stoic term νοητοί used here.
posit that the intermediaries contribute to sight, or if they do not contribute, they at least do not prevent it. But one can at any rate say that earthen intermediaries are such as to interfere with sight.

If, however, the medium receives the affection first and in a way receives an impression of it – an indication of this is that if someone stands in front of us looking at a colour, he also sees it – it follows that, if no affection had arisen in the medium, it would not reach us.

In fact, it is not necessary for the medium to be affected, if the nature of that which it is to be affected – the eye – is affected; or at any rate, if affected, it would be affected differently as, for example, the rod between the torpedo fish and the hand is not affected by what the hand experiences;⁷ and yet in this case, if the rod and the line were not in between, the hand would not be affected. And yet even this could be disputed; for the fisherman is said to experience a shock even if the torpedo fish gets into his net.⁸

Actually, the discussion here seems to be moving towards the so-called ‘relations of cosmic sympathy’.⁹ For if one thing is of a nature to be affected by another sympathetically because it has a certain sameness to it, the medium would not be affected if it had no such sameness, or it would not be affected in the same way. If so, then what was of a nature to be affected would be affected all the more if there were no medium in between, even if the medium were of such a kind as to be affected also in some way itself.

§4.5.2. If seeing consists of something like the light of the eye making contact with the light¹⁰ in between extending as far as the sensible, then this light must be in between, and the present hypothesis is enquiring as to this intermediary. But if it is the underlying body which is the object of sight that effects the change in question, what is there to prevent the change going straight to the eye with nothing in between – even if, as things are, when there is something located in front of the eyes it is necessarily changed in some way?²

Those who make acts of seeing an outpouring¹¹ would not have to accept the consequence that something must absolutely be between, unless they were afraid that the ray might collapse. But it consists of light, and light travels in a straight line. Those, on the other hand, who make an impact the cause would certainly require a medium. But the

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⁷ The torpedo fish gives a nasty numbing electric shock.
⁸ Implying less direct contact than holding a rod and line.
⁹ Cf. 4.4.32.13 15; infra 6.17 20.¹⁰ Preserving φῶς with the mss.
¹¹ See Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 127.17ff., 136.30 138.2. The three theories listed here are those of the Platonists, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. Also, see Ps. Plutarch, De plac. philos. 901a c.
champions of images who say they go through the void require empty space, so that they may not be obstructed; and so, if having nothing in between will so much the more not obstruct sight, they have no quarrel with our hypothesis.  

Those, by contrast, who say that seeing takes place by means of sympathy, will say that we see to a lesser degree if something were to be in between, insofar as it would obstruct, impede, and obscure the sympathy; it would be more consistent to say that even what is of a kindred nature inevitably obscures the sympathy, insofar as it is itself affected. For, after all, if a body which is continuous in composition down to its depths were being burnt by a flame being applied to it, the part of it which is deep down would be less affected by the application than the part on the surface.

But if the parts of a single living being were in sympathy, would they be affected less because there is something in between?

In fact, they would be less affected, but the affection would be proportional to the extent nature wanted, with the intermediary preventing an excessive degree of affection; unless, presumably, the affection transmitted is such that what is between is not affected at all.

But if the sympathy comes from the fact that the cosmos is a single living being, and we are affected because we are in a single living being and belong to it, how is it not necessary for there to be continuity whenever there is sense-perception of something at a distance?

In fact, there is continuity and something in between because the living being must be continuous, but the affection is of something which is continuous only accidentally; otherwise, we shall have to say that everything is affected by everything. But if one thing is affected by another, and something else by something else again, and not in the identical manner, one would not need something in between in every case. If, then, someone were to claim that it is required in the case of sight, he must say why. For what passes through the air does not appear to cause it to be affected in every case, except in the sense that it divides it.

For example, if a stone were to fall from above, what else does the air do except not offer resistance to it? For it is not reasonable that it should fall due to ‘reciprocal displacement’, since its downward motion is natural. For in this way fire, even more so, could rise up by ‘reciprocal displacement’; but that is absurd – because fire, by the very swiftness of

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12 See Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 46 50 (= fr. 319 Usener); Lucretius, De re. nat. 4.26 43.
13 Reading <διαδομην> with Igal and HS. Cf. infra 4.5.4.47. See Pl., Tim. 45D2, 67b3 4.
14 See Pl., Tim. 79D E, 80A C. For the technical Peripatetic term ἀντιπεριστάσις see Ar., Phys. 8.10.267a16 17; Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 129.1.
its own motion, anticipates the reciprocal displacement of the air. But if someone says that the reciprocal displacement is speeded up by its speed, this would happen only accidentally, and it would not be the cause of the upward motion. For in the case of trees, too, the upward thrust takes place without any pushing on their part. We also cut the air when we move, and the reciprocal displacement does not push us, but merely follows us and fills the space emptied by us.

If, then, the air is divided by bodies of this kind without being affected, what is there to prevent it allowing forms to pass through to the eyes without any division? And if the forms do not pass through as in a stream, what need is there for the air to be affected, and for the affections to come to us through it by its being affected beforehand? For if our sense-perception happens because the air is affected beforehand, we should not see the object of sight by looking at it; rather, we would derive our sense-perception from the air adjacent to us, as in the case of being warmed. For in that case, it is not the fire that is at a distance but the air adjacent to us that is warmed and appears to warm us; for this happens by contact, but in acts of seeing there is no contact. Hence, when a sensible is placed on the eye it does not make us see, but something between must be lit. This is presumably because the air is dark. If it were not dark, perhaps there would have been no need of light, for the darkness, being an impediment to seeing, must be overcome by light. Or perhaps if the object is applied directly to the eye, it is not seen because it brings with it the shadow of the air as well as its own.

§4.5.3. A very strong piece of evidence that we do not see the form of a sensible by means of the air being affected as if by transmission is that fire, the stars, and their shapes, are seen at night in darkness. For certainly no one will say that the forms arise in the darkness and thus make contact; for there would not have been darkness if the fire had illuminated its own form. Since even when it is very dark and the stars are hidden, and the light from them does not shine, the fire from beacons can be seen, and also that from towers which give signals to ships. But if someone were to say, contradicting sense-perception, that even in these cases the fire is passing through the air, it would be necessary for sight to apprehend the faint trace of fire in the air and not the fire itself, in its original brightness. But if, when there is darkness intervening, what transcends it can be seen, it will be seen all the more when there is nothing in between.

15 See Ar., DA 2.7.419a10 13.
16 For the technical term διάδοσις see Alex. Aphr., De an. 41.5.
But one might consider that it will be impossible to see when there is no medium, not because there is no medium, but because, due to its unity, the living being's sympathy with itself, and that of its parts with each other, will be destroyed. For it seems that any kind of sense-perception happens because the living being – that is to say, this universe – is in sympathy with itself. For if this were not so, how could one part of it participate in the power of another, particularly when that power is at a distance? We should actually look into this: if there were another cosmos and another living being not contributing to this one, and there were sight ‘on the back of heaven’, would it see that cosmos across a proportional interval?

In fact, this cosmos would have no relation to that one.

But that is a question for later. For now, one could adduce additional evidence for the claim that seeing does not take place due to the medium being affected. If the medium consisting of air actually underwent the affection, it must, of course, necessarily be affected in a corporeal way; that means that there would be an impression as in wax. A part of the object of sight should actually be impressed on each part of it; and so the part in contact with the eye would for its part receive a portion of the object seen identical in dimensions to the pupil. But as things are, all of it is seen, and all those who in the air generally see it, when they are facing it or away to the sides, near it, and from its back, so long as there is no obstacle in the way; and so each part of the air has the whole of the object of sight, as, for example, a face. This is not, however, a corporeal kind of affection, but one that takes place due to greater psychical exigencies, that is, to a single living being in sympathy with itself.

§4.5.4. But what about the light of the eye that is in contact with that which is adjacent to the eye and extending as far as the sensible? In fact, in the first place, there is no need for the air in between, unless after all one could not talk of light without air. In this way, it would be in between accidentally, but the light itself would be in between without being affected. And, in general, there is no need for an affection here, but nonetheless there is a need for something in between. But if light is not a body, there is no need for a body. And indeed sight would not need light which is not its own and is in between simply for seeing, but for seeing at a distance. As for the question as to whether there could be light without air, we shall deal with that later.

For the present, however, we must consider this: if this light in contact is ensouled, and the soul is carried through it and comes to be

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in it, as in the case of the light that is within, then in the act of apprehension, which is seeing, there would be no need of intermediate light, but seeing will be like touch, with the power of sight apprehending its object in the light, and what is in between not being affected, but the motion of sight proceeding to its object.

Indeed, we should investigate whether sight must proceed to that object because there is some interval between them, or because there is some body in the interval. And if it is because the body in the interval forms a barrier between them, if that were to be removed, it will see. But if it is because there is merely an interval, one must suppose that the object of sight is not naturally active and exerts no influence whatever. But this is impossible. For it is not only touch that says that something is near and is touching it, but it is affected by differentiae in the object of touch, and makes report of them, and if nothing were to stand in the way, it would perceive something, even if the object concerned is at a distance. For both the air in between, and we ourselves, perceive a fire simultaneously, without waiting for the air to be heated. The solid body is warmed rather than the air, so that it is rather warmed through the air, and not by it.

If, then, the object has the capacity to act, while the subject – that is to say, the faculty of sight in some way or other – has the capacity to be acted on, why does it need something else in the middle on which it can act so as to make something happen? For that is as if one had need of an obstacle. For when the light of the sun approaches, it is not necessary that the air be affected first, and next us, but both are affected simultaneously, and often before the light comes near the eye – when it is elsewhere – so that we can see without the air having been affected beforehand, with what has not been affected being in between, and the light, with which our sight must be in contact, not yet having arrived. Indeed, seeing the stars, or any kind of fire, at night would be difficult to justify on this hypothesis.

But if the soul remains in itself, but needs light as a kind of stick to enable it to reach its objects, then the apprehension would have to involve force, and take place with light exerting pressure and being extended, and the sensible, the colour, qua colour, would itself have to offer resistance; for that is how contacts through an intermediary take place.

Next, on this hypothesis, the object came to be in close proximity, without there then being anything in between; for later, in this way, making contact through an intermediary cause, it produces cognition,

\[\text{For the Stoic image, see SVF 2.864 (= Alex. Aphr. De an. man. 130.14 18); SVF 2.867 (= D.L., 7.157).}\]
as if by memory or even more as if by syllogistic reasoning; it does not, however, happen like this. But if the light adjacent to the sensible must be affected, and next transmits the affection as far as the eye, we have the hypothesis identical to the one that involves the light from the sensible first of all modifying that which is in between, against which we have already raised objections elsewhere.\footnote{It is not clear to what this refers. Cf. perhaps 4.4.23.20.}

§4.5.5. When we turn to the subject of hearing, should we in this case grant that it occurs when the adjacent air is acted on by the first motion produced by the object that makes the sound, and that the sound comes to sense-perception by means of the air extending to the ear which is acted on in the identical manner? Or is what is in between affected accidentally by being in the middle, though if what is in between is removed, once the sound happens, for example, when two bodies clash together, the sense-perception reaches us immediately? Or is it the case that the first motion needs the air that is being struck, but thereafter what is in between is involved in another way?

Here indeed the air does seem to be responsible for sound.\footnote{See Ar., DA 2.8.419b19.} For sound would not happen in the first place when two bodies clash together unless the air that has been struck in the swift collision of these bodies is forced out, and impacts on the air next to it as far as the ears and the sense of hearing, and passes on the sound. But if the air is responsible for sound, and the impact is produced by the air that has been set in motion, what is the source of the differences in voices and in sounds in general? For bronze produces a different sound on bronze from the one it produces on something else, and other things again produce different sounds; but the air and the impact on it is identical in each case, and the differences are not just differences of loudness and softness.

If, however, we must say that the impact on air has produced the sound, we should not say that it is on it \textit{qua} air. For it makes the sound when it acquires the condition of a solid body, remaining where it is like something solid before it flows away.\footnote{See Ar., DA 2.8.419b21 22.} And so the bodies clashing together are sufficient, and the clash and this impact are the sound that comes to sense-perception. There is also evidence for this in the internal sounds of animals, which do not involve air, but are produced when one thing clashes with and strikes another; for example, the bending of bones and their grinding when they are rubbed against each other, without air coming in between.

But enough of this problem. The result of the investigation here also turns out to be the same as the one we propounded about sight, with...
what happens in the case of hearing also being based on a sort of self-awareness, as in a living being.

§4.5.6. We must also raise the question as to whether there could be light in the absence of air, as when the sun shines on the surface of bodies with the space in between being empty, and in this case, too, being lit up accidentally, just because it is there. But if other things also are affected by it, and light has real existence because of air – for it would be an affection of it – then the affection would not exist without there being something that is to be affected.

In fact, the first point is that the light is not primarily an affection of the air, nor of it qua air. For light is a property of each individual or fiery body; indeed, even stones of a certain kind are endowed with a luminous surface.

But would the light that extends to something else from that which has this kind of surface exist if air did not exist? If it were only a quality, and a quality of something, since every quality exists in a substrate, we must necessarily look for the body in which light must exist. But if it is an activity that comes from something else, why will it not exist and impinge on what transcends it when there is no body adjacent, but a kind of void in between, if indeed that were possible? Since it proceeds in a straight line, why should it not reach its destination without being supported by anything? But if it were actually to collapse, it will be carried downwards. For neither the air nor any illumined thing will actually drag it away from what illumines it and force it to move forward; for it is not accidental, so that it is altogether attached to something else, nor is it an affection of something else, so that there has to be something to be affected. Otherwise, it would have to stay put when it has arrived at its destination. But as it is, it departs. So, it could also arrive.

Where, then, is it?

In fact, all that is needed is a place. Yet this way the body of the sun will lose the activity that comes from it; and that is light. But if this is so, light will not belong to anything. But its activity comes from some substrate; it does not go to a substrate, and the substrate would be affected in some way if it were there. But being the activity of a soul, like life, it would be the activity of something that would be acted on, like body, if it were there, but it happens even when the substrate is not there; what, then, would prevent the same applying to light, if indeed it

26 Cf. supra 4.10.
27 I.e., the secondary activity (ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας) as opposed to the primary activity (ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας). Cf. 2.1.7.26; 4.4.29.9 12; 5.4.2.27 33.
28 Cf. supra 2.10ff.
were some kind of activity? For as it is, it is not the luminosity of the air that generates the light, but since it is mixed with earth it makes it dark and so not pure.29 So, it is the same as saying that something sweet exists if it were mixed with the bitter.

But if someone were to say that light is a change in the air, one must say that the air itself would have to be changed by this change, and the dark element in it to have become not dark by a process of alteration. But as it is, the air stays as it is, as if it were not affected at all. But the affection must belong to that of which it is an affection. So, light is not a coloration of air, but exists in its own right; air is just present to it.

And so let this be the end of our consideration of this question.

§4.5.7. Is the light simply dissipated, or does it run back to its source? We might derive something from dealing with this question which would help us with our previous one.

In fact, if it were inherent, so that what participates in it has it as its own, one would perhaps say it was dissipated; but if it is an activity that does not flow away – for if it were, then it would flow about and pour itself into the inside to a greater extent than it proceeded from the source of the activity – it would not be destroyed, so long as what produced the light remained in existence. But if that changes, the light is in another place, not because there has been a flowing back or a change of course, but because the activity belongs to what produces the light and is present, to the extent that nothing gets in the way of this. For even if the sun’s distance from us were many times what it actually is, the light would extend as far as this, so long as nothing prevents it or stands in between.

But the activity inherent in it that produces the light is like the life of the luminous body, is superior, and a kind of first principle of the activity or source; while the other is beyond the boundary of the body, an image of what is inside, a secondary activity, though not detached from the first. For each being has an activity, which is a likeness of itself, so that while the being exists the likeness does as well, and while it remains where it is, the likeness can extend to a distance, one to a greater and another to a lesser extent; and some activities are weak and dim, and some even escape our notice, but those of some are considerable and extend to a distance.30 And when such an activity extends to a distance, we are driven to conclude that it is both there, where the thing that exercises the activity and has the capacity is situated, and again at the point it reaches. One can see this in the case of eyes, where animals that

29 τὸ φωτεινὸν (‘luminosity’) is equivalent to ἡ διαφάνεια (‘transparency’). See Ar., DA 2.7.418b9; Alex. Aphr., De an. 44.14 46.1.
30 See Ar., DA 2.7.418b4 10; Alex. Aphr. De an. mant. 141.31 142.4.
have luminous eyes, when they project light also outside their eyes; and
indeed in the case of animals which have fire concentrated inside them,
which shine light to the outside in darkness by means of dilation, while
in their contractions there is no light outside, nor again has it perished,
but exists either outside or not.31

What, then? Has it gone inside? Or is it not outside because the fire is
not directed outside, but has gone inside? Has the light, then, gone in as
well?

In fact, only the fire has. And when it has gone inside, the rest of the
body is in front of it, so that it cannot exercise its activity outwards.
The light from bodies, then, is the outward activity of a light-giving
body; but the light32 itself in bodies of this kind, which are actually such
primarily, is wholly substantiality relating to the form of the primarily
light-giving body. But when this kind of body is mixed with matter it
gives off colour; only the activity does not give it, but in a way adds some
coloration inasmuch as it belongs to another and depends in a way on
that, and what separates itself from that body also stands apart from the
activity. But one must say that light is entirely incorporeal, even if it
belongs to a body.

For this reason, neither the expression ‘it has gone away’ nor ‘it is
present’ are used in the strict sense; these apply in another way, and the
real existence of light is like an activity. For one must call even the image
in a mirror an activity, since what is reflected in it acts on what is capable
of being acted on, while not flowing out towards it; but if the object is
present, it appears there, and is like an image of colour fashioned in
a certain way. And if it goes away, the transparent medium no longer has
what it had before, when what was seen provided itself to it for the
exercise of its activity.

But this is also the case for soul, for to the extent that it is an activity of
another prior soul, when that prior one remains as it is, the subsequent
activity does so, too.33

But what if someone says it is not an activity, but derives from an
activity, such as we already said a body’s own life was, like light already
mixed with bodies?

In fact, here there is colour because what produces it has been
included in the mixture.

But what about the body’s life?
In fact, it has life because there is another soul adjacent to it. When
the body, then, is destroyed – for certainly nothing can exist without

31 Plotinus seems here to be thinking on the one hand of animals such as cats, and on the
other of insects such as fireflies.
32 Reinserting φῶς with HS⁴.
33 Cf. 3.4.3; 27; 4.3.10.29; 38, 12.1 2.
having a share in soul – when, then, the body is being destroyed and the soul that gave it life, or some other one in the vicinity, is inadequate to it, how could life any longer remain? What, then, happens? Has this soul been destroyed?

In fact, not this one; for this is also the image of an irradiation. It is just no longer there.  

§ 4.5.8. If there were a body outside heaven, and there were someone looking from here with nothing preventing him from seeing, would what is not in sympathy with that body be able to view it, if the sympathy that exists here arises from the nature of a single living being?

In fact, if the sympathy exists because the receiving subjects and the objects perceived belong to a single living being, then there would be no sense-perceptions, unless this body on the outside were a part of this living being. If it were, there might be. But what if it were not a part, but had a body that was coloured and the other qualities, like a given body here, and was of a type conformable to the organ of sight?

In fact, even so it would not be visible, if our hypothesis is correct – unless someone were to try to undermine the hypothesis for this very reason, maintaining that it would be absurd, if colour is not to be seen when the sense of sight is present, and the other senses were not to exercise their activity on their proper sensibles when they are present to them.

But we are in a position to reveal the actual source of this apparent absurdity: in fact, it is that we act here and are acted on because we are in and belong to one thing. We must, then, consider this point, if there is any other factor at work besides this, and consequently whether our demonstration can stand on its own; if not, the thesis should be demonstrated with other arguments.

It is, then, clear that the living being is in sympathy with itself. And if the cosmos is a living being, that is sufficient; and so the parts, inasmuch as they are parts of a single living being, will be in sympathy with each other.

Now suppose someone were to say that this arises from sameness? But apprehension or sense-perception take place in the living being because it is the identical thing that partakes of sameness. For the organ is the same as its object, and participates in it. So, sense-perception will be the soul’s apprehension through organs which are the same as the objects apprehended. If, then, being a living being, it were to perceive not things in themselves, but things the same as the ones in itself, will it apprehend them insofar as it is a living being?

34 Cf. 4.4.29.12 31. 35 Cf. 4.4.32.13 25.
In fact, they will be apprehensible not as belonging to it, but as being
the same as the things in it. And, in fact, what can be apprehended can be
apprehended like this due to the sameness, because this soul has made
them the same, so that they should not be non-conformable. And, so, if
what creates the things there were a soul 36 altogether different from
ours, then the supposed same things there would have no relation to the
soul of our cosmos. Actually, the absurdity shows that its cause is the
contradiction inherent in the hypothesis. For it speaks simultaneously of
soul and not soul, of things that are related and not related, and says that
the identical things are the same and not the same; so that, having
contradictories in itself, it would not be a hypothesis. For it says that
there is a soul in this other cosmos; so, it postulates a cosmos and not
a cosmos, another and yet not another, nothing and yet not nothing, and
something complete and yet not complete. So, we must abandon the
hypothesis, since it is not possible to seek its consequences by removing
the very thing hypothesized in it.

36 Reading ἐκείνη ψυχή with HS4 after the correction of Igal.
On Sense-Perception and Memory

INTRODUCTION

This short treatise is a further enquiry into the nature of sense-perception. It stresses that the soul takes an active, rather than a passive, role, in the process of perception; the imagery of ‘impressions’ upon the sense organs originating from sense-objects is therefore inappropriate, and should be abandoned. This conclusion leads in turn to a re-examination of what happens in the case of memory (a topic already addressed in 4.3–4). It is not a matter of the retention of impressions; it is rather an active power, that works on impressions received from the senses or from the intellect.

SUMMARY

§1. The theory of sense-perceptions as ‘impressions’ does not give a correct view of the facts.
§2. This is because the soul is an active power, not a passive recipient of data in respect of any of the senses, even taste and smell. This is much clearer in respect of objects of intellection, which arise from within.
§3. Memory too is an active power. The way memory operates shows that it is not just a conservation of impressions, as indicated by the ways in which one can train it.
§4.6.1. Since we maintain that acts of sense-perception are not ‘imprints’ or ‘sealings’ that come about in the soul, it follows that we are going to refrain altogether from saying that memories are acts of grasping pieces of knowledge or acts of sense-perception, with their impression remaining in the soul, seeing as there never was one in the first place. For this reason, both theses would depend on the identical argument; either these impressions come about in the soul, and remain, if there is to be memory; or, if one does not grant the one proposition, then one cannot grant the other. Those of us who actually maintain neither proposition must necessarily raise the question as to what is the manner in which either phenomenon comes about, since we neither say that the impression of the sensible comes to be in the soul and puts a stamp on it, nor do we assert that memory is the result of the remaining of the impression.

Now if we were to examine what happens in the case of ‘the clearest of the senses’, perhaps, by extrapolating to the other senses, we might come to the discovery of what we seek. It is clear, presumably, in every case, that when we have a sense-perception of anything by means of sight, we see and direct our sight straight to where the object of sight is situated. This would indicate, plainly, that this occurs through apprehending the object there and the soul looking at what is outside it, inasmuch as, I presume, no impression has come to be or is coming to be within it, nor taking on a seal, as from a seal-ring in wax. For in that case, there would have been no necessity to look at what is external, as it would already possess within itself the form of the object of sight, the impression of which it was already looking at when it entered.

And as for the matter of the soul’s actually adding an interval to the thing seen, and being able to say how far away it is seeing it from, how would it be seeing as something far away what is within it and in no way separated? And as for its magnitude, such as it really is in the external

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1 Cf. 4.3.26.31; See Ar., De mem. 1.450a30 32.  2 See Pl., Phdr. 250D2.  3 Reading οὐδὲ τὴν σφραγίδα with ms R.
world, how would it be able to say what it is, or that it is big, as in the case of heaven, when the impression lying within it is not capable of being of such a size? And the greatest problem of all: if we were merely taking in impressions of what we see, it will not be possible to view the actual objects that we are seeing, but only reflections and shadows of those objects, so that the actual things themselves will be one thing, and the objects of our sight another.

And in general, even though we find it stated\(^5\) that one cannot see any object which is placed on the eyeball, but one needs to stand away from it to gain a view of it, this must be even more emphatically so when applied to the soul. For if we were to place the impression of the visual object within it, that in which the impression was sealed could not see it as an object of sight; for the seeing agent and the thing seen must be two separate things. The seeing agent, therefore, must be distinct, seeing the impression as situated somewhere else, not in the place where it is. Sight, therefore, is not of something situated within, but rather of something not so situated, if it is to be sight.

§4.6.2. If, then, it is not like this, how does it work?

In fact, the soul reports on objects that it does not possess; for this is characteristic of [active] potency, not the experiencing of something, but rather the power to act, and to produce an effect on what it is assigned to. For it is in this way, in my view, that the objects of sight and of hearing would be distinguished in the soul; this would not be the case if either of them were impressions, but if it were their nature neither to be impressions nor affections, but rather activities relative to what presents itself to them. But we, in our incredulity that each potency would be able to cognize its own proper object unless it suffers an impact, bring it about that it is affected by, rather than cognizes, what is contiguous to it, though its role is to be in control of this, not to be controlled by it.

The identical manner of proceeding should indeed be assumed in the case of hearing, too; the impression is in the air as a sort of articulated blow, like letters inscribed by that which has made the sound, while the power or the substantiality of the soul in a way reads the impressions inscribed on the air on their approach to them, on which approach it is their nature to be seen. And in the case of taste and smell, we have on the one hand the basic affections, and on the other what constitute acts of sense-perception of and judgements on these, which are cognitions of the affections, being distinct from them.

In the case of intelligibles, the cognition of them is relatively unaffected and impressionless; for in the reverse manner, the intelligibles,

\(^4\) Cf. 4.3.26.29 33.  \(^5\) See Ar., DA 2.7.419a12 13.
in a way, issue forth from within, while the sensibles are viewed as external. And the former are activities in a stronger and more proper sense; for knowledge is of itself, and it itself is the activator of each of its objects. As to whether the soul sees itself as two and as one thing contemplating another, while intellect\textsuperscript{6} sees itself as one and both of the two aspects as one, is something that we have discussed elsewhere.\textsuperscript{7}

§4.6.3. But having dealt with this topic, we should next discuss memory. First, we should say that it is not remarkable – or rather, it is remarkable, but one should nevertheless not doubt the existence of such a power of the soul – if, while not taking in anything into itself, it nonetheless achieves an apprehension of what it did not possess. For soul is the expressed principle of all things, that is, its nature is to be the ultimate expressed principle of intelligibles, or of the contents of the intelligible world, but first of the contents of the whole sensible world.\textsuperscript{8} For this reason, it is actually oriented towards both worlds, from the former deriving felicity and renewal of life, while from the latter, due to their sameness, it suffers deception and is drawn downwards as if under a spell. Occupying this median position, then, it perceives both worlds, and it is said to think intelligibles by coming to a memory of them, if it should encounter them; for it knows them by somehow being them; it knows not by establishing them in itself, but rather by having them in a certain way,\textsuperscript{9} and seeing them, and being them in a rather dim way, and by coming to be clearer, from this dim state, by in a way rousing itself, and proceeding from potentiality to actuality.

It operates in the identical manner in the case of sensibles; when it attaches itself to these in turn, it makes them, in a way, shine out by itself, and contrives that they appear before its eyes, since its power is ready for them and, in a way, strives in labour towards them. So, when the soul moves strongly towards any of the appearances presented to it, it is so disposed for a long time as if it were present to it, and the more strongly, the more permanently. And that indeed is why children are said to be better at remembering, because they do not move their attention away, but the object attended to remains in front of their eyes, as they are not yet involved in looking at a multiplicity of things, but only a few. In the case of those, on the other hand, whose discursive thinking and faculty of sight are directed at many things, it is as if they are running past these and not staying. But if indeed the impressions

\textsuperscript{6} Reading νοοῖς with Theiler and Harder. \textsuperscript{7} Cf. 5.1.4.20 22; 5.3.6.1 8; 5.6.1.10 14. \textsuperscript{8} Cf. 4.8.7. \textsuperscript{9} See Pl., \textit{Tht.} 197B8 10, on the distinction between ‘possessing’ (κεκτησθαι) and ‘having’ (ἔχειν) knowledge.
were such as to endure, their great number would not have diminished people’s capacity to remember.\textsuperscript{10}

Furthermore, if the impressions were permanent, there would be no need to focus our attention in order to remember, nor would it be the case that we could remember, after forgetting at an earlier stage, if the impressions were lying there all the time.

Exercises to improve memory recovery indicate, too, that what is happening is an empowerment of the soul, rather like the training of hands or feet to enable them to perform easily feats that do not come naturally to hands or feet, but to which they can be trained by constant practice. For why is it that, if we hear something once or twice, we do not remember it, while we do so if we hear it many times, and then again in the case of something that we heard previously and did not retain, we remember it again much later? For it is certainly not by having previously possessed parts of the impression; one would then have to have remembered these. No, this rather comes about all of a sudden, as a result of hearing something said at a later date, or indulging in some type of mental exercise.

These phenomena give evidence of the arousal of a power due to which we remember, when the soul is invigorated, either in general or in respect of this in particular. And when it is not only in respect of subjects about which we have exercised ourselves that memory manifests itself in us, but when those who have taken in a lot of information as a result of being accustomed to making use of reports find it that much easier to have the so-called memory recoveries\textsuperscript{11} about other things as well, to what might one attribute the cause of this mnemonic facility other than to the strengthening of this power?

After all, the permanence of impressions is an indication of weakness rather than of power; for that which is most receptive of impressions is so by reason of yielding, and since the impression constitutes an affection, it would be the more impressible entity that is better endowed with memory. The opposite of this, however, appears to be the case; for in no instance does practice in any given area render the subject of the exercise more prone to affection. In the case of the sense organs, after all, it is not what is weak – as, for example, an eye – that sees, but rather that which possesses greater power for actualizing itself. For this reason, those who have grown old are weaker both in respect of their senses and likewise with regard to their memories. Both sense-perception and memory, therefore, are a kind of strength. Further, if acts of sense-perception do not constitute impressions, how could memories be retentions of these, seeing as they were not put there in the first place?

\textsuperscript{10} Reading μνήμονας with Creuzer and HS\textsuperscript{5}.

\textsuperscript{11} See Ar., De mem. 2.451a20.
But if memory is a power and a preparation for readiness, how is it that we do not come to recollection of the identical things all at once, but only at various later points?

In fact, it is because in a way one needs to set the power up and make it ready. We see this in the case of the other powers of the soul, when they are made ready to do what they are capable of; they are able to do some things at once, and others when they collect themselves. And, as a general rule, the identical people are not endowed with good memory and sharp-wittedness, because it is not the identical power that is relevant to each of these, even as the identical person does not tend to be good at boxing and at running; for different forms of competence prevail in different people. And yet there was nothing preventing someone with any number of advantages of a psychical nature from reading off the data available in his soul, nor for someone inclined in this direction acquiring an imperviousness to having the affection or to retaining it. Also, the non-dimensionality of the soul bears witness to the fact that the soul is a power.

Generally speaking, there is nothing surprising in the fact that everything to do with the soul is otherwise than is supposed by people who have not gone properly into the question, or who are prone to hasty conclusions on account of sensibles, and which deceive them due to the ways they are the same. For their attitude to the senses and to the process of remembering is to regard them just like letters inscribed on boards or writing tablets, and neither those who hold soul to be a body, nor those who regard it as incorporeal, see what impossibilities follow upon their theories.

12 See Ar., De mem. 1.449b7 8.
On the Immortality of the Soul

INTRODUCTION

This early treatise (only second in Porphyry’s chronological list) is a survey, in a rather scholastic mode, of a sequence of doctrines on the nature of the soul adopted by other schools – Epicureans, Stoics, Pythagoreans who hold that the soul is merely a harmony of the body, and Aristotelians – in ascending order of acceptability (§§1–85), leading up to an exposition of the true Platonic doctrine that the soul is not a body, but an immaterial, eternal substance (§§9–15).

A peculiarity of this treatise is that a number of chapters (now numbered 81–85), containing much of the critique of other schools, were omitted from the existing manuscripts of the Enneads, and appear only in extracts from the tractate quoted by the Church historian Eusebius. Since these were not known to Marsilio Ficino, the first editor of the Enneads, who is responsible for the division of the treatises into chapters, they have had to be added to the original numbering.

SUMMARY

§1. An introductory chapter, spelling out the nature of the human being, and the respective roles of body and soul.

§§2–4. Plotinus proceeds to a refutation, first, of the materialist psychology of the Stoics (and incidentally, at the beginning of §3, of the Epicureans), refuting the notion that the soul is any kind of material entity, atomic or otherwise, nor yet a pneumatic entity (in the Stoic sense), nor yet a ‘mode’ of body (§4).

§5. Body cannot be a principle either of existence or of movement.
§§6–7. If the soul were a body, it would not be possessed of sense-perception, at least in any conscious or coherent way, nor could it properly analyse the source of pains or other sensations; this against the Stoics.

§8. If the soul were a body, it would not be capable of thought.

§8¹. Soul is not a quantity.

§8². If soul were material it would not penetrate bodies entirely, as in fact it does; this serves as a rejection of the Stoic doctrine of total mixture.

§8³. Soul and intellect are naturally prior to nature and to body.

§8⁴. Refutation of (a misunderstanding of) Pythagorean doctrine that the soul is a ἁρμονία or ‘attunement’ of body, and nothing more than that (the suggestion of Simmias in Plato’s *Phaedo*).

§8⁵. Refutation of the Aristotelian doctrine (in *On the Soul* 2.1) of the soul as entelekhēia, or ‘realized actuality’ of the body.

§9. The soul as a principle of life, being life of itself.

§10. Soul is of a divine nature; when it discovers its own true nature, that endows it with happiness.

§§11–12. The soul is of its nature immortal and indestructible; having no parts, it is not liable to alteration, or, therefore, dissolution.

§13. The purely intellective part of soul does not descend into body; only that which acquires desire comes into relation to body, without actually being in the body; it produces, embellishes, and directs all things in this world.

§14. Even the souls of non-human living things subsist separately from their bodies, though an element of their souls derives from nature.

§15. Concluding theological postscript. Evidence adduced from divine pronouncements, prophetic shrines, and suchlike.
§4.7.1. Whether each one of us is immortal, or, on the contrary, is destroyed entirely, or if some parts of the individual depart into dispersion and destruction, while other parts persist forever – those which constitute the self – this is something that one might discover if one conducted the enquiry with a view to our nature. A human being is certainly not something simple, but there is in him a soul, and he also has a body, whether in the role of an instrument for us, or connected to us in some other way. At any rate, let the division be made along these lines, and let us examine the nature and substantiability of each.

The body, being itself actually composite too, cannot logically be assumed to be permanent and, in fact, sense-perception observes it dissolving and wasting away and being prone to all sorts of destructive forces, as each of its component parts is borne to its proper place, one destroying another and changing into another and self-destructing, and especially when the soul which makes them all work together is no longer present to the parts of its mass. And even when each part is isolated and to that extent becomes one, it is not one, since it admits of dissolution into form and matter, which are the necessary constituents of even simple bodies.

Further, bodies, inasmuch as they are bodies, have magnitude, and so are liable to being cut up and broken into little pieces, and in this way meeting with destruction. So, if this is a part of us, we are not entirely immortal, while if it is an instrument which has been assigned to us for a certain period of time, it should be endowed with a nature corresponding to that. The dominant part of us, and that which constitutes the human being himself, if indeed it is this, is related to the body as form to matter, or as user to instrument. In either case, the soul is the self.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Cf. 6.4.4.39 46.  
\(^2\) Reading <ἐν> οὐκ ἔστιν with Igal and HS.  
\(^3\) Cf. 1.1.10.7 11; 4.4.18.10 19. See Pl. [?], Alc. 1129E5, 130C5; Ar., Meta. 7.10.1035b14 16, 8.3.1043b3 4; Alex. Aphr., De an. 2.1 2; De an. mant. 115.14 15.
§4.7.2. What, then, is its nature?

In fact, if it is a body, it is at all events subject to dissolution; for every body is, after all, composite. If it were not to be a body, but of some other nature, then that nature, too, would have to be examined either by the identical method or by some other. But first we must examine what components into which we must analyse this body which they claim soul to be.\(^4\) For since life is of necessity present to soul,\(^5\) it is necessary that, in the case of this [supposed] body which is the soul, if it is composed out of two or more bodies, either or each of them must possess life innately, or one of them would possess it and the other not, or neither or none of them. After all, if life were actually present to any one of them, then this very one would be soul.

What, then, would the body be that possesses life in itself? For fire and air and water and earth are in themselves soulless; in the case of any one of these to which soul is present, this enjoys a borrowed life, and there are no other bodies apart from these. And those who take the view that there are other elements in addition to these have asserted that those are bodies, not souls, and so not possessing life.\(^6\) But if, when none of them possesses life, the conjunction of them creates life, that is an absurdity; whereas if each of them were to have life, even one would be sufficient. But it is quite impossible for a composition of bodies to generate life, and for things devoid of thinking to generate intellect.\(^7\)

Moreover, they are not also going to claim that these bodies are mixed together in any random way. So, therefore, there should be something that orders them and constitutes the cause of their mixture so that this could assume the role of soul. For, quite apart from a composite, there would not even exist a simple body without soul’s presence in the universe, if it is indeed true that it is the approach of the expressed principle to matter that generates body, with the expressed principle proceeding from no other source than from soul.

§4.7.3. But if this line of argument is rejected, and one wants to claim that it is by the union and co-affectivity of atoms or indivisibles of some sort that soul is produced,\(^8\) he would be refuted by pointing to the inadequacy of mere juxtaposition, which is not even complete, as

\(^4\) See SVF 1.142 (= Iamblichus, De an. apud Stob., Ecl. 1.49.33), 518 (= Nemesius, De nat. hom. 2.32), 2.780 (= Galen, Def. med. 29.19.355), 790 (= Nemesius, De nat. hom. 2.46).

\(^5\) See Pl., Pbd. 105D\(3\) 4.

\(^6\) These are Atomists. See Democritus apud Ar., DA 1.2.403b\(31\) 404a\(3\); Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. (= D.L., 10.63); Alex. Aphr., De an. 12.2 3.

\(^7\) See Alex. Aphr. De an. 24.18 24; 26.26 30.

something unitary or co-affective does not come about from bodies which are incapable of affection and have no capacity to unify themselves. Soul, however, is co-affective with itself; but from indivisibles neither a body nor anything with magnitude at all could be generated.

Further, if they claim, accepting that the body concerned is simple, that the material element in it does not possess life of itself – for matter is devoid of quality – but that it is the element associated with form that contributes the life, and if they are going to say that this form [provides] substantiality, then the soul will be this substance, not the complex of the two [i.e., form and matter]; and that substance will not be a body, for this in turn would have to be composed of matter, and once again we will submit it to analysis in the identical manner. If, on the other hand, they are going to declare that soul is an affection of matter, and not a substance, they will have to tell us whence this affection and its attendant life has come to be in the body; for it is certainly not the case that matter imposes form on itself, nor inserts soul into itself.

We must, therefore, have something that can provide the life, whether this provision is made to matter itself or to any other sort of body, which originates from outside, and transcends any corporeal nature. After all, no body would even exist if the soul’s power did not exist. For body is in flux, and its nature is subject to constant motion, and it would rapidly self-destruct, if all things were bodies, even if one of them were given the name of soul. For it would experience the identical fate of all other bodies, since they would all have one matter. Or rather, it would not even be generated in the first place, but all things would remain stable at the level of matter, since there would be nothing to give it shape.

And perhaps there would not even exist such a thing as matter. This whole cosmos, in fact, would be dissolved, if one were to entrust it to the binding power of matter, granting it the rank of soul so far as titles are concerned, that is to say, to air and breath, things supremely liable to dispersion and having their principle of unity not from within themselves. For how, when all bodies are subject to fragmentation, in attributing this universe to any one of them, will one not render it non-intelligible and random in its motions? For what order could there be in a breath which itself requires ordering from soul? What reason, or

9 I.e., the juxtaposition cannot in principle result in complete unification, as the Stoics maintain. See SVF 2.473 (= Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 216.14), 479 (= D.L., 7.151).
11 See SVF 1.89 (= Stobaeus, Ed. 1.138.14 21) where Zeno is said to hold that the soul causes life.
12 See SVF 2.786 (= Alex. Aphr., De an. 26.13 17).
13 See Pl., Tim. 53A B.
what intellect? Rather, if soul exists, all these things will be subject to it for the establishment of the cosmos and of each living being, with various powers from various bodies contributing to the whole; whereas if this is not present in the cosmos, these things will not even exist, never mind not being in an ordered system.\footnote{Cf. infra 84.25 26.}

§4.7.4. They themselves bear witness to the fact that they are being constrained by the truth, namely, that there must be prior to bodies some form of soul which is superior to them. They specify that the breath is ‘possessed of intellect’ and the fire is ‘intellectual’,\footnote{See SVF 2.779 (= Aëtius, Plac. 4.3.3), 806 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1052f.).} implying that without fire and breath the superior element could not exist among beings, as it would be in search of some place to situate itself, whereas they should be looking for a place where they will situate bodies, since it is, therefore, in the powers of the soul that these must be situated. But if they lay it down that life and soul are nothing other than breath, what are we to make of this much-vaunted term ‘in a certain condition’\footnote{Cf. 6.1.30.1 20. See SVF 2.1013 (= Sext. Emp. M.9.78).} which they take refuge in, being forced to postulate some other active nature distinct from bodies?

If, then, not every breath is a soul, because there are countless breaths that are devoid of soul, but they want to say that it is a breath ‘disposed in a certain way’, they will have to assert that this ‘disposed in a certain way’ or this condition are something real or not real.\footnote{See SVF 2.806 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1052f.). The term σχέσις, here translated ‘condition’, sometimes means ‘relation’.} But if it is not real, it would be only breath after all, and the ‘disposed in a certain way’ would be merely an empty word. And so they will end up saying that soul and god are nothing else but matter, and all are mere words, but only breath exists.\footnote{See SVF 2.1047 (= Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 226.10 19).} If, on the other hand, the condition is something real and is distinct from the substrate and matter, immanent in matter but not material itself by reason of not itself in turn being composed of matter, it would be a sort of expressed principle and not a body, and a different sort of nature.

Again, on the basis of the following considerations as well, it seems no less impossible that the soul should be any sort of body. For a body must be hot or cold, hard or soft, liquid or solid, black or white – and so on for all qualities of bodies, which differ according as they are present in one body or another. And if it is simply hot, it will heat things; if simply cold, it will chill them; and the light will make things light, when it is applied to them and present in them, and the heavy will make them
heavy; and the black will make them black, and the white white. For it is not the role of fire to cool, nor is it of the cold to make things hot. But the soul both produces different effects in different living beings, and opposite effects in the identical thing, congealing some things, dissolving others, and rendering others in turn dense and rare, black and white, light and heavy. And yet, if it were a body, it would have to produce one effect in accordance with its quality and, particularly, its colour; but as things are, it produces multiple effects.

§4.7.5. How, though, does it actually come to produce different motions, and not just one, seeing as every body has just one motion?¹⁹

Now if they are going to attribute the responsibility for this either to acts of choice or alternatively to expressed principles, they would be right in so doing; but choice is not a function of body, nor yet are expressed principles, which are after all differentiated, while body is one and simple, and has no part in such an expressed principle, other than such as is bestowed upon it by that which has made it to be hot or cold.

But how could it happen to a body to grow at definite times, and up to such and such a limit? It is proper to the body to grow, certainly, but also for it to have no capacity for causing growth, other than such as is assumed into the mass of body in order to serve the purposes of that which brings about the growth by means of it. For after all, if soul, as a body, causes growth, it necessarily also causes itself to grow, to wit, by the addition of a body the same as itself, if it is going to keep pace with what has been endowed by it with growth,²⁰ and this additional element will either be soul or soulless body. And if it is soul, whence and by what means will it enter the body, and how will it be added to it? But if it is a soulless entity that is added, how will this be ensouled, and how will it be in agreement with what was there before it, and become one with it, and share the identical beliefs with the previous incumbent, and not be like an alien soul finding itself in ignorance of what the other believed?

And if, as with the rest of our physical mass, some of it is always flowing away, while other material is accruing, and nothing of it will remain identical, how are memories going to arise in us, and how will we come to know what is appropriate for us if no one ever has access to the identical soul?²¹

Further, if it is a body, and it is the nature of body to be divisible into a multiplicity of parts, and for each of the parts not to be identical with the whole, then if the soul is a magnitude of a given size, lesser than which it would not be soul – even as every body of a given magnitude

¹⁹ See Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 115.23 24.
²⁰ See SVF 3.251 (= Seneca, De beneficiis 3.22).
²¹ Perhaps an allusion to the Stoic doctrine of ὀικείωσις (‘appropriation’). See D.L., 7.85.
alters its former existence by reason of subtraction – if one of those things which have magnitude, when its mass is reduced, yet remains identical in quality, insofar as it is a body, it is different, and insofar as it is a quantity, but in respect of its quality, being different as it is from its quantity, it is able to preserve its identity – so, what will these people say who maintain that the soul is a body?

First of all, as regards each part of the soul that is in the identical body, will each of them be a soul, of the same nature as the whole? And the same goes for the part of the part? In that case, the magnitude would have contributed nothing to its substantiality; and yet it ought to have, if the soul were of any given size and present as a whole in many places, which is something that is impossible for a body – to be identical in many places as a whole, that is, for the parts to be identical with the whole.

But if they are going to assert that each of the parts is not a soul, then the consequence for them will be that the soul will exist as made up of parts that are soulless. And, in addition, the magnitude of each soul will be delimited, and it will no longer be a soul if its size alters in either direction, either for the lesser or for the greater.

So, whenever, as a result of one act of intercourse, and one seed, there arise twin offspring or indeed as in the case of many animals, a large number of offspring, with the seed being divided off in many directions, where each is actually going to be a whole – how does this not teach those who are willing to learn that, in a case where the part is identical with the whole, this whole has in its substantiality transcended quantity, and must necessarily itself be devoid of quantity? For thus it would remain identical when deprived of quantity and mass, inasmuch as its substantiality would be something different from these. It is, therefore, non-quantitative – and that goes for both soul and expressed principles.

§ 4.7.6. That, if soul is a body, it will be capable neither of sense-perception nor of thinking nor of scientific understanding nor of virtue nor of any beautiful deeds, will be obvious from the following considerations. If anything is going to have sense-perception of anything, it itself must be a unitary thing and apprehend all sensibles by the identical means, both if there is a multiplicity of sense-data coming in through multiple sense organs, or many qualities are observed as present in one sensible, or alternatively, if a variegated sensible, such as a face, is perceived through one sense organ. For there is not one sense-perception of a nose, and another of eyes, but the identical

22 Cf. 5.7.3.1 3. See SVF 2.750 (= Ps. Plutarch, De plac. philos. 906c).
23 See Alex. Aphr. De an. 63,6 13.
sense-perception of all simultaneously. And if one sensible is perceived by means of the eyes, and another by means of hearing, there must at any rate be one thing on which both converge. Or how would one be in a position to say that these things are different, were it not for the fact that these sense-data are simultaneously convergent upon an identical destination?

So, this must be in the nature of a central point, with the sense-perceptions coming together upon this from all quarters like lines converging from the periphery of a circle, and that which apprehends them all in must be such as this, really unitary. If this, on the other hand, were to be spatially extended, and the sense-perceptions were to impinge, in a way, on both ends of a line, either they will run together into an identical point, in a way, the middle, or one will be in one place, another in another, and each will acquire the sense-perception of each [different sensible] – rather as if I were to perceive one item, and you another.

And if the [potential] sense-datum were one, like a face, either the sense-data will be drawn together into one, which is indeed what seems to happen, for they are drawn together in the actual pupils of the eye; otherwise, how are very large things to be perceived by the pupil? So, a fortiori, when they get into the controlling principle, they will come to be like partless thoughts and it will be in effect partless; or else, if the sense-data remain magnitudes, the sense-perception will be divided along with it, so that one part will observe one part, and another another, and we will have no apprehension of the sensible as a whole.

But the whole sensible is one; for how on earth could it be divided? There certainly could be no fitting of equal to equal, because the controlling principle is not equal to the whole sensible. Into how many parts, then, will it be divided? Will it, perhaps, be divided into as many parts as the incoming sense-data can be counted as having, by reason of its variegation? And then each of those parts of the soul will, therefore, actually also perceive with its own parts. Or are the parts of the parts to be devoid of sense-perception? But that is impossible.

Now if any part whatever perceives the whole object, since any given magnitude is divisible into unlimited parts, the result will be that there will be an unlimited number of sense-perceptions for each part in respect of the sensible, just as if there were within our controlling principle an unlimited number of images of the identical thing. And indeed if the sensible is a body, sense-perception would take place in no

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24 See Alex. Aphr., De an. 63.8 13.
25 See Ar., DA 3.2.426b19; Alex. Aphr., De an. 61.1.
other way than the way seals are impressed in wax from signet-rings,\textsuperscript{26} whether the sense-data are imprinted into the blood, or into air.

And if the imprinting takes place as it would in fluid bodies, as is plausible, it will dissolve just as it would into water, and there will be no question of remembering; while if the impressions are permanent, either there is no way for others to be imprinted, since the previous ones are in occupation, so that there will be no further sense-perceptions, or, if others come into being, the earlier ones will be destroyed; so, either way, there is no possibility of remembering occurring. So, if there is such a thing as remembering, and perceiving one thing after another without the earlier impressions getting in the way, then it is impossible for the soul to be a body.\textsuperscript{27}

§4.7.7. The identical conclusion might be drawn from the phenomenon of pain, that is, the perception\textsuperscript{28} of pain. When a human being is said to have a pain in his toe, the pain obviously centres on the toe, but the perception of the pain, they will plainly have to acknowledge, occurs in the controlling principle.\textsuperscript{29} Now, while the breath\textsuperscript{30} is certainly different from the part that is hurting, the controlling principle does the perceiving, and the whole soul experiences the identical thing.

How, then, does this come about? By a process of ‘transmission’,\textsuperscript{31} they will say, whereby it is the breath in the toe that suffers the affection in the first instance; then, that is passed on to the next part, and that in turn to another, until it arrives at the controlling principle. So, the necessary consequence is that if the original part that suffered the pain perceived that, the perception by the second part would be different, if the perception were by ‘transmission’, and that of the third different again, and a multitude – even an infinity – of perceptions will arise in respect of one pain, and what the controlling part perceives will be subsequent to all these, and its own affection will be in addition to these.

The truth would be, though, that each of those would not be the pain in the toe, but the perception of the part next to the toe would be that the sole of the foot has a pain, and the third would be that another part higher up had, and there would be many pains, and the controlling principle would not perceive the pain associated with the toe, but the one next to itself, and it would know only this, and would be oblivious to

\textsuperscript{26} See Pl., \textit{Tht.} 191D7; Ar., \textit{De mem.} 1. 450a32, b6, b16. \textsuperscript{27} Cf. 4.3.26.25 34.

\textsuperscript{28} The term is αἴσθησις but here used more broadly than when used for the five senses in relation to sensibles.

\textsuperscript{29} See \textit{SVF} 2.854 (= Ps. Plutarch, \textit{De plac. philos.} 904c).

\textsuperscript{30} See \textit{SVF} 2.836 (= Ps. Plutarch, \textit{De plac. philos.} 902a c).

\textsuperscript{31} Rendering the Stoic technical term διάδοσις. Cf. 4.2.2.14. See Alex. Aphr., \textit{De an.} 63.16.
the others, having no knowledge that it was the toe that had a pain. So, if there is no question of perception of such a thing coming about by transmission, nor of one body, seeing as it is an extended mass, having knowledge of an affection suffered by another – for it is characteristic of every magnitude to have one part distinct from another – we must postulate that that which is perceiving is of such a kind as to be everywhere identical with itself. But producing that state is fitting for some being other than a body.

§4.7.8. That it is not even possible for there to be such a thing as thinking, if the soul is a body of any sort, may be indicated by the following considerations. For if sense-perception is the soul’s apprehending of sensibles by employing the body,\(^32\) it would not be the case that thinking also is apprehending by means of the body, or it will be identical with sense-perception.\(^33\) If, then, thinking is apprehending without involving the body, far more so should that which will be doing the thinking not be a body.

Furthermore, if sense-perception is of sensibles, and intellection is of intelligibles – if they are not willing to concede that, yet there will at any rate be acts of thinking of some intelligibles and apprehensions of objects without magnitude\(^34\) – how, then, being a magnitude, will it think what is not a magnitude, and by means of that which is divisible think of that which is indivisible?

In fact, it will do so by a partless part of itself. But if this is the case, that which is thinking will not be a body; for it will certainly not have need of the whole in order to make contact; for it is sufficient to do so with one part of it.\(^35\) If, then, they will concede what is, in fact, the truth, namely, that the primary acts of thinking are of those objects which are most entirely free from contamination with body, that is, the ‘what it is itself of each thing’,\(^36\) it is also necessary for them to recognize that that which is thinking will think its objects by being or becoming purified of the body.

But if they are going to say that the acts of thinking are of the forms in matter, nonetheless they come about after the separation of these from bodies, with intellect doing the separating.\(^37\) For after all, it is not

\(^{25}\)See Pl., *Phd.* 79C2 3.

\(^{32}\)See Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 61.3 8.

\(^{33}\)See see *SVF* 2.331 (= Sext. Emp., *M.* 10.218) on the Stoic incorporeals, space, time, void, and ‘sayables’, that is, propositions, questions, and linguistic fragments of these. Probably, Plotinus is referring to sayables here.

\(^{34}\)See Pl., *Tim.* 37A5 3B; Ar., *DA* 1.3.407a18 19.

\(^{35}\)The term is *οὐτοεκάστου*, referring to Forms. Cf. *infra* 12.9. See Alcinous, *Didask.* 155.21 156.23; Alex. Aphr. *De an.* 83.8 23.

\(^{37}\)See Alcinous, *Didask.* 155.39 42; Alex. Aphr., *De an.* 83.8 23.
actually in association with flesh or, in general, with matter that the separation of 'circle' and 'triangle' and 'line' and 'point' takes place. The soul, therefore, also must separate itself from body in such an operation. It must, therefore, itself not be a body.

Beauty and Justice are both, I presume, without magnitude; and, therefore, so is the intellection of them. So, when they present themselves to it, our soul will receive them by means of its partlessness, and they will repose in it as in something partless.

How, though, if the soul is a body, will things stand with its virtues, self-control, justice, courage, and the rest? The exercise of self-control, after all, would have to be some kind of breath or blood, and so with justice or courage, unless perhaps courage were to be regarded as the resistance of the breath to being affected, and self-control a benign blending of its elements, while beauty would be a kind of shapeliness in impressions, in accord with which we say, on beholding certain bodies, that they are endowed with youthful vigour and beauty.

Now there might be some appropriateness in the strong and the beautiful consisting in impressions on the breath; but what does a breath need with self-control? On the contrary, would it not find more agreeable embraces and touching, whereby it might be warmed, or correspondingly 'seek for cooling', or come into contact with things soft and delicate and smooth? Of what concern to breath, after all, is 'apportionment according to worth'?

Is it, after all, the case that the soul attains insights into the virtues and other intelligibles as eternal Beings, or is virtue something that arises for someone, confers benefit upon them, and then is again destroyed? But, then, who is it that produces it, and where does it come from? For if there is some such thing, then that in turn would have permanence. They must, therefore, be eternal and permanent, like the propositions of geometry. But if they are eternal and permanent, they are not bodies. It necessarily follows, then, that that in which they [i.e., the virtues] inhere [i.e., the soul] should also be of such a nature. So, therefore, it must not be a body; for that is not permanent, but the nature of body is always in flux.

§4.7.8. But if, when they observe the actions of bodies, heating and cooling, thrusting forward and weighing down, they identify the soul with these functions, establishing it in some sort of executive role, first of all they are ignoring the fact that bodies themselves perform these

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18 See SVF 2.140 (= Galen, De plac. Hip. et Plat. 2.8).
19 An ironic reference here to Od. 10.555 where the witless Elpenor 'seeks cooling', by going up on the roof of Circe's house (from which he then falls off).
40 An example of justice. See SVF 3.262 (= Stob., Ed. 2.59.4).
due to the powers inherent in them which are incorporeal; and next, that it is not these powers that we hold to be proper to the soul, but rather thinking, perceiving, calculating, desiring, devoting good care to things, all of which activities demand another kind of substantiality.\(^{41}\) In transferring the powers of incorporeal realities to bodies, then, they leave no power as proper to the former.

That it is due to incorporeal powers that bodies can do what they do will become plain from the following considerations. For they\(^{42}\) will grant that quality is different from quantity, and that all body is of a given quantity, while not all body possesses quality, as, for example, matter. Once they have granted this, though, they will have to grant that quality, being something different from quantity, is also different from body. For how, if it is not quantity, will it be body, if indeed all body is a quantity?\(^2\)

Further, as was remarked earlier,\(^{43}\) if every body and every mass suffers diminution of its previous state when it is divided, but when a body is broken up, the same quality as a whole remains in each part, as, for example, the sweetness of honey is to no less a degree sweetness in each part, sweetness would not be a body; and that goes also for all other qualities.

Next, if powers were bodies, it would necessarily follow that strong powers would comprise large masses, while powers of little force would be small in mass. But if, however, the powers of large masses are small, while small and even minimal masses possess the greatest powers, we will have to attribute the power of action to something other than magnitude; and, therefore, to something devoid of magnitude.

Further, the fact that matter, while remaining identical, and being, as they maintain, a body,\(^{44}\) yet produces different things when it takes on qualities, demonstrates, does it not, that what it takes on are immaterial and incorporeal expressed principles?

And let them not bring up the argument that living beings die when they are deprived of breath or blood. For it is indeed the case that it is not possible to exist without these, but nor is it without a lot of other things, none of which would be alleged to be soul.

Further, neither breath nor blood pervades the whole body, but soul does.

\(^{41}\) See Pl., Lg. 897A1 2.

\(^{42}\) The Stoics. Cf. 6.1.29. See e.g., SVF 2.377 (= Porphyry, De an. apud Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.347.21ff.); Alcinous, Didask. 166.15 38.

\(^{43}\) Cf. supra 5.24 52.

\(^{44}\) See SVF 1.85 (= D.L., 7.134), 2.309 (= Sext. Emp., M.10.312), 325 (= Aëtius, Plac. 1.9.7).
§4.7.8\textsuperscript{2}. Again, if soul permeated the whole body as a body itself, it would be blended with it, in the same way as blending takes place in the case of other bodies. But if the blending of bodies permits none of the components of the blend to persist in actuality, then neither would the soul inhere in actuality in bodies; rather, its essence as soul would be destroyed, and it would exist merely in potentiality; even as, if sweet and bitter were to be blended, the sweet no longer persists as such. And, therefore, we no longer have a soul.

But the actual mixing of body with body, ‘whole through whole’,\textsuperscript{45} in such a way that, wherever one element is, there the other is also, with both of the masses involved occupying an equal space, and no increase taking place through one or the other component inserting an extra element, there will be no part left over which will not be divided. For the blending is not a matter of laying large portions side by side – for this is what your Stoic would term ‘juxtaposition’\textsuperscript{46} – but what is inserted penetrates through everything, even if it is into progressively smaller parts – which certainly involves an impossibility, namely, that the smaller should be equal to the larger – but in any case, in its penetration it divides everything at every point. So, it is necessary if it divides it at every point, and there is to be no body in between that is not divided, that the division of the body should be into geometrical points – which is an impossibility.

If, on the other hand, in the case that the division is unlimited – for whatever body you take is subject to division – the products of the division will be unlimited, not just potentially, but in actuality.\textsuperscript{47} So, it is not possible for one body to penetrate another ‘whole through whole’. Soul, on the other hand, can penetrate thus wholly; it is, therefore, incorporeal.

§4.7.8\textsuperscript{3}. Now to claim that the identical breath was formerly at the level of ‘nature’,\textsuperscript{48} but when it comes into contact with cold and is tempered it becomes soul, through coming to be more rarefied in the cold – a proposition which is in itself actually absurd; for many living beings come to exist in the heat, and possess a soul which is never cooled – but, at any rate, they say that ‘nature’ is prior to soul, which comes into being due to external circumstances. The result for them is that they put the worse first, and before that again something inferior still, which they call

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{45} Cf. 2.7.1.11 19. See SVF 1.102 (= Stob., Ed. 152.19); 2.465 (= Plutarch, De comm. not. 1077e), 471 (= Stob., Ed. 153.24), 473 (= Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 216.14 218.10).
\item \textsuperscript{46} See SVF 2.471 (= Stob., Ed. 153.24).
\item \textsuperscript{47} See SVF 2.482 (= Stob., Ed. 142.2 6; D.L., 7.150).
\item \textsuperscript{48} In the Stoic system, ‘nature’ (φύσις), or the principle of growth, comes below soul and above mere ‘condition’ (ἕξις), the cohesive principle of inanimate objects.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
'disposition', while intellect, it would seem, comes last of all, after soul. In fact, if intellect is prior to all others, one should have made soul next, and then ‘nature’, and so on down from better to worse, in accordance with the order of nature. If, then, god, too, who is for them associated with intellect, is later and generated and has thinking as something externally acquired, it would be possible for neither soul nor intellect nor god to exist at all. If that which is in potency were to come to exist without the prior existence of that which is in actuality, namely, intellect, it will indeed never attain to actuality. For what will there be to lead it there, if there is nothing else prior to it? If it is going to lead itself into actuality – which is absurd – it will at least have to do this leading while looking to something else which will be not in potency but in actuality. And if indeed that which is potency possesses the characteristic of always remaining identical, it will lead itself on its own initiative into actuality, and this will result in something superior to what is potential, as being the object of its striving. This superior element, therefore, will be prior and have a nature different from body; therefore, intellect and soul are prior to ‘nature’. Soul cannot, therefore, be regarded as being either breath or body of any sort. But that soul could not be called a body has been stated in different ways by others, and these arguments will suffice here.

§ 4.7.84. Since, then, it is of another nature, we must enquire what this is. Might it perhaps be different from body, but something belonging to body as, for example, an attunement? Whereas the followers of Pythagoras intended this ‘attunement’ in another sense, people thought what was meant was something like the attunement of the strings of a lyre. For even as in this latter case, when the strings are made taut, there supervenes upon them a kind of state, which is called ‘attunement’; in the identical manner, when our body, too, comes to be in a state arising from a blending of dissimilar elements, this certain quality of blending brings about life and soul, which is a state arising from the blending. Now as to the impossibility of this theory, many arguments have already been produced, to the following effect; the soul, after all, is prior, while an attunement is supervenient; the one rules and is in charge

49 See SVF 2.1013 (= Sext. Emp., M. 9.78).
50 See SVF 1.374 (= Galen, De Hippn. et Plat. 7.2), 377 (= Porphyry, De an. apud Stob., Ecl. 347.21), 2.835 (= Iamblichus, De an. apud Stob., Ecl. 317.21), 2.836 (= Aëtius, Plac. 4.21).
51 Cf. 5.9.4.4 6. See Ar., Meta. 9.8.1049b24 27, 1050b2.
52 This is the suggestion put forward by the Pythagorean Simmias in Pl., Phd. 85E. 86C. See Ar., DA 2.1.407b27 408a11.
of the body, and in many cases comes into conflict with it, while if it were
an attunement it could not act in this way; and further, that the one has
substantiality, while the attunement does not have substantiality; and
that the mixture of bodies, out of which we are constituted, when it is in
proper proportion, produces health; and since in each part of the body
the mixture takes a different form, the soul would be different, and so
there would be many souls; and, actually, the most powerful argument
of all, that prior to such a soul as this there would have to be another soul
which would bring about this attunement, even as, in the case of musical
instruments, there is the musician who imposes the attunement upon
the strings through possessing within himself a principle of proportion,
in accordance with which he tunes them. For neither in that case will the
strings, nor in this case bodies, be able of themselves to bring themselves
into attunement.

In general, these theorists produce ensouled things from that which
is soulless, and from things without order things ordered by accident,
and they do not assume order to arise from the soul, but rather that the
soul receives its real existence from a sort of spontaneous ordering.
But this is something that cannot arise either in particular things or in
things of any other sort. Soul is not, therefore, an attunement.

§ 4.7.85. Now as for the question of how the term ‘entelechy’ might be
applied to the soul, one might address it as follows. They declare that
soul in the composite assumes the position of form in relation to the
matter which is the ensouled body, not the form of every sort of body
nor of body as such, but of ‘a natural body endowed with organs,
potentially possessing life’.58

Now if it is taken as being assimilated to that with which it is
associated, like the form of the statue to the bronze, then, when the
body is divided, the soul will be divided along with it, and if some part of
it is cut off, a portion of soul will go with the part cut off, and the soul
will not be able to effect a withdrawal in sleep, if indeed the entelechy
must by nature adhere to that of which it is the entelechy, and so, in
truth, sleep could not even take place.

Further, if it is an entelechy, there can be no opposition of reason to
appetite, but the whole composite must be one and experience the
identical thing in all of its faculties, without there being any discord
with itself. And perhaps it would only be possible for there to be sense-

53 See Pl., Phd. 92B7 C2; Lg. 896C2 3; Sts. 311C6.
54 And not soul. See Ar., DA 1.4.408a1 3.
55 Cf. supra 3.32 35; 3.2.4.26 33; 3.6.4.41 52. See Ar., DC 1.10.28a17 8.
56 See Ar., DA 2.1.412a22 24, 2.5.417b9 17.
57 I.e., Aristotle and the Peripatetics.
58 See Ar., DA 2.1.412a27 b1.
perceptions, and not possible for there to be acts of thinking. For this reason, they themselves introduce another soul or intellect, which they declare to be immortal. Necessarily, then, the calculating soul is an entelechy in another way, if we are to use this term at all.

Nor, therefore, will the faculty of sense-perception if indeed this possesses the impressions of sensibles which are no longer present to it, preserve these in association with the body. If they were present in it in this way, after all, it would be as shapes and images; but if they were present in it in that way, it would be impossible for it to receive others on top of them. It cannot, therefore, act as an inseparable entelechy.

Further, not even the appetitive part, if its appetite is for, not food and drink, but other things not associated with the body, can be an inseparable entelechy. There would remain, then, only the faculty of growth, about which there would seem to be some controversy as to whether it might be an inseparable entelechy in this sense. But not even this is the case. For if the controlling principle of every plant is centred on the root, and when the rest of its body withers, the soul in the majority of plants concentrates in the root and in the lower parts, it is plain that it deserts the other parts and is withdrawn into just one area; so it was not, therefore, in the whole as an inseparable entelechy. And conversely, before the plant grows, it is present in the small mass of the seed.

If, then, it proceeds into a small compass from the plant in its larger state, and from a small initial state into the whole developed plant, what is there preventing it from being entirely separated from it? And how, partless as it is, could it come to be the entelechy of a body divided into parts? And the identical soul comes to be that of one living being after another. How, then, could the soul of the former living being become that of the next one, if it were the entelechy of just one? But this is the plain result of the phenomenon of living beings changing into other living beings. It is not, then, by being the form of something that it possesses its existence, but it is a substance not deriving its existence from being situated in a body, but existing prior to belonging to this particular body.

What, then, is its substantiality? If it is neither a body, nor an affection of a body, but rather [a source of] action and of production, and there are many functions both inherent in it and emanating from it,

59 See Ar., Da 2.2.413b24 27; 3.4.429a22 430a9.
60 HS⁴, following Harder, bracket as a gloss the clause that follows these words: οἶον ζῷον οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν γεννήσει. We follow Harder’s deletion. If the words were to be included, the sense would be something like ‘as illustrated by the fact that the animal body will not generate the soul’.
it will be a substance independent of bodies – and what sort of a thing is that?

In fact, it is clear that it is what we call real Substance.61 For the whole corporeal world would be properly characterized by becoming, not Being, ‘coming to be and being destroyed, never really Being’62 preserved only by participation in Being, insofar as it can participate in that.

§4.7.9. The other nature, however, that which has its existence from itself, is all that is really Being63 which neither comes to be nor is destroyed;64 indeed, all other things will pass away, and never return again, if that suffered destruction which preserves them, other things, and, above all, this universe as a whole which is preserved and endowed with order by means of soul. For this serves as ‘principle of motion’,65 providing motion to all other things, while is itself moved by itself, bestowing life on the ensouled body, while possessing it of itself, which it never loses, inasmuch as it has it from itself.66

For indeed it is not the case that everything enjoys a life sourced from outside – that would lead to an infinite regress – but there must be some nature that is primarily alive, which must necessarily be ‘indestructible and immortal’67 inasmuch as it serves as a principle of life for all other things as well.

It is certainly there that the divine as a whole and the blessed must have its seat, having life by itself and being by itself, being primarily, that is, primarily alive, having no part in change to its substantiality, neither coming to be nor perishing.68 For where would it come from, or into what would it perish?69

And if we are to employ the term ‘being’ in its truest sense, it will be necessary that it not be at one time and not at another. Even as in the case of whiteness, just the colour itself, it is not at one time white and at another not white; and if the whiteness were also a being along with being white, it would have been eternal; but, in fact, it has only the

61 The words δότως οὐσίαν indicate Plotinus’ rejection of Peripatetic hylomorphic composite substances as fundamentally real. Cf. 1.6.2.7 8; 4.9.4.21 26. See Pl., Phdr. 247C7; Soph. 247D8 248A13.
62 Cf. 6.2.1.20 23; 6.7.3.5. See Pl., Tim. 28A3 4; Alcinous, Didask. 154.25 32, 156.5 14.
63 πᾶν τὸ δότως ὄν (‘all that is really Being’) often refers to Intellect and the Forms; here the term refers to the incorporeal generally, including Soul.
64 The phrase ‘has its existence from itself’ is not meant to deny that everything depends for its existence on the One. What is being denied for the other nature is contained in the remainder of the sentence, namely, generation and destruction.
67 See Pl., Phd. 95C1; Alcinous, Didask. 177.18 20. 68 See Pl., Symp. 211A1.
69 See Parmenides, 28 B 8.19 DK.
characteristic of being white. That, on the other hand, which has being present to it of itself and primarily, will be always. So, this thing which is primarily and always, is not something dead, like a stone or a log, but must be always living, and must enjoy a pure life, at least as much of it as remains on its own; but whatever is mixed with a worse element, possesses an impediment as regards what is best\(^70\) – though it does not, for all that, lose all contact with its own nature – but it can recover ‘its ancient state’\(^71\) by ascending to what belongs to itself.\(^72\)

§4.7.10. That the soul is akin to ‘the more divine nature and the eternal’ is something that is made plain by our demonstration that it is not a body.\(^73\) Further, it has no shape or colour, and is impalpable. All this may also be demonstrated from the following considerations.

Since we are indeed agreed that the whole world of the divine and really real is endowed with ‘a life of goodness and intelligence’,\(^74\) we must consider next after this, taking our start from our own soul, what would be its nature. Let us for this purpose focus on a soul that has not, in the body, taken to itself non-rational appetites and passions and made itself the receptacle of other emotions, but one that has cleansed itself of these, and as far as possible has nothing in common with the body.\(^75\) The postulation of such a soul as this will make it clear that vices are accretions to the soul and come in from elsewhere,\(^76\) while when it is purified what inheres in it are the best things, ‘wisdom and the rest of virtue’,\(^77\) which are its proper inhabitants.

If, then, the soul is such as this, when it rises up so as to be on its own, how can it not belong to that nature, such as we declare to be that of the whole divine and eternal world? For wisdom and true virtue, divine as they are, would not come into being in any low-grade mortal receptacle; rather, it is necessary that such a thing should be itself divine, inasmuch as it partakes in divinity through kinship or sameness in being.

For this reason, any of us who is like this would be very little different from the inhabitants of the world above in respect of his soul itself, being inferior only as regards this part, which is in the body.\(^78\) For this reason indeed if every human being were like this, or even if a substantial multitude were endowed with such souls, there would be no one so sceptical as not to be convinced that the part of them which is soul is entirely immortal. As it is, however, seeing the soul in the great majority

\(^70\) Cf. i.1.1.2.10 28; 1.8.13.24 25, 14.44 49; 4.8.4.25 30. See Pl., Pbd. 65A9 B1.

\(^71\) See Pl., Rep. 547b6 7. \(^72\) Cf. 6.4.1.17 29.

\(^72\) Cf. supra 2 3. See Rep. 611E2 3.


\(^74\) See Pl., Rep. 611B10 C5. \(^75\) Cf. 3.6.5.13 29.

\(^75\) See Pl., Symp. 209A3 4.

\(^76\) Cf. infra 32 37, 13.1 3; 5.1.3.12.
of people to be in various ways corrupted, they do not regard it as being a thing either divine or immortal. But one must view the nature of each thing rather by looking to its purified state, since the state that accrues from without tends always to get in the way of knowledge of that to which it accrues.  

Examine it by actually subtracting that element, or rather let one subtract himself and then look, and he will come to believe that he is immortal, when he contemplates himself on the intelligible level and as having come into a pure world. For he will see an intellect viewing no sensible, nor any of mortal things here, but grasping with the everlasting aspect of itself the everlasting reality, all the contents of the intelligible world, a world itself intelligible and suffused with light, being illuminated by the truth radiating from the Good, which beams its truth upon all the intelligibles; so that often it should occur to him that this is indeed well said:  

‘Hail, I am to you as an immortal god!’ – as he ascends to the divine, and focuses his attention on the sameness he has to it.  

But if this purification results in him realizing the knowledge of the best things, then the branches of scientific understanding come to be revealed as being within him, those ones that are actually branches of scientific understanding. For it is certainly not by running away from itself that the soul ‘beholds Self-Control and Justice’, but all by itself, in the process of its grasping of itself, and of what it formerly was, beholding in a way statues set up within itself, which it has cleaned up after their infection by the rust of time. It is as if gold were to become ensouled, and next, knocking off the earthy element that pervades it, having been previously in a state of ignorance as regards itself, which caused it not to see itself as gold, but then seeing itself on its own, would at once be astonished at its own nature, and would reflect that it had no need, after all, of beauty imported from without, since it itself emerged as supreme, provided that one let it be by itself.  

§4.7.11. Regarding a thing of this sort, who endowed with good sense would dispute that it is immortal? It is, after all, something endowed of itself with life, which it is not capable of losing. How indeed could soul be destroyed, since life is not added to it from outside, nor does it have it in the way that heat is present to fire? I do not mean to imply that heat is something externally introduced into fire, but rather that, even if it is

79 See Pl., Rep. 611B10 C1.  
80 See Pl., Phd. 65A10; Rep. 611E5 612A2.  
82 Cf. 5.1.3.12. See Pl., Rep. 508D5.  
83 Cf. 5.3.17,28 38. See Empedocles, fr. 31 B 112.4 DK.  
84 See Pl., Phdr. 247D6.  
85 See Pl., Symp. 216E6.  
86 See Pl., Phd.102A10 107B10.
not introduced into fire, it is into the matter underlying the fire; for it is
through this that the fire is extinguished.

Soul, however, does not have life in this way, as matter that underlies it, but it is life coming to be in it that renders it a soul. For either life is a
substance, and a substance such that it possesses life of itself – which is
just that thing that we are in search of, the soul – and this they agree to
be immortal; or they will have to analyse this, too, in turn as a composite,
until they arrive at something immortal which is moved of itself, for
whom it is not licit to ‘receive the portion of death’. Otherwise, if they
declare that life is an affection externally introduced into matter, they
will be compelled to admit that that very thing from which this affection
is introduced into matter is itself immortal, being incapable of receiving
into itself the opposite of what it introduces. But, really, there is only
one nature which lives in actuality.

§4.7.12. Further, if they are going to maintain that every soul is
destructible, it would be necessarily the case that all things should have
perished long ago. If, on the other hand, one class of soul is perishable and
another not, as, for example, the soul of the universe is postulated to be
immortal, but our own are not, then they will have to give us the
explanation for that; for each of them is a first principle of motion, and each of them lives of itself, and each of them acquaints itself with
the identical things by the identical means, thinking both what is in
heaven and what transcends heaven, seeking out everything which has
substantiality, and ascending as far as the first principle. And this
grasping of the ‘what it is of each thing’, which it actually derives
from its own resources from the acts of contemplation of that which is
within it arising from the process of recollection, endows it with an
existence that is prior to the body, and, since it makes use of everlasting
types of scientific understanding, allows that it is everlasting as well.

Everything, after all, that is dissoluble, having assumed composition for
the purpose of existing, is naturally disposed to suffer dissolution according to the method of its composition. But the soul is one and a
simple nature, whose actuality consists in its living, so, due to this, it
will be indestructible.

87 See Pl., Tim. 41B4. 88 See Pl., Phd. 105D10 11.
89 The Stoics. See SVF 2.809 (= Eusebius, Pr. ev. 15.20.6). 2.774 (= D.L., 7.156).
90 See Pl., Phdr. 245C9. 91 I.e., soul alone has life essentially. Cf. supra 11.18.
92 Along with the words πον ἐκτικεχομένην the word ὄντως ἐνικηθεῖν should be under
stood and we translate accordingly.
93 Cf. supra 4.7.8.16. 94 See Pl., Phd. 72E3 73A3, 78C1 2.
95 Countering Ar., DA 2.4.414b13, who says that living is the actuality of an animal, not of
its soul.
But [one might say] as it is divided,\textsuperscript{96} therefore, by reason of being split up into individual bits, it would be prone to perishing. No, the soul is not any sort of physical mass or quantity, as has been demonstrated.\textsuperscript{97}

Well, then, it is through experiencing change that it will come to destruction.\textsuperscript{98} But the process of change, insofar as it is destructive, does away with the form, but leaves the matter as it is; thus, this is something experienced by a composite.\textsuperscript{99} If, then, the soul is not susceptible to destruction by any of these means, it necessarily follows that it is indestructible.

§ 4.7.13. How is it, then, that, whereas the intelligible world is entirely separate, the soul enters into contact with the body? This is because whatever is intellect alone remains eternally incapable of being affected there among the intelligibles, enjoying a life that is solely intellectual – for there is in it no element of impulse or desire – whereas if that which follows immediately upon that intellect takes on desire, by the addition of that desire it in a way proceeds already a stage further, striving to impose order on the model of what it has seen in Intellect, as if pregnant from that source and straining to beget, it is eager to produce something, that is, to create.\textsuperscript{100}

And being keyed up with this enthusiasm for the world of sense, it is on the one hand in cooperation with the soul of the universe as a whole that it dominates the external object of its administration and joins in the supervision of the cosmos, but through its wish to administer a part and finding itself isolated and increasingly attached to that in which it is involved, it yet does not give itself over whole and entire to its body, but retains as well some element outside the body.\textsuperscript{101}

Not even in the case of such a soul, then, is its intellect subject to affections; but this soul is sometimes in the body, and sometimes out of the body, driven forth by its impulse from the primary Beings, and proceeding as far as the third level of Being,\textsuperscript{102} to the world this side of Intellect, by the activity [of Intellect],\textsuperscript{103} which remains itself ever in the identical state and, by means of Soul, fills all things with various types of beauty, and adorns them, immortal by means of an immortal, if indeed Intellect itself, in its eternal existence, will be engaged in unceasing activity.

§ 4.7.14. Concerning the souls of other living beings, such of them as have failed as humans, and have descended into the bodies of beasts,
they, too, will necessarily be immortal. But if there is another type of soul, this must derive from no other source than that of living nature, it itself being also a cause of life to living beings, including indeed the soul in plants; for all have sprung forth from the identical principle, possessing their own proper life, and being themselves incorporeal and partless and substances.

Now if it is asserted that the human soul, seeing as it is tripartite, will be subject to dissolution by reason of being composite, we in turn will say that the pure souls, when set free, will rid themselves of what has been tacked on to them at birth, while others will maintain this association for a very long time; and even when the worse element is disposed of, it itself will not perish, so long as that persists from which it takes its origin. For nothing from Being will ever perish.

§4.7.15. We have, then, said what was required for those who are in need of a demonstration. But for those who also have need of conviction fortified by sense-perception, we must make a selection from the considerable store of information relative to such matters, and specifically from what the gods have handed down in ordering us to appease the wrath of souls that have suffered wrongs, and granting honours to the dead as if they were still able to perceive them as indeed all human beings do in respect of those who have departed. Also, it is a fact that many souls which were formerly in human bodies, when they have departed from their bodies, have not ceased to confer benefits on human beings; indeed, by instituting oracles and prophesying by other means, they both grant us benefits and demonstrate also by their own examples, too, that the rest of souls have not in fact perished.

104 Cf. 2.9.9; 3.2.13, 15, 17; 3.3.8; 3.4.2; 4.3.24.27; 6.4.16; 6.7.6. See Pl., Tim. 90E 92C.
105 Cf. 1.1.11.8 15.
106 See Pl., Rep. 439D E, 441A.
108 See Pl., Lg. 927A1 3.
INTRODUCTION

This is an early treatise, but it is of peculiar importance in revealing certain salient aspects of Plotinus’ thought. First of all, it shows that he is prepared to recognize tensions, if not contradictions, in Plato’s thought, and to address them constructively (§§ 1–4). Then, it illustrates both his essentially ‘world-affirming’ attitude to the creation of the physical world and the embodiment of the soul (§§5–7), together with his rather distinctive conviction that even our souls do not descend, but an element in each of us remains ‘above’ (§8).

SUMMARY

§§1–2. Beginning with a vivid ‘autobiographical’ passage, Plotinus turns to an enquiry into the role of soul in general in the physical world. Following a survey of the opinions of the early ‘sages’, such as Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Pythagoras, the question is raised as to the true position of Plato, who seems to present conflicting views.

§§3–4. Is the descent of the individual soul a misfortune, or is it an integral aspect of the structure of the universe? In the latter case, it must be accepted, if not welcomed.

§5. Plato’s apparently contradictory remarks on this topic can in fact be reconciled. Descent for the individual soul is necessary; all depends on the quality of the life lived after the descent.
§6. The power inherent in the first principle must project itself outwards and ‘downwards’, through Soul, to create a world of multiplicity.
§7. It is the nature of soul to be intermediate between the intelligible and physical realms, and it need not be harmed by this.
§8. A part of the individual soul always remains ‘above’, in the intelligible world, even if we are not always conscious of this.
§4.8.1. Often, after waking up to myself from the body, that is, externalizing myself in relation to all other things, while entering into myself, I behold a beauty of wondrous quality, and believe then that I am most to be identified with my better part, that I enjoy the best quality of life, and have become united with the divine and situated within it, actualizing myself at that level, and situating myself above all else in the intelligible world. Following on this repose within the divine, and descending from Intellect into acts of calculative reasoning, I ask myself in bewilderment, how on earth did I ever come down here, and how ever did my soul come to be enclosed in a body, being such as it has revealed itself to be, even while in a body?

Of our predecessors, Heraclitus, who exhorts us to investigate this very thing, postulating the necessity of ‘reciprocal changes’ from opposite states, and talking of ‘the way up and the way down’, and ‘in change there is rest’, and ‘it is laborious always to be toiling at and being subjected to the identical tasks’, has presented us with these hints, having no concern to clarify his utterance for us, indicating perhaps that we must search the answer out for ourselves, even as he discovered it by searching.

Empedocles, in turn, having stated that it is the law for souls that have erred to fall down to the sensible world, and that he has descended after becoming ‘a fugitive from the gods, entrusting myself to raving strife’, has in my view revealed as much as has Pythagoras too, and his followers who have spoken enigmatically on this matter, as upon many others. In the case of Empedocles, however, there is the excuse for lack of clarity that he is writing in verse.

1 Cf. 6.9.7.17. See VP 23.15 16 where, however, union with the One, not Intellect, is described.
2 See Pl., Phdr. 248B1; Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b30.
3 See frs. 22 B 90, B 60, and B 84a b DK respectively, the last pair only known from this passage of Plotinus.
4 See fr. 22 B 101 DK, ‘I searched into myself’.
5 See Empedocles, fr. 31 B 115.13 14 DK.
There remains for us, then, the divine Plato, who, among many other beautiful pronouncements on the soul, has in many places in his works spoken of its arrival in this world in such a way as to arouse in us some hope of clarification on the subject. What, then, does this philosopher say?

Well, it will be plain that he does not say the identical thing in every instance, so that one might easily discern his intention, but granting in all cases scant respect for the sensible world, and blaming the soul for its association with the body, he declares that the soul is ‘in bondage’ and has buried itself within it, and that ‘the pronouncement made in secret rites is a great one’, to the effect that the soul is ‘in prison’ here. And his ‘Cave’, like the cavern of Empedocles, is to be taken, it seems to me, to be referring to this universe, seeing as the ‘release from the shackles’ and the ‘ascent’ from the Cave he declares to be the journey towards that which is intelligible. And in Phaedrus he identifies ‘moulting of feathers’ as the cause of its arrival in the sensible world; and ‘periodic cycles’ bring the soul which has ascended back down here, and judgements send others down here, and lots, chances, and necessities.

But then again, while in all these passages he has blamed the soul for its arrival in the body, in Timaeus, in speaking of this universe, he commends the cosmos and declares it to be a ‘blessed god’, and that the soul was bestowed by the Demiurge in his goodness so as to render this universe intelligent, since it had to be intelligent, and this could not come about without soul.

The soul of the universe, then, was sent down into it by the god for this purpose, while the soul of each one of us was sent to ensure its perfection; since it was necessary for the identical genera of living being in the intelligible world also to exist in the sensible world.

§4.8.2. So, when we seek to learn from Plato about the situation of our own soul, we find ourselves necessarily involved also in an enquiry into soul in general, how it ever acquired a natural impulse to associate itself with body, and what we should posit as being the nature of the cosmos in which soul involves itself, whether under compulsion or voluntarily or voluntarily.
in some other way; and also about the creator of the cosmos, whether he
has been able to do his work without impairment, or whether perhaps he
is affected like our souls, which by reason of having to administer bodies
of inferior nature are constrained to descend deep inside them, if indeed
they are going to master them, each element of them otherwise being
scattered and carried to its proper place\textsuperscript{17} – whereas in the universe as
a whole all things are already by nature in their proper places – and
requiring a great deal of onerous providential care, inasmuch as there
are many external influences falling upon them, and they are constantly
in need of support, and the difficult situation that they are in requires
every sort of assistance.\textsuperscript{18}

The body [of the cosmos], on the other hand, being perfect and
sufficient to itself\textsuperscript{19} and autonomous, and containing nothing in it
contrary to nature, needs only a brief prompting; and the soul of the
 cosmos is always in the state that it wants to be in, and it is subject to no
appetites or affections; ‘for nothing goes out from it, nor does anything
enter into it’.\textsuperscript{20} It is just for this reason that Plato says that our soul, too,
if it would come to associate with that perfect soul, would come to be
perfected itself, and would also ‘walk on high and govern the whole
world’;\textsuperscript{21} when it stands apart in such a way as not to be enclosed within
any body nor involved with it, then it, too, even as is the case with the
soul of the universe, will cooperate readily in the administration of the
cosmos, since it is not in any way an evil thing for the soul to provide the
body with the power of flourishing and existing, because not every form
of providential care for what is inferior deprives the carer of remaining
in its best state.

For there are two kinds of care of everything, that of the totality being
achieved at the bidding of an agent ordering by a ‘royal’ supervision that
calls for no exertion, while that of particular things involves a sort of
‘hands on’ activity, in which the contact with what is being acted upon
suffuses the agent with the nature of the object of his action. Now, since
the divine soul is said always to administer the whole heaven in the
former way, transcending its subject in respect of its higher aspect, but
sending forth its power into its deepest recesses,\textsuperscript{22} god could not be said
to be the cause of placing the soul of the universe in a worse state, while
the soul is not deprived of its natural state, as it possesses this from all
eternity and will continue to possess it, this state not being something
that can be rendered unnatural, since it pertains to it eternally and never
had a beginning.

\textsuperscript{17} See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 32B5 6. \textsuperscript{18} See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 43B8 C1.
\textsuperscript{19} See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 34B2, 34B8 9. \textsuperscript{20} See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 33C6 7.
\textsuperscript{21} Cf. 4.7.13.9. See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 246E1 2. \textsuperscript{22} See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 247E3 4.
And when Plato declares that the souls of the stars relate in the identical manner to their bodies as does that of the universe – for the Demiurge ‘inserts’ their bodies also ‘into the circuits’ of the soul – he would thereby preserve also for them their proper state of happiness. There being, after all, two aspects of the association of soul with body that are troublesome, first, that it constitutes an obstacle to acts of thinking, and secondly, that it infects the soul with pleasures and appetites and pains; none of these would befall a soul which has not entered into the innards of a body, nor belongs to a given body, nor has come to be the soul of that body, but rather that body belongs to its soul, and is such as neither to desire anything nor to be deficient in any respect, so that that soul will not be infected with appetites or fears. For it does not ever expect anything alarming to derive from such a body as that, nor does any troublesome concern arise, causing declination to what is lower, such as to draw it down from its blessed contemplation of the higher, but it is always in contact with such objects, administering this universe with an effortless power.

§4.8.3. But let us now turn to speak of the human soul, which is said to suffer all sorts of misfortune in the body and to ‘suffer’ through falling into follies and appetites and fears and all sorts of other evil states, and for which the body is a ‘bond’ and a ‘tomb’, and the world its ‘cave’ and ‘cavern’ and enquire what view he has of its descent that will not be discordant with itself because the causes [he indicates] for the descent are not identical.

So, accepting that universal Intellect dwells in the place of intellect whole and entire, which we indeed posit as the intelligible cosmos, and that there are comprised within it intellectual powers and particular intellects – for it is not one only, but one and many – there are necessarily also both a multiplicity of souls and one Soul, and the many distinct from the one, like species derived from one genus, some better and some worse, some more intellectually active, while others are such to a lesser extent. For indeed there in the world of Intellect we have on the one hand Intellect itself embracing virtually all others, like a great

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26 See Pl., Phd. 66C2 3. 27 Cf. 4.3.9.34 36; 6.4.16.16. 28 See Pl., Phd. 95D3.
29 Cf. supra 1.30 34. A composite reference to Pl., Phd. 62d1 and Crat. 400c2.
30 A conjunction of the ‘Cave’ of Pl., Rep. 7 with the ‘cavern’ of Empedocles, fr. 31 B 120 DK, also mentioned supra 1.34 35.
31 I.e., the cause for the descent of the human soul is not identical to the causes for the descent of the soul of the cosmos and the soul of the stars.
32 Cf. 5.1.8.23 27; 5.4.1.21. See Pl., Parm. 155E5. Intellect is usually said to be a one many and Soul a one and many.
Living Being\textsuperscript{33} and, on the other, individual intellects, each actualizing one of those which the other embraced virtually.

For example, if a city were to possess a soul embracing all the other ensouled beings within it, the soul of the city would be more perfect and more powerful, but would not preclude the other souls also being of the identical nature as it; or, if from fire as a whole one were to imagine there deriving on the one hand a big fire, and on the other many little fires; but the total substance will be that of fire as a whole – or rather that from which the substantiality of fire as a whole also derives.\textsuperscript{34}

It is the role of the more rational soul to think,\textsuperscript{35} but not solely that; otherwise, how would it differ from Intellect itself? For, by taking on in addition to its intellectual activity something else, it did not remain static in the manner of Intellect; it has its own proper role, after all, if indeed this is the case with all members of the intelligible world. When it looks towards what is prior to it, it thinks, but when it looks to itself, it turns to ordering and administering and ruling what is below it; because it was not possible for all things to remain fixed in the intelligible world, when the capacity existed for something else to arise in succession – of lesser status than it, certainly, but necessary nonetheless, if indeed that what comes before it is necessary also.

§4.8.4. As for particular souls, they actually employ an intellectual desire in their reversion to that from which they derive, but they also possess a power directed towards this world, like a light which is attached on its upper side to the sun, but which on its lower side does not begrudge what service it can provide; they are free from care as long as they remain with universal soul in the intelligible world, while in heaven they share with the universal soul in its administration,\textsuperscript{36} like those who associate with a king of universal power and assist in his administration without descending themselves from the royal premises; for they are all together then in the identical place.

But, then, transposing themselves from the universal plane to existing as a part and to being on their own, and becoming in a way weary of existing with another, they retreat each into themselves.\textsuperscript{37} When the soul actually does this over a period of time, and shunning the totality of

\textsuperscript{33} See Pl., Tim. 30C\textsuperscript{3} 8. \textsuperscript{34} Presumably, this would be the Form of Fire. 
\textsuperscript{35} Referring to the rational part of the embodied soul or to the soul of the cosmos. 
\textsuperscript{36} Plotinus seems here to be obscuring his own distinction between the hypostasis Soul and the soul of the cosmos, with the term ‘universal soul’ used for both. Cf. infra 7. 10 11; 4:3:2.55 56. 
\textsuperscript{37} The words ‘existing as a part’ indicate the individuality or particularity of an embodied soul as distinct from the individuality of an undescended intellect. Cf. 4.7.13.9 14; 6.4.16.32 37.
things and standing apart in self-distinction, it ceases to look towards the intelligible; having become a part, it falls into isolation and weakness, and busies itself with trivialities and takes a partial view, and due to its separation from the whole, it fastens upon some individual body and shuns the rest of the totality, coming and directing itself towards that one individual; battered as it is in every way by the totality of things, it severs itself from the whole and turns to administering the particular with all the trouble that involves, fastening now upon this and putting itself in thrall to externals through its presence in it, and plunging itself deep into the interior of it.

It is here that there befalls it the so-called ‘moulting of feathers’ and its coming to be in the bonds of the body, once it has failed of its blameless cooperation in the administration of the better alternative, which involved remaining with the universal soul; that previous situation was altogether better for it, as it was tending upwards. Consequent on its fall, then, it has been caught down here, and is in its prison, and is active at the level of sense-perception, because it is impeded from the outset from activating itself intellectually, and it is said to be ‘buried’ and ‘in a cave’; whereas once it has turned itself back towards intellection, it is said to be freed from its bonds and to ‘ascend’, when it has taken its start in ‘contemplating Beings’ from its exercise of recollection; for despite everything it always retains some element of the transcendent.

Souls, then, come to be, in a way, amphibious, as of necessity they live part of their life in the intelligible world and part of their life in the sensible world; those who are able to connect more with Intellect spending more time at the former level, while those in the contrary state whether by nature or misfortune are more engaged at this level. Plato actually gives a discreet hint of this when he divides in turn the contents of the second mixing-bowl and makes them ‘parts’, and then declares that it is necessary that they proceed into the world of generation, since they have become ‘parts’ of this sort. But if he speaks of the god ‘sowing’ them, that is to be understood in the same sense as when he presents him as ‘speaking’ and, in a way, ‘addressing an
assembly’, for his mode of procedure requires him to depict as generated and created what is eternally existent in the nature of the cosmos, for the purposes of exposition presenting in sequence things that are always becoming and things there are eternally Beings.

§4.8.5. So, there is no discordance between the ‘sowing into the world of generation’ and the concept of descent for the perfection of the universe, the judgement and the cave, necessity and the voluntary – seeing as the necessity includes the voluntary – and the entry into body as something evil; nor yet is there a discordance in the ‘flight from god’ of Empedocles, nor the moral error, on which follows the judgement, nor the ‘respite in flight’ of Heraclitus, nor, in general, that between the voluntariness and the involuntariness of the descent. After all, every process towards the worse is involuntary, but if something goes there by its own motion, in suffering the worse it is said to suffer punishment for its actions.

But when the doing and experiencing of these things becomes necessitated eternally by a law of nature, that soul which unites itself to a body in descending from a world superior to the human, accommodating itself to the needs of another – if one says that it is a god who has sent it down, one would not be in contradiction either with the truth, or with oneself. For each class of things, albeit of the lowest status, even if there be many intermediate stages, is to be referred back to the principle from which it sprang.

Now, accepting that there are two stages of moral error, the one connected with the cause of the initial descent, the other with whatever vicious deeds one might commit when down here, the first is punished precisely by that very thing, what it experiences in the initial descent, while the nature of the second, when less serious, causes it to enter one body after another and the more quickly to proceed to judgement according to its due – the fact that it indeed comes about by divine ordinance is indicated by its very name, ‘judgement’ – while the immoderate type of vice merits punishment of a more serious nature, under the supervision of avenging daemons.

In this way, then, though soul is a divine being and derives from the places above, it comes to be encased in a body, and though being a god, albeit of low rank, it comes thus into this world by an autonomous inclination and at the bidding of its own power, with the purpose of bringing order to what is inferior to it. And if it extricates itself

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46 See Pl., Tim. 41A7 D4. 47 Cf. supra 11 19. 48 Cf. 4.3.24.15 16. 49 See Pl., Phdr. 248C3 D2, 248E5 7. 50 Cf. 3.4.6.10 17. See Pl., Phd. 113D1 114C6; Rep. 615E4 616A4.
promptly, it suffers no harm, acquiring a knowledge of evil and learning the nature of vice, while bringing its own powers into the light and exhibiting deeds and productions which, if it had remained inactive in the incorporeal world, would have been useless, as never coming to actuality; and the soul itself would never have known what capacities it had, since they would never have been revealed or developed. This is so, if indeed in all cases actualization reveals the potentiality that would otherwise have been entirely hidden and in a way blotted out and non-existent, since it never would truly exist. As it is, however, everyone is brought to wonder at what is inside it by reason of the variegation of what is outside, reflecting on what sort of a thing it is from the observation of its sophisticated acts.

§4.8.6. If, then, it indeed had to be the case that there should not be just one thing only – for all things would then have remained hidden, since they would not possess form in the One, nor would any one of all things have come to exist, since the One would have stood fast in itself, nor would there have been the multiplicity of these Beings which have been generated from the One, if the things after them had not proceeded such that they assumed the position of souls in the order – in the identical manner it had to be that there should not only be souls without the appearance of those entities which have come into being through their agency; if indeed it is inherent in each nature to produce what comes after it, and to unfold itself like a seed, developing from a partless principle to a sensible end-product. The higher element remains always in its proper seat, while what follows it is, in a way, generated from an inexpressible power such as is characteristic of those higher levels of being, for whom it is not an option to remain in a way inactive out of grudging; rather, it always proceeds, until all things so far as possible reach their final state, under the impulsion of an immense power that extends from itself over all things, and can overlook nothing so as to leave it without a share in itself.

For there is actually nothing that prevents anything from having a part in the nature of the Good, insofar as each thing is capable of participating in it. So, either the nature of matter existed from all eternity, in which case it was not possible for it, as existing, not to participate in that which provides the good to all things insofar as they are competent to receive it; or its generation followed of necessity on the causes which preceded it, in which case not even so is it possible for it to

51 This presumably does not imply premature physical death, but rather a spiritual ‘death’ to the physical world and its attractions.
52 Cf. i.7.1-20 26; 2.9-3.7 12; 3.8.10.1 4; 5.1.6.38 39. 53 Cf. supra 3.19 22.
54 See Pl., Tim. 29E1 3, 42E5 6.
stand apart, as if that which granted it its existence by a sort of gift came to a halt through lack of power before it reached it.\textsuperscript{55}

That, then, which is finest in the sensible world is a manifestation of what is best in the intelligible world, both of its power and of its goodness, and all things are held together forever, both the intelligible world and in the sensible world, the former existing of themselves, while the latter assume their eternal existence by participation in these, imitating their intelligible nature insofar as they can.\textsuperscript{56}

§4.8.7. Given that soul’s nature is twofold, intelligible and sensible, it is better for the soul to be in the intelligible, but it is necessary nonetheless for it to partake also of the sensible, possessing such a nature as it does; and it must not be discontented with itself if it cannot in all respects adhere to the better, seeing as it holds a median position among things that exist.\textsuperscript{57} Though belonging to the ‘divine portion’,\textsuperscript{58} it is yet situated at the outer limit of the intelligible, such that, sharing as it does a common border with the sensible nature, it gives something to this from what is proper to it, while apprehending something from that provided that it does not impose this arrangement at the cost of preserving its own security, and plunges in with an excessive degree of enthusiasm, without remaining as a whole in contact with the universal soul.\textsuperscript{59}

This is especially so when it is possible for it to rise up again, after acquiring a record of what it saw and experienced in the sensible world and, therefore, having learned what it is like to be in the intelligible world, and by the comparison of what are in a way opposites, in a way learning more clearly of the better.

For the experience of evil results in a clearer knowledge of the Good in those whose power is too weak to attain knowledge of evil prior to experiencing it.\textsuperscript{60} And even as the outgoing procession from Intellect is a descent towards the lowest level of what is inferior for it is not feasible to ascend to what transcends it,\textsuperscript{61} but it must, because it is activating itself from itself and is not able to remain on its own level, by what is indeed a necessary law of nature proceed as far as Soul\textsuperscript{62} – that being its goal – and it must then hand over to Soul the reality next in line to it before ascending again, such also is the activity of Soul; one part is that which comes after it, namely, the contents of this world, while the other part is the contemplation of the Beings that are prior to it.

\textsuperscript{55} Cf. 1.8.14.51 54; 3.4.1.5 12. \textsuperscript{56} Cf. 2.9.8.10 20, 16.48 56; 3.2.13.18 14.6.
\textsuperscript{57} Cf. 4.4.3.11 12. \textsuperscript{58} See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 230A6. \textsuperscript{59} Cf. supra 4.5 6.
\textsuperscript{60} See Pl., \textit{Tht.} 149C1 2. \textsuperscript{61} See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 509B9.
\textsuperscript{62} Cf. 5.2.1.17 18; 6.2.22.23 32.
For some souls such an experience takes place little by little, and in a temporal sequence, and their reversion towards the better takes place in a milieu which is worse, while for that which we call the soul of the universe there has never actually come about an involvement in what is worse, but from a position unaffected by evils it is able to observe by contemplation the things that are below it, while remaining constantly in touch with what precedes it.

In fact, the two things are possible at the same time: that the soul should be in receipt of what comes from the intelligible world, while ministering to the needs of the sensible world, because there is no way that, being a soul, it can escape contact with these beings, too.

§4.8.8. And if, against the belief of others, one is to venture to express more clearly one's own view, the fact is that even our own soul does not descend in its entirety, but there is something of it always in the intelligible world.\(^{63}\) However, if that part which is in the sensible world becomes dominant, or rather if it is dominated and subjected to disturbance, it does not permit there to be self-awareness\(^{64}\) in us of that of which the upper part of the soul is in contemplation. For that which is the object of intellection by the upper part only impinges on us when, in its descent, it reaches our self-awareness; it is not the case, after all, that we take cognizance of everything which happens in every part of the soul, before it comes to the whole soul; as, for example, an appetite that remains in the soul's faculty of appetite is not cognized by us, except when we come to grasp it with the internal power of self-awareness, or with that of our discursive thinking, or both.

For every soul possesses an element which inclines downwards towards body, and another which inclines upwards towards Intellect. Now the universal soul or the soul of the universe,\(^{65}\) imposes order upon the whole universe with that part of it which inclines towards body while remaining above it free from any effort, because it does not have to employ calculative reasoning as do we, but rather intellect, in order to administer what is below it as a whole – even as they say, 'craft does not deliberate'.\(^{66}\)

\(^{63}\) Cf. 2.9.2-5; 3.4.3.24 27; 4.3.12.1 3; 5.1.10.13 19; 6.4.14.16 22; 6.7.5.26. Perhaps 'others' refers to other Platonists.

\(^{64}\) The term αἴσθησις here seems to be used synonymously with the term συναίσθησις, 'awareness' and is translated accordingly.

\(^{65}\) Here Plotinus again seems intentionally to blur the distinction between the hypostasis Soul and the soul of the universe.

\(^{66}\) See Ar., Phys. 2.8.19a28. The syntax here is obscure, and probably corrupt, but this seems to be the sense.
Souls, on the other hand, which are particular and preside over a part, while they, too, possess a transcendent element, are yet very much taken up with sense-perception, and with the faculty of apprehension apprehend much that is unnatural and painful and disturbing, inasmuch as the part that they are concerned with is both defective and beset on all sides by alien forces, while having at the same time many things that it aspires to; it is steeped in pleasure, and pleasure is its snare. The other soul is exempt from such fleeting pleasures, and its way of life is concordant with its abode.\footnote{See Ar., \textit{Meta.} 12.7.1072b14 15.}
4.9 (8)
On Whether All Souls Are One

INTRODUCTION
This is an early treatise (no. 8 in Porphyry’s list), and concerns an issue that Plotinus inherits from his Platonist predecessors (raised previously also in 4.2 (4)), and which continues to concern him until he effectively settles it in the first section of 4.3 (27) (§§1–8), the relation between the individual soul and the soul of the cosmos, or the hypostasis Soul (from which he has not yet clearly distinguished the soul of the cosmos). Plotinus is concerned to argue that all souls are in some sense, or to some extent, one, while maintaining that their diversity must also be recognized.

SUMMARY
§1. The thesis that all souls are one is set out, and certain difficulties are raised: what is this single soul, and how do we explain the differences between souls?
§2. These difficulties answered: even within one body, not every part experiences what affects other parts; and diversities may be tolerated within the ambit of a single soul.
§3. The phenomenon of cosmic sympathy argues for the unity of souls, while the diversity of levels of soul does not militate against it.
§4. If the one soul were a body, then the souls deriving from it would be separate, but, as it is incorporeal, the individual souls need not be separate from it.
§5. The question is raised how one single substance can be present in a multiplicity of souls. The answer is that this is not a problem for an immaterial entity; a good analogy that is proposed is that of a science and its individual propositions, each of which assumes the whole science.
§4.9.1. Is it the case that, even as we say that the soul of each individual is one because it is present as a whole everywhere in the body, and is really one in this way, not having one part of itself in this area of the body, and another in that, and the soul being present in this way in beings with the faculty of sense-perception, and in plants likewise the corresponding soul being present as a whole in each part,¹ so my soul and your soul should be one, and indeed all souls should be one?² And in the universe as a whole, is the soul in all things one, not divided as constituting a mass, but everywhere identical? For why would the soul in me be one, but the soul in the universe not be one? For there is no mass in that case, nor body. Now if my soul and your soul derive from [the identical material as]³ that of the universe, and that is one, these, too, ought to be one. And if the soul of the universe and my soul derive from one Soul, then again all souls are one.⁴ So, what is this one soul?

First, however, we must discuss the question whether it is correct to say that all souls are one, just as the soul of each individual is one. For if my soul were one with that of anyone else, absurdities would surely result; for example, if I were to perceive something, then this other person should perceive it, too, and if I were good, he would have to be good also, and if I had an appetite for something, he, too, would have to have the appetite and, in general, we would have the same experience as each other and as the universe, so that if I had an experience of something the whole universe would be aware of it. And further, how, if all souls were one, would one be rational, and another non-rational, and one in animals, and another in plants? On the other hand, though, if we do not make that postulate, the universe will not be one, and there will be no possibility of finding one principle of souls.

¹ I.e., the faculty of growth. ² Cf. 4.2.1.68 76. ³ See Pl., Tim. 41D4 7, where our souls are made from the identical ‘mixture’ of ingredients as the soul of the cosmos, but with a lesser degree of purity. ⁴ Cf. 4.3.2.50 58.
§4.9.2. First of all, then, it is not the case that if my soul and that of someone else are one, it follows that the two relevant complexes are identical. For though it is identical in one subject and in another, it will not undergo the identical affections in each of them, as in the case of ‘human being’ being present in me while I am moving; for if I am moving and you are not moving, in me it will be in motion, whereas in you it will be at rest. It is not absurd or unduly paradoxical, after all, that the identical thing should be in me and in you; there is certainly no necessity that when I perceive something, someone else should in all cases have the identical affection. For not even in the case of one body does the one hand feel what the other hand is experiencing, but it is the soul in the whole body that does so. If indeed you had to cognize an affection of mine, there being one thing comprising both of us, then that thing would have to be a conjoined body; for only if linked together in this way would either of us perceive the identical thing.

It is also appropriate to bear in mind the fact that many things that occur in one identical body fall beneath the notice of the whole, and so much the more according as the body is possessed of a greater magnitude, as is said to be the case with great monsters of the sea, with whom, when some affection occurs in a part, no perception of that, by reason of the smallness of the motion, impinges upon the whole; so that there is no necessity, when just one part is affected, that the perception should come through clearly as an impression on the body in its entirety. But there is nothing absurd, nor is it an idea to be abandoned, that there should be a community of affection, without this necessarily resulting in a sensible impression.

And that there should be virtue present in me, and vice in someone else, is not absurd either, if it is indeed not impossible for the identical thing to be in motion in the one and at rest in the other. For we do not speak of this as one in the sense of being completely devoid of multiplicity – for this must be reserved for the higher nature – but we say that it is both one and multiple, and partakes both of the nature which comes to be divided in bodies, and yet again of the undivided nature, so that once again it is one. And even as in my case there is no necessity that an affection occurring in the part should dominate the whole, although what occurs in the dominant part has some bearing on the [the other] part, even so the influences which come from the universe to each individual have a much clearer impact, since in many cases individuals have the same
experiences as the whole, whereas it is unclear whether what affects us personally makes any contribution to the whole.\footnote{Cf. 4.2.1.41 53; 4.4.33.25 41.}

§4.9.3. Moreover, on the basis of considerations opposite to this, the argument maintains that we feel sympathy with each other and share in each other’s pain through having sight of it, and we find relaxation and are stimulated to love by the promptings of nature; and, no doubt, this is the reason for the phenomenon of love.

And if spells and magical procedures in general serve to bring people together and cause them to connect sympathetically from considerable distances, this must at all events result from a unity of soul.

And an utterance pronounced quietly has an effect on what is far distant from it, and has caused an attentive reaction from something vastly removed in space. From such phenomena, one may conclude the unity of all things, by reason of the unity of soul.

How, then, if soul is one, will one soul be rational and another non-rational, and another even just a faculty of growth?

In fact, it is because the undivided part of soul is to correspond to the rational element and is not divided in bodies, whereas the part which is divided in bodies, while also itself being one, in being divided in bodies, and in providing every sort of sense-perception, is to be regarded as activating different powers of itself, one of which is its power of moulding or producing bodies. It is not because it has many powers that it is not one; after all, in the seed there is a plurality of powers, and it remains one; and from this one seed there derives a multiplicity which is yet one.

But why, then, are not all the powers instantiated everywhere? For in the case of the one soul which is said to be everywhere, the exercise of sense-perception is not the same in all the parts, and reason is not present in the whole, while the faculty of growth is present even in the parts which are devoid of sense-perception; and, nonetheless, it all reverts to a unity when it departs from the body. And the faculty of nutrition, if it derives from the universe, possesses something also of that soul.

Why, then, does the faculty of nutrition not derive also from our soul? Because what is nourished by this faculty is a part of the universe, which itself possesses a passive faculty of sense-perception, but the sense-perception which makes judgements with the help of intellect is proper to the individual, which had no need to mould that which already received its moulding from the universe – though it would have performed this moulding, if it had not had to be present in this universe already.\footnote{Cf. 4.3.6, 23.31 32; 4.4.22.30 32.}
§4.9.4. All this, then, has been said with the aim of diffusing any wonderment that might arise in connection with the proposal that all souls should be drawn back to a unity. But the argument still leaves open the question: in what sense are they all one? Is it in the sense that all derive from one, or that they are all one? And if they derive from one, does this arise through its dividing itself, or by it remaining as it is as a whole, but nonetheless producing a multiplicity from itself? And how, on the other hand, if it remains one,\(^\text{13}\) would it be able to produce a multiplicity from itself?

Let us declare, then, calling upon god to come to our assistance, that there must be one first, if indeed there are to be many, and it is from this that the many [souls] must arise. Now if it were a body, it would be necessary that the many should arise from the division of this, with each becoming a completely different substance; and if it were uniform in its parts, all the souls would come to exist as uniform, bearing within them one identical form overall, and distinct only in mass; and if their being souls were conditioned by their underlying masses, then they would be different from one another, but if this was owing to their form, then the souls would be one in respect of form.

This, then, involves the existence of one identical soul in a multiplicity of bodies, and prior to this one soul in the multiplicity, the fact that there is another one that is not in the multiplicity, from which derives the one that is in the multiplicity, like an image borne about in many places of the one which is remaining in one place, as, for example, if from one signet-ring a plurality of wax impressions were to be made bearing the identical image.\(^\text{14}\) In the former case, though, the one soul would be all used up in creating the many, but in the second the soul would be something incorporeal. And even if it were a mere affection, there would be nothing remarkable in one quality coming to be in many things from some one thing; and if the soul is to be considered in relation to the complex,\(^\text{15}\) that would not be remarkable either. But as it is, we posit that it is incorporeal and a Substance.\(^\text{16}\)

§4.9.5. How, then, will the Substance be one in many souls? For either the one is present as a whole in all, or the many arise from the one whole, while that remains as it is. That soul, then, is one, and the many relate back to it, as a unit giving itself to a multiplicity, and yet not giving itself; for it has the resources to make itself available to all and yet remain one.

\(^{13}\) Accepting Harder’s proposal μία (‘one’) for the υπόστασις (‘substance’) of mss and HS\(^2\), which hardly seems to fit the context. The alternatives that Plotinus has just advanced are ‘deriving from one’, and ‘being one’.

\(^{14}\) See Ar., DA 2.11.42-43.19. \(^{15}\) I.e., of soul and body. \(^{16}\) Cf. 4.7.85-43. 46.
It is capable, after all, of both extending to all things, while yet not being cut off from each individual; so it is identical in the many.

And let no one actually doubt that this is possible. A science, after all, is a whole, and its parts are such as for the whole to remain as it is and the parts to derive from it. And a seed also is a whole, and the parts into which it is its nature to divide derive from it, and each of them is a whole, and yet the whole remains in no way diminished as a whole – it is merely the matter that has been subject to division – and all are one.

But in the case of a science, one might say, the part is not the whole.

In fact, here the part that one is making use of because one needs it is actualized, but all the other parts follow along with it in their hidden potentiality, and the totality of them is in the part. And perhaps it is in this way that one should speak of ‘whole’ and ‘part’ in this case; in the science as a whole, the parts are, in a way, in actuality at the same time; so each part that you want to focus on is ready to hand, and the readiness is in the part, but it is empowered in a way by its contiguity to the whole.

One must not, then, think of the part as isolated from the rest of the relevant propositions of the science; otherwise, it will be no longer a component of a craft or science, but it will be like the utterance of a child. If, then, it is taken as a component of a science, it includes potentially all the others. For at least the scientist, in knowing what he knows, adduces all the other components, in a way, consequentially; for example, the geometer, in conducting an analysis, demonstrates how the one theorem comprehends all the others before it, due to which the analysis may be carried through, and also the consequent theorems that are generated from it.

But all this meets with disbelief by reason of our feebleness, and is obscured because of our corporeal condition. In the intelligible world all is transparent, and each individual, too.
Ennead Five
On the Three Primary Hypostases

INTRODUCTION

The present treatise is, in a way, a continuation of the chronologically previous treatise 6.9 (9) ‘On the Good or the One’. Given the perfection of the first principle of all, the question may be raised as to why there is any separation from it, including the separation of embodied souls. This treatise attempts to answer that question by situating the embodied lives of individuals into the larger metaphysical framework. This framework is a hierarchy of principles, beginning with the One, followed by the Intellect, and then Soul. Plotinus aims to show how from the unqualifiedly simple first principle of all anything non-simple can arise and how the process of unfolding or emanating is one of increasing complexity or ontological separation from the One. Here Plotinus also argues that his systematic representation of Plato’s philosophy is accurate.

SUMMARY

§1. Souls are separated from their father. The means of reconciliation are twofold: cultivation of disdain for that which is contaminated with matter and a technique for the recollection of one’s authentic heritage. The need for self-knowledge in order to know this.

§2. The familial relation between the individual soul and the soul of the cosmos. Soul is the source of the life and motion of all things.

§3. Soul is an image of Intellect, the intelligible matter for the form that is an expressed principle of Intellect.

§4. The paradigmatic status of Intellect, containing all intelligible reality. The identity of Intellect and Forms.
§5. The absolutely simple One is above Intellect and is its cause. Number is generated by the operation of the One on the Indefinite Dyad, which is inchoate Intellect.

§6. How the One produces Intellect without itself changing. How Intellect reverts to the One and in so doing thinks all intelligibles and generates Soul.

§7. Intellect is like the One but not vice versa. The complete transcendence of the One. The generation of Soul by Intellect is the last generation within intelligible reality.

§8. The Platonic provenance of the three hypostases. Parmenidean antecedents, and the superiority of the account of Parmenides in the dialogue of that name.


§10. In what way the three hypostases are in us. The need to separate from the body.

§11. It is owing to the presence of Intellect that the embodied soul can think and with the presence of Intellect comes the One, its cause.

§12. The need to turn from the exterior to the interior and to ascend to the intelligible world.
§ 5.1.1. What can it be, therefore,\(^1\) that has made the souls forget the god who is their father\(^2\) and be ignorant of themselves and him even though they are parts of the intelligible world and completely belong to it?\(^3\)

The starting point for their evil\(^3\) is, then, audacity, generation, primary difference,\(^4\) and their willing that they belong to themselves.\(^5\)

Since they appeared actually to take pleasure in their autonomy, and to have made much use of their self-motion, running in the opposite direction and getting as far away from home as possible, they came not to know even that they themselves were from the intelligible world. They were like children who at birth are separated from their fathers and, being raised for a long time far away, are ignorant both of themselves and of their fathers. They can, then, no longer see their father or themselves, and they dishonour themselves, due to their ignorance of their lineage, honouring instead other things, in fact, everything more than themselves. They marvel at these things and are awestruck by them; they love them and are dependent on them; they severed themselves as much as possible from the things from which they turned away and which they dishonoured.

So, it follows that it is honouring these things and dishonouring themselves that is the cause of their absolute ignorance of god. For to pursue and marvel at something is at the same time to accept that one is inferior to that which one is pursuing and to that at which one is marvelling. If one supposes oneself inferior to things that come to be and perish and assumes oneself to be the most dishonoured and mortal

\(^{1}\) Indicating a continuation of the line of thought in the previous treatise, \textit{6.9} (9).
\(^{2}\) Probably a reference to Intellect, not to the One. Cf. \textit{6.9.5.10} 15.
\(^{3}\) The word \textit{kak\(\omicron\)n}, translated throughout as evil, here has a connotation that extends beyond the moral to include all ‘badness’.
\(^{4}\) I.e., the difference from the ‘father’ that results from ‘willing that they belong to themselves’. Cf. \textit{3.7.11.15}; \textit{4.8.4.11}.
\(^{5}\) Cf. \textit{4.4.3.1} 3; \textit{4.7.13.9} 13; \textit{4.8.4.13} 18, 5.28; 6.9.8.31 32. See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 248D1 2; \textit{Tim. 41E}3.
of the things one does honour, neither the nature nor the power of god could ever ‘be impressed in one’s heart’.6

For this reason, the way of arguing with those so disposed should be twofold – that is, if one is indeed going to turn them around in the opposite direction and towards the things that are primary and lead them up to that which is highest or first, that is, the One. What, then, are the two ways?

The first is to show how the things now honoured by the soul are in fact dishonourable; we will discuss this further elsewhere.7 The second is to teach the soul to remember the sort of lineage it has and what its worth is – a line of reasoning that is prior to the other one and, once it is clear, makes that other one evident, too. This is what needs to be spoken of now; it is close to what we are seeking and provides the groundwork for it. For what is doing the seeking is a soul, and it ought to know what it is that is doing the seeking, so that it should first of all learn about itself; whether it has the ability for seeking such things, whether it has the right sort of ‘eye’ that is able to see,8 and whether it is fitting for it to seek these things. For if the things sought are alien to it, why should it seek them? But if they are of the same lineage, it is fitting for it to seek them, and it is possible to find that which it is seeking.9

§5.1.2. So, let every soul first consider that soul itself10 made all living beings by breathing life into them, those that are nourished by the earth and the sea, those in the air, and the divine stars in heaven. Soul itself made the sun and this great heaven, and it ordered it, and makes it circulate in a regular way, being a nature different from that which it orders, from that which it moves, and from that which it makes to be alive.11 And it is necessarily more honourable than these, since while these are generated and destroyed whenever soul departs from them or supplies them with life, soul itself exists forever by ‘not departing from itself’.12

As for the actual manner in which it supplies life to the whole universe13 and to each individual, this is how soul should reckon the matter: let it consider the great soul,14 as being itself another soul of no small value having already been released from deception, and from the

6 See Homer, Il. 15.566.
7 It is difficult to know exactly what, if any, texts Plotinus is alluding to. 2.4, 3.4, 3.6, and 6.4 have all been suggested.
8 Pl. [?], Alc. 1 133B C; Rep. 533D2; Soph. 254A10.
9 See Pl., Tim. 35Aff. See also Pbd. 79D3; Rep. 409B4, 611E1 ff.; Lg. 899D7.
10 See Pl., Tim. 39E10 40A2. The soul of the cosmos is meant.
11 See Pl., Phdr. 246B6 7; Lg. 896E8 897A1.
12 Cf. 4.7.9.6 13. See Phdr. 245C5 246A2; Pbd. 105C9 107A1.
13 See Pl., Tim. 30B5, 31B2 3.
14 I.e., the soul of the cosmos.
things that have enchanted other souls, and that it is in a state of tranquillity. Let not only its encompassing body and its surging waves be tranquil, but all that surrounds it; let the earth be tranquil, the sea and the air be tranquil, and heaven itself, its better part. Let this soul, then, think of the great soul as, in a way, flowing or pouring everywhere into immobile heaven from ‘outside’, inhabiting and completely illuminating it. Just as rays from the sun light up a dark cloud, make it shine, and give it a golden appearance, so soul entered into the body of heaven and gave it life, gave it immortality, and wakened it from sleep.

And heaven, moved with an everlasting motion by the ‘wise guidance’ of soul, became ‘a happy living being’ and acquired its value from soul’s dwelling within it, before which it was a dead body, mere earth and water, or rather the darkness of matter or non-being and ‘that which the gods hate’, as the poet says. The power and nature of soul would be more apparent, or clearer, if one were to reflect here on how soul encompasses and directs heaven by its own acts of will. For soul has given itself to the entire extent of heaven, however much that is, and every interval both great and small is ensouled, even as one body lies apart from another, one here and one there, some separated by the contraries of which they are composed, and some separated in other ways.

The soul is, however, not like that, and it does not make something alive by a part of itself being broken up and put into each individual, but all things are alive by the whole of it, and all soul, being the same as the father who begat it, is present everywhere in each thing and in everything. And though heaven is multiple and diverse, it is one by the power of soul, and this cosmos is a god due to this. ‘The sun is also a god – because it is ensouled – and the other stars; as, for this reason are we, if indeed anything [is a god], ‘for corpses are more apt for disposal than dung’.

But the explanation for gods, being gods, must necessarily be a god older than they. Our soul is of the same kind, and when you examine it without the accretions, taking it in its ‘purified condition’, you will find that it has the identical value that soul was found to have, more valuable than everything that is corporeal. For all corporeal things are

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15 See Pl., Tim. 43B5. 16 Presumably, ‘the better part’ is the soul.
17 Correcting ἰστῶσα to ἰστῶτα as per HS. 18 See Pl., Tim. 36E3.
19 Cf. 5.9.3.30 32. See Pl., Tim. 36E4. 20 See Pl., Tim. 34B8.
21 Cf. 1.8.3 5; 2.4.16.3. 22 Homer II. 20.65, said of Hades.
23 Father, Demiurge, and Intellect are here identified. Cf. infra 8.5; 2.1.5.5; 2.3.18.15; 5.9.3.26. See Pl., Tim. 37C7.
24 Cf. 3.5.6.14 24. See Pl., Tim. 92C6 7. 25 See Heraclitus, fr. 22 B 96 DK.
earth. But even if they were fire, what would be the cause of its burning? And so, too, for everything composed of these, even if you add water and air. But if the body is worth pursuing just because it is ensouled, why would one\textsuperscript{27} ignore oneself to pursue another? If you love the soul in another, then love yourself.

§5.1.3. Since the soul is indeed such an honourable and divine thing, you should by now already be confident in your pursuit of a god like this, and with this explanation in mind, ascend to him. You will certainly not have to cast far, ‘nor are the intermediary steps many’.\textsuperscript{28} So, understand soul’s higher ‘neighbouring region’,\textsuperscript{29} which is more divine than the divine soul, after which and from which the soul comes. For even though soul is the kind of thing shown by the argument, it is an image of Intellect.\textsuperscript{30} Just as spoken words are an expressed principle of thinking, so, too, Soul is an expressed principle of Intellect\textsuperscript{31} and its whole activity, and the life which it sends forth to make something else really exist.\textsuperscript{32} It is just like fire that has both internal heat and radiant heat.\textsuperscript{33}

But in the intelligible world, one should understand that the internal activity does not flow out of it; rather, one activity remains in it, and the other is that which comes into existence.\textsuperscript{34}

Since, then, Soul is derived from Intellect, it is intellectual, and its own intellect is found in its acts of calculative reasoning,\textsuperscript{35} and its perfection, too, comes from Intellect, like a father raising a child whom he begat as imperfect in relation to himself. Its real existence, then, comes from Intellect, and its actuality as an expressed principle derived from Intellect occurs when Intellect is seen in it. For whenever Soul looks into Intellect, what it thinks and actualizes are objects that belong to it and come from within itself. And these alone should be called activities of Soul, namely, those that are intellectual and those that belong to it. The inferior activities come from elsewhere, and are states of an inferior soul.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{27} Reading τις with HS\textsuperscript{5}.
\textsuperscript{28} See Homer \textit{Il.} I. 156.
\textsuperscript{29} This is Intellect. See Pl., \textit{Lg.} 705A4.
\textsuperscript{30} Cf. \textit{infra} 7.1; also, 2.9.4.25; 5.3.4.15 21, 8.46ff.; 5.9.3.30 37.
\textsuperscript{31} Λόγος (‘expressed principle’) is the manifestation or expression of that which is hierarchically inferior in relation to that which is superior. The intelligible content of the higher is maintained in the lower.
\textsuperscript{32} The discursive intellectual part of the embodied soul. Cf. 5.3.4.15 21. See Pl., \textit{Tht.} 189E6 7; \textit{Sopb.} 263E3 9; Ar., \textit{AP} 1.10.76b24 25.
\textsuperscript{33} Ar., \textit{Meta.} 2.1.993b25.
\textsuperscript{34} Cf. 4.7.10.19 21, 32 37, 13.1 3.
\textsuperscript{35} Soul will include both individual souls and the soul of the cosmos. The intellectual activity of these is discursive; that of Intellect itself (and undescended intellects) will be non discourse. Cf. 4.7.10.32 37.
\textsuperscript{36} Referring to embodied souls or to their lower parts. Cf. 3.6.4.30 38.
Intellect, then, makes Soul even more divine by being its father and by being present to it. For there is nothing in between them but the fact of their being different, Soul as next in order and as receptive, and Intellect as form. Even the matter of Intellect is beautiful, since it is like Intellect and simple. What Intellect is like, then, is clear from the above, namely, that it is superior to Soul thus described.

§ 5.1.4. One could also see this from the following. Take someone who starts by marvelling at this sensible cosmos, looking at its expanse and its beauty and its everlasting motion and the gods in it, both the visible and the invisible ones, and the daemons, and all the animals and plants; let him then ascend to the archetype of this cosmos and the truer reality, and in the intelligible world let him see all that is intelligible and eternal in it with its own comprehension and life, and ‘pure Intellect’ presiding over these, and indescribable wisdom, and the life that is truly that under the reign of Kronos, a god of ‘fullness’ and intellect. For it encompasses every immortal within itself, that is, every intellect, every god, every soul, and is always stable. For why should it seek to change from its happy condition? Where could it go, when it has all things within itself? It does not even seek to enlarge itself, since it is absolutely perfect.

For this reason, in addition, all the things in it are perfect so as to be perfect in every way, having nothing which is not like this, nothing in it that it does not think and it thinks not by way of enquiring but by having what it thinks. Its blessedness is not acquired; rather, everything is in it eternally, and it is true eternity, which time imitates, moving around it along with Soul, dropping some things and picking up others. For at the level of Soul, thoughts are always changing; now it thinks of Socrates, now of a horse – always some particular being – whereas Intellect just is everything. It has, then, all Beings stable in it, and it alone is, and the ‘is’ is always, and the future is nothing to it – for it ‘is’ then, too, and is always perfect.
there a past for it – for nothing in the intelligible world has passed away – but all Beings are set within it always inasmuch as they are identical and in a way pleased to be in this condition.

Each of them is Intellect and Being, that is, the totality consists of all Intellect and all Being – Intellect, insofar as it thinks, making Being come to exist, and Being, by its being thought, giving to Intellect its thinking, which is its existence. But the cause of thinking is something else, something that is also the cause of Being: in other words, the cause of both is something else. For those coexist simultaneously and do not abandon each other, but this one thing is nevertheless two: Intellect and Being, thinking and what is being thought – Intellect, insofar as it is thinking, Being insofar as it is what is being thought. For thinking could not occur if there was not Difference as well as Identity.

The first things that occur, then, are Intellect, Being, Difference, and Identity. And one should include Motion and Stability – Motion if Intellect is thinking, and Stability so that it remains the identical thing. There must be Difference, so that there can be both thinking and what is being thought; in fact, if you were to remove Difference, it would become one and fall silent. It also must be that things that are thought are different from each other. There must also be Identity, since Intellect is one with itself, that is, there is a certain commonality in all its objects, but 'differentiation is Difference'. And in becoming many, they produce Number and quantity, and quality is the unique character of each of these, and from these as principles all the other things arise.

§5.1.5. The god, then, who is above Soul is multiple, and it is possible for Soul to exist within this, connected to it, so long as it does not want to be 'separated' from it. When it, then, approaches Intellect and in a way becomes one with it, it seeks to know who it is that produced it. It is that which is simple and prior to this multiplicity, which is the cause of this god’s existence and its being multiple; it is the producer of Number. For Number is not primary.

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46 ‘Being’ refers to the μεγαλογεινο δεινος Being and all the intelligibles that share in it as seen from the following lines. Cf. 5.3.5.26ff.; 5.3.5.1; 5.3.5.13; 8.2 4; 6.7.41.12. See Pl., Soph. 254B D.

47 Cf. 5.9.5.12 13.

48 I.e., the One. Cf. 6.7.16.22 31.

49 Cf. 5.3.1.1 12, 5.1 3; 6.7.1.7 9, 12 13; 39.12 13.

50 Cf. 6.2.7 8. See Pl., Soph. 254D4 5, 254E5 255A1; Parm. 145E.

51 Cf. 5.3.10.30 32, 40 42.

52 Reading ἐν in l. 40 with Kirchhoff.

53 See Ar., Meta. 4.2.1004b21, 9.1018a12 13.

54 Cf. 5.2.1.11 32. See Pl., Parm. 142D1 143A3. See Pl., Parm. 144B2.

55 Reading ἐν τῇ Γενέσει in l. 3 with the mss followed by a comma with HS.

56 Cf. 5.3.16.10 16.
Before the Dyad is the One; the Dyad is second and, having come from the One, the One imposes definiteness on it, whereas it is in itself indefinite.\(^{58}\) When it has been made definite, it is henceforth Number, Number as Substance.\(^{59}\) Soul, too, is Number,\(^{60}\) for the first things are neither masses nor magnitudes. The things that have thickness, those things that sense-perception takes to be beings, come later. Nor is it the moist part in seeds that is valuable, but the part that is not seen. This is number and an expressed principle.\(^{61}\) What are, then, called Number and the Dyad in the intelligible world are expressed principles and Intellect. But whereas the Dyad, understood as a sort of substrate, is indefinite,\(^{62}\) each Number that comes from it and the One is a Form, Intellect in a way having been shaped by the Forms that come to be in it.\(^{63}\) In one manner, it is shaped by the One, and in another by itself, as in the way the power of sight is actualized.\(^{64}\) For intellection is a vision in which seeing and what is seen are one.\(^{65}\)

§ 5.1.6. How, then, does Intellect see, and what does it see, and how in general did it get to exist or come to be from the One in such a way that it can see? For the soul now grasps that these things must of necessity be, but in addition it longs to grasp the answer to the question much discussed indeed among the ancient wise men, too, of how from a unity, such as we say the One is, anything acquired real existence, whether multiplicity or duality or number;\(^{66}\) why it did not remain by itself, but why instead such a multiplicity flowed from it – a multiplicity which, though seen among Beings, we judge appropriate to refer back to it.

Let us speak of this matter, then, in the following manner, calling to god himself, not with spoken words, but by stretching our arms in prayer to him in our soul, in this way being able to pray alone to him who is alone.\(^{67}\) So, since god is by himself, as if inside a temple, remaining tranquil while transcending everything,\(^{68}\) the contemplator should contemplate the statues which are in a way fixed outside the temple.

\(^{58}\) Cf. 5.4.2.4 10; 6.6.3.12 15 for the identification of the Indefinite Dyad with Intellect. That the One imposes definiteness does not mean that it itself is definite. Cf. 5.3.11.1 12; 6.7.17.15 16.

\(^{59}\) Cf. 5.4.2.7 8; 5.5.4.16 17; 6.6.1.1 2. See Ar., Meta. 1.6.987b14; 13.7.1081a14; Alex. Aphr., In Meta. 55.20 56.35.

\(^{60}\) Cf. 6.6.16.45ff. See Xenocrates, fr. 60 Heinze.\(^{61}\) Cf. 3.8.2.20 30; 6.7.11.17 28.

\(^{62}\) Cf. 2.4.5.22 23; 5.4.2.7 8. See Ar., Meta. 13.7.1081a14 15.\(^{63}\) Cf. infra 7.5 18.

\(^{63}\) Cf. 3.8.11.1 8; 5.2.1.7 13; 5.3.11.4 6; 6.7.15.21 22, 16.10 13. See Ar., Dei 3.2.426a13 14; 3.3.428a6 7.

\(^{64}\) See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1074b29 1075a10.\(^{65}\) Cf. 5.2.1.3 5; 5.9.14.2 6.

\(^{65}\) Cf. 1.6.7.9; 6.7.34.7 8; 6.9.11.51.\(^{66}\) See Pl., Rep. 509B9.
already – or rather the first statue displayed, revealed to sight in the following manner.

It must be that for everything in motion there is something towards which it moves. Since the One has nothing towards which it moves, let us not suppose that it is moving. But if something comes to be after it, it has necessarily come to be by being eternally turned towards it [the One]. Let the sort of coming to be that is in time not get in our way, since our discussion is concerned with things that are eternal. When in our discussion we attribute ‘coming to be’ to them, we are doing so in order to give their causal order. We should say, then, that that which comes to be from the One in the intelligible world does so without the One being moved. For if something came to be as a result of its having moved, then that which came to be would be third in line from it, after the motion, and not second. It must be, then, that if something was second in line from it, that thing came to exist while the One was unmoved, neither inclining, nor having willed anything, nor moving in any way.

How, then, does this happen, and what should we think about what is near to the One while it reposes? A radiation of light comes from it, though it reposes, like the light from the sun, in a way encircling it, eternally coming from it while it reposes. And all beings, so long as they persist, necessarily, due to the power present in them, produce from their own substantiality a real, though dependent, existent around themselves directed to their exterior, a sort of image of the archetypes from which it was generated. Fire produces the heat that comes from it, and snow does not only hold its coldness inside itself. Perfumes especially witness to this, for so long as they exist, something flows from them around them, the existence of which a bystander enjoys. Further, all things, as soon as they are perfected, generate.

What, then, must we say about that which is most perfect? Nothing can come from it except what is next greatest after it. And the greatest thing after it, the second greatest thing, is Intellect. For Intellect sees the

69 See Ar., Phys. 4.11.219a10 11; 5.1.224b1 10.
70 Reading αὐτὸ with Atkinson instead of αὑτὸ (‘itself’) in HS. With the latter, the end of the sentence reads ‘while that [the One] is always turned towards itself’. In support of the former, cf. supra 5.17 19 and infra 7.5 18; for the latter, cf. 6.8.8.11 13, 15.1.
71 Reading αἵτις τάξεως αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσεως with Atkinson thus enabling us to understand αἵτις as genitive singular.
72 Cf. 5.3.12.28 31.
73 Cf. 4.6.8.8 12; 5.3.7.23 24; 5.4.2.27 33; 6.7.18.5 6; 6.7.21.4 6; 6.7.40.21 24.
74 See Ar., DA 2.4.415a26 28.
One and is in need of it alone. But the One has no need of Intellect. And that which is generated from something greater than Intellect is Intellect;\footnote{Cf. 5.3.16.10 16; 5.5.9.9 10; 6.8.18.3.} and Intellect is greater than all other things, because other things come after it. For example, Soul is an expressed principle derived from Intellect and a certain activity, just as Intellect is an activity of the One. But Soul’s expressed principle is murky, for it is a reflection of Intellect and, due to this, it must look to Intellect. Similarly, Intellect has to look to the One, so that it can be Intellect. It sees it not as having been separated from it, but because it comes after it and there is nothing in between, as there is nothing in between Soul and Intellect. Everything longs for that which generated it and loves this, especially when there is just generator and that which is generated. And ‘whenever what is best is the generator’,\footnote{See Ar., \textit{Meta.} 14.4.1091b10.} that which is generated must necessarily be found with it, since they are only separated by being different.

§5.1.7. We are saying that Intellect is an image of the One,\footnote{Cf. \textit{supra} 6.30 34; 46; 5.4.2.25 26.} first – for we should express ourselves more clearly – because that which is produced must somehow be the One and preserve many of its properties, that is, be the same as it, just like the light that comes from the sun. But the One is not Intellect. How, then, does it generate Intellect?

In fact, by its reversion to it, Intellect saw the One, and this seeing is Intellect.\footnote{Cf. 5.3.11.1 5, 9 13; 6.7.15.12 14.} For that which grasps anything other than itself is either\footnote{Reading ἢ with HS.\footnote{Reading ἢ with HS.}} sense-perception or intellect. Sense-perception is a line, etc.\footnote{I.e., sense perception is comparable to a line, Intellect to a circle, and the One to the centre of the circle. The text of this line, ἀσθήσην γραμμὴν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα is taken by HS\footnote{With the punctuation from HS\footnote{With the punctuation from HS.} as corrupt.} as corrupt.} But the circle is the sort of thing that can be divided, and Intellect is not like that.

In fact, there is unity here, but the One is the productive power of all things.\footnote{Cf. 5.3.15.31; 5.4.2.38; 6.9.5.36 37.} Intellection observes those things of which the One is the productive power, in a way cutting itself off from that power. Otherwise, it would not have become Intellect – since as soon as it is generated, it has from itself, in a way, its self-awareness of this power, the power to produce Substance. For Intellect, by means of itself, also defines its own existence by the power that comes from the One.\footnote{With the punctuation from HS\footnote{With the punctuation from HS.} Cf. 6.7.15.18 22.}

And, because it is, in a way, a unitary part of what belongs to the One and is the Substance that comes from it, it is strengthened by it and...
brought to perfection as Substance by it and as derived from it. It sees what is in the intelligible world within itself, a sort of division of the indivisible, and is life and thinking and all things, none of which the One is.  

For in this way everything comes from it, because it is not constrained by some shape, for it is one alone. If it were everything, it would be among the Beings. This is why the One is none of the Beings in Intellect, although everything comes from it. For this reason, these things are Substances, for each has already been defined, and each has a sort of shape. Being should not be suspended, in a way, in the indefinite, but fixed by definition and stability. Stability among intelligibles is definition and shape, by means of which they acquire real existence.

‘This is the lineage of this Intellect, worthy of the purest Intellect, born from nowhere else than from the first principle, and, having been generated, at once generating all Beings which are with itself, both all the beauty of the Ideas and all the intelligible gods. And it is full of the Beings it has generated and, in a way, swallows them again by having them in itself and neither letting them fall into matter nor be reared by Rhea – as the mysteries and myths about the gods enigmatically say that Kronos, the wisest god, before the birth of Zeus, holds back in himself what he generates, so that he is full and is like Intellect in satiety.

After this, so they say, being already sated, he generates Zeus, for Intellect, being perfect, generates Soul. For since it is perfect, it had to generate and since it was such a great power, it could not be barren. That which was generated by it could, in this case as well, not be superior to it but had to be an inferior reflection of it, first similarly undefined, and then defined and made a kind of image by that which generated it. The offspring of Intellect is an expressed principle and a real existent, that which thinks discursively. This is what moves around Intellect and is a light and trace of Intellect, dependent on it, on one side attached to Intellect and filled up with it and enjoying it and sharing in it and thinking, and on the other side, attached to the things that came after it, or rather itself generating what is necessarily inferior to Soul. These matters should be discussed later. This is as far as the divine Beings go.

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81 Cf. 5.2.1.5 7; 6.9.3-36 40. 84 Cf. 3.8.9.40; 6.9.2.44 45.
82 5.5.6.1 13. See Pl., Parm. 142B5 6.
83 See Pl., Rep. 547A4 5, quoting Homer, Il. 6.211. 87 The wife of Kronos.
85 Referring to Soul and individual souls. Cf. 4.3.5.9 11.
86 Cf. 5.5.5.14; 6.8.18.15, 23.
88 No particular treatise is clearly indicated here. 2.4 is the most likely possibility.
§5.1.8. And it is also because of this that we get Plato’s threefold division: the things ‘around the king of all’ – he says this, meaning the primary things – ‘second around the secondary things’, and ‘third around the tertiary things’.91 And he says ‘father of the cause’92 meaning by ‘cause’ Intellect.93 For the Intellect is his Demiurge. And he says that the Demiurge makes the Soul in that ‘mixing-bowl’.94 And since the Intellect is cause, he means by ‘father’ the Good, or that which transcends Intellect and ‘transcends Substantiality’.95 Often he calls Being and the Intellect ‘Idea’,96 which shows that Plato understood that the Intellect comes from the Good, and the Soul comes from the Intellect. And these statements of ours are not new nor even recent, but rather were made a long time ago, though not explicitly. The things we are saying now comprise exegeses of those, relying on the writings of Plato himself as evidence that these are ancient views.97

Parmenides previously touched on this doctrine to the extent that he identified Being and Intellect, that is, he did not place Being among sensibles, saying ‘for thinking and Being are identical’.98 And he says that Being is ‘immobile’,99 though he does attach thinking to it, eliminating all corporeal motion from it so that it would remain as it is, likening it to a ‘spherical mass’,100 because it encompasses all things and because thinking is not external to it, but rather within itself. Saying that it was ‘one’ in his own writings,101 he got blamed for saying that this one thing was found to be many.102

Plato’s Parmenides speaks more accurately when he distinguishes from among each other the primary One, which is one in a more proper sense, a second one, which he calls ‘one-many’, and a third one, ‘one and many’.103 In this way, too, he is in harmony with our account of the three natures.

§5.1.9. Anaxagoras, too, in saying that ‘Intellect is pure and unmixed’, is himself positing the first principle as simple and the One as separate,
although he neglects to give an accurate account due to his antiquity. In addition, Heraclitus knew the One to be everlasting and intelligible, since bodies are always coming into being and are ‘in flux’. And for Empedocles, ‘Strife’ divides and ‘Love’ is the One – he himself makes this incorporeal, too – and the elements are posited as matter.

Aristotle later said that the first principle was ‘separate’ and ‘intelligible’, but when he says that ‘it thinks itself’, he no longer makes it the first principle. Further, he makes many other things intelligible – as many as there are spheres in heaven, so that each intelligible moves each sphere – but by doing so he describes intelligibles in a way different from Plato, proposing an argument from plausibility, since he did not have an argument from necessity. One might pause to consider whether it is even plausible, for it is more plausible that all the spheres, contributing to one system, should look to one thing that is the first principle.

And one might enquire if the many intelligibles are, according to him, derived from one first principle, or whether he holds that there are many principles among the intelligibles. And if they are derived from one, it will be clear that it is analogous to the way that, among sensibles, one sphere encompasses another until you reach the outermost one that is dominant. So, in the intelligible world what is first will also encompass everything, that is, there will be an intelligible cosmos. And just as in the sensible world the spheres are not empty, but the first is full of stars, and the others also have stars, so, too, in the intelligible world the movers will have many things within themselves, and the truer Beings will be there. But if each one is a principle, the principles will be an arbitrary collection.

And what will be the explanation for their functioning together and agreeing on a single task, namely, the concord of the entire universe? How can there be equality in number of the sensible spheres

104 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 12 DK, which Plotinus is quoting inexacty; Pl., Phd. 97B8 C2; Ar., Meta. 1.3.984B15 19.
105 See Heraclitus, fr. 22 A 1 DK; Pl., Thet. 152D2 E9, 179D6 183B5; Crat. 402A4 C3, 439B10 440E2; Ar., Meta. 1.6.987A33 34.
106 Cf. 4.4.40.5 6; 6.7.14.19 20. See Empedocles, fr. 31 B 17. 7 8 DK (= 26.5 6); Ar., Meta. 1.8.989A20 21; 12.10.1075B3.
110 Supplying the negative οὐ, which is missing from HS. Cf. supra 4.31 33, 37 39; 5.6; 6.7 37 41.
111 See Ar., Meta. 12.8.1073A28 b1.
112 See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072B23 26, 1072B14, 1074A36 38, 10.1074A36 38.
113 Reading συνεργάζει in l. 24 with Harder.
in heaven in relation to the intelligibles or movers? And how can these incorporeals be many in this way, without matter to separate them?  

So, among the ancients, those who adhered most closely to the doctrines of Pythagoras and his followers, and to those of Pherecydes, held to this account of the nature of things. But some of them worked out this view among themselves in their own writings, while some did not do so in writings but demonstrated it in unwritten discussions or altogether left it alone.

§5.1.10. It has already been shown that it is necessary to believe that things are this way: that there is the One which transcends Being, which is such as the argument strove to show to the extent that it is possible to demonstrate anything about these matters; that next in line is Being and Intellect; and that third is the nature that is Soul.

And just as in nature these aforementioned three are found, so it is necessary to believe as well that these are in us. I do not mean that they are among sensibles – for these three are separate from sensibles – but that they are in things that are outside the sensible order, using the term ‘outside’ in the same manner in which it is used to refer to those things that are outside the whole of heaven. In saying that they belong to a human being, I mean exactly what Plato means by ‘the inner human being’.

So, our soul is something divine and of another nature [i.e., other than sensibles], like the nature of all soul; it is perfect by having intellect. One part of intellect is that which engages in calculative reasoning and one part is that which makes calculative reasoning possible. The calculative reasoning part of soul is actually in need of no corporeal organ for its calculative reasoning, having its own activity in purity in order that it also be possible for it to reason purely. Someone who supposed it to be separate and not mixed with body and in the primary intelligible world would not be mistaken. For we should not search for a place in which to situate it; rather, we should make it outside all place. For this is how it is for that which is by itself, outside and immaterial, whenever it is alone, retaining nothing from the nature of the body. Because of this, Plato says that the Demiurge ‘in addition’ encircled the soul of the universe from ‘outside’, pointing to the part of the soul that

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114 Cf. 2.4.42 7, 14 17. See Ar., Meta. 12.8.1074a31; 14.2.1088b14 28.
115 Probably a reference to Plato’s ‘unwritten teachings’. See Ar., Phys. 4.2.209b11 17, the only explicit reference to such teachings.
118 Cf. supra 3.13. The distinction is between intellect in us and Intellect.
119 See Ar., DA 3.4.429a24 27; Alex. Aphr., De an. 84.10 12.
abides in the intelligible world. In our case, he hid his meaning when he said that it is ‘at the top of our head’. And his exhortation ‘to be separate’ is not meant spatially – for our intellect is separate by nature – but is an exhortation not to incline to the body even by acts of imagination, and to alienate ourselves from the body, if somehow one could lead the remaining part of the soul upwards, or even carry upward that which is situated in the sensible world, that part that alone acts demiurgically on the body and has the job of shaping it and caring for it.

§ 5.1.11. Since, then, there is soul that engages in calculative reasoning about just and beautiful things, that is, calculative reasoning that seeks to know if this is just or if this is beautiful, it is necessary that there exists permanently something that is just, from which the calculative reasoning in the soul arises. How else could it engage in calculative reasoning? And if soul sometimes engages in calculative reasoning about these things and sometimes does not, there must be Intellect that does not engage in calculative reasoning, but always possesses Justice, and there must be also the principle of Intellect and its cause and god. And it must be indivisible and unchanging; and while not changing place, it is seen in each of the many things that can receive it, in a way, as something other. Just as the centre of the circle exists in its own right, but each of the points on the circle contains it in itself, the radii add their unique character to it. For it is by something like this in ourselves that we are in contact with [the One] and are with it and depend on it. And if we converge on it, we would be settled in the intelligible world.

§ 5.1.12. How, then, given that we have such great things in us, do we not grasp them, but rather are mostly inactive with respect to these activities; indeed, some people are altogether inactive?

They are always involved with their own activities – I mean, Intellect and that which is prior to Intellect and eternally in itself, and Soul as well, which is thus ‘always moving’. For not everything in soul is immediately sensible, but it comes to us whenever it comes to our sense-perception. But whenever there is activity that is not being transmitted to the faculty of sense-perception, it has not yet reached the entire soul. We do not yet know it, then, inasmuch as we are the whole soul, including the faculty of sense-perception, not just a part of...
it. Further, each of the parts of the soul, always alive, is always acting by itself with its own object. But cognizing occurs whenever transmission, that is, apprehension, occurs.

So, if there is going to be apprehension of things present in this way, then that which is to apprehend must revert inward, and focus its attention there. Just as if someone were waiting to hear a voice that he wanted to hear, and, distancing himself from other voices, were to prick up his ears to hear the best of sounds, waiting for the time when it will come — so, too, in this case one must let go of sensible sounds, except insofar as they are necessary, and guard the soul’s pure power of apprehension and be ready to listen to the sounds from above.

130 I.e., to our undescended intellects. Cf. 3.4.3.24; 4.3.5.6, 12.3.4; 4.7.10.32 33, 13.1 3; 4.8.4.31 35, 8.8; 6.4.14.16 22; 6.7.5.26 29, 17.26 27; 6.8.6.41 43.
5.2 (11)
On the Generation and Order of the Things Which Come after the First

INTRODUCTION

This brief treatise is a sort of appendix to the previous one, treating of the continuity of the three hypostases. Plotinus here wants to show that the hierarchy beginning with the One and ending with the souls of plants is continuous, meaning primarily that there is nothing that could be that is not and that there could not be another arrangement of the hierarchy from first to last. The threefold principle of generation within the hierarchy is the stability of the higher, its procession to the lower, and the reversion of the lower to the higher.

SUMMARY

§1. The One is all things and no thing. How Intellect comes from the One and Soul from Intellect. How from Soul come individual souls including the lowest types of souls, those of plants.
§2. The superiority of the higher to the lower. The hierarchy of psychical powers from rational beings to animals to plants.
§5.2.1. The One is all things and is not one thing.¹ For it is the principle of all things,² but is not those things, though all things are like it, for they did, in a way, find their way back to the intelligible world, or rather they are not there yet but will be.

How, then, do they arise out of a simple One, given that there is neither apparent variegation nor any doubleness whatsoever in that which is self-identical?³

In fact, it is because there was nothing in it that all things came from it; and, in order that Being should exist, it is itself not Being, but the generator of it. Indeed, this is, in a way, the first act of generation. Since it is perfect, due to its neither seeking anything, nor having anything, nor needing anything, it in a way overflows and its superabundance has made something else.⁴ That which was generated reverted to it and was filled up and became what it is by looking at it, and this is Intellect. The positioning of it in relation to the One produced Being; its gazing upon the One produced Intellect. Since, then, it positions itself in relation to the One in order that it may see, it becomes Intellect and Being at the same time. Intellect, then, being in a way the One and pouring forth abundant power, produces things that are the same as it – Intellect is, after all, an image of the One – just as that which is prior to it in turn pours forth.

And this activity, arising from the substantiality of Intellect, belongs to Soul, which becomes this while Intellect remains still. For Intellect also came to be while that which was before it remained still.⁵ But Soul does not remain still when it produces; rather, being moved, it generated a reflection of itself. It looked to the intelligible world from where it

¹ Cf. 3.8.9.39 54; 3.9.4.3 9; 5.3.11.14 21, 13.2 3; 5.4.2.39 42. See Pl., Parm. 160B2 3.
² Cf. 6.8.8.8 9. ³ Cf. 5.1.6.3 8; 5.4.1.23 28. ⁴ See Pl., Rep. 508B6 7.
⁵ Cf. 6.4.11.16; 6.7.3; 6.7.17.41 42. ⁶ Cf. 5.1.6.40 46, 7.9 17.
came to be, it was filled up, and it proceeded to another and contrary motion, generating a reflection of itself, namely, sense-perception and nature as it is found in plants.\(^7\) Nothing of what is before it is separated or cut off. For this reason, the Soul from above also seems to extend down to plants, for Soul does, after all, extend down in a definite manner, since there is life in plants. Of course, not all of Soul is in plants, but it comes to be in them because of the way it is; it advanced all the way down to them, producing another real existent by its procession and its desire for what is inferior to it.\(^8\) And since the part of Soul prior to this was dependent on Intellect, it leaves Intellect alone to remain by itself.

§5.2.2. There is a procession, then, from the beginning to the end, in which each thing is left in its own place for eternity, and each thing that is generated takes a new inferior rank.\(^9\) And yet each one becomes identical with that upon which it follows, so long as it connects itself with it. Whenever, then, Soul comes to be in a plant, it is like another part of it, a part that is most audacious and unintelligent, having proceeded such a long way. And, then, whenever Soul comes to be in a non-rational animal, the power of sense-perception becomes dominant and brings it there. But whenever Soul comes to be in a human being, Soul's motion is either entirely in the faculty of calculative reasoning, or it comes from Intellect, since an individual soul has its own intellect and a will of its own to think or, generally, to move itself.

Let us actually look into the matter more closely. Whenever someone cuts off the shoots or the tops of plants, where has the soul of the plant gone? Where did it come from? For it has not separated itself spatially. It is, then, in its source. But if you were to cut off or burn the root, where would the soul in the root go? In the soul, for it has not changed place. It could be in the identical place or in another, if it ran back to its source. Otherwise, it is in another plant, for it is not constrained to a place. If it were to go back to its source, it would go back to the power preceding it. But where is that power? In the power preceding it. That takes us back to Intellect, not to a place, for Soul was not in place. And Intellect is even more not in place than Soul, which is not in place either. It is, then, nowhere but in that which is nowhere, and at the same time it is also everywhere. If it proceeded in this way to the upper

\(^7\) Soul generates all psychical functions in living beings other than the higher function of discursive thinking. Cf. 3.4.1.1 3; 4.4.13.1 8; 5.9.6.20.

\(^8\) Here, the use of the term ᾑπόστασις (‘real existent’) for nature is indicative of the fact that Plotinus does not limit the term to the three principal hypostases, One, Intellect, and Soul.

\(^9\) Cf. 3.8.10.4 19; 4.8.6.10. See Pl., Tim. 42E5 6.
region, it would pause in the middle before arriving altogether at the highest, and it has a life in a middle position and has rested in that part of itself.

These things are and are not the One; they are the One, because they are from it; they are not the One, because it endowed them with what they have while remaining in itself. It is, then, in a way like a long life stretched far out, each of its parts different from those that come next, though it makes a continuous whole. The parts are distinguished by being different one from the other, not because the first is destroyed with the appearance of the second. What, then, is the soul that comes to be in plants? Does it generate nothing?

In fact, it generates in that in which it is. We should examine how by taking another starting point.\(^{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) *Cf. 3.4.1 2; 4.4.22.*
On the Knowing Hypostasis and on That Which Is Transcendent

**Introduction**

In this treatise, Plotinus explores the connection between our embodied intellects and the hypostasis Intellect. Following his own general metaphysical principles, but making extensive use of Peripatetic thought, Plotinus argues that intellection in general must be understood according to the paradigmatic activity of Intellect. Plotinus argues that intellection is primarily self-intellection or self-knowledge. Our embodied intellects are images or inferior versions of this. Plotinus will use this principle to respond to the profound attacks of Sceptics on the possibility of knowledge. If Intellect engages in the paradigmatic act of intellection, the question arises regarding intellection in the One. Plotinus will argue that the One is beyond intellection or cognition in general, although this is not a mark of deficiency in it.

**Summary**

§1. Thinking is primarily self-thinking. Primary self-thinking is identical with thinking of intelligibles.

§§2–3. The nature of embodied discursive thinking in relation to sense-perception and intellection.

§4. The ascent from embodied discursive thinking to identification with our disembodied undescended intellect and hence with Intellect itself.

§5. The identification of intellect and intelligibles and how this is self-knowledge.

§6. The dialectical steps leading to the recognition that discursive thinking is an image of disembodied intellection.
§7. The connection between knowledge of the first principle and self-knowledge.
§8. The nature of Intellect’s intellection and how this affects embodied thinking.
§9. Strategies for ascent through the hierarchy of cognition.
§10. Self-knowledge implies complexity in the knower identical with the objects of knowledge. Hence the first principle of all, since it is absolutely simple, cannot have self-knowledge.
§11. How Intellect tries to cognize the One but can necessarily only cognize a multiplicity of its images, namely, all intelligibles.
§12. The absolute priority of the simple to the complex, including the complex self-thinking of Intellect.
§13. The One does not think itself nor can it be the object of thinking.
§14. Although it is not possible to think the One, it is possible to have a sort of awareness of its existence and presence.
§15. How the One produces that which it is not.
§16. The self-sufficiency of the One and its productive power.
§17. The relative self-sufficiency of Intellect. The ascent of the embodied individual to the One or Good.
§5.3.1. Must that which thinks itself be variegated in order that, with some one part of itself contemplating the others, it could indeed be said to think itself, the idea being that, were it altogether simple, it would not be able to revert to itself – that is, there could be no grasping of itself?¹

Or is it possible for that which is not composite to have intellection of itself, too?²

In fact, that which is said to think itself for the reason that it is a composite, just because some one part of itself actually thinks the others – as if we were to grasp in sense-perception our own shape and the rest of our corporeal nature – would not be able truly to think itself. For in this case, it will not be the whole that is known, since the part which thinks all the rest has not also been thinking itself. This will not be a case of 'self-thinking'² which is what was wanted, but a case of one thing thinking another.

So, one should suppose that a grasping of itself belongs to something simple, and seek to discover, if one possibly can, how this occurs, or else relinquish the belief that anything really thinks itself. But relinquishing this belief is completely impossible given that so many absurdities would follow. For even if we should refuse to allow self-thinking to the soul on the grounds that that would be quite absurd, still it would be altogether absurd not to give it to the nature of Intellect, and to claim that, although it has knowledge of other things, it will not be counted as having knowledge or scientific understanding of itself.³

Now it is sense-perception and, if you like, discursive thinking and belief that apprehend externals, but not Intellect, though whether

¹ See Sext. Emp., M. 7.283 287; 310 313 for the argument set out in full. Also, Ar., DA 3.4.429b9, 6.430b25 26.
² See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b19 28, 9.1074b21 23.
³ Throughout this treatise Plotinus uses the generic terms γνώσις γιγνώσκοι, in referring to the mode of cognition that belongs to Intellect. This mode of cognition will be, in fact, the highest mode, elsewhere usually called νοήσις ο Ιπποτήμη.
Intellect has knowledge of them or not should be examined. Clearly, though, everything that is intelligible will be known by Intellect.\(^4\) So, will that which knows these know only these, or itself as well? Or will it, then, know itself in the sense that it knows these things, although it will not know itself? That is to say, will it know that it knows things that belong to it, but it will have no further knowledge of who it is? Or rather will it know both that which is its own and itself? In what manner this occurs and to what extent is something that must be investigated.

§ 5.3.2. First, however, we must examine whether we ought to endow the soul with knowledge of itself, and what in it knows, and how it does it. We should start by saying that its faculty of sense-perception is only of externals, for even if there were some self-awareness of what occurs inside the body, the apprehension would still be of what is outside itself, for it is itself the means by which it perceives states in the body.

As for the part of the soul that engages in calculative reasoning: it makes discriminatory judgements about the semblances presented to it by sense-perception, organizing and distinguishing them.

In fact, in regard to what comes from Intellect, it even considers something like impressions of these, and has the identical power of discrimination in relation to them.\(^5\) And it acquires further comprehension as if by recognizing and matching up those impressions that have been in it from before with new ones recently arrived. And we would certainly call these acts the soul’s ‘recollections’.\(^6\)

And does the intellect which is a part of the soul stop at this point in its power, or does it turn to and know itself? Or is this to be attributed [only] to Intellect? For if we grant self-knowledge to this part of the soul – we shall now call it ‘intellect’ – we shall find ourselves investigating in what way it differs from the higher Intellect. But if we do not give self-knowledge to intellect, the argument will lead us to Intellect, and we shall have to investigate there what ‘self-thinking’ means.

Further, if we should grant it to the intellect in the sensible world, we shall have to investigate the difference between its ‘self-thinking’ and Intellect’s, for if there is none, this intellect will straightway be the ‘unmixed’ Intellect.\(^7\) So, does the soul’s faculty of discursive thinking itself revert to itself? It does not. Rather, it acquires comprehension from the impressions it receives from each of its sources.\(^8\) And how it acquires comprehension is the matter that should be first investigated.

\(^{4}\) Because intelligibles are not ‘outside of’ Intellect. Cf. 5.5.

\(^{5}\) Cf. 1.1.7-9 14; 4.3.30.1 15.

\(^{6}\) Cf. infra 16.45 47. See Pl., Pbd. 72E5; Men. 81E4; Alcinous, Didask. 154.40 155.12.

\(^{7}\) See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 A 15 DK; Ar., DA 1.2. 405a16 17.

\(^{8}\) I.e., sense perception and Intellect.
§5.3.3. So, then, sense-perception saw a human being and gave the impression to discursive thinking. What does discursive thinking say?  

In fact, it says nothing yet, but rather just became cognizant and stopped at that. Unless, that is, it were to converse with itself and say, ‘Who is this?’ assuming it had met this human being before, and would then say, relying on its memory, that this is Socrates. And if it analyses the shape, it is dividing up what the imagination has given it. And if it should say whether he is good, it says this based on what it has become cognizant of through sense-perception, but what it says about these things it would already have in itself, since it has a rule about the Good in itself. How does it have the Good in itself?  

In fact, it is Good-like, and is fortified for the sense-perception of this sort of thing by Intellect illuminating it. For this is the purified part of the soul, and it receives the traces of Intellect that have been impressed on it.  

Why, then, is this not what Intellect is, and all the other faculties, starting with the perceptual, are what soul is? Is it not because soul has to be involved in acts of calculative reasoning? For all of these acts are the functions of a faculty of calculative reasoning. But, then, why should we not just put an end to the matter by endowing this part with self-thinking? Is it not because we already endowed it with the job of examining externals and busying itself with them, whereas we judge that it belongs to Intellect to examine and busy itself with its own affairs, that is, the things that are internal to it? But if someone says, ‘What, then, prevents this part from examining things internal to it by another power?’ he is not asking about the faculty of discursive thinking or calculative reasoning; rather, he has in view pure Intellect.  

What, then, prevents pure Intellect from being in soul? We will say, ‘Nothing’. But should we say in addition that Intellect belongs to soul? What we will say is that it does not belong to soul, though we will say that it is our intellect; and though it is other than the faculty of discursive thinking, having gone upward, nevertheless it is ours even if we were not to count it among the parts of the soul.  

In fact, it is ours and not ours. For this reason, we use it and do not use it, though we always make use of discursive thinking. It is ours when we use it and not ours when we do not.  

What, then, does ‘using it’ actually mean? Is it when we ourselves become it or speak as Intellect does? Or is it rather when we do so in

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9 The ‘impression’ is identical to the ‘semblance’ of 2.8 supra.
10 See Pl., Tht. 189E6 7; Soph. 263E4.
12 See Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 112.18.
13 Cf. 1.1.11.2 8; 2.0.2.4 10; 6.4.14.25 26.
accord with Intellect? For we are not Intellect. We are, then, in accord with it by the faculty of calculative reasoning that is first receptive of Intellect. For we perceive by means of sense-perception even if we are not ourselves perceivers. Is it, then, that we think discursively in this way, that is, we think by means of Intellect in this way?

In fact, we ourselves are the ones engaged in calculative reasoning, and we ourselves think the thoughts by our discursive thinking. For this is what we are.  

The results of the acts of Intellect are from above just as the acts arising from sense-perception are from below. We are this – the sovereign part of the soul – in the middle between two powers, a worse and a better one, the worse being that of sense-perception and the better being Intellect. But it has been conceded that sense-perception seems to be always ours, for we are always perceiving; whereas Intellect is disputed, because we do not always use it, and because it is separate. And it is separate due to its not inclining towards us, whereas we rather are looking upward to it. Sense-perception is our messenger, but Intellect ‘is our king’.

§ 5.3.4. But we are kings, too, whenever we are in accord with Intellect. We can be in accord with it in two ways: either by, in a way, having its writings written in us like laws or by being in a way filled up with it and then being able to see it or perceive it as being present. And, due to this vision, we know ourselves when we learn about other things, either through the faculty of knowledge itself, because we learn about other things by means of it, or because we become what we learn, so that one who knows himself is double, one part knowing the nature of the discursive thinking of the soul, the other knowing that which is above this, namely, the part which knows itself according to the Intellect that it has become.

Further, in thinking himself again, due to Intellect, it is not as a human being that he does so, but as having become something else completely and dragging himself into the higher region, drawing up only the better part of the soul, which alone can acquire the wings for intellection, in order that there be someone who could be entrusted with what he sees in the intelligible world.

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14 Cf. 1.1.7.9 17. 15 See Ar., EN 10.7.1178a2.
16 The word δύναμις (‘power’) could well be translated as ‘faculty’ when applied to sense perception. It could also be used for a faculty of embodied intellect, but is awkwardly applied to Intellect itself which is not a faculty of anything.
17 See Ar., DA 3.5.430a17. 18 See Pl., Phil. 28C7. 19 See Ar., DA 3.4.430a1.
20 Eliminating HS’s σύνεσις.
21 See Pl., Phdr. 246B7 C2. The reference to the Phaedrus myth suggests that the ‘better part of the soul’ is the faculty of discursive thinking.
Is it actually the case that the faculty of discursive thinking does not see that it is the faculty of discursive thinking, and that it acquires comprehension of externals, and that it discerns what it discerns, and that it does so by internal rules, rules which it derives from Intellect, and that there is something better than it that seeks nothing but rather, in fact, has everything? But after all, does it not know what it itself is just when it has scientific understanding of what sort of thing it is and what its functions are? If, then, it were to say that it comes from Intellect and is second after Intellect and an image of Intellect, having in itself in a way all its writings, since the one who writes and has written is in the intelligible world, will one who knows himself in this way halt at these, but we, by using another faculty, observe again Intellect knowing itself; or, by sharing in Intellect, since it belongs to us and we to it, shall we in this way know Intellect and ourselves?

In fact, it is necessary that we know it in this way, if indeed we are going to know what ‘self-thinking’ is for the Intellect. Someone has himself indeed become Intellect when he lets go of the other things that belong to him, and looks at Intellect with Intellect; he then looks at himself with himself. It is, then, actually as Intellect that he sees himself.

§ 5.3.5. Does Intellect, then, with one part of itself observe another part of itself? But in that case, one part will be seeing, and one part will be seen; this is not, however, ‘self-thinking’. What if, then, the whole is comprised of parts that are, in a way, of the same kind, so that the part that sees does not differ at all from the part that is seen? For in this way the part of itself that is seeing that which is identical with it sees itself – since that which sees does not differ from that which is seen.

In fact, first of all, the division of itself is absurd, for how does it divide? Indeed, it does not do so by chance. And what is it that is doing the dividing anyway? Is it the part that assigns to itself the task of seeing or the part that belongs to what is seen?

Next, how will that which is seeing know itself in that which is seen when it is undertaking for itself the task of seeing? For the seeing was not in that which is seen.

In fact, if it knows itself in this way, it will think itself as that which is being seen and not as that which sees, so that it will neither know all of itself nor know itself as a whole. For what it saw was what was seen; it did

Reading ἑδε as per HS and the mss.  

See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b20.  

I.e., in knowing what Intellect is, we know what it is to be Intellect.  

Returning to the problem raised by Sext. Emp., M. 7.310 312.
not see the seeing. And in this way it will be something else, and not itself, that it is seeing.

Or perhaps it will add from itself that which has seen, too, in order that it would be thinking of itself perfectly. But if it adds that which has seen, at the same time it also adds the things seen. If, then, the things that have been seen exist in the seeing, either they are impressions of them, and it does not have them themselves; or it has them, but not by the seeing that is a result of a division of itself; rather, it was prior to dividing itself that it saw and had them. If this is so, the seeing must be identical with the seen, that is, Intellect must be identical with the intelligible, because if they are not identical, there will not be truth, for that which possesses things different from Beings, will have an impression, which is not truth. The truth, therefore, should not be about something different from itself; rather, what it says is what it is. In this way, therefore, Intellect and that which is intelligible are one; and this is primary Being and indeed primary Intellect which has the Beings, or rather which is identical with them.

But if intellection and that which is intelligible are one, how will this be the explanation for the fact that that which thinks, thinks itself? For though intellection will, in a way, encompass that which is intelligible, or will be identical with that which is intelligible, it is not yet clear how Intellect will be thinking itself. But if intellection and that which is intelligible are identical – for the intelligible is a certain kind of actuality; it is neither a potency nor something without thought, nor is it separated from life, nor are life and thinking added to it by something that is other than it in the way that they might be added to a stone or to something inanimate – then the intelligible is primary Substantiality. If, then, it is actuality, that is, the primary actuality and indeed the most beautiful, it would be intellection, that is, Substantial intellection. For it is most true. And such intellection, actually being primary and primarily Intellect, would be the primary Intellect, for neither is this Intellect in potency nor is it one thing and its intellection another. For if it were, again, the Substantial part of it would be in potency.

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26 Cf. 5.5.2.18 20, 3.50 25. See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b21; DA 3.4.429b9, 6.430b25. 26.
27 Cf. 1.4.6.10; 3.8.8; 2.9.1.46 51; 3.8.8 11; 5.1.8.7; 5.6.1.4 13; 5.9.5.6 10; 6.6.15.
19 24; 6.7.41.18; 6.9.2.36 37. See Parmenides, fr. 28 B 3 DK.
28 See Ar., DA 3.4.430a2 9.
29 See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b27.
30 Cf. 4.7.3.23 29. See Pl., Soph. 246A8.
31 The phrase οὐσιώδης νόησις ('Substantial intellection') could be glossed as ‘the kind of intellection belonging to Substance’.
32 See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1074d33 35.
If, then, it is actuality, that is, the substantiality of it is actuality, it would be one and identical with its actuality. But Being, or that which is intelligible, is also one with that actuality. All will be simultaneously one; Intellect, intellection, and intelligible. If, then, its intellection is that which is intelligible, and the intelligible is it, it will, therefore, be thinking itself, for it will think by its intellection, which it is, and it will think that which is intelligible, which it is. In both ways, therefore, it will think itself; because it is intellection and because it is that which is intelligible – that which it thinks by the intellection – which is what it itself is.

§5.3.6. The argument has indeed demonstrated that ‘self-thinking’ in the proper sense exists. Thinking, then, does occur in the soul, though it more properly occurs in Intellect. The soul thought itself because it belongs to something else, whereas Intellect thought because it is itself, that is, because it is the sort of thing it is or whatever it is, starting from its own nature and then reverting upon itself. For seeing Beings, it saw itself; and in seeing, it was in actuality, and the actuality was it. For Intellect and intellection are one. And the whole thinks by means of the whole, not one part by means of another.

Has this argument shown itself also to have, in some way, persuasive force?

In fact, it has the force of necessity, though it is not persuasive. For necessity is in Intellect, but persuasion is in soul. But it does seem as if we are actually seeking more to persuade ourselves than to see the truth by means of pure Intellect, for while we were up in the nature of Intellect, we were content, and we were thinking, and, gathering all things into one, we saw. For it was Intellect doing the thinking and speaking about itself, whereas the soul was tranquil and ceded to the result of the actualization of Intellect. But since we have come to be in the sensible world again in soul, we are seeking for some kind of persuasion to arise, wanting to see the archetype in a sort of image. Perhaps, then, we ought to teach this soul of ours how Intellect sees itself, and to teach this part of soul that is somehow intellectual, supposing it to be a ‘faculty of discursive thinking’, a term which signals that it is some sort of intellect or that soul has this faculty due to Intellect and from Intellect.

So, it belongs to the faculty of discursive thinking to know that it knows the things which it sees by itself and that it knows what it is speaking about. And if it were itself what it is speaking about, it would

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33 See Pl., Lg. 903B1. 34 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 12 DK. 35 See Pl., Phdr. 244B C, 266B. 36 That the soul is ‘discursive’ (διανοητικόν) is ‘due to Intellect’ (διὰ νοῦ).
know itself in this way. And since the things it is speaking about are above or come to it from the intelligible world, where it came from itself, it might also happen that it would know itself by its being an expressed principle and receiving things that are akin to it and fitting them to the traces in itself.

So, let us transfer the image to the true Intellect, which was identified with the truths being thought, those that are really Beings and primary, both because it is not possible that something like this could be outside itself\textsuperscript{37} – so that if it is indeed in itself and with itself and just what it is, it is Intellect – for an Intellect without thought could not exist – and it is necessary that the knowledge of itself accompanies it – and because it is in itself and the function and Substantiality for it is nothing other than to be Intellect alone. For it is, of course, not practical intellect, which looks to externals and does not remain in itself, and has a kind of knowledge of externals. If it were indeed entirely practical, it would not be necessary for it to know itself. But in that in which there is no action – for pure Intellect has no desire for that which is absent from it – the reversion to itself demonstrates not only that it is reasonable but also that it is necessary that it should have knowledge of itself. For if action is removed from it, what else would the life of that which is in Intellect be?\textsuperscript{38}

§5.3.7. We could say that Intellect contemplates god. But if someone will agree that it knows god, he will be compelled to concede that in this way it also knows itself. For it will know all such things as it has from god, that is, what he has given and what he has the power to do.\textsuperscript{39} Learning these and knowing them, it will in this way know itself, because it is itself one of the things that have been given – or, rather, it is all the things that have been given. If, then, it will know god by learning his powers,\textsuperscript{40} it will also know itself, since it is come from the intelligible world and has been provided from there with what it has the power to do. But if it is powerless to see god clearly, since seeing is, perhaps, the very thing that is seen, in this way especially it would be left to it to see and know itself, if this seeing is identical with that which is seen.

What else could we give to it? Stillness, by Zeus. But for Intellect, stillness is not a self-transcending experience; rather, the stillness of Intellect is an activity free from occupation with other things. In the case of other things, too, which have stillness when they are apart from

\textsuperscript{37} Cf. supra 5.21 23.  \textsuperscript{38} See Ar., EN 10.8.1078b20 21; Meta. 12.9.1074b18.
\textsuperscript{39} The One is δύναμις τῶν πάντων. Cf. infra 15.32 33, 16.2 3; 5.1.7-9 10; 5.4.2.38 39; 6.9.5.36 37.
\textsuperscript{40} Reading αὐτοῦ with HS\textsuperscript{1}.
rest, their own proper activity remains, especially those things whose existence is not potential but actual. The existence of Intellect, then, is activity, and there is nothing else to which the activity is directed. It is, therefore, directed to itself. In thinking itself, therefore, it is in this way directed to itself and has its activity within itself. For if something comes from it, this will be due to its being in itself and directed towards itself. For it first had to be in itself and next directed towards something else, or something else must have come from it, having been made the same as it. Similarly, fire, which is first fire within itself and, having the activity of fire, is able to produce a trace of itself in another.

And, again, Intellect is an activity within itself, whereas for soul, as much of it as is directed to Intellect is in a way inside, but as much as is outside Intellect is directed to what is outside it. One part of soul is made into a likeness of that from which it comes, whereas the other, not being a likeness, is nevertheless made to be a likeness of that from which it comes even while it is in the sensible world, whether it be by acting or doing; for when it does something it is, nevertheless, contemplating, and in doing something it makes forms, which are, in a way, detached acts of intellection, so that all things are traces of intellection and of Intellect proceeding according to the archetype and imitating it; the ones closer more so, while the ones furthest away preserve a murky image.

§5.3.8. What sort of thing does Intellect see when it sees the intelligible, and what sort of thing when it sees itself?

In fact, one should not seek the intelligible as if it were the colour or the shape of a body, for the intelligibles exist prior to these. And the expressed principle in the seeds that produce these colours or shapes is not identical with them. For by nature even these are invisible; even more so are the intelligibles. And the nature of the intelligibles and of those things which have them is identical, as is the expressed principle in the seeds and the soul that has them.

The soul, however, does not see what it has, for it did not generate them but is itself a reflection, as are the expressed principles, whereas that from which the soul came is clear and true and primary and belongs to itself and is for itself. But this reflection, if it did not come to be from another thing and exist in another thing, does not even last: ‘for it

41 ἐνέργεια is translated as ‘actuality’ when it is used in contrast to ‘potentiality’ or ‘potency’ but ‘activity’ when there is no such implied contrast.
42 Cf. 6.7.40.14; 6.8.4.26 28.
43 Cf. 5.1.6.30 34; 5.4.2.27 33; 6.7.18.5 6.21.4 6.40.21 24.
44 Reading ἀπηρτημένας with Theiler.
45 Cf. 3.8.3.3 23.
46 I.e., Intellect and intellects.
belongs to an image, as coming from something else, to be in something else’, 47 unless it is dependent on that from which it came. For this reason, soul does not see, inasmuch as it actually does not have enough light, and even if it does see, it sees another thing that is realized in another, and it does not see itself.

But there is, then, nothing of these things in the intelligible world; rather, seeing and the object of sight are together in it, and the object of sight is the same sort of thing as the seeing, and the seeing is the same sort of thing as the object of sight. Who, then, will say what sort of thing it is? The one who sees. But it is Intellect that sees. Even in the sensible world, seeing, since it is light or, rather, united with light, sees light, for it sees colours. But in the intelligible world, seeing is not by means of something different; rather, it is by means of itself, because it is not of what is outside it. Intellect thus sees one light with another, not by means of another. Light, therefore, sees another light; therefore, it sees itself.

And this light shone in the soul and illuminated it, that is, made it intellectual; that is, it made it to be a likeness of itself by means of the upper light. This is, then, in a way, the trace of light that came to be in the soul, and if you believe that it is like this and even more beautiful and greater and clearer, you would come closer to the nature of Intellect and of the intelligible. And again, having illuminated this, it gave the soul a clearer life, but not a generative one. On the contrary, it made the soul revert to itself and did not allow it to be scattered; rather, it made it love the splendour in itself. It is surely not a life of sense-perception, for sense-perception looks outside itself and perceives, whereas that which acquires the light of true Beings sees visible beings better but in the opposite sense of ‘visible’. 48

So, what remains is for it to have acquired an intellectual life, a trace of the life of Intellect. For the intelligible world is where the true Beings are. But the life or activity in Intellect 49 is the primary light, being an illumination primarily for itself and gleaming for itself, illuminating and being illuminated at the same time, that which is truly intelligible, that is, thinker and what is thought, seeing by itself and in need of nothing else in order to see, sufficient to itself for seeing – for what it sees is itself – known even by us due to that light, since the knowledge of it has come to us by means of that. How else could we speak about it? Intellect is such that while it apprehends itself more clearly, we apprehend it by means of it.

47 See Pl., Tim. 52C2 4.
48 Eliminating the οὐ of HS². The ‘non visible’ is more ‘visible’ to Intellect.
49 See Ar., Meta. 12.7. 1072b27.
By means of these arguments, our soul, too, goes back up to it, supposing itself to be an image of it, so that its life is a reflection and likeness of it, and whenever it thinks, it becomes god-like, that is, ‘Intellect-like’.\(^5\) And if one were to ask the soul, ‘What sort of thing is the Intellect that is perfect and complete and that knows itself primarily?’, it would actually use itself as evidence, referring to things of which it possessed memories, since it was originally in Intellect, or ceded its activity to Intellect. So, it is in some way able to see Intellect because it is a kind of image of it, an image which is likened to it as closely as any part of the soul can come to being like Intellect.

§ 5.3.9. It appears, then, that one who intends to know what Intellect is should observe soul, especially the most divine part of it. This could perhaps occur in the following way: if you first separated in thought the body from the human being, I mean, from yourself, and next the [lower] soul that shapes the body and, of course, all sense-perception, appetites, and passions and other such irrelevancies,\(^5\) since these all tend towards the mortal, what actually remains of soul is this: that which we called an image of Intellect,\(^5\) preserving something of its light – in a way, like the light of the sun which shines around it and out of it, beyond its spherical mass.

Now no one would allow that the light of the sun exists on its own around the sun, emitted and then remaining around it, and that successive rays of light proceed from the ones before until the light reaches us on earth. Rather, one would suppose everything that is around the sun is in something else, so that one did not allow there to be an interval empty of body beyond the sun. But the soul, having arisen from Intellect as a light around it, is dependent on it and is neither in something else, but rather is around Intellect, nor in place, for Intellect is not. Hence, the sun’s light is in air, whereas such a soul is pure, so that it is able to see itself by itself and by any other soul of the same kind.

And soul ought to draw conclusions about Intellect, starting its investigation from itself, though Intellect itself knows itself without drawing conclusions about itself, for it is always present to itself, whereas we are only so when we are directed towards it. For our life has been fragmented, that is, we have many lives, whereas Intellect has no need of another life or of other lives, since what it provides it provides to others, not to itself. For it neither has need of what is inferior to it, nor does it provide to itself that which is less when it has everything, nor

\(^5\) Cf. 1.2.3.11 30. See Pl., Pbd. 95C5; Tbt. 176B.
\(^5\) Cf. supra 4.22 24; 8.46; 2.9.4.25; 5.1.3.7; 6.1.7.1.
does it have traces of primary Beings, since it has the originals. More precisely, it does not have them, but is them itself.

If, however, someone is unable to grasp a soul such as this, one that thinks purely, let him grasp a soul which has beliefs, and next let him ascend from this. But if he cannot do even this, let him take sense-perception, which provides the forms in the broader sense, but sense-perception in itself with its powers and already immersed in the forms. Or if someone wants, let him descend to the generative soul and keep going until he arrives at the things it produces. Then, when he is there, let him ascend from the forms that are at one extreme to the Forms that are at the other extreme, or rather to the primary ones.

§5.3.10. These remarks are, then, sufficient for this matter. If there were only things produced, there would be nothing at the other extreme. But in the intelligible world, things that produce are primary, and it is as a result of this that they are primary. That which is primary, then, must at the same time be that which produces, that is, they both must be one. If they were not, there will have to be another.

What, then? Will there not be a need, again, for something that transcends Intellect? Or is this Intellect?

What, then? Does it not see itself?

In fact, this is not in need of seeing. But this will be treated later.

Let us now say again – for the examination is ‘not about some trivial matter’ – and it should be reiterated that this Intellect needs to see itself, or rather that it has the seeing of itself, first by being a many, next by belonging to something else, and from necessity being capable of seeing, and of seeing that other thing, and its seeing is its substantiality. For seeing must be of some other thing that exists, and if that does not exist, seeing is in vain. So, it must be more than one, in order that there should be seeing, and the seeing must coincide with the seen, and that which is seen by it must be a multiplicity within a totality. For that which is one in every way has nothing on which it will act, but being ‘alone and isolated’ it will in every way be stable. For insofar as it acts, there is one thing and then another. If there were not one thing and another, what will it produce? Or where will it direct itself? For this reason, that which acts must be acting on something else, or it itself must be a ‘many’ if it intends to act within itself.

If, though, something does not direct itself towards another, it will be stable. But when there is total stability, it will not think. So, that which thinks must, whenever it thinks, be a duality, and either one of these is

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53 I.e., the activity of embodied intellection. See Alcinous, Didask. 165.16 19.
54 Cf. 4.4.23–32; 4.5.2.48 49.
55 Cf. infra 11 13.
57 See Pl., Phil. 63B7 8.
outside the other or both are in the identical thing, and the intellection always of necessity involves difference and identity. And the things that are principally thought are identical and different in relation to Intellect.58

And, again, each of the things that are thought brings with it this identity and difference; otherwise, what will it think if it does not have one thing and another? For if each one is an expressed principle, then each is many. So, it learns about itself by being a variegated eye or by being composed of variegated colours. For if it directed itself to an object that was one and without parts, it would be without an account of it. For what would it have to say or to understand about it? For also if that which is totally without parts should need to speak about itself, it must first say that which is not. So, in this way, it would be many in order to be one. When it, then, says ‘I am this’, if the ‘this’ means something other than itself, it will be wrong. But if it is referring to something that belongs to it, it will say that it is many or it will say ‘am am’ or ‘I I’.59

What, then, if it were only two and should say, ‘I and this’?

In fact, in that case it would necessarily be many already. For from the two, assuming they are different in any way, number immediately follows and many other things, too.60 So, that which is thinking must be different and grasp that which is different and that which is thought has to be understood as being variegated. Otherwise, there will not be intellection of it, but only a touching and a sort of inexpressible contact without thought.61 The act that is prior to thinking is when Intellect has not yet come to be, and the touching when there is not yet thinking. But that which is thinking must not itself remain simple, especially insofar as it thinks itself. For it divides itself even if it offers silence as comprehension.

Next, it62 will not need a sort of meddling with itself. For what will it learn by thinking? For prior to thinking, that which is in itself will exist. For, again, knowledge is a certain type of longing and in a way a discovery of what has been sought. So, that which is altogether different remains turned towards itself, and seeks nothing in regard to itself, whereas that which analyses itself would also be many.

§5.3.11. For this reason, this Intellect, which is multiple, whenever it wants to think that which is transcendent, thinks it as one, but, wanting to attain it in its simplicity, ends up always grasping something else

58 See Pl., Soph. 254D E; Tim. 35A.
59 See Pl., Soph. 251B7 C2.
60 See Pl., Parm. 142C7 144E7.
61 With the punctuation of HS: ἄπτετο, ἀλλά.
62 Cf. 6.7.6.3 5, 39.19 20; 6.9.4.25 27, 8.19 29. See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b21.
63 This probably refers to Intellect on the hypothesis that it is absolutely simple.
pluralized in itself.\(^\text{64}\) As a result, it impelled itself towards it not as Intellect, but as sight that is not yet seeing, and when it stopped, it possessed what it itself had pluralized, so that whereas it longed for something else having in an undefined way something like a semblance, when it stopped it grasped something else in itself, making it multiple. For, in addition, it has an impression of that which is seen; otherwise, it would not have permitted it to come to be in itself. But this became a multiple from a one, and in this way, in cognizing it, it knew itself, and then it became sight that sees.\(^\text{65}\) This is already Intellect when it has it, and it has it as Intellect. Prior to this, it was only desire and a sight that is without an impression. This Intellect, then, attained it, but when it grasped it, it became Intellect, always in need,\(^\text{66}\) and when it thought, it became Intellect and Substance and intellection; prior to this, there was no intellection since it did not have an intelligible, nor was it Intellect since it was not yet thinking.

That which is prior to these is their principle, but not as existing in them.\(^\text{67}\) For that which exists in something is not that from which it comes, but that out of which it is made. That from which each thing comes is not that thing, but is different from all that out of which it is made. So, it is not some one thing among all things, but prior to all things, which means that it is prior to Intellect. For all things are internal to Intellect.\(^\text{68}\) And even if what comes after it has the status belonging to that of all things, for this reason, too, it is prior to all things. Indeed, it must not be one of these things since it is prior to them, nor should you call it ‘Intellect’.

Neither, then, should you call it ‘the Good’; if ‘the Good’ indicates some one thing among all things, it is not this. If it indicates that which is prior to all things, let it be so named. If, then, Intellect is Intellect because it is multiple, and if thinking pluralizes it, being a sort of addition to it, even if this comes from itself, that which is in every way simple and first of all must ‘transcend Intellect’.\(^\text{69}\) For if it thinks, it will not transcend Intellect, but it will be Intellect. But if it is Intellect, it, too, will be a multiplicity.

§5.3.12. But what prevents Intellect from being a multiplicity in this way, so long as it is, uniquely, Substance? For a multiplicity is not a set of composites, but its activities are the multiplicity. But if its activities

\(^{64}\) Cf. 3.8.8.31 33; 6.7.15.21 22.  
\(^{65}\) Cf. 3.8.11.1 2; 5.1.5.17 19; 5.4.2.44 46.  
\(^{66}\) Reading ἐνδείξησις as suggested by Igal.  
\(^{67}\) Cf. 3.8.9.39 54; 3.9.4.3 9; 5.2.1.1 2, 13.2.3; 5.4.2.39 42; 6.1.18.13; 6.7.14.11.  
\(^{68}\) The generic ‘all things’ (τὰ πάντα) here implicitly refers to the paradigmatic or archetypical status of all things in Intellect.  
are not Substances, but come to actuality from potentiality, it is not a multiplicity, but is, on the other hand, incomplete until it acts according to its substantiality. But if its substantiality is activity, its activity is the multiplicity, and its substantiality will be as much as its multiplicity. But we allow this to Intellect, to which we also attribute thinking, but not to the principle of all. For the One has to exist prior to the many, and the many comes from it. 70 For in number, that which is one is first of all.

But they speak about number just in this way. For the number series is a composition of things in order, whereas in the case of Beings, what is the necessity for there to be a one already here from which the many comes? But in that case, the many will be dispersed, one going here and one there into a composition according to chance. They will say, though, that the activities proceed from a simple Intellect which is one. 72 They are thereby positing something simple which is prior to the activities.

Next, they will posit the activities as remaining forever or existing forever. But they will be existents which are different from Intellect, from which they arise; and, while it remains simple, what comes from it is itself a multiplicity and is dependent on it. For if these exist starting from the point when Intellect began acting, there will be a multiplicity in the intelligible world, too. But if they are themselves the primary activities, and they produce the secondary ones, they allow that which is prior to these activities to be on its own and remain still; and they turn over to what is secondary the activities which arise from the primary activities. 73 For the Intellect is one thing, and the activities which arise from it another, because it was not [on this hypothesis] acting. If this is not the case, Intellect will not be the primary activity. For it is not as if the One desired that Intellect should come to be, and next Intellect came to be, with the desire for it midway between the One and the Intellect that was generated. But the One did not desire anything, for if it did, it would be incomplete and the desire would not have anything to desire. Nor, again, could it have one part of that which it desired and not have another, for there would be nothing to which the motion outward could be directed.

70 Cf. 5.1.5.6 9; 5.6.3.2 3.
71 Perhaps a reference to Peripatetics who are probably the focus of the previous paragraph.
72 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 A 55 (= Ar., DA 1.2.405a15 19). Also, Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 109.27 110.3.
73 This sentence appears to be corrupt. We follow Igal in reading εἰδόσσαι in l. 23, εἰδόσσαι and ἀν παραχωρήσειαν in line 25.
But it is clear that if something came into existence after the One, it came to be while ‘it remained in its accustomed state’. It must, then, if anything else is to exist, conduct itself in stillness throughout. If this were not so, it would either move itself prior to something being moved and think prior to there being thinking, or else its primary activity will be incomplete, being only an impulse. On what should it fix its impulse, then, as if it were missing something?

If we are going to commit to an analogy, we will say that Intellect and the intelligible nature in its totality is the activity flowing from the One in a way like light from the sun. The One is seated at the summit of the intelligible, ‘ruling’ over it, without any manifestation going out from it – or else we will make another light prior to light; rather, it shines forth while it remains forever still above the intelligible. For that which comes from it is not cut off from it, nor is it, again, identical with it, nor is it the sort of thing not to be Substance nor, again, is it the sort of thing to be blind, but it sees and knows itself and is the first knower. But just as that which transcends Intellect transcends knowing, not being in need of anything, it is thus not in need of knowing. But knowing is in the second nature. For knowing is some one thing. The One is without the ‘something’. For if it were some one thing, it would not be the One itself. For the ‘itself’ is prior to the ‘something’.  

§5.3.13. For this reason, the One is, in truth, ineffable, for whatever you might say about it, you will be saying something. But to say ‘transcends all things and transcends the majesty of Intellect’ is, among all other ways of speaking of it, the only true one, not because that is its name, but because it indicates that it is not ‘something’ among all things, it having itself no designation. But, as far as possible, we try to give ourselves indications about it.

But if we raise as a problem that it has, then, no perception of itself and is not consciously aware of itself and does not know itself, we ought to consider that in saying this we are turning ourselves around to the opposite claim. For we make it many if we make it knowable and knowledge, and, if we endow it with thinking, we put it in need of thinking. But even if thinking were to belong to it, it will be superfluous for it to think. And this is because, in general, thinking seems to be a self-awareness of the whole when many parts come together in the identical thing, that is, whenever something thinks itself, which is actually thinking in the principal sense. Each part of this whole is itself some one thing.

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79 Cf. 5.56.1 8. See Pl., *Parm.* 142A3. 80 Cf. 6.7.38.10.
and seeks nothing, whereas if intellection is to be of that which is outside it, it will be deficient and will not be thinking in the principal sense.

Now that which is completely simple and self-sufficient is really in need of nothing.\(^{81}\) That which is self-sufficient in a secondary sense, needing itself, needs this for thinking itself. And that which is deficient in regard to itself has produced self-sufficiency in the whole with an adequacy arising from all the parts, being present to itself and inclining towards itself, for self-awareness is a perception of something that is many; even the word is a witness to this.\(^{82}\)

And intellection, being prior, reverts inward to Intellect, which is clearly many. For even if it says only this, ‘I am Being’, it says it as one discovering something – and it says it with good reason, for Being is many. This is so, since if it were to focus on itself as something simple and say ‘I am Being’, it would hit upon neither itself nor Being. For it is not saying it is Being in the way it speaks the truth when it says a stone has being, but it has said many things in one word. For this Being which is said to be real Being and not to have a mere trace of Being – which would not even be said to be a being because of this, but as an image in relation to an archetype – has many things.

What, then? Will not each of these Beings be thought? Now if you want to grasp the ‘isolated and alone’,\(^{83}\) you will not be thinking. On the contrary, Being itself is many within itself, and if you should mention something else, Being includes that. But if this is so, then if there is something that is the simplest of all, it will not be intellection of itself. For if it is, it will do it by being many. Neither, then, is the One thinking, nor is it intellection of itself.

§ 5.3.14. How, then, do we speak about it?

In fact, we do speak in some measure about it, but we do not speak it, nor do we have knowledge or intellection of it.

How, then, do we speak about it if we do not have knowledge or intellection of it?\(^{84}\)

In fact, if we do not have knowledge of it, does it follow as well that we do not have it at all? But we have it in such a way that we can speak about it, though we cannot speak it. For we say what it is not; what it is, we do not say, so that we are speaking about it on the basis of things posterior to it. We are not prevented from having it, even if we do not say it.

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\(^{81}\) Cf. 6.9.6.16 26.

\(^{82}\) The Greek word is συναισθησις where the prefix συν indicates a complex act, something beyond mere sensation.

\(^{83}\) Cf. 6.7.40.28. See Pl., Phil. 63B7 8.

\(^{84}\)  See Pl., Parm. 142A5 6.
But just as those who are inspired and possessed have knowledge to the extent that they know that they have something greater than themselves in themselves, even if they do not know what it is, and from the things by which they are moved and speak they acquire a certain perception of that which moved them although their motions are different from what moved them – in this way we, too, are related to the One, whenever we possess purified Intellect. We thereby have it revealed to us not only that this is the inner Intellect, which gives Substantiality and whatever else belongs to this level of Being, but also that the One is, therefore, such as not to be those Beings; it is something more powerful than that which we call ‘Being’, but it is also more and greater than what can be said about it, because it is more powerful than speech and intellect and sense-perception, and because it provides these, not being them itself.

§ 5.3.15. But how does it provide these? Either by having them or by not having them. But how can it provide what it does not have? But if it has them, it is not simple. If, on the other, it does not have them, how can the multiplicity of things come from it? Someone might perhaps grant that one simple thing came from it – though even then one should enquire into how this could come from what is absolutely one. But nevertheless, even if it is possible to speak about how it comes from the One in something like the way that radiance comes from light – still, how do many things come from it?

In fact, that which was to come from the One is not identical with it. If, then, it is not identical, it is not better either. For what could be better than the One or transcend it entirely? It is, therefore, worse. And this means that it is more in need. What, then, is more in need than the One?

In fact, it is that which is not one. It is, therefore, many, though, nevertheless, desirous of the One. It is, therefore, a ‘one-many’. For everything that is not one is preserved by the One and is whatever it is due to this. For if it has not become one, even if it is composed out of many parts, it is not yet that which someone could speak of as ‘itself’.

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85 See Pl., Ion 533E6 7.
86 Correcting the typographical error κεκίνηται to κεκίνηνται.
87 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 12 DK.
88 Cf. 3.8.9.22 26; 6.9.3.22 36.
89 The mss have ή τῷ ἔχειν (‘either by having’), while HS add the words ή τῷ μὴ ἔχειν (‘or by not having’). The reason for the conjectured change is that without the addition, Plotinus seems to contradict his claim that the One does not have any of the things that it gives.
90 Cf. 5.1.8.26; 6.2.15.14 15; 6.4.11.15 16. See Pl., Parm. 137C 142A, 144E5, 155E5.
91 Or ‘that which is one’, meaning whatever unity it has. Cf. 6.9.1.1 4.
92 Following de Strycker’s suggestion and reading δ ὀν εἶποι. Cf. 3.8.10.20 28.
And even if someone were able to say what each part is, they would be saying this due to the fact that each is one, that is, due to its being itself.

But that which, not having many parts in itself, is thereby not one by participation in the One, but is itself the One, and it is not one due to something else but because it is the One, that from which other things somehow also come, some by being near and some by being far. For that itself which comes after it makes clear that it comes after it due to its multiplicity, being a ‘one-everywhere’. For even though it is a multiplicity, nevertheless it is self-identical and you could not divide it because ‘all things are together’. Since each of the things that come from it, so long as it partakes of life, is a ‘one-many’, each cannot show itself to be a ‘one-everything’. But Intellect is a ‘one-everything’, because it comes after the principle. For that principle really is one, and ‘truly is one’. That which comes after the principle is, somehow, by the influence of the One, all things partaking of the One, and any part of it is all things besides being also one.

What, then, are ‘all things’?

In fact, they are those things of which the One is the principle. But how is the One the principle of all things? Is it because by producing each of them as one it preserves them in existence? In fact, it is also because it made them to exist really. How did it actually do this?

In fact, it was by having them prior to their existence. But it has been said that in this way it will be a multiplicity. We must, therefore, say that it had them in such a way that they were not distinct, whereas the things in the second principle are made distinct by an expressed principle, for this is at once actuality, whereas the One is the productive power of all things.

But what manner of power is this? For it is not what is meant when matter is said to be in potency, namely, because it is receptive. For matter is passive, and this type of being in potency is the opposite of producing. How, then, does it produce what it does not have? Indeed, it does so neither by chance nor by having reflected on what it will produce yet it produces nevertheless. It has been said, then, that if there is something that comes from the One, it should be something other than it; being other, it is not one. For if this were one, it would be the One. But if it is not one, but two, it is at once necessary that it also be

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91 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK. 94 Reading μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν with Igal and HS.
92 See Pl., Soph. 245A8. 95 See Pl., Parm. 153C3.
96 See Pl., Parm. 146A8. 97 Cf. 6.7.23.22.
98 Cf. 3.8.10.11; 4.8.6.11; 5.1.7.9; 5.4.1.23 26, 36, 2.38; 6.7.32.31; 6.9.5.36.
99 Cf. 2.5.1.21 26.
a multiplicity, for it is at once different and identical and of some kind, and the rest.  

It has been shown that that which comes from the One is actually not one. But it is worth puzzling over the fact that this is a multiplicity and the sort of multiplicity that has been observed to be in that which comes after the One. And the necessity of there being something that comes after the One is yet to be examined.

§5.3.16. That there must be something after that which is first has been said elsewhere and, generally, that the first is power, that is, incredible power – this, too, has been said, namely, that this claim should be trusted on the basis of all the other things we observe, because there is nothing, not even at the extremes, that does not have the power to generate.  

But as for those things, the point should now be made that, since things that are generated cannot go upward, but can only proceed downward, that is, in the direction of multiplicity, the principle of each of them is simpler than they are. So, what makes the sensible cosmos cannot itself be a sensible cosmos, but is rather Intellect and an intelligible cosmos. So, what is before this, which generates it, could not be Intellect or an intelligible cosmos; rather, it must be simpler than Intellect and simpler than an intelligible cosmos. For a many does not come from many, but that which is many comes from that which is not many. For if the intelligible cosmos is many, this is not a principle; the principle is that which is before this. If indeed this is to be really simple, there must, then, be a coalescing into what is really one, outside of any multiplicity and any qualified simplicity.

But how can that which is generated from the really simple be a multiple and comprehensive expressed principle, while that from which it came is clearly not an expressed principle? And if it is not this, how, then, can an expressed principle come from what is not an expressed principle? And how does that which is ‘Good-like’ come from the Good? What indeed does it have in itself due to which it is said to be Good-like? Is it, then, because it has ‘its identity in a stable manner’? And what does this mean in relation to the Good? For we seek out that which is always stable just because it is one of the things that is good.

100 See Pl., Soph. 254E5 255A1.
101 Cf. 2.9.3; 4.8.2.26 38, 6.1 18; 5.1.6.30 34; 5.2.1.7 28; 5.4.1.37.
103 Cf. supra 3.10; 3.8.11.16; 6.7.15, 18.1. 104 See Pl., Soph. 248A12.
In fact, we seek that which is prior to stability, which we should not leave, because it is the Good. If it were not, it would be better to be separated from it.

So, is living in a stable manner and willingly remaining like this what we are seeking? If, then, living like this is what it loves, it is clear that it seeks nothing. It would seem, then, that it lives like this for this reason, namely, because its present life is sufficient for it. But it loves its life because all things are at once actually present to it, that is, present but not as other than it. And if its entire life is a life of clarity and perfection, then every soul and every intellect is in it, and nothing of life or of intellect is absent from it. It is, then, self-sufficient and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, it has in itself what it would have sought, had that not been present to it. It has, then, in itself that which is good, whether we say life and intellect are actually that or something else that is accidental to these.

But if this is the Good, there would be nothing that transcends Life and Intellect. But if the Good transcends them, it is clear that Intellect’s life is directed to it and dependent on it and has its real existence from it and lives directed to it. For that is its principle. So, the Good must be better than Life and Intellect, for this is why Intellect will revert to it – both to the Life that is in the Good, as a kind of imitation of what is in it, in it insofar as what is in it is Life, and the Intellect in it, as a kind of imitation of what is in it, whatever this is.

§ 5.3.17. What, then, is better than the wisest life, without a fault, unerring, that is, the life of Intellect, which has all things, and is all Life and all Intellect? If we respond, then, ‘that which produced these’ we should also ask ‘how did it produce these?’ And, should there not appear something better, our calculative reasoning will not go on to something else but will stop at Intellect. But, still, one should go upward for many reasons, but especially because the self-sufficiency of Intellect, since that is due to all the things of which it is composed, is outside it, for each of these is clearly deficient. And because each of these has partaken of and partakes of the One itself, it is not the One itself. What, then, is that of which Intellect partakes, which makes it exist and all things together?\(^{105}\) If it makes each exist, and it is by the presence of the One that the multiplicity of Intellect and Intellect itself are self-sufficient, it is clear that that which is productive of Substantiality and of self-sufficiency is itself not Substantiality but ‘transcends this’ and transcends self-sufficiency.\(^{106}\)

Is it enough, then, having said these things, to leave off?

\(^{105}\) See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 A 60  61, B 1 DK.  \(^{106}\) See Pl., Rep. 509B8  9.
In fact, the soul is still in labour and even more so than before. Perhaps, then, she must now give birth, having both longed for the One and been consumed with labour. But we must sing another charm if we are to find one to relieve her labour. Perhaps it would come from what has already been said, and if someone were to sing it over and over, it would happen. What other fresh charm, then, is there? For she has run through all the truths, truths in which we participate, yet still flees them if someone wants to speak and think through them, since discursive thinking must, if it is to say something, go from one thing to the other. It is, in this way, successive. But what sort of succession is there for that which is completely simple?

But it is sufficient if one grasps it intellectually. And having grasped it, so long as one does, it is quite impossible to speak nor is there time to speak; later, one can reason about it. But at that moment, one cannot but be confident that one has seen, whenever the soul suddenly makes contact with light, for this comes from the One and is it. And at that moment, one cannot but believe that the One is present, just as when another god, called to someone’s house, comes bringing light. If the god had not come, he would not have brought the light. Thus, the unillumined soul, bereft of god, is without light. When she is illumined, she has what she sought, and this is the soul’s true goal: to make contact with that light and to see it by itself, not by the light of something else; to see that very thing through which it sees. For the means of its illumination is what the soul ought to see; we do not see the sun by the light of something else. How, then, can this come about? Abstract from everything.
5.4 (7)
How That Which Is after the First Comes from the First, and on the One

INTRODUCTION
This treatise is a sort of epitome of the longer treatise 5.1 (10). It is focused on the problem of how a many can be derived from a One. This is a problem raised in the chronologically previous treatises 5.9 (5) and 4.8 (6). The problem is exacerbated by the fact that production from the One cannot involve its going outside itself for this would undermine its simplicity. Plotinus here also argues that the primary product of the One must be Intellect, first as that which is primarily complex and then as that which is identical with all that is intelligible as it reverts to the One.

SUMMARY
§1. The ontological priority of the absolutely simple first principle of all.
§2. The derivation of Intellect from the One and the distinction between internal and external activity. In what sense Intellect is identical with the Indefinite Dyad and in what sense it is identical with all Being.
§5.4.1. If there is something after that which is first, it is necessary that what comes from it does so either immediately, or else it has its ascent back to it through intermediaries and there is an ordering of things second and third,\(^1\) with the second ascending to the first and the third to the second. For there must be something simple prior to all things and different from all things after it, being by itself, not mixed with the things that come from it, all the while being able to be present to other things, having what those other things have in a different manner, being truly one, and not having its existing different from its being one.\(^2\) Given this, it is false that that of which there is no ‘account or scientific understanding’\(^3\) is even one;\(^4\) it is actually said to ‘transcend Substantiality’\(^5\) – for if it is not simple, beyond all combination and composition and not truly one, it would not be a principle. And it is absolutely self-sufficient by being simple and first of all. For that which is not first\(^6\) needs that which is prior to it, and that which is not simple is in need of the ‘simples’ in it in order that it be composed of them.\(^7\)

That which is indeed one like this must be unique. For if there were something else like this, the two of them would be one. For we are not speaking about two bodies or saying that the One is the first body. For no body is simple. And a body is generated, and not a principle; ‘a principle is ungenerated’.\(^8\) Since the One is not corporeal, but truly one, it would be that which is first. If, therefore, there should be something different after that which is first, that thing would not itself be simple; it will, therefore, be a one-many.\(^9\)

From where, then, does this come? It comes from that which is first. For it certainly doesn’t happen by chance. If it did, it would no longer be

\(^1\) Cf. 5.1.8.1, 4. See Pl. [?], 2nd Ep. 312E3 4.  
\(^2\) Cf. 6.9.5.33.  
\(^3\) See Pl., Parm. 142B5 C1.  
\(^4\) See Pl., Parm. 142A3 4.  
\(^6\) Reading τοιμ η with Igal.  
\(^7\) Cf. 5.3.12.10 16; 5.5.9.1 15.  
\(^8\) See Pl., Phdr. 245D3.  
\(^9\) Cf. 5.1.8; 5.3.15.11; 6.2.15.14 15; 6.4.11.15 16. See Pl., Parm. 144E5.
a principle of all things. How, then, does it come from that which is first? If that which is first is perfect, that is, the most perfect of all things and the first power, it must be the most powerful of all things, and the other powers imitate it as much as they are able. In the case of other things, we see whatever comes to perfection, generating, and not holding back so as to remain self-contained, but rather making something else. This is the case not only for things that have choice, but also for things that grow without choice – and even for things without souls, which give of themselves to the extent that they are able. For example, fire warms, and snow chills, and drugs which act on something else according to their own nature. Everything imitates the principle according to its capacity by tending towards eternity and goodness.

How, then, could that which is most perfect and that which is the first Good remain in itself as if it were grudging of itself, or without power – that which is the productive power of all things? How would it still be a principle? Something actually must come to be from it if indeed other things are to exist beside it. That these things come from it is a matter of necessity. That which is generated must certainly be the most honourable and, as second to it, must be better than everything else.

§ 5.4.2. If, then, Intellect itself were doing the generating, that which is generated must be inferior to Intellect, though as close as possible to Intellect and the same as it. But since that which generates transcends Intellect, that which is generated is necessarily Intellect. Why is that which generates not Intellect, the activity of which is intellection? But intellection sees the intelligible and turns towards it and is in a way perfected by this; it is itself indefinite like sight, and made definite by the intelligible. For this reason, it is said that ‘from the Indefinite Dyad and from the One’ come the Forms or Numbers. For this is Intellect. For this reason, Intellect is not simple, but multiple, revealing itself as a composite, although an intelligible one, and consequently seeing many things. It is, then, itself intelligible, but also thinking. For this reason, it is already two. But it is also an intelligible other than the One due to the fact that it comes after the One.

But how does this Intellect come from that which is intelligible? The intelligible, remaining in itself and not lacking anything, as does

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10 Cf. 4.8.6.10 16; 5.1.7.9 10; 5.3.15.32 33; 6.9.5.36 37. See Pl., Tim. 29E1 2.
12 Cf. 6.6.9.29 34 for Forms as Numbers. See Ar., Meta. 1.6.987b21 22; 13.7. 1081a13 15.
13 See Ar., DA 3.4.430a44.
14 The One is ‘intelligible’ because it is ‘the productive power of all things’, that is, all that is intelligible. Cf. 5.5.6.19 20.
that which sees and that which thinks – I mean by ‘lacking’ the state of what thinks in respect of the intelligible – it is not in a way unperceiving; rather, all things that belong to it are in it, and with it. It is in every way self-discerning; its life is in itself and everything is in itself; and its grasping of itself\textsuperscript{15} is itself – a grasping that is as if by self-awareness in a state of eternal stability, or by an act of intellection that is different from the intellection of Intellect. If, then, something comes to be while it remains in itself, this thing comes to be from it when it is most of all what it is. While it remains, then, ‘in its own customary state’,\textsuperscript{16} that which comes to be comes to be from it, but comes to be while it remains. Since, then, it remains intelligible, that which comes to be is intellection. And since it is intellection, and intellection of that from which it came – for there is nothing else – it is Intellect, in a way a second intelligible and in a way a second One; an imitation and image of the One.\textsuperscript{17}

But how does the Intellect come to be while the One remains? There is activity which is activity of the substance and there is activity which arises from the substance of each thing.\textsuperscript{18} And the activity of the substance is the actuality that each thing is, while the activity which arises from the substance, which absolutely had to follow of necessity, is different from it. For example, in the case of fire, there is the heat which fills out its substantiality, and there is another heat deriving from it, which at once comes to be when fire is actualizing its native substantiality by remaining fire.

It is actually the same for the intelligible world, and much more so there, where the One remains ‘in its own customary state’,\textsuperscript{19} and the activity generated by its perfect and internal activity acquires real existence, and inasmuch as it is from a great power, in fact, the greatest power of all, it comes into its existence and substantiality. For the One ‘transcends Substantiality’,\textsuperscript{20} and is the productive power to be all things; but it is already all things. Conversely, if Intellect is all things, the One transcends all things, and therefore transcends Substantiality.

But if the Intellect is all things, the One, not being equal to all things, is prior to them, and must, due to this, transcend Substantiality. But this Substantiality is the substantiality of Intellect; therefore, there is something that transcends Intellect. For Being is not a corpse, or something

\textsuperscript{15} The term κατανόησις (‘grasping’) is elsewhere used for Intellect. Cf. 4.7.10.45, 47; 5.3.1.13.
\textsuperscript{16} See Pl., Tim. 42E5 6.
\textsuperscript{17} Cf. 5.1.6.47 48, 7.1; 5.3.16.43; 5.5.5.22 23.
\textsuperscript{18} Cf. 2.9.8.22 25; 4.5.7.15 17, 51 55; 5.1.6.34; 5.3.7.23 24; 5.9.8.13 15; 6.2.22.24 29; 6.7.18.5 6; 6.7.21.4 6; 6.7.40.21 24.
\textsuperscript{19} See Pl., Tim. 42E5 6.
without life, or without thinking. Intellect and Being are actually identical. For Intellect is not of objects – as sense-perception is of sensibles – that pre-exist it, but Intellect itself is its objects, since Forms are not provided to it from elsewhere. Where would it get them from? But it is just where its objects are and is identical to them – that is, one with them. And the scientific understanding of things without matter is identical with those things.

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21 See Pl., Soph. 248E7 249A2.  
22 See Ar., Cat. 7.8a11.  
23 Cf. 5.9.8.3 17. See Ar., DA 3.4.430a3, 7.431a1 2, b17.
That the Intelligibles Are Not outside the Intellect, and on the Good

INTRODUCTION

This treatise is really a part of the treatise that precedes it chronologically, 5.8 (31). That treatise may also include 3.8 (30) and 2.9 (33). Their separation is owing to Porphyry's non-chronological ordering. The task of 5.5 is to show that the intelligibles or Forms cannot be external to Intellect; rather, they must be constitutive of Intellect’s identity. This claim must be established not only to properly understand Intellect, but since Intellect is engaged in the paradigm of thinking, if Intellect is not cognitively identical with Forms, then the possibility of thinking even for us is eliminated. From the internal complexity of Intellect, Plotinus shows the necessity of an absolutely simple first principle of all.

SUMMARY

§1. The necessity of the internality of Forms to Intellect. The identity of Forms and Intellect means that Forms are alive and are not separable from each other.

§2. Intellect is cognitively identical with Forms and so possesses them, or more exactly is them. Intellect’s cognition of Forms is non-inferential and non-propositional.

§3. Intellect, the second god, is the locus of Being and derived from the first god.

§4. The unity of Intellect is inferior to the unity of the One. The One is not a number.

§5. The One is productive of all things. It produces Intellect first. The One is not participated in.

§6. The transcendence of the One. It is beyond Being. The requirement of negative theology.

§7. Analogy of intellection to sight.
§8. The omnipresence of the One.
§9. The ‘containment’ of Soul within Intellect and Intellect within the One. The One is itself within nothing.
§10. The One is unlimited in power and is identical with the Good. The One must be unlike everything of which it is the cause.
§11. The unqualified unlimitedness of the One. The immateriality of the first principle of all.
§12. The priority of the Good to that which is beautiful. The desire for the Good is prior to the desire for the beautiful.
§13. The absolute simplicity and transcendence of the Good. The Good is not good nor does it possess any other predicates.
§5.5 (32)  
That the Intelligibles Are Not outside the Intellect, and on the Good

§5.5.1. Might, then, one say that Intellect – the true and real Intellect – will ever be in error and have beliefs about non-beings?¹ Not at all. For how would Intellect still be what it is if it is unthinking?² It must, therefore, always know and not ever forget, and its knowledge must not be conjecture, or uncertain, or like something heard at second hand. So, its knowledge is not acquired by means of demonstration either.³ For even if someone were to say that some of what it knows it knows by means of demonstration, in that case there would still be something self-evident to it. Actually, our argument maintains that everything is self-evident to it. For how could someone distinguish the things that are self-evident to it from those that are not?

But as for those things they concede are self-evident to it – from where will they say their being self-evident comes?⁴ And from where will Intellect derive the conviction that things are self-evident to it? For even sensibles, which certainly seem to bring with them the most self-evident conviction, do not, in fact, convince us that their seemingly real existence is in substrates rather than in our experiences, and that they are not in need of intellect or discursive thinking to make judgements about them. For even if it is agreed that the sensibles are in their substrates, the apprehension of which sense-perception will bring about, what is known by means of sense-perception of the object is a reflection of the thing; it is not the thing itself that sense-perception receives, for that object remains outside it.

¹ This treatise is continuous with 5.8. The last sentence of that treatise is: ‘So, is what has been said sufficient to lead to a clear understanding of the intelligible world, or should we go back and take another path like this one?’
² I.e., since Intellect’s activity is eternal cognitive identification with Beings, its having beliefs about that which is not would be equivalent to ‘unthinking’ for it.
³ Cf. 5.8.7–43.
⁴ The Epicureans. See D.L., 10.32; Sext. Emp., PH 2.169 170; M. 7.203, 364; 8.9.
Given that when Intellect knows, it knows intelligibles, how, if these are different from it, would it connect with them? For it is possible that it does not, so that it is possible that it does not know, or knows them only at the time when it connected with them and will not always have the knowledge. But if they are going to say that they are linked to it, what does the term ‘linked’ mean? In that case, acts of intellection will be impressions. And if this is so, they act externally, that is, they are impacts. But how will these impressions be made, and what will be the shape of such things? And in that case, an act of intellection will be of what is outside it just like sense-perception. And in what way will it differ from sense-perception other than by apprehending something smaller? And how will it know that it really apprehended them? And how will it know that something is good or beautiful or just? For each of these will be other than the object, and the principles of judgement by which it will attain conviction will not be in it, but rather these will be outside it, and the truth will be there.

Next, either intelligibles are themselves without perception and without any portion of life and intellect, or they do have intellect. And if they have intellect, both are simultaneously here – this truth and this primary Intellect – and we shall investigate in addition what the truth here is like, and whether the intelligible and Intellect are identical and occur simultaneously, and yet are still two and different – or how are they related?

But if the intelligibles are without thought or without life, what sort of Beings are they? For they are certainly not ‘premises’ or ‘axioms’ or ‘sayables’; if they were, straightaway they would be referring to things different from themselves, and they would not then be the Beings themselves. For example, if they will say ‘that which is just is beautiful’, that which is just and that which is beautiful are in fact other than what is said.

But if they say that these are ‘simples’, Justice being separate from Beauty, then, first, the intelligible will not be some one thing nor in one

5 See Pl., Thht. 186C7 10; Ar., DA 3.4.430a4 5, 5.430a19 20, 6.430b25 26, 7.430b17, 8. 431a22 23.
6 The term συνεζεύχθαι (‘linked’) is attributed to the Epicureans by Sext. Emp., M. 7.203.
7 The term τύποι (‘impressions’) is Stoic. See D.L., 7.45.
8 The term is πληγαί. Cf. 3.1.2, 11; 3.6.6.35, 62. See Alex. Aphr., De an. 72.5 11.
9 Cf. infra 2.1 13; 3.8.9.5 11.
10 Cf. 6.7.8.25 27. See Pl., Rep. 477A3; Soph. 248E6 249A2.
11 The premises are the supposedly self-evident propositional truths that form the basis of Aristotelian demonstrations. See Ar., APr. 1.1.24a16 b15. The axioms and ‘sayables’ are Stoic. See e.g., SVF 2.132 (= Sext. Emp., M. 7.38). Plotinus may also be responding to Longinus, who reputedly held that Forms are outside the intellect and identical to ‘sayables’. See Syrianus, In Meta. 105.25 30.
thing, but each intelligible will be dispersed. And where and in what places will they be dispersed? And how will Intellect hit upon them, meandering through these places? How will it remain undisturbed – rather, how will it remain in the identical place? In general, what sort of shape or impression will it have of them? Or are we to assume that they are like constructed golden images or some other matter produced by some sculptor or engraver? But if they are like this, the contemplating of Intellect will in fact be sense-perception. Further, why is one of these things Justice and another something else?

But the greatest objection is this. If indeed one were to grant that these intelligibles are totally outside Intellect, and then claim that Intellect contemplates them as such, it necessarily follows that it does not itself have the truth of these things and that it is deceived in all that it contemplates; for it is those intelligibles that would be the true reality. So, it will contemplate them though it does not have them, instead receiving reflections of them in a kind of cognition like this. Not having true reality, then, but rather receiving for itself reflections of the truth, it will have falsities and nothing true. So, if it knows that it has falsities, it will agree that it has no share in truth. But if it is ignorant of this as well, and thinks that it has the truth when it does not, the falsity that is generated in it is double, and that will separate it considerably from the truth.

This is the reason, I think, that in acts of sense-perception, too, truth is not found, but only belief, because belief is receptive, and for this reason, being belief, it receives something other than that from which it receives what it has. If, then, there is no truth in Intellect, an intellect of this sort will not be truth nor will it be truly Intellect, nor will it be Intellect at all. But there is nowhere else for the truth to be.

§5.5.2. So, one should not seek for intelligibles outside Intellect, nor assert that there are impressions of Beings in it, nor, depriving it of truth, make it ignorant of intelligibles and make them non-existent, and even eliminate Intellect itself. But if indeed one must also bring in knowledge and truth, that is, preserve Beings and knowledge of what each of them is – but not of their qualities, inasmuch as in having these, we would have only a reflection and a trace of real Beings, and we would not have or be present with or mixed with the Beings themselves – all Beings should be given to true Intellect. For in this way it would know, that is, truly know, and not forget, nor would it meander seeking them,

12 See Pl., Sopb. 259E4 6. 13 Cf. infra 2.18 20; §5.3.5.22 23.
14 Taking the word for belief, δόξα, from the word for ‘receive’ δέχομαι.
15 Cf. 2.6.1.43 44. See Pl. [?], 7th Ep. 342E2 343A1.
and the truth will be in it, and it will be the foundation\textsuperscript{16} for these Beings, and they will be alive and will be thinking.

All of this must belong to the most blessed nature anyway; otherwise, where will its honour and dignity be? Indeed, again, this being the case, it will also have no need of demonstration or of conviction that these things are so – because it is itself the way that it is and it is self-evident to itself that it is this way; and if there is something prior to it, that is because it is self-evident to it that it comes from that; and if something comes after what is prior to it, that is because it is self-evident to it that that is itself – and no one can be more convinced of this than it is – and because in the intelligible world it is this and really so.

So, the real truth is also not its being in harmony with something else, but with itself, and it expresses nothing else beside itself, but what it expresses, it is, and what it is, this is also what it expresses.\textsuperscript{17} Who, then, could refute it? And from where would one draw the refutation? For the refutation adduced would rely on the identical thing said before, and even if you were to provide something else, it is brought in line with that which was said originally and it is one with that. For you could not find anything truer than the truth.

§5.5.3. So, there is for us one nature, which is Intellect, all Beings, and the truth.\textsuperscript{18} And if this is so, it is a great god, though it is not just some god; rather, one might well think that that which is all Beings is the universal god. And this nature is god, a second god, revealing itself before we see the first. That first god is seated or settled above Intellect, as if on a sort of beautiful pedestal which is suspended from it.\textsuperscript{19} For it had to be the case that the One, in proceeding, did not proceed to something soulless, nor indeed even proceed immediately to Soul, but that there had to be an indescribable beauty leading its way,\textsuperscript{20} just as in the procession of a great king, the lesser come first, and the greater and more dignified come after them in turn, and those who are even closer to the king are more regal, and those next even more honoured. After all these, the Great King suddenly reveals himself, with the people praying to him and prostrating themselves, at least those who have not already left, thinking that it was enough to see those who preceded the king.

So this king is other than those who precede him, who are other than him. But in the intelligible world, the king is not a foreign ruler; rather,
he has the most just rule by nature, and true kingship, inasmuch as he is
the king of truth, and by nature sovereign of the massed ranks of his own
offspring, 21 a divine battalion; is king of the king and of kings, and
would more justly be called father of gods than Zeus. 22 Zeus imitated
him in this, not holding himself to the contemplation of his father, but
imitating what is in a way the activity of his grandfather which is realized
in the real existence of Substantiality.

§5.5.4. It has been said, then, that it is necessary to make the ascent to
a one, 23 that is, to what is truly one, 24 but not in the way that other
things are one, which, being many, are one by partaking of a one – we
must grasp that which is not one by partaking, not that which is not
more one than it is many – and it has also been said that the intelligible
universe and Intellect are more one than anything else, and that
there is nothing that is nearer the One itself, though these are not
purely one. 25

Now we long to see that which is purely and really one and not one
due to something else, if this is in some way possible. So, it is necessary
to rush towards the One from the sensible world, and not to add
anything else to it, but to stop in absolute fear of separating ourselves
from it; and not to proceed to duality in the least bit. If you don’t do
this, you get two, among which the One is not; rather, both will be
posterior to it. For it does not want to be counted with something
different from it no matter whether that is one or how many; indeed, it
does not want to be numbered at all. For it is a measure and is not
measured, and it is not equal to other things, such that it is among
them. If this were not the case, there would be something common to
it and the things numbered, and that would be prior to it. But there
cannot be anything prior to it.

Not even the term ‘Substantial Number’ applies to it, let alone what
is posterior to this, namely, ‘quantitative number’. For Substantial
Number is that which eternally provides Being, 26 whereas quantitative
number provides quantity along with other things or even without other
things, if indeed this is a number. 27 Since the nature of quantitative
numbers is produced as an imitation in relation to the one [Number]
which is their principle – that being among the prior Numbers, which
are themselves imitations in relation to the true One – it does not have
real existence by using up or fragmenting its unity, which is a unit prior
to a duality that comes from it. And this unit is not each of the ones in
the duality nor is it one of them while not being the other. For why
would it be one rather than another? If, then, it is neither of them, it is
different and, though it remains what it is, it does not remain isolated. 28

How, then, are the ones in the duality different from each other? And
how is the duality one? Is the one of the duality identical to the one in
each part of the duality?

In fact, we have to say that they partake of the primary one, being
other than that of which they partake, and the duality, insofar as it is one,
also partakes, but not in the same way, just as an army and a house are
not one in the same way. 29 A house is one insofar as it is continuous; it is
not essentially one, nor is it a one in quantity.

Are the units, then, in the pentad other than the units in the decad,
while the one that unifies the pentad is identical to the one that unifies
the decad?

In fact, if every ship is compared with every other ship, small and
large, and every city with every other, and every army with every other,
the one in them is identical in each case. But if it is not in these cases,
then neither is it for those. If, then, there are certain puzzles remaining
regarding these matters, we will take them up later. 30

§5.5.5. But we should return to the point where it was said that which
is first remains identical even if other things should come from it. In the
case of numbers, then, the one remains while another one produces, and
the number is generated according to that one. But in that which precedes
Beings, here the One remains by itself much more. And though it remains,
it is not the case that another does the producing, if Beings are produced
by it; rather, it is sufficient itself for generating Beings.

And just as there in the case of quantitative numbers, there was
a first – the unit – which was a form primarily and secondarily for all
of them, that is, the individual numbers which came after it do not
participate equally in it, so in the case of Substantial Numbers, each of
the Beings that came after that which was first has within itself some-
thing of it as a sort of form. And for quantitative numbers, participation
brought into existence the quantity of the numbers, whereas for
Substantial Numbers participation brought into existence their
Substantiality, so that their Being is a trace of the One.

And if someone says that the word ‘to be’ \textit{[e\(\text{inai}\)}] – the name that is
indictive of Substance \textit{[ousia]} \textsuperscript{31} – comes from ‘one’ \textit{[hen]}, he may have

\textsuperscript{28} Reading \textit{οὐ} with the mss.

\textsuperscript{29} Cf. 6.2.10.3 4, 11.11 12; 6.6.13.18 25; 6.9.1.4 6.

\textsuperscript{30} Cf. 6.6.5.

\textsuperscript{31} ‘To be’ \textit{(e\(\text{inai}\)} is indicative of ‘Substance’ \textit{(ousia)} because referring to something as
existing always entails that that which exists is something or other; it has Substantiality.
hit on the truth. For that which is said to ‘be’ first proceeded a little from the One, in a way, and did not want to go still further, but turned within itself and stood there [este], and became Substance, the ‘hearth’ [bestia] of all things. It is as if someone who utters the sound ['einai'], starting with the sound ben, reveals that which is from the One, and signifies being [on], insofar as possible. Thus, that which has been generated, the Substance and its existence, have an imitation that flows from the power of the One. And Substance, looking at and being moved by the sight, and imitating what it saw, let out the sound ‘being’ [on] and ‘to be’ [einai] and ‘Substance’ [ousia] and ‘hearth’ [hestia]. Thus, the sounds want to indicate the real existence of the one who, in pain, gave birth to the sounds. They imitate, so far as is possible, the generation of Being.

§5.5.6. But let these remarks be taken in whatever way one wants. Since the Substantiality that is generated is form – for someone could not actually say that what is generated from the One is anything else – and that it is not a form of something, but of everything, the One is necessarily formless. And being without form, it is not Substance. For Substance must be a ‘this something’, and this is defined. But it is not possible to grasp the One as a ‘this’. For in that case, it would no longer be a principle, but only that thing which you said was a ‘this’.

But if all things are found within that which is generated, which among these will you say that the One is? Since it is no one of these, it can only be said to transcend them. These are Beings, that is, Being. It, therefore, transcends Being. For ‘that which transcends Being’ does not indicate a ‘this’ – it does not posit it as such – nor does it indicate its name, but implies only that it is not this. If this is what the expression does, it does not at all encompass the One. For it would be absurd to try to encompass this unlimited nature. Someone who wanted to do this would have immediately prevented himself from in any way advancing towards a trace of the One.

But just as someone who wants to see the intelligible nature will, if he has no image of the sensible nature, be able to contemplate that which

34 HS' take the subject of the sentence to be ψυχή ('soul') but HS' alters this, correctly in our view, to οὐσία.
35 Cf. 6.2.8.7 8. See Pl., Crat. 401C. D. 36 Cf. 6.7.17.36, 32.9; 6.9.3.4.
37 Since Substance includes all Beings, the fact that the One transcends the former means that it transcends the latter. Cf. 1.3.5.7; 2.4.16.25; 3.9.9.1; 4.4.16.27; 5.1.10.2; 6.2.17.22; 6.6.5.37; 6.8.9.27.
38 Cf. 5.3.13.1 6. See Pl., Parm. 142A3.
transcends the sensible, so someone wanting to contemplate that which transcends the intelligible will contemplate it by setting aside all that is intelligible, because while he learns that it exists by means of the intelligible, he learns the way in which it exists by setting the intelligible aside.\textsuperscript{39} ‘The way it is’ might as well be ‘the way it is not’, for the ‘way it is’ is not in anything or a ‘something’. But we in our birth pains to say something are necessarily at a loss, and we are speaking about that which is inexpressible, and wanting to give it a name, we are trying insofar as we are able to make it clear to ourselves.

But perhaps the name ‘One’ just indicates an elimination of plurality. Hence, it is also due to this that the Pythagoreans symbolically meant the One when among themselves they referred to ‘Apollo’ as the negation of plurality [\textit{a-pollon}].\textsuperscript{40} And if the One is affirmed both as the name and as that which the name indicates, this would be less clear than if someone did not say that name.\textsuperscript{41} For perhaps this name was being used so that someone who started their enquiry from that which indicates what is absolutely simple would end up negating this name, too. For though it was asserted as well as could be by the one who asserts it, this has no value for clarifying its nature, because that cannot be heard nor can it be understood by one who hears, but by one who sees, if indeed by anyone at all. But if the one who is seeing seeks to look at a form, he will not see the One.

\textsection{5.5.7}. In fact, the activity of seeing is twofold, as with the eye – one is the thing seen by it, the form of the sensible, the other is that light by means of which it sees the form, and this itself is sensible, and though it is different from the form, and the cause of the seeing of it, it is seen in the form, that is, along with it. For this reason, the light does not at that moment provide a clear sense-perception of itself inasmuch as the eye is directed to that which has been illuminated. But when there is nothing else but it, the eye sees it in a concentrated impression, though even then the eye sees it being supported by something else, since if it came into being alone, and not in relation to something other, sense-perception would not be able to grasp it. For even the light of the sun, the light which is in it, would perhaps escape sense-perception if it were deprived of the mass that supported it.\textsuperscript{42} But if someone were to say that the sun is all light, one could take this as a clarification of what has been said. For light will be in none of the forms belonging to the other things which are seen, and perhaps it will by itself be visible. For the other visible things are not light alone.

\textsuperscript{39} Cf. 3.8.1.31 32. \textsuperscript{40} See Plutarch, \textit{De Is.} 381f. \textsuperscript{41} Cf. 6.7.38.4 5. See Pl., \textit{Soph.} 244D\textsubscript{3} 9. \textsuperscript{42} Reading \textit{ὑπέκειτο} with HS\textsuperscript{4}.
So, the seeing of Intellect is like this. It itself also sees by means of another light the things that are illuminated by that primary nature, and sees since the light is in them. But insofar as it inclines towards the nature of that which is illuminated, it sees it less. If it were to set aside the things seen and were to look at that by means of which it sees, it would be looking at light and the source of light. But since Intellect must look at this light as not being outside it, we must go back to the eye. This at times will itself see not light that is outside or alien to it, but for a moment, something akin to it, prior to that which is outside, and more brilliant. Either it springs from the eye in the darkness of night or, when it does not want to look at other things, it lowers the eyelids and nevertheless emits light, or when the eyelids are shut, one sees the light in the eye. For then it sees without seeing and it is most of all then that it sees. For then it sees light. And the other things it saw were light-like in their form, though they were not light.

It is actually in this way that Intellect, covering its eyes so that it does not see other things, and collecting itself into its interior, and not looking at anything, will see a light that is not other than it or in another, but itself by itself alone and pure, and it appears to it all of a sudden so that it is in doubt as to where it appeared from, outside or inside, and when it goes away it says, ‘so it was inside – but, again, not inside’.

§ 5.5.8. In fact, one must not try to discover where it comes from. For there is not any ‘where’; it neither comes from nor goes anywhere, it both appears and does not appear. For this reason, it is necessary not to pursue it, but to remain in stillness, until it should appear, preparing oneself to be a contemplator, just like the eye awaits the rising sun. The sun rising over the horizon – the poets say ‘from Ocean’ – gives itself to be seen with the eyes.

But from where will that which the sun imitates arise? And rising over what horizon will it appear?

In fact, it arises over the Intellect which contemplates it. For Intellect will be stable in its contemplation, since it is looking at nothing else beside that which is beautiful, inclining and giving itself over completely to what is in the intelligible world; stable and in a way filled with strength, it sees first itself becoming more beautiful, and shining, as it is near it. It did not, however, come as one expected; rather, it came as if it had not come. For it was seen not as something coming, but as something present prior to everything, before Intellect came to it.

Cf. 6.7.34.10; 6.9.4.26. See Homer, Il. 7.422.
Here referring to the One itself. Cf. 6.7.33.12 22. But also 1.6.9.37 39; 5.8.8.5, 13. 11 12; 6.7.42.15 17.
It is Intellect that comes and Intellect that goes away, because it does not know where it should wait and where the One is waiting, which is nowhere. And if it were possible for Intellect itself to wait nowhere – not in the sense that it is in place, for it is not in place, but in the sense that it is altogether nowhere – it would be always looking at the One. And yet it would not be looking, but would be one with it, and not two. Now, however, because it is Intellect, when it looks, it looks in this way, by that in itself which is not Intellect.\(^{48}\) It is certainly wondrous how it is present not because it has come, and how, not being anywhere, there is nowhere that it is not. It is, then, immediately marvelled at, but for one who knows, it would be marvellous if indeed it were the opposite. Or rather: the opposite is not possible such that one could marvel at the opposite. And this is how it is:

§5.5.9. Everything that comes to be by something else is either in that which has produced it or in something else, if indeed there were to be something after that which produced it. For inasmuch as that which comes to be by another was also in need of that other for its generation, it needs that other in every sense, for which reason it is in another.\(^{49}\)

Things, then, which are by nature last in order are in the last things prior to them, which are in the things prior to them, and so on until one arrives at the principle which is first. But inasmuch as the principle has nothing prior to itself, there is not any other in which it is. And not being in any other, it encompasses all the other things which are in the things prior to themselves. Encompassing them, it is not scattered among them and it holds them and is not held by them. In holding them and in not being held by them, there is actually nowhere it is not. For if there is somewhere it is not, it does not hold what is there. But if something is not held, it is not there. So, it is present and not present by not being encompassed, and by being free of everything that would prevent it from being anywhere. For, again, if it is prevented, it is limited by another, and things immediately after would have no share in it, and the god would only go this far, and would no longer be in control, but would be subservient to things after it.

The things which are in something, then, are there where that thing is. But as for things which are not somewhere, there is nowhere they are not. For if a thing is not ‘here’, it is clear that another place contains it, and it is ‘here’ somewhere else, making it false that it is nowhere. If, then, it is true that it is not anywhere and false that it is

\(^{48}\) Cf. 3.8.9.19 23, 32.

\(^{49}\) Including Beings in the intelligible world. Cf. 2.4.5.25 28; 2.9.3.11 14.
somewhere—without thereby implying that it is somewhere else—it is not separate from anything. And if it is not separate from anything, being nowhere, it will be everywhere self-contained. For there is not some part of it here, and some part there; nor is it even in one place as a whole. So, it is a whole everywhere, with nothing holding it and nothing not holding it. Everything, therefore, is held by it.

Consider the cosmos, too, which, since there is no cosmos prior to it, is not in a cosmos nor, again, in place. For what place could exist before the cosmos? Its parts are dependent on it and are in it. And soul is not in the cosmos, but rather the cosmos is in Soul. For the body is not a place in which Soul is, but Soul is in Intellect, body is in Soul, and Intellect in something else. And there is nothing else beyond this such that it would be in that. It is, therefore, in nothing at all. In this way, then, it is nowhere. Where, then, are other things? They are in it. Therefore, it is not cut off from other things nor is it in them nor is there something holding it, but rather it holds everything. For this reason, and in this way, it is the Good of everything, because everything depends on it, each in a different way.

§5.5.10. But please do not, for my sake, look at it through other things. If you do that, you will see a trace of it, not it. But think what it would be to grasp that which is in itself, pure, mixed with nothing, all things partaking in it, but nothing holding it. For there is nothing else of this sort, yet there must exist something of this sort. Who, then, could grasp its power as a whole? For if it is everything at once, how could something differ from it?

Does one, then, grasp it in part? But you who are approaching it, approach it comprehensively, even though you are not able to describe it as a whole. Otherwise, you will be an intellect thinking, and even if you chance on it, it will escape you, or rather you will escape it. But when you try to see it, look at the whole. And when you think it, whatever you might remember of it, think that it is the Good—being the productive power of everything, it is the cause of intelligent life and thought, that from which comes life and intellect and whatever there is that has substantiality and existence—that it is one— for it is simple and

50 See Pl., Parm. 138B5 6. 51 See Pl., Parm. 144B1 2.
52 Cf. 5.1.10.7 11; 5.4.2.13; 6.9.6.15.
53 The distinction between the soul (of the cosmos) and the hypostasis Soul is here not clearly made. Cf. 4.3.22.8 11. See Pl., Tim. 36D9 E3.
54 I.e., the One. 55 Cf. 6.2.11.26. 56 Cf. 3.8.9.21 22, 10.33; 6.8.11.23; 6.9.4.2.
first – that it is a principle – for from it all things come. The first motion is from it, for it is not in it, and from it is stability, because it did not need it, for ‘it does not move nor come to be stable’, for it has neither that in which it can be stable nor that in which it can move. For around what or in relation to what or in what would it do these things? For it is first.

But it has not been limited. For by what would it be so? And yet it is not in magnitude that it is unlimited. For where would it have had to proceed to? Or in order to become what, given that it has no need of anything? No, it is insofar as it is power that it possesses unlimitedness, for it will never be otherwise nor will it lack anything, whereas it is because of it that there are things which are not lacking as well.

§5.5.11. Further, this is unlimited by being not more than one, and it has nothing in relation to which something that comes from it will have a limit. For by being one it could not be measured nor will it amount to a number. It is not limited, then, in relation to something else or in relation to itself for in that case it would be two. So, neither does it have a figure, because it has no parts, nor does it have a shape.

So, do not try to see this with mortal eyes, as our account says, nor try to see it as would someone who supposed that all things are sensible. By supposing that, one would eliminate what exists most of all. For those things which someone thinks to exist most of all, most of all do not exist. And that which someone thinks has great existence has less of it. That which is first is the principle of Existence and even more properly first than Substantiality.

So, you should reverse your belief. If you don’t, you will be left alone, bereft of god, like those at festivals stuffing themselves with food – something that it is not licit for those approaching the gods to do – believing that the food is more substantial than the sight of the god – whom they should be celebrating – and not partaking of the rites within. For in these rites, the god, who is not seen, produces disbelief in those who only believe in things they can see clearly, which they only see with their flesh. It is as if there were people who slept throughout their lives and believed that their dreams were trustworthy and clear; if someone were to waken them, they would disbelieve what they saw with their own eyes, and they would go back to sleep.

59 Cf. 2.9.1.1 2. See Pl., Rep. 511B7. 60 See Pl., Parm. 139B3.
63 Cf. 6.5.4.13 15; Ar., Meta. 12.7.1073a8 11.
64 I.e., Intellect and Soul. Cf. 3.7.5.23 24; 6.9.6.10 11.
65 Cf. 3.6.6.65 69; 5.9.1.3 4. 66 Cf. 5.9.5.26, 6.1 2, 8.16 17.
67 See Pl., Phd. 81E5; Tim. 73C6 8; Phdr. 238B1.
§5.5.12. It is necessary to look at each thing by that by which each should properly be perceived; some things are perceived with the eyes, others with the ears, and others by other means. And one should trust that other things are seen with the intellect, and not believe that thinking is done by hearing or seeing, just as if someone were to command one to see with the ears, and to claim that there were no sounds because they were not seen. It is also necessary to consider how people have forgotten what they originally desired, and even now long for and desire. For all things desire and pursue that by a necessity of nature, as if they had divined that without which they are not able to exist.\(^{68}\)

And the apprehension of that which is beautiful is there already for those who, in a way, know it and have wakened to it, and so, too, the amazement, the awakening of love. But the Good, inasmuch as it was present of old to an innate desire, and is also present to those who are asleep, does not amaze those who sometimes see it, because it is always with them and there is never a recollection of it. People do not see it because it is present when they are asleep. But the love of that which is beautiful, when it is present, gives pain, because one must desire it once having seen it. This love is secondary, and the fact that lovers are conscious of it at once reveals the beauty also to be secondary.\(^{69}\) But the desire that is more ancient than this, and non-sensible, declares the Good to be more ancient and prior.

Everyone thinks that, having gotten the Good, that is sufficient for them, for they think that they have thereby arrived at their goal. But not all see that which is beautiful, and when it is generated, they think that it is beautiful in itself rather than beautiful for them, just in the way it is with beauty here, for it is the beauty of the one who has it. And for them, it is sufficient if things seem beautiful, even if they are not. This is not how they stand in regard to the Good.\(^{70}\) For they argue and compete and quarrel especially about the primacy of beauty, since they think that beauty has come to be in the way they do. It is as if one who was last in the royal line wanted to attain the same position as the one who is first in line, on the grounds that they both have their origin in the king himself, ignoring the fact that, although he does derive his status from the king as well, the other man comes before him.

The explanation for the error is that both partake of the identical thing, that is, the One, which is prior to both, and that in the intelligible world, the Good is not in need of that which is beautiful, whereas that which is beautiful needs it. The Good is gentle, pleasant, and most

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\(^{68}\) Cf. 1.7.1.9 13; 5.6.5.18 19; 6.5.1.11 13.

\(^{69}\) Cf. supra 8.10; 1.6.9.37 43. See Alcinous, *Didask. 165.27 31.*

\(^{70}\) See Pl., *Rep.* 505D\(^5\) E1.
delicate, and present to someone just when they want it. But that which is beautiful brings amazement and shock and pain is mixed with the pleasure. That which is beautiful even draws away from the Good those who do not know it, as a beloved draws one away from one’s father, for that which is beautiful is younger. The Good is prior not in time, but in truth, which has a prior power. For it has all the power. That which comes after it does not have all the power, but as much as there is that comes after it and from it.

So, the Good is also sovereign over this power. It is not in need of that which comes from it, but removing entirely everything that comes from it, and needing nothing of that, it is identical with what it was before it produced that. This is so since it would not have mattered to it if that had not come to be, just as it was not going to begrudge being to anything that was able to come to be from it. As it is, there is nothing left that can come to be. For there is nothing which has not come to be, given that everything has come to be. But it itself was not all things in a way such that it would need them, and since it transcends all things, it was able to produce them and leave them to themselves while it remained above them.

§ 5.5.13. But since it is the Good and not good, it must have had nothing in itself, since it did not even have the [property of being] good. For what it will have, it will have either as good or not good. But that which is not good will not be in that which is primarily and authoritatively the Good; nor will the Good have the good [as a property]. If, then, the Good has neither that which is not good nor that which is good, it has nothing. If, then, it has nothing, it is ‘alone and isolated’ from other things. If, then, the other things are either goods and so not the Good, or are not goods, it will have neither of these properties; in not having them, it is the Good by having nothing. If, therefore, someone adds something to it, either substantiality or intellect or the property of being beautiful, by that addition he subtracts from it the Good that it is.

Therefore, removing everything from it, and saying nothing about it, nor making a false claim about there being something in it, one allows the ‘is’, not giving false testimony about things being present in it as do those who produce panegyrics with no scientific understanding in them and who reduce the fame of the things they are praising by attributing to them less than their worth, being at a loss to say true things about the underlying subjects behind the words. We, then, too, should try not to add anything of that which comes later and that which is lesser, but treat
it as that cause which is above these things, while not being identical to them.

For, again, it is the nature of the Good not to be all things nor to be any one of them. For if it were, it would fall under one identical [genus] to which they all belong. But by falling under one identical [genus] with all those, it could differ from them only by a unique differentia, and differentiation is addition. So, it would be two, not one, of which one part is not good, namely, that which is common to other things, and one part good. It will, therefore, be a mixture of good and not good. It will, therefore, not be purely nor primarily good; rather, that will be primarily good which, being other than the common part, is that by participating in which it has actually become good. But, then, the Good will be good by partaking. But that in which it partook is not one among all things; therefore, the Good is not one among all things. But if the Good, thus conceived, was in it – for there was a differentia due to which the composite was good – it is necessary for this to come from something else. But it was simple and uniquely good. Much more so, therefore, is that from which it came uniquely good.

That, therefore, which is primarily good, that is, that which is the Good, reveals itself to us as being over all beings and uniquely good and having nothing in itself, but unmixed with anything and over everything and the cause of everything. For indeed neither that which is beautiful nor beings come from what is evil nor from that which is indifferent.73 For that which produces is better than that which is produced. For it is more perfect.

73 Cf. 5.1.7.37 40; 5.2.2.1 3.
On the Fact That That Which Transcends Being Does Not Think and on What the Primary Thinking Is and What Is Secondary

Introduction

The focus of this treatise is to demonstrate that the first principle of all does not think or, conversely, that primary thinking cannot be the first principle of all. The opposition to Plotinus’ position includes Peripatetics and those Platonists who identified the Demiurge or a divine intellect with the first principle of all. Plotinus here argues that Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover cannot be the first principle of all. Since its thinking is primary Being, the first principle must be beyond primary Being. This does not mean, however, that the first principle does not exist. Plotinus explains why that which is beyond Being is identical with the Good.

Summary

§1. The distinction between thinking that is of externals and primary thinking that is self-thinking.
§2. Why prior to self-thinking, there must be that which is absolutely simple or one.
§3. The One cannot be many in any sense or have parts.
§4. The analogy of light and of number. The identity of the One with the Good.
§5. The Good does think because thinking is always of that which is distinct from the thinker and thinking is always of the Good. The Good cannot be distinct from itself.
§6. The Good’s activity is not intellection. The Good is beyond thinking and beyond Being.
§5.6.1. There is one type of thinking which is by a subject that is other than its object and another which is by a subject of itself, and the latter, as a result, avoids duality more. The former type also wants to think itself, but it is less able to do so, for though it has within itself that which it sees, it remains something other than it. By contrast, the latter is not separated from its object in substantiality, but being together with itself, it sees itself.¹ It becomes two while remaining one.

It thinks more truly, then, because it has what it thinks, and thinks in a primary sense because that which is thinking must be one and two. For either it is not one [but two], and the subject of thinking will be other than what is thought – [in this case], it would not be that which is thinking in the primary sense because receiving the thinking from something other than it, it will not be that which is thinking in the primary sense, and this is so because that which thinks does not have what it thinks as its own, so that it does not think itself; or else, it has what it thinks as itself, so that it thinks in the proper sense, and that which is two will be one; therefore, subject and object must be one – or it is one and not two, and it will not have something to think of. So, it will not be thinking. Thinking, therefore, must be simple and yet not simple.

One would better grasp the nature of primary thinking if we start our ascent from the soul. For it is easier to distinguish it there, and someone could easily see its duality. If, then, one supposes a double light, the soul as the lesser light, and that which thinks as the purer form of it, and next suppose that the light which sees is equal to that which is seen, since one is no longer able to separate the two by their difference, one will suppose

¹ Cf. 4.6.2.22 24; 5.3.1.12 15, 13.14 16.
the two to be one, thinking that they are two, but by the same token seeing them as one. It is in this way that one will grasp Intellect and intelligible.

We have, then, made one out of two in our account, but the contrary is the case: the two actually come from one because it thinks, making itself two, or rather, because it thinks it is two, and because it thinks itself, it is one.

§ 5.6.2. If there is indeed primary thinking, and next there is thinking in a different way, then that which transcends primary thinking would no longer think.² For an intellect must be generated in order to think, and being an intellect, and having that which is intelligible, and thinking primarily, it must have the intelligible in itself. But it is not necessary for everything that is intelligible to have thinking in itself or to think.³ For it will in that case not be only intelligible but also thinking, and it will not be first since it is two. And intellect which has the intelligible would not be realized unless there is a purely intelligible Substance;⁴ this will be intelligible for intellect, but in itself it will neither be thinking nor principally intelligible. For the intelligible, which is the purveyor of content to the act of intellection, is so for something different from it, namely, intellect, and its thinking is empty unless it grasps and seizes the intelligible which it thinks. For it has no thinking without the intelligible.

Is the One, then, perfect when it has it? But before it was thinking, it had to be perfect in its own substantiality. That, therefore, in which perfection is to exist will be like this prior to thinking. It is, therefore, not necessary for it to think. For it is self-sufficient before this occurs. It will, therefore, not think. There is, therefore, that which does not think, and that which primarily thinks, and that which thinks secondarily. Further, if that which is first thinks, something will exist in it, and therefore it will not be first, but second, and not one, but many, and thereby all the things that it thinks. For even if it thinks itself, it will be many.⁵

§ 5.6.3. But if they⁶ will say that nothing prevents that which is self-identical from being many, there will be one substrate for these. For it is

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² Cf. 1.7.119 20; 3.9.11, 12; 5.1.8.7 8; 6.7.40.26 27. ³ Cf. 5.4.3.13 19. ⁴ This use of οὐσία (‘Substance’) for the One appears to contradict the repeated claims that the One ‘transcends οὐσία’ and also intelligibility. Cf. 3.8.9.10 12. We may suppose that the qualification οἷον (‘in a way’, ‘sort of’) is meant to be understood here, as in 6.8.7.52 and 6.8.13.7. The One is intelligible ‘relative to Intellect’ because the One ‘contains’ within it all that is intelligible. ⁵ Cf. 5.3.10.9 16, 12.9 10. See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1074b34 35. ⁶ Presumably, Peripatetics.
not able to be many if there does not exist a one from which the many are derived or which is constituted of the many or, generally, a one which is counted first among all the rest, which we must grasp alone in itself. But if this one is to exist at the same time as the rest, and we must take it together with them, though it is nevertheless different from them, we must let it go with the others, and seek that which underlies them, no longer being with the others, but itself by itself. For if it were among the others, it would be the same as the One, but it would not be this.

It should, however, be isolated if it is also going to be seen among the others; that is, unless someone were to say of it that its being consists in having its real existence along with the others. It will not, therefore, be simple; but neither will it be something composed of many parts, for that which is not able to be simple will have no real existence, and that which is composed of many parts will not exist either, since that which is simple will not exist. For if no simple individual can have real existence, since there is no one simple that has real existence by itself, then neither can a composite made out of many of them exist, since none of them can have real existence of their own, or make itself available to exist in conjunction with something else, since it does not exist at all. How could that which is composed of many come to be put together from things that do not exist – not from that which is not a particular existent but from that which is absolutely non-existent?

If, therefore, there is some many, there must be a one prior to the many. If, then, there is a multiplicity in thinking, there must be no thinking in that which is not a multiplicity. But this was what is first. Thinking and intellect, therefore, will be in the things that are posterior.

§5.6.4. Further, if the Good is simple and must lack nothing, it would have no need for thinking. But that which it does not need will not be present to it. And since, generally, nothing is present to it, therefore, thinking is not present to it. And it thinks nothing because there is nothing other than it to think. Further, Intellect is other than the Good, and it is Good-like by thinking the Good. Further, as in a duality there is a one and another one, and it is not possible for this one which is with another to be the number one, but rather the number one in itself must be prior to that one which is with another, so it must be in the case of something that has simplicity in it which is with another thing that has simplicity in it. There must be something that is simple in itself, not having in itself anything which is found in things that are joined with other things. For how can it be that there is one thing in
another if that thing did not come from something that existed separately beforehand? What is simple could not arise from something else – but what is many, or even just two, must itself depend on something else.

And so, one should compare the first principle to light, the second to the sun, and the third to the heavenly body of the moon to which light is provided by the sun. For Soul has Intellect added to it, which colours it when it is intellectual, whereas Intellect has what belongs to itself, not being only light, but something illuminated in its own substantiality while that which provides the light to Intellect is not something else, but simply light, providing to Intellect the power to be what it is. What, then, would it be in need of? For it is not identical with that which is in another thing. For what is in another thing is other than that which is what it is due to itself.

§5.6.5. Further, that which is multiple might seek itself and want to converge on itself and be aware of itself. But as for that which is totally one, where will it be such that from that place it can proceed towards itself? What would be the occasion on which it would need awareness of itself? But it is identical with itself and is better than self-awareness and every act of intellection. For thinking is not first, neither by being first nor by being more honourable, but it is second and has come to be when the Good, which already existed, moved that which had come to be to itself, which then was moved and saw it.

And this is intellection: motion towards the Good that it desires. For the desire generated the intellection and caused it to exist with itself. For desire for seeing is sight. The Good itself, then, needs to think nothing, for the Good is not other than itself. And since whenever that which is other than the Good thinks it, it thinks it by being Good-like, that is, having a likeness in relation to the Good, and thinks it as the Good and as desirable to itself, and in a way having an image of the Good. And if it is always like this, it always does this. And again, in the act of intellection, it thinks itself accidentally. For looking towards the Good, it thinks itself. For in its activity, it thinks itself; given that the activity of everything is towards the Good.

§5.6.6. If we have indeed stated these matters correctly, the Good would not have any sort of room for thinking, for the Good must be other than that which is thinking. It is, then, without the activity

10 Inverting the analogy of Rep. 508B.
11 Cf. 3.8.11.23 25; 6.7.35.2 3. See Pl., Soph. 248E6 249A2.
12 See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1074b35 36; Alex. Aphr., De an. 86.22.
[of thinking]. And why should activity be additionally active? For generally, no activity has a further activity. But even if some are able to attribute to actualities other activities directed to something else, that which is primary amongst all, that on which everything else depends, must be allowed to be what it is, with nothing added to it. Such an activity, then, is not thinking. For it does not have something to think. For it is first.

Next, it is not thinking that thinks, but that which has the thinking. Two things, then, again, arise in that which is thinking. But the Good is in no way two.

Further, one could better see what this is if one grasped more clearly how in everything which is thinking this dual nature exists. We say that Beings, both collectively and individually, that is, the Beings that are truly Beings, are in the ‘intelligible place’. This is not only because some things stay as they are due to the substantiality they have, while there are things in the realm of sense-perception that flow and do not stay as they are – though perhaps there are even things among sensibles that do stay as they are – rather, it is because they have the perfection of existence from themselves. For that which is said to be primary Substantiality must not be the shadow of existence, but rather have the fullness of existence. And existence is full when it receives the form of thinking and of life. Thinking, therefore, living, and existence are together in the realm of Being. If, therefore, there is Being, then there is Intellect; and if there is Intellect, then the thinking is together with its existing.

Thinking, therefore, is many and not one. So, it is necessary for anything which is not like this not to be thinking. And we must take as really distinct Human Being and the act of intellection of Human Being, and the act of intellection of Horse and Horse, and the act of intellection of Justice and Justice. So, all things are double, and the one is two, and, again, the two combine into one. But the Good is not among these, nor is it each one, nor is it the totality of these twos, nor is it two at all. As for how the two come from the One, this

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13 See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b26 27. 14 Reading ταῖς ἄλλαις τίνες with Theiler.
15 Cf. 3.9.9.12 17; 6.8.16.14 18, 31.
16 With Kirchhoff moving σαφείστερον to modify λάβοι.
17 See Pl., Rep. 508C1, 517B5.
18 Cf. 1.4.10.6; 3.8.8.8; 5.1.8.15 21; 5.9.5.29; 6.7.41.18. See Parmenides, fr. 28 B 3 DK.
19 The word καθέκαστα (‘really distinct’) is usually rendered as ‘individuals’ or ‘particu-
lars’. Here, though, Plotinus is making the point that there is a real (internal) dis-
tinction in the intelligible world between the act of intellection and its objects.
20 Cf. 5.9.7.11 15; 6.6.6.30 32; 6.7.8.7.
has been discussed elsewhere.\textsuperscript{21} But something which ‘transcends Substantiality’\textsuperscript{22} must also transcend thinking. So, it is not strange if it does not know itself. For it does not have within itself something to learn, being one. Nor must other things know it. For it gives to them something greater and better than knowing it since it is the Good of other things; rather, it allows them to get hold of it, insofar as they are able, by identifying with it.

\textsuperscript{21} Cf. 5.1.6.4 7; 5.9.14.4. \textsuperscript{22} See Pl., Rep. 509B9.
On Whether or not There are Ideas of Individuals

**INTRODUCTION**

Plotinus accepts the fundamental Platonic principle that a Form is a ‘one-over-many’, that is, many things that are the same. This leaves open the question of whether or how that which is unqualifiedly unique has its paradigm in the intelligible world. At least in the case of individual intellects, Plotinus wants to argue that their paradigms are in the intelligible world as undescended intellects for each person in addition to the Form of Human Being. Whether this conclusion is in any sense extendable for things without intellects is not clear from this treatise and from some other passages throughout the *Enneads*.

**SUMMARY**

§1. Is there a Form for each individual human being? If there is, this does not entail an infinity of Forms.

§2. The problem in relation to children.

§3. Can two individuals ever be exactly the same, for example, identical twins? The Stoic doctrine of radical uniqueness of every individual.
§5.7.1. Is there an Idea of each individual?

In fact, there is, if I and everyone else have a means of ascent to the intelligible, and the principle for each of us is in the intelligible world. If Socrates, that is, the soul of Socrates, is eternal, there will be a Socrates Itself,\(^1\) insofar as each individual is its soul and, as was just said, the principle for each of us is in the intelligible world.\(^2\) If the principle does not always exist, but the soul that was at one time Socrates comes to be different individuals at different times, say, Pythagoras or someone else, the individual soul will no longer be in the intelligible world.

If, though, the soul of each contains the expressed principles\(^3\) of all those it will successively enter, then, again, all will be in the intelligible world. And we do say that such expressed principles as the cosmos contains, each soul also contains. If, then, the cosmos contains the expressed principles not only of human beings but also of individual animals, so, too, does the soul. There will be, then, an unlimited number of expressed principles, unless the cosmos is recycled periodically, in which case the unlimitedness will reach a limit when the identical things recur.

If, then, in general, the things that come to be are more in number than their paradigms, why should there be expressed principles or paradigms for all of the things that come to be in one period? For one Human Being would be sufficient for all human beings, just as a limited number of souls produce an unlimited number of human beings.

In fact, it is not the case that there is the identical expressed principle for different individuals, nor is the identical Human Being sufficient as

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\(^1\) The word Αὐτοσκειμάτις refers to a Form of Socrates, but it is not yet clear what the inferential connection is between the eternal soul that is Socrates and this Form. Cf. 5.9.12.1 4.

\(^2\) A reference to our undescended intellects. Cf. 3.4.3.2 4; 3.5.6, 12.3 4; 4.7.10.32 33, 13.1 3; 4.8.4.31 35, 8.8; 6.4.14.16 22; 6.7.5.26 29, 17.26 27; 6.8.6.41 43.

\(^3\) Correcting the typographical error λολοὺς to λόγους.
paradigm of human beings differing from each other not only in matter, but in thousands of unique ways. For it is not the case that they are related to their Form [Human Being] as images of Socrates are related to their archetype; rather, the production of different human beings results from different expressed principles.\(^4\) The entire periodic cycle contains all the expressed principles, and with the next one the identical things are produced again according to the identical expressed principles.\(^5\) We need not fear this unlimitedness in the intelligible world, for everything there is in an indivisible whole and when it acts, it in a way proceeds [to division].

§5.7.2. But if it is the mixtures of the expressed principles of male and female that produce different offspring, there will no longer be an expressed principle for each one that comes to be. Rather, one of the parents, say the father, will produce, not according to different expressed principles, but according to one that is his own or his father’s.

In fact, nothing prevents the father from producing according to different expressed principles as well, by having all of them, with different ones always available.\(^6\)

What happens when there are different offspring from the identical parents?\(^7\)

In fact, it is because of the parents’ unequal dominance. But there is this: it is not the case, even if it appears so, that sometimes most of the expressed principles come from the male and sometimes from the female or from each in equal parts; rather, each insists on giving the whole lot and they are all present but only part of one or the other dominates the matter.\(^8\)

Why are people in different places different? Is it, then, the matter that causes the difference since it is not dominated in the same way? In that case, all people but one would be contrary to nature. If the difference is mainly with respect to beauty, then the Form is not one. But only ugliness should be attributed to matter and even there, while the complete expressed principles have been concealed, they have been given as a whole.

But let the expressed principles be different. Why should there be as many as there are individuals that come to be in one period if indeed it is possible that with one\(^9\) identical expressed principle, there appear external differences? But haven’t we already granted that the expressed principles are given as a whole, whereas the question is whether the individuals differ when the identical expressed principles dominate? Is it

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\(^4\) Cf. *infra* 3.7 13.  
\(^5\) This would be an identical soul in a numerically different body.  
\(^6\) Cf. 5.9-12.4 11.  
\(^7\) See Ar., *GA* 4.3.768b5 769b3.  
\(^8\) Cf. 6.7.7.6 15.  
\(^9\) Reading ἑνί with the mss.
the case, then, that the identical individual can exist in different periods, but cannot be identical with anything else in its own period?\(^{10}\)

§ 5.7.3. How, then, will we be able to say that the expressed principles are different in the case of many twins? And what if one considers other living beings, in particular, ones that have multiple births?

In fact, in cases in which there are no differences, there is one expressed principle. But if this is so, then the number of expressed principles does not correspond to the number of individuals. But they are as many as the different individuals where the differences do not occur by a defect in form.

In fact, what is it that prevents there being different expressed principles in individuals who are not different?

Suppose, generally, that there are cases of individuals that are completely indistinguishable. Now just as with the craftsman who, even if he makes things that are indistinguishable from each other, must nevertheless grasp what is identical in them along with a logical difference, which enables him to make them distinct by importing some kind of difference in addition to what is identical in them, so in nature where things do not come to be by calculative reasoning but only by expressed principles, the difference must be joined with the form. We, however, are unable to grasp the difference.

But if the production is of an indeterminate number of individuals, the account will be otherwise, whereas if the number is measured, then their limited number will be determined by the unrolling and unfolding of all the expressed principles, so that whenever everything stops, there will be another beginning. For the extent of the cosmos, that is, the number of individuals that will pass through it in its life will reside in that which has the expressed principles at the beginning.

In the case of other living beings, then, are we to suppose that, when there is a multiplicity of offspring at one birth, there are a corresponding number of expressed principles? Now, we should not fear an unlimited number in the seeds and in the expressed principles, since Soul contains them all. And in Intellect, as in Soul, the unlimited number of these is, again, available in the intelligible world for use.\(^{11}\)

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\(^{10}\) See *SVF* 2.395 (= Simplicius, *In De an.* 217.36) on the doctrine of ἴδιως ποιόν.

\(^{11}\) Cf. 3.8.8.40; 6.2.21.6. 11.
5.8 (31)
On the Intelligible Beauty

INTRODUCTION
This treatise is a part of the larger treatise including 5.5 (32) and perhaps 3.8 (30) and 2.9 (33). In this part of the treatise, Plotinus explores the paradigmatic status of Intellect for the sensible world, including both its beauty and intelligibility. In addition, the activity of Intellect, non-discursive intellection, is a paradigm for all embodied discursive thinking and for cognition generally. Understanding of the paradigmatic status of Intellect is necessary for understanding that Intellect cannot be the first principle of all.

SUMMARY
§1. The paradigmatic status of Intellect.
§2. The beauty of nature and moral beauty have their paradigms in Intellect.
§3. The ascent to Intellect through its images.
§4. The life of Intellect and of the Forms identical with it.
§5. The non-propositional cognition in Intellect.
§6. Egyptian hieroglyphics as an analogy to non-propositional thinking.
§7. Intellect is not only paradigm but producer of its image, the sensible world.
§8. The beauty of the intelligible world.
§9. The method for eliminating materiality from our thought and so of ascending to the intelligible.
§10. The contemplation of intelligibles by Intellect.
§11. The sense in which the soul is unified with Intellect.
§12. The myth of Kronos and Zeus as analogies for the intelligible and sensible worlds.
§13. The extension of the myth, including Ouranos and Aphrodite, to the three fundamental hypostases. Transition to 5.5.
§5.8.1. Since we are saying that one who has arrived at a vision of the intelligible cosmos and at a grasping of the beauty of true Intellect will be able to conceptualize its father, that which transcends Intellect, let us try to see and to say for ourselves how it is possible to say these things, how someone might be able to see the beauty of Intellect and of that cosmos.¹

So, let us, if you like, take two piles of stones lying next to each other, one of them shapeless and untouched by craft, and the other having been mastered by craft and made into the statue of a god or even of some human being. If it is a god, then let it be a Grace or a Muse, if a human being, not someone in particular, but made by art into an amalgam of every type of beauty.

The stone which has acquired the beauty of form by craft does not appear beautiful by being stone – for in that case the other would be similarly beautiful – but by the form which the craft imported. So, the matter did not have this form, but it was in the one conceptualizing it even before it came to be in the stone. And it was in the creator not insofar as he had eyes or hands, but because he partook of the craft. The beauty was, therefore, in the craft, and it was far superior there. For the beauty in the craft did not enter the stone, but while that beauty remains in the craft, in the stone there is another lesser beauty that comes from that. And in the stone, the beauty did not remain pure, nor was it there at the stone’s behest, but only inasmuch as the stone yielded to the craft.

If the craft produces something like what it is and has – it makes it beautiful according to the expressed principle of that which it is producing – it is superior and more truly beautiful by having the beauty of craft which is superior to and more beautiful than the beauty in the external object.² For to the extent that something advances towards

¹ The beginning of this treatise is clearly a continuation of the discussion at the end of the chronologically previous treatise 3.8.11.
² Cf. 3.8.4.31 44; 4.3.18.1 7.
matter, it is that much weaker than that which remains in a unified condition.\(^3\) For everything extended is separated from itself, if with respect to strength, then in strength, if with respect to heat, then in heat, and if generally with respect to power, then in power, and if with respect to beauty, then in beauty.

And the primary producer must be in every way superior in itself in relation to that which is produced. For it is not the lack of musicality that makes someone musical, but musicality, and the music which is prior to sensible music makes it so. And if someone lacks respect for the crafts on the grounds that they make imitations of nature, it should be said first that natural things imitate other things.\(^4\)

Next, one should know that it is not simply that which is seen that they imitate, but they go back to the expressed principles from which nature comes.

Next, as well, one should know that the crafts produce many things by themselves and, as they possess beauty, they supply whatever is missing, as in the case of Phidias, too, who did not produce his statue of Zeus according to anything sensible, but grasping what he would be if Zeus wanted to appear before our eyes.

§5.8.2. But let us set aside the crafts. Let us look at that which their products are said to imitate, the things that come to be and are said to be beautiful by nature, all rational and non-rational living beings and especially those among them that have succeeded because the creator who fashioned them dominated the matter and imposed the form that he wished.\(^5\) What, then, is beauty in these?

It is not indeed in the blood and the menstrual fluid; their colour is different in each case and their shape amounts to no shape or else it is something shapeless or like the contour of some simple body. Where did the beauty of the Helen who was fought over actually radiate from, or those women who are said to be as beautiful as Aphrodite? Indeed, where did the beauty of Aphrodite come from? Or, generally, of any beautiful human being, or of any god who revealed himself to sight – or who had in himself a perceivable beauty, even if he never appeared to human beings? Is it not, then, everywhere a form, imposed by the producer on that which comes to be, as in the crafts where we said form was imposed on products of craft by the crafts?\(^6\)

What, then? Are the things produced and the expressed principle imposed on the matter beautiful, whereas the expressed principle in the

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\(^3\) See Pl., Tim. 37D6.

\(^4\) See Ar., Protrep. fr. B 13 Düring (= Des Places, 80.7 8); Meteor. 3.3.381b6; Phys. 2.2. 194b21 22.

\(^5\) See Pl. (?), Epin. 981B7 C2.

\(^6\) Cf. supra 1.18 21.
producer that is not in matter, but is primary and immaterial, is not? But
if it were the mass that was beautiful insofar as it was a mass, it would be
necessary for the expressed principle, which produced it, not to be
beautiful because it was not a mass. And if it is the identical form,
whether in a small or in a large mass, that by its own power moves and
disposes in the same way the soul of one who sees it, beauty should not
be attributed to the magnitude of the mass.

Here is further evidence: while something is outside us, we do not yet
see it; when it comes to be inside us, it causes us to be disposed in
a certain way. But it enters through the eyes only as form. How else
could it enter through this small space? But the magnitude is drawn in
not with a mass that is great, but with a form that becomes great.

Next, the one who produces it must be ugly or beautiful or neither.
Being ugly, he would not produce the opposite; being neither, why
would he produce something beautiful rather than ugly? Indeed,
nature which produces such beautiful things takes precedence in
beauty by far, while we, being accustomed not to see things internal
or to know them, pursue externals, being ignorant of the fact that it is
the internal that moves us. It is as if someone, looking at his own
image, and being ignorant of where it came from, were to pursue it. But
it is clear that that which is pursued is different, and the beauty is
not in magnitude, but in intellectual pursuits and in practices and,
generaly, in souls.

There is certainly more beauty in truth than that in magnitude when
you see and rejoice in the wisdom in someone, not paying attention to
his face – which might be ugly – but setting aside every shape, pursuing
his internal beauty. But if it does not move you yet to say that beauty is
like this, you would not look into yourself and delight in the beauty
there. In that case, you would seek it there in vain, for you will seek it
with that which is ugly and not pure. For this reason, the arguments
about such things are not for everyone. If you have seen yourself as
beautiful, you must remember it.

§5.8.3. There is, then, an expressed principle in nature that is the
archetype of corporeal beauty, and the expressed principle in soul is
more beautiful than the one in nature, and its source. This is really
clearest in the virtuous soul which is already advanced in beauty. For
adorning his soul and providing light coming from a greater light, which
is primarily beautiful, it makes us, on the basis of its presence in the soul,

7 See Ar., DA 2.424a18. 8 Cf. 1.6.8.9 12.
9 See Pl., Symp. 210B6 C7, 211C1 6.
10 The ‘archetype’ is the Form; the ‘expressed principle’ is the nature of that Form as it
appears at a lower ontological level.
infer the nature of the beauty that is prior to it, a beauty that in this case does not come into another thing, but remains in itself. For this reason, it is not an expressed principle, but the producer of the first expressed principle of beauty in the soul in its capacity as a material principle.\(^{11}\)

This producer is Intellect, which is always Intellect and never not Intellect, because it does not come to itself from outside itself. What, then, could someone take as an image of it, for all of these would be drawn from that which is inferior to it? Indeed, the image must come from Intellect, so that one is not grasping it through an image, but in a way like a piece of gold that stands for all gold, and if that which is taken is not pure, to purify it in deed or in word, showing that the piece is not entirely gold, but the gold is only this bit in the entire mass. In the same way, we may start from the purified intellect in us or, if you wish, from that of the gods, and the nature of intellect in them. For all the gods are dignified and beautiful and their beauty is extraordinary.\(^{12}\)

But what is it that makes them so?

In fact, it is Intellect, I mean Intellect that is more active in them, so that it is visible. It is certainly not because their bodies are beautiful. For those that do have bodies, it is not this that makes them to be gods, but these are gods, too, because of their intellects. Indeed, they are beautiful insofar as they are gods. And it is certainly not the case that they sometimes act wisely and sometimes not; they always act wisely in unaffected and steady and pure intellect, and they know all things and are acquainted not with human affairs but with their own divine affairs, and those things that Intellect sees.\(^{13}\)

Among the gods, some are in heaven and – since they are at leisure – they are always contemplating, as if from afar, the things that are in that intelligible heaven above their heads. But other gods are in that intelligible heaven,\(^{14}\) namely, those that have their dwelling on it and in it, dwelling in everything which is there in that heaven – for everything in the intelligible world is heaven; the earth is heaven and the sea and the animals and plants and human beings, everything of that heaven is heavenly.\(^{15}\) The gods that are in it do not disrespect human beings or anything else that is in the intelligible world, but just because the things are in the intelligible world, they travel across the region there and are always resting in place –

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\(^{11}\) Cf. 2.4-3.4 5; 3.9.5. See Ar., DA 3.4-429a27 28; 3.5-430a10.


\(^{13}\) See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 12 DK; Pl., Phdr. 247A2 B1, 248A2 3, 249C1 4; Phd. 109D2 E5.

\(^{14}\) These are incorporeal gods.

\(^{15}\) Cf. 6.7.12.6 7.
§ 5.8.4. — for in the intelligible world it is ‘the life of ease’, and truth is their mother and nurse and Substantiality and nourishment — and they see all things, ‘not those to which becoming belongs’ but those to which Substantiality belongs, and they see themselves in others. For everything is transparent and there is nothing dark or opaque, but every god is visible to all the others through and through, for it is light that is visible to light. For every god has everything in himself, and, again, he sees everything in another, so that everything is everywhere and all is all and each is all and the glory is unlimited. For each of them is great since even the small is great. And the sun in the intelligible world is all the stars, and all the stars are, again, the sun and all the other stars. Something different stands out in each, even if everything is manifest in all. The motion is also pure, for the mover does not disturb its moving by being different from the motion. And the stability is not disturbed because it is not mixed with that which is not stable. And that which is beautiful is beautiful because it is not in that which is not beautiful. Each one travels on land which is in a way not foreign, but its essence infuses every place it occupies, and the place from which it came runs along with it going in a way upward; and it is not the case that it is one thing, and the place another. For Intellect is the substrate, that is, Intellect itself. It is as if one thought that in the case of our visible heaven, being luminous, the light which came from it gave birth to the stars.

But in the sensible world one part does not come from another, and each part would just be itself alone, whereas in the intelligible world each always comes from the whole and each is at once also all. For it looks like a part, but sharp sight sees into it as whole; it is in a way as if sight were like that of Lynceus, who in the myth was said to be able to look into the interior of the earth, an enigmatic reference to eyes in the intelligible world.

There is no satiety or weariness of the contemplation in the intelligible world so that they cease to contemplate. For there is no emptiness such that when they are full, the end would be reached; nor is one different from the other such that what satisfies one does not satisfy the other. There is no weariness in the intelligible world. But there is a lack of fullness there inasmuch as the fullness does not make them disdain that which has produced the fullness. For in seeing one sees more, and observing one’s own unlimitedness, and the objects one sees,
one follows one’s own nature. And no one’s life is wearying when it is pure. What could weary someone living the best life?

This life is wisdom, wisdom that is not furnished by means of calculative reasoning, because it was always there omitting nothing that would require being sought. But it is the first, and is not derived from another. Its substantiality itself is wisdom; it does not first exist, and next become wise. Because of this, no wisdom is greater, and scientific understanding itself here is enthroned with Intellect, being revealed together with it, as they say that Justice is symbolically enthroned beside Zeus. All such things in the intelligible world are in a way statues that can see themselves, so that it is a sight seen by ‘supremely happy spectators’. One could, then, glimpse the magnitude and the power of the wisdom that it has with itself and that has produced all the Beings, and all the Beings that followed from it, and it is itself the Beings, and they came to be with it, and were one together with it, and the Being there was wisdom.

We did not, however, achieve comprehension because we have supposed that types of scientific understanding are a matter of theorems and a nexus of propositions; this is not true, even in areas of scientific understanding in the sensible world. But if someone wants to dispute these matters, let them be set aside for now. Regarding scientific understanding in the intelligible world, which Plato actually glimpsed and said, ‘it is not scientific understanding that becomes different as it knows different things’ – though he left it to us to investigate and discover what this means, if indeed we are to be judged worthy of our name – perhaps it would be better to start from the beginning now.

§ 5.8.5. For, not for everything that comes to be, whether products of craft or nature, it is some sort of wisdom that produces them, that is, it is everywhere wisdom that takes a leading role in their production. Indeed, if it is true that someone produces according to this wisdom, let the crafts be like this. But the craftsman, again, goes back to wisdom that is in nature, according to which he himself has come to be, a wisdom that does not extend to theorems, but is something whole, not composed by uniting many things, but rather analysable into a many from one. If, then, one places this wisdom first, that is sufficient, for it is then no longer from another nor in another.

21 See Pindar, Olym. 8.221 222; Sophocles, Oed. Col. 1382; Pl., Lg. 716A2.
24 Perhaps the ‘name’ is ‘Platonist’ or just ‘philosopher’.

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If they\textsuperscript{25} will say that, although the expressed principle is in nature, nature is its principle, we will ask where nature acquired it, that is, if it acquired it from something else.\textsuperscript{26} If it is from itself, we will stop there; if they advance to Intellect, we should look here to see if Intellect generated this wisdom. And if they say that this is so, from where did it get it? From itself? But this is impossible unless Intellect is wisdom itself.

The true wisdom, therefore, is Substance and the true Substance is wisdom, and the value in Substance comes from wisdom, and, because it is from wisdom, it is true Substance. For this reason, substances that do not have wisdom, while they are substances insofar as they have come about through some wisdom, are not true Substances, insofar as they do not have wisdom in themselves.

So, one should not believe that in the intelligible world the gods, or the ‘super-blissful beings’\textsuperscript{27} who are there, see axioms, but rather each of the things said to be in the intelligible world, which are beautiful images such as one might imagine are in the soul of the wise man,\textsuperscript{28} images not drawn, but Beings. For this reason, the ancients said that the Ideas are Beings, that is, Substances.\textsuperscript{29}

§5.8.6. The wise men of Egypt seem to me to have grasped this, whether with precise understanding or innately. When they want to display their wisdom, they don’t use forms of letters which spell out arguments and propositions, or imitate sounds and the verbalization of statements. Rather, they draw images, and carve them in their temples – each thing having one image, rather than a discursive description.

So, then, each image is a bit of scientific understanding or wisdom: a substrate whose parts are taken altogether, not an act of discursive thinking or deliberation. A reflection of this synoptic image,\textsuperscript{30} which spells it out now in another form and expounds it discursively and finds the explanations for its being this way, comes later.

So, someone capable of appreciating when something in the realm of becoming is so beautiful, would say that he was appreciating the wisdom itself which, although it does not have the causes due to which substance is as it is, provides them to the things that are produced according to it. Anything, then, which is beautiful in this way, and which would, as a result of an investigation, appear with difficulty or not at all as having to be the way it is, if indeed someone were to discover it, would be found

\textsuperscript{25} The Stoics. See SVF 1.631 (= Diocles Magnes \textit{apud} D.L., 7.54), 3.4 (= Stob., \textit{Ecl.} 2.76.16), 198 (= Cicero, \textit{Tusc.} 4.34).

\textsuperscript{26} Reading \textit{ἐκεῖνο} with some mss following Igal.

\textsuperscript{27} See Pl., \textit{Symp.} 216E6.


\textsuperscript{29} See Pl., \textit{Rep.} 509B5 9.

\textsuperscript{30} I.e., the hieroglyph.
to exist in this way prior to investigation and prior to calculative reason-
ing. For example, let us take the single most significant case of what I am
talking about, which will serve to illustrate them all.

§5.8.7. Consider this universe: if indeed we agree that it exists and is as it
is due to something else, are we to think that its producer conceived by
himself the thought that the earth had to be situated in the middle, then
water had to be placed on the earth, and everything else had to be in order
up to the heavens, then all living beings, each having their own shapes,
such as they have now, and their internal organs and their exterior parts,
and then, after arranging everything by himself, set to work?

But such conceptualization is not possible – for where did the con-
cepts come from, given that the producer had never seen anything? Nor,
if he got them from elsewhere, would it have been possible for him to
operate as creators who nowadays produce things using their hands and
tools. For hands and feet came afterward. So, it remains that all things
are in something else, and since there is nothing between them, given
the internal proximity of one thing to another among Beings,
a reflection or image of the intelligible world appears, in a way, straight-
away – whether directly or as the result of the intervention of Soul or
some particular soul does not matter for the present. But, then, every-
thing that is here is in the intelligible world in a more beautiful way. For
the things here are mixtures, whereas those things are not.

These things, then, are held together by forms from beginning to
end, first matter by the forms of the elements, then there are other forms
in addition to these, and then still others. Hence, it is hard to find
matter, concealed as it is under many forms. Now since matter itself is
a certain form, namely, the last, this world is all form and all the things
in it are forms. For the paradigm is Form. It produces in silence, because
everything which produces is Substance or Form. For this reason, the
creation is without effort. And the creation was of all things, insofar as
they comprise the cosmos. So, there was nothing that impeded it, and it
still dominates now, even though some of the things that come to be
impede others. But nothing impedes it. For it abides as the cosmos.

Now it seems to me that if we, too, are at once archetypes or
Substances or Forms, and the form that produces here was our sub-
stantiality, our craftsmanship would dominate without effort. And
indeed a human being creates a form other than himself, that which
comes to be. For he stops being all things now that he has become

31 Since matter is not nothing, it is something, that is, it has a quasi form.
32 Cf. 5.7 on Forms of individuals. The ἄνθρωπος ('human being') here perhaps refers to
the Form of the individual human being, perhaps identical with the undescended
intellect.
a human being. But when he ceases to be a human being, Plato says that he ‘walks on high and arranges the entire cosmos’ for having come to be a part of the whole, he produces the whole.

But the point of this argument is to show that you have to speak of the cause which explains why the earth is in the middle and why it is round, and why the ecliptic is the way it is. It was not because it had to be this way in the intelligible world that this was willed so, but it is because things there are as they are that these things here are beautifully arranged. It is as if the conclusion came before the explanation in a syllogism, and did not flow from the premises. For it is not a result of entailment or conception; it is prior to entailment and prior to conception. For all these things come afterwards, as well as argument and demonstration and confidence in them.

And since there is a principle, all things at once come from this and are as they are. And it was well said that we should thus not seek a cause for a principle, especially a perfect principle of this kind, which is identical with the end. What is principle and end is the universe altogether and lacks nothing.

§ 5.8.8. Who, then, would say that that which is primarily beautiful is not beautiful and whole, that is, everywhere whole, so that it is not diminished in beauty by lacking any part? For indeed one will not claim that that which is not whole is beautiful or that that which has only a part of beauty or is missing some part is beautiful. If the primarily beautiful is not beautiful, what else is? For what is prior to it does not want to be beautiful. For that which is primarily an object of contemplation is, as a Form, that is, an object of contemplation for Intellect, also wonderful to see.

For this reason, Plato, wanting to indicate this in terms that are clearer to us, makes the Demiurge satisfied with that which he has completed, wanting thereby to show the beauty of the paradigm, that is, of the Idea, as wonderful. For whenever someone marvels at something produced by something else, the marvelling is directed at that according to which that was produced. If ‘one is ignorant of what is happening to him, there is no marvel in this’, since lovers, too, and generally all those who have marvelled at beauty here are ignorant of the intelligible beauty due to which they are having this experience – for it is due to that. Plato makes it clear, appropriately enough, that ‘was delighted’ refers to the paradigm, when he says in the following passage, ‘he was delighted and he wished that it be made even more like the

33 Cf. 6.5.12.16 19. See Pl., Phdr. 246C1 2. 34 See Ar., Phys. 1.5.188a27 30.
35 Cf. 1.6.6.21 32; 6.7.33.9 22. 36 See Pl., Tim. 37C7 D1.
paradigm’.

He shows what the beauty of the paradigm is like when he says that the beauty of what comes from it is itself an image of it. Also because, if that paradigm of beauty were not ‘extraordinary in its beauty’, what would be more beautiful than what is seen here? Hence, those who disdain beauty here do not do so rightly, unless they do so to the extent that the beauty here is not the paradigm.

§5.8.9. So, let us grasp by discursive thinking this cosmos all together as one, each of its parts remaining what it is and not jumbled together, if possible, so that if any one of these should occur to us— for example, the sphere outside the periphery of the cosmos—an image of the sun follows immediately and together with it all the other stars, and earth and sea and all the living beings are seen, as if all these were in reality to be seen in a transparent sphere. Let there be formed in your soul, then, the image of a luminous sphere having all things in it, whether moving or stable, or some moving and some stable.

Keeping this image, take another for yourself by abstracting the mass from it. Abstract, too, places and the semblance of the matter you have in yourself. Don’t try to take another sphere smaller than it in mass, but call on the god who made that of which you have a semblance, and pray for him to come. And he might come bearing his cosmos with all of the gods in it, being one and all of them, and each is all coming together as one, each with different powers, though all are one by that multiple single power. Rather, it is that one god who is all. For he lacks nothing, if all those gods should become what they are. They are all together and each is separate, again, in indivisible rest, having no sensible shape—for if they had, one would be in one place, and one in another, and each would not have all in himself. Nor do they have different parts in different places, nor all in the identical place, nor is each whole like a power fragmented, being quantifiable, like measured parts. It is rather all power, extending without limit, being unlimited in power. And in this way, the god is great, as the parts of it are all unlimited. For where could one say that he is not already present?

This heaven here, then, is great, and all the powers are in it together, but it would be greater still, and inexpressibly so, if there were not present to it the puny power of a body. One might indeed say that the powers of fire and of the other bodies are great. But it is only by a lack of experience of true power that they are imagined to burn and destroy and

40 Perhaps an attack on Gnostics. Cf. 2.9.4.22 26, 13.18.
41 Embodied individuals must use a process of διάνοια (‘discursive thinking’) to grasp what is in reality all together. Cf. 6.4.7.22 29.
42 Reading ὅλον with Harder and the mss.
crush and support the work of the generation of living beings. Rather, they destroy because they are themselves destroyed, and they generate because they are themselves generated.

The power in the intelligible world has only its existence, that is, its existence as Beauty. For where would Beauty be had it been deprived of its existence? Where would its substantiality be had it been deprived of its being beautiful? For in being deficient in beauty, it would also be deficient in substantiality. For this reason, its existence is longed for, because it is identical with Beauty, and Beauty is loved because it is identical with its existence. And since they are one nature, why is it necessary to seek which one is the cause of the other? For the substantiality in the sensible world is false and in need of an added image of beauty in order that it should appear beautiful and, basically, be, and it is beautiful to the extent that it partakes of Beauty according to Form, and receiving it, the more it receives, the more perfect it is. For insofar as it is beautiful, it has more substantiality.

§ 5.8.10. For this reason, Zeus, even if he is the most ancient of the gods whom he leads, is the first to process to the contemplation of this, with the other gods and daemons and souls who are able to see these Forms following. The Beauty appears to them from some unseen place and, originating from on high, shines down on them and fills everything with its rays and dazzles those below, and they turn away, not being able to see it, as if it were the sun.

Some of them, then, are arrested by the sight and look, while others are terrified, to the extent that they are removed from it. But all those who are able to see do see it and look at what belongs to it. It is not always the identical sight that is afforded to each, but one who is looking intently sees the source and nature of Justice shining down, another is filled with a vision of Self-Control, not like it is among human beings when they have it, for this only imitates that in some way.

But the nature of Beauty extending over all in their entire extent is seen last by those who have already experienced many clear visions, the gods individually and all together, those souls which have seen everything in the intelligible world and which arise from everything, so that they encompass everything themselves from beginning to end. And

43 Cf. 6.7.2.9 10; 6.7.19.18 19. 44 Cf. 3.6.7.40.
45 The singular τούτου probably refers to Beauty representing all the Forms collectively (ταύτα). Cf. 1.6.9.36.
47 As HS note, the words τοῦ καλοῦ φύσις are to be understood along with the feminine η (‘the’) here. If so, then Plotinus is describing a passage from a vision of individual Forms to a comprehensive vision of Forms.
these souls are in the intelligible world to the extent that it is their nature to be there, though many times all of them are in the intelligible world together when they are not materially divided.

It is then that Zeus sees these, along with whoever among us is a lover like him; he sees at last the whole of Beauty surmounted on all, that is, he participates in Beauty in the intelligible world. For it sheds light on everything and fills those who have come to be in the intelligible world so as to make them beautiful, too, in the way that human beings often when ascending to high country are infused with the golden colour of the terrain there and, filled with that colour, they begin to resemble the ground on which they have walked. But in the intelligible world, the colour on the bloom is Beauty, or, more accurately, everything is colour and Beauty from its depths. For the Beauty is not other than that which is blooming.

But as for those who do not see it as a whole, only the surface impression is credited, whereas those who do see it in a way are intoxicated and filled up with nectar, inasmuch as beauty comes into the whole soul, and they are no longer merely spectators. For there is no longer an external spectator looking at an external object, but the one seeing sharply has that which he sees in himself, and having many things in himself, he is ignorant of the fact that he has them and he looks at them as if they were external because he looks at them as objects to be seen and because he wants to see them. Everything that someone sees as a sight he sees as external. But it is necessary for him to transfer these at once into himself, and to look at them as one and as himself – as if someone were possessed by a god, seized by Phoebus or by some Muse, and were to make the vision of the god internal to himself, assuming he had the power to see the god within himself.

§ 5.8.11. And if one of us who is unable to see himself when possessed by that god focuses his contemplation on the sight, he focuses on himself and sees an image of himself made beautiful. But he then dismisses the image even though it is beautiful, achieving self-unification and, no longer being divided, is at the same time one and is all things along with that god who is silently present, and he is with him to the extent that he is able and willing. Even if he should revert to duality, he continues, if he remains pure, to be with the god so that he can be present to him again as before if he should again turn to himself.

But in the reversion he has this benefit: he begins to perceive himself, so long as he is different from that god. He rushes into his interior and

48 See Pl., Phdr. 249E4. 49 See Pl., Symp. 203B5. 50 See Pl., Phdr. 245A1 2. 51 Reading εἰ with the mss.
has everything, and, putting the perception behind him for fear of being different from that god, he is unified with him in the intelligible world. And if he should desire to see him as different, he externalizes himself. He should, as part of his learning about that god, use a representation that was left in him while he was seeking to discern him; if he learns about him in this way, he will approach the sort of state he is entering upon with the confidence that he is entering upon the most blessed state. He forthwith delivers himself to his own interior and immediately becomes, instead of someone seeing, a sight for the gaze of someone else, bright with the thoughts that come from the intelligible world.

How, then, will someone be in beauty when he doesn’t see it? In fact, seeing it as different from himself, he will no longer be in beauty, but will come to be it – ‘in it’ in this extreme way. If, then, seeing is of that which is external, there should not be seeing, or else only the seeing in which one is identical with that which is seen. This is, in a way, comprehension and self-awareness, though one is careful not to be separated from oneself by relying too much on sense-perception.

One should think about this: the perceptions of evils have greater impact, but lesser intellectual effects because these are driven out by the impact. For sickness is more of a disturbance, whereas health in its restful accompaniment would give us comprehension of itself. For it settles in inasmuch as it is akin to us and unites itself with us. Sickness is alien and not akin to us, and this seems clear by its being exceedingly different from us.

We ourselves and what belongs to us cannot be seen by us. Since this is how we are, we are most of all understandable to ourselves when we have made ourselves one with the scientific understanding of ourselves. So, in the intelligible world, when we know better than ever by the measure of Intellect, we seem to be ignorant because we are waiting for the experience of sense-perception, which says that we have not seen anything. For it did not see such things, nor could it ever see them. What does not believe, then, is sense-perception, but something else is seeing; in fact, if it, too, were disbelieving, it would be disbelieving in its own existence. But it is not able to put itself outside itself so as to be sensible to corporeal eyes.

§5.8.12. So, now it has been said how one is able to look at himself as different from himself and how he can look at himself as identical to himself. But in actually seeing, whether as different or as still himself, what does he proclaim? He announces that he has seen a god giving

52 Cf. 1.6.9.15 22; 4.8.1.3 7. See Pl., Rep. 516E8. 53 Cf. 3.8.4.19; 4.3.26.45 46.
birth in pain to beauty, that is, all things that have actually come to be in him, and he has the birth pains painlessly in himself. For he is pleased with what he has generated and, delighted with his offspring, he retains all of them in himself, enjoying their splendour and his own. Among those beautiful offspring and the even more beautiful ones that remain in the interior, Zeus is the only child that shows himself in the exterior. From him, even though he is the youngest child, it is possible to see as if from some image, how great his father is, and his brothers who remain with him.

Zeus says that he did not come from his father in vain. For there must be another beautiful cosmos that has come from the father as an image of Beauty. For it is not licit that there be no beautiful image of either Beauty or of Substance. The image actually imitates the archetype in every way. For, as imitation, it has life and the properties of Substance, and Beauty as it is in the intelligible world. And it has, as an image, its everlastingness; otherwise, the intelligible world will sometimes have an image and sometimes not, given that the image does not come to be by craft. Rather, every image naturally exists for as long as its archetype remains.

For this reason, they are not right who destroy the cosmos though the intelligible remains, and generate it as if the production were by someone who only occasionally wanted to do this. For they do not want to understand the nature of this sort of production, nor see that so long as that archetype shines forth, the other things would never be lacking, but that they exist while it exists. It always was so and always will be. For we must use these words as necessary for indicating what we want to say.

§5.8.13. The god [Kronos], then, who, being bound, remains as he is, concedes the rule of this universe to his son [Zeus] – for it was not in him to abandon the rule of the intelligible world being sated with the beauties there for a newer and later rule. He let this cosmos go, and established his father [Ouranos] on his own, extending down to him from above. Again, he established the things below him, beginning with his son, so that he is midway between both, cut off from that which is above by difference, and from that which comes after and below him by the bond which keeps him back from it, and is midway between a father who is greater and a son who is lesser.

54 See Hesiod, Theog. 459. 55 See Hesiod, Theog. 478.
56 This is the sensible cosmos.
57 The Stoics. See SVF 1.98 (= Eusebius, Pr. ev. 15.14.1 2). 58 Cf. 6.4.10.1 15.
But since his father was greater than to be judged in terms of Beauty, Kronos remained primarily beautiful, even though Soul is beautiful, too. He is, though, more beautiful than this, because Soul has a trace of him in itself, and though its nature is beautiful, it is more beautiful whenever it looks to the intelligible world. If, then, speaking in a more familiar way, we say that the soul of the universe, that is, Aphrodite herself, is beautiful, what should we say about Intellect? For if she is beautiful from herself, how much beauty would Intellect possess? If it comes from another, from what does Soul and that which is added to it and that which belongs to its nature by its substantiality have beauty? We, too, while we are beautiful by being ourselves, are ugly when transforming ourselves into another nature. And though, when we know ourselves, we are beautiful, when we are ignorant of ourselves, we are ugly. Beauty, then, is in the intelligible world and comes from there.

So are the things said sufficient to lead to clear comprehension of ‘the intelligible world’, or do we need to go back and pursue another road like this one?
5.9 (5)
On Intellect, Ideas, and Being

Introduction

This treatise is concerned with the relation between Intellect and the Forms, together constituting Being. Here, Plotinus confronts Epicureans and Stoics on their denial of the existence of an intelligible realm that is separate from the sensible. He aims to explain the relations among Forms and their relation to Intellect and how the intelligible world is supposed to serve an ineliminable explanatory role for the sensible world. The sketchiness of the discussion of many points here anticipates the much longer discussions in later treatises. In this regard, it is to be noted that Plotinus does not discuss in this treatise except in passing the first principle of all.

Summary

§1. The superiority of Platonism to Epicureanism and Stoicism in explanatory power.
§2. The ascent from the sensible to the intelligible.
§3. An argument for the necessary existence of Intellect and intelligibles.
§4. The superiority of Intellect to Soul and Soul’s dependence on Intellect.
§5. The eternity of Intellect’s intellection of Forms which are internal to it. Sensibles participate in intelligibles.
§6. Intellect’s identity with all intelligibles and their distinctness from each other and from it.
§7. The objects of primary knowledge are Forms. Forms are prior to Intellect and not created by it.
§8. Being consists in Intellect and the Forms which are identical.
§9. Intellect is identical with all that is intelligible. There could be nothing that is not in Intellect paradigmatically.

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§10. Everything that has a measure of intelligibility in the sensible world has its paradigm in the intelligible world. There is, however, no evil in the intelligible world.

§11. The sense in which artefacts and crafts can be said to be in the intelligible world.

§12. Are there Forms of individuals? Answer to this question deferred until later (cf. 5.7 (18)).

§13. The sense in which souls are and are not in the intelligible world.

§14. There are not Forms for everything in the sensible world, including accidental composites, the results of decay, and evils.
§5.9.1. All human beings, when they are born, from the beginning use sense-perception prior to intellect, and, necessarily, encounter sensibles first. Some of them remain at this level and live their lives believing that these are the first things and the last they will encounter, supposing that what is painful in these is evil and what is pleasurable is good, and they typically pass their lives believing that it is sufficient that they pursue the one and manage to avoid the other.

Those, at least, who pretend that they are just being rational, lay this down as wisdom, like heavy birds who, taking in a lot from the earth, and being weighted down by it, are unable to fly high even though they are naturally equipped with wings. Others are furnished with the ability to ascend a little from things here below by the better part of their soul moving them from that which is pleasurable to that which is more beautiful. But, having nowhere else to plant themselves, they are unable to see above, and are brought back down to a nominal virtue concerned with actions and ‘choices’ made of those things here below from which they at first tried to elevate themselves. But there is a third type of divine human being who, with superior power and sharp-sightedness, saw, as if by a piercing vision, the glory up above and raised themselves to the intelligible world, in a way, beyond the clouds and the obscurity of the sensible world and remained in the intelligible world looking down on all the things here. They were delighted by being in a true and familiar place, as if after much wandering a human being arrived in his well-governed fatherland.

§5.9.2. What, then, is this place? And how might one reach it? One who is a lover by nature and from the start really has the disposition of

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1 The Epicureans. See Ep. ad Men. 128-130.
2 The Stoics. See SVF 3.23 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1040c).
3 See SVF 3.64 (= Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 160.3), 118 (= Stob., Ed. 2.79.1); Sext. Emp., M. 11.133.
4 The Platonists. See Pl., Phd. 82B10. 5 Cf. 1.6.8.16 17. See Homer, Od. 5.37, 204.
a philosopher might reach it;' assuming that inasmuch as he is a lover,
he is having ‘birth pains’ regarding beauty, and since he cannot bear
‘corporeal beauty’ flees from there to ‘the beauties of the soul, virtues
and types of scientific understanding and practices and laws’. Again, he
continues his pursuit on to the cause of what is beautiful in the soul, and
whatever might be prior to this, until he comes at last to the first, which
is beautiful in itself. Arriving there, his birth pains will cease, but not
before then. But how will he ascend? Where does the power to do so come from to
him, and what argument will instruct this love? In fact, it is this: this beauty which is added to bodies belongs to
to bodies. For these shapes that bodies have are added to them as to matter.
At least, the substrate changes and from being beautiful it becomes ugly.
The argument, therefore, maintains that it is by participation that this is
so. What, then, is that which makes a body beautiful? In one way, it is
the presence of beauty; in another, it is the presence of soul, which
moulded it and brought this shape to it.

What, then? Is soul beautiful by itself?

In fact, it is not. For if that were the case, one soul would not be wise
and beautiful and another stupid and ugly. It is, therefore, by wisdom
that beauty is in the soul. And what is it, then, which gives wisdom to the
soul? Necessarily, it is Intellect; not an intellect that sometimes acts like
intellect and sometimes does not, but the true one which is, therefore,
beautiful by itself. Should one actually stop here, taking this as first, or
ought one to transcend Intellect, with Intellect standing in front of the
first principle, from our perspective, as if ‘on the threshold of the
Good’, proclaiming that all things are in itself just like an impression
taken from it, or rather in multiple impressions of it, while it remains in
every way one?

§5.9.3. The nature of this Intellect, which the argument claims to be
that which is real and true Substance, should be investigated, after first
having taken another approach to assure ourselves that there must be
such a thing. It is, then, perhaps foolish to seek to discover that intellect is
among things that exist even if some would contend that it is not. It is

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6 See Pl., Phdr. 248D3 4.  7 Cf. 1.3.1.5 18; 1.6.9.1 6. See Pl., Symp. 210b3 C6.
8 See Pl., Phdr. 251E3 252A1.  9 See Pl., Symp. 210E3.
10 Cf. 2.9.1.50; 5.5.1.3; 5.8.3.9 10. See Ar., Da 3.5.430a22.
12 See Pl., Phil. 64C1.  13 See Pl., Tim. 37D6.
14 Perhaps an allusion to Epicureans. Alternatively, Plotinus is referring to Intellect, the
existence of which Epicureans would deny even if they believe that intellect exists in
some sense.
better to ask if intellect is such as we say it is, and if it is something separate, and if this is identical with Being and if the nature of Forms is here. Regarding this, it remains for the following to be said.

We certainly see that all things that are said to be are composites not one of which is simple, both whatever craft fashions and whatever is constituted by nature. For the products of craft are just bronze or wood or stone, and nothing is made from them until a particular craft fashions a statue or a bed or a house, introducing the form which it has in itself.\(^{15}\)

Further, the same goes for the things constituted by nature, some of which are multiply composited and are called compounds; these can be analysed into the form and the compounded elements that it governs. For example, a human being can be analysed into soul and body, and the body into the four elements. And when you find that each of these is a composite of matter and something that shapes it – for matter by itself is without shape – you will investigate where the form comes to matter from. You will investigate, again, whether the soul is among the simples already or whether there is something in it that is composed of matter and form; and whether the intellect in it has one part which is like the shape in the bronze and another part which is like the one who produces the shape in the bronze.\(^{16}\)

And, then, transferring these considerations onto the whole universe, one will ascend to posit Intellect, too, as the true producer or creator, and one will say that the substrate, having received shapes, becomes fire, water, air, and earth. These shapes come from another. This is the soul; it is soul, again, that gives to the four elements the shape of the cosmos. But it is Intellect that supplies the expressed principles for this to be generated, just as the expressed principles come from the crafts to the souls of the craftsmen to actualize. Intellect is, then, the form of the soul, analogous to the shape, and that which provides the shape is analogous to one who produced the statue, in whom everything which he imposed, pre-existed. That which Intellect gives to the soul is near to the truth; what the body receives are already images and imitations.\(^{17}\)

§5.9.4. Why, then, must one ascend above Soul, and refrain from positing it as first?

In fact, it is because Intellect is different from Soul and greater than it and that which is by nature greater is first. For it is actually not the case, as they think,\(^ {18}\) that Soul, when it has been perfected, generates

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\(^{15}\) Cf. 5.8.1.15 30.  \(^{16}\) See Ar., DA 3.5.430a14 15.  \(^{17}\) See Pl., Tim. 50C5.

\(^{18}\) The Stoics. Cf. 4.7.8.3 9. See SVF 2.835 (= Iamblichus, De an. apud Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.317.21), 836 (= Aëtius, Plac. 4.21), 837, 839 (= D.L., 7.159).
Intellect. For where will the actualization of that potency come from if there is not a cause that brings it to actuality? For if it happens by chance, it is possible for it not to come to actuality. For this reason, we must posit first principles in actuality that are self-sufficient and complete. Those that are incomplete come later from these, being brought to perfection by that which has generated them in the way that fathers bring to perfection offspring that are originally born imperfect. And Soul must be matter in relation to that which is first, that which produces it; when it is informed, it is brought to perfection.

Indeed, if Soul has affective states, there must be something that is unaffected – otherwise, in time all things would cease to be – and there must be something that is prior to Soul. And if Soul is in the cosmos, there must be something that is outside the cosmos, and in this way, too, there must be something prior to Soul. For if that which is in the cosmos consists of that which is in body and matter, nothing remains that is identical so that a human being and all the expressed principles are neither eternal nor do they retain their identities. And one can come to the conclusion that Intellect must be prior to Soul from these and many other arguments.

§5.9.5. One should grasp Intellect if we are indeed going to use this term correctly, as not being in potency nor as that which goes from a nescient state to being Intellect – if we do not do this, we will need to seek again something else prior to it – but as that which is in actuality and is always Intellect. But if it does not have intellectual activity from outside, then, if it thinks, it thinks by itself, and if it has something, it has it from itself. But if thinking comes from itself and out of itself, it is itself what it thinks. For if its substantiality is other than its thinking, what it thinks is different from it, and its substantiality will be without thought, and once again, it will be in potency, not in actuality. Neither, therefore, should be separated from the other. But it is customary for us to separate those things and the conceptions of them in us.

What, then, is in act and what thinks, so that we may posit it as that which it thinks?

In fact, it is clear that Intellect, being real, thinks Beings and causes them to exist. It is, therefore, these Beings. For either it will think these as Beings in something different from itself, or as Beings in itself. It is, then, impossible that they be in something different from

19 Since bodies are always changing. See Pl., Crat. 440A7; Tht. 152E1.
20 Cf. 2.9.2.46 51; 3.8.8.11; 5.3.5.23 48; 8.15 41; 5.4.2.44 48; 5.5.1.19 33; 50 61; 5.6.1.4 13; 6.6.15.19 24. See Ar., DA 3.4.430a2 5; 5.430a17 18; 7.431a1 2; Meta. 12.7.1072b18 21 12.9.1074b18 1075a5.
21 Cf. 5.1.4.26 28. Adding the omitted τά in the words ἐστιν ἄρα ὄντα.
it. For where would that be? Therefore, it is the Beings and they are in it.

For they are certainly not in sensibles, as they think. For anything which is first is not a sensible. For the form in sensibles that is over and above their matter is an image of the real Form, and all form that is present in something else comes to it from something else, and is an image of that from which it comes. And if there must be ‘a producer of this universe’, this will not think a universe that does not yet exist in order to produce it. There must be, therefore, prior to the cosmos those Beings that are not impressions of other Beings, but archetypes and primarily Beings and Intellect’s substantiality.

If they will say that the expressed principles are sufficient, it is clear that these will be eternal. But if they are eternal and unaffected, they must be in an Intellect of this sort, which is prior to disposition and nature and soul, for these are in potency. Intellect, therefore, is the real Beings, and does not think Beings as if they were elsewhere. For they are neither prior to it nor after it. But it is, in a way, the primary lawgiver, or rather it is itself the law of their existence. It is, therefore, correct to say that ‘thinking and Being are identical’, and ‘the scientific understanding of that which is without matter is identical with the thing itself’, and ‘I searched myself’, as being one of the Beings.

And it is the same with recollections. For they are not outside Beings nor are they in place, but rather they remain always in themselves not admitting change or destruction. For this reason, they are really Beings. But if they are generated or destroyed, their being will have to be added to them from outside, and they will no longer be Beings, but that which is added will be Being.

Sensibles are indeed what they are said to be by participation, with their underlying nature acquiring a shape from elsewhere; for example, bronze receives it from the sculptor and wood from the craftsman by means of an image belonging to the craft entering into it, whereas the craft itself is outside the matter and retains its identity, having the true statue or bed. This is certainly how it works in the case of bodies.

24 See Pl., Tim. 28C3 4. Cf. 5.1.4-5 7; 5.3.7-30 34; 5.8.12.15 20; 6.5.8.12 13.
25 The Stoics. See SVF 2.1013 (= Sext. Emp., M. 9.78). These are the three manifestations of πνεῦμα for the Stoics.
26 See Numenius, fr. 13.
And this universe, by participating in reflections, reveals Beings to be other than these; they are immutable, while the reflections are mutable; they are ensconced by themselves, not in need of a place for they are not magnitudes; and they have a real intellectual existence which is sufficient for them. For the nature of bodies wants to be preserved by something else, whereas Intellect, holding up by its marvellous nature the things that would by themselves fall, does not itself seek a place to be ensconced.

§ 5.9.6. Let us agree that Intellect is indeed Beings, and everything it has in itself it does not have a place for them, but in the way that it has itself; that is, as being one with them. And in the intelligible world ‘all things are together’, and no less is each thing distinct from the others. Even soul has together in itself many types of scientific understanding, though it does not have these jumbled together, and each soul attends as necessary to what it has, not dragging in the others; and each pure thought acts on the basis of what is inside the soul, while the others are standing by. Intellect, then, is, in this way, much more all things together and, again, not all together, because each has its own unique power.

Intellect as a whole encompasses all things just like a genus encompasses its species and just like a whole encompasses its parts. The powers that seeds have are a metaphor for what is being said. For all things are undistinguished in the whole, and the expressed principles are as if in the centre. And yet there is one expressed principle of an eye and another one of the hands, whose difference is known from the sensible entity that is generated by the seed.

As for the powers in the seeds, each one of them is a whole expressed principle with all its parts enveloped within it, having the corporeal as its matter – for example, that which is moist in the seed – whereas it is itself the form as a whole and an expressed principle, being identical to the form in the soul that generates, which is a reflection of another greater soul. Some designate the soul in the seed as nature, which is set in motion from the intelligible world, from the things prior to it, and just as light from fire, it twisted and shaped the matter, not pushing it or using those levers that are much spoken of, but endowing it with its expressed principles.

34 See Pl., Crat. 400C7. 35 Cf. 5.5.3.1 2.
36 Cf. 5.3.15.21; 5.8.9.3. See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK. 37 Cf. 6.2.21.54 56.
38 Cf. 6.2.20.1 23.
39 The Stoics. Cf. 4.9.5.9 12. See SVF 2.743 (= Galen, De foet. form. 6.4.699).
40 See Ar., Phys. 8.6.259b20.
§5.9.7. And in the rational soul, there are types of scientific understanding which are of sensibles – assuming one should call these types of ‘scientific understanding’, as opposed to the more appropriate name ‘belief’ – because they are posterior to their objects and are images of them. And there are types of scientific understanding which are of intelligibles, which are indeed truly types of scientific understanding,\(^41\) which come from Intellect into the rational soul, and think nothing sensible.\(^42\) But insofar as they are types of scientific understanding, they are, each of them, identical with what they think, and have internally the intelligible and the intellection, and that is because Intellect remains within itself – it is the primary Beings themselves – being together with itself always and existing in actuality. It is not related to its objects as if it did not possess them,\(^43\) either seeking to acquire them or passing through them in order as if they were not already available – for these are states that the soul experiences – but stands fast in itself being ‘all things together’,\(^44\) and does not bring each one into existence by thinking them.

For it is not the case that it thought god and god came to be, nor, when it thought Motion, that Motion came to be. Hence, to say that Forms are acts of thinking is not right, if what is meant is that when someone thought, this or that came to be.\(^45\) For that which is thought must be prior to that which is thinking. Or how else would one come to think it? For it is indeed not likely to be by chance nor did it just happen upon them.

§5.9.8. If, then, intellection is of that which is internal to Intellect, then the Form is that which is internal.\(^46\) It is the Idea itself. What, then, is this? Intellect and the intellectual Substance, with each Idea not being different from Intellect, but each being Intellect. And Intellect is wholly all the Forms, and each Form is Intellect,\(^47\) just as the entirety of scientific understanding includes all theorems, each part of the whole not discriminated by place, but each having its own power in the whole.

This Intellect is, then, in itself and holding itself in stillness, always full. If, then, one supposed that Intellect were prior to Being, one should have said that Intellect, in being actual and in thinking, perfected and generated the Beings. But since Being must be supposed to be prior to

\(^{41}\) See Pl., Phdr. 247E2.  
\(^{42}\) See Pl., Rep. 533E8 534A2.  
\(^{43}\) Cf. 5.5.1.62 65. See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b21 23.  
\(^{44}\) See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.  
\(^{45}\) Cf. 5.6.6.26; 6.6.6.30 32; 6.7.8.7. See Pl., Parm. 132B3 4.  
\(^{46}\) Cf. 5.5.  
\(^{47}\) Literally, ‘each Form is each intellect’ (ὦ̂ καστον εἴδος νοῦς ὦ̂ καστος). Cf. 4.9.5.17 20; 5.1.4.26 27; 6.2.20.10 23.
Intellect, it is necessary to posit that the Beings reside in that which is thinking, whereas the actuality, that is, the intellection is an addition to the Beings – as in the case of fire, the actuality of fire is an addition to it – in order that they would have Intellect as the unity that is their own actuality. But Being is also actuality. There is, then, one actuality for both, or rather both are one.  

Being and Intellect are, then, one nature. For this reason, so are the Beings and the actuality of Being and an Intellect of this sort. And so acts of intellection are the Form or shape of Being, and its actuality. They are considered by us as one before the other, since they are divided by us. For the dividing intellect is one thing, but the undivided Intellect does not divide and is Being and all things.

§ 5.9.9. What, then, are the things in the unity of Intellect which we divide when we are thinking? For we should, although these are stable, bring them forth, in the way that we consider the contents of a science that is unified. Since this cosmos is actually a living being encompassing all living beings which has its existence, that is, its existence as the sort of thing it is, from something else, which leads back to Intellect, it is necessary, too, that its entire archetype be in Intellect, and that this Intellect be an intelligible cosmos, which, Plato says, is ‘in that which is the Living Being’.

For just as, when there is an expressed principle for a living being, and there is matter which is receptive of the seminal principle, then it is necessary for that living being to come to be, so when there is an intelligent nature which is all powerful and prevented from doing nothing, and there is nothing standing in the way of this and of that which is able to receive it, it is necessary that the one be ordered and the other do the ordering. And that which has been ordered is divided and this is how it receives the Form, with a human being in one place and the sun in another. But that which orders has all things in a unity.

§ 5.9.10. Such forms as there are in the sensible world come from the intelligible world; such forms as are not there, do not. For this reason, things that are contrary to nature are not in the intelligible world, just as there is nothing contrary to craft in the crafts, and there is no lameness in seeds. Lameness of the feet is actually either congenital and due to the expressed principle not dominating, or by chance and due to damage to the form. In the intelligible world, there are indeed harmonious qualities and quantities, numbers and magnitudes and relations, actions and

48 Cf. 5.3-5.32 35; 5.4.2-43 44. 49 See Pl., Tim. 33B2 3. 50 Presumably, Soul.
51 Cf. 5.3-5.31 35; 6.7.12.1 14. See Pl., Tim. 39E8.
52 See SVF 1.102 (= D.L., 7.135 136).
experiences which are in accord with nature, kinds of motion and stability generally and their parts. Instead of time, there is eternity. Place in the intelligible world is of an intellectual kind, where one Being is in another.

In the intelligible world, then, all Beings are together, and whichever of them you happen to grasp is Substance and intellectual, each partaking of Life – Identity, Difference, Motion, and Stability\(^53\) – being in motion and stable – Substance and quality – since all are Substance. For each Being is in actuality and not in potency such that the quality of each Substance has not been separated from it.\(^54\)

Is it, then, the case that only the forms in the sensible world are in the intelligible world or are there more of other things there? In order to answer this question, we have to first examine things that are produced according to craft. For there is no evil in the intelligible world; evil here comes from a lack or privation or deficiency, and it is the state of matter’s misadventures or of that which is made to be like matter.

§5.9.11. In the intelligible world, then, are there products of the crafts and the crafts themselves?\(^55\) Actually, among the crafts, such as the mimetic ones – painting and sculpture, dance and mime – the construction of which, I suppose, is done here by the use of a sensible paradigm, that is, by imitating forms and motions, and transferring the symmetries that they see, one would not reasonably refer to the intelligible world, unless it were to the expressed principle of human being. But if human beings had some disposition for examining the symmetries of beings generally apart from those of individuals, it would also be a part of that ability to examine and to theorize the symmetry of everything in the intelligible world.

Further, we could say the identical thing for the study of harmony and rhythm in the case of music generally, too, insofar as matters concerning rhythm and harmony have a conceptual basis,\(^56\) just as intelligible Number has as well.\(^57\) And so, too, those of the crafts that produce sensible objects, such as architecture and carpentry, to the extent that they make use of symmetries, would have their principles in the intelligible world and their thought processes there, too.

But insofar as they are mixed with something sensible, they are not as a whole in the intelligible world, except within the human being. Indeed, there would not be farming, which contributes to the growth of the sensible plant, nor medicine, which considers health in the


\(^{54}\) Cf. 2.6.1.1 8; 5.1.4.33 41; 6.2.8.25 41. \(^{55}\) Cf. 6.3.16.13 27.

\(^{56}\) See Pl., *Rep.* 398D2; *Συμφ.* 187E5; *Lg.* 655A5. \(^{57}\) See Pl., *Rep.* 525C 526A.
sensible world, nor the craft which is concerned with strength and good conditioning. For there is another power in the intelligible world and another health, according to which all living beings are undisturbed and have sufficient means.

But as for rhetoric and strategy, economics, and the craft of kingship, if some of these share in that which is beautiful in their actions, and if they contemplate that, they have, by having this scientific understanding, a share of the scientific understanding that is in the intelligible world. Geometry, being concerned with intelligibles, should be classified as being in the intelligible world, as should theoretical wisdom, which at the highest is concerned with Being. And this is what needs to be said about the crafts and about things produced by them.

§5.9.12. But if there exists in the intelligible world a Form of Human Being, that is, of Human Being qua rational or craftsman, and of the crafts which are generated from Intellect, it is necessary to say that Forms of universals exist:58 not of Socrates, but of Human Being. We should examine whether in regard to Human Being there is also a Form of an individual human being.59 There is individuality because the identical characteristic varies from individual to individual. For example, given that one nose is snub and another is aquiline, the snub and the aquiline should be posited as differentiae in the Form of Human Being, just as there are differentiae in the Living Being. But it is the result of matter that one has one sort of aquiline nose and another has another. And some colour differentiae belong in the expressed principle, whereas for others matter and location make them to be as they are.

§5.9.13. It remains to speak about whether only things in the sensible world are in the intelligible world, or also, just as Human Being itself is different from human being, Soul itself in the intelligible world is different from soul, and Intellect itself different from intellect.60 The first thing to say is that one should not believe that all things that are in the sensible world are images of archetypes, nor should one believe that soul is an image of Soul itself, but the one differs from the

58 See Ar., Meta. 8.1.1042a15.
59 Cf. 5.7.
60 The words αὐτῷφυς and αὐτώνοδος are being used on the analogy of αὐτόφύλακτος, which would normally refer to the Form of Human Being. But here Plotinus seems to be asking about soul and intellect on the analogy with the nature of a Form as distinct from the Form itself that has this nature. He is asking if this nature, due to its being in the intelligible world, is different from its (non-sensible) being in the sensible world. See Ar., Meta. 1.9.991a29, b10; 7.16.1040b33; 13.5.1079b33, 7.1081a11, 8.1084a14 18.
others in value, and Soul itself is in the sensible world as well, though perhaps [its nature is] not as it is in the sensible world.

And for each individual soul that is truly a soul, there should be some sort of justice and self-control, and for the souls in us there should be some genuine scientific understanding, and these are not reflections or images of Forms as are things in the sensible world, but are the identical things here in another manner. For they are not set apart in a different place; whenever the soul is released from the body, those virtues and scientific understanding are in the intelligible world. For the sensible world is localized, but the intelligible world is everywhere. And such things as this kind of soul has here are in the intelligible world.

So, if one takes the things in the sensible world to be just those things which are seen, then not only are things in the sensible world in the intelligible world, but so are other things, too. But if one takes things in the cosmos to include soul and what is in soul, everything is in the intelligible world that is here.

§5.9.14. This nature, then, encompassing all things in the intelligible world, should be posited as this principle. And how is this so, when the real principle is one and simple in every way, whereas there is a multiplicity among the Beings? We need to say how besides the One there is multiplicity, that is, how there are all these Beings, and why Intellect is all these and where it comes from, beginning from another beginning.  

Regarding the question of things that arise from putrefaction and wild animals, and whether there is a Form of them in the intelligible world, and one of dirt and mud, it should be said that everything provided by Intellect from the outset is best. These things are not among these types. Nor can one infer from these things to Intellect; rather, to Soul, which comes from Intellect, and receives additional things from matter, these things among them. Regarding these, matters will be spoken of more clearly when we come back to the puzzle of how a plurality comes from a one.

We must say that composites occurring by chance and not by Intellect are sensible by coming together by themselves, and are not among Forms. The things that come to be by putrefaction are perhaps from a soul impotent to produce anything else; if it were, it would have produced one of the things that exists by nature. Nevertheless, it produces what it can.

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61 Cf. 5.4. 62 See Pl., Parm. 136C6; Alcinous, Didask. 163.28 29.
Regarding the crafts, it should be said that such crafts as are attributable to things that are natural for a human being are included in the Human Being itself. But is there another universal human nature, and Soul itself, or Life, that goes with it, prior to human nature?

In fact, there is Soul itself in Intellect prior to the generation of Soul, which makes it possible for Soul itself to be generated.
Ennead Six
6.1–3 (42, 43, and 44)  
On the Genera of Being 1–3

INTRODUCTION

6.1–3 (42, 43, 44) form a single treatise on the genera of being. The first section 6.1 is devoted to a criticism of Aristotle, above all of his Categories, and of the Stoics. 6.2 continues with a positive theory taking as a starting point the view developed in Plato’s Sophist that there are five greatest genera of being. The third and final part 6.3 completes the account by using the results of the second part to offer an account of the genera applying to beings that undergo change.

SUMMARY

6.1

§1. Plotinus begins by discussing the various positions taken by earlier thinkers on the question how many (genera of) beings there are, before concentrating on Aristotle (§§1–24); the final chapters then turn to the Stoics. The two central questions in discussing the Peripatetic view are: can one reduce the number of genera to ten? And: how does sensible being relate to intelligible being? Plotinus raises two problems: in any genus there is no prior and posterior, hence given a distinction between sensible and intelligible being, there cannot be genera of being. Secondly, there is only identity of name (‘homonymy’) between sensible beings and intelligible beings – when you say what each of them is, there are two different definitions.

§§2–3. The nature of substance. The fundamental problem that Plotinus raises here, repeated in the case of the other genera is the following: the things that are supposed to be substance are too diverse to fall under a single genus. For it should include sensible and intelligible being, form, matter and composite, individuals and species.
§§4–5. The nature of quantity. He repeats the criticism that there is no common characteristic uniting them in a genus. There are two species of quantity – continuous and discrete. But Plotinus wishes to establish which is really quantity and he comes to the conclusion that time and space are only accidentally quantities, and that only number is essentially quantity.

§§6–9. The nature of relatives; here too a problem is the coherence of the genus. But even prior to this, the question about the being of relatives has to be settled. §7 pursues a thesis that there are only relatives for us, in that they do not affect the relata. §8 returns to the question of the being of relatives – they are not bodies, but incorporeal. But they are of different kinds. §9 discusses three kinds of principles of relatives – the relation that brings about (1) an activity, (2) participation, (3) sensation, states and measures.

§§10–12. The nature of quality. On the basis of four types of quality distinguished by Aristotle: states, disposition, capacity, and figure, Plotinus argues that quality does not form a coherent genus. There is no one feature common to all types. In §10 he argues that in fact the distinctions between the four types are not tenable, and in §12 he sketches a new, provisional typology, depending on whether the qualities are those of body and soul, corresponding to activities, and harmful or beneficial.

§13. The nature of the ‘when’, which insofar as it collects adverbs of time is a genuine genus. However, Plotinus tries to show that it can be reduced, namely to quantity in that time is a quantity.

§14. The nature of the ‘where’, which provides answers to questions formulated with ‘where’? Because it can be reduced to place, it is not a genus in its own right. The parallel between the where and the when is extended to include the idea that neither is simple in the way that a genus should be, since they indicate parts of place and time. Both can in fact be considered as relatives.

§§15–22. The discussion of producing change and being affected takes up §§15–22. In fact, Plotinus insists on discussing the activity by which something acts. He then moves on to refute Aristotle’s definition of motion as an incomplete activity. For it is complete, in every instant, is continuous, and not infinitely divisible. Once motion has been assimilated to activity, the question arises whether acting and
being affected are not in fact simply relatives. Plotinus in fact considers producing change and being affected as species of motion (§18): some activities relate to something being affected, others do not. Only the former are changes, and the latter are activities. Activities can then be distinguished into locomotion and thought. If the change in being comes from its own being, that is acting, if from that of another being, then it is being affected. However (§19), the distinction between acting and being affected is not clear-cut: cutting for example includes both. Being affected does not merely designate the process of becoming worse. Finally, in §§21–22 Plotinus argues that acting and being affected are not genera of being. If they differ from one another, then they are changes, more exactly alterations. If they are merely two aspects of one change, then they are both merely relatives. However, those acts which do not relate to other things should not be considered as acting at all; so all acting is in fact relative.

§§23–24. The nature of having, providing Plotinus with a variety of criticisms, above all why such a restricted notion should be a genus at all. Similarly, he argues against the position (§24), that many items placed in this genus can easily be placed in other genera.

§§25–30. Attack on the Stoic notion of genera. First, he attacks the logical mistakes he sees in the choice of genera, and secondly he attacks Stoic corporealism: all the genera are bodies, except lekta, ‘sayables’. They distinguish four primary genera of being, that is, of body – the substrate, the thing qualified, the way of being, and the way of being related to other things. Common to all of these is being ‘something’. Plotinus criticizes this notion in that this genus encompasses both bodies and incorporeals. And a genus can only be differentiated into species using differences not lying in the genus itself. And it finally contravenes the law of the excluded middle – in including both beings and non-beings (incorporeals). Their notion of substrate combines that of matter and body – and the former is prior to the latter, and so cannot be in one genus with it. Furthermore, matter is a principle, not a genus.
6.2

INTRODUCTION

6.2 (43) tackles the question of what the genera of being are, and the answer Plotinus develops is based on the five greatest genera from Plato’s *Sophist*. The first matter to be settled is what a genus of being is (§§1–3). They must be primary, that is subordinate neither to one another nor to any other genus.

SUMMARY

6.2

§1. The Platonic genera.
§2. Being is one-many.
§3. The genera of being are secondary, caused to be by the One.
§4. And they are intelligible being, rather than becoming, that is, they are not body.
§5. Soul, on the other hand, is a principle producing things, by being the source of their expressed principles (λόγοι).
§6. While soul is one, in fact one soul, it is the source of the forms producing all bodies.
§7. In soul, we find Being, Life and thinking, which in terms of the greatest genera provide Plotinus with Being, Motion, and Stability. These genera are situated in Intellect: its mode of thinking is to be understood in terms of Being, Motion, and Stability.
§8. Since each of these is identical to itself, and different from the others, two further genera are added: Identity and Difference.
§§9–18. These five genera cannot be augmented, especially not by the One, which is not a genus, nor by quantity (§13), nor quality (§§14–15), nor the relative or other Peripatetic genera (§16). Other candidates are also excluded: the Good (§17), the Beautiful and the virtues (§18).
§19. But how are the greatest genera related to their species? Being, i.e., Intellect, produces the particular intellects, and also soul.
§20. The way the particular intellects are produced by Intellect.
§21. Intellect also produces particular things.
§22. Finally, Plotinus relates his account back to that in Plato – *Timaeus* 39E, *Parmenides* 144BC, *Philebus* 16E.
6.3

**INTRODUCTION**

6.3 (44) proceeds to apply the lessons of 6.2 to things that come to be. What does becoming have in common with being? There are analogously the same genera, primarily in being, and secondarily in coming to be. §2 proceeds to argue against an Aristotelian view of what is common between the greatest genera and Aristotelian substance. §3 tries to deduce the five primary genera applicable to becoming: substance, relatives, quantity, quality, and motion. The following chapters discuss these five genera: substance §§4–10, quantity §§11–15, quality §§16–20, motion §§21–27, relatives §28.

**SUMMARY**

6.3

§1. What does becoming have in common with being? There are analogously the same genera, primarily in being, and secondarily in coming to be.

§2. Argument against an Aristotelian view of what is common between the greatest genera and Aristotelian substance.

§3. Attempt to deduce the five primary genera applicable to becoming: substance, relatives, quantity, quality, and motion. The following sections discuss these five genera: substance §§4–10, quantity §§11–15, quality §§16–20, motion §§21–27, relatives §28.

§4. Form, matter, and composite are substance. Substance is not merely the substrate of attributes, it is the source of other things, and of production; in short that because of which there are other things.

§5. In the intelligibles, being the substrate is said differently, namely homonymously. Not being in anything else can also be said of time or place.

§6. In the case of the elements, their being is simple, whereas in that of attributes such as pale, being is accidental.

§7. If sensible beings have their being from matter, the question arises where it acquires its being from, since it is not primary.

§8. (Sensible) substance is not the elements but a bundle of qualities or forms in matter.

§9. Sensible substances are then more or less material – elements, plants, animals – their species, both individuals and universals.
Individuals are prior to us, in that they are more knowable to us, but naturally prior are those which are more general, i.e., species.

§10. It is possible to divide substances by the coupling of simple qualities or else by a quality, i.e., their form in the case of organic substances.

§11. The quantity that makes instances of quantity lies in both number and magnitude.

§12. There are contraries in quantity – large–small, many–few. There is quantity when a unit or point is extended. The magnitude of the quantity depends on how long the extension is.

§13. The continuous magnitude is to be distinguished from the discrete one by the possession of a boundary. Line, plane, and solid are species of magnitude.

§14. Straight line is for example a species of line, and hence of quantity. Even if magnitudes are distinguished by qualities, they remain magnitudes.

§15. Sameness in magnitude is quality, but the differentiae of quantity should really be placed along with the things they are differentiae of. So too the differentiae of substances are rather substances than qualities.

§16. A quality is what is said of something, apart from what is its substance, and indicates what kind of a thing it is, such as virtue or baseness in the soul. Some such characteristics are in the intelligible, and some in the sensible. Crafts relating to body are sensible qualities, whilst other crafts are intelligible.

§17. So some qualities are psychical and some are corporeal. Qualities here can also be distinguished by the different kinds of sense-perception. That leaves us the question of how qualities falling under one form of sense-perception, e.g. pale and dark, differ.

§18. But there are no differentiae of differentiae; and qualities are differentiae.

§19. Privations of qualities are qualities; but the process of acquiring a quality is not.

§20. In some cases, there is contrariety between qualities when there is a greatest change between the two termini. In other cases there is contrariety where there is nothing mediating.

§21. Motion cannot be reduced to any other genus. Coming to be is not a motion, since motion presupposes that something already is. It includes as a species change, namely that motion which goes beyond what something is.
§22. Alteration is motion when this is to something other. Motion generally speaking is a path from capacity to what it is capable of. It is a woken form, rather than a static one. What is common to all motion is something’s not being in the identical state it was before.

§23. In sensible things, motion comes from outside the thing moved. The motion is then in the thing moved. The quality of a motion is determined not only by what it is in, but also by what brought it about, and what it occurs through.

§24. What unifies cases of local motion up and down is something being carried to its natural place. Local motions can also be distinguished by the geometrical form of the course.

§25. Combination and separation are either forms of local motion (withdrawal or approach of one thing from or to another), or else mixing and its contrary; in the second case there is local motion but something else supervenes. And combination and separation cannot be reduced to alteration, although this too is initiated by combination and separation in many cases.

§26. Motions can be divided according to whether they are caused by soul or not, or according to whether they are caused by nature, craft, or choice.

§27. Repose is the removal of motion, in things whose nature it is to move, whereas stability among the intelligibles is entirely compatible with motion.

§28. Producing motion and being affected can be reduced to motion. And the other genera have been reduced to these ones.
§6.1.1. Of the most ancient thinkers who also investigated how many beings there are and which they are, some said one, others, a limited number, and yet others, an unlimited number. And of those who say that being is one, some said one thing, others said other things; the same is true for those who say that beings are limited or unlimited in number. Since their beliefs have been sufficiently investigated by those who came after them, let us set them aside.

These later thinkers placed the number of beings they discovered in definite genera: in these cases, we must investigate those who said that being was neither one, because they saw a plurality also among intelligible beings, nor unlimited because that was not possible, nor would scientific understanding then be possible.

And we must look into those who posited a limited number of beings, because they thought it was wrong to say that the substrates are like elements; so, they spoke rather of genera, some of them making ten genera, and some of them fewer. Some indeed may have said more than ten. There are also differences in their genera. Some take the genera as principles, others the beings themselves, which fall into just that number of genera.

So, we must first grasp the doctrine which divides beings into ten. Should we take them to be saying there are ten genera having the

1 See Pl., Soph. 242C4 6; Ar., Meta. 7.1.1028b3 6; Phys. 1.2.184b22 24.
2 Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus. See Ar., Meta. 1.3.983b18 21, 984a5 7.
3 Empedocles, on the one hand, Anaxagoras and Democritus on the other. See Ar., Meta. 1.3.984a8 13; Democritus, fr. 68 A 37 DK; Simplicius, In DC 295.1 2.
5 See Ar., Phys. 1.4.187b34.
6 See Ar., Phys. 1.4.187b7 8, 6.189a13; Meta. 1.2.994b28 29.
7 See Ar., Cat. 4.1b2 27; Top. 1.9.103b22 23.
8 See Ar., Cat. 4.1b25 27; Top. 1.9.103b22 23.
9 Cf. infra §25. See e.g., SVF 2.369 (= Simplicius, In Cat. 66.33 67.2).
10 See Dexippus, In Cat. 1.37.32, 10.34.2 for references to Peripatetic discussions of Categories by Andronicus, Boethus, and their school.
11 Cf. infra 25.24 25; 6.2.2.11. See Ar., Meta. 3.3 999a22 23, and some Stoics.
12 Other Stoics. Cf. infra 25.1 3.
common name ‘being’, or ten predicates? For they say, rightly, that ‘being’ is not univocal in all ten.

At all events, we must ask the following question first: whether the ten genera exist in the same way in intelligibles as in sensibles, or whether they all are in sensibles but only some of them are in intelligibles, while the others are not? For it certainly cannot be the other way round. We should, then, investigate which of the ten are in the intelligible world, too, and whether the things in the intelligible world are to be subsumed under one genus with the things here, or whether ‘Substance’ in the intelligible world and ‘substance’ in the sensible world are said equivocally. If this is so, then the genera are more than ten. If, though, ‘substance’ is univocal, it is absurd that ‘substance’ means the identical thing when used of prior Beings and posterior ones, without there being a common genus, which the prior Beings and the posterior beings belong to. But they do not speak about intelligibles in this division. Hence, they did not want to divide all beings; rather, they left those that are most of all Beings, the intelligibles, on one side.

§6.1.2. Again, then, are they to be considered to be genera? And in what way is substance one genus? In any case, one has to begin with substance. It has already been said that it is impossible for there to be a genus common to intelligible Substance and to sensible substance. And besides, it would be another genus prior to the intelligible and to the sensible, being another genus which is predicated of both which could not be either corporeal or incorporeal. For it could, then, either body would be incorporeal or the incorporeal would be body.

And indeed as for the substances in the sensible world, one must enquire what is common to matter and form, and to that which consists of both. For they say all these are substances, and not to be related equally to substance when they say that form is more substance than

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13 Κατηγορία is a predicate or form of predication.
14 Cf. infra l. 24. See Ar., Cat. 1.11 12; Meta. 4.2.1003b5 6; 5.7.1017a22 27; 7.1. 1028a10 13.
15 Cf. 6.3.5.1 7.
16 I.e., it cannot be that all the genera are in the intelligible world but only some of them are in the sensible world.
17 See Ar., Meta. 3.3.96a6 7; EE 1.7.1218a1. 18 Cf. supra 1.26 27.
19 Plotinus is here alluding to the Stoic summum genus, τι, which is neither corporeal nor incorporeal. See SVF 2.329 (= Alex. Aphr., In Top. 4.301.19 Wallies), 331 (= Sext. Emp., M. 10.218), 332 (= Seneca, Ep. 28.12 18).
20 The Peripatetics. Cf. 6.3.3.1 2, 4.1. See Ar., Meta. 8.3.1043b20 30.
matter. 21 And rightly so. Other thinkers 22 would say matter is substance to a greater degree.

What do the so-called primary substances have in common with the secondary substances, 23 if the secondary substances can be called ‘substances’ on the basis of the primary ones? It is not possible to say what substance is in general. For if someone gives its property, they do not have its definition, and perhaps not even ‘one in number and self-identical, being receptive of contraries’ 24 fits all cases.

§ 6.1.3. But is substance a single predicate for those who group together intelligible substance, matter, form, and the concrete thing consisting of both matter and form? It would be as if someone were to say the genus of the Heraclids is one, not in the sense that there is something common to them all, but because they all derive from one thing. 25 Primarily, there is the intelligible substance and secondarily, and to a lesser extent, there are the others. What prevents them all from being one predicate? For all the others things are said to be with reference to substance. 26

In fact, they are mere states of substance, and substances succeed one another in a different way. In this way, we are not yet able to penetrate substance, nor to grasp its principal referent, so that we can see how everything else also derives from it.

Let all so-called substances actually be homogeneous in the above manner, namely, by possessing something distinct from the other genera. What, then, is this ‘something’ itself, this ‘this’, 27 the substrate, which is not imposed on another substrate, and which does not belong to another, in the way that pale is a quality belonging to a body, or as an amount belongs to a substance, and as time belongs to change, and change to the thing changing. 28

But secondary substance 29 is said of another thing.

21  See Ar., Meta. 7.3.1029a29 30.
22  See Ar., Meta. 7.3.1029a18 19; Stoics, SVF 2.316 (= D.L., 7.150). Epicureans are also included.
23  Cf. 6.3.9.19 21. See Ar., Cat. 5.2a14 15.
24  The essential property of substance given by Ar., Cat. 5.4a10 11.
25  I.e., the family of the Heraclids all claimed descent from Heracles. See Ar., Meta. 5.28 1024b31 36 and 10.8 1058a24.
26  See Ar., Meta. 4.2.1003b5 10.
27  Aristotle characterizes substance as being ‘a this’ (τὸ τὰς τι); an alternative translation is ‘this something’, where ‘something’ (τι), stands for a determinate kind, that is, an individual of a determinate kind, which is the substrate of other things without itself having a substrate. See Cat. 5.b10, 12, 14; Meta. 7.3.1029a1 7.
28  Cf. 3.7.7.19 20. See Ar., Phys. 4.11.219a10; DA 1.3.406b12 13.
29  E.g., a genus such as animal, which is said of human, but in another sense from that in which human is said to be pale, as Plotinus goes on to explain. See Ar., Cat. 1b10, 2a30.
In fact, it is said of another in another manner here, namely, as an inherent genus, that is, inhering as a part, that is, a part of the ‘what it is’ of that thing; by contrast, the pale belongs to another thing because it is in another thing. 30

These may be called the properties of substances relative to other things, and because of this they can be brought together into a unity and one may call them substances. But one would not call them one genus, nor would doing this clarify in any way the conception and nature of substance.

Let us leave these things here 31 and move on to the nature of quantity.

§6.1.4. They actually call number the primary quantity and also all continuous magnitude, place, and time, and they reduce all else they call quantities to these; 32 motion is a quantity because time is one, although, perhaps, conversely, time derives its continuity from motion. But if indeed they assert that the continuous insofar as it is continuous is a quantity, then anything discontinuous will not be a quantity. If, though, the continuous is accidentally a quantity, what will there be common to both that makes them quantities?

Let being quantities belong to numbers. But thereby they are merely said to be quantities, whereas the nature due to which they are said to be quantities has not yet been made clear. But line, surface, and body are not said to be quantities; they are said to be magnitudes, and not quantities, if indeed one does grasp in addition that they are each said to be a quantity when brought under a number, for example, two cubits or three cubits. For even a body when measured becomes a quantity, as does a place, accidentally, and not insofar as it is place. 33

We do not need to grasp what is accidentally a quantity, but rather what that is in itself, that is, quantity. 34 For three oxen are not a quantity either; rather, the quantity is the number applied to them. For ‘three oxen’ are already two predicates [ox and three]. Thus, in a line of such and such a size there are two predicates, and a surface of such and such a size is also two, and its quantity is a quantity, but why is the surface itself a quantity? It is only a quantity when limited, for example, by three or four lines.

What, then? Will we say that only numbers are quantities? But if we mean the Numbers in themselves, these are said to be Substances, 35 especially by existing by themselves. But if we mean those numbers in things which participate in them, that is, those numbers by which we

30 See Ar., Cat. 5 231 32, 6.3.4.8.
31 Cf. 6.3.2 10.
32 I.e., the Peripatetics. See Ar., Cat. 6.4b23 24, 5a38 b1.
33 Cf. 6.3.11.6 7.
34 The word ποσότης is used for the nature of quantity or ‘quantitativeness’ or ‘quantity as such’, used here in opposition to the term τὸ ποσόν which is used throughout to refer to a particular quantity.
35 Cf. 5.5.4.17; 6.6.9.
count, not units, but, for example, ten horses and ten oxen, then, first, it will appear absurd if numbers in themselves are substances, whereas these numbers used for counting are not, too; and, next, if those numbers which measure substrates are present in them, and are not also outside them, in the way that rulers and measures serve to measure things.

But if numbers are taken to measure while being in themselves and not being in substrates, neither will the substrates be quantities, since they do not participate in quantity; and why will the numbers be quantities? For they are measures; and why do measures have quantities or why are they what quantity is itself?

In fact, it is because, since numbers used for counting are among beings, and if they fit no other predicate, they will be that which they are said to be, and will fall under [the category of] quantity which is what they are said to be. For indeed their unit delimits one thing, then it proceeds to another one, and the number declares how many they are. Soul measures the multiplicity, here, too, making use of number.

In measuring, then, the soul does not measure what the thing is, for it says one and two, even when they are opposites, but not the disposition which the thing may have, for example, hot or beautiful, just how many there are. Number itself, therefore, whether considered in itself or in the things participating in number, and not the things participating in number, falls under a quantity. Thus, three cubits is not a quantity, but three is. So, why are magnitudes also regarded as quantities? Is it because they are near to a quantity, and we call quantities the things they come to be in, not because of the quantity properly speaking, but we call them big, because they partake of a large number, and small, because they partake of a small number? But big and small themselves are not judged to be quantities, but relatives. Still, they are said to be relative insofar as they are held to be quantities.

We must look at the matter more accurately. So, there will not be one single genus, just number alone, with the others being quantity in a secondary sense. So, quantity is not properly speaking one genus, but one predicate bringing together things that are close together, both primary and secondary quantity.

But we must investigate how Numbers in themselves are Substances or are themselves a quantity. Whichever way they are, they will have nothing in common with quantities beyond the bare name.

§6.1.5. How are [verbal] statement, time, and motion quantities? Let us first discuss statement, if you like. Well, statement is of such and such

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36 Cf. 6.6.15-37 42. 37 Cf. infra 5.15, 34: 3.7-9.17. 38 Cf. 6.3.11.11 13. See Ar., Cat. 6.5b27 29, 6a8 11. 39 Cf. 6.6.
a quantity, for it is measured, but as statement, it is not a quantity. For it is meaningful, like name and verb. The matter for it is air, just as it is for these; for it is composed of name and verb. The impact is rather the statement, though not simply the impact, but the occurrent impression, which, in a way, shapes the air. Thus, it is rather a production, indeed a production involving meaning. It is reasonable to take this motion actually to be a production, due to the impact, and the motion which answers to it as an affection, or each of them as a production of one thing, and the affection of another, that is, a production with regard to the substrate, but an affection in the substrate.

If, though, there is said to be a voice not only because of the blow, but also because of the air, there would be two predicates and not one arising from the meaningful voice, if the meaning belonged to one predicate, and the co-meaning to another predicate.

As for time, if it is grasped according to its measuring function, one has to grasp what the measuring thing is, either soul or the now. If it is grasped insofar as it is measured, then in respect of being however much it is, for example, a year long, then let it be a quantity; but it is another nature insofar as it is time. For being however much it is, it will be so because it is something else. For time is actually not quantity as such since Quantity as such is what is quantity principally, and it is attached to nothing else. If one posited all that partakes of a quantity as being quantities, then substance, too, would be identical to a quantity.

‘Equal and unequal are to be grasped as the properties of the quantity in itself, not of the things that participate in it, or of these only accidentally, not as these things themselves, as someone who is three cubits tall is a quantity; the comprised quantity is not placed in one genus, but under one genus and one predicate.

§ 6.1.6. We should investigate the relative by asking if there is something present in it common to the whole genus, or if the genus is related in another way to one thing, and, above all, if the relation itself is a real existent, for example, right and left, the double and the half, or if it is a real existent in some cases but not in others, such that it is a real

40 See Ar., Cat. 6.6b32 33 where he is speaking of verbal λόγος or ‘articulate speech’ measurable by long and short syllables.
41 Cf. 6.3.12.25 28, 19.8 9. See Ar., De int. 2.16a19, 3.16b6, 4.16b26.
42 Adopting Igal’s suggestion <τὸ σημαντικὸν ταύτης, τὸ δὲ>. See Simpl., In Cat. 6.131. 8 10.
43 The blow belongs to one category and the affection of the air to another.
44 See Ar., Phys. 5.10.218a6, 14.223a21 28. 45 Cf. 6.3.11.6 7.
46 See Ar., Cat. 6.6a26 27. 47 I.e., substance and three cubits.
existent in those mentioned first but not in those mentioned later, or else nowhere at all.

What real existence is there indeed in double and half, or quite generally, in the exceeding and the exceeded, and again in disposition and state, bending, sitting, standing, and again in father and son, master and slave, and again in same and not same, equal and unequal, productive and passive, measure and measured? And we can add scientific understanding and sense-perception: the one is relative to the object of scientific understanding, the other to the sensible. For scientific understanding, when actualized, might contain real existence in relation to its object, and likewise sense-perception in relation to its object. So, too, that which is productive in relation to that which is passive, if it actively produces something, and that which measures in relation to the thing measured, if it produces the measurement.48

But what kind of effect could that which is the same have in relation to that which is the same as it?

In fact, the sameness is not the effect of that which is the same as it, but merely present, that is, the identity in what is qualified as the same. But, besides that which is in each, no other quality is involved. Nor with equal things. For the identity in the quantity is present prior to the relation.

What is the relation other than our judgement when we compare what the things are in themselves, and say ‘this and that have the identical magnitude and the identical quality’, and ‘this has produced that, and this rules that’? What is sitting or standing besides the sitting and standing thing?49 The state, in relation to the thing which possesses it, should rather mean possession;50 and in relation to what is possessed, should mean rather a quality. And it is the same way with disposition. So, what is there besides these things in relation to one another if not ourselves thinking the comparison? In the case of exceeding, there is one thing of this magnitude and another thing of that magnitude: they are two different things and the comparison is ours, not in the things themselves.

The right hand in relation to the left, and front and back, are presumably positions, not relations; this is thus, and this is thus. We think the right hand and the left, and there is nothing in the things themselves. Before and after are two times, and we think the before and after in the same way.

48 Cf. 6.3.28.10 11. 49 See Ar., Cat. 7.6b11 12.
50 This is a play on ἕξις, here ‘state’, which is etymologically related to ἔχειν ‘possess’ or ‘have’.
§6.1.7. If, then, we are merely using empty phrases, but are deceived in what we say, there would be none of these things; the relation would be empty. But suppose we are saying something true, when we say ‘this is before that, and that is later’, in comparing two times, and saying that one of them is prior and is different from their substrates; and the same with right hand and left hand; and with magnitudes, the relation between them holds besides their quantity, insofar as the one exceeds and the other is exceeded.

Even when we do not say or think it is thus and so, for example, that this is double that, and this possesses, and this is possessed, even before we know it, equals stand in relation to one another independently of us, and in the case of things which are qualified, the relation consists in their identity relative to one another, and in the case of all things where we say they stand in relation to one another, there is a relation of the things to one another, which follows on the substrates, and we see that there is the relation, and this cognition is relative to the thing cognized – here, the real existent arising from the relation is indeed pretty clear. The search, then, as to whether there is a relation, may be brought to a stop.

But we should also note that in such cases, as long as the substrates remain as they are, even if they are apart from one another, the relation obtains, whereas in other cases even though they remain, the relation ceases, either entirely or becomes another one, for example, if something is on the right or near.

These are the considerations which give rise most of all to the suspicion that there is nothing to such cases. You must, then, investigate what is identical in all cases, once you have noted the above, and whether this is a genus, and not accidentally. Then, once one has found this identical thing, one must say what kind of real existence it has.

Something should actually be called a relative not if it simply belongs to another thing like a state of the soul or the body, nor if it is the soul of this person, or in another thing, but only in those cases in which the real existent arises solely out of the relation. The real existent is not that of the substrates, but that which is said relative to something, for example, the double being relative to the half, provides real existence neither to two cubits nor to two in general, nor to the thing of one cubit, nor to the one in general. Rather, given that there are these things because of a relation, then, in addition to being two, and to being one, the one of them can be, that is, can be said to be double, and the other can be said to be half. They bring about both from themselves, such that double and half are distinct, although they come about in relation to one another, and their existence is precisely that which holds through their relation to

51 Cf. 6.3.21.15 21. See Ar., Cat. 7.7b15 21.
each other; for the double arises from exceeding the half, the half from being exceeded.

The result is that one of them is not prior, the other posterior; rather, they both come to exist simultaneously. Do they also remain simultaneous?

In fact, in the case of father and son and people closely resembling one another, when the father passes away, the son remains, and when one brother dies, the other brother remains. For we say 'He is like the one who has died.'

§ 6.1.8. But we have digressed from the subject. At this point in the investigation, we must enquire why all these cases are not the same. Let these people\(^{52}\) say what common real existence this kind of being possesses which derives from [the relata] in their relations to one another.\(^{53}\) This common element, then, cannot be a body. So, it remains that it is incorporeal, if indeed there is such an element at all; and it is either in the things themselves or comes from outside.

If it is the identical relation for all relatives, then ['relation'] is univocal, but if not, that is, if it is a different relation for different relatives, then it is equivocal. For it is certainly not the case that because it is called a relation, it has to have the identical substantiality. Are relations, then, not to be divided as follows? Some relatives have, as we can observe, an inactive relation, lying there, in a way, and their real existence lies altogether in the simultaneity of the relata, while other relatives relate capacity and function.

In the latter kind, we can distinguish between two cases. In the first, the relata possess readiness always in respect of the relation, before any given point of time, and the relation comes to really exist from the union of the relata and by their activity. In the second lot of cases, one of the pair of relata is actively productive, while the other comes to really exist, and the real existent only gives its name to the other one of the relata, while the productive part provides real existence to the other part. Such is the case with father and son. Both the actively productive and the passive part have, in a way, life and activity.

Is relation, then, to be divided like that, that is, is it to be divided not as one identical thing, common in all the different cases? Does one relation, generally speaking, have a different nature in each of the two differentiated parts, and is it to be called equivocally the relation with one relatum actively doing both the producing and the undergoing the affection as if they were one, and in the other relation neither relata

\(^{52}\) I.e., the Peripatetics.

\(^{53}\) I.e., the existence peculiar to relatives, uniting this kind of being. Cf. supra 7.22 23.
produce the relation, but rather something else in both relata actively produces it, as, for example, equality makes things equal? For they are equal because of equality and, in general, identical due to some kind of identity. There are big and small, the one due to the presence of greatness, the other due to the presence of smallness. And when one gets bigger, the other gets smaller, by participating, the larger by the activity of the greatness appearing in it, and the small by the activity of smallness.

§6.1.9. But in the cases mentioned before, such as the active producer, and scientific knowledge, one must posit the relation as active – in respect of the activity – and define it corresponding to its activity; in the other cases, there is participation in the form and definition. For indeed if Beings had to be bodies, one would have to say that the relations that relatives indicate are nothing. But if we give both incorporeals and expressed principles the principal position, saying that relations are expressed principles, and the participation in Forms are the causes, then the cause of the double is the Double itself, and the Half is cause in the half. Some things are what they are said to be due to the identical Form, others, due to opposing Forms. Then, the double approached this thing at the same time as the half approached another; and when magnitude approached this thing, then smallness approached that one. Or both are in each thing: both sameness and lack of sameness and, generally, identity and difference. For this reason, the identical thing is both the same and not the same, both identical and different.

How, then, can one human be ugly and someone else uglier by the participation in the identical Form?

In fact, if they are altogether ugly, they are on an equal footing by the absence of the identical Form. But if the one is more ugly, and in the other the less so, the less ugly one will participate in the Form, though the Form does not dominate over him, while in the uglier one, the Form will have even less dominance. Or, if one wishes to obtain the contrast between them by privation, that would be, in a way, the form in them.

Sense-perception is some sort of form arising from both [relata] and cognition is likewise a form consisting of both. Possession is relative to what is possessed, an activity, in a way, holding them together, like a certain active production. Measuring is an activity of the measuring thing, a proportion relative to the thing measured.

54 Cf. supra 8.10ff. 55 The Stoic view. 56 See Ar., Phys. 2.1.193b19. 57 The meaning of λόγος here.
If, then, one were to posit the status of the relative generally as a form, there is, then, one genus and one real existent in the sense of one expressed principle everywhere [in the genus]. But if the expressed principles are opposed and have the differentiae which have just been mentioned, then it is presumably not one genus; rather, they would all be collected by a certain sameness that they have, that is, under one predicate.

But even if all the things mentioned can be gathered together under one genus, yet it is impossible to put everything that falls under the identical predicate with them to be placed in the identical genus. For the Peripatetics collect the negations under one genus, and the things which are so called after them are so called from them, like both the double and that which is double. How, then, can they be in one genus, the thing itself and the negation, for example, double and not double, relative and not relative? It is as though you were to posit a genus animal and put not-animal in it. So, too, the double, and that which is double, and paleness and that which is pale, are not identical at all.

§ 6.1.10. As for quality, because of which someone is said to be qualified in some way, first, we must grasp what it is such that it makes things which are said to be qualified in some way to be such, and if it is one or self-identical [genus], corresponding to one common element which provides the species by means of the differentiae, or else, if qualities are said to be in many ways, then it would not be one genus. What, then, is the common element in state, disposition, passive quality, figure, and shape? And in thin, thick, lean? For if we say that the common element is a potency, which fits both states, dispositions, and physical capacities, by which the possessor can do what it can do, then, incapacities will not fit. And how are the figure and the shape of an individual capacities?

Next, being qua being will have no potency, but only when a qualification is added to it. The activities of the substances, that is, those things that are especially activities, activate what belongs to the qualification, because of the substances, and are activities of their proper capacities. But, then, are there capacities because of the substances in themselves? For example, the potency for boxing does not belong to the human being as such; only the rational potency does. So, rationality in this sense is not a quality, only that rationality is which one possesses arising from one’s virtue. So, ‘rationality’ is equivocal. So, that quality

58 See Ar., Cat. 1.1a12; 8.10a28. 29; Dexippus, In Cat. 33.8 13.
59 See Ar., Cat. 8.8b25 9.11b1. 60 See Ar., Cat. 8.8b36 9a13.
60 See Ar., Cat. 8.9a19 21. 61 See Ar., Cat. 8.9a28 10a10. 62 See Ar., Cat. 8.9a16.
61 See Ar., Cat. 8.9a19 21.
would be a potency added to substances, once the substances themselves are qualified. But the specific differentiae which distinguish substances from one another are [said to be] qualities equivocally, being rather activities, and definitions, rather than parts of expressed principles, no whit the less making clear what it is, even if they seem to say the substance is qualified in a certain way.

Qualities, properly speaking, because of which human beings are qualified in a certain way – which we do indeed call capacities – have in common that they would be expressed principles and, in a way, shapes and [things like] beauty and ugliness in soul and body alike. But how are all qualities capacities? Let beauty be one potency, and both psychical and corporeal health, but then what do we do with ugliness and sickness and weakness, and incapacity quite generally?

In fact, are these capacities because people are said to be qualified in a certain way because of them? What, though, prevents people who are said to be qualified in a certain way from being said to be qualified equivocally and not because of one definition? And not only in four ways, but at least in two different ways for each of the four?

In fact, first, quality is not divided according to producing or being affected, such that what is able to produce is quality in one way, and being affected is quality in another. Rather, we call health a quality insofar as it is a disposition and a state, and so, too, with disease, and strength and weakness. But if this is so, then potency is not the common element, so one has to look for some other common element. Nor are they all expressed principles; for how is disease, as a permanent state, the expressed principle? But, then, do some qualities consist in forms and capacities, while others are privations [like disease and weakness]? So, they do not form one genus, but are related to one common element, in the sense of one predicate, for example, scientific knowledge is a form and a potency, ignorance is a privation and an incapacity.

In fact, incapacity and disease are a sort of shape, and both disease and vice are both capable of many things and do many things, just badly. But if something misses the target, then how is it a potency?

In fact, each of them exercises its own potency although they are not guided by what is correct. For one could not do something which one is incapable of. Beauty has also a potency for something. Then, does a triangle, too?

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64 Cf. 2.6.1.15 29, 2.1 5; 6.2.14.14 23; 6.3.15.15 18, 17.8 10. 65 Cf. supra 1.8
66 Actually and potentially, relating to the four kinds of quality. Cf. infra 11.8 22.
67 Eliminating the interrogative punctuation in HS.
68 Reading τὸ κόμλος with the mss.
69 See Ar., Cat. 8.10a14.
In fact, one should not look to the potency at all, but rather to the way something is disposed.

So, quality is, in a way, shapes or characteristics, and the common element is the shape or the form which is an addition to the substance and posterior to it. But then again how are they capacities?

In fact, the naturally talented boxer is in possession of this talent by being disposed in some way. And equally with the person with an incapacity for something or other.

Generally, a quality is a non-substantial characteristic, which nonetheless, as the identical characteristic, may be held to contribute to both substance and to non-substance, for example, heat and paleness and colour, in general. For when it belongs to the substance, it is different, like the substance’s activity, whereas the characteristic in a secondary sense is derived from the primary one, and is another thing in another thing, an image of that one and the same as it. But if there is a quality due to formation, characteristic, and expressed principle, how about those due to incapacity and ugliness?

In fact, they are to be called imperfect expressed principles, as in the ugly human being.

And how is the expressed principle in the disease?

In fact, there is here an expressed principle of health that has been disturbed. And, in fact, it is the case that not all things consist in expressed principles; rather, it is sufficient if the common element in all quality, besides being disposed in a certain way, is outside substance, and anything that comes along additionally, after the substance is the quality of the substrate. The triangle is a quality of that in which it is, not a triangle unqualifiedly, but the triangle in this [substrate], and insofar as this has been shaped. But does humanity also bestow shape?

In fact, it bestows substance.

§6.1.11. But if things are like this, then why are there several species of quality and why do states and dispositions differ? For being permanent or not is not a differentia of quality, but a disposition suffices to provide some qualification. Permanence is an outside addition to the disposition; unless one were to say that dispositions are only imperfect like shapes, whereas states are perfect. But if dispositions are imperfect, then they are not yet qualities; if, though, they are already qualities, permanence is an addition.

And how are natural capacities another species of quality? For if they are qualities insofar as they are capacities, this aspect of potency will not

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70 See Ar., Cat. 8.9a19 20. 71 See Ar., Cat. 8.8b36 38. 72 See Ar., Cat. 8.8b26.
fit all qualities, as has been said. If we say that someone is a natural boxer, that is, is qualified because of his disposition, the potency, when added, will do nothing, since the potency is already included in the states.

Next, how will the human being qualified by potency differ from the human being qualified by scientific understanding? And if they are qualified people, then the differentia will not be one that belongs to quality, if the one possesses his potency from training, and the other by nature; this distinction will be outside the quality. How can this distinction relate to the species [of quality] that boxing is in itself?

Nor is there a distinction in the quality, if some qualities arise from affection, and others do not; for quality is not distinguished depending on where the quality comes from. I mean here the variations and the differentiae of quality. One could enquire, if some qualities arose from affection, and some came about in another way, and did not belong to the identical subjects, how could they all fall under the identical species? And if some qualities lie in the substrates coming to be affected, and others in the substrates’ active production of the affection, then they would be [said to be] qualities equivocally.

What about the shape belonging to each individual? For if it is insofar as each individual is form, then it is not a quality. If it is insofar as the individual is beautiful or ugly posterior to the form of the substrate, then it is reasonable for the shape to be a quality.

Is one not right to call rough, smooth, rarefied, dense qualities? The fine and the dense and the rough, do not actually consist in the distance or nearness of the parts to one another, and roughness does not arise everywhere from the irregularity and regularity of position. And even if they did consist in these, still nothing would prevent them from being qualities.

Light and heavy, when one knows what they are, will make clear where one should place them. In the case of light, there might be equivocity, if it is not distinguished by means of the scales into more and less light, since it includes the lean and the fine, which fall under a species of quality different from the other four.

§6.1.12. But if one does not think it right to divide up quality in the way just described, how would one divide it? One should, then, investigate whether one should, given the division between qualities of body and qualities of the soul, partition those of the body according

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73 Cf. supra 10.8 11. 74 See Ar., Cat. 8.9a14 16. 75 See Ar., Cat. 8.9a35 b11. 76 See Ar., Cat. 8.10a11 12. 77 See Ar., Cat. 8.10a16 22. 78 Cf. 6.3-9, 11. 79 See Ar., Cat. 8.10a25; Andronicus apud Simplicius, In Cat. 8.263.19 22.
to the senses – apportioning these by sight, those by hearing or taste, yet others by smell or touch.\textsuperscript{80}

But then how do we divide the qualities of the soul? As belonging to the soul’s faculties of appetite, spiritedness, and calculative reasoning? Or rather by the differentiae of the activities which come to be due to the qualities, since these qualities produce these activities? Or are they to be distinguished by the beneficial and harmful? But one must distinguish the kinds of the beneficial and the harmful. They are the identical ones that make qualities different also in the case of the corporeal qualities.\textsuperscript{81}

For these are the distinctions belonging properly to quality.

In fact, benefit and harm appear to stem from quality and how something is qualified; otherwise, one should see how benefit and harm come about in another fashion. And one should investigate how something qualified by a quality is in the identical predicate as the quality. For there is actually not one genus of both. If the boxer is thus and so by being qualified, then why not the actively productive person? And if the productive person is so constituted, then so is the productive thing.

The result is that one should not place the actively productive or the passive among relatives, if the passive human being is someone qualified.\textsuperscript{82} And presumably the productive person is better placed here, if he is said to be such because of his potency, and the potency is the quality. But if the potency relates to substance or is a determinate potency, then it is neither relative nor yet a way of being qualified. For the productive thing is not like something larger because something larger has real existence, \textit{qua} larger, only in relation to something smaller, but the productive thing is already productive by being qualified in such a way.

But perhaps, although it is qualified according to the sort of thing it is, it is called a relative insofar as it is able to be productive relative to another. Why, then, is the boxer, and indeed the boxing craft itself, not relative to something? For the boxing craft relates to another person generally. For there is no theoretical element\textsuperscript{83} at all in this craft which does not relate to the opponent. So, equally, one should look into the other crafts, or most of them. Insofar as the crafts dispose the soul in a certain way, they are qualities, but insofar as they produce something, they are productive, and as such relative to another human being and to

\textsuperscript{80} Cf. 6.6.3.17.1 5.  
\textsuperscript{81} Omitting from l. 10 the words \textit{τῷ ὠφελίμῳ καὶ βλαβερῷ} which are a repetition of the words in l. 8.  
\textsuperscript{82} See Andronicus \textit{apud} Simplicius, \textit{In Cat.} 8.25.8.18 22.  
\textsuperscript{83} The word is \textit{θεώρημα}.  

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a thing, since they are relative to something in another way, insofar as they are called states.\textsuperscript{84}

Is there not, then, another real existent in respect of the productive thing, without the productive thing being different from being qualified in a certain way? For one could very well assume in the case of living beings and even more in the case of things with choice, because of their inclination to production, that there is also a special form of real existence in respect of being productive.

And in the case of inanimate capacities, which we say are qualities,\textsuperscript{85} what could be the productive potency?

In fact, when one thing meets with another, it derives benefit from it, and changes through what the other thing possesses. So, if the identical thing is both productive relative to another and affected relative to the first, then how is it still the productive principle? For the greater thing, being, for example, three cubits in itself, is both greater and smaller in meeting with another thing. But one will say that the greater and the lesser arise by participating in Magnitude and Smallness.\textsuperscript{86}

In fact, in this case, too, it is by participating in the productive and the passive.

At this point, one must investigate whether the qualities in the sensible world and those in the intelligible world fall under one genus. This question is addressed to those who do posit qualities in the intelligible world, too.

In fact, even if someone does not admit Forms, and yet in speaking of Intellect, he calls it a state, there will, then, be something common to the state in the intelligible world, and the one in the sensible world. And wisdom is conceded by these thinkers to exist.

In fact, if ‘wisdom’ in the intelligible world is equivocal relative to that in the sensible world, then it will obviously not be numbered among these things here. But if it is univocal, then the qualified will be common to the sensible world and to the intelligible world unless one were to say that everything in the intelligible world belongs to Substance. So, Intellect would, too. But this is a problem common to all the other categories whether they are double, here and there, or whether both fall under one genus.

§6.1.13. This is how we should investigate the ‘when’; if yesterday, tomorrow, a year ago, and suchlike are parts of time, why are they not in the identical genus as is time?\textsuperscript{87} For since ‘was’, ‘is’, and ‘will be’, are forms of time, it would be fair if they were ordered along with time.

\textsuperscript{84} Cf. supra 6.26 28. See Ar., Cat. 7.6b2. \textsuperscript{85} Cf. supra 10.8 9. \textsuperscript{86} See Pl., Phd. 100E5 6. \textsuperscript{87} See Pl., Tim. 37A3 5; Ar., Cat. 4.2a2 4. 663
Time is said to belong to something quantified, so why do we need another predicate? But if they say that time is not just ‘was’ and ‘will be’, but also ‘yesterday’ and ‘a year ago’ – for these must be subsumed under the ‘was’ – it is, then, not just time, but a certain time; still it will be primarily time, if it is a certain time.

Next, if yesterday is past time, it will be something composite, if time and past are different. There will, then, be two categories, and it will not be simple. If they say that being in time is being sometime, but not time, if they say this thing is in time, for example, that Socrates was yesterday, Socrates will be something apart from time, and they are not saying one thing.

But in the case of Socrates or an action, what would they be other than in a part of time? If, because they say a part of time, and insofar as it is a part of time, they do not think that they are saying something is simply time, but a past part of time, then they produce several things, and furthermore grasp the part qua part as a relative being. And the past will in their view be a constituent of or identical with the ‘was’, which was defined as a form of time. If ‘was’ is defined by being indefinite, while ‘yesterday’ and ‘a year ago’ are definite, then, first where shall we place ‘was’?

Next, yesterday will be a ‘definite was’, so that yesterday will be a definite time. But this is a quantified time. So, if time is something quantified, each of these will be a definite quantity. But if when they say ‘yesterday’, and we understand this to assert that this occurred at this definite past time, then they will be speaking of even more things.

Next, if one has to add other categories by making one thing occur in another, as in the sensible world in time, we will find many other categories arising from making one thing in another.

We will speak more clearly about this in the account of the ‘where’, which now follows.

§6.1.14. The ‘where’, for example, in the Lyceum or in the Academy. The Academy and the Lyceum are assuredly places, and parts of place, as up and down, and ‘here’ are forms or parts of place. The differentia lies in that the former are more determinately parts. So if up and down and the middle are places, for example, Delphi is the middle, and what is beside the middle, such as Athens and the Lyceum and indeed the rest, what do we need to look for besides place, especially because we say these phrases indicate place?

88 The Peripatetics. 89 See Ar., Cat. 4.2a1 2. 90 See Ar., Cat. 6.6a12 14. 91 Delphi was for the Greeks the ὀμφαλός or ‘navel’ of the earth. See, e.g., Pindar, Pythian 4.74; Pl., Rep. 427C3 4.
If we say one thing is in another, then we do not say one thing, nor do we say anything simple.

Next, if we say that this is here, we generate a relation of this in this, and of the receiving thing to that which receives it. Why, then, is it not a relative, if something is generated from the relation between one and the other?

Next, how does ‘here’ differ from ‘in Athens’? But they say that the demonstrative ‘here’ indicates a place. So, too, with ‘in Athens’. So, ‘in Athens’ belongs to place.

Next, if ‘in Athens’ is ‘it is in Athens’, ‘it is’ is predicated in addition to place. But it should not be; just as the predicate is not ‘it is a quality’, but just ‘quality’ alone.

In addition, if being in time and being in place is something else besides time and place, why does Aristotle not make ‘being in a bucket’ another predicate, and being in matter another, and being in a substrate another, and the part being in the whole, and the whole in the parts, and the genus in the species, and the species in the genus? And so in this way, the predicates will be multiplied.

§ 6.1.15. One should investigate the following matters in what is called ‘that which produces’. For it is said that, just as, since after substance, those things connected with substance were quantity and number, and the quantified was another genus, and, since there is quality, another genus connected with it is what is qualified in some way, so, too, since there is production, another genus is producing.

Is the genus producing or production, then, from which producing stems, just like quality, too, from which the qualified stems? Or should the act of production, the producing, and the producer be included in one genus or only the producing and the act of production? But it is rather producing that reveals the producer, not production.

And producing consists in some production, and this is actual. So, the predicate is rather an activity which is said to be seen connected with substance, as was quality.

And if it is connected to substance-like motion, then motion is one genus of beings, too. For quality is one of those things connected with substance, and quantity another one, and the relative another one.

92 Cf. 6.2.16.4. See Ar., Phys. 4.5.212b13 16. The implication is that this is then not a distinct category if it is not something simple. See Ar., Cat. 2.1a16 19 and Cat. 4.

93 See Ar., Cat. 4.1b27, 9.11b1.

94 The participial form ποιούν (‘producing’) makes apparent that there must be a subject, i.e., a being, that produces, which the nominal form ποιησις (‘production’) does not. See Ar., Meta. 7.1.1028a22 29.

95 See Ar., Meta. 9.3.1047a32; 12.5 1071b1 2.

96 See Pl., Soph. 254D4 5.
through the relation of one thing to another. So, why will motion not also be one genus, since it is also connected with substance?

§6.1.16. If someone were to say ‘motion is an incomplete activity’, nothing would prevent him from making activity prior, and a motion a species, namely, one that is incomplete, predicating ‘activity’ of it, and adding ‘incomplete’. ‘Incomplete’ is said of it, not because it is not an activity, but because, while it is an activity in the full sense, it comprises in itself iteration, not so that it will arrive at activity – it is that already – but so that something distinct from it may be brought about after it.

And it is not the motion that is then completed, but the thing it was aiming at. For example, walking is walking from the outset. But if it is necessary to cover a stade, and when it has not yet been covered, what remains does not belong to the walking nor to the motion, but to a certain quantity of motion. Walking is already both some quantity and a motion. For the person moving already has moved, and the cutter already has cut. And as what is called activity needs no time, neither does motion, only that motion which extends a determinate length. And if activity is in the timeless, so, too, is motion when taken generally. And even if motion generally acquires continuity in time, so, too, would uninterrupted seeing be continuous and in time.

Evidence for this [Peripatetic view] also comes from the analogy which states it is always possible to take some further arbitrary part of a motion, and that there is no starting point of time, in which and from which it starts, nor that there is a starting point of motion itself, but that it is always possible to divide it further. It would then follow that the motion which has just now begun has been changing from unlimited time, and that it is unlimited in the direction of what starts it. This occurs because of separating activity from motion, and saying that the one begins to be in the timeless, and saying that the other needs time, not merely of such an amount; however, they are forced to say that, generally, its nature makes it so much although they admit themselves that quantity is present in it accidentally, for example, if the motion were half a day long, or of any particular amount of time.

97 Cf. 6.3.21.1. 98 See Ar., Phys. 3.2.201b31; Meta. 11.9.1066a20 21.
99 See S VF 2.498 (= Simplicius, In Cat. 9.307.1 6).
100 See Ar., Phys. 5.4.227b15 17.
101 The examples here, and seeing in l. 18 are traditional. See Ar. Meta. 9.6.1048b29, 33.
102 Plotinus is here contradicting Ar., Phys. 6.2.322b20.
103 See Pl., Parm. 156E1, referring to the ‘instant’ (τὸ ἐξαφνής); κίνησις νου (‘motion of intellect’) would be another example of motion not in time.
104 Reading ἀναλογία with the mss. 105 See Ar., Phys. 6.4.235a18 25.
106 See Theophrastus apud Simplicius, In. Cat. 9.304.32 33.
Just as activity, then, takes place in the timeless, so, too, nothing prevents also motion from beginning in the timeless, and time is only present because the motion has come to be a certain amount. Changes also are agreed to come to be in the timeless, when Aristotle says that ‘as if change did not come to be all at once’. If change, why not motion as well? Change is not grasped here as completed. For there was no need of change in that which has changed.

§ 6.1.17. If someone were to say that neither activity nor motion need a genus of their own, but that they reduce to the relative because it is activity of what is potentially capable of activity, on the one hand, and because motion on the other is motion of that which moves or undergoes motion, one must reply that the relation itself brings about the relatives, and not just because one thing is said relative to another.

Whenever there is some real existent, even if it belongs to something else or is related to something else, it has acquired a nature prior to the relation. So, activity itself and motion and a state, despite belonging to something else, do not cease being something prior to the relation and do not cease to be conceived of in themselves; otherwise, everything would be relative. For, in general, anything has a relation to anything, as in the case of the soul.

And as for production itself and producing, why will they not be reduced to relatives? For they are in any event either motion or activity. If they reduce production to a relative, but make producing a genus on its own, why do they not put motion in the genus of the relatives, and yet make moving one genus, and thus divide moving, as one thing, into the species of producing and being affected, instead of saying, as they now do, that one genus is the producing and the other the being affected?

§ 6.1.18. Given that they will assert that, in the genus producing, some [species] are activities and some are motions, and given they call activities the ones that are all at once, and motions, those like cutting – for cutting is in time – one should investigate whether they are all motions or accompanied by motion, and whether all productions are relative to being affected or some are independent, such as walking and speaking, and whether all motions are relative to being affected, and the activities

107 See Ar., Phys. 1.3.186a15 16; Meta. 8.6.1048b28 35.
108 Cf. 6.3.21.9. See Simplicius, In Cat. 6.63.9 11.
109 See Ar., Phys. 3.1.200b30 31; 8.1.251a9 10.
110 Cf. supra 8.7 8; 6.3.21.15 17.
111 Cf. infra 20.12 13; 22.5 11; 6.3.21.6 9.
112 See Pl., Tht. 156A5 7, 157A4 6; Boethus apud Simplicius, In Cat. 9.302.15 17.
113 See Ar., Cat. 4.243 4.
114 Cf. supra 16.25 35.
are separate or whether each fall into both genera. For indeed I think that they would say that walking, although it is independent, is a motion, and thinking, which has no affection, is itself an activity.

Or is one to say that neither thinking nor walking is a producing? But if they are not in this genus, where should they be said to be? Perhaps, the act of thinking is relative to the intelligible, as is the faculty of thinking. For sense-perception is relative to the sensible. But if there, too, sense-perception is relative to the sensible, why is not the act of sense-perception itself relative to the sensible? And sense-perception, if it is relative to something else, has a relation to that thing, but it is something besides the relation, namely, either an activity or an affection. If, then, the affection is something besides belonging to something and being under the influence of something, so, too, is activity. Certainly, walking itself, being both of something, that is, the feet, and being caused by something, is a motion. Thinking, then, besides being a relative, is either a motion or an activity.

§6.1.19. One should investigate whether some activities are also held to be incomplete, taking no time in addition, with the result that they come to be identical to motions, for example, living and life. For the living of each human being lies in a complete time, and happiness is an activity which does not occur in something without parts; rather, it is such as they think motion is, too. The result is that both should be spoken of as motions, and motion is one thing, that is, one genus, because we observe in our theory besides the quantity in substance, both quality and motion applying to it.

And, if you like, call some corporeal, some psychical; and some derive from themselves, while others come about under the influence of other things working on them. Or say that some motions come from themselves, and other motions from other things, and some of those derived from themselves are productions, either directed towards other things or independent, while yet other motions are affections derived from other things.

The changes directed towards other things, however, are identical to those derived from other things. For example, cutting which is, on the one hand, in the one cutting, and which is, on the other hand, in the thing being cut, is one, but cutting and being cut are different. Perhaps cutting, that is, what originates in the one cutting and that in the thing being cut are not one thing; rather, it is possible for cutting arising from such and such an activity and motion to become another, dependent, motion in the thing cut.

115 See Ar., DA 1.3.406a9. 116 See Ar., EN i.11.1101a11 13.
Or perhaps the differentia does not relate to being cut itself, but rather to another supervening motion, like being in pain. For here, too, there is something being affected. But what, then, if something does not suffer pain? What else is there then apart from the activity of the one producing the cut which is in this other one? So, too, with producing, when it is spoken of in this way. And the producing is double in this way, the one aspect constituted not in something else, and the other in something else.

So, it is not the case that there is producing and being affected; rather, producing in another thing has brought it about that there are thought to be two things, producing and being affected, for example, in writing, too, although it is in another thing, requires nothing be affected, because it produces nothing further in the tablet besides the activity of the one writing, just like feeling pain. And if someone says he has written, then he does not mention being affected.

And in the case of walking, although there is the earth on which one walks, nothing has been affected. But whenever one walks on the body of an animal, he thinks of something being affected as well, taking into account the suffering which supervenes, and not only the walking; otherwise, he would have thought of it before.

So, too, in all cases, with reference to producing, one thing is to be said to be together with the thing said to be affected, that is, the opposite. What is said to be affected, is what comes to be afterwards, that is, not the opposite like burning and being burnt, but what comes from burning and being burnt – which are one – are what supervenes on these, like pain or something else like shrivelling up.

What, then, happens, if someone does something to give pain, is it not the case that one thing produces, and one thing is affected, even if these both come from the one activity?

In fact, one does produce, and one thing is affected. There would not be the wish to give pain in the activity; rather, he would produce something else, through which he gives pain but which, coming about in the one who is going to have the pain, and being the one identical thing, has produced another thing, having pain. Why, then, is the one thing coming about, before it even produces pain, or which does not produce pain in the patient, not an affection of the thing towards which the motion happens, like hearing?

In fact, hearing is not an affection, any more than is sense-perception in general, whereas having pain is to come to be affected, which is not opposite to producing.

117 See Ar., Phys. 3.3.202a13 b29 on where motion is.
118 See Sosigenes apud Dexippus, In Cat. 9.2.
119 See Ar., Cat. 4.2a4.
§6.1.20. So, suppose it is not the opposite. Still, being different from producing, it is not in the identical genus as the production. Or, if both are motions, then they are in the identical genus, for example, ‘alteration is a motion in relation to quality’. 

But, then, when the motion relative to quality goes from the producing person, is the alteration production, and does the producing belong to him, since he is unaffected?

In fact, if he is unaffected, it will be in the producing, but if he is active towards another, like someone delivering a blow, he is also affected, and he no longer produces.

In fact, nothing prevents the person producing from also being affected. If, then, being affected is relative to the identical thing, like rubbing, why does he produce rather than be affected?

In fact, because he is rubbed in turn, he is affected as well. So, then, shall we say, because he is moved in turn, that there are also two motions relating to him? And in what way are they two? There is no way. So, then, there is one change.

How, then, is the identical motion both production and affection?

In fact, it is like this: it is affection, because it derives from another thing, and the production acts on another thing. Shall we say it is another motion? But how does the motion, in altering the person being affected, arrange in a certain way something else, while the producing person is unaffected by it? How can he be affected by what he produces in another? Does, then, the motion in another thing produce the being affected, which then would not be affected relative to the producing thing?

But if the expressed principle of swan were to produce whiteness, and the swan, in coming to be, becomes white, will we say that it is affected when it acquires substantiality? But if so, may it be white also later, when it has come to be? If one thing causes growth, and the other grows, is the growing thing affected? Or is affection only in quality? And if one thing makes something else beautiful, and the other becomes beautiful, is the thing becoming beautiful affected? If, then, the thing becoming beautiful becomes worse or is destroyed, like tin, and the other thing becomes better, like copper, will we say the copper is affected, and the tin produces?

120 See Ar., Phys. 5.3.226a26. 121 Cf. supra 17.15 17.
122 See Ps. Archytas apud Simplicius, In Cat. 9.314.16 18 (= p. 28.27 28 Thesleff).
123 Cf. infra 21.21, 26; 22.9. For the phrase εἰς οὐσίαν (‘into substantiality’) see Pl., Soph. 219B4 5 and Ar., DA 2.5.417b10 where it is equivalent to εἰς ἐντελεχείαν.
124 See Ar., Meta. 5.21.1022b15.
How will we say that the person learning is affected, when the activity of the agent\textsuperscript{125} gets to him? In fact, how would it be a process of affection, insofar as it is one process? No, in itself is it not a process of affection. But if the one who is learning is affected, where will the being affected come from? It is not at any rate by him not having been put in a state of activity. For learning is not like being hit, any more than is seeing, since it consists in apprehension and cognition.

§ 6.1.21. What, then, are we to grasp being affected by? Not, certainly, by activity derived from another thing, not if the person receiving the activity makes it his own in receiving it. But wherever there is no activity, is there just a process of affection? What, then, if something became better, would the activity have the property of being worse? Or if someone were active viciously, and ruled another licentiously? In fact, nothing prevents an activity from being bad and a process of being affected from being good.

So, how are we to distinguish production and affection? Is it by the fact that the one involves the activity passing from the agent to another thing, while the affection is in another thing, and is derived from the other one?

What about the case, then, where the activity comes from oneself, and is not directed to another, as in thinking or believing? Or getting heated in oneself, when one thinks something or is angered on the grounds of a belief, when nothing from outside is added?

In fact, producing is a motion coming from oneself, whether in oneself or towards another.

What, then, about the appetite, and desire in general, if desire is moved by the object of desire?\textsuperscript{126} That is, unless someone supposes that it is not moved by the object of desire because that desire is awakened after that object appears. How, then, does desire differ from being hit or being brought down by being pushed? Must we make distinctions among desires: some of them are productions, that is, those that follow reason, and some of them are affections, that is, those that are pullings?

Is being affected not distinguished by being derived from another thing rather than from oneself – for something might rot in itself – even if nothing is contributed from outside, whenever it endures alteration which does not lead to substantiality,\textsuperscript{127} and which, therefore, diverts the thing to the worse or at any rate not to the better? Does such an alteration possess the property of affection, that is, of being affected?

\textsuperscript{125} I.e., the teacher. \textsuperscript{126} See Ar., DA 3.10.433a28 29. \textsuperscript{127} Cf. supra 20.20 and infra l. 24; 6.6.3.22.21.
But suppose heating up is to acquire heat, it would be possible for this to contribute towards the substantiality or not. It would follow that the identical thing will be both affected and not affected. And how can heating up not be double?

In fact, getting hot, when it contributes to substantiality, will also then contribute to the substantiality of the other thing that is affected, for example, when the bronze is heated, and so is affected, the being is the statue, which does not itself get hot except accidentally. If, then, the bronze is more beautiful due to being heated or in respect of being heated, nothing prevents us from saying that it is affected, on the one hand, in becoming worse, and on the other, in becoming better, or neither of the two.

§ 6.1.22. Being affected, then, comes to be through possessing motion in oneself, which is any alteration whatever. And producing is either possessing in oneself independent motion starting from oneself or that motion which is completed with reference to another from oneself, originating from the one who is said to produce. Furthermore, motion is in both, and the differentia distinguishing producing and being affected is that the motion preserves the producer as unaffected in the producing, as such, and affection consists in the thing being differently disposed from what it was before, while the substantiality of the thing affected acquires no addition towards its substantiality, on the grounds that it is something else that is affected, when a substance comes to be.\(^{128}\)

So, the identical motion is in one way producing, and in another, being affected. It will be a producing when considered in one way, although it is the identical motion, and in another way, an affection, because, in the latter case, the one concerned is disposed in such and such a way.

In this way, it looks as though both are relatives, in those cases in which the producing of something is relative to being affected. When looked at in one way, the identical thing is producing, and in another way, it is being affected. And each of the two is not being considered in itself, but only along with the other. This one moves, and this one is moved, and these are two predicates in each case. And this one gives to the other motion, while this one receives the motion, so that it is giving and receiving, that is, these are relative.

In fact, if the receiver is said to have something, for example, a colour, why is it not said to have motion, too? And in the case of independent motion, such as that of walking, the subject has walking and has thinking.

\(^{128}\) Cf. 6.3.21.6 9, 22.23 25.
But we should investigate whether forethought is producing, and whether coming to be the recipient of forethought is being affected. For forethought relates to another thing, and is about another thing.

In fact, forethought is not a producing, even if the thinking is about something else, nor is the object of thought being affected.

In fact, thinking is not producing – for the thinking does not occur in the object of thought, but is rather about it – nor is it production generally. 25

Nor should one call all activities productions or a kind of producing. For the production is accidental. What, then, are they? If the walking person makes footprints, do we not say that he has produced them? Yes, but that is because he is something else. 130

In fact, we say that he produces footprints accidentally, and the activity accidentally, because this is not what he was looking to do. For we say ‘produce’ also in the case of inanimate things, for example, fire heats, and the drug worked. But enough of this.

§ 6.1.23. On the subject of having, if having is said in many ways, why will not all the modes of having be reduced to this one predicate? Thus, with quantity, because it ‘has’ size, and quality, for example, because it ‘has’ colour, so, too, with father and suchlike, because he ‘has’ a son, and son, because he ‘has’ a father, and possessions in general.

And if there are other things in those predicates, weapons, sandals, and things to do with the body, one would enquire first why in possessing these things the subject produces another predicate, whereas in contrast, in burning or cutting or digging or losing them, he does not produce another predicate or predicates. But if the reason for there being a distinct predicate here is that the thing envelops the body, then when the cloak is lying on a couch, it will be another predicate as compared to when someone is wrapped in it. But if it is in respect of possession itself, that is, the having, evidently all those other things which are said in respect of having, will in turn be reduced to having, wherever the having might be. For it will not differ depending on what is had.

If, however, you should not say ‘have a quality’, for in this way quality would have been said of something, nor ‘having a quantity’ because quantity would have been said of something, nor ‘having parts’ because substance is thus being said of something, why may you say ‘having weapons’, since substance is mentioned there, namely, the one which

130 I.e., the person produces the footprints, not the walking.
131 See Ar., Cat. 4.1b27, 15.15b17; Meta. 5.23.1023a8.
132 See Ar., Cat. 15.15b19 22.
they belong to? Just how is ‘this man has weapons’ simple and so belongs to one predicate? For this is what ‘being armed’ means.

Next, does it apply only to a living person or also if it is a statue to whom they belong? For person and statue seem to have them in a different way, probably equivocally. For ‘he is standing’ is not identical in each case. And how is it reasonable that that which infrequently occurs should have a different general predicate?

§ 6.1.24. In the case of position which also only applies to few things, namely, when they are said to be reclining, being seated, and not simply a matter of being placed, but ‘how it is placed’,¹³³ or ‘is placed in such and such a posture’.¹³⁴ And the posture is something else; for what does being placed mean other than: ‘it is in place’? And since place and posture are mentioned, why does one need to combine two categories into one?

Next, if ‘he is seated’ means the activity, then it should be placed among the activities, but if the affection, then in the [genus] of ‘having been affected’ or of ‘being affected’. What else does ‘he is reclining’ mean other than lying propped up, and lying down, or lying between? Since ‘reclining on’ is a relative, why is the one reclining not also?¹³⁵ Since we place ‘right’ and ‘left’ among relatives, we also place the one who is on the right or left among relatives, too. So much, then, for these matters.

§ 6.1.25. There is much also to be said in reply to those¹³⁶ who posit four genera, and divide them into substrates, qualities, dispositions, and relative dispositions;¹³⁷ and who posit a common genus over them, including all things in one genus, because they postulate one common thing, that is, one genus in all cases, namely ‘something’. But their genus ‘something’ is unintelligible and irrational; it does not fit both incorporeals and bodies.¹³⁸ And they have left themselves no differentiae with which to divide the something.

The something, then, is either being or non-being. If, then, it is being, it is one of the species of being, and if it is non-being then being is non-being. And there are thousands of such objections.

Let us, then, leave them for the present, and investigate the division itself. Having put substrates first in the order, placing matter first before the other things, they rank what they take to be the first principle on a level with the things that, in their eyes, come after the principle.¹³⁹

¹¹³ See Ar., Cat. 4.2.a 3.
¹¹⁴ The meaning of σχήμα here.
¹¹⁵ See Ar., Cat. 7.6b 11 12.
¹¹⁶ I.e., the Stoics.
¹¹⁷ See SVF 2.369 (= Simplicius, In Cat. 4.66.33 67.2).
¹¹⁸ See SVF 2.329 (= Alex. Aphr., In Top. 4.301.10 Wallies), 330 (= Sext. Emp., M. 1.17), 334 (= Philo, Leg. alleg. 151.28).
And first of all, they bring together prior things with posterior ones, in one genus, but it is not possible for prior and posterior things to be in the identical genus.\(^{140}\) For in those things among which there is a prior and a posterior, the posterior takes its existence from the prior, and in things falling under the identical genus, in respect of existence, each thing is equal, namely, in deriving its existence from the genus, if indeed a genus must be what is predicated of the species, and is in their essence. For they say, I think, that it is from matter that other things have their existence.

Next, in reckoning the substrate to be one, they have not counted all beings; rather, they are seeking the principles of beings. But it makes a difference if one says principles or things themselves. If they say that only matter is being, and all other things are states of matter, they should not have ranked one genus before being and the others.\(^{141}\) It would be better to say that one thing is substance,\(^{142}\) and the other things are states, which can then be distinguished. As for saying substrates on the one hand, and other things on the other, because the substrate is one and has no differentia, unless it is divided, like a mass into parts – though, in fact, substance is not divided because it is continuous – it would have been better to say ‘substrate’ in the singular.

§6.1.26. The most utterly absurd thing is, quite generally, to rank matter, which is in potency, before everything else, and not rank actuality before potency.\(^{143}\) For it is not possible for that which is in potency ever to progress to actuality, if that which is potency occupies the place of principle among beings. For indeed it will not bring itself to actuality; instead, either something in actuality must exist before it, in which case it is no longer the principle, or, if they were to say they are simultaneous, they would place the principles among chance happenings.

Next, if they are simultaneous, why do they not rank actuality higher? And why is matter more being, and not actuality? And if actuality is posterior, then in what way? For matter does not actually generate form, that is to say, unqualified matter does not produce qualified matter, nor does actuality arise from that which is potency. For in that case, actuality would be present in matter, and matter would not be simple any longer.

And in their eyes god is secondary to matter.\(^{144}\) For body consists of matter and form. And where does god’s form come from? For if he is

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\(^{140}\) See Ar., *Meta.* 3.3.999a6 7.  
\(^{141}\) Cf. 2.4.1.6 11. See Ar., *Meta.* 1.3.983b9 11.  
\(^{142}\) Using the Peripatetic terminology in the criticism of Stoicism.  
\(^{143}\) See Ar., *Meta.* 9.8.1049b5.  
\(^{144}\) See *SVF* 2.313 (= Plutarch, *De com. not.* 1085b c), 323 (= Galen, *De qual. incor.* 19.476. 4 477-7).
a principle-like and an expressed principle, even without possessing matter, then god is incorporeal, and that which is able to produce is incorporeal. If, even without matter, he is composite in substance, inasmuch as he is body, they will be introducing another kind of matter, namely, god’s matter.

Next, how can matter be a principle, if it is body? For body is necessarily many. And all body consists of matter and quality. And if matter is body in another way, then they will be saying that it is body equivocally. If the common feature of body is three-dimensionality, they will be talking about mathematical body. If it is three-dimensionality together with resistance, then they will not be talking of one body.

Next, resistance is either a quality or accompanies a quality. But where does three-dimensionality come from; or who made it extended? For matter does not occur in the account of three-dimensionality, nor does three-dimensionality occur in the account of matter. So, in participating in magnitude matter will no longer be simple.

Next, where does its unification come from? For it is indeed not self-unifying, but unified by participation in unity. They actually should have worked out that it is not possible to rank mass before all else, but rather that which is without mass and is one, and that one should begin from that which is one and end with the many, moving from that which is without magnitude to magnitudes, assuming it is not possible for the many to be, if that which is one is not, nor for magnitude without that which has no magnitude, and assuming that magnitude is one not by being one itself, but by partaking of that which is one, and by combination.

So, what exists primarily and properly speaking must be prior to that which is by combination. And how does the combination occur? And we should enquire what manner of combination it is. For presumably, if they had, they would have found what is not accidentally one. By ‘accidentally’ I mean what is not one by itself, but has its unity from something else.

§6.1.27. What they should have done, preserving in a place of honour the principle of all things, is not to posit as principle the shapeless, nor the passive, nor something not partaking of life, without thought, dark, and indefinite, but rather to refer even substance back to this. For god is introduced by them, for the sake of appearances, as possessing his existence from matter, as both composite and posterior, in fact, as being matter in a certain state.

145 Cf. 4.4.7.4.16 17. See SVF 2.1047 (= Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 226.10 19).
146 Cf. supra 6.26.16.
Next, if matter is the substrate, there must be something else which, being outside matter, acts on matter, and makes it into the substrate for those properties which it emits from itself into matter. If god is in matter, then he would be substrate, even when he has come to be in matter, and he would not make matter substrate, nor would he himself be substrate together with matter. For what would matter then be substrate to, when he is no longer there to provide the substrates themselves, since all substrates have been used up in what they call the substrate? For the substrate is relative, but not to the thing which is in it, but to that which actively affects it as it lies there.

And the substrate is substrate relative to what is not substrate. If so, then it is relative to something outside, with the result that this is what is received. If the substrate needed nothing from outside, it would itself be able to become all things by being formed, as in a dance a man makes himself into all things; then it is no longer substrate, but rather all things itself. For just as a dancer is not the substrate to the figures he makes – these are his actuality – so, too, what they call matter will not be substrate to all things, if the other things are derived from it. Indeed, it is rather the case that the other things will not exist at all, if the other things are matter disposed in a certain way, in the way that the figures are the dancer disposed in a certain way. If the other things do not exist, then matter itself is not, generally, substrate, and not the matter of beings. Indeed, if there is only matter, then by this fact itself, it is not matter. For matter is relative.

For the relative is relative to another thing, from the identical genus, like double and half, and not substance to double. How can a being relative to non-being be a relative, except accidentally? The one is being in itself, and matter is being relative to being. For if matter is potency, what is it going to be if the other principle is not substance? Matter, then, will not be the potency for substance.147 So they, who accuse others of making substances out of non-substances, themselves make substance out of non-substance. For the cosmos, insofar as it is a cosmos, is not a substance. It is absurd to make matter the underlying substance, and not make bodies substances in a stronger sense, and not make the cosmos substance in a stronger sense than these, or only a substance insofar as matter is a part of the cosmos.148

They say an animal does not have its substantiality from soul, but only from matter, and soul is a state of matter, and posterior. So, where does matter have its animation from, and, generally, where does the real existence of the soul come from? How does matter sometimes become bodies, while another bit of it becomes soul? And if the form comes from

147 Cf. 6.3.8.30 31. 148 See SVF 2.323 (= Galen, De qual. incor. 19.476.4 477.7).
elsewhere, soul would never come to be when a quality enters matter, but only inanimate bodies. If something moulds it, and makes it into soul, the productive soul will be there before the soul that comes to be.

§6.1.28. Given that much has already been said against their hypothesis, let us pause here, lest we ourselves appear absurd in gloating over a victory against such an evident absurdity, having shown that they rank non-being as what is being most of all, that is, putting the last first.

The explanation for their mistake is sense-perception, which they make their guide, and take as trustworthy in positing principles and other things. For they believe bodies to be beings; next, viewing with apprehension the change of bodies into one another, they thought that what is stable under them is what being is, just as if someone believed place rather than bodies to be being, because they believed that place does not pass away. Yet even this is stable in their view, although they should not have believed something stable in just any way to be being; rather, one should first see what must belong to genuine being. For among these [genuine] beings, there also exists everlasting stability. For if a shadow is always stable, following something that is altering, then its being is still not more than that thing. The sensible along with that [supposedly stable underlying substrate], and many other things would be, if judged by amount, more the whole being than any one thing of those in it. For if the whole is actually non-being, how is that substrate the fundament?

The most amazing thing of all is for those who trust sense-perception in every respect to posit as being something that cannot be grasped by sense-perception. For it is not correct to grant matter resistance; for this is a quality. If they say they grasp it with intellect, this intellect is absurd in positing matter as prior to itself, granting it being, and not itself. If, then, there is no intellect in their view, how could it be trustworthy when speaking about those things more authoritative than itself, and without being akin to them in any way at all? But enough has been said about this nature and these subjects in other places.

§6.1.29. Qualities should be different from substrates in their view, and they claim they are. Otherwise, they would not rank them in second place. So, if they are different, they must be simple. And if they are simple, they are not composite. And if this is so, they do not have matter,

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149 See SVF 2.329 (= Alex. Aphr., In Top. 4.301.19 Wallies).
150 Cf. 6.3.4.3; See Pl., Tim. 52B1.
151 See SVF 2.381 (= Galen, De qual. incor. 19.483.8 484.3).
152 On the supposition that intellect cannot be grasped with the senses.
153 Cf. 2.4.6 16; 3.6.6 19.
insofar as they are qualities. Again, if this is so, they must be incorporeal and active. For it is matter that underlies the qualities, and is affected by them.

But if they are composites, then the division contrasting simples and composites is absurd, which first puts them into one genus, and next puts each of them in different species, as though someone were to divide scientific understanding, and call the one part scientific understanding of letters, and another part scientific understanding of letters along with something else. If they call qualities qualified matter, first, their formulae are enmattered but they do not make something composite when they come to be in matter; rather, they will be composite before the composite which they make out of matter and form.\textsuperscript{154} They are, therefore, neither forms nor formulae.

If they say formulae are nothing but matter disposed in a certain way, they will clearly say that qualities are disposed in a certain way, and are to be ranked in the third genus. But if this is a different condition,\textsuperscript{155} then what is the differentia making it distinct?

In fact, it is clear that the disposition here is rather a real existent. Yet if there is no real existent there, too, why do they reckon it as one genus or species? For being and non-being certainly cannot fall under the identical genus. But what is this thing in the case of matter that is disposed in a certain way? For it must be either being or non-being. And if it is being, then it is entirely incorporeal. And if it is not being, it is spoken of emptily, and it is matter only, and the quality is nothing; nor is the thing disposed in a certain way. For it is even more non-being; and this applies to the fourth genus they speak of in even greater measure.

Matter, therefore, is alone being. Who, then, proclaims this? Not indeed the matter itself; unless it does, for intellect disposed in a certain way is matter. Yet ‘disposed in a certain way’ is an empty addition. Matter, therefore, says these things and understands them. And if matter speaks with understanding, it would be a wonder how it can think and perform the functions of soul, while possessing neither sense nor soul. But if it speaks without understanding, positing itself to be what it itself is not, and could not be, who should this lack of understanding be attributed to?

In fact, if matter speaks, then it should be attributed to matter. But, really, matter does not speak, even if a speaker speaks with many characteristics derived from matter, and belongs wholly to matter, if it has even a portion of soul, in ignorance of itself and of the potency to speak the truth about such things.

\textsuperscript{154} See Alex. Aphr., De an. 17.15 18.10. \textsuperscript{155} The meaning of σχέσις here.
§6.1.30. As for things which are disposed in a certain way, it is probably absurd to place things disposed in a certain way third, or to place them in any rank at all, since all things disposed in a certain way relate to matter. But they say there is a differentia in the things disposed in a certain way, and that matter is disposed thus and so in one way, and in another among things disposed in a certain way, and that, furthermore, qualities are disposed in a certain way relative to matter, whereas things disposed in a certain way properly speaking relate to the qualities. But since the qualities themselves are nothing except matter disposed in a certain way, things disposed in a certain way go back to matter in their view, and will be related to matter.

How is the thing disposed in a certain way a single genus, if there are several differentiae in it? How do three cubits and pale fall under one genus, since one is a quantity and the other a quality? And the when and the where? And how is yesterday or last year being disposed in a certain way at all? And how is time disposed in a certain way at all? Neither time itself nor things in time itself, nor things in place nor place itself are disposed in a certain way. Nor is the person actively producing in a certain way disposed in a certain way, but rather producing in a certain way; indeed, not in a certain way at all, just simply producing. And the person who is affected in a certain way is not disposed in a certain way; rather, he is affected in a certain way, or, generally, affected in this way.\(^{156}\) Probably, being disposed in a certain way only really suits things placed in a certain way, and having.\(^{157}\)

As to the relative, if they did not place it in one genus along with the other things disposed in a certain way, another argument for those enquiring is, namely, whether they ascribe a real existence to such relations, given that they have oftentimes not done so.\(^{158}\) Furthermore, it is absurd to place a thing which supervenes in the one identical genus with those things which are prior. For one and two must be there before one has half and double.

On those who posited beings or principles of beings in another way, whether unlimited or limited, whether corporeal or incorporeal, or also both, it is possible to investigate each group of them separately if one also grasps what ancient thinkers said in answer to their opinions.

\(^{156}\) See Dexippus, *In Cat.* 38.34.19 24.

\(^{157}\) Πῶς ἔχων (‘being disposed in a certain way’) here is equated to ἔχων (‘having’ or ‘possessing’). See *SVF* 2.401 (= Boethus of Sidon ἀπὸν Simplicius, *In Cat.* 337.7 8).

\(^{158}\) See Sext. Emp., *M.* 8.453.
§6.2.1. Since we have conducted an investigation into the so-called ten genera,¹ and have spoken about those who subsume whatever is under one genus, that is, posit all things as belonging to four quasi-species falling under the one genus,² the next thing is to say how these matters appear to us, attempting to relate our view to Plato’s.

If, then, one should posit Being as one, there would have been no need to investigate the following questions: whether being is one genus subsuming all things; whether there are genera which do not fall under one genus; whether there are principles; whether one should posit principles as identical to genera, or genera as identical to principles; whether one should posit all principles as also genera, but not all genera as principles, or vice versa; whether in each of the two cases, some principles are also genera, and some genera are also principles; whether in one of the two cases all are also the other, or in one of the two some are also the other.

But since we deny that Being is one – why this is so, has been said by Plato³ and others – it perhaps becomes necessary to investigate these questions also, first of all laying down the number of the genera of Being and in what way they are genera.

Since, then, we are investigating Being or Beings, it is first necessary to distinguish between what we call ‘Being’, about which the investigation may now properly begin, and what others think is Being, but which we say is becoming, and never truly Being.⁴ We should think of Being and becoming as divided from one another not in the way of a genus ‘something’⁵ divided into being and becoming; nor should we think that Plato did this.⁶ It is ridiculous to subsume non-being under Being,

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³ See Pl., Soph. 244B 245E; Parm. 141E9 10. The others would include Peripatetics and Stoics.
⁴ See Pl., Tim. 28A2 4. ⁵ As the Stoics did. Cf. 6.1.25.1 11.
⁶ As apparently some earlier Platonists argued. See Severus apud Proclus, In Tim. 1.227. 13 16.
which would be just like putting Socrates and his statue under the identical genus. For ‘distinguishing’ is here marking off Being from becoming and positing them as separate; and it is to assert that the appearance of Being is not Being. By this Plato shows that true Being is something else. And by adding ‘always’ to Being, he indicates that Being must be such that it never falsifies its nature.

Let us, then, begin our investigation by talking about this Being, that is, about this Being which is not one. Later, if it seems appropriate, we will say something about coming to be and what comes to be, the sensible cosmos.

§6.2.2. So, since we say that Being is not one, do we say it is some limited number or is it unlimited? In what way is it actually not one?

In fact, we say it is at once one and many, and is a kind of complex one, embracing its many as one.

It is necessary, then, that a one of this kind be one in genus, and Beings are its species, through which it is at once many and one; or else there are more genera than one, but all genera fall under the one genus; or that there are several genera and none of them falls under another; rather, each includes the Beings that fall under it, whether these are themselves also lesser genera or species, and under these come individuals, and all belong to the one nature, and the constitution of the intelligible cosmos – which we actually call ‘Being’ – consists of all these things.

If this last is indeed the case, these cannot be merely genera; they must also be principles of Being at the same time. ‘They are genera because lower genera fall under them, and then species and individuals. They are principles if Being consists of many in this way and if the whole consists of these. If, however, there are several things the whole consists of, and the wholes, coming together, produce the universe without subsuming other things under them, they would be principles and not genera; for example, if one were to make the sensible world out of the four elements, fire and suchlike. These would be principles, but not genera; unless, of course, ‘genus’ is equivocal.

So, shall we say that they are indeed kinds of genera, and they are also principles, and hence bring the whole to completion by mixing together the genera, each genus along with what falls under it, thus producing a blend of all things? But in that case, each thing will be potential and not actual, and not pure either.

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7 Cf. 3.15.31 33. 8 See Pl., Tim. 27D5. 9 See Pl., Tim. 28D6. 10 Cf. 2.5.5.23. 11 Cf. 6.3. 12 Cf. 5.1.8. See Pl., Parm. 145A2. 13 See Ar., Meta. 3.3.999A22 23. 14 Reading ἄλλον with the mss. [Ficino: alia].
But shall we put the genera on one side, and mix the individuals? What, then, will the genera in themselves be?

In fact, the genera in themselves will be pure even then, and the mixing of the individuals will not destroy the genera. But how?

In fact, let us postpone these questions to a later occasion.\(^{15}\)

At present, since we have agreed both that there are genera, and furthermore that they are also principles of Substance, and that they are principles and a composition in a different manner, first we must say how many genera there are, and how we distinguish them from one another and do not subsume them under one genus, as though they had come together to form a unity by chance. Yet it is much more reasonable that they fall under a unity.

In fact, if they could all be species of Being, and then after them there would be individuals, and nothing outside these, it might be possible to produce everything in this manner. But such a claim actually refutes itself,\(^{16}\) for species will not be species, nor generally will there be a multiplicity falling under one, but rather all will be one, since there is nothing, no things, outside of that one. How can the one become many, so as to produce species, unless there is something else besides it? For it is not in itself many, unless someone cuts it up like a magnitude, and in that case the thing doing the cutting up is something else.\(^{17}\) If it cuts itself up or divides itself generally, then it will be divided before being divided.

In this way, then, and for many other reasons, one should distance oneself from Being as one genus, also because it is not possible to call just anything you grasp either Being or Substance. And if one does call it Being, then one will be saying something accidental of it, like someone saying a substance is pale. For then one is not saying just what Paleness is.

§6.2.3. We say that there are indeed several genera, and they are not several accidentally. They are, then, derived from One.

In fact, even if they are derived from One, since it is not predicated of them in the definition of their essence, nothing prevents each itself from being a separate genus, since they are not of the same kind as each other. Is the One, then, the explanation for the genera that come to be outside it because it is not predicated of the other things in their essence?

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\(^{15}\) See 6.2.19.12 17.

\(^{16}\) Reading αὐτὴς instead of the αὐτὴς of HS\(^2\). On the latter, followed by Armstrong, the αὐτὴς would presumably refer to οὐσίας (‘substance’) of l. 28.

\(^{17}\) See Pl., Rep. 529E1 4; Parm. 144E3 4.
In fact, it is outside. For the One transcends,\textsuperscript{18} insofar as it is not reckoned among the genera, if the others are on account of it; and they are of equal status with regard to being genera. And why is it not reckoned among them?

In fact, we are looking for Beings, not for what transcends Being. That, then, is how this is. But what of the One that is reckoned among them?\textsuperscript{19} In the case of this One, one might wonder how it might be reckoned among things to be explained.

In fact, it would be absurd if it and the other Beings fall under one genus. But if it is reckoned among those things it explains, as being the genus itself, and the other genera follow on it, and there is a differentia between the genera following and it – and it is not predicated of them as their genus, nor as anything else – then they must be genera, insofar as they have anything falling under them. For neither is it the case that, if you bring about walking, you would be the genus for walking. And if nothing were prior to it as its genus, while there would be genera posterior to it, then walking would be a genus of beings.

Generally, that which is one should probably not be called the explanation for other things. Rather, the genera are like parts of it [the One-Being], and like elements of it, and all one nature partitioned by our notions. [This One-Being] itself is one relative to all genera because of a wonderful power, while it appears as many and comes to be many, when it is, in a way, moved, according to the full intelligence of its nature which makes that which is one not be one, and makes us in a way parts of it; we produce these parts, and so positing each one, and calling it a genus, not knowing that we do not know the whole at once, and that we rather produce them bit by bit and then fit them together again, since we are unable to hold them for a long time, while they move eagerly towards themselves.\textsuperscript{20} For this reason, we let them back into the whole, and we allow them to become one, or rather, to be one.

But these things will certainly be clearer once the genera have been understood, and we grasp how many genera there are; for then we will also grasp their mode of being. But since, in conducting this enquiry, we should not just make assertions,\textsuperscript{21} but rather aim at a conception and intellection of the things under discussion, let us go on to do that now.

\textsuperscript{18} The word is ἐπίκειναι. Cf. infra l. 10. and Pl., Rep. 509B9.
\textsuperscript{19} I.e., Intellect, which is all real Being and is here identified with the One Being of the second hypothesis of Parmenides.
\textsuperscript{20} Cf. 3.5.9.26 29; 5.8.5 6; 6.7.35.28 30. \textsuperscript{21} Cf. 3.7.1.9.
§6.2.4. If we wish to see the nature of body, for example, by asking ourselves what is the nature of body itself in this [sensible] world, then — by comprehending this in the case of one of its parts, for example, stone, that this is the substrate, and this its quantity, that is, its magnitude, and this the quality, for example, the colour — should we not say in the case of all other body that one thing is its substance, the other its quantity, and this its quality, all of them collected together, but that they are divided by our reasoning into three, and one body is these three things? And if motion were innate in body’s constitution, we should count this in as well, and these four things would be one, and the unity of body would be made dependent on unity, and its nature on all those parts.

Indeed, in the identical manner, since our present reasoning is about intelligible Substance, that is, about the genera and principles in the intelligible world, we have to take away the coming to be in bodies and grasping by means of sense-perception, and their magnitudes — that is how bodies are separate and divided from one another — and we have to grasp a real intellectual existence both as truly Being and as being one to a greater degree. Therein lies the marvel how what is one in this way is many and one. In the case of bodies, it is agreed that the identical thing is one and many. For the identical thing can be divided up without limit; and colour is different, and shape. For it is separated.

But if someone grasps one soul, undivided, without magnitude, most simple, as it will appear in the initial apprehension occurring in discursive thinking, how can one expect to find it, in contrast, to be many? And yet thinking that one would come to a stop in this [unity of soul], when one divides a living being into body and soul, and finds body to be multifarious, composite and variegated, one would be confident, once one finds soul to be simple, in bringing the course of enquiry to an end, having arrived at its principle.

So, let us grasp the soul, since it has come to be ready to hand from the intelligible place, just as body, in the previous discussion, came from the sensible place, in what way this one is many and in what way the many souls are one, not a composite one made out of many, but in the way that one nature is many things. For because of our grasp of this one, and its becoming evident, we asserted that the truth about the genera of Beings will be evident.

§6.2.5. First of all, it is to be borne in mind that bodies, for example, those of animals and plants, are each pluralities, because of their colours, shapes, magnitudes, and the forms of their parts, each different in each

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22 See Pl., Rep. 508C1, 517B5. Plotinus here and throughout the following sections is referring either to the hypostasis Soul or to any individual soul.

23 Cf. supra ll. 12 18.
part, but they all will come from a one that is either in every respect and entirely one, or from a one that is more one than what comes from it, such that it is to a greater degree than what comes to be – for the greater the distance is from one, the greater it is from being – so, then, since it comes from one, but not from one in such a way that it is entirely one or the One itself – for that would not make a discontinuous multiplicity – it remains that it comes from a multiplicity which is one. The producing thing is soul. This is, therefore a multiplicity which is one.

What, then? Does the multiplicity simply consist of the expressed principles of the things that come to be? Or is it, then, itself one thing, and the expressed principles something else?

In fact, the soul itself is the expressed principle, that is, the summation of the expressed principles, and the different expressed principles are its activity, namely, the activity of soul in accordance with its substantiality. Its substantiality is the power of the expressed principles. In this way, it has actually been shown that this one is many from the effects it produces in other things. But what would happen if it were not productive? Or if one were to grasp soul as not producing, by ascending to the non-productive aspect of soul? Will one not discover many powers there, too? For everyone will agree that soul exists.

Is this identical to saying that a stone exists?

In fact, it is not identical. Nonetheless, even in that case, what it is for stone to exist is not [just] to exist, but to be a stone. So, too, what it is for soul to exist includes existence along with being soul.

Is the situation, then, as follows: existence is one thing and whatever else completes the substantiality of soul another, that is, on the one hand, there is existence and, on the other hand, the differentia which produces the soul?

In fact, the soul is a being, not, however, in the way pale man is, but simply as a substance is. This is identical to saying that what it contains does not come from outside its substantiality.

§6.2.6. But does soul not contain what is outside its own substantiality, so that it may be in accordance with Existence, on the one hand, and on the other, in accordance with existing as such and such? But if it is in accordance with existing as such and such, and the such and such is outside substance, the whole as soul will not be substance, but only in some respect, and a part of it is substance whereas the whole is not substance.

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24 Accepting the emendation to ἥξει by Igal of a text that is perhaps corrupt.
25 Cf. 6.7.5.3. 26 Cf. 3.1.1.14. 27 See Ar., Meta. 7.11.1056a1 3; 8.3.1043b2 4.
Next, what will be existence for soul, without the other [properties], other than [would be the case with] a stone?

In fact, this existence of the soul has to be inside like ‘a spring and principle’,\(^\text{28}\) indeed everything that is soul has to be inside. And life, then, too. And so both together, both existence and life, are one. So, are they one in the way an expressed principle is one?

In fact, the substrate is one, and it is one such that it is, again, two or more, that is, all the primary properties that the soul is.

In fact, it is, then, substance and life, or has life.\(^\text{29}\)

But if it has life, then, whatever itself has life is not in life, and life is not in substantiality. But if neither has the other, we must say that both are one.

In fact, they are a one and many and just as many as appear in the one. And it is one for itself but, relative to other things, many.\(^\text{30}\) And it is one being, making itself many in a sort of motion. And it is one whole, but it is many when it tries to contemplate itself, just as being cannot endure being just a one thing, when it is able to be as many things as it is. Contemplation is the explanation for it appearing many, in order that it may think. For if it were to appear to be one, then it does not think, but is already that thing it is thinking.

§6.2.7. What, then, are the genera we see looking into soul, and how many are they?\(^\text{31}\) Since we find in soul at the same time substantiality and life, and this substantiality is common to all soul, and life is common, too, and Life is in Intellect, too,\(^\text{32}\) when we introduce both Intellect and its life, we will posit Motion\(^\text{33}\) as one genus common to all Life.

We will posit two genera, Substance and Motion, as primary Life. For even if they are a one, the intellect separates them in thought, discovering that they are not one; otherwise, it would not have been able to separate them.

Look at motion or life in other things, too, as they are clearly separate from the existence [of the thing], even if this is not the case in true

\(^{28}\) See Pl., \textit{Phdr} 245C9.

\(^{29}\) Perhaps an allusion to \textit{Pbado}, where Plato shows that soul is life and brings life to the body because it also has life. See Pl., \textit{Pbd}. 105D1 3.


\(^{31}\) Here begins the discussion of the five \textit{μέγιστα γένη} of \textit{Sophist}. These are ‘Being’ (τὸ ὅν), ‘Identity’ (ταὐτόν), ‘Difference’ (ἐτίθημι), ‘Motion’ (κίνησις), and ‘Stability’ (στασίς). ‘Substance’ (οὐσία) is at l. 6 said to be one of the γένη, though at 2.6.1.1 8, οὐσία and τὸ ὅν are distinguished, the latter being one of the five γένη (as in \textit{Sophist}) while the genera of being are elements of οὐσία. See \textit{infra} l. 36 and 8.12 13 for the distinction between οὐσία and τὸ ὅν (here τὸ εἶναι).


\(^{34}\) See Pl., \textit{Sophb}. 249A9 B3.
Existence, but at least in the shadow, in what is said to have existence equivocally.\(^{35}\) Just as in a statue of a human being much is missing, most of all the dominant thing, life,\(^{36}\) so, too, in sensible things, existence is a shadow of Existence, taken away from what exists most of all, namely, Life in the archetype. In this way, then, we are able to separate existence from life and life from existence.

There are indeed many species of Being and one genus, and Motion is neither to be subsumed under Being nor to be ordered above it; rather, it is on a level with Being, and is found in Being, but not as something in a substrate, for it is the activity of Being, and neither of them is without the other, except in thought, and the two natures are one. For Being is actual, not in potency. Even if you were to grasp each of them separately, both Motion would appear in Being and Being in Motion, just as with the ‘One-Being’,\(^{37}\) although each of them separately contains the other, still discursive thinking says they are two, and that each Form is a double one.

Since Motion appears in connection with Being, without altering the nature of Being, but rather producing something like completion in Being\(^{38}\) – since the nature of Being always remains thus and so even while moving – it would be even more absurd if one were not willing to introduce Stability than if one were not willing to admit Motion. For the concept or thought of stability is much closer to being than is that of motion. For Being in the intelligible world is ‘what is in the identical state in the identical way’,\(^{39}\) and that which has the one definition. So, then, let Stability indeed be one genus,\(^{40}\) different from Motion, in that it is clearly the contrary of Motion.

That Stability is different from Being should be clear at many points, and also why it is different; namely, if it were identical to Being, then it would not be more identical to Being than is Motion.\(^{41}\) For why should Stability be identical to Being, and Motion not, when Motion is the Life and activity of Substance and of Being itself? But just as we separated Motion from Being as identical and not identical to it, and we called both two as well as one, in the identical way we will separate Stability from Being, too, and also not separate it, only separating it in intellect, to such an extent as to posit another genus among Beings.

\(^{35}\) Cf. 6.3.22.16. See Pl., Parm. 133C D.  
\(^{36}\) Cf. 6.7.5.16. See Pl., Tim. 19B C.  
\(^{37}\) See Pl., Parm. 142D1, the second hypothesis the subject of which Plotinus identifies with Intellect.  
\(^{38}\) See Ar., DA 1.3.466b12 15, whose criticism of Plato on the soul is here being answered.  
\(^{39}\) See Pl., Soph. 248A12.  
\(^{40}\) See Pl., Soph. 249C1.  
\(^{41}\) The point is that if Stability were identical with Being, so too would Motion be. But Motion has been shown to be distinct from Being.
In fact, if we were to collect together Stability and Being into one, and say that Stability and Being differ in no respect whatever, we would bring together Stability and Motion, using Being as a middle term, and Motion and Stability would be one.\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Soph.} 252D6 20; 254D4 10.}

§6.2.8. So, we need to posit these three, if indeed intellect thinks each of them separately. It thinks and posits them at the same time, if indeed it thinks them, and they exist, if indeed they are being thought. For those things whose existence requires matter do not have their existence in intellect. But for immaterial things, if they have come to be thought, that is existence for them.

But look at pure Intellect, consider it with close attention, not regarding it with these eyes here. You see the hearth of Substance,\footnote{For the etymology linking Hestía, the goddess of the hearth, and οὐσία cf. 5.5.18 25 and see Pl., \textit{Crat.} 401C.} and unsleeping\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 52B7.} light in it, and how it stands in itself, and how it is divided from itself, being all together, both remaining life and intellection, not active regarding the future, but with regard to the now, or better, to the now and what is always now, what is always present, and you see how it thinks within itself, and not outside itself.

Its activity and motion, then, consist in thinking, in thinking itself lies Substance and Being. For existing, it thinks, and thinks itself as Being, and what it, in a way, leans on is Being. For its activity towards itself is not Substance, but Being is what the activity is towards and from. For it is what is seen, not the looking, that is Being. But the looking also has existence, in that the looking is towards Being and from Being.

Since Intellect is in actuality, and not in potency, it brings Intellect and Being together, that is, does not separate them; rather, Intellect makes itself into Being, and makes Being into itself. Being, the most steadfast of things, which other things relate to, causes Stability to really exist, and has it as something not acquired from outside, but from itself and in itself. What intellection ends in is Stability, without having begun, and where it sets out from, without setting out, is Stability. For Motion does not run from Motion nor towards Motion.

Furthermore, the Idea is stable, since it is the limit of Intellect, while Intellect is the motion of the Idea. So, then, all things are Being, Stability, and Motion, these being genera that permeate the wholes,\footnote{See Pl., \textit{Soph.} 254D4 5.} each posterior thing is a particular being, or a particular stability or a particular motion.

When someone actually looks at these three genera, having come to pay attention to the nature of Being, he sees Being by the being in
himself, and the other genera by the other things in himself; in addition, the Motion in Being by the motion in himself, and Stability by stability. Once, then, one fits being, stability, and motion in oneself to those in Intellect then, on the one hand, they come together and are, in a way, confused, by mixing them and not distinguishing them; but, then, on the other hand, by, in a way, distinguishing them a little, and holding back, and dividing them, when one looks at these three, Being, Stability, and Motion, each of them one, does one not say they are different from one another, that is, that they are distinguished in differentia, and does one not see the differentia as being real, in that he has posited three things, each of them one?

And then again, when he brings them together as one, that is, in a one, such that all are one, bringing them to identity, does he not, on inspection, catch sight of identity, as it comes to be and is? It is, then, necessary to add these two, Identity and Difference, to those three [Being, Stability, and Motion], with the result that the genera turn out to be five in total. These two provide those things that follow them with their being different and being identical. And each posterior thing is something identical, and each is something different. Taken unqualifiedly and without the qualification ‘something’, Identity and Difference would be found among the genera.

And they are primary genera, because you cannot predicate anything essential of any of them. You can indeed predicate being of them, for they are Beings, but it is not their genus, for they are not just what it is to be something. Nor can you predicate being of Motion or Stability, for they are not species of Being. Some things are Beings by being species of Being, others by participating in Being. Nor does Being participate in them as its own genera. For they are neither superior to nor prior to Being.

§6.2.9. One might confirm, then, from the above considerations, and perhaps also from others, that these are five primary genera. But how can one be confident that there are only these genera, and none in addition? Why is unity not a genus, too? Why not quantity and quality, the relative, and the others, which others have already enumerated?

That which is one one, then, if by that is meant the absolute One, which nothing further is added to, not Soul, not Intellect, nothing whatever, well, this would be predicated of nothing whatever, so it is not

48 Here and in the following three sections, Plotinus argues that, although oneness or unity is found in the intelligible world, it is not a genus.
49 See Ar., Cat. 4.1b26 27. 50 See Pl., Parm. 142A3 4.
a genus. If it is present in addition in Being, for which we use the name One-Being, this is not the primary One.

Further, since it is without differentiae, how could one produce species of it? And if one cannot do this, it is not a genus. For how will you divide it? For in dividing it you will produce many, with the result that the One itself will be many and destroy itself, if you want it to be a genus.

Next, what will you posit in addition when you divide it into species? For there would be no differentiae in the One, as there are of substance. For intellect accepts that there are differentiae in Being, but how should one say the same of the One?

Next, each time you posit two, by making a differentiation, you destroy the unit, since the addition of one unit always destroys the previous quantity.

If someone says that unity, in the case of Being, and in the case of Motion, is common to the other genera as well, reducing Being and unity to identity, then just as in the argument that did not make Being the genus of the other things – because Being is not just what something is, rather these are each Beings in different ways – so, too, unity will not be common to the other genera; rather, it will be one primarily, while others are one in other ways.

If someone says that he is not making of unity a genus for all other genera, but nonetheless affirms that unity is a genus for itself, like the others, then the reply is: if Being and unity are identical in his account, he is introducing a mere name, since Being has already been reckoned among the genera. And if each of them is one, what nature is he talking about? And if he adds ‘some kind’, then he means some kind of unity, and if he adds nothing, then he will again be meaning that unity which is predicated of nothing. If he means the unity which goes together with Being [One-Being], then we have already said that he does not mean the primary One.

But what prevents this [unity] from being the primary One, if that absolute One has been put on one side? For we do say that Being comes after the One and that it is primary Being.

In fact, in the case of Being, what is before it is not Being; if indeed it were, Being would not be primary Being. But in the case of unity, what is before it is the One.
Next, when it has been separated from Being by thought, unity does not have the differentiae of Being.

Next, as for the One-Being: if unity follows on Being, then it is also posterior to everything, whereas the genus is prior. If it were simultaneous with Being, then it is so with everything, but the genus is not simultaneous. If it is prior to Being, then it is really a principle of Being only. If it is the principle of Being, then it is not the genus of Being. And if it is not the principle of Being, then neither is it the principle of the other things generally speaking. One-Being is close to the One and, in a way, coincides with Being, and Being, on the one hand, since it is in relation to that One, and, on the other, being posterior to that One, is able also to be many – and so that One quite reasonably remains itself, One, and neither is willing to be partitioned nor does it wish to be a genus.

§6.2.10. How, then, is each thing that belongs to Being one?

In fact, any particular one is not [simply] one – for a particular one is already many things – indeed, each species is [said to be] one equivocally, for the species is a multiplicity, so that the one in this case is like that of an army or a chorus. So, the unity in the intelligible world is not in these things, with the result that unity is not a common element, nor does our theory say that it is identical in Being [the genus] and in things that have Being, with the result that unity is not a genus, since if any genus can be truly predicated of something, then the opposites of the genus cannot be truly predicated of it. Thus, unity as a genus is not truly predicated of all those Beings of which one and its opposites are truly predicated.

The consequence is that unity will not be predicated truly of the primary genera, especially as One-Being is not more one than it is a many, nor is any of the other genera one in such a way as not to be many, nor [does one] hold of the posterior genera each of which is a many in every respect.

Generally, no genus is one, with the consequence that if unity were a genus, this would destroy its essential unity. For unity is not number.

But it will be a number if it comes to be a genus. Furthermore, the unit is

58 See Ar., Meta. 3.3.998b20; 10.2.1053b22 24.
59 Because it is the unity of a species, for example, so it is more than one, and hence not simply one.
60 Cf. infra 11.8, 16; 5.5.4-31; 6.6.13.18; 6.9.1.4, 5, 32. See e.g., SVF 2.366 (= Plutarch, Prae. conjugalia 34), 367 (= Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum 29), 1013 (= Sext. Emp., M. 9.78).
61 Not following the addition of the words <τὸ ἐν ὀνοματον> of HS.
62 See Pl., Parm. 142D1.
63 See Ar., Meta. 5.6.1016b20.
one in number; if it were a unit by [being a] genus, then it would not be a unit properly speaking.

Furthermore, just as in numbers the unit is not predicated of them as a genus, but is said to be a constituent, and is not said to be a genus, in the same way, if the unit is said to be in the Beings, it is not the genus either of Being nor of the other primary genera nor of all Beings.

Furthermore, just as the simple should be the principle of what is not simple, and yet is by no means the genus of what is not simple, for then what is not simple would also be simple, so, too, in the case of unity. If unity is a principle, it will not be the genus of what is posterior. It is not, then, the genus of either Being or the other genera. If indeed it were, it would be the genus of the individual ones, as though one thought it right that unity should be separated from substance. So, it would then be the genus of individual things. For just as Being is not the genus of everything, only of the species of Being, so, too, unity is only the genus of the individual species in respect of each of them being one. What, then, would be the differentia between one thing and another in respect of being one, parallel to the case of the differentia in being between one thing and another?

But if unity is portioned along with Being and Substance, and the genus Being is portioned by partitioning into species and by theory finding the identical genus in many Beings, why is unity not also as clearly manifold as is Substance, and why would unity not be, [on this hypothesis], being portioned equally [with Substance], [also] a genus?

In fact, first, because it is not necessary, if something is present in many things, for it to be the genus of the things it is present in, nor need it be the genus of anything else. More generally, something in common is not in all events the genus of those things it is common to, for example, the point, which is present in lines, is not their genus nor that of other things, nor, as we have said, is one which is among numbers the genus of number or of other things. For it is necessary for [a genus] that is common or one in many things to use the proper differentiae to produce species and to be present in their definition. But what could be the differentiae of unity, and what kind of species could it bring about? If it produces the identical species as in the case of Being, then it would be identical to Being, and then only the name is different, and Being would suffice for both.

§6.2.11. We have to investigate how unity is in Being, and how partitioning, as we call it, works, and in general the partitioning of the

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65 See Ar., Meta. 10.1.1052a31. 66 See Ar., Meta. 5.6.1016a24.
67 E.g., the letters of syllables.
68 The singular ἕν is here being used because there is no plural of ἕν.
genera, and if it is identical in each case or different. First, then, in what way is any particular whatever one, and how does it exist?

Next, is unity said to be the same in One-Being\textsuperscript{69} and in that which is beyond One-Being?\textsuperscript{70} Unity, then, which holds for all is not identical, for it is not same in the case of sensibles and intelligibles – for neither is being identical in each of these cases – nor, likewise, is it the same in the sensibles in relation to one another. Unity is not identical in a chorus, and an army, and a ship and a house, nor in all these and in something continuous. Still, they all imitate the identical [One], although some are further from it, and others closer, and thereby are more truly in Intellect. For soul is one, and to an even greater extent, Intellect is a one, and Being is one.

So, then, in each case when we say that something has being do we also mention that it is one, and that as it has being so it is one?

In fact, that is accidental and it is not the case that it is one inasmuch as it has being; rather, it is possible that its being is not diminished when it is less one. For an army or a chorus has no less being than a house, although they are still less one.

It would seem, then, that the unity in each looks rather to the Good and to the extent that it obtains the Good it is to that extent one, and being more or less one lies in this. For each thing does not have a simple tendency towards being, but only together with the Good. Because of this, whatever is not a unity has the impulse to become one as far as it can, with natural things coming together by their own natures into identity, tending to be unified with themselves.\textsuperscript{71} For the various kinds do not have an impulse away from their own kind, but towards one another, and to themselves. And all souls would wish to come to be one in consequence of their own substantiality. And the One is on both sides of their impulse, both where it is from and where it is going. For it begins from the One and proceeds to the One. For this is the way the Good is, too. For without the impulse to the One, no being would come to exist, nor, when already existing, would it persist.\textsuperscript{72} So much indeed for natural things.

As for artificial things, each craft itself handles them in relation to the Good as far as it can and in the way it can.

This impulse towards the Good holds most of all in the case of the genus Being, in that it is close to the Good. Hence, other things are simply called what they are called, for example, human being, and if we

\textsuperscript{69} Cf. \textit{supra} 3.7; 6.6.13.52. See Pl., \textit{Parm.} 142D1.

\textsuperscript{70} The contrast is between the One Being of the second hypothesis of \textit{Parmenides} and the One of the first hypothesis.

\textsuperscript{71} I.e., organic growth produces a sort of unity.

\textsuperscript{72} Cf. 6.5.1.12 14.
do say one human being, then it is in comparison with two human beings. If we do call something one in another way, we do so adding the one starting from the thing itself.

In the case of Being, we call this whole One-Being, and assert that it is close together with the Good, when we declare it one. Unity, then, occurs in it, too, as principle and end, but not in the same way, but in a different way, such that the before and the after are also in that which is one. What, then, is unity in it? Is unity not in the same manner in the parts, since observation makes it something common?

In fact, the point in lines, too, is common, and yet is not the genus of lines and indeed this unity is probably the something common in numbers, and is not their genus. For unity in itself is not identical to the one in one or two, and the other numbers.

Next, nothing prevents there being an ordering into before and after in Being, and some things being simple, and others composite. And if unity in all the [parts] of Being were identical, without there being any differentiation of unity, then it would produce no species. And if there were no species, then it could not itself be a genus.

§6.2.12. So much, then, for that. But how does the Good for numbers consist in each of them being one, although they are inanimate?

In fact, it is this that is common to other inanimate things. But if someone were to deny that numbers exist at all, [let us assume that] we are here speaking only about beings, insofar as each is one. If they were to seek an indication of how the point partakes of the Good, and if, on the one hand, they were to say it exists by itself, if they say it is inanimate, then they are enquiring about the identical matter in all the other such things. If, on the other hand, they say it is in other things, such as in a circle, and this is that which is good for it, the desire for this has the impulse as far as possible because of the Good in the intelligible world.

But how, then, are the [five] genera the genera of these things? Are they each cut up?

In fact, the genus as a whole is in each. Are they, then, only in those things that partake of them?

In fact, they are not; rather, they are both in themselves and in those things which partake of them. This will surely become clearer later.

§6.2.13. Now then, why is quantity not among the primary genera, and indeed quality?

In fact, quantity is not primary with the others because the other genera are simultaneous [at the same level] with Being. For Motion is

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73 As in nature. Cf. supra ll. 25 26. 74 See Theophrastus, Meta. 4423 b1.
75 The circle is the good a point can [help] accomplish. 76 Cf. infra §§ 19 20.
with Being, being the activity and the Life of Being. Stability has entered 
Substantiality itself. And it is even more the case that, since [Motion, 
Stability, and Being] are different from each other and identical with 
themselves, Difference and Identity can be seen here, too. Number is posterior to these, and posterior to itself [as an ordered series], the later 
coming from the prior; they are in succession to one another, and the 
posterior ones are present in the prior ones, with the consequence that 
they cannot be reckoned among the primary genera.

But we must enquire if numbers are a genus at all. Magnitude is posterior to a greater degree, and composite. For magnitude is number in [the composite], line a kind of two, and plane a three. If, then, even 
continuous magnitude has quantity from number, how could it have 
this, if number were not a genus?

In magnitudes, too, the prior and the posterior are present. If being quantities is common to both numbers and magnitudes, we must get 
a grasp on what this is, and once we have discovered that, we can posit it 
as a posterior genus, and not among the primary ones. And if it is 
a genus, although not among the primary genera, then it has to be 
referred back to one of the primary ones, or to some of those which 
are so referred back.

So, it is perhaps clear that the nature of quantity reveals how much of 
something there is, that is, it measures how much of each thing there is, 
that is, this nature is itself so and so much. But if being so and so much is 
common to number and magnitude, then either number is prior and 
magnitude is derived from number, or else number consists in a mixture 
of motion and stability, and magnitude is either a kind of motion or 
derived from motion, that is, motion proceeding to the indefinite, while 
stability, by stopping the thing proceeding, produces the unit.

But later we have to produce a theory about the coming to be of 
number and magnitude, or rather about their real existence and the conception of them. For perhaps number is among the primary 
genera, and magnitude is posterior and consists in composition. And 
number is of things that are stable, while magnitude is in motion. But, as 
we said, of these things later.

§6.2.14. And why is quality not among the primary genera?

In fact, it is because this is also posterior, and so comes after 
Substance. [Substance must have qualities as its accompaniments, and may not be constituted from these, and may not be completed

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77 See Ar., D.1 1.2401b16 30, who is probably recounting the view of Plato, although some have taken him to be referring to Xenocrates.
79 Cf. 3.7.10.1 8; 6.3.3.4 6.
because of them; otherwise, it would be posterior to quality and quantity.]\(^80\)

Then, in substances that are composite, that is, composed out of many, in which numbers and qualities produce motion, there are also qualities, and a common feature will be observed in them. One should make the division in the primary genera not into simple and composite, but rather into simple and what completes the Substance, not, that is, the particular substance. There is nothing absurd in the particular substance being completed by quality, if it already has its substantiality before the quality, whereas the qualification comes from outside, and whatever the substance has, it has as something with the nature of substance.\(^81\)

Yet we have elsewhere\(^82\) judged that the things that are completions of Substance are [said to be] qualities equivocally, while those which come from outside subsequent to Substance are qualities properly so-called: some of the things in Substances are their activities, and those things that come after the activities are then affections. We now add that the features of a particular substance are not such as to complete Substance generally speaking. For there is not an addition of Substantiality to a human being as such for him to be a substance.\(^83\) For he is Substance derived from above before he acquires the differentiae, just as he is already an animal before he acquires rationality.

§ 6.2.15. So how do the four genera complete Substance without making it a substance qualified in a certain way? For they do not make it a particular substance. We have said,\(^84\) then, that Being is primary, and clearly it is not [in this respect] different from Motion, Stability, Difference, and Identity. And while it is pretty obvious that Motion itself does not produce quality, our account will make it even clearer.

For if Motion is the activity of Substance, and Being is in activity, as are the primary genera in general, Motion cannot be accidental, but by being the activity of an actual Being it should not be called the completion, but Substance itself; accordingly, it does not fall into some posterior grouping, nor into quality; rather, it is ordered among the groupings at the same level as the primary genera.

\(^{80}\) HS\(^2\) add lines 2 5 from Simplicius, *In Cat.* 8.241.17. Cf. 6.3.8.19 20 where Plotinus says that sensible substances are a ‘bundle’ of qualities and matter.

\(^{81}\) Lines 11 14 from Simplicius, *In Cat.* 8.241.20 22 deleted by HS\(^2\). In any case, this line and the one above help our understanding of this passage.

\(^{82}\) Cf. 2.6.1.15 29, 2.20 32; 3.6.17.23 24; 6.1.10.20 27; 6.3.8.12 13.

\(^{83}\) I.e., which makes him a particular human.

\(^{84}\) Cf. 6.2.8.25 49.
For it is not the case that there is Being first, which next is moved, nor is it the case that there is Being first, which is then stable. Nor is Stability an affection. Neither Identity nor Difference is posterior, because Being does not become many later; rather, it is just what is one-many. And if it is many, then there is Difference, too, and if it is a one-many, then there is Identity, too.

And these suffice for Substance. And when it is destined to proceed downwards, other genera, then, arise, which do not produce substance, but qualified substance, and quantified substance. These may come to be genera, but not primary ones.

§6.2.16. As for the relative, it is ‘like an offshoot’, so how can it be among the primary genera? For the relation is from one thing to another and not between the thing and itself. Where and when are even further from the primary genera. For where is one thing in another, and hence two things, and a genus must be one, and not a composite. And neither is place in the intelligible world. We are now talking about Beings in the true sense.

We should consider whether time is in the intelligible world; more than likely, it is not. But if time is indeed a measure, and not one simply but of motion, then the whole [measured motion] is two and composite, and posterior to Motion, with the consequence that Motion cannot be in the same division. Producing and being affected are in Motion – if, that is, affection is in the intelligible world. Producing is two, likewise being affected. So, neither of them is simple. And having is two, and position is one thing in another in a certain manner, and hence three things.

§6.2.17. But beauty and the good and the virtues: why are they not among the primary genera? And what about scientific knowledge and intellect?

In fact, the Good, that is, the primary good, which we certainly do call the nature of the good, of which nothing is predicated, but which we call this since we have no other means of indicating it, may not be the genus of anything. For it is not said of other things; otherwise, each thing of which it is said would be that which it is said of [namely, the Good]. And this is prior to Substance, and not in Substance. And as

85 Cf. infra 17.25, 21.47. See Pl., Parm. 144E5. 86 Cf. 6.1.6.1 3.
87 See Ar., EN 1.4.1096a21 22.
88 Perhaps the cautious wording stems from the fact that, given the principle that what ever is found in the sensible world has its paradigm in the intelligible world, one might wonder how the strictly atemporal can be the paradigm of the temporal.
89 See Ar., Phys. 4.12.22b32 221a1. 90 Cf. 6.1.13.20. 91 Cf. 6.1.22.5 6.
92 Cf. 6.1.23.18 19. 93 Cf. 6.1.24.1 8. 94 See Pl., Phil. 60B10.
95 As the following lines indicate, what is meant is that the Good cannot be the identifying predicate of anything with a nature other than that of the Good itself.
for good as a quality, quality quite generally is not among the primary genera.

Why is the nature of Being not good?

In fact, first it is, but in a different way, that is, not in the way that the primary [Good] is good, but, secondly, it is good but not as having a quality; rather, the Good is in it. But we also said that the other genera are in it, which is why each genus is something in common, and is seen in many things. If, then, the Good is seen in each part of Substance and of Being, or in most of them, why, then, is it not a genus and among the primary genera?

In fact, in each of the parts it is not identical, but primarily, secondarily and so on in a derivative fashion. For either the one part comes from another, the posterior one from the prior one, or else because they all come from the One which ‘transcends’ everything, and different things participate differently according to their nature.

If someone did indeed want to posit good as a genus, then it would be posterior, for something’s being good is posterior to its substantiality or essence, even if they always went together, whereas the genera belong to Being as Being, and contribute to Substantiality. For on these grounds, there is also what transcends Being, since Being or Substance are not capable of not being many, they necessarily have these enumerated genera, and are one-many.

If, however, the good we are referring to is the one that is in Being – and let us not hesitate to call its activity, namely, the natural activity towards this One [the Good], its good, so that it is Good-like – then the good for Being will be its activity towards the Good. This is its life, and this is Motion, which is already one of the genera.

§6.2.18. About beauty, that is, if primary Beauty is the One, the identical things or close to these may be said as to those said in the arguments about the Good. And if beauty is what in a way shines on the Idea, then we can say that it is not identical in all things, and that the shining on is posterior. But if Beauty is nothing other than Substance itself, it has been accounted for in what has been said of Substance.

If it is in relation to us, who see it, by producing such an affection, this activity is motion; and if the activity on our part is relative to [beauty], then this is motion.

97 Cf. supra 2.7 8. 98 Cf. 5.5.6.5 13. See Pl., Rep. 509B9.
101 Cf. 6.7.22. The suggestion is that beauty shines on the Forms from the Good similar to the truth which flows from the Good to the Forms. See Pl., Rep. 507B6 7, 508E5 509A5. 102 Cf. 5.5.12.
Scientific understanding is self-motion, since it is a sight of and an activity of being, but not a disposition, so that it falls under [the genus] Motion, or if you prefer, under [the genus] Stability, or indeed under both. If under both, then as a mixture, and if a mixture, this is posterior. Intellect, a thinking Being and a composite of all things, is not one of the [five] genera. And true Intellect is Being with all Beings, and is already all Beings, whereas Being alone, grasped as a bare genus, is one element of Intellect. Justice, Self-Control, and Virtue in general are kinds of activity of Intellect, so that they are not in the primary genera; they are posterior in genus, and species.\textsuperscript{103}

§6.2.19. Since these are indeed the four primary genera,\textsuperscript{104} does each of them as such produce species? For example, is Being already divided in itself without the others?

In fact, it is not, for the differentiae need to be taken from outside the genus, and they must be the differentiae of Being as Being, while the differentiae are not Being itself. Where, then, will it get the differentiae from? Certainly, it is not from non-beings. But if it did actually get them from Beings, these would be the remaining three genera, and it would clearly obtain the differentiae from these, and with these being added, and coupled with Being and coming to be simultaneously with it.

But, then, all these comings to be simultaneously would actually produce [Intellect comprising] everything. So, how would the others [the genera] be after [Intellect] which comprises everything? And how would they, all being genera, produce species? How would Motion produce the species of Motion, and so, too, Stability and the others?

We must be careful, though, lest each of them vanish in their species, and lest the genus is predicated only as it is posited by theory in those species. It must be asserted as at once in those and in itself, both mixed and pure and unmixed, lest in contributing to Substance it destroy itself.

These things certainly have to be investigated.

Since we said\textsuperscript{105} that that which consists of all Beings is each intellect, we posit Being, that is, Substance to be Intellect before all things which are its species and parts. Indeed, let us make this puzzle productive in finding what we are looking for, and by using it as a kind of model, guide ourselves on the path to knowledge of the things mentioned.

§6.2.20. Let us, then, take Intellect to be that which has no contact with anything particular and is not active with respect to any particulars, so

\textsuperscript{103} Cf.\textsuperscript{1.2.7.2} on the virtues as they exist in Intellect as Forms.

\textsuperscript{104} Cf. \textit{supra} 15.1. Here, the four primary are Being, Motion, Stability, and Identity and Difference taken together as one.

\textsuperscript{105} Cf. \textit{supra} 18.12 15.
that it does not turn out to be an individual intellect, just as science is prior to particular species of it, and any specific science is prior to the parts in it. Science is not any of its parts, but the potentiality for all of them, while each species is actually just that, a part, and potentially the whole; the same applies to universal science. Some are potentially in the species, and the others potentially in the whole: those that actually have something specific are potentially the whole. The whole of science is predicated [of the part], not the part of the whole. The whole of science must be unmixed in itself.

And so, too, we should indeed say that the whole of Intellect exists in one way, namely, that Intellect which is prior to all actual individual intellects, and each intellect, filled with all Beings from part of Intellect, exists in another. "That Intellect set over all others is, on the one hand, the chorus-leader for the particulars, and their potentiality, on the other; it contains them in universality, while the individual intellects, in their particularity, contain the universal Intellect, just as an individual science does science.

And this great Intellect both is in respect of itself and is the particular intellects, which are in themselves: and the individual intellects are embraced by the whole, and conversely the whole by the individuals. They are by themselves and in another, it is by itself and in those, and all are in that one, which is by itself, and is indeed everything simultaneously, and potentially each thing severally.

And they are, in turn, actually what they are, and potentially the whole. For insofar as they are what they are said to be, they are actually what they are said to be. Insofar as that [whatever it may be] is in a genus, they are potentially just that. That again, insofar as it is a genus, is the potentiality for the species falling under it, and none of them actually; they all are stable in it. But insofar as it is prior to the species in actuality, it is one of the things that is not individual. Indeed, if those intellects which are specific are to be in actuality, then its activity must be the cause.

§6.2.21. How, then, does [Intellect] produce particulars, while itself remaining a unity in its rational structure? This is the identical question as how out of the four genera those things that are said to follow them come to be.

So, see in this Intellect, great, inconceivable, not garrulous but thoughtful as it is, the Intellect holding everything, the whole Intellect, not a part or an individual intellect, how everything in it can come from it. It actually contains Number in every respect in the things

106 Cf. supra 18.8; 4.9.5.8. 107 Cf. 6.7.9.31. 108 Cf. supra 19.1.
it sees,\textsuperscript{109} and it is a one and many, and these are powers, wonderful powers, not weak ones; this is so inasmuch as they are the greatest of all, because pure, and in a way bursting, truly powers, having no boundary. So, they are unlimited, in fact, unlimited in their greatness.\textsuperscript{110}

So, when you look at this greatness, together with the beauty in its substantiality and the splendidour around it, as being in Intellect, you see the quality blooming, and magnitude with the continuity of activity shining forth to your attention, lying at peace; when one and two and three are there, there is magnitude, which is three-dimensional, and all quantity.\textsuperscript{111} When you have seen the quantity, and the quality, and both coming together into one, and in a way becoming one, then you will see figure.

When the other breaks in, dividing both quantity and quality, then there are differentiae of figure, and other differentiae of quality. And when Identity is there with them, it produces equality, and Difference produces inequality in quantity, that is in number or in magnitude, from which both circles and rectangles, and irregular figures, numbers that are the same and not the same, even and odd, arise.

Since this life is thinking, and a complete activity, it leaves out nothing that we are able to discover to be an intellectual work. Indeed, it has everything \textsuperscript{[as]} Beings in the power of this activity, containing them in the way Intellect may contain them; and Intellect has them as in an act of intellection, and that is not a discursive act of thinking. Nothing is left out of those things of which there are expressed principles; rather, it is itself in a way one expressed principle, great and complete, embracing everything, traversing from its primary \textsuperscript{[genera]}, or rather for ever going over them, such that it is never true that it is traversing them.

For it is everywhere generally the case that, whatever one may grasp of natural things by calculative reasoning, one will find in Intellect without calculative reasoning, so that one believes that it is as if, having calculated, Intellect produces Being in this way, just as in the case of the expressed principles that produce animals.\textsuperscript{112} For just as the most accurate calculative reasoning may calculate best, that is how things are in the expressed principles before any calculation.

What \textsuperscript{[else]} should one expect to be in things higher than nature and the expressed principles in it? For in those things with Substantiality in them, there is nothing else but Intellect, and neither Being nor Intellect is acquired from outside and everything is in the best state without toil,

\textsuperscript{109} Cf. 6.6.7 14.  
\textsuperscript{110} I.e., there is no intelligible content that Intellect could have had that it does not have.  
\textsuperscript{111} See Pl., Parm. 143A 144A on the generation of Numbers.  
\textsuperscript{112} Cf. 6.7.1.29 32.
if indeed it is disposed according to Intellect, and this is the Being that Intellect wants and is. For this reason, it is true and primary. For if it came from something else, that something would be Intellect.

Indeed, when all figures have been seen in Being, and all quality – not any particular quality, for it was not possible for it to be one, since the nature of Difference is in it, rather it was one and many. For there was Identity, too. This Being is originally one and many, so that one and many is in all species – actually, different magnitudes and different figures and different qualities. For it was neither possible nor lawful to omit anything. The entire intelligible world was complete; otherwise, it would not have been the entire intelligible world.

And because life runs in, or rather is together with it everywhere, all animals come to be of necessity, and there were bodies, since there was matter and quality. Because everything is forever coming to be and persisting, embraced in Being in eternity, and because each of the Beings is separate, and again all are together in unity, in a way the weaving together and compositing of Beings into unity is Intellect. And since it has Beings in itself it is a ‘perfect Living Being’ and ‘Living Being in itself’, by allowing that which proceeds from it to see it as intelligible, and granting that it be rightly called ‘Intellect in the intelligible world’.

§ 6.2.22. And then there is Plato’s riddling statement: ‘as Intellect sees the Ideas present in the perfect Living Being, it sees what they are, and how many they are’. This is so, since even Soul, coming after Intellect, insofar as it contains [Forms] within itself, sees better what is prior to it. And our intellect, when it is in what is prior to it, sees better. For when it is in itself, it merely sees; when it is that which is before it, it sees that it sees. Indeed, this Intellect, which we says sees, without letting go of what is before it, inasmuch as it is from that, and has within it a many that belongs substantially to the nature of the Different, comes to be a one-many.

Since Intellect is one-many, it also produces the many intellects from this kind of necessity. It is, generally, not possible to grasp the one, that is, the indivisible by number. Whatever you do grasp is [merely] a species, for it is without matter. For this reason, Plato says, here again speaking in riddles, ‘substantiality is cut up without limit’. As long as the cutting up is into another species, for example, from a genus, it is not yet unlimited. For it is bounded by the species that have been brought

113 Cf. 5.9.6.9 10.
114 Cf. infra 22.1 3; 6.6.7.16 17, 15.8 9, 17.39; 6.7.8.31, 12.3, 36.12. See Pl., Tim. 31B1.
115 Accepting Igal’s addition <ἐκείνῳ>.
116 See Pl., Tim. 39E7 9; Soph. 248E7.
117 Cf. 6.7.17.27 30.
118 See Pl., Parm. 144B4 C1.
forth. The final species, which is not divided into species, is unlimited to a higher degree. This is what Plato means when he says ‘release them into the unlimited and let them go’.\footnote{Cf. 4.7.7.21. See Pl., Phil. 16E1 2.} As long as they are by themselves, they are unlimited, but when they are included in a one, they are on their way to number.

So, Intellect contains Soul, which is posterior to it, so Soul is in number [is numerable] up to its very limit, but its limit is already unlimited in every respect. The Intellect we have given an account of is a part, although it contains everything, and is all Intellect\footnote{Lines 24–25 are incomprehensible and have not been satisfactorily emended. We give the general sense.} and Soul is a part of a part, but as an activity which originates in [Intellect]. For when Intellect is active in itself, the other intellects are what is actualized, and when it is active outside itself, Soul is actualized.

When Soul is actualized as a genus or as a species, the other souls form species. And the activity of these is twofold. On the one hand, activity upward is Intellect, and that downward is the other intellectual potencies, the final one touching and shaping matter.\footnote{A reference to nature, the lowest part of the soul of the cosmos. Cf. 4.4.13.21 23.} Its downward activity does not hinder all the rest from being upward.

In fact, what is called its downward tendency is also its reflection, not one that is severed, but like those in mirrors, which exist as long as the original is present outside the mirror.

We have to understand what this ‘outside’ means. The whole intelligible cosmos, complete since it is composed of all intelligibles, extends down to just before the image, just as this [sensible] cosmos, since it is an imitation of that one, insofar as it can preserve the picture of the Living Being, is a living being itself, just as the semblance drawn or in water is held to be a semblance of what is there before water and drawing.

The imitation in the drawing or in the water is not of both together, merely of that one which has been formed by the other one. The image of the intelligible cosmos, then, since it contains reflections, not of what produced it, but of those things included in the thing produced, among other things, both a human being and any other animal. This, and the thing produced [by Intellect], are both an animal, but in a different way; and both are in the intelligible realm.
§6.3.1. We have said what we think about Substance, and how this may harmonize with Plato’s view. We should also investigate the other nature [becoming], as to whether the identical genera are to be posited in the sensible world, as we posited in the intelligible world, or whether there are more genera here, that is, others have to be posited in addition to those there, or whether they are wholly different, or whether some are identical to those in the intelligible world, and others different. However, ‘identical’ should be understood analogically or equivocally.¹ This will become evident when these genera have become known.

This is our starting point: since this account is about sensibles, and all sensibles are included in this cosmos, it is necessary to investigate its nature, that is, what it consists of, and to posit these constituents, dividing them by genus. This is the way one would proceed if one divided sound,² which is unlimited, by bringing it back to limited elements, [that is to say], what is in many to one, and next to another, and then another, until one can enumerate the whole series,³ calling what embraces individuals species, and what embraces species genera. In the case of sound, it is possible to relate back every species to one genus, and so, too, with all the [genera] that come to light, and to predicate of all of them either ‘letter’ or ‘sound’.

This is not possible in the case of the things we are investigating, as has been shown.⁴ For this reason, we must look for more genera, and they are different in the sensible world from those in the intelligible world, since this world is different from that one, and [its constituents] are not [named] univocally, but rather equivocally, that is, as an image.

But although here, too, in the mixture and the composition there is body and soul – for the universe is a living being – the nature of soul in the intelligible world does not fit into the classification of what is called substance in the sensible world, we should exclude it, even if that is hard,

¹ Cf. infra 11.22 23; 5.1 7; 6.1.1.19 35. ² See Pl., Phil. 17B 18C.
³ See Pl., Phil. 18C6. ⁴ Cf. 6.1.3.6 22; 25.3 10.
from the present investigation. It is just as if someone, wishing to classify
the citizens of some city, for example, by the census or by their trades,
would exclude the resident aliens. We should, however, investigate the
affections which occur with body or through body in the soul, and see
how they are to be placed, when we investigate things here.

§6.3.2. First, we must construct a theory about so-called substance.
Now we agree that corporeal nature is merely [said to be] Substance equivocally or not Substance at all, since it is accommodated to the
conception of things in flux; properly, it is called 'becoming'.

Next, becoming is qualified in different ways; and bodies, both
simple and composite, fall under one genus, along with their accidental
or secondary features, which we also distinguish from one another.

In fact, there is matter and the form over it; and each is a separate
genus or they fall under one, either as [said to be] substance equivocally or becoming. But what is common to matter and form? How is
matter a genus, and what is it the genus of? And what differentiae are
there [of the species] in matter? Which genus is the composite of
matter and form to be placed in? If the composite of both is corporeal
substance, and neither matter nor form is body, how can they be
placed in one genus, or in the identical genus with the composite?
And how can the elements of a thing be in the identical genus that the
thing itself is in? But if we were to begin with bodies, we would be
beginning from syllables.

Why should we not consider them analogously? So, even if the
division is not according to identities, we could say that instead of
being in the intelligible world there is matter in the sensible world,
and instead of motion in the intelligible world, there is form here,
like a kind of life and the completion of matter, and that a lack of
displacement of matter represents stability, and that there is identity
and difference here, since there is much difference or rather lack of
sameness here?

In fact, first, matter does not take on and possess form as its life or its
activity; instead, form enters from elsewhere, since it does not belong to
matter.

5 See Pl., Phil. 32C; Ar., De sens. 1.436a7 8. 6 Cf. infra 16.40 47.
7 Plotinus now shifts from οὐσία ('Substance', 'Substantiality') to γένεσις ('becoming')
which is, nevertheless, called substance and is said to have substantiality, mainly by
Peripatetics.
8 See Pl., Soph. 246C1; Tim. 27E 28A.
9 The word is στοιχεῖα, which also means letters, hence the talk of syllables in the next
sentence.
10 The μέγιστα γένη ('greatest genera') discussed in 6.2.
Next, in the intelligible world form is activity and motion, while in the sensible world motion is something else, that is, accidental. The form is more like the matter’s stability, that is, a sort of stabilizing of it; for it makes definite matter which is indefinite. In the intelligible world, Identity and Difference belong to one thing which is different and identical; in the sensible world, one thing is different by participation, and in relation to something else; some particular here is identical and different, not as some particular is in the intelligible world, but as some particular among things posterior [to those in the intelligible world] would be identical and different. But how can there be stability for matter, when it is being dragged into all types of magnitude, and, because it takes on shapes from outside, is not sufficient of itself to generate other things with these shapes? So, this division must be set aside.

§ 6.3.3. How, then, shall we say it [becoming] is to be divided? Actually, the first point is that there is matter, there is form, there is the thing mixed from both, and there are things that relate these. Some of these are merely predicates whereas others are also accidents. Some accidents are in the form, matter, and composite, and in some cases form, matter, and composite are in the accidents; some are acts of [the three], others their affections, and yet others accompaniments.

Matter is a common element, and is in all substances, but not as a genus, since it contains no differentiae, unless someone were to say that it has differentiae in respect of some matter having a fiery shape and other matter an airy one.

If one were satisfied with the common view that matter is shared among all things that there are, or that matter is a whole relative to parts, then it is a genus in another way. This is an element, if the element can also be a genus. One separates the form relative to matter or in matter from other forms, but one does not include all substantial form.

If we call form whatever is capable of producing substance and the account of substance in respect of form, we have still not said how substance should be understood. If the composite made of form and

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11 See Ar., Meta. 1.8.98b18. 12 Cf. 1.4.3.16 24. 13 Cf. infra 4.1, 26 27. See Ar., Meta. 8.2.1043a27 28. 14 See Ar., AP 1.22.83a24 28. 15 Cf. 3.7.10.1 8; 6.2.14.3. 16 Cf. 6.2.2.16 19 for Plotinus’ denial that it is. 17 I.e., to distinguish it from the ἑδος (‘species’), as relative to a genus. 18 The term is ὅσιωσις referring to form as found in the intelligible world as opposed to form as found in the sensible world of γένεσις. The latter is an expressed principle of the former. Cf. infra 7.7 9.
matter alone is substance, then those things [form and matter] are not substance. If all three, composite, form, and matter, are substance, then we have to see what they have in common. Predicates would only be in the [genus] of relatives, such as being an explanation for [something else] or being the element [of something else].

Some of the accidents in things are a quantity, others a quality, that is, those which are in them. The three [form, matter, and composite] themselves, then, are in some accidents, such as in place or time; others are their acts and their affections, in the sense of motions, and other accompaniments, such as place and time: the place of the composite, and the time of the motion. And all three [form, matter, and composite] would relate to one thing, if we found what they have in common, namely, to be equivocally named ‘substance’ in the sensible world.

Next come the others in order: relatives, quantity, quality, in place, in time, motion, place, and time.

In fact, once place and time have been left out, then ‘in time’ and ‘in place’ are also superfluous, which gives us five, taking the first three – form, matter, and composite – as one. But if these three do not fall into one, there will be matter, form, the complex, relatives, quantity, quality, and motion. Or we can put these last three into the genus ‘relative’, as being more comprehensive than they are.

§6.3.4. What, then, is the identical thing common to form, matter, and composite, which makes these substance among the things around us? Is it being a foundation for the other things?

In fact, matter is held to be the fundament or seat for form, so that form will not be placed in the [genus] of substance. The composite is the fundament or seat for other things, so that form and matter will underlie composites, or all those things which only come after the composite, such as quantity, quality, and motion.

So, is the identical thing common to the three what is called ‘not being said of another’? Pale, or dark, is [said of] something else, namely, the thing that has grown pale, and the double belongs to something else – I mean the piece of wood, for example, that is double the size, not the double of the half – and father as such is the father of something else, and scientific understanding belongs to something else, namely, the intellect it is in, and place is the boundary of something else, and time is the measure of something else. However, fire does not

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19 The term παρακολουθήματα (‘accompaniments’) is used by both Epicurus (see fr. 294 Usener) and Stoics (SVF 2.509 = Stob., Ed. 1.106.5).
20 I.e., as accompaniments.  
22 Cf. 6.1.2.9.  
23 The Peripatetics’ use of ωςια.  
24 Cf. 6.1.28.17.  
25 See Pl., Tim. 52B1.  
26 See Ar., Cat. 2.1420 b9, 5.3a11 21.  
27 I.e., motion.
belong to something else, nor is wood as such, nor human being, nor Socrates, nor generally, the complex substance,²⁸ nor is the form relative to substance, because they are not an affection of something else.

For neither is the form [said] of matter; rather, it is a part of the composite. The form of the human being and the human being are identical; and matter is part of a whole,²⁹ that is, as something other than the whole not in the sense that that of which it is said is different from it. The pale that something is said to be is that of something different from it.

Anything, then, that belongs to another thing and is said of that thing, is not substance. So, substance is that which is [said] of itself, just what it is, or else, because it is a part of the composite, has the potency to perfect the composite. Each part or both parts of what is [said] of itself is [said] of itself, but relative to the composite it is said of that in another way.

In fact, if it is a part, then it is said relative to another thing, but what it is as such by nature in its essence is not said of another.³⁰ Also ‘substrate’ is common to matter, form, and complex,³¹ but matter [is the substrate] of form in one way, form is the substrate of states in another way, and the complex [is substrate of the states in a third way].

In fact, matter is not the substrate of form – for the form is its perfection, insofar as matter is in potency – nor is the form in it. For that with which one thing completes a unity is not one thing in another; rather, both matter and form are equally substrates of another thing, for example, human being and a particular human being are the substrates of states, and are present before the activities and accompaniments. [Substance is] both that from which the other things originate, and that because of which there are other things, and the substrate of affection, and the source of production.

§6.3.5. You must take these things as being said about substance in the sensible world. Do they hold in some way for Substance in the intelligible world? Perhaps they do, but only analogously or equivocally. For substance is said to be primary in relation to what comes after it. But it is not simply primary; it is last in relation to intelligibles, whereas it is first in relation to what comes after it.³²

²⁸ See Ar., Meta. 8.3.1043a30.
²⁹ See Ar., Meta. 7.11.1037a28 29; 8.3.1043b1 4; Alex. Aphr., Quaest. 1.8.18.1.
³⁰ See Ar., Meta. 7.4.1029b13 14.
³¹ See Ar., Meta. 7.3.1029a 3; Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 119.32 33.
³² Cf. supra 1.3 7; 6.1.1.19 25.
The substrate is in another way in the intelligible world, and it is disputed if affection [occurs] there; if it does, then it is another kind of affection. And ‘not being in a substrate is said of all substance’, if ‘being in a substrate’ is not present as ‘part of that which it is in’, nor in such a way that it completes some one thing with that. For form cannot be in that with which it contributes to composite substance, that is, matter, as being in a subject. The upshot is: neither is form in matter as in a substrate, nor is human being in Socrates as in a substrate, because it is a part of Socrates.

What, then, is not in a substrate is substance. If we say, substance is ‘neither in a substrate nor said of a substrate’, then ‘as of something else’ is to be added, so that human being when said of a particular human being is also included in the account, namely, through the addition of ‘not of something else’. For when I predicate human being of Socrates, I do not say this as I say the wood is pale, but as I say the pale is pale. For in saying that Socrates is human, I say that a particular human being is human, predicating human of the human being in Socrates. This is identical to saying that Socrates is Socrates, and as predicating animal of such and such a rational animal.

If someone says that not being in a substrate is not a property of substance, for the differentia is also not among those things in a substrate, it is by understanding biped to be part of substance that he is saying that biped is not in a substrate, since if he does not understand biped to be what such a substance is, but bipedality, he is not calling it substance but a quality, and then biped will indeed be in a substrate.

But neither is time or place in a substrate. If the measure of motion is taken in respect of what is measured, then the measure is in the motion as in a substrate, and motion is in the thing moved. If measure is understood with reference to the thing measuring, the measure will be in the thing measuring. Place, being ‘the boundary of what is contained’, will be in the subject.

And what about this substance, which we are discussing now? One can understand it in contrary ways, if it is taken with reference to one of these, more than one of them or all of them, since what has been said fits all three, matter, form, and the composite.

§6.3.6. And if someone were to say that, although these theoretical considerations are about substance, what substance is has not been

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33 See Ar., Cat. 5.347 8. 34 See Ar., Cat. 2.124a 25. 35 Cf. supra 4.7 26. 36 See Ar., Cat. 5.241b 13. 37 See Ar., Cat. 5.321a 24. 38 I.e., time. See Ar., Phys. 4.12.1220b32 221a1. 39 See Ar., Phys. 4.4.2124a 6.
stated, then he is probably demanding to see it as a sensible. But one cannot see its ‘is’, that is, its existence.40

What, then? Are fire and water not substance? So, is not each of them substance, because it is seen? No. Then by containing matter? No. Then by containing form? Not that either. And also not by being a complex. But by what, then? By existing. Well, both the quantity is, and the quality is. Yes, but we will, therefore, certainly want to say that they are so only equivocally.

But what is the ‘is’ in the case of fire, earth and suchlike, and what is the differentia between this ‘is’ and that of other things [quantity and quality]? In fact, the one means simply existing or simply being, whereas the other means, for example, to be pale.41

What, then? Is the being that is added to pale identical to that without the addition? No, the one is primarily being, the other in respect of participation, that is, secondarily. Pale, when added, produces the pale being; being when added to the pale produces being pale, with the consequence that in either case, the pale is accidental to being, and being accidental to pale.42

And we do not say this in the way someone might say ‘Socrates is pale’, and ‘the pale thing is Socrates’. For in both, Socrates is identical, but presumably pale is not. For in the case of ‘the pale thing is Socrates’, Socrates is included in the pale, whereas in ‘Socrates is pale’ the pale is simply an accidental. Thus, in ‘the pale is a being’ the pale is included in being. And, generally, the pale includes being, on the grounds that [‘pale’] refers to that which is, that is, to that which has being. Its being, then, comes from that.43 A being is a being from itself, and pale from the pale, not because it is itself in the pale, but because the pale is in it. But since this sensible being is not being because of itself, we should say that it contains being from that which truly has Being, and from it, it contains the pale from that which is truly Paleness, because that thing, too, which contains the pale, has its existence by participation in the Being in the intelligible world.

§6.3.7. If someone were to claim that everything in the sensible world which has material existence,44 has its existence from matter, we would ask from where matter acquires its existence and its being. We have already said that matter is not primary,45 but if someone said that it is on the grounds that other things would not come into being except based

40 See Pl., *Tht.* 185C4 D3. 41 See Ar., *Meta.* 5.7.1017a7 8; 7.1.1028b30 31.
42 See Ar., *AP* 1.27.43a25; *Meta.* 4.4.1007b8. 43 See Ar., *Meta.* 5.7.1017a7 22.
45 Cf. 6.1.25 28.
on matter, we would admit this for sensible things. Although matter is prior to the sensible, nothing prevents it from being posterior to many things, that is, of all the things in the intelligible world, since its existence is dim, and less than that of those things based on it, to the extent that these are expressed principles, and derived from that which has being to a greater degree, while matter is wholly without an expressed principle – a shadow of an expressed principle, and a lapse from an expressed principle.

If someone were to claim that matter bestows existence on those things based on it, as Socrates does to the pale that inheres in him, then one should say that something that has being to a greater degree can give being to something that has being to a lesser degree, whereas what has being to a lesser degree cannot give being to what has being to a greater degree.

But if form has being to a greater degree than matter, then being something is no longer something common to both, nor is substance a genus comprising form, matter, and the complex; no, then there will be many things common to them, which we have mentioned, and still their existence will be different. For when something that has being to a greater degree comes to something which has being to a lesser degree, the latter may be first in order, but posterior in substantiality. This has the consequence that, if existence is not equal in form, matter, and complex, then substantiality cannot still be what they have in common in the sense of a genus.

But substance will stand in a different relation to the things after it, as containing something in common with them because of their existence, like life, which may be fainter, or clearer, the one [like] the outline of pictures, and the other the finished thing. If faint existence were the measure of existence, and one were to leave aside the greater existence in other things, then here again existence would be common to all; but one should never do this. For each whole is different, and the faintness is not common to them, just as there is nothing common to nutritive, sensible, and intellectual life.

So, even in the sensible world, existence is different in the case of matter and form, and both originate from a one flowing this way and that way. For not only if the second comes from the first, and the third from the second, then must one be to a greater degree, and that which succeeds it must be worse and to a lesser degree, but this is also the case when they both come from the identical thing, for example, if the one has a greater share of fire, and is a pottery jar, and the other less, and so does not become a pottery jar. But perhaps matter and form do not

46 I.e., sensible forms. Cf. supra 3.15 17.  47 Cf. supra 5.35 39.
actually originate from the identical thing. For there are differences among those things in the intelligible world.\footnote{A reference to intelligible matter. Cf. 2.4.1.17 18.}

\section{§6.3.8.} Should we then abandon the division into elements, especially when talking about sensible substance, which one should grasp more by sense-perception than definition, and not take into consideration what it consists of, since these elements are not substances, at least not sensible ones? [Instead, should we not] include in a single genus what is common to stone, earth, and water, and by the plants and animals likewise which consist of them? For neither matter nor form has been left out, in that sensible substance contains these. For fire and earth, and the elements in between, are matter and form; and composites are many substances each brought together into unity. And what is common is in all these, insofar as they are separate from the others.\footnote{I.e., intelligibles.} For these are the substrates for the others and are themselves not in a substrate, nor do they belong to another. What we have already said,\footnote{Cf. supra 4.21 36.} applies here.

But if sensible substance is not without magnitude or quality, how will we then distinguish the accidents? For in distinguishing these things – magnitude, figure, colour, solidity, fluidity – what will we posit as the substance itself? For the substances themselves have certain qualities. But just what can those factors be reduced to which produce being a substance with a quality out of being merely a substance?\footnote{See Ar., Meta. 7.3.102916 19.} And will the whole of fire not be substance, but merely something belonging to it, for example, a part?\footnote{Cf. 2.7.3-4 5.} And what would this be?

In fact, matter.\footnote{Cf. supra 4.21 36.}

But in that case would sensible substance be a bundle of qualities and matter such that when these qualities have been compacted all together on one piece of matter that would be substance and, when each is taken separately, one would be quality and one quantity, or would they be many qualities?\footnote{See Ar., Meta. 7.3.102916 19.} That factor which, if deficient, will not let the completed separate existent come to be, is a part of this substance, whereas anything that supervenes on the substance that has come to be, has its proper place, without being concealed by the mixture producing the so-called substance. I do not mean that when [the former factor] is present with the other [factors], it is substance, bringing to completion a mass of such and such magnitude and quality, whereas elsewhere, when it does not complete something, it is a certain quality; nor is each factor there [in the case of a substance being brought to completion] substance; no, the whole made up from all of them is substance.\footnote{Cf. infra 15.24 38.}
And there is no call to have qualms if we make sensible substance from factors which themselves are not substance. For the whole is not true Substance, but is modelled on the true one, which has being without any of the factors around it, even though the other things come to be out of it, because it is truly. Thus, even the foundation is unfruitful, and insufficient to be Being, in that the other things do not originate in it, and it is shadow and a painting, that is, an appearance, on something that is itself shadow.

§6.3.9. So much, then, for so-called sensible substance, taken as one genus. But which species should one posit, and how should one divide them? One must, then, posit the whole as body, some of them more material, some more equipped with organs. More material are fire, earth, water, and air. The bodies of plants and animals are equipped with organs, getting their respective [differentiae] from their structures.

Next, one should grasp the species of earth and of the other elements, and in the case of bodies equipped with organs, dividing the bodies of plants and animals according to their shapes or by their being on the earth or in the earth, and their constituents element by element. Or else, [we can classify] some bodies as light, others as heavy, and some in between; the ones are stable in the middle, some encompass [the others] from on high, and some in the middle. In each of these, the bodies are already divided by their figures, so that some are the bodies of heavenly living beings, and others corresponding to other elements. When one has distinguished the four elements according to their species, the next thing after this is to weave them together in another way, namely, by mixing their differentiae according to place, shape, and mixtures, such that they are called fiery or earthy, according to which element there is more of in them, and so is dominant.

Calling them first substances and second substances, for example, ‘this fire’, and ‘fire’ reveals another distinction, namely, that the one is particular, and the other is universal; but this is not a difference in substantiality. For in quality there is a particular pale thing, and paleness, a case of literacy, and literate.

Next, what deficiency does literacy have in relation to a case of literacy, or generally, scientific understanding to a case of scientific understanding? For literacy is not posterior to a case of literacy; rather, since there is literacy, there is also the literacy in you. Since the literacy

56 True φύσις in the intelligible world. 57 See Ar., Meta. 5.8.1017b10 12.
60 See Pl., Tim. 55D 56B. 61 See Pl., Tim. 62C 63E.
62 The heavenly bodies, which are spherical. 63 See Ar., Cat. 5.2a11 19.
in you is particular by being in you, it is in itself identical to the
universal. And Socrates did not himself give what it is to be a human
being to what was not human being, but Human Being gave being
a human being to Socrates, for a particular human being is such due
to his participating in Human Being.\footnote{Contra Ar., Meta. 12.5.1071a20 21.}

Next, what else could Socrates be except such and such a human
being, and how could this such and such make any difference in respect
of his being a substance? If it is because ‘the form alone is the human
being’, and the other is ‘a form in matter’, then the latter is less human in
this regard. For the expressed principle is defective, when in matter.
If even human being is not form in itself, except when in matter, why will
it have \([\text{the form}]\) less than when in matter, that is, the expressed
principle itself than that in matter?\footnote{See Ar., Cat. 13.15a4 5.}

Furthermore, that which is naturally more generic is prior, with the
consequence that the species is prior to the individual. Naturally prior is
simply prior. Then how could the expressed principle be less general?
But the particular, being more knowable relative to us\footnote{See Ar., Cat. 5.2b10 14; Phys. 1.1.184a16 29.} is prior [relative
to us]. This [priority] does not correspond to any differentia in the
things.

Next, according to this line of thought, there will not be one defini-
tion of substance. For the definition of first substance and of second
substance is not identical, nor do they fall under one genus.

§6.3.10. It is also possible to divide by hot and dry, dry and cold, fluid
and cold, or however Aristotle wants the coupling to be, and the
composition and mixture following next from these.\footnote{See Ar., GC 2.3.329b9.}

Either one can
rest there, at the composite, or divide them up with respect to their
being terrestrial or subterranean or according to the structures and
according to the differentiae of animals, not dividing up animals, but
according to their bodies which are like tools. The division according to
structures is not absurd, if indeed their division according to qualities –
heat, cold, and suchlike – is not either. If someone says ‘but bodies are
active according to their qualities’,\footnote{See Ar., GC 2.2.329b9.} then we will answer that it also is so
according to mixtures, colours, and shapes. For since we are giving
an account of sensible substance, the division is not absurd if it is
understood relative to the differentiae apparent to sense-perception.
For sensible substance is not simply being, but this whole is a sensible,
since we said that its seeming real existence is a union of things relative
to sense-perception, and our belief in their existence comes from sense-
perception.
If the composition is unlimited, one must divide by the species of animals, just like the form of human being in the body. For this is a quality of body, such and such a form, and it is not absurd to divide by a quality. But if we said that some bodies are simple, and some are composite, making one division of the opposites simple-composite, we were talking of the substance which is more material and equipped with organs, not taking the composite into account. For the division using composite and simple as opposites is not possible; rather, in the first division, simple bodies are posited, and then mixed on the assumption of another principle, to produce the differentia in the composite bodies either by place or by shape, for example, some are heavenly, others earthy.

Thus far, then, concerning substantiality or becoming among sensibles.

§6.3.11. As to that which is quantified or quantity, one should posit it in number and magnitude, inasmuch as each thing is of a certain size, which is numbered among enmattered things, and occupies the extension of a substrate — we are now giving the account not of the separate instance of quantity, but of that quantity which makes, for example, the wood three feet long, or makes there to be five horses — it has often been said that only these things are instances of quantity, and that place and time are not to be grasped in respect of quantity. Rather, time is the measure of motion, and it is to be put among relatives, and place is such as to contain body, so this, too, consists in a relation, and is among the relatives; motion is also continuous, but was not placed in quantity.

But why are big and small not instances of quantity? For the big is big because of some quantity, and magnitude is not a relative, rather more and less are, since they are more and less relative to something, as is the double. Why then is a ‘mountain small, and a millet seed large’? First, small is said instead of smaller. For if it is agreed that small is said [of the mountain] in relation to things of the same kind, and because of them, then it is agreed that small is being said instead of smaller, and the large millet seed is not being said to be simply large, but to be a large millet seed, and this is identical to saying it of things of the same kind, and it would be naturally said to be larger than things of the same kind.

Next, if small and large in this use are admitted as relatives, why should not also that which is beautiful be said to belong to the relatives?
In fact, we say something is beautiful in itself, that is, it is an instance of the quality, and that ‘more beautiful’ is a relative. Nonetheless, something that is said to be beautiful would appear to be ugly relative to something, like the beauty of a human being relative to a god. Plato says⁷⁹ ‘the most beautiful monkey is ugly when compared with another kind’. But it is beautiful in itself, though relative to another it is more beautiful or the opposite.

And here, turning back to the topic at hand, something is big in itself because of magnitude, and not as such relative to another. Otherwise, beautiful would have to be removed [from something we say is beautiful] on the grounds that something else is more beautiful. So, in the same way large is not to be rejected, on the grounds that something is larger. For larger would not be at all, if large were not, any more than more beautiful would without beautiful.

§6.3.12. So, we should accept that there is contrariety, too, with regard to a quantity. For our thoughts allow for contrariety, whenever we say something is large or small, by making the imaginative representations⁸⁰ contrary, just as with many and few. Indeed, roughly the same is to be said about many and few: ‘the people in the household are many’ we say, not more; the latter is relative. ‘There are few people in the theatre’, and not fewer. Generally, ‘many’ should indicate a large multiplicity in number – and in which way is multiplicity meant to be a relative? – and this is identical to [what is expressed by] ‘the extension of number’, the opposite being its ‘contraction’.

The identical distinction applies to something continuous, since thought draws out the continuous thing further. There is, then, a quantity, when a unit or a point proceeds [into extension].⁸¹ But if either of them comes to rest quickly, then the quantity is few or small. If the procession, in going forward, does not stop quickly, then the quantity is many or large.

So, what is the boundary? And what is it of beauty, or the hot? It is possible for ‘hotter’ to be in the sensible world in the quantity. But ‘hotter’ is said of something relative to another thing, while ‘hot’ is simply a quality. There must be an expressed principle, just as of Beauty, so, too, of the Large, which when participated in makes something large, as Beauty makes things beautiful.

So, there is contrariety in these respects in the case of the quantity. There no longer is in respect of place, because it is not a quantity.⁸²

⁷⁹ See Pl., Hip. Ma. 289B4, quoting Heraclitus, fr. 22 B 82 DK.
⁸⁰ The word here is φαντασίαι where we might expect φαντάσματα.
⁸¹ See Ar., Top. 1.18.108b26.
⁸² See Pl., Tim. 63A4 6, used against Ar., Cat. 6.6a11 15.
Furthermore, if place were a quantity, ‘up’ would not even be the
counter of something, as there is no ‘down’ in the universe. ‘Up’ and
‘down’, when said of parts, would not mean anything more than ‘further
up’ or ‘further down’, the same as ‘on the right’ and ‘on the left’. These
are relatives. It is an accident of the syllable and the word to be quan-
tities, or to support quantity, for they are so much sound, and that is
a variety of motion.\(^83\) They are, then, to be referred to motion, as is
action.

\section*{§6.3.13.} [Aristotle] got it right that the continuous is distinguished
from the discrete by possession of a boundary, which is both common,
and peculiar to each part;\(^84\) and also, in the case of number, by odd and
even.

Again, if there are special differentiae of each of these, either it should
be left to those who, anyway, work on number, or else one should posit
these differentiae as holding of monadic [intelligible] numbers,\(^85\) but
not of numbers in sensibles. If the argument separates numbers in the
sensible, then nothing prevents one from thinking that the identical
differentiae hold of these.

But what about the continuous, if this comprises the line, the plane,
and the solid?\(^86\) The one-dimensional, the two-dimensional, and the
three-dimensional do not appear to be the work of someone dividing
into species, but of someone merely making an enumeration. For if in
numbers, when they are understood in this way, according to what is
prior and what is posterior,\(^87\) what they have in common is not a genus,
nor will there be anything shared in the first, second, and third dimen-
sions. But perhaps they equal one another as far as they are quantities,
and it is not the case that some are more quantities and others less, even
if some have more dimensions.

So, in the case of numbers, too, what they have in common will lie in
them insofar as they are all numbers. For it is perhaps not the case that
the unit produces the dyad, the dyad the triad, but rather the one thing
produces them all. And if they do not come about, but just are, but we
conceive of them as coming to be, let us suppose the lesser one prior, the
greater one posterior, but still, as numbers, they will fall under the one
genus.

\^81\ Cf. infra 19.8 9; 6.1.5.2 12; 6.3.19.8 9. See Ar., Cat. 6.4b32 33.
\^83\ See Ar., Cat. 6.4b20, 25 26.
\^84\ Cf. 6.6.9-35, where ‘monadic number’ refers to number in the sensible world. See Ar., Meta. 13.8.1083b16 17.
\^85\ Cf. 6.1.4.11. See Ar., Cat. 6.4b23 24.
\^86\ Cf. 6.1.1.27 28; 6.2.13.7 15. See Ar., Cat. 6.5a30 31; Meta. 3.3.999a6 14.
We must, then, transfer this feature of numbers to magnitudes. We will separate from one another line, plane, and solid, which is actually called body, by their being different species of magnitudes. But we must investigate whether we must divide each of these, the line into straight, curved, helical, the plane into rectilinear, and curved figures, and solid into the solid figures, the sphere, and those with rectilinear sides, and these again, into the triangles and quadrilateral figures that the geometers produce, and if these must be divided again.

§6.3.14. What, then, should we say a straight line is? Is it not a magnitude?

In fact, one might say the straight is a magnitude qualified in a certain way. What, then, prevents it from being a differentia in a line as such? For straight only belongs to line; we provide the differentiae of substance, too, from the quality. So if a line is straight, it is an instance of quantity with a differentia; but the straight line is not a composite of straight and line. If it is composite, then only in having its peculiar differentia.

Why, then, is something made of three lines, the triangle, not a quantity?

In fact, the triangle is not simply three lines, but only when arranged thus and so, and the quadrilateral, when the lines are thus and so. For even the straight line is both thus and so and a quantity. For if nothing stops us from saying the straight line is not merely a quantity, then does the same not apply to the bounded line, too?

But the boundary of the line is a point, and not in anything further. So, the bounded plane is also a quantity, since lines bound it, which are themselves in the quantitative to a greater degree. If, then, the bounded plane is in the quantitative, either a quadrangle or many sided or six sided, then all figures are in the quantitative, too.

But if we say that the triangle and the quadrangle is each a quality, we will place them in the qualitative. Nothing stops us from placing the identical thing under several forms of predication. Insofar as it is a magnitude and a magnitude of this size, something is in the quantitative, and insofar as it exhibits such and such a shape, it is in the qualitative.

In fact, as such, a triangle is such and such a shape; so what stops us saying the sphere, too, is qualified in such and such a way?

So, if one carries on with this line of thought, it turns out that geometry is not about magnitudes, but about quality. But this is not
an acceptable opinion: since the business of geometry is about magnitudes. The differentiae in the magnitudes do not cancel out their being magnitudes, just as those of substances do not cancel out substances’ being substances. Furthermore, every plane is limited, for it is not possible for a plane to be unlimited.91 Furthermore, when I grasp a quality of substance, I mean a differentia relevant to substance, all the more so when I grasp geometrical figures, I grasp the differentia in quantity.92

Next, if we do not grasp these differentiae as ones belonging to magnitudes, what are we going to say they belong to? If they are the differentiae of the magnitudes, then the differentiated magnitudes that arise from the differentiae should be ordered in their species.

§6.3.15. In what way are ‘equality and inequality properties of quantity”?93 For triangles are spoken of as the same.94

In fact, magnitudes are also said to be the same, and the sameness meant does not eliminate sameness and lack of sameness from being in quality. For probably, the sameness in the magnitudes is meant differently, and not in the way it is in quality.

Next, it is not the case that, if Aristotle says that equality and inequality are properties,95 he also eliminated sameness being predicated of some things. And if he says ‘sameness and lack of sameness belong to quality’,96 then this has to be meant differently, as we said, in the case of quantity. But if the sameness is identical in these, too, then we have to investigate what other properties there are of each of these genera, quality and quantity.

In fact, we should say that sameness is said also of quantity insofar as there are differentiae in it, but that, generally, those differentiae which complete the thing should be ordered along with the thing they are differentiae of;97 this holds especially when the differentia as such is only of that thing. If the differentia in question in one case completes the substance, and in another does not, it is to be placed in the same genus as the substance it completes, and it should be taken on its own, when it does not complete the substance.98 I mean ‘completes the substance’ not simply, but that it completes such and such a substance, since the thing takes on such and such an addition that is not substantial.99

91 See Ar., DC 1.5.272b18 19. 92 See Ar., Meta. 5.14.1020a33 b3.
93 See Ar., Cat. 8.10a14 16.
94 I.e., the triangles have the same proportions. See Euclid, Elem. VI Def. 1; Ar., AP 2.17.99413.
95 I.e., of quantity, as l. 1. 96 See Ar., Cat. 8.11a18 19. 97 Cf. supra 14.25 32.
98 Cf. 2.6.1.15 29. 99 Cf. infra 17.8 10; 2.6.1.29; 6.1.10.20 27; 6.2.14.14 23.

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Note, too, that we say triangles and quadrangles are equal, and so, too, for all figures, planes, and solids. The consequence is that we assume that equal and unequal are properties of quantity. We have to investigate, however, if sameness and lack of sameness are peculiar properties of quality.

We discussed how the quality, when mixed with other things, that is, matter and quantity, produces the completion of sensible substance, and that probably what is called substance itself is this thing composed out of many things, and is not a ‘something’, but rather a quality. And the expressed principle, for example, of fire probably indicates more properly a ‘something’, whereas the form it produces is more properly a quality.

The expressed principle of a human being is probably the ‘something’, whereas the thing produced in body, being the image of the expressed principle, is more properly a quality, as though one were to call the portrait of Socrates, Socrates, although he is a visible human being, and the portrait consists of colours, that is, of the paints in the painting. In the same way, then, since there is an expressed principle in accordance with which Socrates is, you should not rightly say the visible Socrates is Socrates; rather, you should say he is ‘colours and figures’, imitations of those in the expressed principle. And this expressed principle is affected in the same way relative to the truest expressed principle. This, then, is how these things are.

§6.3.16. Each [genus], if taken apart from the others relating to what is called substance, is a quality in these sensibles. They do not indicate a ‘something’, nor a quantity nor motion, but rather indicate the characteristic mark, what sort of thing it is, for example, beautiful and ugly in a body. Beauty in the sensible world and in the intelligible world are [said to be beautiful] equivocally, with the result that this holds generally for quality, since the dark and the pale are different in the sensible world and in the intelligible world.

But is the quality in the seed, that is, in that kind of expressed principle, identical to the quality which appears or [is it said to be quality] equivocally? Is it to be classed with things in the intelligible world or with those in the sensible world? And the ugliness in the soul?
For it is already clear that beauty is different. But if ugliness is among the
qualities in the sensible world, then virtue is, too, if virtue is among
qualified things here [at all].

In fact, some virtues are among qualified things in the sensible world,
and others are among things in the intelligible world. 106

Since the crafts are also expressed principles, one may well be puzzled
whether they are among things in the sensible world. 107 For even if they
are expressed principles in matter, their matter is the soul. 108 But when
they are present with matter, in what way are they in the sensible world?
For example, lyre playing, which involves strings, and the song is a part
of the craft, that is, a voice which can be perceived, unless, of course, one
were to class these as activities and not parts. Even then they are
activities which can be perceived, since, even if beauty in bodies is
incorporeal, we nonetheless assign it, as something sensible, to things
relating to body and of the body.

We posit geometry and arithmetic as being each twofold: one aspect
each of them is to be classed among the qualities in the sensible world,
and the other as the soul’s study relative to the intelligible in the
intelligible world. Indeed, Plato says just the same about music and
astronomy. 109

The crafts, then, concerned with body and which use sensible instru-
ments and sense-perception, even if they are dispositions of the soul,
since in their case the soul is inclined downwards, are to be classed
among the qualities in the sensible world.

Moreover, nothing prevents us from classing those virtues as being in
the sensible world which produce civic action, 110 and which do not
separate the soul by leading it to things in the intelligible world, but
which generate beautiful deeds in the sensible world, considering this to
be preferable, 111 but not necessary. So, beauty is in the seed, and even
more so the pale and the dark are in these things here.

What follows from this? Will we then class a soul of this kind, 112 in
which there is an expressed principle of this kind, among the substances
in the sensible world?

In fact, we did not call them bodies, but since the expressed principles
concern themselves with body and the productions of body, we class
them among the qualities in the sensible world. Since we posit sensible
substance as consisting of the factors mentioned, we will never class
incorporeal Substance with it. Although we say all qualities are

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106 Cf. 1.2.3 4. 107 Cf. 5.9.11. 108 See Ar., Meta. 7.7.1032a32.
109 See Pl., Phil. 56A 57D; Rep. 525A 530B. 110 Cf. 1.2.1.16 20.
111 See SVF 3.137 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1048a); Ar., Pol. 7.14.1333a36 b3.
112 Presumably, an individual soul having the civic virtues.
incorporeal, we reckon them as being in the sensible world since they are affections in substance inclined downwards.

Since affection is divided into two aspects – what it is related to [the body], and what it is in, the soul – we placed it among qualities, as not being corporeal, but related to body. But we did not place soul among substances here, because its affection relative to the body had already been placed in the quality. But we placed soul, conceived of without this affection and without the expressed principle, in the place it originates from, leaving no intelligible Substance whatever in the sensible world.

§ 6.3.17. If, then, this seems to be right, we should divide qualities into psychical and corporeal, because they belong to the body. But if one wishes to place all souls in the intelligible world, it is possible to divide qualities here by types of sense-perception, that is, those through the eyes, ears, touch, taste, and smell. And further divisions will be possible, if there are differentiae of these things, colours by sight, sounds by hearing, and by the other types of sense-perception, for example, sounds, insofar they are such and such, into pleasant, rough, smooth.

Since it was by using qualities that we divided the differentiae in the case of substance, and activities, and beautiful or base actions, and in general things like that – since the quantity either seldom or never contributes to the differentiae producing species – and the quantity by its proper differentia, one may well be puzzled how one is to divide the quality into species. Which differentia is one to use, and which genus are they in? For it is absurd if the differentiae are the same in genus, as though one were to say that the differentiae of substance were themselves substances.

By what is pale differentiated from dark, and colours in general? And colours from tastes and tactile qualities? If these things are distinguished by the different sense organs, then the differentia is not in the substrate. And then what about qualities that are perceived by the identical sense faculty? If we say that some contract eyes and tongue, while others dilate them, then first of all it may be contested about these affections themselves whether they are dilations and contractions.

Next, Aristotle has not said what they themselves differ by. If he says, by what they are capable of, as is not unreasonable, then one should probably say that things which are not seen, such as sciences, should be

113 Cf. 2.7.28 29. See Alcinous, Didask. 166.14 15. 114 Cf. 3.6.19.14.
115 Cf. supra 33 36. 116 Cf. 6.1.12.2 5. 117 Cf. supra 15.15 19.
118 Cf. infra 18.4 6.
119 See Pl., Tim. 67E5 6; Ar., Meta. 10.7.1057b8 9; Top. 7.3.153a38 b1.
120 See Ar., Cat. 8.9a14 16, which is probably the text Plotinus has in mind, though it is not precisely on this point.
divided by what they are capable of. But since these qualities are sensible, why should they be made up of what they produce? Also, when we divide types of scientific understanding using what they are capable of, and generally distinguishing among the capacities of the soul by means of what they produce, we are able to grasp their differentiae by reason, not only their field of operation, but also by seeing their expressed principles.

In fact, we will be able to grasp the crafts by their expressed principles and their theorems; but then what about corporeal qualities? One may well ask how the different expressed principles differ in the case of the crafts. Obviously, pale does differ from dark: we are asking, how.

§ 6.3.18. But all these difficulties show that we should look for the differentiae of other things, that is, what we distinguish them from one another with, but it is both impossible and irrational to look for the differentiae of differentiae. For you cannot look for the substances of substances, or quantities of the quantities or the qualities of qualities, or the differentiae of differentiae. But it is necessary, where possible, to distinguish things using extrinsic features, such as what produces them or such like. When this is not possible, for example, with light green and yellow, since they say these colours are between pale and dark, what is one to say? That they are different will be said by sense-perception or intellect, but they give no reason – sense-perception, because reason does not belong to it; it merely produces differentiated data, and intellect, because, in its simple acts of apprehension, it nowhere uses reasons; it just says of each thing: this is this, and this is this. There is difference among the motions belonging to intellect, which divides one thing from another without itself needing a difference.

So, do all qualities turn out to be differentiae or not? For paleness and colour in general, tactile qualities, and tastes would turn out to be the differentiae of different things, although they are species, but how can literacy and the crafts?

In fact, it is by making this soul literate, and this one cultivated, especially when it occurs naturally, with the result that they, too, are differentiae that produce species. If, then, quality is a differentia, it may come from the identical genus or from another one. If it is from the identical genus, then these will be differentiae among things of the identical genus, for example, the qualities of qualities. For if virtue

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121 See Ar., De sens. 4. 442A 4 5; Cat. 10.12A 18. 122 See Pl., Lg. 932D.
123 Cf. 6.2.8.25 49. 124 Μουσική, those activities presided over by Muses.
125 I.e., the differentia may differentiate qualities within one genus of quality or in another. Cf. 6.3.7.14 16.
126 Cf. supra ll. 4 6.
and vice are each such and such a disposition, with the result that since dispositions are qualities, the differentiae will be qualities, unless one denies that the disposition without the differentia is a quality, and claims that the differentia produces the quality.

If one says the sweet is beneficial, the bitter harmful, then one is dividing using the relative, and not a quality. And what about saying the sweet is thick, the bitter fine? One is probably, then, not saying that thick is what sweet is, but what the sweetness is in; the identical argument applies to the bitter. So, we must enquire if everywhere quality is the differentia of what is not a quality, just as substance is not the differentia of substance, nor a quantity of quantity.

In fact, five differs from three by two, or rather, exceeds it: one does not say it differs. For how could it differ by two, which is in three? But nor could one motion differ from another by a motion, nor will one find any example in the other genera. In the case of virtue and vice, we have to understand the whole in relation to the whole, and will divide in this way using the wholes. As for the differentiae coming from the identical genus, the quality, and not from another, if one divides virtues and vices in view of pleasure, anger, and the acquisition of goods, and if one were to accept this as a good way of defining them, it is clear there are differentiae which are not qualities.

§ 6.3.19. The differentiating qualities must be classed among qualities, as we thought, insofar as quality relates to them, but without the qualities themselves being added, so that there are not two predicates; instead they ascend from themselves to the quality from which they are said to be qualified.

‘Not pale’, if it indicates another colour, is a quality; if it were just a negation, it would be nothing, unless it is a sound, or a name or an account of the thing which occurs in itself. If it is a sound, then it is a motion, and if it is a name or an account, then it is relative, because these signify something. But if we count by genus not just the things, but instead include necessarily both what is said and what signifies, that is, which genus each of these signifies, then we’ll say that some expressions posit things, by revealing them, others eliminate them. But it is

127 See Ar., Cat. 8.8b27. 128 Cf. 6.1.12.10 11. 129 See Pl., Tim. 65B 66C. 130 Cf. supra ll. 23 25; 6.2.19.11. 131 See Ar., Pol. 7.16.1335a21 22. 132 Cf. 6.1.10.1, 12.13 14. See Ar., Cat. 8.10a27. 133 The point is not to avoid there being two categories substance and quality since of course there are these two genera of predication, but to avoid having, e.g., human and good as two predications when one says that someone is, e.g., virtuous. 134 Cf. 6.1.5.2 12; 6.3.12.26 27.
surely better not to count negations, since we at any rate do not count affirmations because they are composite.\footnote{135}

And what about privations? If they are privations of qualities, then, the privations are qualities, like toothless or blind. But neither the naked man\footnote{136} nor the dressed man is a man with a quality, but rather in some state, and thus in a relation to something else.

Furthermore, an affection, that is, one that is continuing to occur, is not a quality, but a kind of motion,\footnote{137} but an affection that consists in having been affected and now possessing the remaining affection is a quality.\footnote{138} If the thing were not now to have the affection, but is said to have been affected, then it is said to have been moved. This is identical to saying, ‘it was in the process of being moved’. Motion has to be conceived of here on its own, by abstracting from time; it is not appropriate even to add ‘at this instant’. ‘Well’ and suchlike additions have to be referred back to the one concept\footnote{139} of the genus [of quality].

We should ask if going red in the face is to be referred to quality, but not red in the face. For the subject’s going red is not correctly referred back to quality, since he is being affected or, generally, is being moved.\footnote{140} If he is no longer going red, but is already red, why is he not, then, qualified in a certain way? For being qualified in a certain way is not constituted by time – in fact, what time should it be defined by?\footnote{141} – but in being such and such, and when we say he is red in the face, we are saying he is qualified in a certain way.\footnote{142}

In fact, we will say that only states are qualities, and not dispositions.\footnote{143} So, the hot man is qualified in some way, not the man getting hot; someone ill is, and someone going down with an illness is not, qualified.

§6.3.20. We must see, though, if there is another quality contrary to every quality.\footnote{144} For the intermediate is also held to be contrary to the extremes in the case of virtue and vice.\footnote{145}

In the case of colour, the intermediates are not like this. If this is so, because the intermediates are mixtures of the extremes,\footnote{146} then one should not divide so as to produce oppositions, but merely by pale and dark, while the other colours are combinations.

\footnote{135}{See Ar., Cat. 4.2a6 7.}
\footnote{136}{See Ar., Cat. 10.12a26 32.}
\footnote{137}{See Ar., Cat. 8.9b32 33.}
\footnote{138}{See Ar., Cat. 8.9b19 21.}
\footnote{139}{The word used here is νόησις, which is not normally used in this way.}
\footnote{140}{Here motion (κίνησις) is being treated as the genus of which qualitative change is a species.}
\footnote{141}{See Ar., Cat. 8.9b30 33.}
\footnote{142}{Cf. 6.1.11.2 6.}
\footnote{143}{See Ar., Cat. 8.8b35.}
\footnote{144}{See Ar., Cat. 8.10b15 17.}
\footnote{145}{See Ar., EN 2.5.1106b24 28.}
\footnote{146}{See Ar., De sens. 4.442a25.
In fact, in the case of the intermediates, even if they are observed to come from a combination, we oppose them to one another. In fact, this is because contraries do not merely differ, they differ most of all, and differing most of all is probably grasped by positing these intermediates, since if one removes this ordering, what will one define ‘most of all’ by?

In fact, it is because grey is nearer pale than dark, and this is indicated by sight, and so, too, with tastes, and tactile qualities, bitter-sweet, hot-cold, and whatever is neither is in between.

But while we are clearly accustomed to understand things like this, someone may not agree with us here, and claim that pale and yellow, any colour you please in relation to any other, differ from one another entirely, and because they differ, they are contrary qualities, not because they are intermediate to pale and dark, but because of the difference. At any rate, there is no intermediate to health and illness, and these are contraries, in fact, because anything arising from one of them undergoes the greatest change; yet how is it possible to say ‘greatest change’ if there are not lesser changes in between?

In the case of health and illness, then, it is not possible to talk of a ‘greatest change’. So, their contrariety is to be defined by something other than the ‘greatest change’. If it is to be defined by a great extent, [between the termini], and if this is said instead of greater, in contrast to less, contrariety without intermediates will not be captured yet again. If it is simply a large extent, on the basis of the agreement that the nature of each of the terms is distant from the other by a large extent, then it is not possible to say it is greater than something else.

But we should investigate in what way there is contrariety. Are things, then, with some type of sameness – and I do not mean in genus or by being mixed at all, for example, with the forms of other things, whether greater or small – not contraries, whereas those not belonging to the identical species, are contraries? And one has to add: in the genus quality. Hence, there are those contraries without intermediates, where there is no sameness, because there are no other terms mediating, in a way, and with a sameness to each other, and in some cases only some features have no sameness. If so, those colours with something in common will not be contraries, but nothing stops one colour being

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147 See Ar., Cat. 6.6a17 18; Meta.10.8.1058a11.
148 See Pl., Tim. 68B C; Ar., Cat. 10.12a17 18.
149 See Ar., Cat. 10.12b34 35; DA 2.10 422b10 12,25 26; De sens. 4.441b28 30, 442a13.
150 See Ar., Cat. 10.12b30 31.
151 See Ar., Meta. 10.4.1055a24.
152 See Ar., Cat. 10.12b27 32.
contrary to another; and the same applies to tastes. So we have now raised the difficulties on this subject.

As for ‘the more’, we thought it lay in those things which participate [in the contraries], whereas the difficulty remained with health and justice themselves.\footnote{See Ar., Cat. 8.10b26 1145.} If each of these actually has this latitude, then so do the states themselves. But in the intelligible world each thing is the whole thing, and contains nothing else besides.

\section*{§6.3.21.} As to whether motion should be posited as a genus,\footnote{Cf. infra 23.20.} one should consider the following issues: first, whether it is not appropriate to reduce it to some other genus; next, if nothing higher than motion is predicated of it in what it is,\footnote{Cf. infra 23.20 26.} and, finally, if it produces species by taking on many differentiae.\footnote{Cf. supra 3.31 32; 6.1.17.1 3.}

To what sort of genus will one reduce it? First, motion is neither the substantiality nor a quality of things possessing it. Nor does it belong to producing, for many motions are to be classed as affection, nor does it belong to affection, since many motions are producings although producing and being affected can be reduced to motion.\footnote{Cf. 6.1.15 16; 6.2.2.5 11.}

Nor does motion correctly reduce to the relative,\footnote{Cf. supra 3.31 32; 6.1.17.1 3.} [even] on the grounds that motion is of something and not in itself. Those grounds would place the quality in the relative as well, for quality is of something and in something; so, too, for the quantity.

If quality and quantity are said [to be], because these are beings of a certain kind, even if they are of something insofar as they are, then in the same way we have to grasp what motion is in itself, since, even if it is of something, it is something prior to being of something. Generally, the relative should not be posited as something which first is [something], and then is of another thing; rather, it is that which the relation generates, with nothing beside the relation in accordance with which it is said to be. For example, the double,\footnote{See Pl., Pbd. 96E3.} insofar as it is said to be double in comparison with the cubit length, gets to be called and to be this in comparison with another thing, since it in this way acquires its coming to be and its real existence, and is not conceived of before this.

What, then, is this thing, [motion] which, by being of another thing, is something so that it may be of another thing, like the quality, the quantity, and substance?

In fact, it is to be understood as prior in that nothing is predicated prior to it as its genus.
But if someone were to say change is prior to motion, then, first, we answer that, whether one says it is identical with motion or its genus, in saying it he will produce another genus besides those mentioned above.

Next, it is clear that he will place motion in a species, and he will oppose something to motion, presumably coming to be, calling this a change, but not a motion.

So why is coming to be not a motion? For if the reason is that the thing coming to be is not yet, and motion does not relate to what is not, clearly neither would coming to be be a change. And if the reason is that coming to be is nothing more than an alteration and an increase, because coming to be is when things are altered and increased, he takes things prior to coming to be, but one has to take coming to be as another species among these. For having come to be, and coming to be are not in [the species] passive alteration, like being heated, or going pale. For these may occur when simple coming to be has not yet occurred, namely, when it comes to be something, as when an animal or a plant takes on some form.

One would say that it is more appropriate for change to be classed as a species than motion, since change tends to mean one thing coming about instead of another, whereas motion also includes that process which does not go beyond what belongs to the thing itself, such as local motion. If someone does not like this example, then take learning, or playing the lyre, or generally motion on the basis of a disposition. So, alteration should be a species of motion, because it is a motion that goes beyond a [given] state.

§6.3.22. Let us assume, however, that what we conceive of as alteration is identical with motion insofar as what follows motion is something other.

What, then, should we say motion is? Indeed, speaking in a summary manner, let it be that motion is the path from a potency into that which the thing is said to be in potency. Since some things are said to have a potency, because they could proceed to some form, for example, it is a statue in potency, and other things because they could proceed to an activity, for example, the capacity for walking, this advance is motion, therefore, the advance to the statue is motion in the case of the statue, and the walking itself is the motion in the case of the walking – and dancing in the case of someone able to dance,
whenever he or she dances. And in the case of a motion to the statue, another form comes about, which the motion has produced; in the other case, dancing, because it is the simple form belonging to the capacity, nothing remains from the motion when it stops.

The consequence is that, it would not be absurd to say that motion is a woken form, in contrast to static forms, insofar as the others persist, while it does not; and motion is the cause of other forms whenever some one of them comes to be after it. If one were to call the motion, which we are now discussing, the life of bodies, then one would have to call this motion equivocally with the motions of intellect and soul. One may well be confident that motion is a genus, above all because it is not easy, not to say impossible, to grasp it in a definition.

But in what way is it a form, when motion is in the direction of the worse, or passive motion in general?

In fact, it is the same as heating from the sun that makes some things grow, and forces other things to the opposite of growth; motion may be something in common, identical in both cases, and it has the apparent differentia in the substrates.

Then, are becoming healthy and falling ill identical? In fact, inasmuch as they are motions, they are identical. And what do they differ by – by their substrates or by something else? This belongs later, when we discuss alteration.

Now let us consider what is identical in all motion; for this is the way it could be a genus, otherwise it would be spoken of in several ways, as is being. As to the puzzle, we should perhaps consider those motions that lead to what is natural or are active in the natural, to be forms, in a way, as we have said, whereas those that are tendencies to what is against nature should be understood in analogy with what they lead to.

But what is common to alteration, growth, coming to be, and their contraries, along with change of place, due to which they are all motions?

In fact, each thing not being in the identical state in which it was before, nor resting, nor being in complete stillness, but rather, inasmuch as motion is present, to have a tendency towards something else; the different thing does not remain in the identical state, for motion passes away when it is not other.
For this reason, difference does not lie in having come to be, and remaining in that which is different, but is always difference.\textsuperscript{177} Hence, time is in each case different, because motion produces it; for it is measured motion\textsuperscript{178} that does not persist. Time runs along with it, as though being carried on motion which itself is borne along.

What is common to all motion is being a procession and a tendency from potency, and what is possible, to actuality.\textsuperscript{179} All things that are moved are moved in respect of some motion, and have the previously existing potency for this production or affection when they come to be by being in motion.

§6.3.23. Now the motion that relates to sensibles is introduced from without, and shakes\textsuperscript{180} drives, awakens, and pushes the things that participate in it. The result is that they do not sleep\textsuperscript{181} nor do they remain in the identical state, so that they are indeed held together by the lack of stillness and this busyness, in a way, which is a likeness of Life. One should not think that moving things are motion,\textsuperscript{182} for feet are not walking; rather, walking is the actuality of a potency in the feet. Since the potency is invisible, necessarily we can only see the feet; and what we see is not simply the feet, as though they were at rest, but we see them now along with something else, which, although it is invisible, is seen accidentally, because it is with something else, namely, when we see the feet in one place and then another, and not resting.

The alteration derives from the thing altered, because its quality is not identical. What, then, is motion in, whenever it moves something else, and whenever it goes from the capacity in it to actuality? Is it in the thing that effects the motion? How, then, will the thing being moved, that is, being affected by the motion, have a share in motion? So, is the motion in the thing being moved?

But then when the motion has arrived, why does it not persist?

In fact, the motion should neither be separated from the thing producing the motion, nor may it be in that thing; rather, it must come from that thing to the other one, where it may not be cut off; it is from one to the other, like a gust of wind towards something else. When the capacity for motion is one for walking, it pushes, in a way, and makes the thing keep on changing place; when it is a capacity for heating, it heats up the thing. And then the capacity takes matter and builds\textsuperscript{183} it into the thing’s nature, that is growth, and when another capacity takes it away, then it is shrinking\textsuperscript{184} of the thing shrinking on the basis of its potency to undergo shrinking.

\textsuperscript{177} See Ar., Phys. 3.2.201b20 21. \textsuperscript{178} Cf. 3.7.9.25. \textsuperscript{179} Cf. supra 22.4 7. \textsuperscript{180} See Pl., Tim. 54A4. \textsuperscript{181} Cf. 3.7.18.8. \textsuperscript{182} See Ar., Phys. 3.3.202a13 14. \textsuperscript{183} Cf. infra 26.11. \textsuperscript{184} See Ar., Cat. 14.15a14.
And when reproductive nature is active, then there is coming to be, and when this is incapacitated, and the nature with the capacity for destruction is dominant, then there is destruction, not in the thing that already has come to be, but in the one on the way. And becoming healthy likewise: it occurs because the capacity to produce health is active and dominant; the contrary incapacity produces the contraries.\footnote{See Ar., \textit{Phys.} 5.5.229a32 b2.} The consequence is that, as a matter of fact, motion is of a certain quality, and the property of the motion is thus and so in such and such things, not only because of what the motion is in, but also because of both what it comes from, and what it occurs through.

§6.3.24. On local motion: if being carried upwards is contrary to being carried downwards, and circular motion differs from motion in a straight line, what kind of difference is this?\footnote{See Ar., \textit{DC} 1.4.271a2 5.} For example, throwing something over your head, or down to your feet. For the capacity for pushing\footnote{Cf. \textit{supra} ll. 11, 21.} is one, unless one were to say that the capacity for pushing upwards is one, and the one pushing downwards is another; and that locomotion downwards is different from that upwards, especially if something is moving naturally, when [then] the one [capacity] would be lightness, and the other heaviness.\footnote{See Ar., \textit{DC} 1.6.} But what is identical or common in both cases is the thing being carried to its proper place,\footnote{See Ar., \textit{DC} 1.7.276a12 and 1.9.279b2 contra Pl., \textit{Tim.} 62C. 63E.} with the consequence that the difference in the sensible world will presumably turn out to depend on external circumstances.

But how do motion in a circle and in a straight line differ, for example, if people run in a straight line and run in a circle? In fact, the difference is due to the geometrical shape of the course, unless one says that motion in a circle is mixed,\footnote{I.e., a mixture of rest and (linear) motion. Cf. 6.2.18.10 11; 2.2.3.21 22.} because it is neither entirely motion nor does it completely go beyond itself. But it is reasonable on the whole that there is one local motion which is differentiated by extrinsic predicates.

§6.3.25. But we should investigate what the situation is with combination and separation.\footnote{Cf. \textit{supra} 17,20 23. See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 61E.} Are they different motions from the ones mentioned – coming to be and passing away, growth and diminution, local change,\footnote{Plotinus here uses \textit{μεταβολή} for \textit{κίνησις.}} and alteration – or are they to be reduced to these, or are some of these to be classed as combination and separation? If, then, combination includes this – the approach, the coming near of one thing to another, and conversely, separation includes the withdrawal of one
thing from another – one would say they are two local motions,\textsuperscript{193} and say that two things move towards one another or withdraw from one another.

But if they mean a combination in the sense of mixture or blending,\textsuperscript{194} that is, the composition of a unity from [another] unity, in the sense of being composed, not in the sense of having been already composed, what, among the things mentioned, is one meant to reduce these to? Local motion will be the beginning, but something else will supervene on it, just as one finds local motion beginning growth, and then quantitative motion supervenes. So, too, in the sensible world local motion is actually the start, and being combined or separated does not follow of necessity. Rather, if interweaving between the things that meet takes place, then they are combined, and if the things in the coincidental combination are split up, then they are separated.

But often the motion in place of the things separated will follow, or occur at the same time as the separation, and not a local motion. The affection which things being separated undergo is to be thought of as different, and not in terms of local motion, and in combination it is thought of as another affection, that is, composition, which is an accompaniment distinct from the local motion.

Are separation and combination, then, independent [kinds of motion], and is alteration to be reduced to them? For when something becomes dense, it is altered, and this would be the same as ‘it is combined’; when something becomes rarefied [fine], it is also altered; and this would be the same as ‘it is separated’. And when wine and water are mixed, each of them becomes other than it was. And it is combination that has produced the alteration.

In fact, we should say that in the sensible world, too,\textsuperscript{195} combinations and separations initiate some alterations, which are distinct from the combinations or separations. But we should not say that other alterations are like that, nor that rarefaction and condensation are combination and separation, or quite generally consist in them. For in this way, one would indeed be accepting that there is a void.\textsuperscript{196}

And what about darkness and paleness?\textsuperscript{197} If one contests these, then one eliminates colours, in fact, qualities, at least most of them, and probably all of them. If someone were to say that all alteration, by which we mean ‘change in respect of quality’,\textsuperscript{198} is combination and

\textsuperscript{193} See Ar., Phys. 8.9.265b19 20.
\textsuperscript{194} Cf. 2.7. See Ar., GC 1.5.320a24; Meta. 1.3.948a8 11; 12.2.1069b11 12, 25 27; Phys. 8.9.265b30 32; Empedocles, 31 B 75 DK.
\textsuperscript{195} Cf. supra l. 16 where local motion initiates combination and separation.
\textsuperscript{196} See Ar., Phys. 4.9.216b22 23; Meta. 1.4.985b4 7 (= Leucippus 67 A 6 DK).
\textsuperscript{197} See Ar., Meta. 10.7.1057b8 9. \textsuperscript{198} See Ar., Cat. 14.15b12.
separation, then nothing that comes to be is quality, merely things lying close together or apart.

Next, how are learning and teaching combinations?

§6.3.26. These are certainly matters for further investigation; now we must look into what are called ‘motions’ which are said to be divided up into species, as in the case of local motion, whether it is not to be divided up into up, down, and circular, as in the puzzle discussed above,\(^{199}\) by motion of animate and inanimate things, for without them the motion of these things is not the same, and then, this into motion on foot, and swimming and flying.\(^{200}\)

Perhaps one could divide motions in each species by their being natural or contrary to nature. This would mean that the differentiae of motion are not extrinsic;\(^{201}\) in fact, the motions themselves produce the differentiae, and do not occur without them. Nature is held to be the principle of these motions,\(^{202}\) or rather some occur by nature, others by craft, and others by choice. Growth and diminution occur naturally; house-building, and shipbuilding occur because of craft; research, learning, politics, and in general speaking and acting occur by choice. Growth, alteration, and coming to be each differs as to whether it is natural or against nature, or by the substrates of these changes.

§6.3.27. What should one say about stability or repose\(^{203}\) as opposed to motion?\(^{204}\) Should it be posited as a genus on its own, or is it to be reduced to one of the ones mentioned? It is probably better to reserve stability for things in the intelligible world, and only look for repose in the sensible world.

The first thing to enquire about this repose is: what is it? Even if it should appear to be identical to stability, it would not be correct to look for that in the sensible world, since nothing here is stationary; rather anything that appears to stand still is subject to quite leisurely motion. If we were to say that repose is distinct from stability in that stability concerns things that are completely immobile, then repose concerns things that have come to a standstill, whose nature it is to move, whenever they are not moving;\(^{205}\) if, that is, we mean by reposing, the coming to a standstill of a motion that has not stopped, but is stopping.\(^{206}\) If stability does not really concern moving things, we must first see if there is anything in the sensible world not moving.

\(^{199}\) Cf. supra 24.1 11. \(^{200}\) See Ar., De motu an. 1.698a5 6, b17 18.

\(^{201}\) Cf. supra 24.13 14. \(^{202}\) See Ar., Phys. 5.6.230a19 20.

\(^{203}\) The contrast is between στάσις (‘Stability’), found only in the intelligible world, and ἠρέμια (‘repose’), found only in the sensible world.

\(^{204}\) See Ar., Phys. 202a4; Cat. 14.15 b11. \(^{205}\) See Ar., Phys. 5.2.226b12 15.

\(^{206}\) See Ar., Phys. 5.6.230a4 5.
But if it is not possible for anything to be moved in respect of all kinds of motion, then it must be not moving in respect of some kinds of motion, so that one can say that this is the thing moving. What else should we say of something not in local motion, but reposing in respect of this motion, except that it is not moving? Repose, therefore, is the negation of motion, that is, it is not in any genus.

Something only reposes in respect of one motion, for example, local motion; repose, then, means the removal of this. But if someone says, ‘why will we not claim that motion is the negation of repose?’ It is because, we will reply, motion comes bringing something with it, and is something that activates something else; it pushes the substrate, in a way, producing or destroying vast numbers of things, whereas the repose of something is nothing besides this thing; it just means that the thing is not being affected by motion.

Why, then, do we not say in the case of the intelligibles that stability is the negation of motion?

In fact, it is because you cannot say that stability eliminates motion, in that there is stability even when motion does not cease. Rather, there is stability when there is motion. In the intelligible world, there is not stability when something that naturally moves does not move, insofar as it does not move; rather, insofar as stability gets hold of something, it is stable, and insofar as it is something moving, it will always be moving. For this reason, it is both at a standstill due to Stability and moving due to Motion.

In the sensible world, something is moved due to motion, and, once the motion is gone, it reposes, since deprived of the necessary motion. One must, then, see what ‘stability’ is, like this. When something goes from illness to health, it is being healed. What species of rest shall we, then, oppose to this process of healing? If we say: the start of the process, that is illness, and not stability. If we say: the end of the process, this is health, which is not identical to stability. If someone were to call health or illness a kind of stability, he will be saying that health and illness are species of stability, which is absurd. If rest is an accidental property of health, will health not still be health before it becomes stable? You can take any view you like on these questions.

§ 6.3.28. We have said that producing and being affected are to be called motions; one can call some of them absolute motions, others

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207 See Pl., Tht. 157A C.
208 Cf. 6.1.9,32.33. See Ar., Phys. 5.6.229b25; Boethus of Sidon apud Simplicius, In Cat. 14.433.30 31.
productions, and yet others affections. And we have said about the other so-called genera that they can be reduced to these.

About the relative, we have said that it is the relation between one thing and another, when both things come together simultaneously. When the relative is produced by the relation of a substance [to something else], it will not be relative insofar as it is a substance; rather, it will be insofar as it is part of something, for example, someone’s head or hand, or the cause or principle or element of something. One can also divide the relative, as it was divided by the ancients, into things that are productive of others, things that measure, things consisting in excess and deficiency, and others that separate by samenesses and differences. So much on these genera.

211 Cf. 6.1.18.5 6, 22.2 3. 212 Cf. infra II. 7 8, 13; 6.1.13 14, 23 24.
213 Cf. supra 11.7 8, 13; 6.1.13 14, 23 24.
214 See Ar., Cat. 7.8a26 28; Boethus of Sidon apud Simplicius, In Cat. 7.188.3 6; 6.1.7.38.
215 See Ar., Meta. 5.15.1020b26 31. 216 Cf. 6.1.6.7 17.
6.4–5 (22 and 23)
That Being, One and Identical,
Is Simultaneously Everywhere Whole

INTRODUCTION
6.4–5 (22–23) comprise a single work on the omnipresence of the intelligible: it preserves its unity in its presence to all sensible things. Any restriction on its presence lies with the sensible, and not the intelligible.

SUMMARY
§1. Discussion of how soul is present throughout the cosmos, first with two solutions from the Timaeus, and then with the fundamental puzzle of how something without extension can extend throughout the sensible world.

§§2–6. A first explanation. §2 explains that the sensible world is in the intelligible, and is an imitation of it. §3 argues that the intelligible is everywhere, in that it does not belong to any of the things which receive it imperfectly; in any case it is not in a place. §4 shows that there are a multiplicity of intellects and souls because multiplicity and unity are both present in the intelligible. §5 argues the soul is great, but not in such a way as to have mass and size. Soul belongs to the body that advances towards it. §6 explains how many bodies share in one soul.

§§7–14. A second explanation. §7 offers two images to aid understanding, that of the hand and that of the luminous sphere. §8 argues that since the intelligible is incorporeal it possesses none of the properties of bodies, especially place, divisibility, and passivity. Of itself, the intelligible does not enter the sensible. §§9–10 Sensible powers are images of the

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1 6.4 and 6.5 in fact form a single work. See Pl., Parm. 131B1 2, 144C8 D1.
intelligible, and hence depend on their model. §11 Each being only participates in the intelligible insofar as it is able to. §12 offers a series of images – ears and eyes, and the presence of sound and sight in the air. While the soul remains in itself, body approaches it, and receives it. §13 The sensible can only participate in the intelligible, that is, in something non-corporeal. §14 Soul itself suffices for all living things in that it is unlimited, in containing all souls and intellects.

§§15–16. When a body approaches the intelligible it receives only what is appropriate to it. In living things, body may dominate intellect. §16 explains the terms used by the decree of Adrastus (Plato, Phaedrus 248C–249B).
§6.4.1. Is soul present everywhere to the universe, because the body of the universe has a determinate size, and because soul is naturally divided in bodies?\(^1\)

In fact, no, soul in itself is everywhere, and not just where it would be extended to by body. Indeed, does body not find that soul is everywhere prior to body?\(^2\) The result is that wherever body happens to be placed, it finds that soul is already there prior to body’s being placed in any part of the universe, and the whole body of the universe is placed in soul which is already there.

But if soul extends so far that, prior to reaching a body of a determinate size, it filled up all extension, how will it not have a magnitude? Or in what manner would it exist in the universe prior to the universe coming to be, when the universe was not? How would anyone accept that the soul, said to be without parts and without magnitude, is everywhere, if it does not have magnitude?\(^3\) And if soul were said to be extended along with body, though it is not a body, in this way one would not avoid the problem of giving it magnitude accidentally.\(^4\)

Similarly, someone could reasonably enquire here how it acquired magnitude accidentally, for the soul actually does not, like a quality such as sweetness or colour, belong to the whole body.\(^5\) For these are affections of bodies, so that the whole of that which is affected has the affection, and the affection is nothing in itself, belonging as it does to

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2. Cf. 4.7.8542 43; 6.5.9.41. 3. Cf. 4.7.8.1 3.
3. See Nemesius, fr. 4b (= Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 2.8 14). The view that the soul is accidentally a body was attributed to Plotinus’ teacher, Ammonius Saccas and to Numenius.
4. Cf. 4.2.1.47 59.
a body and apprehended along with body. For this reason, the affection necessarily has the magnitude of the body, and the pale of one part of the body is not affected along with the pale of another part.

Furthermore, in the case of pale, the pale in the one part and the pale in another are identical in form though not in number, whereas in the case of the soul, the soul in the foot is numerically identical to the soul in the hand, as our acts of apprehension make clear. And, universally, with qualities, the identical thing is understood to be divided into parts, whereas, in the case of the soul, the identical thing is not divided into parts, but is said to be divided because it is everywhere.

Let us, then, give an account of these things beginning with their principle, to establish whether there is something clear and acceptable about the way soul can be incorporeal and without magnitude and yet reach the greatest extent, either prior to bodies or in bodies. Presumably, if it were also to appear to be able to do this before there are bodies, it would be easier to accept also that this kind of thing happens in bodies.

§6.4.2. Certainly, there is both the true universe and the imitation of the universe, that is, the nature of the visible universe. The true universe is, then, in nothing, for there is nothing prior to it. Anything posterior to this is at once necessarily in the [true] universe, if indeed it is at all, and is completely dependent on that; it cannot either persist or move without it. And indeed even if someone were to posit such a thing [the universe] not to be in it [the true universe] as in a place – because he thinks that place is ‘the limit of a surrounding body’ insofar as it surrounds body, or an interval that was prior to the nature of the void and still is – and if he were rather to suppose it [the universe] to be in the [true] universe, as if it were supported by and resting on the [true] universe, which is everywhere and holds the visible universe together, still he should set aside the predication of the name, and grasp by discursive thinking what is being said.

This, however, was said to make another point, namely, that the [true] universe, the primary being, neither looks for a place nor is it in anything at all. Actually, the [true] universe, being all, is not such that it falls short of itself; rather, it has both completed itself and is equal
to itself. And where the universe is, it is there, for it is itself the universe.\textsuperscript{14}

Universally, if something other than the universe settles in it, that thing participates in the [true] universe, and comes together with it and gets its strength from it, without dividing it. Instead, it finds the [true] universe in itself as it approaches it, without the [true] universe thereby coming to be outside itself. For it is not possible for being to be in non-being, but rather, if anything, for non-being to be in being.\textsuperscript{15} Non-being, then, encounters being as a whole. For it was not possible for being to be severed from itself, and to say that it is everywhere clearly means that it is in being, with the result that it is in itself.

And there is nothing to be astonished at if that which is everywhere is in being and in itself. For that which comes to be everywhere is already in unity. For in positing being in the sensible world, we also posit that that which is everywhere is there. Because we think that the sensible is large, we are puzzled how that nature is extended in something of such a largeness. But that which is said to be large is, in fact, small, whereas that which is believed to be small is large, at least if it extends as a whole to every part of the sensible;\textsuperscript{16} rather, this, proceeding from everywhere with its parts to that, finds everywhere [true] universe larger than itself.

Hence, since nothing more would be gained by its having extension – for in that case, it would come to be outside even the [true] universe – it [the universe] wanted to circle around it [the true universe],\textsuperscript{17} and having been able neither to encompass it nor again to come to be inside it, it was satisfied to have a place and a rank where it would be preserved, neighbouring on that which is present and again, not present.\textsuperscript{18} For that [true] universe is in itself, even if something should want to be present to it. Actually, wherever the body of the universe comes together with it, it finds the [true] universe, so that it no longer has a need to go further, but it turns in the identical place,\textsuperscript{19} since it is this universe, where it is, that enjoys in every part the whole of that [true] universe.

If that universe were in place, then the sensible universe would have had to approach it there and proceed in a straight line, to touch one part with another part of that and to be both far and near. But if there is neither distance nor nearness, that universe must be entirely present, if indeed it is present at all. And it is wholly there for each of those things

\textsuperscript{14} I.e., the intelligible world is present wherever the sensible world is present and the former is really or truly what the latter is. We insert ‘[true]’ before ‘universe’ wherever the distinction is apt to be missed.

\textsuperscript{15} See \textit{Pl.}, \textit{Soph.} 256D.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{ Cf. infra 4-5.}

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{ Cf. 2.2.}

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{ Cf. 6.5.3.12.}

\textsuperscript{19} See \textit{Pl.}, \textit{Tim.} 34A3 4.
for which it is neither from afar nor from nearby. It is there for things able to receive it.

§ 6.4.3. Will we, then, say that the true universe is itself present or that, while it is by itself, the powers that come from it extend to everything, and it can be said to exist everywhere in this way? For this is how they say that souls are like rays, so that while it is settled in itself, the rays that are sent out come to one living being and then to another. In fact, in living beings in which there is that unity, because it does not preserve all the nature that is in that [true universe], here a power is present in anything it is present to. Still, one cannot say [the true universe] is not wholly present, since it is not cut off from that one of its powers, which it bestowed on that living being. But the receiver was able to receive just so much, though it was all present.

But where all the powers are, it is itself clearly present, despite being nonetheless separate. For if it had become the form of this one thing, it would cease being everything and being in itself everywhere, while being the form of something else accidentally. Since it belongs to nothing that wants to belong to it, it approaches, as far as possible, whatever might want it, not coming to belong to that, or indeed to anything else, but because that thing desires it.

There is, then, nothing amazing in its thus being in all things, because it is in none of them in such a way as to belong to them. For this reason, it is perhaps not absurd to claim that, in this way, even soul accompanies body accidentally, that is, if the soul were said to exist on its own, not belonging to matter or body, and the whole body is in a way illuminated wholly by it.

One should also not be amazed if the [true]universe, while not being in place, is present to everything that is in place. The contrary would be amazing, in fact, not just amazing, but impossible, if it also had its own place and were present to something else that was in place, or was present wholly, namely, in the way we say it is present. As things are, the argument asserts that it is necessary for it, since it has occupied no place, to be wholly present to anything it is present to, and to be present

20 See Ar. [?], De mun. 6.397b32 398a6, 398b6 10.
21 See Plutarch, De fac. orb. 943d; Hippolytus, Refutations 5.19.4, both referring to a Gnostic position. In Plutarch, the word for ‘ray’ is ἀκτίς not βολή as here.
22 See Ar., Phys. 3.3.202b8.
23 The text has not been satisfactorily emended: the restriction of the power must lie in the recipient, not in the true universe. Cf. infra 8.37 45. We follow Ficino’s emendation as understood by MacKenna and Igal: ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐθέλη ὡς δύναται.
24 See, e.g., SVF 2.463 (= Galen, In Hippocr. De nat. hom. lib. 1.15.32 Kühn), 465 (= Plutarch, De comm. nat. 1077c), 466 (= Alex. Aphr., De mixt. 219.16), 467 (= Simplicius, In Phys. 530.9).
to all just as it is also wholly present to each. If this is not so, part of it will be here and part elsewhere. The result is that it will be divisible and a body.\(^{25}\)

[But that is impossible.] For how will you actually divide it? Will you divide its life? But if the whole of it is life, part of it will not be life. Or will you divide its intellect, so that part of it is in one thing and another in another? But neither of these parts will be intellect. What about its being? But the part will not be being, if the whole was being.\(^{26}\) What if someone were to say, then, that the body is divided, and it has parts that are bodies?

In fact, it was not a division of body, but of a certain quantity of body, and each body is called a body due to its form. But this form did not have a determinate quantity, since it did not have any quantity.

§6.4.4. How, then, is there being and beings and many intellects and many souls, if Being is everywhere one and not just the same in form,\(^{27}\) and Intellect is one and Soul is one?\(^{28}\) There is the soul of the universe, and there are other souls.\(^{29}\) This seems to contradict what we have said, but even if it has a kind of necessity, it is not persuasive, in that the soul thinks it unconvincing that that which is one can be identical everywhere in this way.

Perhaps it would be better to divide the whole without diminishing that from which the division has come about or else, having come to be from it – indeed, to put it in better terms – thus allow one thing to exist on the basis of it,\(^{30}\) and the rest, coming to be like its parts, the souls, complete all things.

But if that being remains in itself, because it seems paradoxical that that which is a whole is at the same time present everywhere, the identical argument will apply to souls. For they will not be in the whole bodies they are said to be in as wholes: either they will be divided or, while remaining whole, they will just bestow their power to somewhere in the body. And the identical puzzle of the whole being everywhere will arise in the case of the souls and their powers. Furthermore, some part of the body will have soul and some part only a power.

But how are there many souls and many intellects and being and beings? Moreover, in proceeding from the prior entities as numbers,\(^{31}\) and not as magnitudes, they will likewise give rise to a puzzle, namely,
how they fill the universe. In our view, then, nothing in a multiplicity proceeding in this way has been discovered to lead to a solution, since we will agree that Being is many, due to difference, and not to place, for Being is all together, even if it is thus many; ‘being borders on being’ and ‘everything is together’. And Intellect is many due to Difference, not place, and [is many] all together.

And souls, too? Indeed, souls too, since ‘that which is divided when in bodies’ is said to be naturally partless, but since the bodies have magnitude, and the nature of soul is present to them – or rather, bodies come to be present to it – to the extent that they are divided, and this nature is reflected in every part, it was believed to be divisible in this way among bodies.

Since it was not divided along with the parts but is whole everywhere, this makes clear that unity and indivisibility really belong to its nature. The fact, then, that Soul is one does not cancel out the many souls, just as being does not cancel out beings, nor does multiplicity in the intelligible world contradict its unity, nor must we fill bodies with life by means of multiplicity, nor must we believe that the multiplicity of souls arises because of the magnitude of body; rather, souls were both many and one prior to bodies. For the many souls are already in the whole, not potentially, but each one is there actually. For the one, whole Soul does not prevent there being many souls in it, nor do the many prevent the unity. They are distinct without being distinct; they are present to one another without being alienated from themselves. They are not divided by limits, any more than are the many sciences in the soul. And Soul is a unity such that it has in it all souls. It is in this way that this kind of nature is limitless.

§6.4.5. And soul’s largeness should be understood like that, and not in terms of mass. For this is small, proceeding to nothingness, if one subtracts from it. But in the intelligible world, it is not possible to take anything away, nor, if you did take anything away, would it give out. And if it will indeed not give out, why should one fear that it will be absent from anything? For how could it be absent when it does not give out? Instead, it is a nature that eternally wells up, without being in flux. For if it were in flux, it would go as far as it could flow. But it is not in flux, for were it so, there is nowhere for it to flow to, for it has taken hold of the universe; indeed, it is the [true] universe. And, since it is

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32 See Parmenides, fr. 28 B 8.5 DK.  
33 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.  
34 See Pl., Tim. 35A2 3.  
35 Cf. infra 11.10 12; 4.3.2.13 57; 6.5.10.48 52. See Pl., Phil. 13E9ff.  
36 See Pl., Parm. 144B3 4.
greater than the nature of body, it is reasonably believed to give little of itself to the universe, to wit, just as much as this can bear.

One should neither say that soul is less nor, if we do posit it as less in mass, then be mistrustful, on the grounds that the lesser cannot cover something greater. For ‘less’ should not be predicated of it at all, nor, in measuring, should mass be set beside something without mass – this would be as if someone were to say that the craft of medicine is smaller than the doctor’s body. Nor should one believe that the universe is, in this way, larger by measurement of its quantity, since this does not apply to the soul. Rather, that is how the large and the small belong to body. There is evidence of the largeness of the soul in the fact that the identical soul, which was in the lesser mass, extends to the whole body when the mass of a body increases. For it would be ridiculous in many ways if one were also to attribute mass to the soul.

§6.4.6. Why, then, does soul not also enter another body?

In fact, the body must come to the soul, if it can, and the body that has come to it and has received it possesses it.

What, then? Does another body possess the identical soul when it possesses the soul that it possesses? What differentiates [between the souls]?

In fact, it lies in the additions.

Next, how is it that there is the identical soul in the foot and the hand, whereas that soul which is in this part of the universe is not identical to the soul in another part? But if sense-perceptions differ, the affections that go along with these should be said to differ as well. But, then, it is not that which judges that differs but the things judged. The one who judges is the same judge who comes to be in different affections. Yet the judge is not identical to that which undergoes these affections; that is the nature of a body. It is like the case where the identical judge judges both the pleasure in a finger and the pain in the head.

Why, then, is one soul not also aware of the judgement of another?

In fact, because it is a judgement, not an affection.

Next, the identical soul that judges, does not also say ‘I have judged’; it only judged. Not even in us does sight say ‘I have judged’ to hearing, though both have judged; calculative reasoning judges in both cases, and is different from both. Frequently, calculative reasoning also knows the judgement made in one who is different from it and has

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37 Soul has no quantity or mass. Cf. 4.7.5-50; 4.9.1-7. 8.
38 I.e., to the soul through the body, see the immediately following lines, 6 11. Cf. 6.5.12.21. And contrast supra 4.39. 46.
39 Cf. 3.6.1.1; 4.4.22.30; 33. 40 Cf. 4.7.6.9; 15; 5.3.2.8; 11.
comprehension of the state that the other is in. But we have spoken about these matters elsewhere.\(^41\)

§6.4.7. But let us explain again how the identical thing extends over all things. This is the identical question as how each of the many sensibles is not without a share in the identical thing, even though they are situated in many places.\(^42\) For, from what has been said,\(^43\) it is not correct to divide up that thing into the many things; instead, one should refer back the divided many to one. That one has not come to them; rather, they, because they are scattered, make us believe that one thing has indeed been divided among them, as if one were to separate the controlling and cohesive thing into parts equal to what is controlled.

A hand, however, could well control a whole body, for example, a piece of wood many cubits in length, or something else, and, while controlling the thing entirely, it is nonetheless not separated into parts equal to what is in its control. The power may seem to extend as far as what is grasped, but nonetheless the hand is limited by its own quantity, not by that of the body that it lifts and controls. And if you were to add another length to the body that is controlled, and if the hand had the power to carry that, too, that power would control it and would not be separated into the number of parts that the body has. Then, what would be the case, if one supposed the corporeal mass of the hand removed, but left the identical power that was in the hand, and which held the thing beforehand? Would it not, in that case, be the identical indivisible power in the whole thing in the same way as it is in each part?

And what if one were actually to make a small luminous mass, in a way, the centre of a larger transparent spherical body, so that the light from the inside is revealed in all the surrounding parts without any radiance reaching the outer mass from anywhere else? Will we not then say that the inside remains unaffected, but has extended itself to every part of the exterior of the mass while remaining fixed itself, and that light seen in the small mass has taken hold of the exterior? So, since that light does not come from the small corporeal mass – for it is not insofar as it is a body that it possesses the light – but as a body which is luminous because of an incorporeal power,\(^44\) so then, if one were to remove the mass of the body, while keeping the power of the light, would you then still say that the light was somewhere, and not that it was equally throughout the exterior sphere? You would no longer rest in the thought where the light was situated beforehand, and you could not say

\(^{41}\) Cf. 4.9.2 3. \(^{42}\) See Pl., Parm. 131 A C. \(^{43}\) Cf. supra 2.1 25. \(^{44}\) Cf. 4.5.7.13 17.
anymore where it came from and where it is going, but, having been puzzled, you would then be amazed, when, attending simultaneously to here and there in the spherical body, you would yourself see the light in both places.

This is also the case with the sun, since you are able to say where the light illuminating all the air comes from by looking towards the sun’s body. Nonetheless, you see the identical light everywhere, and it is not divided. In addition, the segments of the sun in eclipse make this clear, since they neither allow the light to pass over to the other side to that from which the light has come nor do they divide it. So, if the sun were, moreover, only a power separated from body and providing light, light would still not originate from the sun, and you would not be able to say where it does come from. Instead, there would be light everywhere, one and identical, without having originated there or indeed having any origin anywhere.

§6.4.8. Given, then, that light belongs to body, you are able to say where it came from by saying which body it came from. But if there is something immaterial and in need of no body, since it is naturally prior to every body and set in itself, or rather not needing a seat of this sort, but actually having a nature such that it has neither an origin which it started from nor a place from which it came nor a body to which it belongs, how will you say some of it is here, and some of it there? For if you could say this, you could say both where it started and to what it belonged.

So, it remains to explain how, if something participates in [the true universe], it participates in the power of the whole of it, since it is neither affected in any other way, nor has it been divided. For being affected belongs to something with a body, even if it has a body accidentally, and in that way it could be said to be subject to affection and divisible, since this is a kind of affection or form of body. That which does not belong to body but which a body wants to belong to, necessarily cannot undergo any other affection of the body and cannot possibly be divided. For this [division] primarily belongs to body, namely, its primary affection, and a property of a body as such. If, then, the divisible is indeed such insofar as it is a body, then the indivisible is such insofar as it is not body. For how will you divide something which does not have magnitude? If, then, something which has magnitude in any way participates in that which does not have magnitude, it would not

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45 See Pl., Parm. 131B3 C8. 46 Cf. 4.5.7.41. 47 Cf. 4.7.82.6 43. 48 Cf. 2.4.9-3 12.
participate in it by that being divided. Otherwise, it will again have magnitude.

Whenever then you say that [the true universe] is in many things, you are not saying that it has become many. Instead, you are attributing the affection belonging to the many things to that one, because you see it simultaneously in many things. But the words ‘in [the many]’ should not be taken to indicate that it has come to belong either to each of the many things or to all of them, but that it belongs to itself and it exists itself and that it does not leave itself behind.

Nor, again, is it of the same size as the sensible universe, nor as some part of the universe. For it does not have a quantity at all. How then could it have a size? For size belongs to body, whereas one should in no way attribute size to anything which is not body but is of a different nature; not even such and such a quality belongs to it. So, neither should a term such as ‘where’ be used of it. So, neither, should ‘here’ and ‘there’ be used of it, for in that case it would be in many ‘wheres’.

So, if the division is by places, whenever part of it is here, and part of it is there, how could you divide something with no here in it at all? It must, therefore, be undivided and with itself, even if the many should happen to desire it. If, then, the many do desire it, it is clear that they desire it as a whole, so that, if they are able to participate in it, they would participate in the whole of it, insofar as they can. The things that participate in it, then, must possess a part of it such that they participate in something not proper to them. For in this way, it would remain itself whole in itself, and whole in the things in which it is seen. For if it is not whole, it is not itself, nor will the participation be in the thing desired but in something else, which was not what the desire was for.

§6.4.9. For indeed if the part that has come to be in each thing were a whole, and each one was like the primary thing, each one always being cut off, then, the primary things would be many, and each of these would be primary.

Next, what would hold apart these many primary things, so that they were not all together one? It certainly couldn’t be their bodies, since it would not be possible for them to be forms of bodies, if indeed these, too, are to be the same as the primary thing from which they derive.

If the parts said to be in the many things are its powers, then in the first place, each is no longer a whole.

49 Cf. supra 2.48, 5.10, infra 11.3 9.
50 Reading οὑ μετάλαβε with Igal.
51 I.e., the intelligible Being participated in.
52 See Pl., Parm. 142D E.
Next, how did they come to the many, having been cut off and having left behind the primary thing? For if they actually did leave it behind, they clearly left it behind by going somewhere.

Next, are the powers that have come to be in the sensible world still in the [intelligible world] or not? If they are not, it is absurd for that to be diminished and to have become powerless by being deprived of the powers that it previously had. And how would it be possible for the powers to be separate or to be cut off from their being? But if the powers are both in it and elsewhere, too, either the wholes or parts of them will be in the sensible world. If parts of them are in the sensible world, the rest of the parts will be in the intelligible world. If the wholes are in the sensible world, either what is both in the intelligible world and in the sensible world is not divided, and again the identical thing will be everywhere, without being divided, or the powers will each be one whole that has become many, and they will be the same as each other, so that the power will be with each substance. Or else there will only be one power that goes with substance, and the others will be powers only.

But just as it is not possible to have substance without power, so it is not possible to have power without substance, for power in the intelligible world is real existence and Substance, or greater than Substance.53

But if the powers that come from the intelligible world are different, since they are diminished and faint, like the light that is faint when it comes from a brighter light, then indeed so, too, are the substances that go along with these powers, in order that a power does not come to be without substance.

First, in the case of such powers, it is necessary – since they come to be entirely of the same form as each other – either to agree that they are the identical power everywhere54 or else, if they are not identical everywhere, then they are each the identical whole power at the same time in each place, not divided, as if it were in one identical body.55 But if this is the case, why is it not in the whole universe? But if it is divided, each power is divided indefinitely and would no longer be a whole in itself, and it will be powerlessness, because of the division.

Next, if one power is here and another there, that will not allow self-awareness.56

Next, like the image of something, like a weaker light, too, it exists no longer when it has been cut off from its source; universally, it is not possible either to make something exist that has its existence from another and is an image of that, once it is cut off. Nor could these

53 See Pl., Rep. 509B5 9. 54 Cf. 4.9.4 5. 55 Cf. supra 1.25 27; 4.3.8.47 49.
56 Cf. 1.1.9.20 22; 5.4.2.15 20; 5.6.5.1 8; 6.7.16.19 22, 41.26 27.
powers, coming from there, exist, once they are cut off from that. But if this is so, then that from which they originate will be there at the same time [as they are], and the result would be that again the identical whole will be everywhere undivided at the same time.

§6.4.10. But if someone should say that it is not necessary for a reflection to be joined to its archetype, since it is possible for there to be an image when the archetype from which the image is derived is not there, just as something heated by fire can be hot when the fire is removed; first, in the case of the archetype and image, if one is speaking about the image made by the painter, we will say that it was not the archetype that produced the image, but the painter, given that even if someone paints himself, it is not an image of him. For what does the painting is not the body of the painter, nor the imitated form. It is not the painter but the arrangement of these colours thus and so that should be said to produce this kind of image.

Nor is this the making of the image or reflection in the strict sense, such as occurs in water, mirrors, or in shadows.57 For in these cases, images come to exist strictly as derived from that which was prior to them, and they come to be from it, and it is not possible for them, once they have come to be, to be when they are cut off from that.58 But [our opponents] will acknowledge that this is the manner in which the weaker powers come from the prior powers.

In the case of the fire, the heat should not be said to be an image of the fire, unless one were also to say that the fire is in the heat. But if one does not put the fire in the heat, one will make heat apart from fire.

Next, even if not immediately, the heated thing will stop being heated, and the body will cool down, once the fire is removed. But if these people59 were to extinguish these powers, in the first place they will assert that only one thing is indestructible, and they will be making souls and Intellect destructible.

Next, they will produce things in flux from Substance that is not in flux. And indeed if the sun were to remain, being situated somewhere, it would provide the identical light to the identical places. But if someone were to say that it is not identical, by this he would confirm that the body of the sun is in flux. But that the things that come from that [the One] are not destructible; rather, that the souls and every intellect are immortal, has been shown elsewhere using many arguments.60

57 See Pl., Soph. 239D6 7; Rep. 510E2 3.
59 The Gnostics. Cf. 2.9.6.57 58. 60 Cf. 4.7; 5.1.6.27 39; 6.9.9.3 7.

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§6.4.11. But why, if [the true universe] is indeed a whole everywhere, does not everything participate in it as a whole? And in what way is there a primary thing in the intelligible world and then a secondary thing and all the others that come after that?

In fact, one should believe that that which is present is present because of the fitness of the recipient, and Being is everywhere in Being, without leaving itself behind; what can be present to it, is present. It is present as far as it can be, but not in place, in the way the transparent is present to light, whereas the participation for turbid stuff is otherwise.

Moreover, the primary, secondary, and tertiary things are determined by rank, power, and differentiae, not by their places, for nothing prevents different things from being all together, such as soul and intellect and all sciences, both the major and the derived ones. For the eye sees the colour, and the nose smells the scent, and the other senses sense their different objects that all come from the identical thing, although they are all together, and not separate from each other.

Does this, then, make the intelligible world variegated and multiple?

In fact, the variegated is simple, too, and the many are one, for an expressed principle is one and many, and all being is one. For that which is different is in it itself, and Difference belongs to it, since it certainly could not belong to non-being. And being belongs to unity, which is not separated from being, and wherever being may be, its unity is present to it, and the One-Being is again in itself, for it is possible to be present while being separate.

But the way that sensibles are present to intelligibles – those that are present, and those they are present to – is different from the way that intelligibles are present to themselves. And the way that body is present to soul is different from the way that science is present to the soul and science is present to science, when each is in the identical intellect. And body is present to body in a way different from these.

§6.4.12. Just as an ear, when it is present, may often take in, that is, perceive the word in a voice, when the voice is in the air, and if you put

61 Cf. supra 8.41.
62 I.e., everything in the intelligible world remains there despite being received by their participants.
63 Cf. 6.7.42. See Pl. [?], 2nd Ep. 312E. 64 Cf. 5.1.8.26; 5 3.15.10, 22; 6.2.15.14 15.
65 Cf. 6.7.14.
66 Cf. supra. 4.23 26, 39 46; 6.2.8. See Pl., Soph. 255C. D. Here, Difference (= relative ‘non being’) refers to one of the μέγιστα γένη (‘greatest genera’), which is ‘part’ of real Being; non being, then, must refer to what has no real Being or even that which has no being altogether, namely, τὸ μηδέσις δεῦ.
67 Cf. 6.9.1.1 17. See Pl., Parm. 144E1 2. 68 Cf. 3.8.9.22 29.
another ear in between in the gap, then word and voice reach this one, too – or better: the ear comes to the word, and just as many eyes see in relation to the identical thing, and all are filled with the vision, although the thing seen is separated from them just because the one is an eye, the other an ear, so, too, that which is able to have soul will have it – and indeed other things, too, from the identical source.\(^69\)

The voice is everywhere in the air, not as one voice divided, but as a one which is everywhere whole. And in the case of sight, if the air has the shape it has by being affected, then it has it not as divided. Wherever sight is placed, there it has the shape. Not all opinion agrees with this,\(^70\) but it was said because the participation comes from the identical one.

In the case of the voice it is clearer, in that the whole form is in all the air. For everyone would not hear the identical thing were not the whole spoken word everywhere, and did not each hearing take in the whole thing in the same way. If in this case, the whole voice is not spread through all the air, such that this part of it is conjoined with part [of the air], and this part divided together with that, why be incredulous if the one soul is not spread out, having been divided, but is present wholly everywhere it is present, and is everywhere the soul of the universe, without having been divided.

And when the soul has come to be in bodies, in the way it must, it is analogous to the voice actually being sounded in the air, but before it is in the bodies, then it is analogous to the person sounding, and to the person about to sound. Notwithstanding, when it has come to be in body, it still does not distance itself from being the soul that has made the sound, the one who both has a voice and gives voice. What happens with the voice, then, is not identical with those things we used it to understand, but it has a sameness in some respect.

In the case of the soul, however, inasmuch as it belongs to the other nature, one has to grasp that it is not the case that one part of it is in the body and the other part is in itself, but rather that the whole is at once in itself and produces appearances in many things. And, again, another body can take hold of a soul, taking it from the invisible, which is also in the other things. For the soul was not prepared in this way, such that only a part of it, in such and such a state, came to this body. Rather, what is said to come into the sensible world\(^71\) is entire in itself, and is in itself, even if it seems to come into the sensible world.\(^72\)

But how could it come? If, then, it does not come, it is seen now because it is present, and it is present not by waiting for the body that will participate in it, so clearly it is present to this body, too, by being in

\(^69\) Cf. 4.5.3.33 36. \(^70\) Cf. 4.5.3.26 27. \(^71\) See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 248E6. \(^72\) And thereby to have left entirely the intelligible world.
itself. But if it is present in this, by being in itself, then this body came to it. If this body, being outside what is in this way, came towards what is in this way, that is, came to be in the living cosmos, the living cosmos is in itself, actually, whole and not divided into its mass – for it is not a mass – and what has arrived does not come to the mass. Therefore, it participates in it and not in a part and if something else should come to be in this cosmos, it will participate in the whole. Therefore, in the same way it will be in each and every thing, if that whole cosmos is said to be in these things in the sensible world. Therefore, it is also everywhere identical, numerically one, not divided off, but whole.

§6.4.13. Where, then, does soul’s extension over the whole heaven and the living beings come from?

In fact, it was not extended. For sense-perception, which we rely on for our incredulity about this doctrine, says that it is thus and so, and the account that it is thus and so does not say that it became thus and so by being extended. Rather, the whole extended thing participates in it, which is itself without dimension.

If, then, one thing participates in another, it evidently will not participate in itself – otherwise, it will not be something participating, but will be the thing itself. A body, then, participating in something, must not participate in a body. For that it has already. Body certainly does not participate in body, and so neither does magnitude participate in magnitude; for it has that already. For even if it acquires an addition, [then] the magnitude it was before will not participate in magnitude. Two cubits do not become three, but the substrate with one quantity acquires another; otherwise, the two themselves will be three. If, then, the divided thing or the thing extended to such and such a quantity is going to participate in another genus, or in something else generally, then that in which it participates may be neither divided nor extended nor, generally, a quantity.

Anything, therefore, that is to be present to body anywhere must be present by being without parts, yet not partless in the sense of being small. For then it would be nonetheless divisible, nor would it be adapted to the body, nor will it keep pace with something growing. Nor [is it to be partless] as a point is, for the mass is not one point, but an unlimited number are in it. So that this, too, will be an unlimited number of points, if indeed it is to be a point, and not continuous. So [that] there is no way they can fit together. If, then, every mass has it as a whole, it will have it as a whole in every part of itself.

73 I.e., the intelligible world. Cf. 2.5; 3.38 39; 3.66.15 17; 3.8.9.33 35.
§6.4.14. But: if the identical soul is everywhere, how is it the unique soul of each person? And how is one good and another evil?\(^74\)

In fact, soul suffices for each thing, and Intellect contains all souls and all intellects. For Intellect is both one and unlimited, and ‘all together’\(^75\) – and it contains each thing distinguished and yet again not distinguished separately. For how could it be called ‘unlimited’, except because it possesses ‘all together’, that is all life, all soul, and all intellect? Each of them is not set apart by limits. That is why they are one as well. For certainly it must not have one life, but be unlimited, but also one, and one [life] in the sense not that all lives are brought together into one, but because they start from one and remain where they started. Or better, they did not start, but they are in this state always. For there is nothing coming to be in the intelligible world; so, neither is there anything being divided, although it appears to be divided to the one who grasps it. What is in the intelligible world is what is from ancient times and from the beginning, whereas that which comes to be approaches and appears to be connected to and dependent on that.\(^76\)

And we – who are we?\(^77\) Are we what approaches and comes to be in time?

In fact, before that coming to be came to be, we were in the intelligible world, since we were both other human beings, and some indeed gods, pure souls, and [each an] intellect united with the whole of Substance, parts of the intelligible neither bounded off nor cut off, but by belonging to the whole. For even now we are not cut off;\(^78\) actually, the Human Being has approached that human being, despite his wishing to be another [human being]. And having found us – for we are not outside the [true] cosmos – he has wrapped himself around us and added himself to that human being, who was each of us then. It is as though, in the case of one voice and one utterance, another human being would bring his ear from elsewhere and hear the voice, [although it is one voice, even one word], and take it in;\(^79\) actual hearing would come about by having an activity relating itself to something present. And we have become both, not [just] one of the two, which we were before, and the other at some time, which we posited in addition later, when that former human being was inactive and not present in another way.\(^80\)

\(^{74}\) Cf. infra 16. \(^{75}\) See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.

\(^{76}\) See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b14.

\(^{77}\) Cf. 1.1.7.16 18; 2.1.5.20 21; 3.4.2.10 11; 4.4.18.11 12.

\(^{78}\) Cf. 2.9.2.5 3; 4.3.24 27; 4.3.12.1 3; 4.8.8.1 3; 5.1.10.13 19; 6.7.5.26.

\(^{79}\) Cf. 6.4.12.1 29. \(^{80}\) Cf. 4.4.2.7, 3.6 10.
§6.4.15. But how did the thing added get added?

In fact, since its aptitude was present in it, it began to relate to the thing for which it had an aptitude. It was something coming to be in such a way as to receive soul. But it came to be in such a way as not to receive all soul, although all soul was present, even if not to it; for example, other animals and the plants had as much soul as they were able to receive, just as when a voice communicates a word. Some, then, take in the word, too, along with the sound of the voice, and others merely the voice and its physical impact.

When a living being actually comes to be which possesses soul present in it from Being, and due to which it is actually attached to all being, and when a body is present, which, far from being empty, is fitted with soul, and which was not in the soulless beforehand, and even more so when something like proximity comes about in the aptitude, and when it has come to be not only a body, but a living body, and benefiting by a sort of neighbourhood from some trace of soul, not of a part of soul, but as though some warmth or illumination reaches it, then the genesis of appetites, pleasures, and pains grew out of this. The body of the living being that came to be was not alien to the soul.

The soul indeed originating from the divine, is quiet, in accordance with its character when standing in itself, whereas the body, thrown into turmoil by weakness, being itself in flux, and shaken by the blows from outside, first called to what is common to the living being, and so passes on its trouble to the whole. Just as in an assembly when the elders of the people occupy their seats in quiet deliberation, but the disorderly mob, demanding food and complaining of the other things it has actually suffered, throws the whole assembly into unseemly tumult, and, then, whenever word reaches them from a wise man, such people are quiet, the multitude settles into a measured order, and the worse sort does not gain the upper hand. If not, the worse sort gains power, while the better sort remains quiet, because the tumultuous mob could not take in the reasoning from above; and this is the vice of city and assembly.

It is also the vice of a human being, since he has in him a mob of pleasures, appetites, and fears which take over, when a human being gives himself over to such a mob. But whoever will enslave such a rabble and run up to that human being, which he once was, and live in accordance with him, he is also that human being, giving to the body such things as he may give, as though he were giving to someone other than himself. And there would be yet another human being who

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81 Cf. 2.3.9.21 23; 4.4.18.1 4, 29.50 55. 82 See Pl., Tim. 42E4 5.
83 See Pl., Tim. 46B6 C5. 84 See Homer, Il. 3.149.
85 Cf. 4.4.17.24 36. See Pl., Lg. 3.689B1 C2. 86 See Pl., Phdr. 256B2.
lives sometimes this way, and sometimes another, being mixed of a good self and of a different self that is evil.\[^{87}\]

§6.4.16. But if that nature [soul] is not such as to turn evil,\[^{88}\] and what we have just described is the manner of the soul going to the body to remain there, what then about the periodical descent and ascent of the soul – and the judgements, and the insertions into the bodies of other animals?\[^{89}\] We have received these doctrines from those who in ancient times philosophized best about the soul. And we should try to bring the present account into agreement with them, or at least not into disagreement with them.

So, since participation in that nature does not consist in that nature coming to things here, and so being distanced from itself, rather in the [nature] here coming to be in that,\[^{90}\] and participating in it, it is clear that talk of ‘coming’ which they use\[^{91}\] should be applied to the nature of body coming to the intelligible world, and participating in life and soul; generally, this ‘coming’ is not local, but whatever manner of association that it is. The result is that ‘descending’ is coming into a body, as we say the soul comes to be in a body, and gives the body something of itself, without coming to belong to the body. And the soul’s ‘departing’ is the body no longer having a share in soul. In the parts of this universe there is an order in such associating. The soul, being at the lowest level of the intelligible realm,\[^{92}\] gives of itself repeatedly, inasmuch as it is close in power, and involved in shorter distances due to the law of such a nature.

Such association between soul and body is, however, an evil, and release from it a good.\[^{93}\] Why? Even if the soul does not belong to the body, still, soul, on being said to be the body’s, in some way comes to be a particular soul, out of the [true] universe. For its activity relates no longer to the whole, although soul is of the whole, just as if someone possessing scientific understanding were to actively consider a single theorem of the whole science. The good for him in possession of the scientific understanding himself does not relate just to some bit of the science but rather the whole which he possesses.

So, Soul, belonging to the whole intelligible cosmos, and hiding the part in the whole, in a way, leaped out of the whole into a part, into which it activates itself, although it is a part, like fire which is able to burn everything but is forced to burn something little, despite the fact that it has the whole power. For individual soul, despite being entirely

\[^{87}\] Cf. 1.2.5.21 31; 1.4.16.1 10; 1.6.5.26 32. \[^{88}\] See supra 14.2.

\[^{89}\] See Pl., Phdr. 248C 249B; Tim. 42B. \[^{90}\] Cf. supra 4.2; 3.3-9.31 34.


\[^{93}\] Cf. 4 8.7.2. See Pl., Phd. 95D.

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separate, is not individual, but when it is distinguished not by place, but
by activity, it becomes individual then, it is a portion, and not the
whole soul, although in another way it is the whole soul. But when it
is not looking after anything in particular, then it is in all respects whole,
since it is a part then, in a way, potentially.

Going to Hades, if that is to be taken as the invisible is a description of the soul’s separation. But if to a worse place, no wonder in that. For even as it is, the soul is said to be also where and in which place our body is. But even if the body is no more?

In fact, if the shade were not split off, then why should the thing it is the shade of not be there? But if philosophy were to free it completely, even then the shade would go to the worse place alone, while the soul itself is purely in the place of intelligibles, having lost nothing of itself.

The shade, then, that comes about from this kind of thing [soul in the intelligible] is of this sort. But whenever the soul in a way shines out at itself, it is sent out by its inclination towards the other side and concentrated towards the whole, and it is not [soul] in actuality, nor is it destroyed.

But enough of these matters. Let us go back and take up the original argument again.

94 The word is μοῖρα, also ‘fate’.
95 Ἰδῆς, οἰδεῖ (‘Hades’, ‘invisible’), a traditional play on words. See Pl., Pbd. 81C.11; Crat. 403A5 6.
96 Cf. 1.6.6.9 10. See Pl., Pbd. 64C5 7.
97 Cf. 4.3.27-7, 11; 4.3.32.24 4.4.1.4 a single account broken by Porphyry’s division at the point where Plotinus moves from the shade below to the soul above. See Homer, Od. 11.601 603.
98 The word is εἴδωλον, the bodily image or reflection of the true person or soul.
99 See Pl., Pbd. 82E. 83A. 100 I.e., towards the intelligible.
101 I.e., it is no longer an actualized embodied soul, but lives a pure intellectual life.
6.5 (23)
That Being, One and Identical, is Simultaneously Everywhere Whole 2

INTRODUCTION

6.5 §§1–7 offer the third explanation:

§1. We all have the notion of a god which is omnipresent, and the same in each being; the Good, and Being belong to each being as such.

§2. The intelligible has to be treated using its proper principles, and leaving aside body.

§3. True unity remains in itself; other things participate in it insofar as they are able.

§4. It comes to the same thing to believe in god and to believe there is one being which is identical everywhere: everywhere that there is Soul, there is also the One and Intellect.

§5. Warnings about the image of the circle and its radii.

§6. The intelligible is one, and many and unlimited. Things press on Intellect, rather than the latter entering things.

§7. We do not possess intelligibles; we ascend towards them and become them.

§§8–10: A fourth explanation.

§8. In the participation of matter in forms, forms are not locally separate from the matter. Matter presses on the form, and takes on what it is able to.

§9. The sensible world has a single cause, one life, and a single soul.

§10. By staying within itself true Unity is able to be present to other things which depend on it.

§§11–12: A fifth explanation.
§11. The intelligible is unlimited, without magnitude, eternal, and in possession of all power.

§12. On account of its unlimited and immaterial power the intelligible is present; and one can find it within ourselves by removing the non-being added to us.
§6.5.1. That that which is one and identical in number is everywhere, and simultaneously whole, is a common conception, they say,\(^1\) whenever all human beings are naturally moved to say that the god in each of us is one and identical. And if one does not demand of them how this happens, and is unwilling to examine rationally their belief, they would posit this, realizing it in their thought, and they would rest there, supported by that which is one and identical, and they would not want to be cut off from this unity.

And it is the most secure principle of all,\(^2\) which our souls proclaim, in a way, without it being summarized from particulars. Instead, it emerges before all particulars, and before the soul posits and declares that all things desire the Good.\(^3\) And it is in this way that this principle would be true, if all things were to hasten towards unity, and were one, and if their desire were for this.

For this unity, proceeding downward to the other side,\(^4\) as far as it is possible for it to proceed, would appear and somehow even be many things; the ancient nature\(^5\) and the desire for the Good, which is the desire for itself really leads to unity, and all nature hastens towards this, towards itself.\(^6\) For this is the Good, for this one nature, belonging to itself and being itself, and that is what it is to be one nature.

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\(^2\) See Ar., *Meta.* 4.3.1005b11-12, 18 where ‘the most secure principle’ is the law of non contradiction. Here Plotinus claims that the most secure principle is that all things desire the Good, which is in fact the One.

\(^3\) Cf. 6.2.11.20-29, 17.26-30. \(^4\) I.e., to the sensible world.

\(^5\) I.e., the soul prior to its descent into a body. Cf. 6.5.1.16; 6.9.8.14-15. See Pl., *Rep.* 611D2; *Symp.* 192E9; *Tim.* 90D5.

\(^6\) See Ar., *EN* 10.7.1178a5-6.
In this way, the Good is correctly said to belong to all, and for this reason, one ought not look for it outside. For where would it have fallen outside being? And how could one find it in not-being? And insofar as the Good is being and within being, in being in itself, it would be in each being. We have not, therefore, stood apart from being, we are in it; nor did the Good stand apart from us. All beings, therefore, are one.

§6.5.2. When reason tried to examine what has been just said, not being itself one, but something divided, and because it relies on the nature of bodies for the investigation, and, taking its principles from there, it divided substantiality because it thinks it has a corporeal nature. It mistrusted the unity of substantiality, inasmuch as it did not start the investigation from the proper principles.

We, by contrast, should take for a trustworthy account the proper principles on behalf of that which is one and completely being, that is, the intelligible principles of intelligibles or of true Substance. There is, on the one hand, that which is borne about, undergoing all kinds of changes, and always divided throughout all place – and indeed this one would rightly be called ‘becoming’ and not Substance – whereas, on the other hand, there is that which is always disposed in the same way, neither coming to be nor perishing, having no position, place or seat, neither leaving nor entering anything, but persisting in itself.

Regarding the former, if one were to give an account starting from that nature and from the things plausibly thought of it, then one would deduce plausible conclusions in a plausible manner from things that are plausible. When, however, someone gives accounts of the intelligibles, by taking the nature of the substantiality, which is his concern, he would rightly take its principles for the account, without stepping outside to another nature, as though he had forgotten, but he would instead produce a conception of that nature itself by its own nature, since the ‘what it is’ is a principle everywhere, and it is said that even many accidents are known by means of things well defined. But when dealing with things where everything belongs to the ‘what it is’, one should hold on to this principle all the more, and look to it, and explain everything by reference to it.
§6.5.3. If this is indeed true Being and it is in the same state and does not step outside itself, and if there is said to be no becoming for it, not even in place, then it is necessary for it, being in this state, to be always with itself, and not to depart from itself; nor for one part of it to be thus, and another thus, nor may anything proceed from it. That would be to be in one thing and then another, and generally to be in something, and so be neither in itself nor unaffected. For it would be subject to affection, were it in another. If it is unaffected, then it is not in another thing. If, then, it is not distant from itself, nor divisible, nor undergoing any motion among the many [sensibles], it would be one whole together with itself, and would possess being everywhere identical with itself in the many sensibles. But that would be to be of itself, and again not of itself. So, the option left is to say that it is in nothing, and that other things, namely, those that are such as can be present to it, participate in it, to the extent that they can be present to it.

So, it is necessary either to eliminate such hypotheses and principles and say that there is no such nature, or, if this is impossible, and there is of necessity such a nature or such Substance, then one must accept our initial claim: that there is a whole, one in number and self-identical, undivided, and that it maintains no distance from the other things beside it, not needing to pour forth, nor through some portions coming from it, nor, while itself persisting as a whole in itself, does something else, having come to be from it and having left it, come to the many [sensibles] in many ways. In this way, it would be in one place when that which comes from it is in another place, and it would have a place, in being distanced from those things coming from it.

And then again with the [sensibles], one may ask if each is a whole or a part; and if each of them is a part, it will not preserve the nature of the whole, as has actually already been said. But if each [sensible] is a whole, we will divide [the form] into as many parts as there are things it is in, or we will agree that the identical whole can be everywhere.

This argument derives from the thing itself, that is, from its substantiality, without introducing anything extraneous from the other nature.

§6.5.4. Now consider, if you will, this argument, too. We deny that god is in one place but not in another. This is admitted by all those who have a conception of gods, not just of this god, but even about all gods, that they are present everywhere; and the argument asserts that we should

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15 Cf. 6.4.2.38.  16 See Ar., Meta. 13.9.1086a15.  17 Cf. 6.4.1 3.  18 See Pl., Parm. 131A.  19 Cf. 6.4-3.31 35, 8.43, 9.16 23.  20 I.e., sensible nature.
posit this. If, then, god is everywhere, then he cannot be divided, for
then he himself would not be everywhere: one part would be here,
another part there, and he would not be one himself, just as if a
magnitude were cut into many pieces, and is thereby destroyed; all
the pieces are no longer the whole. In addition to these points, he will
also be a body. But if these things are indeed impossible, then the
point of disbelief arises again. For all human nature, in thinking that
there is a god, by the same token thinks that the identical thing is
everywhere simultaneously a whole.

Again, if we say that nature is unlimited -- for it is certainly not
limited -- what other reason for this can there be except that it is lacking
in nothing? And if it is lacking in nothing, that is because it is present to
each thing. For if it was incapable of being present, then it will have
a lack, and there will be somewhere it will not be. For even if we were
speaking about something after the One itself, then the thing coming
after the One will be together with the One, and around it, directed
towards it, and like an offspring in contact with it, in such a way that
anything that participates in what comes after the One, also participates
in the One. Since there are many things in the intelligible world --
primary, secondary, and tertiary, touching a single centre, like that
of a single sphere, not divided by distances, but all together with
themselves -- wherever the tertiary things are, both the secondary and
the primary things are present.

§6.5.5. For the sake of clarity, our account has often used the example
of many lines drawn from one centre in order to illustrate the concept of
a generated plurality. But one should preserve the characteristic of the
things said to have come to be many from 'being all together', just as in
the circle, too, it is not possible to grasp the lines as being separated off.
For it is one plane.

But where there is no interval in one plane, and instead powers and
substances without intervals, then it is appropriate to say that, due to
their centres, they are all unified together in one centre, as though their
limits produced lines which, when they are at the centre, are actually
then all one.

21 Cf. 6.4.3.30 31, 5.18, 8.18 23, 30 31.
22 The One and Intellect (cf. infra l. 17) are both called gods. For the One, cf. 1.1.8.9;
5.1.6.9; 6.9.5.3; for Intellect, cf. 1.8.7.15; 4.3.11.11; 5.8.3.23 24.
23 I.e., Intellect.
24 Cf. 6.4.11.9. See Pl. [?], 2nd Ep. 312E.
25 Cf. 3.8.8.36 38; 4.3.17.12 16; 5.1.11.10 13; 6.8.18.1 22, etc.
26 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.
27 Thus it is clear that the disc is meant, not the circumference, as at 6.8.18.1 22.
Again, if you add the lines which touch the centres themselves, which each of them left, then they are nonetheless each a centre, which is not cut off from the one first centre; each is then together with that centre, and there are as many centres as there are lines for which they provide the limits, and the centres appear to be as many as the lines they touch, and yet they are all together one.

If, then, we liken all the intelligibles to the many centres, leading back to the one centre where they are unified, they appear many through the lines, not because the lines have produced them, but because they reveal them. In the present case, the lines serve our need by providing us with an analogue for those things which by contact with the intelligible nature appear to be many and to be present in many places.

§6.5.6. For although intelligibles are many, they are one, and although they are one, they are many through their unlimited nature, and many in one and one over many, and all together. They are active in respect of the whole with the whole, and are active towards the part also with the whole. The part receives into itself the result of the first act as of a part, and the whole follows. It is as if Human Being, going to a human being, becomes a human being, while still being Human Being. The human being, then, when embodied in matter, and coming from the one ideal Human Being, produces many human beings themselves. The identical thing is one in many in such a way that one thing itself is in a way stamped on many things. Human Being itself, and each thing itself, and the whole universe are not in many things in this way; rather, the many things are in it, or rather round about it. For paleness is everywhere in a different way from the way each thing’s soul is identical in every part of the body. For this is how being is everywhere.

§6.5.7. Both what belongs to us and we ourselves are drawn back to Being, and we ascend to that thing [the One] and the first thing derived from it [Intellect]; and we think them, not simply having images or impressions of them. And if that is so, then we think them by being them. If, then, we have a share in true scientific understanding, we are

28 I.e., radii. 29 Cf. 6.8.18.16 18.
30 On Intellect as one many cf. 4.8.3.10; 5.1.8.26; 5.3.15.11, 22; 6.2.2.2, 10.11, 15.14, 21.7.46 47, 22.10; 6.5.6.1 2; 6.6.8.22; 6.6.13.52 53; 6.7.8.17 18, 14.11 12, 39.11 14. See Pl., Parm. 131B9.
31 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.
32 See Pl., Pbd. 75D2; Alcinous, Didask. 167.1 8.
33 I.e., any Form. The word is ἀυτοεικάστον.
34 Cf. 6.4.4.30. 35 Cf. supra 4.17 20; 6.4.2.35 39. 36 Cf. 6.4.2.1, 17 28.
37 Cf. 5.5.1.55 58, 2.8 10. Ar., DA 3.4.430a 2, 3, 19; 6.431a1 2; 7.431b16 17.
those things, without separating them off in ourselves, since, on the contrary, we are in them. Since not only we but others are them too, we are all them. Therefore, we are them by being together with all things. We are, therefore, all and one.

If, then, we look outside the things we are fastened to, we do not know we are one, just many faces on the outside, but one crown of the head, on the inside. But if someone could turn either on their own or because they have the good fortune to be dragged by Athene, then he will see god, himself, and the [true] universe. At first, he will not see himself as the [true] universe; but, then, having nowhere to stand and draw a boundary of self-limitation, and having let go of segregating himself from all Being, he will come to the whole [true] universe, without issuing forth, but remaining there where the [true] universe is situated.

§ 6.5.8. I myself think that if one investigates the participation of matter in Forms, then one will arrive at belief in what has been said, and not disbelieve it as being impossible, and not be puzzled. It is reasonable and necessary, I think, that since it is not the case that the Forms are located separate and matter is located far apart from them, the illumination by the Forms should not come to matter from ‘somewhere up above’. I am afraid this is an empty saying. For what do ‘far’ and ‘separate’ mean here? And [if that were so] what is said of participation would not be difficult to understand or the most puzzling thing; instead, it would be nearest to hand, well known from examples. Even if we do speak of illumination sometimes, we do not mean it in the same way as we do in cases of illumination of sensibles by a sensible. Since what is in matter are images, and the Forms have the status of archetypes, we mean it in such a way that the illumination keeps separate the thing illuminated.

Now we should try to put it more exactly, and not to posit that the Form is separated in place, and that we then see the Idea in matter, as though it were [reflected] in water. Rather, in touching, and again in not touching the Idea from all sides in its entirety, matter gets hold of as much from the Form as it is able to by getting close to it, with nothing in between them. This is not because the Idea penetrates all the matter and spreads over it; the Idea remains in itself.

38 Cf. 3.4.3.22; 4.7.10.34 36.
39 As Achilles is dragged in II. 1.194 200. Cf. infra 12.29 31.
40 Cf. 3.4.3.22; 4.4.2; 4.7.10.34 36.
41 The word is περιγράφειν, literally ‘circumscribe’.
42 Cf. 5.8.11.10 12. 43 See Pl., Parm. 130B2. 44 See Pl., Soph. 246B7.
45 See Pl., Tim. 50C6, 51A7 8. 46 See Ar., Cat. 2a36.
If, for example, the Idea of Fire is not in matter – let us assume in this argument that matter which underlies the elements\(^{47}\) – then, since Fire itself actually does not come to be in the matter, it will provide the perceptible form\(^{48}\) of fire throughout the fiery matter.\(^{49}\) Let it be assumed that the fire which has primarily come to be enmattered is a great mass; for the identical argument will also fit the other so-called elements.\(^{50}\) If, then, that one fire, insofar as it is an Idea, is seen in all [fiery things] providing an image of itself, it would not do this in the manner of something separate in place, as does that seen illumination. For then, the entirety of fire would already be in the realm of sense-perception, if all of it were [merely] many [fires],\(^{51}\) by it itself generating many places from itself, while its Idea remains outside place,\(^{52}\) because Fire itself would flee from itself in becoming many, so it can be many in this way and participate in the identical thing many times. And the Idea would not give anything of itself to matter, since it is undispersed.

Being a unity,\(^{53}\) the Idea is certainly not incapable of providing with its unity a perceptible form to what is not a unity\(^{54}\) and of being present to the whole thing, in such a way as not to provide one part of it with one part of itself, and another part with another part; rather, each and every part of the thing has its perceptible form due to every part of the Idea.\(^{55}\) For it would be absurd to introduce many Ideas of Fire, so that each fire acquires its perceptible form by a different Idea. For in that case, the Ideas would be unlimited.\(^{56}\)

Next, how would you divide the fires that come to be, since after all it is one continuous fire? And if we were to add another fire to this matter, to make it bigger, then we should say that the identical Idea produces the identical effects on this portion of matter, too. For it is indeed not another Idea.

§6.5.9. So, in this line of reasoning, given that all the elements had already come into being, if someone were to make all the elements into a spherical figure, one should not say that many workers produce the sphere, each one cutting off a portion for himself to produce a part of the sphere. Instead, there is one responsible for the production, producing the whole sphere with all of himself, not producing a part of it with

\(^{47}\) Cf. 2.4.6.  
\(^{48}\) This seems to be the sense of the word μορφή used here.  
\(^{49}\) Cf. 3.6.12.28 48. See Pl., Tim. 51B4 6.  
\(^{50}\) Insofar as they, too, will acquire mass from their respective Forms.  
\(^{51}\) Cf. 6.4.8.22.  
\(^{52}\) Following Tornau’s reconstruction of the text. But the text is not satisfactory: locus nondum sanatus.  
\(^{53}\) See Pl., Parm. 131A8 9.  
\(^{54}\) Cf. 4.2.2.52 55; 5.3.15.8 11.  
\(^{55}\) See Pl., Parm. 131A4 5.  
\(^{56}\) See Pl., Parm. 132B2.
a part of himself. For if that were the case, the workers would again be many, too, unless the production all related back to a one without parts, or rather, unless a producer without parts made it without the producer being diffused throughout the sphere.\footnote{The Stoics think that god is diffused throughout the world as πνεῦμα. Cf. supra 4.1 6. See SVF 1.102 (= Stob., Ed. 1.152.19), 2.441 (= Alex. Aphr , De mixt. 223.25), 634 (= D.L., 7.138), 1027 (= Aëtius, Plac. 1.7.33).} Instead, the sphere must depend on the producer. So, one identical life takes hold of the sphere, once the sphere has been placed in one life. And everything in the sphere, then, relates to one life.

So, all souls are one,\footnote{Cf. 4.9.} but one in a way that is unlimited. For this reason, some said soul was a number,\footnote{See Pythagoras apud Stobaeus, Ed. 1.318.21; Xenocrates, fr. 165 Isnardi Parente (= Ar., DA 1.2.404b27 30).} others that its nature is ‘an expressed principle which grows itself’.\footnote{I.e., it grows itself along with the body. See Heraclitus, fr. B115 DK, although making this line a quotation from a fragment of Heraclitus (see Stob., Ed. 1.130.5) depends on the insertion of <λόγον> as per a suggestion of Roussos.} Presumably, what they are imagining is that it is lacking in nothing and reaches everything, while itself remaining what it is; and even if the cosmos were bigger, its power would not give out before reaching everything; rather, the cosmos would be in the whole soul.\footnote{See Pl., Tim. 36D E.} Actually, one should not take this word ‘grow’ literally; it means that soul does not fail anywhere in being one. For its unity is such that its quantity cannot be measured. For this is the property of another nature,\footnote{I.e., being capable of measurement in quantity. Cf. 6.4.5.17 18.} which falsifies unity, and produces an image of it by participation.\footnote{Cf. 3.6.7.17 26.}

That unity which has a hold on truth cannot be put together out of a many, so that the whole unity is destroyed if a part is taken away, nor can it be divided by boundaries, so that, if other things are not able to be fitted into it, it is lessened because they are bigger than it, nor is it torn apart by itself wanting to reach all things: in that case, it would not be present to all things as a whole, but only parts of itself would be present to parts of all things. As has been said, it actually does not know where on earth it is,\footnote{See Pl., Rep. 403E5 6. Plotinus is here speaking of the consequences of a misunderstanding of the unity of the soul.} inasmuch as it cannot attain a unified perfection, because it is divided from itself.

If, then, this one is indeed to be true, of which we can actually predicate unity as one does of a substance, it must obviously in some way have the opposite nature, namely, that of multiplicity, in its power,
but not to have this multiplicity extrinsically, but in and of itself, and thus being one in truth, and to have in this unity unlimitedness and multiplicity. Because it is like this, it must appear to be a whole everywhere, with a single expressed principle enclosing it, which is not separate from it anywhere, but is instead everywhere in it.

It certainly does not belong to another thing by being divided spatially. For it was before all things which are in place, and it had no need of them; rather, they need it, so that they can settle [into a place]. And by being settled they did not move that expressed principle from its seat in itself. For if its seat moved, things in place would have been destroyed, once their basis was destroyed, that is, that which gives them fixity. Nor was that expressed principle so without thought as to take leave of itself and so be torn apart, and, although preserved in itself, to hand itself over to place, untrustworthy as it is, which is in need of it for preservation.

§ 6.5.10. It remains, then, in itself in self-control; it could not come to be in something else. Those things, in contrast, depend on it, as though they discovered where it is by their longing. This is Love ‘besieging the loved one’s door’: he always comes from elsewhere because of the desire for beauty, and is content if he can thus have a share in it. Even the lover down here does not receive beauty; he possesses it merely by lying beside it. That beauty remains in itself, and the many loves of the one whole beauty possess it whole like this when they do possess it. For what they loved was the whole.

How, then, could that not suffice for all by persisting? Indeed, it is enough, because it persists, and it is beautiful because the whole is for all things – for practical wisdom is whole for all, and it is for this reason that ‘practical wisdom’ is shared, and is not one thing here, and another there. That would be absurd and practical wisdom would need a place!

Further, practical wisdom is not like paleness, in that it does not belong to body. If we truly share in practical wisdom, it must be one and identical, all together with itself. That is the way we receive it from the intelligible world, not in portions, and not one whole for me and one whole for you, each split off from the other. Assemblies, indeed, all gatherings, imitate this since the people involved in pursuit of practical wisdom move towards unity. On their own, each person is weak in practical wisdom, but if everyone in a gathering, and in a way in a true meeting of minds, contributes to the one aim, then he would

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65 See Pl., Parm. 144E4 5.  
67 Presumably, the entire intelligible world.  
68 Cf. 3.5; 6.9.24 33. See Pl., Symp. 203C6 D3.  
69 See Heraclitus, fr. 22 B 113 DK.  
70 See Hom., Od. 10.515.
generate, and indeed find practical wisdom. In any case, what will actually separate them, so that the intellect of one is not in the identical place with that of another? Despite being together, they do not appear to us to be together, just as though someone were to touch the identical thing with several fingers, and thought he is touching different things, or if one plucks the identical string without looking.

And we should have remembered how we touch the Good with our souls. For you do not touch one Good, and I another; it is the identical Good. And it is identical, not such that one stream from it comes to me and another to you; the result of which would be that it would be up there somewhere, and the streams coming from it in the sensible world.

No: the giver gives to those who receive in such a way that they truly receive, giving not to aliens but to its own, since intellectual giving is not a parting gift. For even between bodies separated from one another by place, the giving of one is akin to the other. The gift and the producing aim at the identical thing. The corporeal aspect of the whole acts and is affected in itself; nothing comes from outside. And if nothing actually comes to body from outside, which naturally runs away from itself, in a way, then how can there be anything from outside in the case of a thing without extension? By being in the identical place [with the Good], therefore, we both see and touch the Good, while we are together with our own intelligible objects.

And the intelligible cosmos is one to an even greater extent [than the sensible cosmos]. If this were not so, there would be two sensible cosmoses, divided the same way, and also the intelligible sphere, if it is one in the way described, will be the same as the sensible cosmos. The result would be that there would still be a difference or an even greater absurdity, if indeed the sensible cosmos necessarily and rationally has mass, while the intelligible cosmos has no need of it, and yet the latter still would extend itself and go beyond itself. For what could get in the way of the intelligible sphere’s tendency to unity? For one intelligible will certainly not push another away, by not giving it room – as though we did not see that all learning and theory, and in general all sciences, are in the soul without being cramped.

Someone will deny this is possible in the case of substances.

71 The term is πόντιος. The point is that the gift is given and the guest departs with it, and that is not how things happen with intelligence.
72 See Pl., Tim. 33C8 D1.
73 Cf. 5.1.8.20 22, interpreting Parmenides, fr. 28 B 8.40 44 DK, likening the intelligible world to a ‘sphere’. See Ar., Meta. 1.9.990b1 4.
In fact, it would not be possible, if indeed true Substances were masses.

§6.5.11. But how can something unextended extend itself to all body, having such and such a magnitude? And how, remaining one and identical, is it not torn apart? This puzzle has often been raised when argument tries with excessive zeal to allay the puzzlement afflicting discursive thinking.

It has already often been shown in many ways that it is so. But some reassurance is needed, despite the fact that the biggest contribution to persuading us comes from [the true universe’s] nature having been taught to us to be such as it is. It is not like a stone, like a big cube lying there extended so and so much, which is incapable of going beyond its boundaries, since it is determinately measured both by its mass and by the power of the stone circumscribed within it. In contrast, its nature, by being primary, and neither measured nor bounded as to how big it should be – for in that case it would be measured by another nature – is all power, and in no respect of such and such a size.

For this reason, it is not in time, but is outside all time; time is always being scattered into intervals, whereas eternity remains in the identical [state], and rules over time with its eternal superior power, although time appears to cover more things, like a line which seems to extend without limit while depending on a point, around which the line runs, and wherever it runs the point appears in it, although the point does not move, but is what the line circles round.

So, if time contains in its substantiality a relation to that which remains in itself, and that nature is not only unlimited by being always, but is also unlimited in power, then one must also admit a nature which corresponds to this unlimited power, floating opposite to it, indeed depending on it. Because this nature runs equally with time, in relation to the persisting power, which is greater on account of its producing this nature, however big this nature may be, it is extended along that nature by participating in it as far as it is able. While it is all present, it is not all seen in everything because of the lack of power of the substrate. But it is present, numerically identical everywhere, though not like the material triangle present in many things by being a plurality, but because it is immaterial, and is where the material triangles come from.

Why, then, is there not everywhere material triangle, if indeed the immaterial one is everywhere? Because not all matter has a share in it.

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74 Cf. esp. 6.4.1.1 3, 8 17; 6.4.2.27 30. 75 See Pl., Tim. 37D6.
76 I.e., eternity, Cf. supra ll. 15 16.
77 I.e., like an image in a mirror depending on the original. 78 Cf. 6.4.3.10.
Each thing possesses something different; not all matter relates to everything. Even prime matter does not relate to everything, only to the primary genera, and then on the back of these to other things. But something is present in everything.

§6.5.12. But how, then, is it present? As one life. For life is not in the living being only up to a point, being then unable to reach all of it; it is everywhere. And should someone enquire just how, then he should bear in mind that the power is not determinately quantified, but even if he should divide it in thought, he will always obtain the identical power, fundamentally unlimited. For it has no matter, such that it would diminish with the magnitude of the mass, if the matter grows small.

If you grasp the unlimitedness which always flows from it, an untiring and unabating nature in it, which is in no way deficient, as though it were boiling over with life; if you pay attention to it, or strain to catch it, the opposite will happen to you. For you will not go beyond it, by passing its limits, nor come to a stop, as though it no longer had anything to give by reason of declining into smallness. But you can go along with it; indeed, when you come to be in the whole [intelligible universe], you look for nothing more in the way of smallness, or else, by giving up, you will pass by it to something else, and fall, not seeing what is there because of looking at something else.

But if you ‘look for nothing more’, how will you come to be persuaded of this?

In fact, because you came close to the whole [intelligible universe], and did not remain in a part of it, nor did you say ‘I am this size’; you left off the size, and you became ‘whole’ – even though you were that before. But because something else comes towards you after the whole, you diminish yourself by this addition, since that addition does not come from being. For you cannot add anything to that; the addition comes from non-being. When someone comes into being from non-being he is not whole; he is only that when he puts off non-being. So, you grow yourself by putting off other things; the whole is present when you put it off. And if it is present to you when you put it off, and does not appear to you when you are with other things, then it would not come to be present. Rather, you leave the whole, when it is not there. And if you leave, then not it – for it is present – nor do you then leave, but when you are present you turn to its contraries.

79 I.e., genera of matter, the elements. Cf. 5.8.7.19. See Ar., Meta. 5.4.1015a7.
80 I.e., some part or other of the intelligible world is present in everything.
81 Reading ἔχει with ms R.
82 See Ar., DA 1.2.405b28.
83 Cf. 4.4.17.1 7.
84 I.e., matter. Cf. 1.1.12.23; 5.3.4.29; 6.8.21.26.
So, too, with the other gods, whereas many are present, they appear only to one, since he alone is able to see. But these are the gods who ‘frequent our cities in many guises’, whereas it is to that god to whom the cities, indeed the whole earth, the whole sky are turned, who everywhere rests in and with himself, and who possesses Being from himself, and true Beings, including Soul and Life, depending on him, and who proceeds, through his unlimited absence of magnitude, to his unlimited unity.

85 See Homer, Od. 17.486; Pl., Rep. 381D4.
On Numbers

6.6 (34)

INTRODUCTION

6.6 (34) is largely about number, although the nominal subject is not number as such, but a question from Plato’s *Parmenides* 144A6–7, namely whether number can appear unlimited, without participating in being. The treatment of number concentrates on what numbers are, and how they play a role in cosmology.

SUMMARY

§1 prepares the question about unlimited number, §2 then poses it. The problem is that, while all being is limited, someone counting can always produce another number; thus we are faced with unlimited beings, apparently. For numbers are not produced when counted, they are already in the unlimited. §3 raises the question of unlimitedness in itself.

§§4–16 form the core of the treatise, a discussion of the status of number. §§4–10 go back to the origin of number. §§11–14 deal with objections. §§15–16 provide Plotinus’ own position.

§4. The problem of the relation between numbers and Forms.

§5. One possible way of understanding number, namely, as an accident of things. But everything in the intelligible must be on its own account, hence numbers must be Forms too, which participate in other Forms. Then the question is how number plays a role in the structure of the intelligible. The clue to Plotinus’ answer to this question lies in the triad Being–Life–Thinking.

§6. The intelligible is Being, but also Intellect; and finally, it is a living being.
§§7–8. Number is attributed to Being, which moves in a unified and harmonious manner. Number thus permits the differentiation of beings, as it were as the rule governing the Forms when they come to govern individuals through the activity of Soul.

§9. The question of whether or not Being gives rise to number, or whether number divides Being. Plotinus distinguishes between Substantial Number and the number we count with; the latter is an image of the former.

§10. Analysis of counting: we have the number, and apply it to the thing counted, such that it is such and such a number.

§11. Against a Peripatetic objection, namely, that he is positing a unity which cannot be added up, and cannot compose numbers, Plotinus replies that number is in fact the unity of a multiplicity, and he goes on to explain how a multiplicity can become a unity through number.

§12. Plotinus responds to a Stoic view which makes number the affection of a soul, namely relative to the objects affecting it. But if number is an affection of the soul, it must be in the sensible, whereas in the end it relates back to a Form, as does an expressed principle in the sensible.

§13. He continues his criticism of the Stoics by arguing that unity can be neither an affection of the soul, nor a ‘sayable’, and hence only of a lesser status.

§14. In fact, neither the One nor Number is a relative.

§15. Plotinus’ account of Substantial Number: Beings are numbered, that is to say their essence is determined by Number, which constitutes them.

§16. Analysis of the distinction between the numbering number – Substantial Number – and the numbered number, the number we count with.

§§17–18. The final two chapters return to the original problem of unlimited being: number is not compatible with being unlimited, just as with lines and figures. But as with the intelligible, the limit here is internal to the thing itself, not imposed from outside, so there is no opposition to there being unlimited number.
§6.6.1. Is multiplicity a distancing from the One, and is the unlimited a complete distancing from it, because it is an uncountable multiplicity and, because it is evil, insofar as it is unlimited, and are we evil because we are each a multiplicity?¹ For each thing is many, whenever it is diffused and dispersed in extension through being unable to incline towards itself. And indeed if something is deprived of the One entirely by being dispersed, it becomes a multiplicity, because there is nothing unifying one part of the thing with the other. And, in contrast, if it comes to be as a thing persisting through flux, then it comes to be a magnitude. But what is terrible about a magnitude?²

In fact, if it were something able to perceive, then there would be something terrible about it, for it would be able to perceive itself coming to be apart from itself and being removed far from itself. For each thing seeks itself, and not another thing; the journey away from oneself is either useless or merely necessary. Each thing exists to a greater degree not when it becomes multiple or large, but when it belongs to itself. It belongs to itself when it is inclined towards itself.² The desire to be large, in this sense, is the desire of someone who does not know what largeness truly is, and who does not strive after what one should, but after something external instead; what stands in relation to the thing itself is internal.³

Evidence for this is given by what happens in a magnitude, if it is divided such that each part belongs to itself, and each of them exists, but not the initial thing itself. But if it [the original thing] is going to be itself, then each part must relate to unity. The result is that it is itself, whenever it is in any way a unity, and not when it is large. So, it comes to be through the magnitude and, to the extent that it depends on the

¹ Cf. 1.1.9.5 6; 4.4.17.3, 8. See Pl., Sts. 273B3 C4; Ar., Meta. 1.6.988a11 15; 12.10. 1075a32 36; 13.4.1091b31 32.
² Cf. 5.8.13.20; 6.9.9.11 13.
³ Cf. 3.2.15.48 52; 5.1.10.6 10. See SVF 2.451 (= Nemesius, De nat. hom. 2.42).
magnitude, it is destroyed. To the extent, however, that it relates to unity, it relates to itself.

Further, the universe is large and beautiful.

In fact, this is because it is not permitted to flee to the unlimited, but is circumscribed by unity. And it is beautiful not by largeness, but by Beauty. It was in need of Beauty because it came to be large. And, bereft of this, the larger it was, the more it would appear ugly. So, in this way largeness is the matter for Beauty, since what needs order is multiple; that which is large is rather disordered and ugly.

§ 6.6.2. What, then, about what is called ‘number of the unlimited’? First, how is it a number if it is unlimited? For sensible things are not unlimited, so their number is not unlimited, nor does someone counting the unlimited count. But when he doubles or multiplies, he imposes a limit; and if he takes past, future, or both at once, then he imposes a limit on these, too. This number, then, is not simply unlimited; is it perhaps unlimited in the sense that it is always possible to take more?

In fact, producing more is not up to the person counting, but it is already defined and fixed.

In fact, in the realm of the intelligible, just as Beings are thus, so, too, number is limited to the number of the Beings. Just as we make ‘human being’ many by repeatedly joining together beauty and the other predicates to it, so, too, we generate an image of number along with each image; just as we multiply [in our minds] a town, which does not really exist in this way, so, too, we make the numbers multiple. And were we to count time, we would proceed from the numbers we have to the times, while the numbers remain in us.

§ 6.6.3. But this unlimited, how does it really exist, while being unlimited? For anything that has come to really exist, that is, does exist, is already included in number. Prior to that, we should ask, supposing there is truly multiplicity among Beings, how is multiplicity evil?

In fact, a multiplicity is unified, and prevented from being completely a multiplicity, by being one multiplicity. Because of this it falls short of the One, since it contains multiplicity, and is to that extent worse than the One. And because it does not possess the nature of the One – it has left it behind – to that extent it is inferior. Yet it does possess dignity

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4 See SVF 2.1009 (= Aëtius, Plac. 1.6) for the view being attacked here.
5 ‘Order’ (κόσμος) is also the word for the cosmos.
6 Cf. infra 17.1. See Pl., Parm. 144A6; Ar., Phys. 3.4.203b24; Meta. 13.8.1083b36 37.
7 See Ar., Phys. 3.6.206b16 18. I.e., defined and fixed.
8 See Ar., Phys. 3.8.208a17 19. 10 Cf. 3.7.9. 11 See Pl., Parm. 143A2.
9 Cf. 3.8.11.14 15; 5.5.13.9 11; 6.5.12.19 20; 6.7.37.6 7. See Pl., Soph. 249A1.
due to the unity from that One; it has turned back its multiplicity towards the One, and, in this way, persists.

But what about the unlimited? The unlimited that exists in Beings is already bounded. But if it is not bounded, then it does not exist in Beings, but in beings that come to be, because they are in time. But if it were limited, that is because it was itself unlimited. For it is not limit, but the unlimited which gets limited. For there is certainly no middle between the limit and the unlimited, which takes on the nature of a limit. This unlimited actually flees from the Idea of the limit, and when it is caught, then it is surrounded from outside. It does not flee from one place to another; for it has no place. Rather, when it is captured, place comes to exist really. For this reason, no so-called local motion is to be posited as belonging to the unlimited, nor indeed any of the other so-called motions as belonging to it of itself. So, it is not subject to motion, but neither is it at a standstill; for where can it be, since being somewhere comes about posterior to it?

Still, it appears that one may say that there is motion of the unlimited itself in such a way that it does not persist. Is it the case, then, that it is fixed above in the identical place, or rather swings to and fro? Not at all, for both of these attributes are distinguished with reference to the identical place, whereas what is unsettled is both not inclined to the one place and inclined to it.

How, then, should one conceive of the unlimited?

In fact, by separating its form in discursive thinking. What, then, will one think? Contraries and not contraries at the same time? For one will think of it as both large and small, in that it becomes both, and resting and moving, for it comes to be these. But evidently before the coming to be, it is limited in neither of these ways. Were that not so, you would have limited it. If, then, it is unlimited, then it is these things unlimitedly and indefinitely, and it may appear either, in each case. But if you approach it without throwing a limit over it like a net, you will have it slipping away from you, and you will find that it is not any one thing. For if you had done so, you would have already bounded it.

But if you approach something as one, it will appear to be many things. Yet, if you say it is many things, you will still be speaking falsely; for if each element of it is not one, then all of them cannot be many. The nature of the unlimited is motion, according to one of the imaginative representations of it, while, insofar as the imagination focuses on it, it is rest. And the inability to see it in itself is its motion.

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13 See Ar., Phys. 3.7.207b14 15.
14 See e.g., Ar., Phys., 5.1.225b7 9.
15 See Pl., Parm. 164B4 165A1.
16 Cf. 4.3.20.14 15. See Pl., Tim. 34B3.
18 Cf. 2.4.11.25 38 on the unlimited as matter.
away from Intellect, a slipping away.\(^{19}\) And in contrast, not being able to run away, its being fenced in from outside and in a circle, its inability to move on would be stability.\(^{20}\) So, one cannot say that it is only being moved.

§6.6.4. We must investigate how numbers behave in the intelligible world, whether they supervene on the other Forms or always accompany them.\(^{21}\) For example, since Being is such that it is primary, we conceive of it as a unit; then, since Motion and Stability come from Being,\(^{22}\) we thereby conceive of three [Forms]; and so of each further number with each further Form.

In fact, it is not like this; rather, a single unit is generated along with each Form. Or a unit is generated with the first Being, a pair with the Being after that, insofar as there is an ordering, and so on corresponding to the multiplicity of each thing; for example, if there are ten, then a decad. Or not this way at all; Number itself is conceived of in itself – and if it is like this, then the question arises if Number is prior to the other Forms or posterior to them.\(^{23}\)

Plato,\(^{24}\) then, in saying that human beings came to conceive of numbers through the motion from day to night, attributes their thinking to the difference among things, and would presumably be saying that numerable things produce number through their difference, and that number is constituted in the transition of the soul when it traverses one thing after another, that is, that number comes to be when the soul counts. That is, whenever it goes through them, and says to itself, this is one thing, this is another, on the grounds that when it says ‘one’, it is considering the identical thing, and not a different thing after it.

But when he says, ‘in true number’,\(^ {25}\) that is, Number found in Substance, then that would be saying that there is a certain real existence of Number in itself, and that it does not exist in the counting soul. Rather, the soul stirs up the concept of number in itself from the motion associated with sensibles.

§6.6.5. What, then, is the nature of number? Is it an accompaniment, and in a way, an aspect of each substance, for example, human being and

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\(^{19}\) This is perhaps a reference to Intellect in its primary ‘phase’ when it is identified with the Indefinite Dyad. Intellectual motion is Intellect’s activity in thinking all intelligibles. The Indefinite Dyad seems to ‘move away’ from Intellect as Intellect thinks eternally.

\(^{20}\) Cf. 6.3.2.19 20. \(^{21}\) Cf. infra 5.1 4. \(^{22}\) See Pl., Soph. 250B7 8, 254D4 5.

\(^{23}\) Cf. infra 5.29 40. \(^{24}\) See Pl., Tim. 39B6 C1, 47A4 6.

one human being, and being and one being—applying to all intelligibles and to all numbers?

But then how is a dyad and a triad and all intelligibles unified and a number like this [a dyad or triad] collected into a unity? For in this way, there would be a multiplicity of units, and no number is unified, except the simple unit. [This would be a puzzle] unless one were to say that the thing itself is a dyad, or better, that the dyad is an aspect of the thing which has two connected powers in a way conjoined into one.

Or are they such as the Pythagoreans said, who are said to have held that numbers were said analogically, for example, that justice is a tetrad, and so in other cases. But in that way, the number, too, is linked to the multiplicity of the thing, which is in each case one: it is so and so many times one, for example, a decad. But we do not actually say ten in this way, but rather by assembling ten distinct things.

In fact, we say ten like this, but whenever one thing comes from many, we call it a decad. And so, too, in the intelligible world.

But if this is so, does number have real existence, if it is just considered an aspect of things? Someone might say, since paleness is considered an aspect of things, what would prevent paleness from having the real existence of being in things? But since motion, too, is considered to be in things, there would be real existence for motion when it is at the level of being. But because motion is something, this is why unity is considered to apply to it. And number is not said like motion.

Next, this kind of real existence would remove number from existing as a substance, and make it an accident; and yet it is not entirely a substance. For an accident has to be something before being the accident of something, even if it is inseparable. Like the pale, it must be some nature in itself, and, already being what will be predicated, must then be predicated of another thing.

The result is that if ‘one’ applies to each thing, and human being is not identical to one human being, rather one is different from human being and ‘one’ is common and belongs to everything else, the ‘one’ would be prior to human being and to everything else, so that each thing can attain to unity. So, it is prior to motion, if indeed motion is one, too. And it is prior to being, so that being, too, can partake of being one. I do not mean that One which we say indeed ‘transcends Being’, but the

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26 See Ar., Meta. 4.2.1003b232 230. Aristotle’s point is that ‘human being’ and ‘one human being’ refer to one φύσις.

27 The word here is ἑνάδες which seems to be used synonymously with μονάδες.

28 The word is τὸ θεορούμενον, indicating the number viewed from a particular ‘angle’.

one which is predicated of each of the Forms.\footnote{Every Form is one, but not necessarily by participating in a Form of One, but by participating in Substantiality and thereby having the oneness of a Substance.} So, the decad is prior to that which ‘ten’ is predicated of; and this decad is the Decad itself. For the decad that is indeed considered in relation to a thing is not the Decad itself.\footnote{For lines 41–51, cf. supra 4.6 9; 3.7.7.52 54.}

But does this one, then, come to be and be among Beings? But even if it was generated with beings in the way an accident is, like health for a human being, well, nonetheless, there has to be Health in itself. And even if this one is an element of a composite, the One itself needs to be one prior to this, so that the element can be with another thing.\footnote{See Pl., Parm. 145E3 5.}

Next, if it [the element of one] is mixed with that other thing, which becomes one because of it, that will make it a false one, by making it two. And what about the case of the decad? Why does that thing, which will be a decad due to such a great power, need the Decad? But if it informs it, just as if it is informing matter, and it is ten or a decad by the presence of the Decad, then there has to be prior to it the Decad in itself, which is merely the Decad and nothing besides.

§6.6.6. But if the one itself and the decad itself are independent of things, and if intelligible things are first just what they are, and next exist as ones, twos, and threes, as the case may be, then what is their nature, and what is their constitution?\footnote{See Sext. Emp., M. 10.258.}

One should believe that there is a generation for them only with respect to reason.\footnote{The word here is λόγος.} So, first, one has to grasp the general substantiality of the Forms, namely, that they exist, without someone, in thinking each of them, providing them with real existence by thought itself.\footnote{The word here is λόγος.} For it is not the case that Justice comes to be because one has thought what Justice is, nor does Motion exist because one thought what Motion is. For then the thought would have to be posterior to the thing thought – thus the intellection of Justice would be posterior to Justice itself, and the intellection would also have to be prior to the thing existing because of the intellection, if, that is, it were to exist because of being thought. If Justice is identical to the intellection of it, it would be absurd if Justice were nothing but the sort of definition of justice. For what is the intellection of Justice or of Motion, if not grasping what they are? This would be identical to grasping the account of a thing that does not exist, which is impossible.
But if someone were to say that ‘in things without matter, the scientific understanding [of the thing] is identical with the thing’, we must understand this statement in the following way, that is, not that he is saying that the scientific understanding is the thing, nor that the account which gives the theory of the thing is the thing itself, but conversely, that the thing itself, being without matter, is intelligible and intellection, not such as to be an account of the thing nor an act of apprehension of it, but the thing itself in the intelligible; what else could this be but intellection and scientific understanding [of it]? For it is not the case that the scientific understanding is relative to itself; rather, the thing in the intelligible world has made the scientific understanding, not like the scientific understanding of a thing in matter, but something else, that is, true scientific understanding. This is not an image of the thing, but the thing itself.

So, the intellection of Motion does not produce Motion itself, but Motion itself produces the intellection, such that it is itself both Motion and intellection of it. For the Motion in the intelligible world is both the intellection of the thing itself and Motion, in that it is primary – no other Motion is prior to it – and Motion in truth, in that it is not accidental to something else, but the activity of the moving thing, which is in activity. So, it is, once again, Substance. Our concept of Being is different from Being.

And Justice is not the intellection of Justice, but, in a way, a disposition of Intellect, or rather such and such an activity. And ‘its face is truly beautiful’, and ‘neither the evening star nor the morning star is so beautiful’, nor, generally, is it anything sensible: it is, in a way, an intellectual statue, which takes up position of itself, in a way, and is manifest in itself; or better, it is in itself.

§6.6.7. One has to think that, generally, all things [in the intelligible world] lie within one nature, and that one nature contains them and, in a way, encompasses them, and not that they are each separate, as in the sensible realm, with the sun in one place, another thing somewhere else; rather, everything is together in one. That is the nature of Intellect, which Soul and so-called nature – that is, that which the coming to be of things in different places is caused by and accords with – imitate, while this nature remains together with it. Although all Beings are together, each of them is also separate. And Intellect has insight into the Beings in

37 Cf. infra 15.19 21. See Ar., DA 3.5.430α3, 7.431α1 2; Meta. 12.9.1074b38 1075a5.
38 Cf. 5.6.6.26; 5.9.7.11 15; 6.7.8.7.
39 Cf. 1.6.4.11 12. See Euripides, Melanippe fr. 486, Nauck’ apud Ar., EN 5.5. 1129b28 29.
40 Cf. 4.7.10.47; 5.8.4.42. See Pl., Tim. 37C7. 41 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.

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Intellect and into Substantiality, without attending to them, but rather holding them without separating them.\textsuperscript{42} For each is always separate already.

To those who wonder at the participation in Intellect, we confirm it through the following consideration: the magnitude of Intellect and the beauty of Soul is based in its love for Intellect, and the beauty of other things is based in their love of Soul, because the nature of Intellect is such, and because they are disposed in such a way as to have become the same as it.

And indeed, we say that it is absurd that any living being is beautiful without there being the Living Being itself which is wonderful in its beauty and ineffable. The ‘complete Living Being’ actually consists of all Living Beings, or better, ‘it comprehends all Living Beings within itself’,\textsuperscript{45} and, while being one,\textsuperscript{46} is as great as all things, just as this whole here is one, a visible whole comprehending all things in the visible world.

§6.6.8. So, since there is such a thing as living primarily, for this reason there is Living Being itself, and Intellect,\textsuperscript{47} that is, true Substance; and we assert that it contains all Living Beings, and all Number, and Justice itself, Beauty itself, and all such things – for we speak of the Human Being itself, and Number itself and Justice itself in different ways –\textsuperscript{48} we must investigate how each of these is also something, insofar as it is possible to discover something about them.

So, first, we must dispense with all sense-perception, and form a theory of Intellect using our intellect. We must bear in mind that even in us life and intellect do not depend on mass, but on a power without mass.\textsuperscript{49} And true Substance needs to be stripped of these characteristics and is a self-standing power, far from being a feeble affair; it is the most vital and most intellectual power; nothing is more vital, intellectual, or substantial than it. And anything touching it has in proportion to its touch these characteristics, the things nearer to it, more nearly, and those further away to a more distant degree.

If, then, existence is indeed to be desired, and what exists to a greater degree is to be desired to a greater degree, and most of all Intellect, and if indeed thinking is generally to be desired, then so, too, is life. Actually,
if primary being is to be grasped as being primary, then Intellect, and then the Living Being – for this is held to contain everything\(^{50}\) – and Intellect is secondary, for it is the activity of Substance – then Number does not correspond to the Living Being, for prior to the Living Being there were already one and two; nor does Number correspond to Intellect, for prior to Intellect there was Being, which is one and many.

§6.6.9. So, it remains to be considered whether Substance brought about Number by dividing itself, or whether Number brought division to Substance. Indeed, either Substance, Motion, Stability, Difference, and Identity\(^{51}\) produced Number, or Number produced them.

This is the start of the enquiry: is it possible for Number to be in itself, or must one always consider two in two things, and likewise, three?\(^{52}\) Moreover, is one also among Numbers?\(^{53}\) For if it is able to exist in itself without countable things, it could be prior to beings.\(^{54}\) But is it, then, prior to being in general?

In fact, we should leave this question to one side, and grant for the present that being is prior to number, and that number comes to be from being.

But if a being is one being, and two beings are two beings, one and the number of beings precede being and beings. Is there, then, priority in our conceptualization and apprehension or in existence? Let us look into this question as follows. Moreover, when one thinks one human being or one beautiful thing,\(^{55}\) then one thinks ‘one’ posterior to each thing, and when one thinks dog or horse, then clearly ‘two’ is posterior. But if one were to bring about human being, and were to bring about horse and dog, or were to express these, which are in us, and not bring them about or express them as they occurred to one, would one not then say: ‘One must go to one, and then go on to another one, and make two, that is, produce another one along with myself?’

Further, it is not the beings when they have come to be, that are counted, but as many have come to be as were necessary. So all Number was prior to the Beings themselves. But if it was prior to Being, Numbers were not Beings.

In fact, Number was rather in Being, without being a number of Being, for Being was still one, but the power of Number in coming to

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\(^{51}\) The μέγιστα γένη (‘greatest genera’). See Pl., *Soph.* 254D 255A, and Plotinus’ use of them in 6.2.7 and 8.

\(^{52}\) Cf. *supra* 4.10, 5.2.

\(^{53}\) Plotinus is here referring to the principle of number, one or the unit, not to the One itself.

exist, divided Being, and made it, in a way, to be in labour with multitude. For in fact, its substantiality and activity is Number; both the Living Being itself and Intellect are Number. Is Being, then, unified Number, and are Beings unfolded Number, and is Intellect Number moving in itself, and is the Living Being the containing Number? Yes, since Being comes to be from the One, and because that was one, Being has to be Number in the same way.

For this reason, someone said that Forms are both units and Numbers. And this is the Substantial Number, while the number said to consist of units is an image of it. Substantial Number is considered along with the Forms and co-produces them, that is, primarily, the Number in Being, and along with Being and prior to Beings. Beings have their foundation, source, root, and principle in it. For the One is the principle for Being, and Being is dependent on it – otherwise, it would be scattered. But the One is not dependent on Being, for then Being would have to be one before it attains the One, and anything that attains a decad would have to be a decad before it attains the decad.

§6.6.10. Being, then, is Number resting in a multiplicity; and when it is wakened into many, it is, in a way, a preparation and prefiguration for beings, and, in a way, units containing place for those things which come to settle in it. And indeed one may now say, ‘I want such and such a quantity of gold or houses’. Gold is one thing, but one does not want to make the number gold, but rather the gold a number. That is, one already has the number and one tries to apply it to the gold, so that the gold actually comes to be so and so much.

If beings did come to be before number, and the number were seen as dependent on them, when the nature that counts is moved so and so much, corresponding to the things to be counted, then they would be so many by coincidence, and not of deliberate purpose as many as they are.

56 Cf. 3.8.9.5; 5.4.2.8; 6.4.4.20. See Pl., Tim. 31A4; Ar., DA 1.2.404b29 30, 4. 408b32 409a1.
57 Cf. 5.1.5.5 18, 5.4.2.7 8. See Pl., Phyl. 15Al 7; Ar., Meta. 1.6.987b22; 14.9.1089a12; Phys. 4.2.209b34.
58 See Ar., Meta. 14.2.1088b34.
59 Cf. 6.3.13.6. See Ar., Meta. 13.8.1083b16 17, 9.1086a5; 14.2.1088b34, 3.1090b35.
Here, μοναδικὸς ἀριθμὸς refers to abstract mathematical numbers, countable, divisible, and replicatable. Substantial Numbers are equivalent to Form Numbers or Number Forms.
60 See Pl., Pbdr. 245C9; Timaeus of Locri §31.97e.1.455.10 DK.
61 I.e., the soul. Cf. 6.9.4.23 24. 62 Cf. 3.8.4.38.
If, then, they are not so many due to chance, then Number, being prior, is the explanation for their being so and so many. That is, things coming to be come to partake of Number, being so and so many, which is already there; each is one by partaking of Unity. There is being from Being, and, since Being is being from itself, the one comes from Unity. And each is one, if being one in each case is a multiplicity taken together, so a triad is one, and all beings are a one in this way, not in the way that there is one in a unit, but the way that ten thousand or any other number is one.

Someone who says that ten thousand things have come to be – if the person counting says ‘ten thousand’ – does not assert that the ten thousand things say, ‘ten thousand’, presenting their number as they do their colour. It is discursive thinking which says they are so many. For if it did not say this, then one would not know how big the multiplicity is. How, then, will it say so, if not by knowing how to count? And that is knowing Number. And one could only know Number if there is Number. And it would be absurd, or impossible, if this nature did not know how many there is in the multiplicity.

So, just as, for example, if someone calls some things good, either he says that they are such in themselves, or he predicates goodness of them as an accident. And if he speaks of the goods in themselves, then he is speaking of primary real existence.

But if he is speaking of those things to which good is accidental, the nature of the Good must exist in order that it may belong to other things accidentally insofar as the cause which has produced good in another thing must be either the Good itself or something that has produced the good by its own nature.

This is the way it is when someone is speaking of Number among Beings, for example, the Decad; he may either be speaking of the Decad really existing in itself, or else, in speaking of those things to which the decad belongs accidentally, he would be forced to posit the Decad in itself, that is, the Decad which in itself is nothing else but the Decad. So, it is necessary, if one says these Beings form a decad, that one must either say that these are the Decad themselves, or there is another Decad prior to them, which is nothing but the Decad itself.

So, generally, we should accept that everything that is predicated of another thing came from another thing to that thing, or else is an activity of that thing. And if the predicate is such that it is not now present and now not present, but is always present with that thing, then if that thing is substance, then the predicate is a substance itself, and no.

63 I.e., the Unity that is ‘part’ of One Being or Intellect.  
64 I.e., the faculty of thought.  
65 Cf. 2.6; 6.9.5.28. See Ar., Meta. 5.14.
less of a substance than that thing. And if one does not grant it to be a substance, well, it still belongs to beings and is a being. Even if one could think that thing without its activity, still there is the activity at the same time as that thing, and it is only ranked posterior by our thought. But if it is not possible to conceive of the thing without the predicate, like human being without unity, then the predicate is not posterior, but is along with the thing or is prior to it, such that the thing is because of it. At any rate, we indeed assert that Unity and Number are prior.

§6.6.11. But if someone were to say that the decad is nothing but so and so many units, and if one were to admit that there is a unit, why should one then admit that there is a unit but not that there is a decad? Because [it will be said] the one has real existence; well, then, why do not the others, too? For one may not actually link the one unit merely with one being; since then there would be no longer any of the other beings. But if each of the other things has to be one, then unity is common to them. This is then one nature predicated of many things, which we said must exist in itself before it is seen in many things. If a unit is present in this thing, and is then seen in another thing, even if this second unit exists, still it is not just one of them that has real existence; in this way, there is a multiplicity of units.

But if only the first unit has real existence, then it is together with being in the highest sense or with Unity. But if it is with being in the highest sense, then the other units would be [said to be] equivocally one and will not be ranked with the first unit, or Number will consist of unlike units, and there will be differences among units; in fact, just as many differences as there are units.

But if it is with the highest unit, then why would the supreme One need this unit, so it can be one? If these consequences are indeed impossible, then there must be a one, just by being a bare one, isolated in its substantiality, prior to each thing being thought and said to be one.

So if Unity, without the thing said to be one, is in the intelligible world, too, why will no other unit really exist? Each would be separate, and there would be many units, each of which would be a ‘many one’.68

But if nature were, in a way, to generate continuously, or rather, having generated, were not to rest with the thing it produces, in a way producing a continuous unit, then having sketched out its motion, and coming to a standstill sooner in its procession, it produces smaller

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66 Cf. supra 5.32 36; infra 10.51. 67 Cf. 6.1.1; 6.3.6. 68 See Pl., Parm. 144E5. 69 I.e., the lowest part of the soul of the cosmos.
numbers, and then being moved more, not in other things but in the motions themselves, it causes the larger numbers to really exist. And in this manner, nature actually makes each multiplicity fit the respective numbers, and each being, knowing that, if each were not fitted to each number, then either it would not be, or else, having deviated from its path, it would be something else, having become devoid of number or reason.

§6.6.12. But if someone were to say that unity and the unit possesses no real existence – for nothing is one that is not one something – but that they are merely a certain affective state of the soul relative to each being, then we answer as follows: what prevents one from saying ‘being’ and meaning that being is merely an affective state of the soul, and that no being is? If one can say that being impinges upon the soul, strikes it and forms an image of being, then let us also consider the soul being impinged upon and forming an image relative to unity.

Next, the question arises whether we regard the affective state, that is, the thought in the soul as a one or a multiplicity. But whenever we say ‘not one’, we do not have the unit from the thing itself – for we are asserting that the unit is not in the thing – rather, we are in possession of the unit, and it is in the soul without being one something. But we have the unit from things outside ourselves, getting the concept or impression from them. In some sense, this is a concept derived from the thing. For those who posit that number and unity are one kind of concept in themselves would be positing this kind of real existence if indeed things like this can really exist; we shall reply to them on these points at the proper time.

But, then, if they were to say that an affective state or thought arises posterior to the things, like an after-effect, like the ‘this’ and the ‘something’, too, and indeed also ‘crowd’, or ‘religious feast’, or ‘army’ or multiplicity – for just as the multiplicity is nothing besides the many things, nor the feast besides the people assembled and enjoying themselves at the ceremonies, so, too, we do not conceive of the unit as something alone and isolated from other things, when we say ‘one’.

70 Cf. 6.3.12.12 14.
71 Here and in what follows, the argument is with the Stoics. See SVF 2.864 (= Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 130.14), 866 (= Aëtius, Plac. 4.15.3); Sext. Emp., PH 3.51.
72 See SVF 2.54 (= Aëtius, Plac. 4.12.1), 164 (= Ammonius, In De int. 42.30); Ar., De int. 1. 1643 7.
73 The sense of νόησις here.
74 I.e., the Stoics. See SVF 1.65 (= Cicero, Acad. post. 1.40), 3.25 (= D.L., 7.61).
75 Cf. 6.9.1.4 10, 32 33.

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There are many other such things, such as the right and the up and their contraries. What kind of real existence attaches to the right, except that one person stands, or sits, here and another there? Moreover, it is the same with the up, that is having such and such a position, most of all in the universe, which we call up, relative to what we call down.

Indeed, in reply to this, we should first say that there is a kind of real existence in each of the things mentioned, not, of course, identical in all cases, nor in relation to one another, nor in the relation of all to the One. However, each of the points mentioned has to be looked into separately.

§6.6.13. How would it be reasonable to suggest that the concept of unity actually derives from a substrate, that is, a sensible substrate, for example, a human being or another animal, or even a stone, since the thing that appears – the human being – is one thing and the unity another thing, different from the first? For discursive thinking would not otherwise also predicate unity of something which is not a human being.

Next, as in the case of the right hand, and suchlike, thought is not moved for nothing, but seeing a different position, says, ‘here’, and, in the present case, because it sees, it says, ‘one’. For the affective state of the soul is certainly not empty – it does not apply ‘one’ to nothing. And it is certainly not saying that the thing is alone and there is nothing else; for in saying ‘it is not another thing’, it says another ‘one’.

Next, the other and the different are posterior [to the one]. For if discursive thinking could not rely on the one, then it could not say ‘other’ or ‘different’; and when it says ‘alone’, then it means ‘one alone’; the result is that the ‘one’ is said before alone.

Next, what speaks is itself one before it says of something else that it is one; and what it speaks of is one, before anything is thought or said of it. For it is either one or more than one, that is, many. And if it is many, then a one must have existed beforehand. For when you say ‘many’, you mean more than one – one conceives of an army as many armed men ordered into one; and, though it is a multiplicity, it does not allow it to be a multiplicity.\footnote{I.e., because it is taken to be a unity.} This is what discursive thinking does in this case, too, in giving a unity to a multiplicity which the multiplicity does not possess, or rather, it sees, penetratingly, the unity which arises from order, and that it brings together the multiplicity into a unity. Even here, unity is not deceptive, any more than it is in the case of a house which is a unity out of many stones. Indeed, there is a greater unity in the case of the house.\footnote{Cf. 5.5.4.31 37; 6.9.1.4 10, 32 33.}

If, then, unity is greater in the case of something continuous and greater still in the case of something indivisible, it is evident that unity
has a nature and exists. For it is not possible that in things that do not exist ‘greater’ could occur; rather, just as in predicating substantiality of individual sensibles, one would predicate it all the more properly of intelligibles, on the grounds that we posit the predicate more properly among Beings that exist to a greater degree and exist more properly, and that being is in substance, even in sensible substance, to a greater degree than in the other genera of being. In the same way, we see that unity differs as to degree even among sensibles themselves, and in intelligibles it differs again in degree. In all these ways, one should say that they all refer back to unity.\textsuperscript{78}

Just as Substantiality and Existence are intelligible and not sensible, even if the sensible has a share in them, so, too, unity is seen in the sensible as present by participation; but discursive thinking grasps it as an intelligible, and intellectually. The result is that it thinks one thing it does not see on the basis of another [it does see]. It, therefore, knew the first thing beforehand.\textsuperscript{79} But if it knew beforehand that this thing in the sensible world\textsuperscript{80} is [the being that it is], then it knew it to be identical to that being. And when it says ‘something’, it also says ‘one’, just as when it says ‘a pair’, it says ‘two’, and when ‘several’, then ‘many’.\textsuperscript{81}

So, if it is not possible to think of something without the ‘one’, the ‘two’ or some number, how can there not be that which is necessary to think or say something? For in the case of something of which the non-being would make thinking or saying anything impossible, it is impossible to say that this is not. Rather, something which is needed in all cases for a thought or an account to come about, must be there before the account or thought. For in this way it would be adduced on behalf of the coming to be of these.

But if unity is needed for the real existence of each substance – for there is no being which is not one\textsuperscript{82} – it would be prior to substance and would generate the substance. For this reason, the substance is one being\textsuperscript{83} and not a being that exists, and then is one. For in being there is a one that is many, whereas in that which is one there is not being,\textsuperscript{84} unless it were to produce it by inclining to generation.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{78} See Ar., \textit{Meta.} 4.2.1004a26; Sext. Emp., \textit{M.} 4.11. \textsuperscript{79} See Pl., \textit{Phd.} 74E3.
\textsuperscript{80} A this of a certain kind, that is, a sensible substance. Cf. 6.1.2 3. See Ar., \textit{Cat.} 3b10.
\textsuperscript{81} See Pl., \textit{Soph.} 237D6 10. \textsuperscript{82} Cf. 6.9.1.
\textsuperscript{83} See Pl., \textit{Parm.} 142D4. Plotinus is here applying the analysis of One Being (Intellect) to all real existents.
\textsuperscript{84} See Pl., \textit{Parm.} 144E5.
\textsuperscript{85} The reference here to ‘generation’ (\gamma\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\iota\sigma\varsigma) suggests the ambiguity in the claim about unity. Plotinus is referring both to the One itself, which transcends One Being, and to the Unity paradigmatically in the One Being. The One, along with the instrumentality of One Being, generates everything. Cf. 6.9.2.5 8, 29 30.
And the ‘this’ is not empty for it means a real existent which is indicated instead of its name, a presence, a substance, or one of the other kinds of beings. The result is that ‘this’ is not empty of meaning, nor is it an affective state that discursive thinking undergoes under the influence of nothing. On the contrary, there is an underlying thing which is there, just as if it were to speak the proper name of the thing itself.

§6.6.14. In reply to the arguments using the notion of relatives one can reasonably say that unity is not such that it loses its own nature without itself undergoing anything, when another thing undergoes something. Rather, if something is going to cease being one, then it has to undergo the privation of unity by being divided into two or more. So, if the identical mass is divided into two without being destroyed as a mass, it is clear that, besides the substrate, there was also unity in it, which it cast off when the division destroyed it.

How indeed can we not rank something among things that exist, wherever it is found, which is sometimes present in the identical substrate, and sometimes absent? We assert that it is accidental to these things, and that it is in itself; it appears both in sensibles, and in the intelligibles. It is accidental in posterior things, and in itself in the primary intelligibles when it is first one and then being.

If someone were to say that that which is one, when it undergoes nothing, but another is added to it, is no longer one, but two, then he is not speaking correctly. For the one did not become two, neither the one that was added to nor the one that was added. Rather, each of them remains one, just as it was. Two is predicated of both, and one is predicated of each one which persists. Neither, then, two nor the Dyad consists in a relation. But if it corresponds to a bringing together, and bringing things together is producing two, then two and the Dyad would indeed be this kind of relation. Now, the Dyad is seen in the contrary state as well; for two comes about when one thing is divided. So, two is neither bringing together nor dividing, so as to be a relation. The identical argument applies to all number. For when there is a relation which brings something about, then it is impossible for the opposite relation to bring about the identical thing, if the relation is to be the thing itself.

So what is the proper cause of number? There is one due to the presence of Unity, and two by the presence of the Dyad, just as there is

86 Against the Stoic view. See SVF 2.205 (= Sext. Emp., M. 8.93 98).
87 Cf. supra 12.24 32.
88 See Pl., Phd. 96E7 97B2, 101B8 C1.
89 I.e., in the One Being, unity is prior to being.
90 See here and in what follows, Pl., Phd. 96E7 97B2.
91 Cf. 6.1.7.24 38.
something pale by the presence of Paleness, something beautiful by the presence of Beauty, something just by the presence of Justice. Or else these should not be posited to be either; instead, the relations would be made responsible, for example, that something is made just by such and such a relation to these things, beautiful by being disposed in relation to such and such a thing, without there being anything in the substrate which makes us disposed in this way, and without anything coming from elsewhere to the thing which appears beautiful.

So, when you see something which you call one, it is at all events both great, and beautiful; it is possible to say thousands of things about it. Just as large and magnitude, sweet and bitter and other qualities, then, are in it, why is the one not in it, too? For if any and all qualities are indeed among things that exist, then so, too, will quantity be; nor will only the continuous be quantity, and not the discrete, too, even if the continuous uses the discrete as its measure.

Just, then, as that which is large is large by the presence of Largeness, so, too, there is one by presence of Unity, two by the presence of the Dyad, and likewise with the other numbers. To enquire about how they participate is common to the enquiry about participation in all the Forms.

We should say that the Decad is considered present in discrete things one way, in continuous things in another way, and in another way in many powers when they are unified. At this point, we have already ascended to the intelligibles. Furthermore, in the intelligible world, Numbers are not seen in other things, but are themselves in themselves the truest Numbers, the Decad itself, and not ten intelligibles.

§6.6.15. Let us begin again from what has already been said, namely, that all that true Being, that is, Being, Intellect, and the complete Living Being, are actually all Living Beings altogether. And this whole living being in the sensible world has certainly imitated the unity of that Living Being as far as it was possible for it. For the nature of the sensible flees the unity of the intelligible world, if indeed this universe had to be sensible. That Living Being must actually be all Number. For if it were not complete, it would be missing some Number. If any Number of some Living Beings were not in it, it would not be the ‘complete Living Being’. Number, then, is prior to all living beings, and to the complete Living Being.

Human Being and the other Living Beings are indeed in the intelligible, insofar as they are, and insofar as the intelligible is

92 Pl., Pbd. 96E7 97B2, 100D5 6. 93 Cf. supra 8.1ff. 94 Pl., Tim. 31B1.
the ‘complete Living Being’. For the human being in the sensible world is part of it, insofar as the universe is a living being. And each being, as a living being, is in that Living Being in the intelligible world. And in Intellect, as intellect, all intellects are parts individually. There is also a number of these. So, Number is not primarily in Intellect. Rather, in Intellect there are all the activities of Intellect, that is, Justice, Self-Control, the other Virtues, and scientific understanding, in sum those things whose possession makes Intellect really Intellect.

So, why is scientific understanding not in something else? In fact, the human being in possession of scientific understanding, the object of scientific knowledge, and science are identical and all together. That applies to other activities, too. For this reason, each intelligible exists in its own right, and not an accident, whereas justice, for example, is an accident of the soul as such. For the soul has these activities rather in potency, and they actually belong to it when the soul turns to the Intellect and is with Intellect.

Straightaway after this comes Being, and in this, Number. Being produces Beings with Number, and moving in accord with Number, making the Numbers precede their existence, just as the unity of Being precedes Being, in that unity attaches Being to that which is first. The Numbers do not attach the other things to that which is first. It is enough that Being is attached to it. Being, having become Number, attaches Beings to itself. For it splits itself, though not as a one; its unity remains. Once it was split according to its nature into as many things as it wanted, it knew how many Beings it produced in itself corresponding to the Numbers in itself. For it was split by the powers of Number, and it produced as many Beings as the Number was. The ‘principle’ and ‘source’ of existence for Beings, then, is the first and true Number.

For this reason, in the sensible world, too, the coming to be of each thing occurs with numbers; if it takes another number, then either it produces another thing, or nothing. These are the primary numbers, insofar as they are numerable. And those numbers that are in other beings have these two characteristics already; they are numerable, insofar as they come from these, and insofar as they measure other beings using the primary numbers, counting both numbers and

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95 Cf. supra 6.19 30. 96 Cf. supra 6.19 26. See Ar., DA 3.4.43\(\text{a}4\) 5.
97 I.e., the One. 98 See Pl., Phdr. 245C9.
99 See Ar., Meta. 1.6.987b18 22 on the priority of Numbers to Forms.
100 The primary numbers or Number Forms are not numerable; here they are considered \textit{qua} numberable, that is, \textit{qua} integers.
numerable things. For how could they say ‘ten’ if not by means of the numbers in themselves?

§6.6.16. Someone could ask us, ‘Where do you actually propose putting the numbers you call primary and true, into which genus of being?’ Everyone is of the opinion that they belong in the genus of quantity and actually you have mentioned quantity in the preceding treatment, when you thought it right to place the discrete, like the continuous, among things that exist.’

‘Again, you say, these numbers belong among primary Beings, and you say that there are other numbers which enable one to count. Tell us how you arrange all these matters. For they contain an important puzzle: Is the unit in sensible things also a quantity or does it only become a quantity when repeated several times, whereas in isolation, it is the principle of quantity and not a quantity? And, if it is a principle, is it of the same kind as quantity, or is it something else? It is only fair that you clear these points up for us.’

Here is how we begin to respond to these points. First, we should begin the explanation with sensibles: so, whenever you say ‘two’, in taking one thing with another, for example, dog and human being, or even two or more human beings, or you say ‘ten’, that is, a decad of human beings. In this case, the number is not a Substance, not even a sensible substance, but purely a quantity. If you divide this number by the unit, and produce the parts of this decad, then you make the units the principles, and posit it as belonging to quantity. One human being of the ten is not in itself a unit.

But when you say that the human being himself in himself is a number, for example, a dyad, that is, ‘animal’ and ‘rational’, then this is not the same way of talking of number; to the extent that you pass from one to another and count, then you produce a quantity, and to the extent that the subjects are two, that is, each of them one, if each one completes the requirements of the substance and there is unity in each one, then you mean another, substantial number. And the dyad itself is not posterior, nor is it a quantity merely outside the thing, but the quantity in the substantiality which holds together the nature of the thing.

In this case, it is not you producing a number by running through things, which are in themselves, and which are not constituted by being counted. What could it contribute to the substantiality of one human

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101 Cf. supra 9.34 35; 6.1.4.23 28. Thus, Plotinus distinguishes the Number Form, the integers, and things that are numbered by these.
102 See Ar., Cat. 6.4b20 24. 103 Cf. supra 14.39. 104 Cf. 6.9.2.18. 105 I.e., an instance of a Form Number. 106 See Pl., Phil. 26D7.
being who is counted together with another? For no unit, as in a chorus, but the decad itself of human beings, would contain the real existent, namely, not those in you as you count, but in the ten human beings which you count; if they are not arranged into one, you would deny there is even a decad; you produce ten by counting, and this ten is a quantity. But in the chorus or in the army there is also something outside yourself.

How, then, is number in you?

In fact, it is a number in you in a different way, before you count. And there is another which arises from an external appearance relative to the number in you, and which is either an activity of those numbers or an activity in accordance with them. You count and generate number and produce the real existence of quantity, just as you produce the real existence of a kind of motion in walking.

How, then, is number differently in us? It is the number which belongs to our substantiality, which Plato says participates in Number and harmony, and indeed, is number and harmony. It is, someone says, neither body nor magnitude. Soul, therefore, is Number, if indeed it is Substance. The Number of body is actually a Substance, in the way body is, and the Numbers of Soul are Substances in the way souls are.

Moreover, generally with intelligibles, if it is true that the Living Being in the intelligible world itself is a plurality, for example, a triad, then the triad in the Living Beings is substantial, whereas the triad which is not yet in the Living Beings but generally a triad in being, is the principle of substantiality.

If you count ‘living being’ and ‘beautiful’, then each is one, and you generate number in yourself and actualize quantity, that is, the dyad. If, however, you say virtue is four – it is a kind of tetrad whose parts come together as one – and a tetradic unity like the substrate, then you, too, harmonize with it the tetrad in yourself.

§6.6.17. And what about so-called unlimited number? For these arguments give number a limit.

\[107\] For the two kinds of activity, cf. 5.1.3.10 12, 6.30 39; 5.3.7.21 35; 5.4.2.27 36. The activity is, strictly speaking, of the soul.

\[108\] See Pl., Tim. 36E6 37A1. \[109\] See Ar. DA 1.3.407a2 3; 2.1.412a17.

\[110\] Cf. 5.1.5.9; 6.4.4.20; 6.5.9.14. See Pythagoras apud Stob., Ed. 1.318.21; Xenocrates, fr. 60 Isnardi Parente.

\[111\] I.e., the cardinal virtues, the whole of human excellence: courage, self control, justice, and wisdom.

\[112\] Cf. supra 6.2.1.
In fact, they do so rightly, if indeed it is number – for the unlimited conflicts with number. Why, then, do we say that ‘number is unlimited’? Is it that just as we say there is an unlimited line, not because there is any such line, but because it is possible with the longest line, for example, that of the universe, to conceive of a longer one. So, too, with number? For when we know how big a number is, it is possible to double it in thought, without adding it to the original number. For how can you add to things that exist a thought or imaginative representation which is only in you?

Or shall we assert that there exists an unlimited line among intelligibles? For how big could a line in the intelligible world be? But if the line is not a certain quantity determined by a number, then it would be unlimited. Or is it unlimited in another way, not as being untransversible? But how is it unlimited?

In fact, in the account of the line itself there is no limit included.

What, then, is line in the intelligible world, and where is it? It is posterior to number. For one sees unity in a line; and a line starts from one thing, and is in one dimension. But there is no quantity which measures this dimension. But where is it? Is it only, in a way, in the defining function of our conceptualizing?

In fact, it is a thing, even if an intellectual one. For all things are like that in the intelligible world; they are both intellectual and the thing in some way, too.

Moreover, in the case of planes and solids, and all figures, we also have to ask where they are and how they are. For we do not actually think them [into existence]. Evidence for this is provided by the figure of the universe, which was there before us, and other figures which are physical in physical beings, which are indeed necessarily prior to bodies, figureless in the intelligible world and the primary figures. For they are not shapes in other things; belonging to themselves, they have no need of being extended. For extended things belong to other things.

A single figure is, then, always in a being; thus, it is divided in the Living Being, or before the Living Being. By ‘divided’ I do not mean ‘endowed with magnitude’, but that each figure is separated from each other one, like the Living Being; figure was given to body in the intelligible world, for example. Fire there was given the intelligible pyramid. For this reason, fire wants to imitate this, although it is

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113 See Ar., Phys. 3.6.207a7 8. 114 See Ar., Phys. 3.7.207b28 29.
115 See Ar., Meta., 7.2.102b25 26. 116 See Ar., DC 1.1.1268a7 8; DA 1.2.404b18.
119 Cf. 6.7.32.34 38. 120 See Pl., Tim. 56B4 5.
not able to because of matter; and analogously with the other elements, as is said about the elements here.

But is figure in the Living Being as such or is it in the Intellect beforehand? For it is certainly in the Living Being. If, then, the Living Being were to contain Intellect, then figures would be primarily in the Living Being; but if Intellect is prior in rank, they are in the Intellect primarily. But if there are also souls in the complete Living Being, then the Intellect is prior to the Living Being. But Plato says\(^\text{121}\) that Intellect ‘sees all that it sees in the complete Living Being’. And if Intellect sees, then, it is posterior. Or is it possible for ‘it sees’ to be understood in such a way that in the seeing the real existence of the Living Being comes into being? For Intellect is not something other than the Living Being; rather, all things are one in it. That is, its intellection contains the bare sphere, whereas the Living Being contains the sphere of the Living Being.\(^\text{122}\)

§6.6.18. But in the intelligible world, Number is limited, though we can conceive of a number greater than any put before us. And that is how the unlimited derives from us counting.

But in the intelligible world, it is not possible to conceive of a Number greater than that already conceived.\(^\text{123}\) For it is already. No Number was grasped nor will it be grasped what could be added to it.

But Number could be unlimited in the intelligible world because it is not measured. What could it be measured by? But any Number in the intelligible world is entirely what it is, one, whole, and certainly not circumscribed by any limit, being in itself what it is. For generally speaking, no Being is within a limit. What is limited and measured is what is prevented from running to the unlimited; thus, it is what needs a measure. All things in the intelligible world are measures, which is why they are beautiful.

And indeed as Living Beings, each thing there is beautiful, since it has the best life, and is deficient in no aspect of life, since it does not possess a life which is mixed with death. For there nothing is mortal or dying. The life of the Living Beings itself is not without strength.\(^\text{124}\) Rather, it is primary Life, most clear, and in possession of pure living, like the primary light, which even souls live by both in the intelligible world and those who, coming to the sensible world, bring it with them. It knows what it lives for, and towards what, which is what it also lives from. For what it lives from is what it lives towards.

The wisdom of the whole, and all Intellect, by being close to the Living Being, with intimate contact with it, and being together with it, colours it

\(^{121}\) See Pl., Tim. 31B1, 39E7 9. \(^{122}\) Cf. 6.5.10.43 46. \(^{123}\) I.e., by Intellect. \(^{124}\) See Homer, Il. 5.887.
such that it is better, and by mixing insight into it makes its beauty more venerable. Even in the sensible world a wise life is venerable, beauty in truth, even though it is seen unclearly. In the intelligible world, it is seen clearly. For it bestows seeing on the seer and the power for greater living; and for the human being living more intensely, it bestows the power to see, and to become what he sees. For, in the sensible world, most of our attention is directed towards inanimate things, and when it is directed to living beings, what is not alive about them intervenes; and the life within is mixed with the lifeless. In the intelligible world, everything is a living being, living as wholes, and pure.

And if you should take something in the intelligible world as not living, well, it itself radiates its life straightaway. When you have admired the Substantiability running through them, which makes their life immutable into motion, and their wisdom, and their intellectual excellence and scientific understanding, you will laugh at the pretensions to Substantiability of all nature in the sensible world. For with this Being, Life, and Intellect persist, and Beings take up their position in eternal life. Nothing puts it outside itself, or turns it or makes it deviate. For there is nothing posterior to it which could lay hold of it. If there were, it would be under the influence of that Being. If there were something contrary, then this Being would be unaffected by the contrary itself. But if there were this contrary, it would not be it itself that produced it, but something else, prior to it, and common, and this would be Being.

The result is that Parmenides was right in saying that Being is one. And it is not unaffected through the absence of another thing, but because it is Being. For only this is able to be through itself. How, then, could anyone take Being away from it, or anything else which is through the activity of Being or anything which derives from it? As long as it is, it dispenses benefits; and it is always. It is so great in beauty and power, that it enchants everything, and everything depends upon it, and is joyful to take its trace, and after it to search for the Good. For Being is prior to the Good, relative to us. And the whole of this cosmos wants both to be alive and be wise, so it may be, and all soul, and all intellect desires to be what it is. Being is self-sufficient in itself.

125 See Ar., Phys., 1.7.190b33, 191a5.
126 See Pl., Tim. 31 A6. 8. Plotinus is here applying Plato’s argument for the uniqueness of the Living Being to the uniqueness of a cause of Being and a putative contrary of Being in the intelligible world.
127 Cf. supra 13.50 51. See Parmenides, fr. 28 B 8.6 DK; Pl., Parm. 142.D4.
128 See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b14. 129 Cf. 3.8.11.19 22; 6.7.20.12.
130 Cf. 5.9.2.24 25.
6.7 (38)
How the Multiplicity of the Ideas Came to Exist, and on the Good

INTRODUCTION

6.7 is among the longest of treatises, and it evinces a long development of its theme: basically, what happens when soul is directed by the Good. To this end, we move in the course of the work from Intellect to the Good, beginning with the relation between sensible things and Intellect. A core claim is that being directed by the Good requires being directed by nothing else.

SUMMARY

§§1–14 explain the relation between sensible things and the Forms. Intellect is the collection of Forms, complete Life.

The Good as cause or explanation:

§1. Did the gods give sensations to sensible living things, so that they can live? No, sense-perception was not given to living things by reasoning workmen gods, since god does not reason discursively.

§2. Intellect explains all of sensible life.

§3. But how can there be sensible living things in the intelligible, for they must have the capacity for sense-perception?

§4. Answering this question requires investigation of what the definition of human being includes.

§5. The definition is a mixture of two expressed principles, that for growth and that for intellect. Three human beings are to be distinguished: the first illuminates the second, the second the third.

§6. In Intellect, there is sense-perception of sensibles, such as they are in Intellect.

§7. Sense-perception in the intelligible is clear, in the sensible, faint.
The Good in rational choice:

§§ 8–14. All of the kinds of life can be in Intellect, since there is a hierarchy among them, and each of them represents Intellect in its own way.

§ 8. Intellect is the complete Living Being, containing all intellects and all souls.

§ 9. The powers unfold hierarchically, the lower from the higher, but the lower ones do not include all the power before them, but they make up for these deficiencies with their own peculiar attributes.

§ 10. Intellect is a unitary perfect Living Being; and this precludes it possessing differentiating attributes.

§ 11. The elements in matter derive from their veritable living counterparts in Intellect, being expressed principles like plants and animals.

§ 12. All living things are necessarily in the Living Being. In turn, all life is derived from one source.

§ 13. Intellect is variegated, indeed it comprises all life, since it fulfils its own nature as Substance.

§ 14. Intellect is a structured ‘one-many’, such that all things have their place in it.

§§ 15–42. The nature of the Good and its relation to Intellect.

The Forms are Good-like:

§§ 15–23. What does it mean to say that Forms and hence Intellect are Good-like? The Intellect turns towards the Good, but only in receiving the Good is there actual thought of the Forms. Only in this way does the soul desire Intellect. The paradox is that Forms resemble something without form.

§ 15. Intellect is complete Life, whereas life in the sensible world is merely a trace of the archetype. Intellect is Good-like, because it contains the Good in the Forms, so it is a variegated good.

§ 16. Intellect does not see the Good, it lives in accordance with it, hence the Good explains the Forms, Substance, and their being seen.

§ 17. Intellect acquires boundaries on having seen the Good, hence the Forms are in Intellect, and are themselves intellects. Intellect makes Soul rational by passing on a trace of what it itself receives from the Good.
§18. Life is only good when it comes from the Good; life is not in the Good itself.

§19. But each thing is not good because of desire, and because of each thing’s virtue in the sensible world, but not in Intellect, since there nothing is bad. Reason still needs to understand in what way the Good is in the Forms.

§20. Intellect is not the Good, since, although soul desires it, not everything does.

§21. The activity of Intellect and its contents are Good-like insofar as they are derived from the Good, and bounded. Soul desires the life of Intellect insofar as this is derived from the Good.

§22. Each thing is what it is in itself, but it becomes desired when the Good itself colours it, because this gives it grace and love in the eyes of those desiring it.

§23. There must be the Good, otherwise there would be no vice either. The Good produces Intellect, Life, and Soul.

Nine questions about defining the Good:

§§24–30. Is the Good all that the soul desires? Is the Good a mixture of pleasure and knowledge?

§24. The Good is what everything desires; that is how we know there is the Good. The objection is then raised that in and of themselves Life and Intellect, and anything beyond them, are not good.

§25. Our good includes joy, but the Good itself is desired because it is good, not vice versa. The good of the body is soul, that of the soul is virtue. Then comes Intellect, and finally, the Good. It provides ‘light’ to Intellect.

§26. One can tell that one has hit on the good when things improve, there is fulfilment and no regrets. Pleasure, in contrast, always requires continuation with something new.

§27. Appropriation occurs for each thing when it attains its own fulfilment, which is determined by something superior to itself. This leaves the question of what the primary Good is.

§28. Matter has awareness of the Good, that is, being formed, and so being something. The Good is as far from matter as possible.

§29. Pleasure is not characteristic of the primary Good, since it consists in filling a need.

§30. We have a portion of the Good because of a mixture of truth, measurement, and beauty.
The soul’s return to its origin in the Good:

§§31–36. The Good goes beyond the truth, beauty, and proportion of Intellect. When the soul is directed by the Good alone, this means that it is not directed by any Form whatever.

§31. On account of the love of the Good in the soul, it moves beyond sensible things, and Intellect, and desires to make itself like the thing it loves.

§32. The principle of the beauty of the Forms lies in something formless, namely, in the Good.

§33. Form is measured, but Beauty itself is without measure, and without form: Beauty is the nature of the Good itself.

§34. When the soul arrives at Beauty itself, it sheds all other properties, and has a contentment that cannot be surpassed.

§35. When soul arrives at the Good, all motion, and thought, ceases. Intellect can both think its own contents, and also be receptive for the Good. The Good unifies soul and intellect when it is present to them.

§36. Cognizing the Good is ‘the most important subject of learning’. In its case, seeing and light are one.

The Good and thought:

§§37–42. The separation of Intellect from the Good, and the hierarchy of existence.

§37. The Good does not think, and so does not think itself, as the Peripatetics claim.

§38. The Good is not, has no predicates and does not think itself.

§39. Thinking and Substantiality requires Difference, so that the Good cannot think itself, on pain of not being simple.

§40. Persuasion is added to the arguments: the Good is unmixed with thinking, and is only attained when one moves beyond thought.

§41. Since the Good is perfectly one, primary and independent, it cannot think, since thinking requires an object.

§42. The hierarchy: all beings are for the sake of the Good. Intelligibles follow the Good directly, Soul in Intellect produces the sensible things.
6.7 (38)

How the Multiplicity of the Ideas Came to Exist, and on the Good

§6.7.1. When the god or a god$^1$ sent the souls to come to be, he put ‘light-bearing eyes’$^2$ in their faces, and gave them the other sense organs, foreseeing that like this they would be preserved, if they looked ahead, and heard beforehand and, having touched things, could pursue one and avoid another.

How could the god actually foresee these things? For it was certainly not because other things had previously come to be, then perished for want of perceptive capacities, that he then gave these to human beings and other animals, which would be preserved in this way from suffering by them.

In fact, someone might say that he knew that the living being would be amidst hot and cold and the other affections of bodies,$^3$ and that, knowing this, he gave living beings sense-perception and the organs for these so that their bodies might not easily perish; and through these organs the sense-perceptions are actualized. But he gave them either the organs when they already had the capacities or he gave them both at once. But if he gave them the senses as well, then although they were souls beforehand, they did not have the potency for sense-perception.

If they already had the potency for sense-perception when they became souls, and if they became souls so that they might enter the realm of becoming, then it would be natural for them to do so. Therefore, being apart from the realm of becoming, that is, being in the intelligible world, would then be contrary to their nature. And in that case, they would have been produced so as to belong to another thing, and to be amidst evil. And providence would see to it that they might be preserved amidst this evil; and this would be the calculation of god, that is, comprehensive calculation.

$^1$ See Pl., *Tim.* 44E5: it is the younger gods made by the Demiurge who make the human body.

$^2$ See Pl., *Phd.* 113A4 5; *Tim.* 34BC, 41DE.

$^3$ As Plato does, *Tim.* 33A.
What are the principles of these calculations? For even if they come from previous calculations, they must aim at something prior to the calculation, or at some things in any case. So what are the principles? They must [belong] either to sense-perception or intellect. But sense-perception did not yet exist; therefore, intellect. But if the premises [belong to] intellect, then the conclusion must be scientific knowledge. It does not, therefore, concern anything sensible. For since that of which the starting point is in the intelligible reaches its conclusion in the intelligible, too, how is it possible that this disposition⁴ should arrive at discursive thinking regarding the sensible? Given that this is so, neither providence for the living being, nor indeed for this universe, could come about on the basis of calculation since there is no calculation in the intelligible world; one speaks of calculation⁵ only to indicate that things are arranged as though they were the consequences of calculation; and of foresight, because they are as a wise man would have foreseen.⁶ For in things which do not come to be without prior calculation, calculation is useful because of an absence of the power before the calculation, and foresight is useful because the human being who foresees does not possess the power which would mean that he would have no need of foresight.

For foresight is so that this and not that occurs; and it fears, in a way, that such and such does not occur. But it is not foresight, where only this is the case. For calculation also takes one thing instead of another; for what could one calculate if only one of the alternatives is the case? How can what is alone, one, and simple contain, in a developed state, ‘this, so that this does not happen’, or ‘this had to be, if not that’, ‘this appeared useful, and this was preservative when it came about’? He who says these things, therefore, foresaw something and, therefore, calculated it beforehand, certainly in the case we started from, too;⁷ the god bestowed the senses, even if this gift is most puzzling. Nonetheless, if no activity can be incomplete,⁸ and if it is not lawful to think that anything belonging to god is other than whole and total, then everything must be present in anything that belongs to him.

So, anything that is going to be exists already. There is certainly nothing which only occurs later in the intelligible world; rather, something that is already present in the intelligible world comes to be later in something else.⁹ If, then, what is to be is already present, it must be present in such a way that it has been thought in advance for the later event; that is, because it requires nothing then, that is, there is no

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⁴ I.e., the disposition (ἕξις) of Intellect which is exclusively for intellection.
⁵ See Pl., Tim. 34A8. ⁶ Cf. 6.2.21.32 35. ⁷ Cf. supra ll. 1 17.
⁸ See Ar., Meta. 9.6.1048b34 35. ⁹ Cf. 3.7.3.28.
deficiency. All things, therefore, already were and were always, and were in such a way that one later says this is after that. For when something is extended and, in a way, developed, then it can display this after that, though while it is together, it is all this. This is what it means [for something] to contain its explanation in itself.

§6.7.2. For this reason, one can even discover in the sensible world the nature of Intellect, which we see better than we do other things; still, we do not see the dimensions of the need for Intellect; we grant that it contains the ‘that’, but not yet the ‘why’. Or, if we were to grant it the ‘why’, then it is only as something separate. We see a human being or an eye, as it may be, like a statue or as belonging to a statue. In the intelligible world, there is the ‘that’ of human being, and the ‘why’ there is human being, if indeed human being in the intelligible world has to be intellectual; so, too, with the eye and its ‘why’. For it would not be at all, were there no ‘why’. In the sensible world, just as each of its parts is separate, so, too, is the ‘why’. In the intelligible world, all are in one, with the result that the thing [the ‘that’] and the ‘why’ of the thing are identical.

Often in the sensible world, too, the thing and its ‘why’ are identical, for example, in answer to the question what is an eclipse? What, then, prevents each thing being a ‘why’ in the other cases, too, and this being the substantiality of each thing? Rather, this is necessary. And for anyone trying to grasp the ‘what it was to be’, this is the right approach. For what each thing is is why it is. I do not mean that the Form is the explanation for each thing’s existence, although that is true, but that if you unravel each Form in itself, you will find the ‘why’ in it. Anything inactive and without life quite simply does not have the ‘why’ in it; whereas for something that is Form and belongs to Intellect, where else is it meant to take the ‘why’ from? If someone says that it gets it from Intellect, then the Form is not separate from it, if indeed it is Intellect. If, then, the thing must have no deficiency in anything, then neither does it have a deficiency in the ‘why’.

10 Cf. 5.3.15.21; 5.8.9.3; 5.9.6.3. 8. See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.
11 For the distinction between the ‘that’ something is the case, and the ‘why’ it is the case, see Ar., AP 1.13. The ‘why’ here is the explanation of 1.57 supra, and in 2.4 9.
12 Or: ‘Human Being’ indicating the Form. Throughout this chapter and the following Plotinus does not distinguish between the Form of Human Being which is identical with Intellect and the individual undescended intellect. The ambiguity is preserved using lowercase throughout.
13 See Ar., Meta. 8.4.1044b14; AP 2.2.90a15.
14 Τὸ τὶ ἐστὶν, the Aristotelian technical term for the essence of something.
15 I.e., its existence as the kind of thing it is. See Pl., Pbd. 99D4ff. on the Form as ωςία.
This is how Intellect has the ‘why’ of each of the things in it. It is each of those things in it, so that each of them has no need of ‘why’ it came to be; all at once it comes to be and possesses the explanation for its real existence. Since it has not come to be by chance, it cannot be missing any of the ‘why’; instead, since it possesses everything it also possesses the beautiful togetherness of its explanation. And it bestows this in such a way on the things that partake of it, so that they possess the ‘why’.

Further, just as in this universe here, which consists of many things, all things are strung together, and each ‘why’ also depends on the being of all – just as the part in each case is seen as relating to the whole – it is not the case then when this has come to be, then that comes to be after this; rather, explanation and explanandum are together, standing in relation to one another. So, too, in fact, even more so in the intelligible world must all things stand in relation to the whole, and each thing in relation to itself.

If, then, the real existence of all things hangs together, and is not a matter of chance and if they must not be separated, the explananda would have the explanations in themselves; and each thing is such that it has its explanation in a non-explanatory fashion.

If, then, they do not have an explanation for their existence, they are self-sufficient, and bereft of explanation; they must have the explanation in themselves, and with themselves. For indeed if nothing in the intelligible world is in vain, and many things are in each thing, you should be able to say why each thing contains all the things it does contain. The ‘why’ is prior, and existed together with the other things in the intelligible world, without being ‘why’, but just being the ‘that’. It would be better to say that both of these are one. For what would [an intelligible] have above and beyond Intellect, such that a thought of Intellect is not just that, a perfect product?

If, then, it is perfect, it is not possible to say where it is deficient, nor that it is not present because of such and such a reason. You can, therefore, say it is present because it is present. The ‘why’, therefore, is in its real existence [the ‘that’]. So, in each thought and in the result of each act, in a way, the whole of human being appeared, human being bringing all of itself with it, possessing altogether all it has possessed from the start, and altogether available.

Next, if it is not everything, if, that is, one needs to add something to it, then it belongs to the product of a coming to be. But it is always; so it is everything, whereas the human being that has come to be is generated.

16 Cf. infra 40.48. 17 Cf. supra 2.3, 4, and l. 40.
§6.7.3. What, then, prevents god from deliberating in advance about the generated human being?

In fact, he must correspond to that human being in Intellect, so one may not take any part away or add it: deliberation and calculation occur because of the hypothesis; for Plato hypothesized things as having come to be. Thus, deliberation and calculation [are found in the dialogue]. But in indicating that ‘these things always come to be’, Plato cancelled out the calculation. For there is no calculation in eternity. For calculation belongs to someone forgetful of how things were beforehand. Then, if it is better afterwards, it must have been worse beforehand. And if they were beautiful beforehand, then they are similarly beautiful now. They are beautiful together with their explanation.

Even in the sensible world, too, something is beautiful because it contains all that belong to it – for a form also contains everything belonging to it – and because it dominates the matter, and it dominates matter if nothing is left unshaped. And it leaves it unshaped if some shape is missing, an eye or some such. So, when giving the explanation, you will recount all these things. Why, then, are there eyes? So that everything may be there. And why eyebrows? So that everything may be there. And were you to say, ‘for the sake of protecting the eyes’, you would be saying there is something safeguarding the substantiality present in it, that is, that it contributes to the substantiality. The substantiality, therefore, was before this, and therefore the explanation is part of the substantiality. So, there is something else belonging to the substantiality, namely, what it is. So, all things are for one another; and the whole and complete substance, in total, as well as its being beautiful comes with the explanation and lies in the explanation: the substantiality, or the ‘what it was to be’, and the ‘why’ are one.

So, if having the faculty of sense-perception, and being able to perceive in this way is included in the Form, on the grounds of eternal necessity and the perfection of Intellect, which possesses the explanations in itself, if indeed it is perfect, such that we only see afterwards that things are right this way – for in the intelligible world, the explanation is one and complete, and the human being

20 The word is καίρια which can also be translated ‘cause’. The translation ‘cause’ seems better when speaking about Intellect or the One, and ‘explanation’ when speaking about the Forms or intelligibles generally.
21 Cf. 6.5.10. See Pl., Rep. 4.420C 421B; Tim. 87D. 22 See Ar., PA 4.9.685b14.
in the intelligible world is not just intellect\textsuperscript{23} with the faculty of sense-perception added when he was sent to birth – how could that intellect not incline to things in the sensible world? For what would the faculty of sense-perception be other than the grasping of sensibles? How would it not be strange if the faculty of sense-perception is in the intelligible world from eternity, whereas actual sense-perception is in the sensible world, that is, for the actualization of the potency in the intelligible world to be fulfilled in the sensible world just at the time when the soul becomes worse?

§6.7.4. In view of this puzzle, then, we must return to the question of what that human being in the intelligible world is. Presumably, we should say first just what the human being in the sensible world is, so that we do not investigate that one, as though we had him in our possession, whereas we do not know him accurately at all. Perhaps it would seem to some that this human being and that one are identical.

The enquiry begins from this point: is the human being [in the sensible world] an expressed principle other than the soul which produces this human being, providing him with life and reasoning? Or is such and such a soul the human being? Or the soul using a body of such a kind?\textsuperscript{24} But if human being is a rational animal,\textsuperscript{25} and an animal consists of body and soul, then this expressed principle would not be identical with the soul. But if the expressed principle of human being consisted of rational soul and body, how could it be an eternal real existent, if this kind of expressed principle of human being only comes into being when body and soul come together? For then this expressed principle will reveal the future human being, but not such a one as we call the human being itself; it will be more like a definition indeed like the kind which does not make the ‘what it was to be’ clear.\textsuperscript{26} For it does not make the enmattered form clear, but the form–matter complex, which is already. If this is the case, then the [intelligible] human being has not yet been discovered. For it was the one corresponding to the expressed principle.\textsuperscript{27}

If someone were to say, the expressed principle of such things must be [of] a complex, a ‘this in a this’,\textsuperscript{28} he does not think it worthwhile to mention that according to which each thing is. But one has to say this,
for even if it is necessary to say that the expressed principles belong to
the enmattered forms, and are themselves with matter, one must grasp
as far as possible the expressed principle itself which has produced, for
example, a human being; this is especially so for anyone who thinks that
in each case the ‘what it was to be’ has to be defined, when you define
properly. What, then, is it to be a human being? Is this the inherent factor
which has made this human being, and which is not separable? This
expressed principle itself, then, will be a rational living being. Or is the
complex the rational animal, while the expressed principle itself is
productive of the rational living being? What, then, is it itself? Or
does ‘living being’ take the place of ‘rational life’ in the definition?
So, the human being is rational life. Is the human being, then, life
without soul?

In fact, soul provides rational life; and the human being will then be
the activity of soul, and not a substance; or else the soul will be the
human being. But if the rational soul is to be the human being, then how
is it not a human being when it enters another animal?

§6.7.5. So, the human being must be an expressed principle other than
soul. What prevents the human being from being some complex:
a soul in such an expressed principle, given that the expressed principle
is, in a way, such and such an activity, and given that the activity cannot
exist without the agent? This is the way the expressed principles are in
seeds. For they are neither without souls nor just souls. The expressed
principles that produce them are not inanimate, and there is nothing
surprising if these kinds of substances are expressed principles.

The expressed principles, then, which actually produce the human
being are the activities of what kind of soul? Of the soul responsible for
growth?

In fact, they are of the soul which produces the living being, a clearer
soul, and hence more alive.

A soul of this kind, when it has come to be in such and such matter,
inasmuch as it is this, that is, being disposed this way, and without the
body, is the human being; when in itself shaped in the body, it made
another image of human being such as the body can take on, just as the

29 See Ar., Meta. 7.4.1029b14. 30 Cf. 1.1.
31 Adding a question mark to the sentence.
32 This is an exceptionally clear use of the core meaning of λόγος for a Form contained in
Intellect and ‘expressed’ in souls. The composite human being cannot be soul alone.
33 I.e., the soul.
34 ‘Clearer’ means higher in the intelligible hierarchy. Cf. 3.8.8.18; 6.3.7.22; 6.6.18.16.
painter will produce a human being lesser even than this one; it has the shape, the principles or characters, the dispositions, the capacities, but they are all faint because this human being is not the primary one. Moreover, this soul has other senses which are held to be clear, but are fainter relative to those prior to them and images.

But the human being above this one belongs to a more divine soul, containing a better human being and clearer senses. This must be the human being Plato defines when he adds that the soul ‘uses a body’; it supervenes on that soul which primarily uses a body, and the soul which uses body at one remove is more divine. Once a human being with a faculty of sense-perception had come to be, this soul followed and bestowed a clearer life on the human being. It would be better to say, not that it followed, but that it added itself, in a way. For it does not step outside the intelligible world, but, bound together with the lower soul, it holds the lower soul depending on it itself, having mixed itself, an expressed principle, with an expressed principle. Hence, this human being, although he is murky, becomes clear by illumination.

§6.7.6. How, then, is there the faculty of sense-perception in the better soul?

In fact, it is a potency for sense-perception of the sensibles in the intelligible world as they exist there. For this reason, it also perceives the sensible harmony in this way, whereas the human being [in the sensible world] has a receptive perceptual potency, and is attuned to the last degree to the harmony in the intelligible world, for example, when the fire in the sensible world is attuned to the Fire in the intelligible world, the sense-perception of this fire belongs to that soul corresponding to the nature of Fire there.

Insofar as there are these bodies in the intelligible world, there would be acts of sense-perception and acts of apprehension of them by the soul. And the human being in the intelligible world, the soul of such and such a kind, would be capable of apprehending them. This is why the posterior human being, the imitation, contains their expressed principles in an imitative form. The human being in the Intellect is the human being prior to all human beings.

The first illuminates the second, and the second the third. The last human being contains all of them in a certain sense, not by becoming them but because it is close to them. One of us acts according to the last human being, another has something of the one before the last one, and yet another has his activity from the third [the human being in Intellect].

35 See Pl., Rep. 10.595A 598C.
36 I.e., the intellect. See Pl. [?], Alc. 1 129E11; Phd. 79C2 3.
37 The ‘sensible harmony’ is the mathematical proportions of the elements.
Each of them is the human being according to which he is active; and yet each both does and does not contain them all. Given that the third life, that is, the third human being, is separated from the body, if the second continues to be connected with the body, it would be connected while not separated from things above, where it and the [first] are said to belong.

When it [the second soul] takes hold of a beast’s body, one is filled with wonder, as to how the expressed principle of this is the expressed principle of a human being.

In fact, it is everything, and it acts at different times in accordance with different things; and before it has gone bad, it wants to be the human being and is a human being. For this is more beautiful, and it produces what is more beautiful. It produces also the prior daemons, which have the same form as human beings. And the human being before this soul is even more of a daemon, or better, a god, for the daemon that depends on god, as the human being does on the daemon, is an imitation of god.

What the human being depends on in fact is not called a god. For there is a distinction, namely, the one that souls have towards one another, even if they belong to the identical rank. One should also call ‘daemons’ the kind of daemon which Plato calls ‘intelligences’. But when the soul connected to the daemon it had when it was human being follows a soul that chose ‘the nature of a beast’, it gives the expressed principle that it had in itself to the animal. For this contains it, and this is an inferior activity for it.

§6.7.7. But if the soul only informs a bestial nature on going to the bad, and being degraded, there was not anything originally in it which would have produced an ox or a horse. Thus, the expressed principle of horse, that is, the horse, would have been contrary to nature.

In fact, it is something lesser, not really contrary to nature; that which produced them was in some way originally a horse or a dog. And if the soul contains the means, then it produces something better, and if not, then it produces what it can, which at any rate was what it was ordained to produce. It is like creators who know how to produce many forms, and then either produce these, or what they were ordered to, or what the matter was suited to.

38 Reading ἡ δευτέρα with the mss.
39 Cf. 3.5.6.37.
40 See Pl., Symp. 202D13 E1; Tim. 90A2 4. At Crat. 398B, Plato says that δαίμονες (‘daemons’) are δαίμονες (‘intelligences’). Accordingly, we follow Harder in reading δαίμονες. This is accepted by HS¹ but not by HS².
41 See Pl., Tim. 42C3 4.
For what prevents the power of the soul of the universe from producing a sketch beforehand, inasmuch as it is the expressed principle of everything, even before the psychical powers deriving from it? And what prevents the sketch produced beforehand from being like illuminations anticipating matter, and soul from carrying out the work, following these traces, articulating traces part for part? \(^{42}\) Each soul becomes then what it draws near, shaping itself, just as the dancer fits himself to the role assigned to him.

We have reached this point by following one continuous line of thought. Our argument was how the faculty of sense-perception belongs to the [intelligible] human being, and how those things [sensibles] in the intelligible world do not look in the direction of generation. And it seemed to us, and the argument showed, that those things in the intelligible world do not look in the direction of things [sensibles] in the sensible world, but these things here are dependent upon those things there, and imitate them. And this human being has its powers from that human being, in relation to those things [sensibles]: the sensibles in the sensible world are coupled with this human being, and the sensibles in the intelligible world are coupled with that human being.

We called the latter ‘sensibles’ \(^{43}\) because, though they are incorporeal, they are apprehended in a different way \(^{44}\) – and in the sensible world we called it ‘sense-perception’ because it is of bodies, though this apprehension is fainter than that in the intelligible world, where, because it is of incorporeals, \(^{45}\) it was said to be clearer. Because of this, the human being in the sensible world has a faculty of sense-perception, too, because he has a lesser apprehension of lesser images than those in the intelligible world. The upshot is that these acts of sense-perception are faint acts of intellection, whereas the acts of intellection in the intelligible world are clear acts of sense-perception.

§6.7.8. So much for the faculty of sense-perception. But how are horse and each of the animals in the intelligible world really there in the intelligible world? And how did the [Demiurge] not want to look at

\(^{42}\) Cf. 4.3.6.13 \(^\circ\) 15. \(^{43}\) Cf. supra 6.2.8.

\(^{44}\) The logic of this troubled text, as translated, suggests that the ‘sensibles’ in the intelligible world are apprehended in a way differently from the apprehension of those intelligibles that do not have sensible imitations. Alternatively, with a slightly different text, Plotinus is making the predictable claim that all intelligibles are apprehended differently from the way sensibles are apprehended.

\(^{45}\) Reading αἰσθήσις ὅτι <ἀ>σωμάτων with Hadot.
the things in the sensible world when he produced the animals? But what if it were the case that, in order that a horse or another animal may come to be in the sensible world, he invented the thought of a horse? Still, how was it possible, when wanting to produce a horse, to think it up? For clearly the thought of a horse was there already, if indeed he wanted to produce a horse.

The upshot is that it is not possible to have the thought, in order that he can produce the horse; instead, the Horse that does not come to be exists in the intelligible world before the one that will exist after that. If, then, the horse in the intelligible world existed before the generation [of the other one], and was not thought so that the horse in the sensible world could come to be, then he who possesses in himself the horse in the intelligible world does not possess it with a view to the horses here. Nor did he possess the horse – and other [intelligibles] – so that he could produce the horses in the sensible world; rather, they were in the intelligible world, and the ones in the sensible world followed them of necessity. For it was not possible for things to stop with the things in the intelligible world. For who could have stopped a power that could both remain and proceed?

But why are the animals [in the sensible world] in the intelligible world? What are they in god? Rational animals are there, so be it. But the vast number of non-rational animals – what is holy about them? And why not the opposite? Because it is clear that the One-Being also has to be many, since it is posterior to that which is absolutely One. Otherwise it would not be posterior to the One, but would be the One itself. And since it is posterior to that, it was not possible for it to exceed that One in unity; it had to fall short of it. Since the best was the One, it had to be more than one. For multiplicity lies in deficiency.

So what prevents it from being a Dyad?

In fact, it was not possible for either of the two parts in the Dyad to be absolutely one; rather they had to be at least two, and so, too, their parts in turn.

Next, there was Motion and Stability in the primary Dyad, there was Intellect and Life in it – that is, perfect Intellect and perfect Life. So, it was not as one Intellect, but as all Intellect, that is Intellect containing all the individual intellects; Intellect as many as these are, and more. And

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46 Following Hadot, we read ὡς with the mss and adding a question mark in the first sentence and then adding <πῶς> at the beginning of the second sentence. Cf. supra 7. 18 20.
47 Cf. 5.9.7 8. 48 Cf. 5.5.1 3; 5.9.7 8.
49 Cf. 5.1.8; 6.9.1; 4. See Pl., Parm. 145A2.
50 See Pl., Parm. 142E3 143A1.
51 Cf. 5.9.10.10 15; 6.9.2.24 25. See Pl., Soph. 249A C on the μίγιστα γένη (‘greatest genera’), including Motion and Stability. These are discussed in 6.2.
it was alive not as one soul, but as all souls, containing more power to produce the individual souls. And it was a ‘complete Living Being’,\(^{52}\) containing not only the human being in itself; otherwise, human being would be only in the sensible world.

§6.7.9. Let us admit, someone may say, the more honourable animals, but what about the lower animals and the non-rational ones? Their lowness comes from their being non-rational, clearly, if honour belongs to that which is rational. And if animals are honourable due to their intellectual quality, they are the opposite by their lack of it. Yet how can something without thought\(^{53}\) or non-rational belong to that Intellect in which each thing exists or from which they came?

Before we actually approach these questions, let us grasp that the human being in the sensible world is not such as the one in the intelligible world; so, then, other animals are not in the intelligible world as they are in the sensible world – they have to be understood in a superior sense.

Next, neither is there rationality there. The human being is presumably rational in the sensible world; in the intelligible world, he is prior to calculative reasoning.\(^{54}\) Why, then, would the human being calculate in the intelligible world, and not the other animals?

In fact, since thinking in the intelligible world is different in human beings and in other animals, then so, too, is calculating different. Many products of discursive thinking are in other animals as well; why, then, are they not equally rational? And why are not human beings among themselves equally rational?

One should bear in mind that the many lives are, in a way, motions, and the many acts of intellection need not be the same: both lives and acts of intellection are different. The distinctions differ in luminosity and clarity, first, second, and third, depending on the proximity to the first principles. This is why some of these acts of intellection are gods, others a second kind, which has here the designation ‘rational’, and the one coming after that is called ‘non-rational’. In the intelligible world, what is called here ‘non-rational’ is an expressed principle, and what is without Intellect is Intellect; for it is Intellect that is thinking Horse – and the intellection of Horse is Intellect.

\(^{52}\) See Pl., Tim. 31B1.

\(^{53}\) The word is ἀνόητον (‘without thought’), which would normally be translated as ‘non intelligible’ but is here used to mean ‘non intellectual’ since the hypothetical Greek word for the latter, ἀνόερος, does not seem to exist.

\(^{54}\) The words λογικός (‘rational’) and λογίζεσθαι (‘calculating’) are quite close. Plotinus is thinking of rationality as discursive as opposed to intellection (νόησις) which is not.
But if it was intellection alone, there would be nothing absurd in it being the intellection of that which is without thought. But, as it is, if intellection is identical with the thing, then, how can there be intellection, with the thing being without thought? For in that way, Intellect would make itself be without thought.

In fact, then, it is not without thought, but Intellect with such and such a nature; for it has such and such a life.

For just as such and such a life does not cease to be life, Intellect does not cease to be Intellect; since the intellect in any living being, including a human being, does not cease to be the Intellect of all things, if indeed each and every part is a part of the Intellect of all things, each, presumably, in a different sense. In actuality it is that one thing, but it has the potency for everything. We grasp what is actualized in the particular. And what is actualized is the last thing, for example, the last thing of [the actuality of] Intellect is being horse: it is a horse insofar as it ceases proceeding to ever inferior life forms, and another form if it ceases lower down.

As the powers unfold, they always leave something above. In proceeding, they lose something at each step, and different powers, by losing different things because of the inadequacy of the animal which appears, find different additions coming out of the deficiency, for example, because the animal no longer had what was sufficient for living, nails appeared, claws, with fitting teeth, or horns. The result is that wherever Intellect has descended to, it bounces back because of the self-sufficiency in its nature; its finds in itself the cure for the deficiency.

§ 6.7.10. But how did it come to be deficient in the intelligible world? Why are there horns for defence in the intelligible world?

In fact, for the self-sufficiency and completeness of the Living Being. For as Living Being it must be complete, and as Intellect, it must be complete, and so, too, as Life. The result is that if it is not this, well, then it is that. And the differentia comes from this [property] being substituted for that, so that from all things there may ensue the most complete Living Being, complete Intellect, and the most complete Life: each thing is perfect as the thing it is.

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55 See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1075a1 5.
56 Here employing the ambiguity of ἄνοιγμα as ‘without thought’ or ‘non intelligible’.
57 Each individual intellect and each intelligible thing is a part of Intellect.
58 I.e., a putatively deficient A is really a complete or perfect B.
Further, if the Living Being consists of many things, it must still be one; in fact, it is not possible that it consist of many things and that these are all identical.

In fact, it would then be a self-sufficient unity. So, it must consist of things that are specifically different, like any composite, and where each thing, that is, the shapes\textsuperscript{59} and definitions of the ingredients, are preserved. For the shapes, for example, of a human being, come from such differences, and yet there is one that stands over all. And they are better and worse than one another, eye, and finger, but they all belong to the one thing. But the universe is not worse; indeed, it is better that it is this way. The expressed principle is living being, plus something else [the differentiating property] which is not identical with living being. And ‘virtue’ refers to what is common [the genus] and to what is unique [the differentiating property]; and what is beautiful is the whole [genus plus differentiating property], while what is common is indifferent [neither beautiful nor ugly].

§6.7.11. But it is said that heaven itself does not disdain the nature of all animals – and many animals do actually appear in it – since the universe contains them all. Where, then, does it have them from? Are there all things such as are in the sensible world also in the intelligible world?

In fact, it has all those that are produced by an expressed principle and in accordance with form. But when\textsuperscript{60} it contains fire, then it contains earth, too; and, in any case, it contains plants. And how are there plants in the intelligible world? And how does fire live there? And earth? Indeed, either it lives or it is like a corpse in the intelligible world; then, the result would be that not everything in the intelligible world is alive.

And, generally, what are these things in the intelligible world?

In fact, plants can be fitted into the argument since even in the sensible world, a plant is an expressed principle based in life. If the unmattered expressed principle of the plant, in accordance to which the plant is, is indeed such and such a life, and a kind of soul, and the expressed principle is some one thing, then this expressed principle is either the primary plant or it is not; and in the latter case, the primary plant [the Form of the Plant] is before it, that is, the one this plant derives from. And that primary plant is one, whereas these ones here are many, and necessarily derive from one. And if this is indeed so, then the primary one must live more and be itself a plant; and in derivation from this, the others live secondarily and at a third remove, following in its footsteps.

59 The μορφαί (‘shapes’) are the sensible counterparts of the intelligible Forms.
60 ‘When’ in the sense of ‘if’.

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And what about earth? And what is it for earth to exist? And what is the earth in the intelligible world in possession of life? Or, first, what is earth in the sensible world, that is, what is it to be earth? Certainly, it must, even in the sensible world, have some shape and an expressed principle. And in the case of the plant in the intelligible world it was alive, as its expressed principle is alive in the sensible world. So, too, for this earth in the sensible world?

In fact, if we grasp whatever has most become earthen and been shaped in it, then we would find the nature of earth.

So, consider the growth and formation of stones, the inner shaping of growing mountains. In these cases, we are bound to think of these coming from an animate expressed principle which creates them inwardly and gives them form. And this is the productive form of earth, just as in trees their so-called nature, and so-called earth is analogous to the wood in the tree; and when a stone is cut off it is thus like when one cuts a bit from the tree; but if this does not happen to it, it is still fitted together, like something not cut from the living plant.

When we have indeed discovered nature creating as a creator situated in earth, a life in an expressed principle, we will believe all the more that earth in the intelligible world is much more alive, the expressed principle of life, earth itself, primary earth, from which earth in the sensible world originates.

If fire, too, is an expressed principle in matter, as with the other things like this, it is not spontaneously fire; for then where does it come from? Not from rubbing as one might think. For rubbing is of the bodies being rubbed together which already contain fire, and there is already fire in the universe. Nor is the matter fire in potency in such a way that it is in it, if, that is, the productive factor actually has to work according to an expressed principle, as it gives shape to the product. So what would this be other than the soul that is able to produce fire? This is life and an expressed principle, both being one and identical in both.

For this reason, Plato says that soul is in each of the elements, actually producing the sensible fire. So, what produces fire in the sensible world is also a kind of fiery life, quite veritable fire. And fire in the intelligible world, being more fire, must be more alive. The fire, therefore, itself lives as well.

The identical argument applies to the others, that is, to water and air. But why are these not ensouled like the earth? It is anyway clear that

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61 Cf. 5.9.6.20. This is the Stoic use of the term φύσις. See e.g., SVF 2.743 (= Galen, De foet. form. 4.699).
62 See Ar., DC 2.7.289a20.
63 See Pl. [?], Epin. 981B C, 984B C.
these elements are in the whole Living Being, that is, that they are parts of a Living Being. But life does not appear in these elements any more than it does in earth. However, it was possible to deduce its presence in the intelligible world\textsuperscript{64} from the things which come to be in it. Still, living beings come to be in fire, too, and most clearly in water. And the composition of some living beings is airy.\textsuperscript{65}

Each fire, in coming to be and in being extinguished quickly, passes by the soul in all fire, and has not come to be a persisting mass, such that it would manifest its soul. Similarly with air and water, for if they did naturally coagulate, they would manifest it, but since they needed to be flowing, they do not manifest the soul they have.

It is, presumably, the same with the fluids in us such as blood. For flesh, and anything that becomes flesh, is held to have soul from the blood,\textsuperscript{66} while blood, not providing sense-perception,\textsuperscript{67} does not seem to have soul; but there is necessarily soul in it, too. Without anything violent happening to it, it is ready to separate itself from the soul present in it. This is just as one has to conceive of it in the case of the three elements; for the living beings consisting above all of air do not perceive what they undergo.\textsuperscript{68} Like air passing by intense and steady light, as long as it persists,\textsuperscript{69} this is how air both passes by its soul in a circle and does not pass by. And likewise for the other elements.

§6.7.12. However, let us say the following: since we assert that this universe stands in relation to that one [the intelligible world] as to what is, in a way, its model, the whole Living Being must exist prior in the intelligible world, too, and if its existence is to be complete,\textsuperscript{70} then it must be all living beings. And the sky must actually be a living being in the intelligible world, too, not of course a sky empty of stars, as we call them in the sensible world; that is what being sky is. And clearly the earth is not empty in the intelligible world either, but much more alive than in the sensible world: all animals are in it – those that we call footed and land animals in the sensible world, and, clearly, plants settled in life. And there is sea in the intelligible world, and all water in flux and persisting life; and all the living beings in water. And air is part of the universe in the intelligible world, and the airy animals are in it analogous

\textsuperscript{64} Cf. \textit{supra} ll. 21 36.
\textsuperscript{65} I.e., daemons. Cf. \textit{infra} ll. 67 68; 4.5.7.26 27. See Pl. [?], \textit{Epin.} 984E5; Apuleius, \textit{The Daemon of Socrates}, 12.144.
\textsuperscript{66} See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 8oD 81B; Ar., \textit{PA} 2.3.650a34.
\textsuperscript{67} Because, whereas we perceive our flesh being touched, we do not perceive our blood being touched. See Ar., \textit{PA} 2.3.650b5.
\textsuperscript{68} These are \textit{δαιμονες}. Cf. 3.5.6.31.
\textsuperscript{69} For what happens when a current of air passes through a ray of light, cf. 4.3.22.4 8.
\textsuperscript{70} See Pl., \textit{Tim.} 31B1.
to the air itself. How can things in what is living [the Living Being] not be living, as they actually are even in the sensible world?\textsuperscript{71}

How, then, could not all living beings be in the intelligible world of necessity? As each of the great parts of the cosmos are in the intelligible world, so, too, there is necessarily the nature of living beings in them. In the manner, then, in which heaven is in the intelligible world, so, too, all the living beings in heaven are in the intelligible world; it is not possible for them not to be. Otherwise, the great parts would not be in the intelligible world either.\textsuperscript{72}

Who, then, enquires where living beings come from, enquires where heaven in the intelligible world comes from. This is to enquire where the Living Being comes from, and this is identical to enquiring where life, that is, universal Life, soul, that is, universal Soul, and intellect, that is, universal Intellect come from, because there is no poverty or lack in the intelligible world; instead, everything is filled with life, and in a way seething.\textsuperscript{73} There is, in a way, a flowing of all things from one spring, not as from a single breath or heat, but as though there were one quality which contains all qualities in itself, and preserves them, sweetness with sweet-odour, a vinous quality, the powers of all tastes, the sights of all colours, all that touch can know, all that hearing can hear, all tunes and all rhythms.

§6.7.13. For neither Intellect, nor the Soul arising from it is something simple, but they are all\textsuperscript{74} variegated according to their simplicity, that is, according to their lack of composition, and insofar as they are principles and activities. At the bottom end, the activity is simple because it is where things come to a stop; and all the activities of the first are simple. Intellect in motion is moved [always] in the same manner, that is, in identical respects, and always [as] the same things, since it is not one identical thing in particular, but all things.\textsuperscript{75} For even the one particular is not one thing but unlimited when it is divided.\textsuperscript{76}

Where should we assert it starts from, and where does it finally end? Is all that lies in between like a line, or like another uniform and unvariegated body? But what would be so august about that? For if there is no radical alteration in it, if no Difference wakes it into life, then it would not be activity.\textsuperscript{77} For a condition like that would be no different from non-activity. And if the Intellect’s motion were like this, then its

\textsuperscript{71} Cf. 5.9.9.8 14. \textsuperscript{72} Cf. 5.8.4.4 11.
\textsuperscript{73} See Ar., DA 1.2.405a28 for the conjectured etymological connection between \(\zeta\eta\nu\nu\) (‘boiling’) and \(\zeta\eta\nu\nu\) (‘living’).
\textsuperscript{74} Including intellects that partake of Intellect and souls that partake of Soul.
\textsuperscript{75} Cf. infra l. 50. \textsuperscript{76} See Pl., Parm. 144B1 E7; Soph. 248A12.
\textsuperscript{77} See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1074b17 18.
life would not be multifarious, but monotonous. But it must live entirely, and in every aspect everywhere, and nothing of it may not live. It must, then, move itself in all directions, or rather to have moved itself in all directions.

Indeed, if it were to move itself simply, it would only contain that one motion. And either it is itself, and has not proceeded to anything further, or if it has proceeded, some other [part] of it remained. The result is, then, that it is two. And if this is identical with that [part], it remains one, and has not proceeded; and if this is different from that, it proceeded with difference, and produced a third one from that which is identical and different. Since it has indeed come to be from Identity and Difference, the thing that comes to be has the nature of Identity and Difference. But it is another something, another whole. For that which is identical is the whole of that which is identical. Since it is the whole of Identity and the whole of Difference, it leaves out none of the different things. It, therefore, has the nature to be made wholly different.

If then all the different Beings are prior to it, it would have already undergone motion under their influence. If they are not, then this Intellect generated all things, or indeed, better, was all of them. It is not possible, therefore, for Beings to be if Intellect does not activate them, and it activates one thing after another, and in a way wandering all wanderings, wandering in itself, just as it is the nature of true Intellect to wander in itself. It naturally wanders among Substances, as the Substances run along its wanderings with it. Intellect is everywhere itself. It, then, has a constant wandering. Its wandering is on ‘the plane of truth’, which it does not leave.

It has taken it all into its possession, and has made it in a way a place for its motion; the place is identical with that of which it is the place. This plain is variegated, so that it may traverse it. Were it not in every respect and always variegated, it would come to a standstill insofar as it is not variegated. If it comes to a standstill, it does not think. The result is that if it ever came to a standstill, then it was not thinking. And if so, then it does not exist. It is, then, intellection.

All motion fulfils all Substance, and all Substance is all intellection, embracing all Life, one thing after another. And whatever belonging to Intellect is identical with and also different from it; it makes another

\[78\] See Pl., Tim., 35A3 5. In this passage, the ‘third one’ refers to the soul of the cosmos. Here, Plotinus uses ‘third one’ to refer to Intellect in its identity with all intelligibles. The ‘first one’ is the One; the second, Intellect in its initial phase as generated by the One.

\[79\] See Pl., Parm. 136E2; Lg. 683A. \s[80] See Pl., Phdr. 248B6.

\[81\] See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1074b33 35.
thing always appear for anyone who analyses the Intellect. The path goes through life, and past all living beings, just as for someone going over the earth all he passes is earth, even if the earth has differences.

And the Life in the intelligible world, through which the path leads is identical, but because it is always different, it is not identical. For the Intellect always has the identical traversal running through things that are not identical, because it does not swap one thing for another, but is with the other things in the same way and in the identical respects. If the same way and the identical respects did not apply to other things, the Intellect would be entirely idle; being active and activity would be nowhere. For the Intellect itself is the other things, too, such that it is itself all. If indeed it is itself, it is all; if it were not, then it would not be itself. If it is itself all, and it is all because it is all things, and there is nothing which does not contribute to the completion of all things, then there is nothing belonging to Intellect which is not another thing, so that it may by being another thing also complete this thing. For if it is not another thing, but identical with another thing, it will diminish its own substantiality by not providing for the completion of its nature.

§6.7.14. It is possible by the use of intellectual models to know what manner of thing Intellect is, that is, how it does not stand not being other than it is, in the fashion of a unit. You would not want to take the expressed principle of plant or animal as a model. For if it was some one being, and not a variegated one, then it would not be an expressed principle; rather, the thing that has come to be would be matter, since the expressed principle would not have become it all, by entering in everywhere in the matter and letting none of it be itself.

For example a face is not one mass; it is also nostrils and eyes, and the nose is not merely one thing, but there are several parts of it, if it is to be a nose. For if it were one simple being, then it would be merely a mass. In the same way, the unlimited is also one in the Intellect, in the sense of a ‘one-many’, not in the way a mass is one, but as an expressed principle in it which is multiple; in one figure of the Intellect, like an outline, it contains outlines inside, and configurations inside also, and powers and acts of intellection, not according to a linear division, but eternally inwards, like that of the whole Living Being into the natures of living beings it embraces, and again a division into fairly small living beings, and into the weaker power, where it finally comes to a stop at the individual form.

82 See Pl., Soph. 248A12.
83 Cf. 6.4.1.24.
84 On Intellect as one many cf. 4.8.3.10; 5.1.8.26; 5.3.15.11, 22; 6.2.15.14 15, etc. See Pl., Parm. 144E5.
85 See Ar., Top. 3.6.120a35; Phys. 5.4.227b7.
But the division lying in Intellect is not a jumble, even if it is of Beings that are one; rather, this is, in the universe, what is called ‘Love in the universe’,\textsuperscript{86} not of course the love in the sensible universe, in that this is an imitation of being friendly arising out of disparate things. True love is for all things to be one and never dispersed. Empedocles does, however, claim that it is dispersed within our universe.\textsuperscript{87}

§6.7.15. Who, then, would not delight in this life, if he saw it – plentiful, whole, of the first order and one, and disdain all other life? For the other lives are in darkness, the lives down below, that are small and faint, cheap, not pure, and dirtying the pure lives. And if you should look towards these lives, then you will no longer see the pure lives, nor will you live all those lives all together in which there is nothing which does not live, and in which one lives purely without any evil. For evils are in the sensible world, because here is just a trace of Life and a trace of Intellect.

In the intelligible world, Plato says, the archetype is Good-like,\textsuperscript{88} because it contains the Good in the Forms. On the one hand, there is the Good, and on the other Intellect is good because its life consists in contemplation. It contemplates the objects of contemplation themselves which are Good-like, and which it obtained when it contemplated the nature of the Good.\textsuperscript{89} They came to it, not as they were there [i.e., in the Good], but as Intellect itself came to possess them. For that [the Good] is the principle, and from that the Forms come to be in Intellect; this Intellect is what produced these things from that Good. For it was not licit for Intellect, in looking towards the Good, either to think nothing or to think them in the Good. For in that case, Intellect would not have generated them.

For the Intellect acquired the power to generate from the Good, and to be filled with its offspring, because the Good granted them, which it itself did not have. But out of one thing many come about for this Intellect. For it broke up the power which it was unable to contain, and made many out of the one power, so that it could bear it part by part. Whatever it generated came from the power of the Good and was Good-like, and Intellect itself was good from the things Good-like – a variegated good.

\textsuperscript{86} Love or Friendship, in Empedocles one of the ordering principles. See fr. 31 B 17.7, 26.5 DK. In ll. 22 23 where Empedocles’ theory is also mentioned, he is not named.

\textsuperscript{87} The word here is οὐρανός, usually translated as ‘heaven’ but evidently referring to all that is under the ‘dome’ of heaven, that is, the sensible cosmos. See Empedocles, 31 A 52 DK (= Simplicius, In DC 293.22 23; In Phys. 31.1.23).

\textsuperscript{88} Cf. 3.8.11.16 17; 6.8.18.27, where the Good is the archetype. See Pl., Rep. 509A3.

\textsuperscript{89} See Pl., Phil. 60B10.
For this reason, if someone were to liken the Good to a living variegated sphere,\(^{90}\) and either imagine it a thing that is all face, radiant with living faces, or as all pure souls congregated together without lack having all that belongs to them, with the whole Intellect settled on their tops, so as to illuminate the place with intellectual light – if you imagine it like this, then you would be seeing it from outside as one looking at another; but one should become that itself, and make oneself the vision.\(^{91}\)

§ 6.7.16. But it is necessary not always to rest in this multiple beauty; one must make the transition, rushing upwards, leaving this [Intellect], too, behind, not starting from this heaven, but from that one,\(^{92}\) filled with wonderment at who engendered it and how.

Each thing, then, is a Form, and each is, in a way, a unique impression. Since they are Good-like,\(^{93}\) they all contain in common the thing that runs through them all; so they all have in them Being, they all have the Living Being, since a life in common is present in all; and, presumably, other things, too.

But what can they be good in accordance with and because of? Actually, for this kind of enquiry it is probably helpful to start as follows: did Intellect, when it was looking towards the Good, conceive of that One as a many and, being one itself, conceive of the Good as a many, in portioning up the Good, because it was not capable of thinking it whole all together?\(^{94}\)

But looking at the Good it was not yet Intellect; it looked non-intellectually.

In fact, we should assert that Intellect was never seeing the Good; rather, it was living relative to it; it was dependent on it, and was turned towards it. The motion itself was actually fulfilled by being motion in the intelligible world, and it was fulfilled in relation to the Good itself; it was no longer mere motion, but satiated and full motion. Intellect next became all things and knew this in its self-awareness;\(^{94}\) and now it was Intellect, having been fulfilled, so that it possessed what it saw; it looks on them with light, since it is provided both with them and the light by the bestower of them.

Because of this the Good is said\(^ {95}\) to be the cause not only of the Substance but also of the substance being seen; just as the sun, in being the cause of sensible things being seen and coming to be, and so of

\(^{90}\) Cf. 6.5.4.22. See Pl., Phd. 110B7.

\(^{91}\) Cf. 1.6.9.22; 5.8.10.40, 11.20 21; 6.9.10.19 21, 11.43.

\(^{92}\) The intelligible heaven. Cf. supra 15.20 22. \(^{93}\) Cf. infra 18.1.

\(^{94}\) Cf. 5.3.13.13, 21. See Ar., EE 7.12.1244b26, 1245b24.

seeing in a way, too – and so it is neither seeing nor the things coming to be – so, too, the nature of the Good, being the cause of Substance and Intellect is light, according to the analogy, for the visible things in the intelligible world and the seeing things there, although it is neither Beings not Intellect, but is the cause of them, and, with its light, makes possible thinking and being thought for Beings and Intellect. Intellect came into being by being fulfilled, and fulfilled it was, and brought all things to completion together and saw it. Its principle was before Intellect was fulfilled; it is another principle which, in a way, from outside fulfilled it, and which stamped it with its mark in fulfilling it.

§6.7.17. But how are the Forms in Intellect, and how are they identical with it, although they are not there in the Good which fulfils it, nor in the Intellect as it is being fulfilled?

For when it was not yet fulfilled, it did not contain them.

In fact, it is not really necessary for something that gives something to possess what it gives, but in such cases the giver is to be considered as greater, and what is given is lesser than the giver. Such is coming to be in Beings. For first there has to be something in actuality, whereas the later stages are potentially what came before them. That is, the primary transcends the secondary, and the giver transcends the given. For it is better.

If, then, anything is prior to actuality, then it transcends actuality; and thus transcends Life, too. If Life is in Intellect, then the giver gave Life, and is itself beautiful and more honourable than Life. So, Intellect had Life, and was in no need of a variegated giver. Life was a kind of trace of the Good, not the Life of the Good.

Life, then, while it was looking to the Good, was indefinite, but once it had looked, it was bounded in the intelligible world, although the Good has no boundary. For straightaway on having looked towards something one it is bounded by it, and has in itself boundary, limit, and form. And the form is in the thing shaped, while the thing that shapes is without shape. The boundary was not external, as though it had been set around a magnitude, but was a boundary belonging to all that life, which was itself multiple and unlimited, because it shines out of such a great nature. And it was not life of just something, for then it would have been, as belonging to an individual, bounded already. But, nonetheless, bounded it was; it was, therefore, the bounded life of a ‘one-many’ – and indeed each of the many was also bounded – and while it was

bounded as many, because of the multitude of its life, it was still one because of its boundary.

What, then, does it mean to say 'life was bounded as one'? That it is Intellect, for bounded Life is Intellect. And what are these many things? Many intellects. All things, then, are intellects; the whole is Intellect, and each is an intellect.

Does the whole Intellect, including each intellect, include each as identical to it? If it did, then it would include only one. And if they are many intellects, there must be some differentiation among them. Again, then, how does each intellect acquire some differentiation?

In fact, it possessed a difference by becoming entirely one. For the totality of Intellect is not identical with any one intellect.

The Life of Intellect, then, was all power, whereas the seeing coming from the Good was the potentiality for being all things. And the Intellect that came to be appeared as all things themselves. The Good is enthroned over them, not so that it has a foundation, but so that it may found the Form of the primary Forms, while remaining formless itself.

Intellect comes to be in relation to Soul as light for it, just as that Good is for Intellect. And when Intellect bounds Soul, it makes it rational by giving it a trace of what it acquired. Intellect, then, is also a trace of the Good. Since Intellect is also Form, both in extent and multiplicity, that Good is shapeless and formless: for it produces Forms in this way.

If that Good were Form, then Intellect would be an expressed principle. But that which is first may not be multiple in any way; its multiplicity would again depend on another prior to it.

§6.7.18. But on account of what are the things in Intellect Good-like? Is it that each is a Form or insofar as each is beautiful or what? Indeed, if all that comes from the Good possesses a trace or impression of it, or a trace of that which derives from it, just as what comes from fire is the trace of fire or what comes from the sweet is a trace of sweetness, and if Life, too, has come from the Good to Intellect – for it comes to really exist from the activity from the Good – and if Intellect really exists on

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100 Cf. 6.2.22.10 11.
101 The word is διαφορά, which can refer to a differentia among species within a genus or to a difference among individuals within a species. The translation 'differentiation' is neutral between the two.
102 See Ar., DA 3.8.432a2 where Aristotle identifies intellect as 'form of forms'.
103 The 'external' activity of the Good distinct from the 'internal' activity. Cf. infra 21. 4.6, 40.21 24; 2.9.8.22 25; 4.5-7.15 17, 51 55; 5.1.6-34; 5.3.7-23 24; 5.4.2-27 33; 5.9.8.13 15; 6.2.22.24 29.
account of that, and that is where the beauty of the Forms comes from, then everything is Good-like, both Life, and Intellect and Idea.

But what did they have in common? For being derived from the Good does not actually suffice for their identity. For a common feature must be in them. For things that are not identical may come to be out of one identical thing, or something given in the same way may become other in the things receiving it. Since it is one thing that pertains to primary activity, another that is given by the primary activity, that which comes from these is at once, thereby, another.

In fact, nothing prevents each [Intellect, Idea, Life] being Good-like though rather differently in each case. What, then, is it especially that makes them identical?

First, we have to consider this: is Life a good, as such, Life viewed as bare and entirely stripped?

In fact, Life is a good when considered as coming from the Good. Is this ‘from the Good’ not just a qualification? What, then, is this Life with this qualification? Is it the life of the Good? 104 It was not its life, but Life that comes from the Good. 105 But if true Life flows from the Good into the Life in the intelligible world, and nothing dishonourable comes from it, and if it should be called good insofar as it is Life, then about true Intellect, that primary one, one should say, too, that it is good.

And clearly each Form is good and Good-like, in that it thus possesses a good, either a good in common, or with one thing having it more than another, or with one having it primarily and another in succession and secondarily. 106

Since we have grasped that each Form already has a good in its Substance, 107 and is good because of this – for even if Life was not simply good, but good because it was said to be true Life, and because it derives from the Good, whereas Intellect is truly good – something identical has to be seen in all of them. Since they are different, when the identical thing is predicated of them, nothing prevents this being in their substantiality, though it is still possible to grasp this identical thing apart from the account, just as animal belongs to both human being and horse, and hot belongs to water and fire, the first as the genus, the second as the primary holder of the predicate as opposed to the secondary holder of the predicate. Otherwise, either one member of

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104 Taking the words ἢ ἀγαθός as a question raised by an interlocutor.
105 Cf. 1.6.7.11 12; 3.8.10.1 4; 5.3.16.35 38.
106 The alternatives refer to the ways in which the Forms, Intellect and Life may be said to be good or Good like.
107 Cf. supra ll. 20 25.
these pairs would be said to be good equivocally, or each thing would be homonymously good.

So is the Good in their substantiality?

In fact, each is a whole good, and Good is not applied just with respect to one thing. How does it, then, apply? As parts? But the Good is without parts.

In fact, it is one itself, but one thing is good in one way, and another thing in another. For the primary activity [of Intellect] is a good, and that which is bounded by that is good, and indeed both of them together are good; the primary activity is good because it comes to be under the influence of the Good, the good bounded by activity is good because its order comes from the Good; and both of them together are good for both reasons.

They, then, come from the Good, yet they are not identical, just as voice, walking, and anything else coming from the identical source, are all good because correctly accomplished.

In fact, in the sensible world this is because of order and rhythm; and what about in the intelligible world?

In fact, you might say that in the sensible world the factors come from outside to make up the beautiful state of something, and they differ, whereas in the intelligible world they are identical. But how are they identical? We should not just trust in the fact that they come from the Good and leave it at that. For we have to agree that they are honourable because they come from the Good; but reason longs to grasp just how they are good.

§6.7.19. Shall we, then, hand over the judgement to desire, that is, to the soul, and because we trust in its affection, will we assert that what is desirable to the soul is good, and not bother to enquire why it desires it? Are we going to provide demonstrations of what each thing is, but in this case, just hand over the good to desire?

Many absurdities appear to follow from this. First, the good would become a relative.

Next, there are many desired things, and different things are desired by different beings. How, then, will we judge by the one desiring if what is desired is better than something else? Presumably, we would not know the better if we do not know that which is good.

Will we define the good according to the excellence of each thing? Of course, if we referred this to the Form and the account of it, we would be proceeding correctly. But when we arrive at the intelligible world, what will we say when we investigate why these Forms themselves are

108 See Ar., EN 1.6.1098a15 16.
good? For, quite reasonably, we recognize such a nature when it is in inferior things, even if it is there not in a pure state, since it is not primarily there, but only by conjunction with inferior things. But where nothing is bad, and the good things are themselves in themselves, we will be at a loss. Is the problem, then, since reason is seeking the ‘why’ for things that are in themselves, it is puzzled that, in this case, the ‘why’ is the ‘that’? Even if we claim that the explanation is something else, namely, god, still the problem is the same, since reason has not yet attained that [explanation].

We should not leave off the enquiry, to see if there is not another way we can go so that a solution appears to us.

§6.7.20. Since, then, we put no faith at present in our desires as determining what something is or what kind of thing it is, is it necessary that we have recourse to the judgements and to the oppositions between things such as order–disorder, symmetry–asymmetry, health–disease, form–shapelessness, substantiality–destruction, and in general, constitution–obliteration?

Who could doubt that the first of each of these pairs is in the form of good? If this is the case, then we should rank the things that produce them in the ‘portion of good’. And indeed virtue, and intellect, life and soul, at least a rational soul, lie within the form of good. And thus, too, anything the rational life desires.

But, then, someone will say, why do we not stop at Intellect and postulate this as the Good? For both soul and life are traces of Intellect, and soul desires it. Soul judges and thereby desires Intellect, judging justice better than injustice, and putting every form of excellence before every form of vice, and it honours the identical things it chooses. But if it desires only Intellect, it would presumably need more argument to show that Intellect is not the ultimate thing; and while not everything desires Intellect, everything desires the Good.

And even among things without intellect, not all try to come to possess it, and those who do have it do not stop there, but go on to look for the Good; they look for Intellect on the basis of calculative reasoning, whereas they look for the Good prior to reason as well.

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112 Cf. infra 24.4 5.
113 See Ar., Meta. 1.7.986a23, 12.1072a31; Stob. Ed. 4.15.20 21.
114 The words ἐν ἀγαθοῖς ἔδει (‘in the form of good’) can also indicate ‘Good like’ as above. Plotinus is no doubt taking advantage of the ambiguity.
115 See Pl., Phil. 54C10; also, 20D1, 60B4. 116 See Pl., Rep. 521A4.
117 See Pl., Rep. 505D5 9; Phil. 20D8; Ar., EN 1.1.1094a3.
118 See Pl., Symp. 206A12.
But if they desire life and eternal existence and activity, then the object desired is not desired as Intellect, but as Good, as deriving from the Good and leading to the Good; for that is the way life is.

§6.7.21. What, then, is that one factor in all these things that makes each thing good? Let us venture to say that Intellect and its life are Good-like, and that desire is for these, insofar as they are Good-like. I call them ‘Good-like’ insofar as Life is the activity of the Good, or rather the activity from the Good, an activity which is bounded.\textsuperscript{119} They [Intellect and Life] are full of radiance, and are pursued by the soul, since it comes from them and relates back to them.

So, does it pursue them as belonging to the soul, and not as good?\textsuperscript{120}

In fact, even if they are just Good-like, they are not to be cast aside for this reason. For what belongs to them, even if it were not good, can be avoided, even if it does belong. For things which are distant and inferior can also move the soul.

Intense love for them [Intellect and Life] comes about not when they are what they are but when they are what they are and, in addition, acquire something from the Good. Just as with bodies, even when they have their own light mixed with them, still they need a light from elsewhere, so that the light makes the colour in them appear, so, too, although they have much light, they need a better light, so they can be seen by themselves and by another.\textsuperscript{121}

§6.7.22. Then, when someone sees this light, he is indeed at that moment moved towards these things, and he is greedily delighted by the light which accompanies them; just as in the case of bodies in the sensible world love is not for the material substrates, but for the beauty which appears in them. Each thing is what it is in itself, but it becomes desired when the Good itself colours it, because this gives it grace and love in the eyes of those desiring it. So, the soul, when it takes in the ‘outpouring from the intelligible world’,\textsuperscript{122} is moved and dances, and is pricked by desire, it becomes love.

Prior to this, it is not moved towards Intellect, even if it is beautiful. For its beauty is inactive until it grasps the light of the Good, and the soul ‘falls backwards’\textsuperscript{123} in itself, and is inactive in every respect, and despite the presence of the Intellect, remains blind to it. But when the Intellect gets to it, a sort of warming from the intelligible world, it gains

\textsuperscript{119} The two types of activity ‘of a principle’ and ‘from a principle’. Cf. supra 18.5 6; infra 40.21 24. Since the Good is uniquely unbounded, whatever comes from the Good is, thereby, bounded.
\textsuperscript{120} Making the sentence into a question with Hadot.\textsuperscript{121} I.e., the soul.
\textsuperscript{122} See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 251B2.\textsuperscript{123} See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 254B8.
strength, is wakened and truly becomes winged.\footnote{See Pl., Phdr. 251B2 3.} Although it is struck by things close by, it is lifted more towards something else greater by, in a way, a sort of memory.\footnote{See Pl., Phdr. 251D6.} And it is raised by the giver of love naturally upward. It can go beyond even Intellect, on the one hand, but it cannot go beyond the Good, since there is nothing lying beyond it. If it stays within Intellect, it contemplates beautiful and holy things – and still does not have all it seeks. It approaches it like a beautiful face, but one which is unable to activate sight, since that grace is not in it which accompanies beauty.

For this reason, here beauty is that which shines from symmetry, rather than the symmetry itself; this is what is lovable. For why is there more light of beauty in a living face, and just its trace in a dead face, even if the face has not decayed in its flesh and symmetry? And living beings are more beautiful than statues, even if the latter are more symmetrical. And is not an uglier living being more beautiful than the beautiful living being in the statue?

In fact, it is because the living being is more desirable, and this because it has a soul, and this because it is more Good-like, and this because it is coloured by the light of the Good in some way. And because it is coloured, it has been awakened and lifted up, and has lifted up what it possesses – and makes it good and wakes it up, as far as is in its power.

§6.7.23. Actually, in the intelligible world, what the soul pursues is also what provides light to the Intellect, and when it enters, it leaves a trace of itself. And there is no need to wonder why it has such power that it drags the soul to itself, and calls the soul back from all its wandering,\footnote{See Pl., Phd. 81A6.} so it can come to rest with it. For if all things come from something, then there is nothing more powerful than that; everything else is inferior. In what way is the Good not the best of Beings?\footnote{See Pl., Rep. 518C9, 526E3 4; Phil. 20E6, 60B10 C4.}

Further, if the nature of the Good has to be the most self-sufficient, and in need of nothing else whatever, what else apart from this nature could one discover that was what it was before all else, when there was no vice at all? If there were evils posterior to the Good, in things which had no part in it at all, that is, in the very uttermost things, than which there is nothing worse, evils would relate to it contrarily without having a middle in their contrariety.

This, therefore, would be the Good. For either there is no Good at all, or else, if there has to be, it must be this and nothing else. If someone
says the Good does not exist, then there is no evil either. In that case, things would be by nature indifferent as a basis for our choice. But this is impossible. They call other things good with reference to this, but the Good is related to nothing.

What, then, does it produce by being of this kind?

In fact, it produced Intellect, Life, and souls from this, and all other things which partake of reason, Intellect, or Life. As for the actual source or principle of these things: who could say how good and great it is?

But what does it now produce?

In fact, it now preserves these things, and makes thinking things think, living beings live, filling intellect and life with breath, and if something is incapable of life, at least it makes it exist.

§6.7.24. And what does it produce for us?

In fact, let us return to the light, and say what light it is that Intellect shines with, and that soul shares in. Or better, let us put that off to later and get to grips with these puzzles instead: is the Good good, and said to be good because it is desirable to something else, and, whereas if it were desirable for some particular thing it would be good for that thing, it is because it is desirable for all things that we call it the Good?

In fact, while one should take this as evidence that the Good exists, at least the object of itself has to have such a nature that it would be just to call it this. And does what desires desire because it receives something from it, or because of the joy itself? And if it receives something, then what? But if it desires because of the joy it takes in it, then why joy in this and not something else? Does the Good actually lie in something of one’s own, or in something else?

Moreover, does the Good belong entirely to another thing, or is the Good good for itself?

In fact, is whatever is good not good for itself but necessarily the good of something else? And by what nature is it good? Is there any nature for which nothing is good?

We should not ignore the objection that a troublesome man could make. He could say: ‘Why are you actually so high and mighty with your terminology as to call Life good, here, there and everywhere, and to call Intellect good, and what transcends that? Why should Intellect be good, too? What good could someone thinking the Forms have in his possession by considering each of the Forms? If he is deceived and takes

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128 See SVF 3.117 (= D.L., 7.102).
129 Cf. 6.8.8.22, 11.32, 17.27 28.
130 See Pl., Phdr. 245C9.
131 Cf. 5.3.15.28.
132 Cf. infra 32 end of treatise.
133 Cf. infra 28.32.
135 Cf. infra 27.3 19.
136 Cf. infra 27.19 22.
137 Cf. infra 28.1 19.
138 Cf. infra 29.21 22.
pleasure in them, then he might say this is a good, and that life is pleasurable. But if he is positioned in an unpleasant state, why should he say they are goods? Because of the fact that he exists? But why should he benefit at all from existing? What is the difference between existing and not existing at all – unless the reason for this lies in friendship for oneself? The reason would then be this deception, which is natural, and the fear of destruction which accounts for believing in the positing of goods.  

§6.7.25. Plato, then, mixes pleasure with the end, and does not assume the good to be simple or only in the intellect, as is written in the Philebus; presumably, because he perceived this difficulty, he was not moved to assume that the good coincides entirely with the pleasant – and rightly so – nor did he think that one should assume intellect without pleasure is good, since he saw no motivation in it. Presumably, not for this reason alone but because he also thought that the good had such a nature in itself that it must of necessity be full of charm, and that what is desired contains joy for those who get it or who have got it. The result is that there is no good for anyone without joy. So, if joy belongs to the one desiring, then it does not belong to the first thing of all. And so neither does the good.

And this is not absurd. For Plato himself was not looking here for the primary Good; he was looking for our good. And since this is entirely different, there exists another Good for Plato, since the human good is defective, and presumably composite. Hence, he says that the ‘solitary and lonely’ possesses no good, but exists in another and grander way. The Good, then, must be such as to be desired, not so that it becomes good by being desired, but rather by being good it becomes desired.

Should we not, then, assert that for the last of beings, its good is what precedes it? And in each case, the ascent renders what is above each thing into the good for whatever is below it, if, that is, the ascent never goes beyond the proportionate relation, but always moves towards the superior? It will, then, come to a halt at the last thing, after which one can grasp nothing higher. This will be the primary Good, what is truly

140 See Pl., Phil. 21D9 22A3, 61B3 D2. As we see in l. 12 infra, Plotinus realizes that Plato is in Philebus not speaking about the Idea of the Good, but about the specific good for human beings.
141 See Pl., Phil. 11B4.
142 This Form of the Good, distinct from the superordinate Idea of the Good, is referred to frequently in the dialogues. See Phd. 65D4 7, 75C10 D2, 76D7 9; Tht. 186A8; Parm. 130B7 9; Rep. 507B4 6, 608E6 609A4; Pl. [?], Epin. 978B3 4.
good, and most authoritatively good; and is the explanation for other
goods.

For form is the good for matter – for if matter acquired awareness,\textsuperscript{145} it would welcome it – soul for the body, for it would not be nor be
preserved otherwise, and virtue for the soul. But higher still, there is
Intellect, and above this the nature we indeed assert is primary.

Moreover, we assert that each of these produces something relative
to those things of which they are the goods: the one arrangement and
order, the other life, the others good sense and living well.\textsuperscript{146} And for
Intellect, it is the Good which we say comes to it, both because the
Intellect has its activity coming from the Good, and because the Good
provides something called ‘light’. Just what it actually is, will be dis-
cussed later.\textsuperscript{147}

§6.7.26. Certainly, something which has by nature received the ability
to be aware\textsuperscript{148} from Intellect, is also able to know and say whether it is
the Good that is approaching it. What, then, happens if it is deceived?
There must, therefore, be some kind of sameness [in relation to the
Good], due to which it is deceived. But if this is so, then that [the Good]
would have been the good for it, since when the Good comes, one turns
away from that by which he was deceived. And each thing’s desiring, and
birth pains, testify that there is a good of each thing. The Good is
granted to inanimate things by something else; desiring effects the
pursuit of the Good in things which have a soul, just as for corpses
care and preparation come from the living, whereas the living provide
for themselves. One believes that one has hit on the Good when some-
things becomes better, and there are no regrets, and there is fulfilment;
and it remains with it, and does not look for anything else.

For this reason, pleasure is not self-sufficient,\textsuperscript{149} for it does not want
the identical thing, that is, whatever pleasure is pleased with is not
identical with what it is pleased with the next time.\textsuperscript{150} For it is always
something else one takes pleasure in. Hence, the good that someone
chooses cannot actually be a state that someone is in. For this reason,
anyone who considers this state to be the good remains empty, since
they only possess the state which someone might acquire from the good.
For this reason, one cannot be content with a state relating to something
one does not possess, for example, take pleasure in the presence of a boy,
when he is not there. Nor do I think those who see the good in corporeal
satisfaction would be pleased as though they were eating when actually
they were not, or as though they were enjoying sex, when the person

\textsuperscript{145} The sense of αἰσθήσεως here.  \textsuperscript{146} Cf. supra 24.10 11.
\textsuperscript{147} Cf. infra 32ff.; 5.5.7.18.  \textsuperscript{148} Cf. supra 25.25.  \textsuperscript{149} See Pl., Phil. 67A7.
\textsuperscript{150} Cf. supra 24.11 12.
they wanted to have intercourse with was absent, or generally without doing anything.

§ 6.7.27. But what must occur to each thing so that it possesses what is fitting for it?

In fact, we will say that it is a form; for matter, form is the good, and for the soul virtue is the form. But is this form the good for each thing by belonging to it; and isn’t desiring directed towards what belongs to the thing concerned?

In fact, it is not, because what belongs to something is what is the same as it, and if it wishes for that and delights in what is the same, it still will not possess the good. ⑩

But will we not say that it belongs when we say it is good?

In fact, we should say that what belongs must be discerned by something more powerful and better than the thing itself, which it relates to potentially. For it is potentially it in relation to what it is, and so it is in need of it, and what it is in need of is more powerful than it is, and so it is its good. Matter is most lacking of all, and the final form borders on matter; for it comes after matter on the way up.

But even if something is actually its own good, then it would be rather its own completeness which is its good, and its form, what is more powerful than it – both through its own nature and because it makes the thing good.

But why will anything be good for itself? Is it because it belongs to itself most of all?

In fact, no, but rather because it has a share of the Good. ⑩ For this reason, appropriation ⑩ occurs to a greater extent with the pure and the better.

It is indeed absurd to investigate why something good is good for itself, since it would have to leave its own nature behind in respect of itself, and not be pleased with itself as good. ⑩ But in the case of something simple, we must look and see if when there is not in it several parts, there is appropriation in relation to itself, and if it is good in relation to itself.

Now, if these assertions are correct, the ascent attains the good situated in a determinate nature, and desire does not produce the good, but there is desire because there is a good, and those who possess it have something, and there is pleasure in the possession, then we

⑩ Cf. 6.9.8.29 30, 11.31 32. ⑩ See Pl., Phil. 20D1, 54C10, 60B4.
⑩ ἰκεῖος, a Stoic (and Peripatetic) term for nature making things such that they can acquire what belongs to (ἰκεῖον) them, i.e., their good and proper functioning. See, e.g., Cicero, De fin. 3.16ff.
⑩ Cf. supra 24.13 15.
should investigate Aristotle’s saying: ‘even if pleasure does not accompany it, the good still should be chosen’.\footnote{Cf. infra 29. See EN 10.3.1174a6 8.}

§6.7.28. Now we should see what follows from the argument. If what comes to be attributed to something anywhere as its good is a form, and form, as a unity, is the good for matter,\footnote{Cf. supra 7.24.13 15.} would then matter want to become form alone, if indeed wanting were within its power?\footnote{See Ar., Phys. 1.9.192a19 20.} If it did, then it would want to be destroyed; yet everything seeks what is good for it. Presumably, it does not want to be matter, it wants to exist; and by possessing this, it wants to get rid of its evil. But how can the evil have a desire for the Good?

In fact, we did not posit matter as something with desire.\footnote{Cf. supra 7.24.3 4.} Rather, the argument, by granting it awareness,\footnote{Cf. supra 25.25.} made an assumption, if indeed it were possible to grant it this, while preserving it as matter. And when form comes along, like a dream of the Good, we posit matter coming to be in a higher rank.

If, then, matter is evil, enough has been said. But if it is something else, such as vice, should its essence acquire awareness, would it, then, belong to it to tend towards the better, that is, the Good?

In fact, it is not vice that chooses, but the thing that has been made vicious. If being and evil were identical, how could evil choose the good?

In fact, then, should that which is evil acquire awareness, would it love itself? And how can something not lovable\footnote{Reading μὴ ἀγαπητὸν with the mss and HS'.} be lovable? For we certainly did not posit the Good as belonging to what is appropriate.\footnote{Cf. supra 27.1 19.}

So much for this subject.

If form is everywhere the good, and the higher one gets the more form there is – for soul is more form than is the form of body, and some soul is more form than others, and others yet more so; and intellect is more form than is soul – the Good would approach the contrary of matter, that is, something purified, and what has laid aside matter as far as possible, and most of all what has laid aside matter entirely. Moreover, the nature of the Good, since it shuns all matter, or better, never comes near it, would flee up to the formless nature, from which the primary form is derived. More of this later.\footnote{Cf. infra 32.9 33.38.}

§6.7.29. But if pleasure were not to accompany the Good, and if something were to occur before the pleasure, because of which there is then also pleasure, why would the Good not be welcomed with joy?\footnote{See Pl., Phil. 32D1.}
In fact, in saying welcomed with joy, we already mentioned pleasure. But if it exists in the pleasure, is it not possible for its existence there not to be welcomed with joy? But if this is possible, the thing in possession of the Good, if it has awareness\textsuperscript{164} of it, will not know that it has the Good!

In fact, what prevents one from knowing it, and not being moved other than one was when one possesses it? This would rather be characteristic of the fairly self-controlled human being, and of someone who is in need of nothing. For this reason, it is not characteristic of the primary Good, not merely because it is simple, but because the pleasant is the acquisition of something one needs.\textsuperscript{165}

This will be perfectly clear once we have cleaned up the remaining points and mounted resistance to the stubborn argument already mentioned.\textsuperscript{166} This is the one raised by someone who is puzzled by how someone in his right mind can benefit in regard to the portion of the Good. He is unmoved by hearing of these things. Either he comprehends nothing about them, or he hears just words, or he grasps something else entirely; or he looks for something sensible, or posits the good in money, or some such thing.

We should say to this kind of man that when he dishonours these things, he agrees that he himself is positing a good, although he is at a loss as to how he fits what we say to the notion of the good he has. For it is not possible to say ‘it is not that’, if one is entirely without experience or a notion of what ‘it’ is. But perhaps he will venture a guess about what is beyond Intellect.\textsuperscript{167}

Next, if in concentrating on the Good or on what is near it, one does not know it, then let him proceed from the opposites to some notion of it. Or does he not posit a lack of understanding as evil?\textsuperscript{168} Indeed, everyone chooses to think, and prides themselves on thinking. Acts of sense-perception bear witness to this in wanting to be knowledge.\textsuperscript{169}

If intellect is indeed something honourable and beautiful, most of all primary Intellect, how would one imagine, if one could, its progenitor and father?\textsuperscript{170} In disparaging being and living, he gives evidence against himself, and all his states. If someone is disgusted with that kind of living in which there is an admixture of death, then he is disgusted merely with this life, not with true living.

\textsuperscript{164} Cf. supra 25.25. \textsuperscript{165} See Pl., \textit{Phil.} 20E6, 60C3. \textsuperscript{166} Cf. supra 24.18. \textsuperscript{167} Cf. supra 6.7.30, 3.6.1.2. \textsuperscript{168} Cf. supra 6.16.3; \textit{infra} 32.1 2. \textsuperscript{169} Cf. supra 6.7.29. \textsuperscript{170} Making the sentence into a question with Armstrong.
§6.7.30. But now, in closing in on the Good, it is appropriate to look to see if pleasure must be mixed with the good, and so if a life of contemplating divine entities, and above all their principle, is not perfect. To think, then, that the good consists of intellect as its substrate, together with the affection of the soul which comes from being wise, is not the view of someone who posits this complex to be the end or the good; rather, he is saying that intellect is the good, and that we have joy by possessing the good. This would be one opinion about good.

There is another opinion beside this one, which posits the good to be one substrate made of both, by mixing pleasure with intellect, so that we possess the good by acquiring intellect or even just seeing it. For what is ‘isolated and alone’ cannot come to be nor can it be chosen as a good.

How, then, can one mix intellect and pleasure into one complete nature? It is at any rate quite clear to everyone that one cannot suppose pleasure of the body to be mixed with intellect; but nor can non-rational joys of the soul.

However, since there must be something that follows or accompanies all activity, disposition, and life – on the one hand, insofar as it is a hindrance to this life proceeding naturally, since something of the contrary is mixed with it, which does not allow its life to be, whereas, on the other hand, the act in the other life is ‘pure and clean’, and life shines out in its disposition – those who, having claimed that the state we have been discussing, which belongs to intellect, and is most worthy of being welcomed with joy, and most worthy of being chosen, say that intellect is mixed with pleasure; they do this due to a lack of a proper designation. This is what they do, when they use metaphorically other phrases we love: ‘drunk with nectar’, ‘to the feast and to the banquet’, and what the poets say, ‘the father smiled’, and countless other phrases like these.

171 See Pl., Phlb. 20D1, 54C10, 60B4; Ar., EN 7.14.1153b12 15.
172 I.e., joy or pleasure.
173 The complex of pleasure plus the good. Cf. 6.9.8.43 9.21.
174 This is the view expressed by Socrates at the beginning of Phil. 12B. This view is later rejected in favour of the next view canvassed here, namely, that the good for a human being is intellect in a certain mixture with pleasure.
175 See Pl., Phil. 61D1 2; Ar., EN 10.7.1177a20 25. 176 See Pl., Phil. 63B7 8.
177 See Pl., Phil. 63D 64A. 178 See Pl., Phil. 63E.
179 Or result of its activity. Cf. 6.8.16.17. 180 See Pl., Phil. 52D6 7.
184 See Homer, Il. 5.426, 15.47.
For what is in truth to be welcomed with joy is in the intelligible world, the most pleasurable and most desirable, which is not something coming to be or in motion, and which is the cause colouring these things, illuminating them, and making them shine out. For this reason, Plato adds truth also to the mix, and puts the thing that measures prior to the mix. He asserts that proportion and beauty come from that, and come to beauty in the mix. The result is that, thanks to this mixture, we would also have a portion of the Good.

In another way, what we desire in truth is ourselves, when we lead ourselves for ourselves towards the best in us; and this is indeed proportion, beauty, a composite form, a life that is clear, intellectual, and beautiful.

§6.7.31. But after all things had been made beautiful by that which is prior to them, and had got possession of light – intellect acquired the light of intellectual activity, by which it illuminates nature, and soul the power to live, when a greater life came to it – intellect was raised up to the intelligible world and remained joyful at being near the Good, and that soul which was capable of it, when it knew and saw, had joy in the spectacle, and was awestruck and shaken insofar as it was able to see. It saw, and was shaken awestruck, in a way by perceiving that it has in itself something of the Good, and came to be in a state of desire, like those who are moved by an image of their loved one and want to come to see the beloved itself.

Just as in the sensible world all those who love fashion themselves into a likeness of the person they love, making their bodies more comely, and their souls close to this likeness, in that as far as possible they do not want to fall behind the self-control of the loved one or any other virtue – otherwise, they would be rejected by loved ones with these qualities – and these are those who are able to have intercourse; in this way, soul loves the Good, because it was moved to love from the beginning.

And the soul which has this love at hand does not wait to be reminded by the beautiful things in the sensible world; because it possesses love, even if it does not know that it possesses it, it is always searching. Because it wants to be carried towards the Good, it despises things in the sensible world, and even though it sees beautiful things in this universe, it despises them, because it sees that they are in flesh and bodies, and defiled by their present habitation, divided by their extension, and so not the beautiful beings themselves. For those would

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185 See Pl., Phil. 64D4. 186 See Pl., Phil. 64B2, 64E5 65A5. 187 Cf. 1.6.5.7. 188 Reading συνθετον with the mss and Igal and Hadot. 189 See Pl., Phdr. 250A6. 190 See Pl., Symp. 212A2; Phdr. 252B 253C. 191 See Pl., Symp. 211E2.
not dare, being such as they are, to enter the filth\textsuperscript{192} of the body, defile themselves, and so obliterate themselves. And when the soul sees the beautiful things just floating by, it knows perfectly well that they have the shine diffused on them from elsewhere.

The soul, then, is carried up to the intelligible world, since it is keen to find what it loves; it does not cease until it has got hold of it, unless someone were to take away the love itself. The soul is actually strengthened\textsuperscript{193} by being filled with the Life of Being. It becomes in truth Being, and in truth acquires comprehension, when it perceives itself to be close to the thing it has long been seeking.

§6.7.32. Where, then, is the producer of such beauty, such life, the progenitor of substance? You see beauty over all the Forms which are variegated. It is, on the one hand, beautiful to remain here, but on the other, one must, when among the beautiful Beings, get a sight of where they and their being beautiful come from. This must not be just one of the Forms, for then it would just be something, a part of them. It is, then, not such and such a shape, nor a power, nor all of the powers which have come to be and are in the sensible world. No, it must be above all powers, and above all shapes.

The formless is a principle,\textsuperscript{194} not something in need of a shape, but the origin of all intellectual shape. For anything that came to be, if indeed it came to be, had to become something, and acquire its own form. But as for something that no one produced, who could have made it a determinate something? This, then, is not one of these Beings and it is all of them; it is not one of them, because the Beings are posterior, and it is all because they all come from it. How could something with the power to produce all things have a magnitude?

In fact, it is unlimited,\textsuperscript{195} and if it is unlimited it has no magnitude; for magnitude is a property of the lowest level of things. And if it produces magnitude, it must not have it itself.

The greatness belonging to Substance is not quantitative; if it were, then there would also be something [straight] after the Good with magnitude. By contrast, the greatness of the Good lies in nothing being more powerful than it or being capable of being equal to it. For how can something which shares nothing with the Good in itself arrive at equality with it in anything? The Good’s being ‘forever’ and ‘for all beings’ bestows no measure on it, and not unmeasuredness either. For how could it measure other things?\textsuperscript{196} So, it is not a figure either.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{192} See Pl., Phd. 69C6. \textsuperscript{193} See Pl., Symp. 210D6.
\textsuperscript{194} Cf. supra 17.40; 28.28; infra 33.11; 5.5.6.4; 6.9.3.4. \textsuperscript{195} See Pl., Parm. 137D7.
\textsuperscript{196} See Pl., Lg. 716C where god is a measure of all things.
\textsuperscript{197} See Pl., Parm. 137D8.
Further, if there is something desirable which you can grasp neither figure nor shape of, then it would be the most desirable and lovable thing, and the love is immeasurable. For love here is not limited, because neither is the beloved; the love of it is without limit, such that its beauty is beautiful in a different way, and is beauty beyond beauty. For being, as it is, nothing, what beauty can it have? It is by being the object of desire that it is productive of beauty.

The productive power of everything, then, is the flower of beauty, a beauty that produces beauty. For that is what it engenders, and makes more beautiful through the presence of beauty itself, so that it is the principle of beauty and the limit of beauty. Since the Good is the principle of that beauty, it produces that beautiful thing of which it is the principle; it makes it beautiful but not in shape. The beauty produced is shapeless, although it is in a different sense in a shape. For the shape is so called only when it is the shape in another thing, and is in itself shapeless. Whatever, then, participates in beauty is shaped, not the beauty itself.

§ 6.7.33. For this reason, when beauty is spoken of, one should really avoid assuming such a shape, and not [try to] place it before one’s eyes, in order that you don’t leave behind Beauty itself in favour of what is called beautiful due to its dim participation. The shapeless Form is beautiful – since it is a Form – to the extent that you have stripped away all [physical] shape, such as is done in the account, by which we say one thing differs from another, as for example Justice and Self-Control are different one from the other, although they are both beautiful.

When intellect thinks some property of something, then it is diminished. This is the case both if it grasps all things together, such as are in the intelligible world, and if it grasps an individual intelligible. In the latter case, it has one intelligible shape, and in the former case it has one variegated shape, in a way; and it is still in need, namely, of considering the Being beyond, the entirely beautiful, variegated and not variegated, which the soul desires without saying why it longs for this, whereas reason says this is the true Being, if indeed the nature of the best and most lovely thing lies in complete formlessness.

For this reason, whatever you show to the soul by going back to that thing’s Form, soul searches for something else which shapes that thing. Indeed, reason says that what has shape, shape itself, and Form are all

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200 Cf. 2.6.9.14 24; 2.6.8.22 25; 4.5.7.51 55; 5.1.6.34; 5.3.7.23 25; 5.4.2.28 39.
201 Cf. 6.6.17.24 27.
202 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59 B 1 DK.
203 Cf. supra 28.28, 30.35; infra 33.37. See Pl., Phil. 64E.
measured. But this is not self-sufficient\textsuperscript{204} and does not have its beauty from itself; rather, it is mixed. So, the measured things are beautiful, whereas true beauty, the super-beautiful,\textsuperscript{205} is not measured. And if it is that, then neither is it shaped nor is it a Form. The primary and what is primarily beautiful, therefore, is formless; and Beauty\textsuperscript{206} is just that: the nature of the Good.\textsuperscript{207}

Testimony to this is provided by the state lovers are in. There is no love as long as this affection is in someone having [merely] a sensible impression. When someone himself engenders in himself a nonsensible impression derived from the sensible impression, in his indivisible soul, then love grows. He desires to catch a glimpse of the loved one, so that the latter may irrigate him as he is withering.\textsuperscript{208} But if he comes to comprehend that one has to move towards something with less shape, that is what he would then desire. For what he underwent initially was love of a great light derived from a dim gleam.

For shape is a trace of the shapeless; this then generates shape, not the other way round; and it generates shape when matter approaches. Matter is necessarily the thing furthest away, since it does not even have in itself one of the last shapes. If, then, that which is love is not matter, but something formed by Form, and if the form in matter comes from soul, and if soul is more form and more lovely than matter, and intellect is more form and even more lovely than soul, then we must posit\textsuperscript{209} the primary nature of Beauty to be formless.\textsuperscript{210}

§6.7.34. We will not marvel at the production of such mighty longings,\textsuperscript{211} if it is removed even from all intelligible shape, since the soul, when it comes to have an intense love for it, sheds any shape it may have, indeed any shape of an intelligible there may be in it. For it is not possible for something that is in possession of something else, or is active in respect of something else, either to see [Beauty] or to be harmonized with it. No, the soul should have nothing good or evil to hand, so that, alone, it may take in [Beauty] alone.\textsuperscript{212}

When the soul is so fortunate as to meet with [Beauty], and it comes to the soul, or rather appears by being present, when the soul turns away from the things present, and prepares itself to be as beautiful as may be, and arrives at a likeness to [Beauty] – the mode of preparation\textsuperscript{213} and ordering are somehow clear to those who prepare themselves – the soul

\textsuperscript{204} See Pl., \textit{Phil.} 67A7.  
\textsuperscript{205} I.e., Beauty itself, which is beyond the beautiful things.  
\textsuperscript{206} ἡ καλλονή who appears as a goddess in Pl., \textit{Symp.} 206D.  
\textsuperscript{207} See Pl., \textit{Phil.} 60B10.  
\textsuperscript{208} See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 251B1 4.  
\textsuperscript{209} Cf. supra 21.12.  
\textsuperscript{210} Cf. supra 28.28, 30.35, 33.13. See Pl., \textit{Phil.} 64E6.  
\textsuperscript{211} See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 250D4 5.  
\textsuperscript{212} Cf. infra 36.8 10.  
\textsuperscript{213} Cf. supra 28.28, 30.35, 33.13.
sees it appear suddenly, for there is nothing in between, nor are they two things; both are then one, for you cannot distinguish them, as long as it is present – in imitation of this lovers and their beloved ones here want to mingle with one another – and the soul no longer perceives even that it is in the body, nor does it say that it itself is something else, not a human being, not an animal, not a being, nothing at all. For consideration of itself in these capacities would disturb the soul. Nor does the soul have the leisure for them, nor does it want to. Rather, since the soul sought [Beauty], it encounters it when it is present, and looks at it, instead of looking at itself. It has no leisure to look to see who it is that looks.

There, it would exchange nothing in place of [Beauty], not even if someone were to offer the whole universe, on the grounds that nothing is preferable or better. For it cannot ascend higher, and all other things, even those up there, are a descent for it. The result is that it can then very well judge and recognize that it was [Beauty] that it desired, and to assert that there is nothing better than it. For in the intelligible world, there is no deception.

In fact, where could one find anything truer than the truth? What the soul, then, says of it is: it is that, and later it says so, too; even when it is silent that is what it says, and in its feeling content, it is not deceived about its feeling content. It does not say this because of its body being stimulated but because it has become that which it was when it prospered.

But all the other things it used to take pleasure in – offices, powers, riches, beauties, and sciences – the soul says it looks down on them, something which it would not say, had it not met with things better than these. Nor does the soul fear to suffer anything while it is with that, not seeing anything else at all. Even if the other things round the soul were destroyed, this is what the soul would wish for, so it could be alone with [Beauty]. So great is the contentment it has arrived at.

§6.7.35. The soul, then, is so disposed that it even disdains thinking – which it delights in at other times – because thinking is a motion, and the soul does not want to be motion. And the soul asserts that that which it sees does not think, despite the fact that soul has then become intellect and contemplates, because it has become intellectualized, that is, has come to be ‘in the intelligible world’.

216 See Pl., Phdr. 251C5.
217 I.e., the soul identifies with its undescended intellect and is thereby identified with Intellect. See Pl., Rep. 508C1, 517B5.
When the soul comes to be there, and relates to Intellect, it then thinks the intelligible, but when it sees that god, it dismisses everything, as, for example, when someone enters a brightly decorated house, and considers each of the beautiful decorations inside, and marvels at them, before seeing the master of the house. But when one sees him, and admires him in a way going beyond the nature of the statues in his house, as worthy of true contemplation, then, dismissing the other things, one just has eyes for him. Then, looking and not removing one’s eye from him, one only looks at him for the rest of the time, so that in the continuous time of looking one no longer sees a spectacle, but rather the sight of him becomes mixed with the spectacle with the result that something previously to be seen becomes a seeing; all other sights are forgotten. Indeed, the image would preserve the analogy, if the overseer of the viewer of the house were not a human being, but some god, and if he did not appear visibly but filled the soul of the contemplator.

So, Intellect has one power to think insofar as it regards what is in itself, and another insofar as it regards what transcends itself, with a kind of apprehension and receptivity. It is in accordance with the second power that it first sees, and then later while still seeing both comes to be intellect and a unity. And the former is the contemplation of a wise intellect, whereas this latter is intellect loving, when it becomes senseless, ‘drunk with nectar’. It, then, turns into a loving intellect when it has been made contented by satiety. And it is better for it to be drunk with this intoxication than to be sober.

Does then that intellect see different things in turn at different times? In fact, no, for it is merely our reasoned account, in teaching us, that makes things come to be, whereas it possesses thinking always, but it also possesses not-thinking, that is, regarding the Good in another way. For seeing that, it comes to have offspring; it is aware of them both as they are born and as they are in themselves. When it sees them it is said to think; but when it sees the Good, then it does so by the power due to which it will come to think. The soul in a way muddles up and obliterates the intellect that remains in it. Or, better, the intellect sees first the soul, and vision comes to the soul, and the two of them become one.

218 I.e., the Good.
219 As intellects, we share in the distinct powers of Intellect: (a) desire for the Good and (b) fulfilling that desire by contemplating all that is intelligible. Cf. infra 39.2; 3.8.9.
220 ὁννοῦν ὑπείρημεν means to be wise, but also, more literally and less idiomatically, to possess intellect.
221 See Pl., Symp. 203B3.
222 See Pl., Phdr. 244D4.
The Good is spread over them, and, by being harmonized in the coherence of them both, running over and unifying both of them, is present to them, bestowing blessed perception or vision\textsuperscript{223} on them. It raises them so high that they are not in a place, nor in another thing, where one thing is in another. The Good itself is not anywhere. The intelligible world\textsuperscript{224} is in it, it is not in anything else.

For this reason, the soul is not moved then, since neither is that. So, it is not soul, in that the Good is not alive; it is beyond living. Nor is the soul intellect, because it does not think; it must become assimilated to the Good. It does not even think that it is not thinking.

§6.7.36. The other points are now clear; and we have said at least something about this last point. Still, we should talk about it a little further, taking our starting point from there, but progressing by reasoned arguments.

For the cognition or touching of the Good is the most important thing. Plato says it is the greatest subject of learning,\textsuperscript{225} because he means by subject of learning not the seeing of the Good, but learning something about it beforehand. For analogies, negations, and knowledge of things derived from it, teach us about the Good; and also by certain ‘means of ascent’.\textsuperscript{226} But purifications, virtues, and orderings\textsuperscript{227} set us on the way to it, the ‘rungs of the ladder’\textsuperscript{228} towards the intelligible, settling in it, and feasting on it.

Whoever has become both a spectator and spectacle, himself of himself, and of the others there, and has become Substance, Intellect, ‘a complete Living Being’\textsuperscript{229} no longer regards it from outside: once he has become all this he is close, and what follows next is the Good; it is close, shining on all that which is intelligible.

Someone actually leaving all learning,\textsuperscript{230} up to then having been educated by instruction,\textsuperscript{231} settles in Beauty. Up to then he thinks, carried along in a way by the wave of the intellect, and in a way raised on high by it, puffed up in a way, he sees suddenly\textsuperscript{232} without seeing how. The spectacle fills his eyes with light, not making him see something else through it. The seeing was the light itself. For in the Good there is not one thing which is seen, and another thing that is its light; nor is there intellect and object of intellect, but the radiance, engendering these things later, lets them be beside itself. It itself is only the radiance engendering Intellect, without being extinguished in the act.
of generation, but remaining identical. Intellect comes about because the Good is. If the Good were not such, then Intellect would not have been made to exist.

§6.7.37. Those thinkers, then, who attribute intellection to the Good in their account did not attribute to it intellection of the lesser things, or of what is derived from it. Some say, however, that it is absurd if it does not know other things.

The first group, then, finding nothing more worthy than it, attribute to it the intellection of itself, as though it would be made more beautiful by intellection, as though intellection is better than being the Good in itself, and it was not it that made thinking beautiful.

From what will it acquire its honourable state? From thinking or from itself? If from thinking, then in itself it is not honourable, or less so. But if it is honourable in itself, then it is perfect before thinking, and is not perfected by thinking.

If it is has to think because it is actuality, and not potency, then if it is a substance that always thinks, and they say that it is thereby actuality, then they are saying that two things are together, Substance and intellection; and they are not saying it is simple – they add something else to it, like adding the actual seeing to eyes, even if they always see. But if they say that it is in actuality because it is both activity and intellection, then it would not think due to its being intellection, just as motion does not move. So, then, what shall we say?

Do you not say yourselves that the intelligibles are Substances and actuality? But we agree that these are many and different from one another, whereas the first thing is simple, and we grant intellection to what derives from something else, and [we grant] in a way the investigation of its own substantiality and what produces it, and assert that it is in turning inwards in contemplation and recognizing itself that it is now Intellect in the proper sense.

But in the case of something that does not come to be nor has anything prior to itself, but is always what it is, what explanation will there be for its thinking? It is for this reason that Plato is right to say that it is beyond thinking.
Now Intellect that does not think is without thought.\textsuperscript{242} For in the case of something whose nature includes thinking, if it were not to do this, it would be without thought. But in the case of that which has no function, how could anyone give it a function, and then predicate the privation of this in it, because it does not perform its function? It is as though someone were to label the Good ‘devoid of medical science’.

The fact is that no function belongs to it, in that nothing is ordained for it to do. For it is sufficient to itself. One should not look for anything besides, since it is above all Beings. For it is enough for itself and other things in being what it itself is.

§6.7.38. There is no ‘is’ either in it, for it has no need of this.\textsuperscript{243} For neither can you say of it that it is good. You can say this only of something of which you can say ‘is’. ‘Is’ is not said as one thing of another, but as meaning what something is.

We use the words ‘the Good’ of it, not intending to say its name or predicating ‘good’ as belonging to it, but because it is the Good itself.\textsuperscript{244}

Next, we do not think it right to say ‘it is good’, nor even to add ‘the’ to it – we are unable to make ourselves clear, if someone were to take it away entirely – so that in order not to make it one thing and then another, and so not to have need of ‘is’, we say ‘the Good’.\textsuperscript{245}

But who will accept a nature which does perceive or know itself? What would it know about itself? ‘I am’? But it is not! Why, then, will it not say ‘I am good’?

In fact, again, the ‘is’ is predicated of it. Or it will say only ‘good’, adding something – for one can think ‘good’ without ‘is’ as long as it is not predicated of something else.

That which thinks of itself that it is good will always be thinking ‘I am that which is good’. If not, it will think ‘good’, but it will not be present to it to think that it is this. There must, then, be the thinking ‘I am good’. But if the thinking itself is the Good, then the thinking is not of itself,\textsuperscript{246} but thinking of the Good; and the Good will not be itself, but the thinking. And if the thinking of the Good is other than the Good, then there is the Good before the thinking of it. If the Good is self-sufficient before the thinking, since it is in itself self-sufficient

\textsuperscript{242} Cf. supra 9.26 29. \textsuperscript{243} See Pl., Parm. 141E9 11.

\textsuperscript{244} See Pl., Soph. 244B C.

\textsuperscript{245} In Greek, the definite article and the nominalized adjective ‘good’ here are joined together to make a single word, thus avoiding the appearance that the definite article is something other than the Good itself.

\textsuperscript{246} See the Aristotelian formulation ‘the thinking of thinking’, referred to supra 7.37.1.
25 for being good, it would need no thinking of itself. The upshot is: as good, it does not think itself.\(^\text{247}\)

§6.7.39. But then, as what does it think itself?

In fact, nothing else is present to it and it will have a simple act of apprehension in regard to itself. Since there is nothing such as distance or difference in respect of itself, what else would this act of apprehension be except itself? For this reason, Plato rightly understands difference where there is Intellect and Substance.\(^\text{248}\) For Intellect must always grasp difference and identity if it is indeed going to think. It cannot distinguish itself from the intelligible by the relation of difference it has to that, nor will it contemplate all things, unless difference comes about, such that all things can exist. Otherwise, there would not even be two things.

Next, if indeed the Good does think, it will never, I suppose, think only itself, if it is going to think at all. For why will it not think all things? Or is it because it is incapable of doing so? Generally speaking, it will not be simple, if it thinks itself; the thinking of itself has to be something different, if anything can think itself at all. But we said\(^\text{249}\) that there is no thinking by the Good, even if it wants to see itself as something else. For in thinking itself it becomes many – intelligible, thinking, moved, and all else it befits Intellect to be.

In addition, it befits us to see, as has been said elsewhere already,\(^\text{250}\) that each act of thinking, if indeed it is going to qualify as thinking, has to be something variegated,\(^\text{251}\) whereas the simple and entirely itself – in a way like motion if it were like an act of contact\(^\text{252}\) – will contain nothing intellectual.

What, then? Will the Good know neither other things nor itself? The other things are posterior to it; it was what it was before them, and its thinking of them would be something acquired, and in that case, it would not always be identical, nor would its thinking be of stable things.

Even if it did think of things that are stable, it would be many. For it will certainly not be possible that the posterior things will have their substantiality along with the thinking while the acts of thinking by the Good will be only empty contemplation. Providence is sufficiently guaranteed by its being itself, from which all things come to be.

How does it stand in relation to itself, if it does not [know]\(^\text{253}\) itself? It rests ‘in majestic immobility’. Plato said,\(^\text{254}\) on the subject of

\(^{247}\) Cf. 5.3.12.47 52. \(^{248}\) See Pl., Sopb. 254E5 255A1; Parm. 146A D.

\(^{249}\) Cf. supra 38.21 24. \(^{250}\) Cf. supra 13.2.37, 14.5, 15.24, 17.13, 32.3, 33.10, 35.8.

\(^{251}\) Cf. 5.3.10.30, 41; 6.9.2.44. See Alex. Aphr., De an. 85.23. \(^{252}\) Cf. 5.3.10.42.

\(^{253}\) Cf. supra 1. 21 following Hadot. \(^{254}\) See Pl., Sopb. 249A1 2.
Substance, that it will think but will not rest majestically, on the grounds that Substance thinks, while the thing that does not think will rest ‘in majestic immobility’; he says that it rests because he could not put it any other way, and because he considers that which surpasses thinking to be more majestic, or truly majestic.

§6.7.40. Those who have had any contact of this sort will know that there can be no question of thinking in connection with it. But we should add some words of encouragement to what has been said, to the extent it is possible for argument to make such a thing clear. For persuasion must be mixed with the necessity of proof.²⁵⁵

So, anyone who is aiming to acquire scientific understanding must realize that thinking originates from something and is of something. And one type of thinking, which is together with that from which it originates, has as a substrate that of which there is thinking, and is itself superimposed on the object of thinking because it is its actuality; it fulfils what was potentially, but without engendering it. For it is the thinking of the thing it is of, only in the sense of being its completion.

The other type of thinking, which is accompanied by Substantiality, and which makes Substantiality really exist, cannot be in that from which it came to be.²⁵⁶ For it would not have engendered anything, had it been in that. But since this thinking is a power of engendering, it engendered in itself; its actuality is Substantiality, and is in Substantiality also.²⁵⁷ Thinking and Substantiality itself are not different. Insofar as its nature thinks itself, thinking and that which is thought are not different, except in definition, while being a multiplicity, as has been often shown.²⁵⁸ This thinking is the primary actuality, in making Substantiality really exist: it is the image of something else so great that this image became Substantiality.

If thinking belonged to the Good, rather than deriving from it, then thinking would not have been different from it, and would not have had real existence in itself. For indeed in being primary actuality and primary thinking, it would have neither actuality nor thinking prior to it.

So, then, when someone moves beyond this substantiality and thinking, he would reach neither substantiality nor thinking; he reaches what ‘transcends’ Substantiality²⁵⁹ and thinking, ‘something wonderful’,²⁶⁰ which has neither substantiality nor thinking in itself, which is ‘alone’,²⁶¹ in itself, and in no way needing any of the things originating

²⁵⁵ Cf. i.2.1.52; 5.3.6.9 10; 6.5.11.5 7. See Pl., Lg. 903B1. ²⁵⁶ I.e., the Good.
²⁵⁷ Cf. 5.3.7.18; 6.8.4.26 28. ²⁵⁸ Cf. supra 17.39 40: 3.8.9.3 4: 3.9.1.13; 6.9.5.16.

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in it. For it is not by being active beforehand that it produced actuality. For, then, there would have to be actuality before it was engendered. And it is not by thinking that it produced intellection, for it would already have been thinking before thinking came to be.

For generally, if thinking is of the Good, then it is inferior to the Good. So, thinking cannot belong to the Good. I say that it does not belong to the Good, but I do not mean one cannot think the Good – let us assume that is possible – but that there is no thinking in the Good itself. If that were the case, the Good and what is inferior to it – that is, its thinking – would be one. If thinking is inferior to the Good, it is thinking and being that are together. If thinking were better than substantiality, then the intelligible would be inferior.

So thinking is actually not in the Good, but because thinking is inferior and gains value through the Good itself, it must be in a different place, leaving the Good unmixed with thinking and all else. The Good is unmixed with thinking and is purely what it is, unimpeded by the presence of thinking from being pure and one.

But if someone were to make the Good at once thinking and object of thinking, as well as Substance and thinking conjoined with Substance – wanting in this way to make it self-thinking – then the Good would be in need of something prior to it, if the actuality, that is, thinking, is either the perfection of another substrate or the co-production of its own real existence, and so itself has another nature prior to it by which thinking happens as it should.

For it has something to think of because something is before it. And when thinking thinks itself, then it is as though it recognizes what it acquired from the vision of other things in itself. As for anything which has nothing prior to it, or is not mixed with anything taken from elsewhere, why and how could it think itself? What would it look for or desire? Or would it seek to know how great its power is, since it comes from outside itself, to the extent which it conceives of it? I mean, if it were one power that it gets to know, and another by which it gets to know it. If it were one power, what is it seeking?

§6.7.41. As it happens, thinking was bestowed on the more divine natures, which are nonetheless inferior to the Good, as a means of preservation, in a way like an eye for the blind. But why would an eye need to see being, since it is itself light? And anything that does need to do this, because it has darkness in itself, looks for light using the eye. If thinking is light, and light does not look for light, then that splendour, in not looking for light, would not look to think either, nor to add thinking to itself. For why would it do that? And why would it add it to itself, when Intellect itself is also in need, so that it may think?
So, the Good does not perceive itself—it has no need to—nor is it
two, or rather many—it and its intellection—for it itself is actually not its
thinking—so what is thought of must be a third thing. If Intellect,
thinking and intelligible are identical, by becoming one they would
make themselves disappear in themselves. If they are distinguished by
being other than each other, then they are not the Good either.

So, leave all else entirely out of the best nature, since it needs no
assistance. For whatever you add will diminish by its addition the nature
that needs nothing. For us, thinking is beautiful, because the soul needs
to have intellect, and also for Intellect, since Being is identical with it, and
thinking has produced Intellect.

Intellect, then, must be together with thinking, and always attain
a comprehension of itself, that this is this, and that these two are one.
If they were only one, then it would have been self-sufficient and there
would be no need for it to grasp itself. For ‘know thyself’ is directed at
those who because of their inner multiplicity have a job to count their
parts, and to understand that they do not know, either entirely or at all,
how many parts and what kinds of parts they have, nor what rules over
them, or in what respect they are themselves.

If the Good were something for itself, then that would be in a way
superior to knowledge, thinking, and self-awareness. But it is not any-
thing for itself, for it takes in nothing; ‘it’ suffices for it. It, then, is not
good for itself, but for other things. For they are in need of it, and it is
not in need of itself; that would be ridiculous. For then it would indeed
be lacking itself, too. Nor does it actually see itself; for it would have to
be something and to become something in looking.

It has left all these beings to the beings posterior to itself; and as it
happens, nothing that is present with other Beings is present with the
Good, not even Substantiality. So, neither is it thinking, if indeed that
is where Substantiality is, and, taken together, primary thinking, think-
ing in a strict sense, and Existence. For this reason, it is neither ‘reason,
nor sense-perception nor scientific understanding’ because it is not
possible to predicate anything of it as present in it.

§6.7.42. But when you are puzzled at such a point and so investigate
where one should posit these things, once reason has brought you to
them, place those things you consider venerable in the second rank—
neither add things of the second rank to the first, nor things of the third

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262 Cf. 1.4.10.6; 3.8.8.8; 5.1.8.17 18; 5.6.6.22 23; 5.9.5.29 30. See Parmenides, fr. 28
B 3 DK.
263 I.e., thinking is of intelligibles and Intellect is identical with intelligibles.
264 Reading ωτώ of ms X, Theiler and Hadot. 265 See Pl., Parm. 141E9.
266 Cf. 5.6.2. See Pl., Parm. 142A3 4. 267 See Ar., Meta. 12.9.1074b18.
rank to the second. Place the second rank around the first, and the third round the second.268 In this way, you will allow each to relate to the others as they do. You will be making the last things depend on the superior ones: the last things encircle the superior ones, which remain in themselves.

For this reason, it is why it is said, and quite rightly, too, that all Beings encircle the king of all and all Beings are for the sake of him.269 Plato means Beings by ‘all things’, and he adds ‘for his sake’, in that he is the cause of their existence: they in a way desire him, since he is different from all Beings, and possesses nothing that is present in them.

In fact, they would not be all Beings, if anything of what comes after him belonged to him. If, then, Intellect, too, is one of all Beings, then Intellect does not belong to the king of all things.

In saying he is the cause of all beautiful things, Plato is obviously positing the Beauty among Forms, and positing the Good above all Beauty.

In actually positing these Forms as Beings of second rank, he asserts that the beings which come from them are suspended as beings of the third rank. And in positing that around the beings of third rank there are beings engendered by beings of third rank, he asserts that this cosmos depends on Soul. Since Soul is suspended from Intellect, and Intellect from the Good, in this way all beings relate to the Good through intermediaries, some nearer, some neighbours to the near ones. These last are sensible things suspended from Soul at the greatest distance from it.270

268 See Pl. [?], 2nd Ep. 312E 3 4.
269 See Pl. [?], 2nd Ep. 312E1 2. Plotinus now shifts to the metaphorical representation of the Good.
270 Cf. 5.4.1.1 4.
6.8 (39)
On the Voluntary, and the One’s Wishing

INTRODUCTION

Is the One free? Anything explained by the One or the Good manifests the nature of its ultimate cause. The definition of freedom when applied to the human soul and intellect is the starting point for the whole enquiry. This treatise tackles, as part of its subject, the problems of attributing any predicates to the Good.

SUMMARY

§1. ‘What depends on us’: can this expression be extended from humans to intelligibles and the One? We have to ask how ‘what depends on us’ is distinguished from the voluntary.

§2. Which faculty of the soul does ‘what depends on us’ relate to – desire, spirit, or to a combination of desire and reason? No action depends entirely on us.

§3. Does true freedom lie in opinion or representation? No, in the intellect.

§4. Is it not impossible to attribute freedom to intelligible beings? For they are subject to their own natures. In the case of intelligible beings, one should not distinguish between activity and substance – so one is not subject to the other.

§5. Can virtue be free? It is like a second intellect.

§6. Only freedom in the activity of the intellect is freedom in the full sense. It is the will for the Good that makes the intellect free.

§7. The ‘reckless argument’: the Good is not free since it does not control its own nature. However, a consequence would be to make the expression ‘what depends on us’ meaningless.

1 Porphyry’s title. The word θέλημα (‘wishing’) is Porphyry’s. Plotinus uses θέλησις. Cf. infra 16.22 23.
§8. The predicates which cannot be applied to the Good.
§9. The principle of all things cannot be by accident; it is prior to necessity in being what it is.
§10. The cause of Intellect cannot be by accident; the Good is above all necessity because of its boundless power.
§11. The Good is not, and so cannot be the object of enquiry; it is none of the predicates collected in the genera of Being.
§12. We are aware of our own freedom, so the principle that makes us free must also be free.
§13. Predicates used of the Good are used to persuade; the Good’ activity is not subservient to its being, since the two are identical. Only the Good satisfies itself. Still, all predicates hold only ‘as it were’ of the Good.
§14. If each being is the cause of itself, the Good must be a fortiori cause of itself.
§15. The awareness of our own freedom allows us to approach the true life of the Good.
§16. The positive attributes of the Good.
§17. Neither intelligible nor sensible being is accidentally; only the Good relates solely to itself.
§18. We should look for the Good in ourselves; images of the Good.
§19. Contemplation of the Good itself is better than mere images of it; it is ‘beyond Substantiality’.
§20. Is the Good not prior to itself if it produces itself?
§21. The Good is will entirely; it cannot produce itself other than it does. There is identity between the substantiality of the Good and its will. To contemplate the Good, one has to do away with all other predicates.
§6.8.1. Can one so much as raise the question whether, in the case of the gods, too, there is anything that is up to them, or is it really only appropriate to look for such a thing amongst the frailties and ambiguous powers of human beings, whereas we should grant omnipotence to gods, so that it is not merely something that is up to them, but everything? Or is omnipotence indeed only to be granted to one [god], and, as to the other gods, some are actually disposed in one way, and some in another way, and there are some gods of which either is true?

In fact, we should investigate these things, too, and we should dare to investigate these things both in the case of the primary Beings and in the case of what is above all [the One], how anything is up to it, even if we agree that it is omnipotent. Yet what this very power means has to be investigated, so long as we do not take it to mean a potency in relation to an actuality, that is, to a future actuality.

Let us postpone these questions for the moment, and first look at ourselves, where one anyway usually looks, to see if anything is actually up to us. The first thing to be investigated is how we should define something being up to us, that is, what is the conception of such a thing. In this way, we may come to know if it may be transferred to the gods, too, and even more so to god [the One], or not.

1 Up to it, or us or them, that is, to do something or its opposite, indicating, minimally, moral or legal responsibility but also equivalent to what is indicated by the words ‘free will’. These phrases translate τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν which is an important term in Aristotle and then Stoic discussions of action. Alternative translations are ‘dependent on us’, ‘in our power’, ‘authority over ourselves’. However, asking whether anything depends on the god(s) or is in their power would be strange. Cf. 3.1.7.14 16. See Ar., EN 3.1.1110a17 18, 4.1111b30, 5.1112a31, 7.1113b5; SVF 2.298 (= Plutarch, De St. repug. 1047b); Epictetus, Disc. 1.1.

2 Cf. infra 21.1 8. See Alex. Aphr., De fato 204.12 16. 3 I.e., the One.

4 i.e., Intellect, Soul, undescended intellects, and intelligibles, here and infra in l. 21.

5 Cf. 5.3.15.33, etc.

6 i.e., looking to ourselves rather than to the gods. See e.g., Ar., EN 3.5.1113b5; SVF 2.285 (= Cicero, Acad. Pr. 2.143), 295 (= D.L., 7.42).
In fact, it should be transferred, but we have to investigate just how it applies to the other things, and to the primary Beings.

So, what do we think when we say something is up to us? And why do we investigate it? It is my view that because we are subject to motion in the midst of opposing fortunes and necessities, and the assaults of violent passions attacking the soul, and because we consider all these to be dominant, and because we are subservient to them, and are led where they drive us, we are puzzled as to whether we are nothing after all, and as to whether in fact nothing is up to us.

The upshot is that something that is up to us is as follows: something we do, without being enslaved to fortunes or necessities or violent passions, because we will it, when nothing opposes our willing. If this is so, then the conception of being up to us is that which is subservient to our willing, and, will occur or not, depending on the extent of our willing it. Everything is voluntary that occurs without force and with knowledge [of the circumstances]; in contrast, anything is up to us over which we are in charge.

In many cases, the voluntary and what is up to us may coincide, even if their definitions are distinct, though there are cases where they diverge. For example, if someone has the power to kill someone else, it would not be voluntary for him when he did it, if he did not know that it was his father. And that would perhaps diverge from what is up to him. And, certainly, knowledge relating to what is voluntary must include not only particulars, but also universals. For why is it involuntary if you do not know it is a friend, but not involuntary if you do not know that you should not kill generally? Because you should have learned that this is so? Not knowing that one should have learned these things is not voluntary, nor is anything voluntary that drives you away from learning them.

§6.8.2. But we have to investigate which factor in us we should actually attribute something to, when we explain it by saying it is up to us. Should we attribute it to impulse or some kind of desire? For example, attributing what is done or not to spiritedness or to appetite or to calculative reasoning about the benefit along with desire?
In fact, if it were explained through spiritedness or desire we would say that things are up to children and beasts, also to mad people, and those beside themselves, and those under the influence of drugs or adventitious imaginative representations, over which they have no control.

If we attribute something’s being up to us to calculative reasoning coupled with desire, then the question arises if we should attribute it to calculative reasoning even when it goes wrong.

In fact, it should be attributed to correct calculative reasoning and correct desire. But even then one should investigate whether calculative reasoning moves the desire or the desire the calculative reasoning. For even if the desires are natural, the soul would follow the necessity of nature, if they belong to the animal, that is, the composite. If the desires belong to the soul alone, then many of the things which at present we say are up to us would fall outside this range.

Next, what bare calculative reasoning would precede the [bodily and mental] states? And how, when imagination compels us and desire drags us towards wherever it leads, does that put us in control of these actions? How, generally, are we in control of that to which we are driven? For something in need, desirous of a necessary replenishment, is not in control of the thing to which it is in every way driven.

How, generally, is something an origin for itself, when it originates from another thing, that is, has its origin in something other, which in turn explains why the thing has come to be such as it is? For it lives due to that other thing, that is, as it has been formed by it.

In fact, in that case even inanimate things will be able to have something up to them. For even fire produces effects in line with the way it was produced.

If the animal, that is, the soul, has things up to it because it knows what it does, and if this knowledge is through sense-perception, then what contribution does this make towards its having something up to it? For sense-perception does not give the soul control of the effect merely by its seeing. If it is through knowledge, and if this knowledge is of what has been done, and it merely knows this, well then, something else drives

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14 See Ar., EN 3.4.1111b8 9. Plotinus, unlike Aristotle, does not use ‘voluntary’ for children and animals. He wants to restrict the voluntary to the actions of rational animals.
15 Cf. 3.1-7.14, 6.15.18.
16 See Ar., EN 3.4.1111b8 9, 1114a31, 7.1149b35 1150a1; Alex. Aphr., De fato 14.183.
17 See Ar., EN 3.5.1111b29.
18 See Ar., DA 3.10.433a18 20.
19 See SVF 3.177 (= Plutarch, De St. rep. 1057a).
20 Cf. 3.3.4.31 34.
21 See Alex. Aphr., De fato 14.184.15 19.
it to the action. If reason or knowledge acts, that is, prevails over desire, then we have to investigate by what this is to be explained; and, quite generally, where this occurs. And if reason itself produces another desire, how is this to be understood? If reason halts the desire, and comes to a standstill, and being up to us lies at this point, then being up to us will not lie in the action; rather, it will come to a stop in the intellect, since everything in action, even if reason prevails, is mixed and is not purely up to us.

§6.8.3. For this reason, these things have to be looked into, too. For we now are once more close to the argument about the gods. So, we have now attributed what is up to us to willing, and next posited this as lying in reason, and next in correct reason. Perhaps we should now add the correctness of scientific understanding. For it is not the case that, if someone has the right belief and acts on it, he would really uncontroversially have autonomy, unless he knows why it is right, and is not driven towards his duty by chance or imagination. Since we deny that imagination is up to us, how could we rank those acting in accordance with imagination as having autonomy? Indeed, by ‘imagination properly speaking’ I mean that imagination roused from bodily states – for states of emptiness with respect to food and drink in a way shape the imagination as does being full of seed – the kind of imaginative representations depending on the qualities of the liquids in the body. And we do not rank those who are active in ways corresponding to these imaginative representations under the principle of autonomy.

For this reason, we do not designate the actions of bad people, who do many things according to their imaginative representations, as being up to them or voluntary. But we will designate as autonomous those who, due to intellect, are free of the affections of the body. In explaining what is up to us by reference to the most beautiful principle, we will grant that the activity of intellect and the premises arising from it are truly free, and we shall say that the desires roused from the intellect, which are not involuntary, are present in the gods living in this manner, that is, those who live by intellect and strive according to intellect.

22 See the Stoic view that what is up to us is assent to a representation, e.g., SVF 2.285 (= Cicero, Acad. Pr. 2.143).
23 Cf. supra 1.18.
24 Cf. supra 2.10.
25 The word is αὐτεξοσιον. Alternative translations are: self determination, sovereignty. See SVF 2.975 (= Hippolytus, Philos. 21), 2.990 (= Origen, De princ. 3.110 Delarue); Alex. Aphr., De fato 182.24.
26 Cf. 1.1.3.4; 2.3.9.10; 3.6.1.2; 4.2.2.23; 5.3.2.6.
27 Cf. 3.1.7.13 15.
28 I.e., used in arguments about how to act.
29 Following HS in preserving the last line which is bracketed by HS.
§6.8.4. Still, one should investigate how something occurring in accordance with desire will fall under the autonomy of the agent, because desire drives the agent towards something external, and contains a deficiency. The thing desiring is driven, even if it is driven towards the Good.

Moreover, a problem about Intellect itself arises: since it acts by nature based on what it is by nature, should it be said to be free and are things up to it when it is not up to it not to produce some result?

Next, one should investigate if, generally, one can say ‘up to them’ in the proper sense for those beings in which no action is present.\(^{30}\)

But even for those things which possess the potency for action, the necessity comes from outside.\(^{31}\) For they will not act for no reason. But, then, how will freedom apply also to those enslaved to their own nature?

In fact, if something is not forced to follow another, how then is ‘enslaved’ meant? How can something borne towards the Good be forced, when the desire is voluntary, and if it knows, in moving towards it as good, that it is good? For the involuntary is a diversion from the Good and towards something not good for one. And that is enslaved which is not free and which does not have the power to move towards the Good; rather, because something else better has a commanding position over it, it is driven away from its own goods, in serving the other thing. Slavery is blamed, not because one has\(^{32}\) power to move towards the bad, but where one has no power to move towards one’s own good because one is driven to the good of another.

One can speak of slavery to one’s own nature if you distinguish between the thing enslaved and what it is enslaved to.\(^{33}\) For how could a simple nature, that is, one activity, which is not different potentially and actually, not be free? For you could not say that it acts according to its nature, such that its substantiality is one thing and its activity is another, if indeed in the intelligible world existence and acting are identical.\(^{34}\) If, then, the activity is not because of another thing nor up to another thing, how can it not be free? It must be free, even if ‘up to itself’ does not fit, but something more than ‘up to itself’ is here, and up to itself in such a way that it is not conditional on another, and nothing else is master of its activity. For neither is anything else master of its substantiality, if indeed the substantiality is a principle.

\(^{30}\) I.e., Beings in the intelligible world. \(^{31}\) See Ar., EN 3.1.1110a2.

\(^{32}\) Omitting the οὐχ ἔχει as due to dittography after οὐχ οὖ: blame does not attach to slavery because it is a positive power for the bad, but because slaves perform someone else’s good.

\(^{33}\) See Pl., Rep. 443D4; Tim. 89D3 4; Lg. 645B1 2. \(^{34}\) Cf. 5.3.7.18; 6.7.40.14.
Even if Intellect has another principle, still, this is not outside Intellect, but in the Good. Even if Intellect conforms to that Good, it will be all the more up to itself and something free. For one seeks freedom and what is up to it for the sake of the Good. If, then, Intellect is active in conformity to the Good, then its activity is more up to it. For Intellect already has an orientation towards that from itself and has in itself what it is better for it to be in itself if indeed it is orientated towards the Good.

§6.8.5. Then, is autonomy or the ‘up to it’ in Intellect only when it is thinking alone, that is, in pure Intellect, or are they also in the soul when it is intellectually active and acting according to virtue? If indeed we grant these attributes to a soul engaged in action, first we should not grant it to the soul in respect of what is accomplished in the action. For we do not possess the mastery over bringing actions to completion. But if we grant it to acting beautifully and bringing about everything in our power, then that would be said correctly. But how is even that up to us? For example, if we are courageous because there is war. I mean how is the activity then up to us, when, if war had not taken control of the situation, we would not have engaged in this activity? Likewise with all other actions in accordance with virtue, when virtue is always forced to bring about this or that. Indeed, if one were to grant choice to virtue itself, we can ask if it would want there to be wars, so that it can act and be courageous and want for there to be injustice, so that it can determine and organize what is just, or poverty, so that it can manifest liberality, or, when everything is still and going well, would it choose stillness over action, since no one needs their service, just as a doctor, for example, Hippocrates, wants no one to need his skill.

If, then, virtue, being active in actions, were to be forced to help, how would it have the ‘up to it’ in a pure fashion? Would we call the actions necessary, but the willing, and the reasoning before the actions not necessary?

In fact, if so, then, in positing these attributes in the bare factor prior to the thing done, we will posit autonomy and being up to virtue itself outside the action.

35 Because the Good is not outside anything. All things are in it.
36 The term is τὸ ὁρισμένον (‘an orientation’) which is a correction by Kirchhoff, followed by HS, for τὸ ὁρισμένον (‘that which is seen’). Either reading is difficult to construe.
37 The terms τὸ αὐτεξουσίον (‘autonomy’) and τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ (‘up to it’) are being used synonymously.
38 See Ar., EN 4.2.1120a23; 10.8.1178b6; Alcinous, Didask. 152.33 153.4.
39 Plotinus here agrees with the Stoics. Cf. supra 2.35. See Plutarch, De comm. not. 27. 1071c d.
40 I.e., the willing and reasoning preceding the action; these are up to us, not the action itself.
What is, then, up to virtue itself, as a habit or disposition? Should we not say it comes to order the badly disposed soul, by bringing measure to affective states and desires? How, then, will we say being good and ‘virtue without a master’ are up to us?

In fact, insofar as it is willed and chosen. Or, because, when it has come about in us, it constitutes freedom and the ‘up to us’, and does not permit us still to be the slaves of what we were slaves to before. If, then, virtue is in a way another intellect and a habit which makes the soul rational, then again being up to us does not belong to us in action, but to intellect detached from actions.

§6.8.6. How, then, did we explain something being up to us earlier by reference to willing, in saying ‘this would occur in accordance with my willing’, and also adding ‘or would not occur’?

If, then, this was said correctly, and if the following remarks are to agree with what has been said, we will say that virtue and intellect are authoritative, and that one should explain what is up to us and freedom by these. And we will say that, since they are without a master, intellect wills to be on its own, and virtue wills to be in charge of itself, being in charge of the soul, such that it is good and, to this extent, wills to render themselves and the soul free. But when unavoidable feelings and actions befall it, the good soul, rendered such by virtue, does not want them to occur, and nonetheless, even amidst them, preserves what is up to it, by returning to itself even in the sensible world. And we will say that it will not simply obey the demands of the situation, for example, when saving someone in danger; rather, should it think right, even in abandoning him, it orders him to abandon life, possessions, children, and his country itself, and, in so doing, it has its own beauty as aim, not the existence of those subordinate to it.

The result is, we will say, that autonomy and what is up to us are not to be referred back to acting, not to the external situation, but to the internal activity and intellection and the contemplative activity of virtue itself. This virtue must be called a kind of intellect, not reckoning with it those affective states enslaved to or moderated by reason. For those, Plato says, when corrected ‘by habits and exercises’ belong ‘close to the body’. And, as a result, we will say that it is quite clear that what is immaterial is what is free, and it is by this

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41 See Pl., Phil. 11D4; Ar., EN 2.5.1106a22 24.
42 Cf. 1.2.2.13 16. See Pl., Phil. 45D E.
43 Cf. 2.3.9.17; 4.4.38.25. See Pl., Rep. 617E3.
44 Cf. 1.2.6.11 15; 6.7.35.5.
45 Cf. supra 1.32 33.
46 See Ar., EN 3.7.1113b6.
50 Cf. 5.1.10.19 21.
that what is up to us must be explained, and willing itself, which is in control and on its own, even if something, of necessity, directs it towards something external. Those things, then, which originate in willing and occur because of it are up to us, both externally and in itself. Whatever the will itself wills and accomplishes without hindrance, is indeed the prime case of something being up to us.

Theoretical intellect, that is, primary Intellect is in this way up to itself, since its function is never up to something else. On the contrary, it reverted entirely towards itself and its function, lying itself in the Good with no deficiency and fulfilled, living in a way in conformity to will. Its will is intellection, but it is called ‘will’ because its [activity] accords with Intellect. So-called will imitates what is in accord with Intellect, for will wants the Good, while thinking lies truly in the Good. Intellect, then, possesses what will wants, and, when will attains it, will becomes intellection. If we, then, posit what is up to us in the will for the Good, how can something which already has what will wants to attain not have what is up to it?

In fact, it must be assumed to be something greater, if one does not want to make ‘what is up to itself’ ascend to this level.

§6.8.7. Soul, then, becomes free when it hastens without hindrance towards the Good because of Intellect. And what it does because of Intellect, is up to it, while Intellect does what it does because of itself. The nature of the Good is that which is to be desired for itself, and is that because of which other things have what is up to themselves, when they have the power to attain it without hindrance, or when Intellect has it.

The Good is master of all things lesser in honour, being in the primary abode, towards which other things want to ascend, and on which they depend, and from which they have their powers, such that some things are up to them. How could one bring the Good under the concept ‘up to it’ when that concept is properly used [only] of me and you? Intellect was just barely, albeit violently, dragged under this concept.
We could do this only if we follow a reckless argument. This argument uses a different premise, and claims that, since the nature of the Good is disposed as it is by chance, and is not master of what is, and since it is not what it is on account of itself, it will have neither freedom nor what is up to it, whether or not it produces the effects which it is forced to produce or not to produce.

This argument is certainly repellent and without support; it does away with the nature of the voluntary and of autonomy, and the conception of what is up to us, in that, on this assumption, it would be fruitless to say these things, being mere sounds referring to non-existent things. For the argument must not just claim that nothing is up to anything; it must also say that this phrase cannot be thought or comprehended. If the argument admits that it can be comprehended, then it would already be refuted with ease, since the conception of what is up to us fits those things which the argument claims it does not fit.

But this conception neither has anything to do with substantality nor does it include it, since it is impossible for a thing to produce itself or to bring itself into real existence. Rather, our thought wants to consider which beings are slaves of others, and which have autonomy, and which are subordinate to other beings, and which are master of their own activity, a feature which belongs purely both to eternal Beings insofar as they are eternal, and to those who pursue or possess the Good without hindrance. Indeed, since the Good is above these, it is absurd to look for some other sort of good beside it, since it is also not correct to say that the Good exists according to chance. For chance occurs in things that are posterior and plural. We should not say that the first thing conforms to chance, nor that it is not the master of its own coming to be, because it never did come to be.

It is absurd to say that it produces effects corresponding to what it is, if one were to think that freedom then exists when something produces effects or is active contrary to its nature. Nor may something solitary actually be deprived of power, if it is solitary not through being prevented by another thing, but because it is just that thing itself and, in a way, is self-sufficient, and has nothing better than itself. Otherwise,

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60 Intellect was ‘dragged’ to the sensible world where things were up to human beings with intellect. Perhaps what follows is a reference to a Gnostic argument (cf. 2.9.15.10), although other targets have been suggested, including Epicurus, certain Christian theologians, and the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias.

61 I.e., the Idea of the Good as first principle of all.

62 I.e., the conception of autonomy or what is up to something is not about self creation.

63 See Ar., Phys. 2.6.198a9 10.

64 See Pl., Parm. 153B8 D3.

65 See Ar., Meta. 7.15.1040a29.
one would be removing autonomy from that which attains the Good to
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the greatest degree.
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If this is absurd, it would be even more absurd to deprive the Good of
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autonomy, because it is good and remains by itself, in not needing to be
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moved towards any of those things moving towards it, and being defi-
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cient in nothing. Its sort of existence, is actually its sort of activity, – for
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these are not two distinct things indeed any more than they are in the
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case of Intellect, since its activity does not conform to Existence, any
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more than vice versa – which means that the Good cannot be active in
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conformity with its nature, nor can its activity and its sort of life, be
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explained by reference to its sort of substantiality. Rather, its sort of
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substantiality coexists with its activity and, sort of coming about with it
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from eternity, produces it itself out of both, for its own sake and
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belonging to nothing else.

§6.8.8. We see that autonomy is not an accident of the Good; rather, we
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see that it has this autonomy by stripping away the contraries from things
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with autonomy in other respects. In transferring lesser attributes from
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lesser beings to the Good, on account of our inability to grasp those
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things which should be said of it, we would like to say the following about
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it; yet we are in no position to find anything to say about it, let alone
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anything properly applicable to it. Both all beautiful and all holy attri-
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butes are posterior to it, for it is their principle. Nonetheless, it is not
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their principle in another respect. Indeed, if you take everything away
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from it, then you take away the ‘up to it’, as posterior, and ‘autonomy’,
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since this means an activity in relation to another; so, too, ‘unhindered’,
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and also ‘without impediment towards others’, insofar as there are others.
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Generally, you should not speak of it in relation to another thing. It is
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just what it is, and is prior to them.
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Since we strip away ‘is’ as well, so, too, we strip away anything
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relative to beings. Nor may we actually say ‘it has grown to be
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naturally’. For this is posterior also. Even if this phrase were used of
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intellegibles, it would be said of things coming from something else, and
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thus primarily of Substantiality, because this grew naturally out of the

66 Reading oυτι with Kirchhoff rather than the oτι of HS2. On the latter reading, either
Plotinus would have to be saying what he denies, namely, that activity follows being
more than being follows activity or else the questionable claim would have to be put in
the mouth of an objector. But this sentence does not otherwise indicate that.
67 The expression οίνον (‘sort of, ‘in a way’) indicates that the terms ‘being’, ‘activity’, ‘life’,
and so on only apply to the Good analogously. Cf. infra 8.4 5, 13.48 §1; 5.5.3.23.
68 Cf. 5.3.1.1, 14.1; 5.5.6.12; 6.7.36.7. I.e., non metaphorical.
69 Cf. 5.2.1.1. 70 Cf. infra l. 22. 71 See Pl., Parm. 141E9 10.
72 Cf. supra 4.5, 4.26, 7.50 52.
Good. But if nature is in temporal things, then it is not said of Substantiality. Nor indeed should ‘not being from itself’ be said of this nature. For we stripped away ‘is’, and ‘not from itself’ might be said when something is by the agency of another thing. Is it, then, accidentally thus?  

In fact, not even ‘it is accidentally’ is to be applied to the Good, for no attribute is accidental to it, nor is it in relation to another thing. ‘It is accidentally’ is said, of many things, when some things are, and they are other things accidentally; so how could the first thing of all be accidentally? Nor did it come here, so you cannot investigate how it did come, or which chance brought it or gave it real existence. For chance did not yet exist, nor did spontaneity. For spontaneity also is both derived from something else and occurs among things that come to be.  

§6.8.9. But if someone were to understand ‘it is’ accidentally applied to the Good itself, then you shouldn’t stop with the name, you should try to comprehend what the speaker is thinking of. What, then, is he thinking of? This: by having this nature, that is, power, the Good is principle. For if it had a different nature, this other nature would be the principle, whatever it is; and if it were worse, it would be active in conformity with its substantiality. 

What you should actually say in reply to this kind of thought is that it is not possible that any chance thing can be the Good, since it is principle of everything, not because any chance thing is worse, but because it is not good in some respect and not in others, like a deficiency; no, the principle of everything must be better than everything posterior to it so that the Good is something bounded. I mean by ‘bounded’, that it is unique, and is not what it is by necessity. For there is no necessity in it; necessity is in the things following the principle, and even in them it has no force. The solitariness comes from the Good itself. It is, then, this, namely, just what it ought to be, and not something else. It, then, is not accidentally so; it had to be so. 

And this ‘had to be’ is the principle of those things which had to be, and this cannot be accidentally the way it is. For it is not just anything it happens to be, but what it had to be. More correctly, it is not what it ought to be; rather, other things had to wait on whatever way the King  

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74 Playing on the etymological connection between φύσις (‘nature’) and ἐφυ (‘was born’).  
75 Cf. supra 7.3.  
76 Cf. infra 11.32, 17.27 28; 6.7.23.18.  
77 See Ar., Phys. 2.6.197a36ff.  
78 Cf. supra 8.22.  
79 Retaining ἀρχή deleted by HS following Kirchhoff.  
80 The Good is not bounded by having an essence. Cf. e.g., 5.5.6.5 6. It is bounded in a way only by its uniqueness and its being uniquely unconstrained by any necessity.  
81 Contra Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b10 who says the Prime Mover exists by necessity.
may appear to them, and posit him as this, which is him himself, not as appearing as chance may have it, but as being the King in truth, in truth the principle and in truth the Good.\textsuperscript{82} He does not appear as being active in conformity with the Good, since then he might be thought to follow another, but as being one, just what he is; the upshot is that he is not just in conformity with the Good, he is the Good.

So, if ‘it is accidentally’ does not apply even to Being – for something belongs to being accidentally, if it is accidentally, but Being itself is not accidentally – then neither does Being come to be what it is accidentally, nor is it happenstance that Being is what it is, nor did it get to be the way it is from another; rather, its nature itself truly is to be Being. How can anyone apply in thought ‘it is accidentally what it is’ to something that transcends Being?\textsuperscript{83} For it has generated Being,\textsuperscript{84} which itself is not accidentally what it is; it is as Substance is, being just what Substance is and just what Intellect is.

Furthermore, you could then say Intellect is accidentally Intellect, as though Intellect might be something other than what the nature of Intellect actually is. Indeed, something not stepping outside itself, belonging unwaveringly to itself, is what should most properly be said to be what it is.

What, then, could you say when you are in the intelligible world and have ascended above Intellect, and regard it? What about ‘what it is’, on the grounds that you see it in possession of being what it is accidentally?\textsuperscript{85} No: neither ‘what it is’, nor ‘it is accidentally in any way’; indeed not ‘it is accidentally’ quite generally; rather, you see it being only in this way, in no other way but this. But, again, not even ‘what it is’, for then you would be defining a something of this kind.\textsuperscript{86} It is not possible that the onlooker is able to say either thus or not thus ‘what it is’ or ‘not what it is’. For you would be saying it is one of the Beings to which ‘what it is’ applies.

So, it is something other than all the things to which ‘what it is’ applies. But, when you see that it is indefinite\textsuperscript{87} you will be in a position to speak about all the things posterior to it, and you will say it is none of these, but if indeed at all, that it is all power, master of itself, being what

\textsuperscript{82} Cf. 1.8.2.8; 2.9.34; 5.1.8.2; 5.3.12.42; 6.7.42.10. See Pl. [?], 2nd Ep. 312E.
\textsuperscript{83} I.e., the Good. Cf. infra 16.34, 19.13 where the phrase is ἐπικείμενος ὑσίας. See Pl., Rep. 509B9.
\textsuperscript{84} Cf. 3.8.9.41; 5.1.6.7, 25 40; 5.2.1.8; 6.7.32.2.
\textsuperscript{85} Reading ἄρα γε τὸ ὁῦτος, ὡς εἴδεν αὐτὸν ἐξουσία τὸ ὁῦτος συνέβη following Theiler.
\textsuperscript{86} An individual substance, τὸδε τι. See Ar., Cat. 3.910.
\textsuperscript{87} Cf. supra 1.10, where the term is ἀριστεένον (‘bounded’), meaning set apart by its uniqueness; 6.9.3.39, 43 where the term is ἄμορφος (‘without shape’) and 6.9.6.10 12, where the term is ἀπερος (‘unlimited’). Here it is ἀφριστος (‘indefinite’).
it wants, and even more so distributing what it wants to Beings, being itself greater than any wanting, and itself positing wanting as posterior to itself.\textsuperscript{88} Neither, then, did it want to be ‘what it is’ such that it would follow on something else, nor has any other god made it what it is.

§6.8.10. But one should also ask the person who says of the Good, ‘it is accidentally thus’: How would he think ‘it is accidentally’ could be false, should it be so? And how would one strip away ‘it is accidentally’? And if it were a nature, would he deny that ‘it is accidentally’ fits? If he attributes to chance that nature which removes ‘it is accidentally what it is’ from other things, where could being not from chance come from? This principle itself removes ‘as it happens to be’ from other things, by giving them form or limit or shape;\textsuperscript{89} it is not possible to attribute these to chance in things that come to be what they are according to reason, but this itself [the imposition of form or limit or shape] attributes the explanation to reason, whereas chance occurs in those things which do not come about in orderly progression from earlier to later, but in coincidences.

How can anyone actually attribute to chance the real existence of the principle of all reason, order, and boundary?\textsuperscript{90} Indeed, chance is master of many things, not however of Intellect and reason and order in generating these things. Where chance is indeed admitted to be the contrary of reason, how can it be the progenitor of reason? If, then, chance does not generate Intellect, then neither will it generate what is prior to or better than Intellect. For it would have no resources with which to generate it, nor indeed would it be at all among eternal things. If, then, nothing is prior to the Good, and it is first, then we must come to a stop there, and say nothing more about it. Rather, we must investigate how things posterior to it came about, and not how it came to be, since in truth it did not come about.

Why, then, if it did not come to be, and is such as it is, is it not master of its own substantiality? And even if it is not master of its substantiality, but being such as it is, not making itself exist,\textsuperscript{91} in making use of itself such as it is, then it would be that which it is of necessity, and could not be otherwise.

In fact, it is what it is, not because it is not otherwise, but because the best is what it is. Not everything has autonomy to improve, but nothing is prevented by another thing from deteriorating.\textsuperscript{92} But, that it did not deteriorate, means that it has not deteriorated from itself, not through

\textsuperscript{88} Cf. 3.8.10; 5.1.7; 10; 5.4.1.36; 5.5.12.38; 40; 6.7.42.21; 24.
\textsuperscript{89} Cf. 6.7.17; 36; 40; 41.\textsuperscript{90} Cf. infra l. 36, 15.28.
\textsuperscript{91} This is the inference of the objector.
\textsuperscript{92} The Greek is τὸ χείρος ἐλθεῖν, literally ‘to come to the worse’.
being prevented, but by being that which did not deteriorate. And the inability to deteriorate does not denote an incapacity of the thing which does not deteriorate; rather, not deteriorating lies in the thing itself and is because of it. And not coming to belong to anything else contains the extreme of power within itself, without being constrained by necessity; it is itself necessity and the law\textsuperscript{93} for other things.

Did the necessity, then, cause itself to exist?

In fact, it did not come to exist among the other things, posterior to it, which really exist because of it. How, then, can that which is prior to real existence come to exist through another or through itself?\textsuperscript{94}

§6.8.11. And what is the thing which did not come to exist?

In fact, we should retire in silence, and investigate no further, because our judgement is stuck without any resources. What indeed could anyone investigate further, when he has no further way of proceeding, since all investigation proceeds to the principle, and comes to a standstill at it?

Additionally, all investigation has to be thought of as being either of what something is, or of how it is qualified, or why it exists, or if it exists.\textsuperscript{95} Existence, then, in the way we say the Good exists, [is known] from things after it.\textsuperscript{96} Looking for why it exists is to look for a different principle. But there is no principle of the principle of all. Looking for the quality is to look for what it is accidentally, and that in the case of something which is not anything accidentally. The question ‘what is it?’ makes clear that we should not seek to discover anything about it; rather, grasping it alone, if possible, in our intellects, having learned that it is not licit for anything to be attributed to it.

Generally, we are accustomed to ponder this puzzle – those of us who ponder this nature at all – by first positing position, that is, place, as a kind of chaos.\textsuperscript{97}

Next, once there is position, we introduce this nature into the place that comes to be or is in our imagination. Once we have introduced it to this kind of place, we thus investigate just how and from where, in a way, the Good came to be in the sensible world and, since it is like a stranger, to investigate its presence and its sort of substantiality and, moreover, from which depth or height it was flung into this place.

For this reason, we must, in removing the cause of the puzzle, bring it about that the attention directed towards the Good ignores all place,

\textsuperscript{91} See for this role of god in the Stoics, e.g. \textit{SVF} 1.537, Cleanthes’ \textit{Hymn to Zeus} (= Stobaeus, \textit{Ed.} 1.25.3).

\textsuperscript{92} I.e., the Good is prior to the real existence of all that exists because of it. \textit{Cf. infra} 11.33, 13.57, 16.14 15, 20.11.

\textsuperscript{93} See Ar., \textit{AP} 2.1.89b24 25. \textsuperscript{94} See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 245D2 3.

\textsuperscript{95} See Ar., \textit{Phys.} 4. 1.208b31 33.
and not to posit the Good in any place, neither as always lying in a place, and having its seat there, nor as having come to it. Rather, we must direct attention to the Good as being only as it is, having been said to be as it is by the necessity of our statements, whereas place, like other attributes, too, is posterior, indeed posterior to all things.

If, then, we consider it to be without place, as we do, we will not posit anything around it as if it were encircled, nor are we able to grasp its quantity, nor will we assert that it is accidentally a quantity. Nor indeed is it qualified in any way. For there is no shape around it, not even an intelligible one. Nor is it said in relation to anything, for it existed by itself before there was anything else. What, then, would ‘it is accidentally what it is’ be?

In fact, how shall we be able to say this since everything else said of it is said by stripping away? The result is rather that instead of saying that ‘it is accidentally what it is’, it is truer to say that ‘it is not accidentally what it is’ since it is not accidentally in any respect at all.

§6.8.11. What, then? Is the Good not what it is? Is it at least master of being what it is or of transcending Existence? For the soul, not persuaded by anything we have said, finds itself at an impasse. So, this is what is to be said in response to these objections, namely, that each of us, in respect of the body, must be far from Substantiality but, in respect of the soul and what we are most of all, we participate in Substantiality, and we are a substance, that is, in a way, a composite of differentia and substantiality.

We are, then, not Substance properly speaking, and not Substantiality itself. For this reason, we are not masters of our own substantiality. For the substantiality is, in a way, one thing and we are another, and we are not masters of our substantiality; rather, the substantiality is master over us if indeed it adds the ‘differentia’. Since, however, we are in a way precisely what is master of us, we may thus be said to be in the sensible world no less masters of ourselves.

But that of which the substantiality itself is completely what it is – and it is not one thing and its substantiality another – in this case, it is...
what it is and is master of this, and is no longer to be related [to the substantiality of] another insofar as it exists and insofar as it is substance. For it is again left to be master of itself insofar as it is primarily related to its [own] substantiality.

As for the factor that actually has made the Substance [Intellect] free, and which is naturally such as to make it free, and which one might call ‘freedom-maker’, what could that be slave to if indeed it is licit to say such a thing at all? A slave to its own substantiality? But Substance is free because of the Good and is posterior to the Good, which has no substantiality. If, then, there is activity in it, and we posit it to consist in the activity, this would not be grounds for it being different from itself, nor for it not being master of itself, from whom the activity derives, because the activity is not different from it. But if we generally do not admit actuality to be in it, but claim instead that other things have their real existence by their actuality in relation to it, then all the less will we grant that master and mastered are in the intelligible world.

But neither will we grant it to be master of itself, not because something else is master of it, but because we have attributed being master of itself to Substance, and we posit the Good to be at a greater level of honour than is in conformity with being master of itself. What, then, is there at a greater level of honour than something which is master of itself?

In fact, it is because in the intelligible world, Substance and actuality, although two things in a way, provide the conception of ‘master’ from the actuality, although this was identical to the Substance; because of this, being master became separate and Substance was said to be master of itself. But where it is not two taken together as one but just one – for the Good is activity alone, or it is not activity at all – then it is not correct to speak of it being master of itself.

§ 6.8.13. But even if these names must be applied to the object of the investigation, let it be said once more that these names are not correctly applied because one should not make the Good two even in conception;

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108 I.e., the Good.

Plotinus denies ἐνέργεια to the Good in several places. Cf. 3.8.11.8 10; 3.9.9.8 12; 5.3.12.16; 6.7.17.10. But he also affirms ἐνέργεια of it. Cf. supra 12.2.5; infra 16.16 17; 20.9 15; 6.7.18.6. Given l. 22 supra, it seems that it is because the Good has no οὐσία that it has no ἐνέργεια. This allows Plotinus to distinguish the ἐνέργεια that it does not have from the ἐνέργεια that it does have. In the first sense, ἐνέργεια implies a δύναμις (‘potentiality’); in the second sense it does not. Everything other than the Good, including Intellect, is actualizing a potency in relation to the Good as object of desire. The one word ἐνέργεια should be understood as ‘actuality’ in the first case and ‘activity’ in the second.

110 Cf. supra ll. 13 17.
but now we need to deviate from strict accuracy in our arguments for the sake of persuasion. For if we were to attribute activities to it, and attribute its activities to what is in a way its willing – for it is not active unwillingly – and its activities are in a way its substantiality, then its willing and its substantiality will be identical. If this holds, therefore, as it will, so it is. It is, therefore, not the case that it wills and is active according to its nature rather than its substantiality controlling the way it wills and is active. It, therefore, is entirely master of itself, in possessing existence in itself.

Actually, consider this. Each being, in desiring the Good,\(^\text{111}\) wills to be that rather than what it itself is; and it thinks it is most of all that, when it participates in the Good. In such a case, each thing chooses for itself existence insofar as it can come to possess it from the Good. The grounds for this are that, for the Good, the nature of the Good is clearly more choice-worthy\(^\text{112}\) for itself, if indeed any portion of the Good in another thing is most choice-worthy for that thing and, for the Good, substantiality is voluntary, and comes to it by wishing, and since it is one and identical with its wishing, and exists because of wishing. And as long as each thing has not come to have the Good, it wants something other than itself, and insofar it has the Good, it at once wants itself already and is; and presence like this is not by chance, nor is its substantiality outside willing. And it is defined by this, and belongs to itself by this.

If, then, each thing produces itself by the Good, clearly it then becomes such as the Good would be towards itself primarily, by which other things, too, are being for themselves. And its wishing to be such as the Good is, goes together with its sort of substantiality. It is not possible for anyone to grasp the Good without its wanting for itself to be such as it is. Its wanting to be itself coincides with\(^\text{113}\) its being itself that which it wants, and the wishing and itself are one, and it is not less one because it did not happen to be and that which it willed to be another. For what else would it want to be other than what it is?

Indeed, if we were to suppose it to choose for itself what it wanted to become, and that it is possible for it to alter its nature into another thing, neither would it will to become another thing, nor would it blame itself for being that which it is by necessity, since this is ‘being itself’, which it always wanted and wants. For in truth the nature of the Good is wishing for itself, without being bribed by, or slavishly following, its own nature, but in choosing itself, because there was nothing else such that it could be dragged towards it.

\(^{111}\) Cf. 1.6.7.1; 6.5.1.12; 6.7.26.6.  \(^{112}\) See Pl., Phil. 20D1, 54C10, 60B4 10.  
\(^{113}\) Cf. supra 6.8.20.26, infra 54, συνφιδησμεν. 

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Further, one could also say that everything other than the Good does not include in the account of its substantiality the principle of self-satisfaction; for it might be dissatisfied with itself. But the choice of and wishing of itself is necessarily included in the real existence of the Good; otherwise, it would scarcely be possible for another thing to be satisfied with itself, since things are satisfied with themselves by partaking of the Good or by their imagining themselves doing so.

We must go along with the names, should someone use them of necessity in talking about the Good just by way of indication, although we are not allowed to say them in all strictness. Add ‘in a way’ to each of them!

If, then, the Good has been established as really existing, and choice and willing together comprise its existence – it cannot be without them – then choice and willing will not be many, and willing, substantiality, and wanting\(^{114}\) must be drawn together into one. If wanting comes from it, then necessarily its existence comes from it, and the result is that the argument has shown that it has produced itself.\(^{115}\) For if willing comes from it, and is in a way a function of it, and willing is identical to its real existence, then in this way it will have brought itself into real existence. The result is that it is not any chance thing, but what it willed itself to be.

§6.8.14. Moreover, we should also regard the matter as follows. Everything that is said to be can be identical with, or different from, its own essence. For example, this human being is one thing, and the essence of a human being something else, given that a human being partakes of the essence of a human being. Soul, in contrast, and the essence of soul are identical,\(^{116}\) if soul is something simple and not said of another thing, and human being is identical with the essence of a human being.\(^{117}\) And though a human being can come to be by chance, insofar as he is different from the essence of a human being, the essence of a human being cannot come to be by chance. For Human Being itself comes from itself.

If indeed the essence of a human being comes from itself and not by chance or accidentally, how can that which is above Human Being itself, and which is generative of Human Being itself indeed from which all Beings come, be by chance?\(^{118}\) It is after all a simpler nature than the essence of Human Being, and the essence of Being quite generally.

Furthermore, it is not possible, as one moves towards the simple, to take chance with you; the result is that it is impossible for chance to ascend to the simplest thing.

114 Retaining καὶ τὸ ἔθελεν which is bracketed by HS. 115 Cf. infra 14.41.
116 See Ar., Meta. 8.3.1043b1. 117 See Ar., Meta. 7.6.1031a28 b3.
118 Cf. infra 18.40; 6.9.3.49.
Furthermore, we should recall something said elsewhere,\textsuperscript{119} namely, each of the true Beings comes to have real existence through the agency of the nature of the Good, and if something among sensibles is of a certain kind,\textsuperscript{120} it is of a certain kind by coming from those true Beings. By ‘being of a certain kind’ I mean possessing, along with substantiality, the explanation for the existence of such a substance,\textsuperscript{121} such that the researcher in retrospect can express the reason why each of the features present in it is there – for example, why there is an eye, and why the feet of such and such an animal are as they are – and that there is an explanation which pertains to each of the parts of each thing, and that the parts are there because of one another. Why are the feet elongated? Because this feature is such and such, and because the face is such and such, the feet are such and such. And in general the concord of all parts with each other is their reciprocal explanation; and the explanation why this part is, is that this is what it is to be a human being.

The result is that the existence and the explanation [of the parts] are one, that is, identical. These come from one source in this way, a source which did not engage in calculative reasoning but which provided altogether the ‘why’ and the ‘that’.\textsuperscript{122} It, then, is the source of existence and of the explanation for existence, because it provides both. But just as in the case of things that come to be, the thing they derive from is much more of an archetype, truer and, to a greater extent than in the case of things that come to be, related to the better. If, then, none of the things which have their explanations in themselves are random or by chance or accidental, it has everything from the Good, since it is the ‘father of reason and of explanation’, I mean, of explanatory Substantiality.\textsuperscript{123} It must be the principle, like a paradigm for anything certainly with no share in chance, truly the paradigm, the primary paradigm, unmixed with chance events and spontaneity and accidents, itself being the explanation for itself, from itself, and because of itself. For it is primarily itself, and is itself above Being.\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{119} Cf. 6.7.2.10, 25 30, 52 55. See Ar., \textit{AP} 2.2.90a15.
\textsuperscript{120} Retaining \textit{τοιοῦτον} with HS\textsuperscript{1}.
\textsuperscript{121} I.e., why an animal has the characteristics it has given that the substantiality of the animal is to be instantiated.
\textsuperscript{122} Cf. 6.7.2.19, 19.18 19. Plotinus usually attributes operation without calculation to Intellect. Cf. 3.2.2.8 9; 6.7.1.32 57.
\textsuperscript{123} See Pl. [?], \textit{6th Ep.} 323D4. \textsuperscript{124} Cf. \textit{infra} 16.33; 6.9.6.44 45.
§6.8.15. And it is itself an object of love and love, that is, love of itself, inasmuch as it is only beautiful by reason of itself and in itself. And indeed whatever is present to itself would not be so if that which is present and that to which it is present were not one or identical. If the thing that is present is one with the thing to which it is present, and the thing in a way desiring, one with the thing desired, but the thing desired is with respect to its real existence even like a substrate, then once again desire will have shown itself to be identical to substanti-ality. If that is so, then it is the identical being that produces itself, and is master of itself, and did not come to be such as another wanted, but as it itself wanted.

Further, if we were to say that the Good takes nothing into itself, nor does anything take it into itself, we would make it such as to be outside the realm of chance, not only by making it isolated, and pure of all else, but also for the following reason. If we ourselves were to see a nature like this in ourselves, with nothing in it of the other things attached to us, due to which we undergo whatever happens and whatever is present by chance – for all else in us is enslaved and exposed to chance events, dependent on us in a way according to chance – to this alone belongs our mastery of self and autonomy, by means of the activity of a light Good-like and good, a light greater than that of Intellect, in that this activity is so disposed that its being above Intellect is not an acquired attribute.

On actually ascending to this, and becoming this alone, casting aside all else, what could we say about it, except that we are more than free, and have more than autonomy? Who would connect us with chance events, either random or due to an accidental attribute, once we have become the true Life itself, or having come to be in it, which contains nothing else, but is just itself?

Other things, then, which become isolated are not self-sufficient for their existence, whereas the Good is what it is even when it is isolated. Primary real existence does not depend on anything inanimate or on non-rational life. For non-rational life is weak in existence, since it is a scattering of reason and indeterminate. To the extent that it progresses towards reason, it leaves chance behind. For if something accords with reason, then it is not by chance. For us, once we have made the ascent,

125 Cf. infra 16.13; 6.7.22.8 9.
126 In this and in following chapters, Plotinus invests the Good with a number of ‘personal’ attributes. We retain, however, the impersonal pronouns on the grounds that all of these personal attributes have to be understood oioi (‘in a way’).
131 Cf. 2.9.1.9; 5.3.13.18; 5.6.2.15; 6.6.16.53; 6.7.23.7, 33.18. 132 Cf. supra 10.12.
the Good is not reason but more beautiful than reason. Such is the
distance separating it from being a chance accident. For the root of
reason originates in itself, and all things come to an end in it, like the
principle and foundation of a very large plant living according to an
expressed principle, resting in itself, and giving the plant that expressed
principle which it itself receives.133

§6.8.16. Since we say, and it is generally admitted, that the Good is
everywhere134 and again nowhere,135 we should ponder this, and con-
sider what kind of thing those who look at it from this point of view
should posit the objects of our enquiry to be. For if it is nowhere, then it
is not accidentally anywhere, and if everywhere, then it is everywhere
such as it is itself. The upshot is that it itself is being everywhere and
being in every way, not because it is in the 'everywhere', but because it is
the 'being everywhere' and gives being to others situated side by side
everywhere. By possessing the topmost rank, or rather not possessing it,
but being itself topmost, the Good possesses all things as subservient
without itself being an accidental attribute of other things, but the other
way round. It would be better to say that the other things are around it,
while it does not regard them, but the other way round.136 It is borne in
a way inside itself, as though loving itself, in the pure radiance,137 being
itself that which it loved, that is, it has made itself exist,138 if indeed it is
persisting activity and the most loved thing, like Intellect.139

But Intellect is the result of actuality; hence, the Good is that, too,
but not of anything else.140 It is, therefore, the result of its own activity.
It is, therefore, not as it is accidentally; rather, it is as it itself acts.

So, furthermore, if it exists most of all, because it fixes itself relative to
itself, and in a way regards itself, and this being for itself, in a way, is its
self-regard, as though it would produce itself, then it is not as chance
would have it, but the way it wants to be, nor is its wishing random, nor
accidentally as it is. For because its wishing is of the best, it is not
random.

But that this sort of inclination towards itself, being in a way an
activity of itself, and a persistence in itself, produces what it is, is testified
to by supposing the opposite. If its inclination were towards that which

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133 Cf. 3.8.10.10 12. 134 Cf. 3.8.6.24 28; 3.9.4.3; 5.5.8.23; 6.4.3.18.
139 Cf. 2.5.3.6; 6.5.3.2; 6.7.2.7.18. See Ar., Meta. 7.1072b3.
140 The word is ἐνέργημα ('the result of actuality'), that is, the result of ἐνέργεια, which can
be understood either as 'actuality' or 'activity'. Intellect, actualizing its potency, is
ἐνέργημα according to the former sense (cf. 3.8.11.1 3); the Good, having no potency,
is ἐνέργημα only according to the latter.
is outside itself, it would destroy what it is. Being, therefore, just what it is, it is activity relative to itself. This is one thing, namely, itself.

It, therefore, brings itself into existence, because its activity is brought about along with it. If, then, its activity did not come to be, but always was, and like a waking\textsuperscript{141} when the being who is awake is not something else than the waking, always a waking and super intellecction,\textsuperscript{142} then it is in such a way that it is awake. And the waking transcends\textsuperscript{143} Substantiality and Intellect\textsuperscript{144} and intelligent life, though it is these. It, therefore, is activity beyond Intellect, intelligence, and Life. These come from it and nowhere else. Its existence, therefore, originates in it, and comes from it. There it is not as it is accidentally, but as it wanted itself to be.

§ 6.8.17. Furthermore, we argue as follows. We say that everything in the universe, and the universe itself, are disposed in such a way as to be just as the choice of the producer\textsuperscript{145} would want. And they are also disposed such as would be the case if the producer were proceeding and foreseeing as a result of acts of calculative reasoning which are in conformity with providence. Since everything is always disposed in this way, and always comes to be in this way, we say that the rational grounds of everything lie in those Beings which are together, established in greater order.\textsuperscript{146}

The result of this is that these things, that is, all Beings, transcend providence in the intelligible world and transcend choice, and are always, because they are intellectually fixed. Consequently, should someone call this order 'providence', he should understand that, prior to this, the intellect of the universe is established, from which this universe is derived, and which it conforms to.

If, then, Intellect is prior to all things, and this kind of intellect is a principle, it cannot be as it chances to be, since, although it is a multiplicity, it harmonizes with itself, because it is in a way ordered into a unity. Nothing that is a plurality and a multiplicity, when ordered together, or all rational grounds, comprised in a unity throughout the universe, is as it chances or is accidentally as it is. That is far from this nature,\textsuperscript{147} indeed contrary to it, just as much as chance, depending on non-rationality, is distant from reason. If that which is prior to this

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\textsuperscript{141} See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b17.

\textsuperscript{142} The term is \textit{ὑπερνόησις}, a \textit{hapax} in Greek literature prior to Plotinus. Cf. the related term \textit{κατανόησις}, 5.3.1.4, 13; 5.4.2.17.

\textsuperscript{143} See Pl., Rep. 509Bb, 521A4.

\textsuperscript{144} Ar. On Prayer apud Simplicius, In DC 12.485.19 22 (= fr. 1, p. 57 Ross).

\textsuperscript{145} I.e., the Demiurge.

\textsuperscript{146} I.e., the order of intelligible beings.

\textsuperscript{147} I.e., the Good.
reason is a principle, it is clearly continuous with what has been made to conform to reason, and what has been made to conform to reason in this way is in conformity with that principle, and, by partaking of the Good, is such as the Good wants, and is a power of the Good. So, it is one continuous reason for all things, one number, and one greater and more powerful than what has come be. Nothing is greater or better than it. It, therefore, does not have either being, or its being such as it is, from anything else. It is, then, for itself what it is in relation to itself and towards itself, such that it is not thus in relation to the outside or to something else, but wholly towards itself.

§6.8.18. In your investigations, do not look for anything outside it; everything posterior to it is within it. And leave it alone, for it is the outside, embracing all things, and the measure of all things.

In fact, it is inside in the abyss, and on the outside lies all that is reason and intellect, touching it in a sort of circle, and dependent on it. Insofar as it touches it and in the way it depends on it, it must be Intellect, inasmuch as its being Intellect derives from it.

Then, it is just as a circle, where it would be agreed that it has its power from the centre, inasmuch as it is connected to that centre, and in a way has the form of the centre, in that the lines in a circle, in meeting at the centre, make their limit such that they are extended to it and in a way grow out from it. Because the centre is more important in relation to these lines and their outer limits, the points on the lines are like the centre, but merely vaguely, mere traces of the factor which has the power to determine the points, in having the power to determine the lines, which everywhere contain the centre. Through the lines, the centre also becomes apparent, as the kind of thing it is, in a way, developed without having been developed.

In this way, one should grasp that Intellect, that is, Being, which comes about from the Good, and is, in a way, poured out, and developed from it and depends on it, gives evidence by its intelligent nature of a sort of intellect in the One although this [One] is not Intellect, for it is one. Just as in the case of the circle, the centre is neither lines nor circle, but is the father of lines and circle, by giving traces of itself, and

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148 Reading λελογωμένον with Kirchhoff. This refers to Intellect, an expressed principle of the Good.
149 I.e., the Good is the principle of all expressed principles.
150 Cf. supra 8.22, 11.32; 1.7.1.16 17.
151 See Pl., Phil. 25B1; Tim. 30B8; Lg. 716C4.
152 Cf. 5.1.11.10 13, but here a disc is meant.
153 I.e., the radii.
154 Presumably, the points on the circumference.
155 I.e., because they are determined with reference to it and run to it.
156 Cf. 1.7.1.21; 6.7.42.22.
produces lines and circle with a persisting power; they come about from a kind of strength without being cut off from it at all. So, too, with the Good; it serves as the archetype of the image of itself, when the intellectual power is running around it, whereas Intellect comes about by being overcome by the many, and turning into the many Beings. The Good persists all the while its power generates Intellect.

What coincidence, or spontaneity, or accidental being, could come close to such a power, producer of Intellect, that is, producer of what really is? For what is in the One is many times greater than what is, in a way, in Intellect. It is just as when light is scattered abroad from a single source, which in itself is luminous. The scattered light is an image, its source is the true original. The scattered image, Intellect, does not differ in form; it is not chance, but each [element] in it is an expressed principle and a cause but the Good is the cause of this cause. It is, therefore, to a greater degree in a way more causal, indeed more truly a cause, since it contains all together the intelligible causes which are about to come to be from it. It is generative, not just as chance will have it but as it wants. Its wishing is not non-rational, nor is it arbitrary, and not forced on it, but as it ought to be, since nothing there is without purpose.

Hence, Plato speaks of ‘what it ought to be’ and the ‘opportune moment’, when he wanted to show, as far as possible, that it is far from chance, and that it is as it ought to be. This ‘as it ought to be’ is not non-rational, and if it is the opportune moment, then it is much the most authoritative thing among those posterior to the Good, and prior to the other Beings by being the Good itself; and it is not just as it chances to be, but just as it willed it, if indeed it willed what ought to be, and what ought to be and its activity is one thing. And it ought to be, not as a substrate, but as a primary activity that makes itself apparent as what it ought to be. This is how one ought to speak of it, since one is unable to speak as one wants.

§6.8.19. Let one, then, understand the Good itself from what has been said, by being moved to ascend to it! Then one will even see for oneself, although one is unable to say what one wants. If someone sees the Good

157 Cf. 6.7.15.8 9 where the Living Being is the archetype.
158 Reading νοῦς with HS1 and Ficino.
159 The term ἀλλοειδής (‘other in form’) is a hapax in the Enneads. Since the One has no form at all, Intellect does not differ from it by having a different form.
160 I.e., each Form is a cause or explanation for all of its instances.
161 That the Good is ‘to a greater degree’ and ‘in a way’ more causal is not intended to indicate that it is the same kind of cause as are the Forms since the Good is formless.
162 See Pl., Phil. 28D6 7. 163 See Pl., Sts. 284E6 7.
in itself, although he has put aside any account of it, he will posit it as being derived from itself, such that, if indeed it had substantiality, that substantiality would be subservient to it, and in a way derived from the Good. Nor would anyone dare, on seeing it, to say 'as it is accidentally'; indeed, one cannot speak at all. If one did dare, one would be stupefied, and even rushing towards it, one would not be able to say 'where' about it, inasmuch as it appears, in a way, everywhere before the soul’s eyes. Everywhere one looks, one sees the Good, unless one looks elsewhere, letting the god go and thinking no more of it.

One should understand the riddling saying of the ancients ‘transcends Substantiality’ like this: not only does it mean that it produces Substantiality, but also that it is subservient neither to Substantiality nor to itself. Nor is Substantiality a principle for it; rather, it is itself principle of Substantiality; it did not produce Substantiality for itself; rather, having produced it, it left it outside itself inasmuch as it did not need the Existence it produced. So, it does not produce that which exists according to its own existence.

§ 6.8.20. What, then? Someone might say: Has it not come to be accidentally before coming to be? For if it produces itself, as itself it is not yet; however, from the point of view of production it is already before itself, that which is produced.

To this one should indeed say that the Good is not to be ranked with the thing produced but with the producer, in that we posit its production to be absolute, not so that something else may be completed from its production, given that its activity does not complete something else; rather, the Good is everything. For it is not two, but one. We should not be afraid to posit the primary activity as without substantiality; this itself is to be posited as, in a way, its real existence.

But if one were to posit real existence without activity, then the principle would be deficient, and the most perfect principle of all, imperfect. But if one adds activity to it, one does not preserve its unity. If, then, activity is more perfect than is substantiality, and the first thing of all is most perfect, activity would be primary. In being active, then, it is already the first thing, and it is not possible that it was before coming to be. For it was not the case that it did not exist before coming to be; rather, it was already entire. Since activity certainly does not serve substantiality, it is purely free, and in this way it is itself from itself. For if it were preserved in existence by something else, it would not be first on his own account. If indeed it is rightly said to

164 Reading αὐτῷ with Lavaud.  
165 See Pl., Rep. 533D2.  
168 Cf. supra 16.15; 5.4.2:35 38; 6.7.17.10.  
169 Cf. 5.5.9.14.
maintain itself, then it is itself that produces itself, because from the beginning it has produced the thing that naturally maintains it.

If, then, there was a time when he began to be, ‘having produced’ would be the most proper way of speaking. As it is, if it was just what it is even before eternity was, ‘having produced itself’ should be understood to make ‘having produced’ and ‘itself’ go together. For existing is one with the producing and the sort of eternal generation. Hence, ruling itself, if it is two, and if one, then just ruling. For it contains nothing ruled.

How, then, can there be something ruling without there being something it is relative to?

In fact, ruling is here relative to what was before it, because there was nothing. If there was nothing prior to it, then it is first. Not in rank, but in authority, and power, purely autonomous. And if it is purely autonomous, then there is nothing not autonomous to be got hold of there. It is, then, entirely in itself, autonomous over itself. What, then, is there which belongs to it that is not it? What, then, is not its own activity? And what is not its own function? For if there were a function in it not its own, it would not be purely either autonomous or omnipotent. For it would not be master of that thing which is not its own, nor would it be in that respect omnipotent. For it has no power over something which it is not the master of producing.

§6.8.21. Was it, then, able to produce itself as something other than what it did produce?

In fact, we will not undermine the possibility of its producing good on the grounds that it would not produce evil. For power in the intelligible world is not such that it extends to contraries as well but with an unwavering and unalterable power, which is most of all power, when it does not breach unity. For having the power to produce contraries belongs to powerlessness, when compared to persisting in the best.

The producing that we are talking about, though, must be a once only thing, for it is beautiful. And who is such that he could divert by willing what a god has produced, that is, willed? By the will, then of something that does not yet exist? And what could its will be if its real existence is without willing? Where, then, does its will come from? From inactive substantiality?

\textsuperscript{170} Cf. supra 8.1 2. See Alex. Aphr., \textit{De fato} 180.2, 196.24 29. The point is that in the intelligible world, unlike the sensible world, there is no capacity for contrary actions.
In fact, there is will in its substantiality; therefore, there is nothing different from its substantiality. Or was there something like willing, which it was not? It, therefore, was entirely willing, and there was nothing not willing in it. Therefore, there was nothing prior to willing. Therefore, willing is primarily itself. Therefore, also the way it willed, and the kind of thing it willed, and what followed from its willing, which this kind of willing generated – it generated nothing still in him – it was already.

Its self-maintenance should be grasped as follows, if one may speak correctly like that at all, namely, that all those things that there are, are held together due to it. For this is by a kind of participation in it. And everything is to be explained by reference to this. On its own account, it needs no maintenance or co-presence with them, but rather has all things in itself; better, none of them, and it does not need all things to be itself.

But whenever you speak or think of it, cast all else aside, leaving it alone. Once you have cast all else aside, do not try to add anything; be careful lest you have omitted to cast aside something in your understanding. For it is possible for even you to get hold of something of which nothing else can be said or grasped. Still, this alone, lying above all, is in truth free, because it is not enslaved to itself, but merely is itself, and truly itself, while all else is itself plus something else, too.

171 The Good or One, which has hitherto repeatedly been said to be ‘beyond οὐσία’, is here said to be nothing other than its οὐσία. Plotinus is emphasizing the paradox arising from the fact that the Good exists and so, in some sense, οὐσία, the abstract noun formed from the verb for being, may be used of it. But its οὐσία, as is argued throughout this and previous chapters, is nothing other than its existence, its willing, or its activity.

172 Cf. 5.5.4.1 2. 173 Cf. 3.8.10.20; 5.4.1.2; 5.5.4.1. 174 Cf. 5.1.6.8 10.
**INTRODUCTION**

All beings are beings because of the One. This is a brief but comprehensive treatise in which a system of dependence on the One or the Good is sketched. The One, especially understood as eternal presence, provides guidance and well-being to the soul.

**SUMMARY**

§1. Everything is because of the One; while Soul provides unity it is not the One.

§2. Nor is Intellect the One, and nor are individuals.

§3. For the soul to be directed by the one requires the soul to leave off the variety it is accustomed to, and undergo habituation of character, and then use Intellect as a guide, while excluding all determinations from the One.

§4. The presence of the One is prior to that of science, and only direct vision, not teaching, provides contact with the One.

§5. The progress from awareness of body to that of the One leads via the possession of reason and virtue, then from the science to Intellect, and finally from Intellect to the One. The One is prior to the Intellect in that it has no parts.

§6. The One is not like a monad or a point because it is not in another thing. It is a maximum in being infinite in power: it has no need of anything. It has no good nor will, nor thought nor being with itself.

§7. The One is the object of investigation in that it may be present, not as a thing, and the presence is to be found in not knowing: the presence of the One is to be found within oneself.
§8. For we revolve around the centre, or better making our centre coincide with the centre of all things: in that way the eternal presence is present to us.

§9. By turning around the One, we receive being, in turning towards the One we receive well-being. For the soul has innate love of the Good which makes us desire death, even if true contemplation is possible in this life.

§10. This contemplation is interrupted, although it is unity with the One.

§11. One only remembers being like the One. The soul need not be afraid of proceeding to nothing. For virtue and contemplation take turns in guiding the soul.
On the Good or the One

§6.9.1. All beings are beings due to unity,¹ both those beings that are primarily Beings and those that are said to be among beings in any way. For what could be, if it were not a unity?² For if you take away the unity which they are said to be, then they are not those things. For an army³ does not exist unless it is a unity, nor a choir, or a herd, if it is not a unity. Nor a house or a ship, if it does not have unity, since a house or a ship is a unity, and if it loses its unity, then it is no longer a house or a ship.

So, there cannot be continuous magnitudes unless unity is present in them; when divided, they alter their existence, insofar as their unity is destroyed.⁴ And indeed so, too, with the bodies of plants and animals, since each is a unity, if they lose their unity when they are divided into a multiplicity, they lose the substantiality they had, in that they are no longer what they were; they have become other things which in turn exist, insofar as they are each a unity.

There is health when the body is ordered into a unity, beauty, when the nature of unity controls the parts, and virtue of the soul, when it is unified into a unity that is, into a single concord.

Turning, then, to soul, should we say that because it unifies all things, in creating, forming,⁵ shaping, and ordering them, it is soul itself that bestows unity or that it is the One?⁶ In fact, just as soul is not the other things it provides to body, such as shape and form, which are different from it, so, too, we should think that in the case of unity, even if soul does provide unity, it bestows a unity which is different from itself; by looking towards the One it makes each

¹ The words τὸ ἑν ς ('due to unity') could also be translated as 'due to the One', which, for Plotinus, is certainly no less true. But the wider, ambiguous claim seems to be here the starting point. When Plotinus is speaking dialectically, τὸ ἑν is translated 'unity'; when he speaking of the source of unity in anything, we translate τὸ ἑν as 'the One'. The adjective ἑν is translated 'one'.

² Cf. 5.6.3.15 22.

³ Cf. 6.2.10.1 5.

⁴ See Ar., Meta. 10.1.1052a19 21.

⁵ Pl. [?], Epin. 981B8, 984C3 4.

⁶ Because soul provides unity, it might be supposed to be the One itself. Either the hypostasis Soul or the soul of the cosmos is meant.
thing a unity, just as it looks to Human Being in producing a human
being, grasping the unity inherent in the Form Human Being along with
it. For each of the things which is said to be a unity in this way, is a unity
to the extent it possesses just what it is; the result is that things that are
beings to a lesser degree have unity to a lesser degree, and so corre-
spendingly with those that have being to a greater degree.

Moreover, since soul is different from the One, it has unity to
a greater degree [than ensouled things] corresponding to the greater
degree of its real existence; but it is not the One itself. For soul is one,
and unity is somehow an accident of soul, that is, soul and unity are two
things, just as body and unity are. And something divided, like a choir, is
further from the One, and continuous things are nearer to it, but soul
shares its unity even more.

If someone were to claim that, because there would be no soul were it
not one, soul and the One, therefore, should be viewed as identical, the
reply is, first, that all other things are also what they are along with being
one, and still the One is different from them. For body and the One are
not identical; rather, body partakes of the One.

Next, one must reply that soul is many, even the unitary soul,7 and
even if it does not consist of parts. For there are several faculties in it –
calculative reasoning, desiring, perceiving8 – which are held together by
unity, as by a bond. So, soul bestows unity on other things, because it is
one itself. But soul itself takes unity from elsewhere.9

§6.9.2. Is it the case, then, that for each of the things which are partially
a unity, their substantiality and unity are not identical, while, in general,
for what is Being or Substance, Substantiality or Being and unity are
identical?10 The result would be that someone who has discovered
Being would have discovered the One, that is, Substance itself
would be the One itself.11 For example, if Substance is Intellect, then the One
should be Intellect, too, given that it is primary being and primary unity

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7 This is either the soul of the cosmos or the individual soul.
8 The word is ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι (‘perceiving’) or, alternatively, ‘apprehending’.
9 See S/F 2.366 (= Stob., Ed. 2.107.14), 367 (= D.L., 7.129), whose doctrine of λόγος as
the animating principle of the cosmos is perhaps Plotinus’ target here. One of the types
of λόγος is soul.
10 The proposed identity of τὸ ὅν (‘real being’), and ὀὐσία (‘substantiality’) is difficult to
translate. Here, most clearly, ὀὐσία indicates the ‘beingness’ of a being, what explains
its being, translated here as ‘substantiality’. It may be thought that in the intelligible
world, Beings and their ‘substantiality’ coincide, and so that is where the One is to be
found.
11 I.e., the One is nothing but the unity of real being. See Ar., Meta. 10.2.1054a13.
Alternatively, Plotinus could be referring to the intelligible Unity, distinguished
from the One in the later treatise 6.6.
passing existence to other things to the extent it passes on unity to them.\textsuperscript{12}

What else could anyone say the One is apart from them? For either it is identical with Being – ‘human being and one human being are identical’\textsuperscript{13} – or unity\textsuperscript{14} is a kind of number of each thing, just as when you say ‘two things’, so, too, unity applies to a single thing. If, then, Number is among Beings, it is clear that unity is, too. And we must investigate what it is.

If counting were an act of the soul passing through things in succession, then unity would not be among Beings.\textsuperscript{15} But our argument above\textsuperscript{16} concluded that if there were no unity, there would be nothing at all. We should, then, look to see whether, on the assumption that the unity and the being for each thing are identical, and unity in general and being in general are identical.

But if the being of each thing is a multiplicity, and unity cannot be a multiplicity, then being and unity in general will be different. The Form of Human Being combines animal, rational, and many parts by unity. Therefore, human being and unity are different, since the one is divisible, the other not. And indeed the whole of Being, because it contains all Beings in itself, is even more a many, and is different from unity, having unity by participation or partaking.

Being has life, too\textsuperscript{17} – for it is certainly not a corpse – it is, therefore, a many. If Being is Intellect, then it, too, would have to be many, all the more so if it contained the Forms. For the Idea is not one; rather, it is a Number, both each Idea, and all of them together, and one in the way that the cosmos is one. Generally speaking, the One is primary, while Intellect, Forms and Being are not primary. For each Form is a composite of many elements and is posterior to these.

The following considerations will also make clear that Intellect is not primary. Intellect necessarily consists in thinking; and the best intellect, that is, the one that does not look outside itself, necessarily thinks what is prior to itself.\textsuperscript{18} For in reverting to itself, it reverts to its origin and if it is both thinking and object of thinking, it will be double, and not simple nor will it be the One. But if it looks to something different from itself, it will be looking completely to what is better than and prior to itself. But if it looks to itself and to what is better than it, then it is secondary in that way, too.

\textsuperscript{12} This is perhaps the position of Plotinus’ classmate, Origen. See Proclus, \textit{PT} 2.3 14. 17.
\textsuperscript{13} But it is also a position held by many so called Middle Platonists. See e.g., Alcinous, \textit{Didask}. 22 18.
\textsuperscript{14} I.e., being one, oneness.
\textsuperscript{15} Cf. 6.6.16.32 46. 16 Cf. \textit{supra} 1.3 14.
\textsuperscript{16} Cf. 5.9.10.10 15.
\textsuperscript{18} I.e., the One.
One must also take Intellect to be such that on the one hand it is present to the Good, that which is first, and looks to it, and on the other it is together with itself, and both thinks itself and thinks of itself as being all things. There is, therefore, no question of the One being variegated. So, neither will the One be all things, for then it would not still be one; nor is the One Intellect, for in that case it would be all things because Intellect is all things. Nor, finally, is the One Being. For Being is all things.

§6.9.3. What, then, would the One be, what nature would it have?

In fact, it is no wonder it is not easy to say, when it is not easy to say what Being or Form is. Indeed, our cognition relies on Forms, and so the more the soul moves towards what is formless, it glances off the object and is afraid it will have nothing, since it is completely incapable of comprehending the object on account of not being limited by, and, in a way, given an impression by, the variegation of the thing making the impression. For this reason, in such a situation it gets weary, and takes pleasure in descending from all these things until it reaches sensible, solid reality, which provides a kind of relief. This resembles what happens when sight, wearied with small things, turns with pleasure to large things.

When the soul wants to see according to its own seeing, seeing merely by being self-absorbed, and being one the soul does not then think that it has what it seeks, on the grounds that it is then not different from what is being thought.

Still, that is what one actually has to do, if one is to philosophize about the One. So, since that which we seek is one, and we are searching for the principle of all things, the Good, that which is first, one should not, in falling to the extremes of all beings, move outside those Beings in the ambit of the primary Beings, but in striving for the primary Beings, lift oneself up from sensible beings – which are the extreme – and free oneself from all vice inasmuch as one is aiming towards the Good. And one should ascend to the principle in oneself, and become one from being many, if one is to be the spectator of a principle that is one.

19 I.e., the One. Cf. infra 39.43 44: 5:5.6.4; 6:7.17.40, 28.28, 32.9, 33.21.
20 I.e., grasp nothing. 21 Cf. 6.7.15.24, 33.10, 39.18. 22 See Pl., Phd. 246C3.
23 συνεῖναι ("being self absorbed"), can also have the connotation of physical intimacy. The soul is the more intimate with itself the more it separates itself from the body. Cf. infra 7.2.3, 9.45, 10.10, 11.21. See Pl., Phd. 79D1, 4.
24 Cf. 5:5.4.1; 5:8.11.4; 6:8.17.14; 6:9.1.17.
25 When the soul thinks intelligibles, it identifies with them and so does not have what it seeks. Cf. infra 1.2.2; 6:7.35.4.
26 I.e., the intelligibles. See Pl. [?], 2nd Ep. 312E1.
27 See Pl., Rep. 443E2; Pl. [?], Epin. 992B6.
So, becoming intellect, one should entrust the soul to the intellect, and subordinate it to intellect, so that, being awakened, it may take in what the intellect sees. And it contemplates the One, not by adding any sense-perception, or by any of itself being taken up by the One; rather, it contemplates the purest thing by pure intellect, by the primary element in intellect.

So, whenever in preparing for contemplation of such a thing, one makes an image with size, shape, or mass relating to the nature of the One, then intellect is not the guide of this contemplation; in that case, it is guided by the activity of sense-perception or by the belief following on sense-perception. But one should grasp the claims of intellect regarding what it is capable of. Intellect can see things that belong to it, or things prior to it. What is in intellect is pure, but even purer and more simple are those things which come prior to it, or rather the thing prior to it.

So the One is not Intellect, but prior to it. For Intellect is something, whereas the One is not something, because it is prior to every Being, since it is not Being. Indeed, Being has in a way the shape of Being, whereas the One is shapeless, without even an intellectual shape. For the nature of the One, being generative of all beings, is to be identified with none of them. It is, then, not a ‘this’, not quality or quantity, neither Intellect nor Soul. Neither is it in motion nor at a standstill, nor in place or time, but ‘itself in itself, uniform’; rather, it is formless, being prior to all Form, prior to Motion and Stability. All these things relate to Being, and make it into a many. But why, if it is not in motion, is it not stable? Because in the case of Being, one of these attributes or both of them necessarily apply; something stable is stable due to Stability, and is not identical to Stability, with the result that being stable is an accident, and the thing that is stable is not simple.

Since this is so, to say that the One is a cause is not to predicate an accident of it, but of ourselves, because we grasp something of it, although it is in itself. If one is speaking precisely, one should not say either ‘that thing’ or ‘being’ of it, but of us. It is us, in a way circling it

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28 Or ‘Intellect’. Plotinus is here probably referring to our own intellects and their powers.
29 See Pl., Lg. 963A8.
30 See Anaxagoras, fr. 59B 12 DK.
31 I.e., the Good.
32 Cf. 2.9.1; 5.5.13.20.
33 Tòdè tû (‘this something’), the first of the Aristotelian categories. Cf. 6.1.2 3.
34 See Pl., Parm. 139B5, 138B5 6, 141A5.
35 See Pl., Symp. 211B1; Pbd. 78D5 6.
36 Cf. 5.5.6.4 5; 6.7.17.26, 40.
37 Strictly speaking, there are no accidents in the intelligible world. However, the participation of one Form in another not identical with it entails the compositeness of the Form that participates.
from outside, who wish to interpret the affections we undergo, as we
sometimes are closer to it and sometimes more distant from it, through
the puzzles arising from it.

§ 6.9.4. The biggest puzzle arising is that comprehension of the One is
neither by scientific understanding nor by intellection, as it is in the
case of other intelligibles. It corresponds rather to a presence which is
better than scientific understanding. But the soul undergoes
a departure from its unity and the fact that it is not altogether a unity,
whenever it attains scientific understanding. For scientific understand-
ing involves an account, and an account is multiple. The soul, then,
passes by the One when it falls into number and multiplicity. So, it
should run above scientific understanding, and in no way exit from its
unity, and should depart from scientific understanding, and the objects
of scientific understanding, indeed all else, even from the vision of
Beauty. For everything beautiful is posterior to the One, and comes
from it, just as all daylight comes from the sun.

For this reason, Plato says it is neither to be spoken nor written of. We
do speak and write of it, by way of directing others towards it, waking
them up from discursive accounts to actual looking, as though we were
showing the way to those wanting to see something. For teaching extends
only to the road and the route, while looking is the work of those
already wanting to see. If someone does not attain the sight itself, then
the soul does not come to have comprehension of the splendour in the
intelligible world. It does not undergo, and then have, the sort of erotic
state of a lover seeing the beloved and coming to rest in that, because he
receives the true light, and has his whole soul illuminated through
the great proximity to the One, even if he is held back on the ascent by
a weight pulling him backwards, which is an impediment to the vision.
He does not ascend alone, but takes with him something which separates
him from the One, or is not entirely collected together into a unity.

The One is certainly absent from nothing and from everything; it is
present without being present, except to those who are able to receive it,
and who are prepared for it, so as to be harmonious with it and in a way
grasp it and touch it through their likeness to it, that is, the power in
themselves akin to what comes from it. When one is in the state one

38 Cf. infra 10.5 10. 39 See Pl., Parm. 142A2 3.
40 Here, and in what follows, Plotinus is using Plato’s comparison of the Good with the
Sun, Rep. 508a 509b.
41 See Pl. [?], 7th Ep. 341C5.
42 See Pl., Rep. 532C3.
43 Cf. 1.6.8.5, 9.14; 6.7.21.6.
44 See Pl., Symp. 209B C; Phdr. 251C E.
45 See Pl., Phdr. 250D, 251B.
46 Cf. infra 8.25 35. See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b21.

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was in when one came from the One, at that moment one can see, insofar as the One is such as to be seen.  

If, then, one is not yet in the intelligible world, but is still outside either on account of these things, or because of a lack of educational argument, which inculcates belief about the One, then one must take the responsibility on oneself, and one should try to depart from all things, and be alone.

As to the things you may disbelieve, because of neglecting our arguments, consider the following:

§6.9.5. Anyone who thinks that beings are governed by chance and spontaneity, and are held together by corporeal causes is far removed from god and the conception of unity. My argument is not directed to them, but to those who posit another nature besides bodies and who ascend to Soul.

Moreover, they should understand the nature of Soul, both its other attributes, and that it comes from Intellect, and that it has a share in reason from Intellect, and thereby acquires virtue. They should, then, grasp that there is another Intellect besides the one that engages in calculative reasoning and is called the faculty of calculative reasoning, and that these acts of calculative reasoning are already in some way extended and in motion. And they should grasp that the sciences are accounts in the soul which come to be evident because Intellect has come to be the cause of the sciences in the soul.

And when one has seen Intellect, like a sensible in being apprehended by sense-perception, rising above Soul, of which it is the father, it is to be called an intelligible cosmos, Intellect in repose and stable motion, having everything in itself and being everything, a multitude both undistinguishable and yet distinct. For the contents of Intellect are not distinguished as are the expressed principles, by being thought one by one, nor are they all mixed up. Each of them proceeds separately, just as in the sciences where everything is indivisible, but nonetheless each is separate from the others. This multitude, then, which is all together, the intelligible cosmos, relates to the principle. And our argument asserts that there is the intelligible cosmos necessarily, if indeed one says that Soul exists and it [Intellect] is more authoritative than Soul. Intellect, however, is not primary, because it is neither one nor simple.

48 Cf. 6.7.13.19.  49 Cf. supra l. 23.  50 See Pl., Symp. 210E.
51 See Ar., Phys. 2.4.195b31; Meta. 1.3.984b14; 7.7.1032a29; SVF 2.448 (= Alex. Aphr., De an. mant. 131.5).
54 See Pl., Tim. 35A1 B3.  55 Cf. 5.9.6.3.  56 ‘The first thing’, i.e., the One or Good.
57 Correcting the typographical omission of μὴ before ἔν.
The One, that is, the principle of all beings, is simple. This is indeed prior to the most honourable among beings, if indeed there must be something prior to Intellect, because, while Intellect wants to be one, it is not one; rather, it is one in form, in that, in itself, Intellect is not dispersed. Rather, it truly coheres with itself, without articulating itself, since it comes immediately after the One, having dared to depart somehow from the One.

The wonder actually prior to this is the One, which is not Being, to avoid making the One an attribute of something else in the sensible world, too. Indeed, in truth no name suits it, but if indeed one has to name it, it is fitting to call it ‘One’, as is usually done, but not so that it is something else, and then one. This is the reason it is so difficult to know, and it is known rather through its offspring, Substantiality; Intellect also guides one to Substantiality. Its nature is such that it is the source of the best things, and is a power that generates Beings while it remains in itself, and is not diminished, nor in the things generated by this power.

Of necessity, we call what is prior to these generated things ‘One’, in order to communicate with one another, guiding others with this name to an indivisible conception, and wanting to unify the soul. But we are not calling it one and indivisible in the way that a point or a unit is indivisible. For these are one as the principles of quantity, which would not have existed were not Substantiality prior to it, and what comes prior to Being. So, one should not direct one’s thought to the sensible world, even if the unit or the point are analogous to things in the intelligible world, due to their simplicity and their avoidance of multiplicity and division.

§6.9.6. How shall we speak of unity, and how is it to be made to fit thinking?

In fact, unity has to be posited in more ways than a unit or a point is one. For in these cases the soul takes away extension and numerical multiplicity and leaves off when it comes to the smallest thing, and rests at something indivisible; but a point is in that which is divisible, and a unit is in another thing. But the One is ‘not in another thing’, it is neither in the divisible nor is it indivisible as being the smallest thing. It is the greatest of all things, not in extension, but in power. And so it

58 τόλμα, a crucial factor in all production of multiplicity, both of Soul and Intellect. See 5.1.1.4.
59 See Pl., Parm. 142A3. 60 Cf. supra 1.1 17; 5.4.1.8.
61 Cf. 5.9.5.14, 8.8 11; 6.7.40.10 12. 62 I.e., the One. Cf. supra ll. 34 35.
63 Μονάς, numerical unit. Cf. 6.1.4.26. 64 See Pl., Parm. 138A2 3.
65 Cf. 3.8.10.1; 5.1.7.9 10; 5.3.15.33; 5.4.1.24 25.
is without extension because of its power. Indeed, even the Beings posterior to it\(^{66}\) are indivisible and without parts through their powers, and not magnitudes.

The One must be understood to be unlimited not because it cannot be traversed\(^{67}\) either in extension or number, but by being incomprehensible in its power. For whenever you understand it either as god or as Intellect, it is more. And again when you unify it by discursive thinking, then, too, it is more than you imagine, in being more unified than your thinking of it. For it is in itself, since it has no attributes.\(^{68}\)

One should think of its unity by means of its self-sufficiency. Of all things it must be the most adequate and self-sufficient and least deficient.\(^{69}\)

Further, any multitude, as long as it has not become a unity, is deficient. Its substantiality is deficient relative to being a unity, whereas the One is not deficient of itself. For it is itself. By contrast, what is many needs all the things it is and each of these things, being with the others and not in itself, is in need of all those other things, and brings about a deficiency both in terms of a unity and in terms of being a whole. If, then, there must indeed be something entirely self-sufficient, the One alone must be the kind of thing which is deficient relative neither to itself nor to anything else. It seeks nothing, so that it may be, nor that it may be in a good state, nor so that it may be established in the intelligible world. As it is the cause of other things, it does not get what it is from other things. How can its good be outside it? Thus its good is not an attribute of it; for it is it itself.

It has no place, for it has no need of a place to settle itself through being unable to support itself. Something which settles is inanimate, a falling mass, as long as it does not settle. Other things settle in a place because of the One. Because of it, they exist at the same time as they take up the place assigned to them. To seek a place is to be in need, and the principle is not in need of things posterior to it.

The principle of all things is in no need of all things. Anything in need, is in need because it desires the principle. If the One were in need of something, it would be seeking to be not the One, so it would be in need of what will destroy it. But everything that is said to be in need, is in need of its good, that is, what preserves it. Thus, there is no good for the One, and so it does not have a will for anything.\(^{70}\) It is beyond good, and

\(^{68}\) \(συμβεβηκός\). In this context, Plotinus means to include both accidents, narrowly, and intrinsic properties other than the essence. Cf. 5.3.13.12 21. 
\(^{69}\) See Pl., *Phil.* 201D3, 6cC4; Ar., *Meta.* 14.4.1091a16 17; *EN* 1.5.1097b7 8. 
\(^{70}\) I.e., a will for anything other than itself. Cf. 6.8.21.
is good not for itself but for other things,\textsuperscript{71} insofar as other things can participate in the Good.

Nor is it intellection, in order that it may have no difference in itself; nor motion, since it is prior to motion and intellection. Indeed, what should it understand? Itself? So, it would be ignorant prior to its intellection, and it would be in need of intellection in order that it would know itself, whereas it is self-sufficient in itself.\textsuperscript{72} So, it is not ignorant about itself, on the grounds that it does not know or think itself. For ignorance comes to be about something else, whenever one thing is ignorant of a different thing. It alone neither knows nor does it have anything which it is ignorant about, but being one and one with itself, it needs no intellection of itself.

So, there is no need to add ‘being with itself’,\textsuperscript{73} to preserve its unity. Indeed, one should take away from it both thinking and being with itself and the intellection of itself and of other things. For it should not be ranked with something that thinks, but with the intellection itself. The intellection does not think; it is the cause for something else thinking, and the cause is not identical with what is caused.\textsuperscript{74} The cause of everything is none of these things. So, this should not be called ‘good’, which is what it bestows on other things. Rather, it is the Good in another way, above the other goods.

§6.9.7. If you become unfocused in your view, since the One is none of these things,\textsuperscript{75} you should rely on them, and use them to form your vision. Do not form your vision by diverting your thought elsewhere. It does not lie somewhere bare of other things, it is always present to anyone with the power touch it, and it is not present to anyone without this power. Just as in other cases it is not possible to think something if your thinking is directed at something else, and your being related to another thing, but you should just not add anything to the thing being thought, so that it is just the thing thought, so, too, here one must know that it is not possible to think that thing,\textsuperscript{76} if one has the impression of another thing in the soul, and if that impression is actualized. Nor is it possible, if the soul is occupied and dominated by other things, for it to have the contrary impression. Rather, it is as one says in the case of matter, that it has to be unqualified by anything, if it is to take on the impressions of all things; so, in this case,

\textsuperscript{71} Cf. 6.7.28.5. See Ar., \textit{Meta.} 14.4.1092a1.

\textsuperscript{72} Here the argument is perhaps directed against the Aristotelian view of god as the ‘thinking (νοησις) of thinking’ or ‘intellection of intellection’ in \textit{Meta.} 12.7 9.

\textsuperscript{73} See Pl., \textit{Parm.} 138A3. \textsuperscript{74} Cf. \textit{supra} 3.49 50; 6.7.17.3 4; 6.8.16.

\textsuperscript{75} I.e., will, intellect, being with itself. \textsuperscript{76} I.e., the One.
the soul has to be formless to a greater degree, if it is not to be prevented from being filled and illuminated by the first nature.

If this is so, then the soul should withdraw from everything external and revert entirely to its own inside, without any inclination to anything external. Rather, the soul should ignore everything, especially things in sense-perception, but also in forms, and then, in considering the One, come to ignore itself. And when the soul has come to be with the One, and, in a way, communed with it to a sufficient degree, then it should tell others of this intimate contact, if it can. It is, presumably, because he had such intercourse that Minos is famed as ‘Zeus’ familiar’. And he was mindful of this intercourse when he framed the laws as images of it, since he had been impregnated by a grasp of the divine so as to make the laws.

In fact, not considering politics to be worthy of himself, he wanted always to remain up there, a state which anyone who has seen much may well be in. Plato says that the One is outside nothing but it has intercourse with all things, without them knowing, for they flee outside it, or better, outside themselves, and so cannot grasp what they have fled from; indeed, because they have destroyed themselves, they cannot look for someone else, any more than a child which is beside itself with madness knows its father. In contrast, someone who knows himself knows where he is from.

§6.9.8. If, then, a soul knows itself [as it was] at another time, it knows also that its motion is not straight, but that, other than when it is deflected, its natural motion is like that in a circle, not around something external but about its own centre. The centre is what the circle originates from, and what it moves round, and which it comes from. And the soul depends on the centre, and carries itself towards it. All souls should move towards it; the souls of the gods always do move towards it. In moving towards it they are gods. God is whatever is connected to that centre, while what is far removed is the common human being and beast.

Is it, then, the centre of the soul, in a way, that we are looking for? Or should one realize that there is something else like a centre in which all

77 Cf. infra ll. 32 34.
78 See Pl., Lg. 624B1; Pl. [?], 7th Ep. 341C4 D2; Pl. [?], Minos 319E1.
79 See Homer, Od. 19.178 179; Pl. [?], Minos 319B5 6, D9.
80 See Pl., Parm. 138E4. 81 Cf. 5.1.1-5 11.
82 See Pl., Tim. 43E1. The ‘deflection’ is presumably when the soul is not engaging in the ‘circular motion’ that is contemplation. The words ‘another time’ perhaps refer to the soul when it was not separated from the One or at least when it was oriented to it as its undescended intellect.
83 Cf. 6.8.18.7 14. 84 See Pl., Phdr. 249B3. 85 I.e., the One.
‘centres’ in a way coincide? And that it is only by analogy the centre of this circle here? For the soul is not a circle like the geometrical figure, but rather because ‘the ancient nature’ is in it and around it, and because souls originate from it and even more because, having been separated, they are wholes.

Here and now, part of us is, by reason of the body, as though we had our feet in water, with the rest of the body out of the water. When we actually raise ourselves up, by the part not plunged in the body, we fix ourselves, using our centre, to the centre of all things, in a way, like fixing the centres of the greatest circles to the containing sphere; and there we come to rest. If they were corporeal circles, not psychical ones, they would touch the centre in place, and they would surround it, since it would be located at a place. But since they are intelligible souls, and the centre is above Intellect, the connection must be considered to come about by other powers, such as the thinker being naturally connected to what he thinks. And even more so, the thinker is present to that which is akin to it by sameness and identity, and is connected to it, when nothing is intervening.

For bodies are hindered by bodies from communing with one another, whereas incorporeals are not hindered by bodies. So, they are not separated by place, but by difference and differentia. When, then, no difference is present, distinct things are not present to one another. That thing, since it contains no difference, is always present, and we are present whenever we contain no difference.

That thing does not desire us, with the hope that it would be around us; rather, we desire it, and so are around it. And while we are always around it, we do not always look to it. We are like a chorus that, singing all the while, though relating to the chorus leader, may turn outwards from the spectacle, but when it does turn towards it, the chorus sings beautifully and does in truth relate to the chorus leader. So, too, we are always around it; when we aren’t, then we will be completely dissolved, and will be no longer, but when we look towards it, that is ‘journey’s end

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86 Cf. 4.7.9.28. See Pl., Symp. 192E9; Tim. 90D5; Rep. 547B6 7, 611D2.
87 I.e., when the soul is separated from the body, it is no longer divided.
88 Those circles on a sphere which have the same centre as the sphere. See Geminus, Introduction to the Phenomena 5.70.
89 I.e., the sameness of thinker and object thought owing to their immaterial natures and their identity when thinking is occurring. Cf. infra 11.32; 5.6.2.7 12.
90 The words ἑτερότητι δὲ καὶ διαφορα (‘difference and differentia’) perhaps suggest the intrinsic differences among Forms or their extrinsic differentiation by being the object of Intellect’s contemplation.
91 I.e., the One.
and rest\(^92\) for us, and the end of discordance for us dancing round it a divinely inspired dance.\(^93\)

§ 6.9.9. And, within this circling dance, behold the fount of Life, the fount of Intellect, the principle of Being, the cause of goodness, the root of Soul. They do not grow from it so as to diminish it, for it is not a mass; otherwise, its products would be perishable. As it is, they are eternal, because their principle remains in the identical state, without being portioned up into them. It remains whole, for which reason they remain, too, just as, if the sun remains, so does its light.

For we are not cut off,\(^94\) not separated, even if the nature of body, in creeping into us, has dragged us towards itself. We breathe, we are preserved, not by it giving and then leaving, but because it always provides for us, as long as it is just what it is. We, however, exist to a greater degree when inclined towards it, and our well-being is there,\(^95\) whereas being distant from it makes us alone and lesser in existence.

There, the soul both rests and is beyond evils, when it has reverted to the place free of evils. There, it thinks, and it is incapable of being affected; true living is there. For living now, the trace of life without god is an imitation of that, while living in the intelligible world is an actuality of intellect.\(^96\) Actuality produces gods in touching\(^97\) that quietly; this produces Beauty, Justice, and Virtue. The soul, impregnated with god,\(^98\) bears this progeny, and this is the soul’s beginning and end. It is its beginning because the soul is from the intelligible world, and it is its end because the Good is there.\(^99\) And when it has come to be in the intelligible world, it becomes itself, just what it is. For being in the sensible world,\(^100\) in things here, is the soul’s banishment, escape, loss of feathers.\(^101\)

The love which belongs naturally to the soul makes it evident that the Good is in the intelligible world. And in pictures and stories, Love\(^102\) is yoked to souls. For, since the soul is different from god, but comes from him,\(^103\) it loves him of necessity. And when it is in the

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\(^92\) See Pl., Rep. 532E.
\(^93\) Cf. 6.8.16.11.
\(^94\) Cf. 5.3.12.44.

\(^95\) The word is ἐνταῦθα, meaning simply ‘here’, but usually used by Plotinus to refer to the sensible world in contrast to ἐκεῖ, the intelligible world. Here and in the next few lines, Plotinus perhaps uses this word to indicate immediacy and that he is speaking from his own personal experience.

\(^96\) See Ar., Meta. 12.7.1072b27; EN 10.7.1178a5.

\(^97\) I.e., the Forms. Cf. 5.1.7.30; 6.7.36.

\(^98\) Cf. supra 7.25.

\(^99\) See Pl., Lg. 715E8.

\(^100\) Now ἐνταῦθα for the sensible world in contrast to ἐκεῖ.

\(^101\) In Pl., Phdr. 246C2, 248C9, falling souls lose feathers from their wings.

\(^102\) ἐρως. See Pl., Symp. 180D8 F3.

\(^103\) Here, the personal pronoun is inescapable given the mythical context of the following lines.
intelligible world it possesses heavenly Love, but it becomes vulgar Love in the sensible world. For in the intelligible world she is heavenly Aphrodite, and here she is vulgar, as if she had become a courtesan.\(^{104}\) For all soul is Aphrodite. This is expressed in riddling form by the story of the birth of Aphrodite, and of Love coming to be with her.\(^{105}\)

The natural state of soul, then, is to want to become unified with god, and this love is like that of a beautiful girl for her beautiful father. But when the soul comes into the world of becoming, she is, in a way, deceived by her suitors, and, exchanging her love for another mortal love, is violated in her father’s absence. She comes, then, to hate the violations in the sensible world, and, setting off for her father again, by having kept herself holy from things in the sensible world, she is in a state of contentment.\(^{106}\)

Anyone who is ignorant of this state should get a notion of it by considering loves in the sensible world here, for example, that it is possible to get what one loves most, and that these things are mortal, and damaging. This is a love of images that changes, since they are not what is truly loved, not our good, not what we are looking for.\(^{107}\)

The truly beloved is in the intelligible world, whom one can have intimate contact with\(^{108}\) by participating in him and relating to him truly, not just by enfolding him externally in our flesh.\(^{109}\) Anyone who has seen it, knows what I mean.\(^{110}\) Which is to say: the soul then acquires a new life, when it approaches him, indeed arrives at him and participates in him, such that it is in a position to know that the true provider of life is present, and that the soul is in need of nothing more.

On the contrary, the soul should then put away all other things, and stop in this one thing alone, become this alone, and cut loose everything we wear. The result is that we hasten to exit from here, so we may, despite the vexation at being bound to the other side,\(^{111}\) enfold him with the whole of ourselves, and contain no part with which we do not touch god.

From the sensible world, it is indeed possible to see both god, and oneself, insofar as seeing is licit; oneself in glory, full of intellectual light, or rather, the pure light itself, weightless, buoyant, having become god, or better, being god, kindled at that time; however, should one become weighed down again, then, in a way, extinguished.

\(^{104}\) Cf. 3.5. See Pl., Symp. 180E. \(^{105}\) See Pl., Symp. 203C2 3.

\(^{106}\) See Pl., Phdr. 247D4. \(^{107}\) See Pl., Symp. 212A4 5. \(^{108}\) Cf. 6.8.7.24.

\(^{109}\) See Pl., Symp. 211E2.

\(^{110}\) A formula describing the mysteries of Eleusis (Pausanias, 1.37.4). Initiates were not permitted to tell the uninitiated what they saw in the mysteries. Cf. 1.6.7.2.

\(^{111}\) I.e., to the body. Cf. supra 7.11; infra 11.38.
§6.9.10. How is it, then, that one does not remain in the intelligible world?

In fact, it is because one has not yet exited wholly from here. There will be a time when the vision there is continuous, because one is no longer impeded by any bodily impediment. What had the vision is not what is impeded but something else which, when the seeing part makes the vision cease, does not cease from scientific understanding, found in the proofs, beliefs, and arguments of the soul. Seeing, and what was in a state of seeing, is no longer reason, but greater than reason, prior to reason, and superior to reason, as is what is seen. In seeing oneself, then, one will see oneself to be such, or better, one will be in intimate contact with oneself as being such and such, and will perceive oneself as having become simple.

Perhaps one can argue that one should not say, ‘one will see’, and ‘the thing seen’, if indeed one should say that there are two things, the seer and the seen, and that both are not one. This argument is indeed rash. For at the time [of union], the seeing self neither sees nor discerns, nor imagines two things, but has, in a way, become another, and not oneself, nor does one belong to oneself in the intelligible world. One has come to belong to the Good, and has become one, like a centre touching a centre point. In the sensible world, too, when the circles come together they are one, but when they separate they are two. This is what we mean now when we say ‘different’. For this reason, the vision is hard to make out. For how can someone report that he has seen something different, when he did not see something different in the intelligible world when he had his vision, but rather something united to himself?  

§6.9.11. This is indeed what the injunction about the mysteries makes clear, not to communicate them to the uninitiated; since that is not communicable, it forbids explaining the divine to anyone who has not had the good fortune to see for himself. So, since they were not two, but the seer was one with what is seen, as though it was not being seen by him, but was unified with him, if he remembers who he became when he mingled with the One, then he will have in himself an image of it. He was a one, and contains no difference relative to himself, nor in any other respect. For nothing moved in him, neither spiritedness, nor appetite for anything else was present in him when he reverted to the One; but also not reason, nor intellection, nor he himself, if one should say that. He was instead ravished or ecstatic in solitary quiet, in

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112 Cf. supra 9.10.19 21; infra 11.43; 1.6.9.22; 5.8.10.40, 11.20 21; 6.7.15.31 33.
113 I.e., the One. 114 See Pl., Parm. 142A3.
an unwobbling fixedness, unwavering from his own substantiality in any way, not rotating about himself, entirely stable, as if he were the stability itself. Nor had he any desire for beautiful things, having already surpassed beauty, having already outdone the chorus of virtues.  

And these are the first things one sees on leaving the inner sanctum after the vision within. The intimate contact within is not with a statue or an image, but with the One itself. The statue and the image are actually secondary visions, whereas the One itself is indeed not a vision, but another manner of seeing. It is self-transcendence, simplification, and surrender, an urging towards touch, a resting, concentration on alignment, if one is to have a vision of what is in the sanctum. If indeed someone looks in a different way, then nothing is present to him.

These, then, are images; and yet they provide in a riddling manner a hint to wise interpreters of the way that god is seen. Once a wise priest has understood the riddle, he may, by coming to be in the intelligible world, make true the vision of the sanctum. And if he has not been there, and thinks that the sanctum, that is, the source, and principle, is an invisible thing, he will know that he sees the principle as principle, things that are the same coming together. And, prior to the vision, he omits nothing divine that the soul can contain; the rest he will ask of the vision.

This rest comes to anyone who has gone beyond all things, namely, what is prior to all things. For the nature of the soul will indeed not arrive at what entirely is non-being, but when it descends, it will come to evil, and thus into non-being, but not into what is entirely non-being. Moving in the opposite direction, it will not come to something else, but to itself; thus in being in nothing else, it will not be in nothing, but will be in itself, that is, in itself alone, and not in that Being there. For a self does not become Substantiality, but ‘transcends Substantiality’ by this intimate contact.

If, then, one sees oneself having become this, then one has himself as a likeness of that; and if one moves from oneself, as from the image to the archetype, then he reaches ‘journey’s end’. And when one drops out of the vision, then one wakens virtue in oneself again; and seeing oneself ordered by virtues one is again uplifted by virtue, in the

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117 Reading ὡς ἀρχὴ with ms Q. See Philolaus, fr. 44 A 29 DK; Empedocles, fr. 31 B 109 DK; Democritus, fr. 68 B 164 DK.
118 Cf. 2.4.14.21 24, 16.3. 119 Cf. 6.7.22.15 20. 120 I.e., among intelligibles.
124 Cf. supra 8.43 44. See Pl., Rep. 532E3.
direction of intellect, and wisdom; and through wisdom, towards oneself.\textsuperscript{125} This is the way of life of gods, and divine, happy human beings, the release from everything here, a way of life that takes no pleasure in things here, the refuge of a solitary in the solitary.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{125} See Pl., \textit{Phdr.} 248A\textsubscript{1}; \textit{Tbt.} 176A\textsubscript{1} 2. \textsuperscript{126} Cf. 1.6.7.9; 5.1.6.11 12; 6.7.34.7 8.
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<td>form, Form, species, Species, kind</td>
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<td>intelligible world. Literally, 'there'</td>
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<td>ἐν, τὸ</td>
<td>ben, to</td>
<td>the One, unity</td>
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<td>ἕξις</td>
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ἐπίνοια  epinoia  conceptualization, conceptual distinction
ἐπιστήμη  epistēmē  science, scientific understanding
ἐπιστροφή  epistrophe  reversion
ἐργον  ergon  function, deed, task
έτερότης  heterotēs  Difference, difference
ἐφ’ ἡμῖν  eph’ hēmin  up to us
ἐφεσίς  ephēsis  desire
ζωή  zoē  life, Life
ζωιόν  zoion  living being, Living Being, animal
ἡ  e  in fact. Literally ‘or’
ἡγεμόν  hēgemon  controlling principle
ἦθος  ēthos  character
ἡσυχία  hēsuchia  stillness
θελείν  thelein  wanting
θέλησις  thelēsis  wishing
θέμις  themis  licit
θείος  theios  divine
θεός  theos  god
θεωρία  theoria  contemplation
θρεπτικόν  threptikon  faculty of nourishment
θυμοειδές  thumoeides  faculty of spiritedness
θύμος  thumos  spiritedness
ἰδέα  idea  Idea, idea
ἰδιότης, ἴδιον  idiotēs, idion  property, distinguishing property, essential property
ἰνδάλμα  indalma  reflection
καθέκαστον  kathekaston  individual, particular
κακία  kakia  vice
κακόν  kaken  evil
κάλλον, καλόν  kallon, kalon  Beauty, beauty
κατηγορία  katēgoria  category, predicate
κένων  kenon  void, empty
κινήσις  kinesis  motion, Motion
κοινόν  koinon  common, composite
κόσμος  kosmos  cosmos
κράσις  krasis  blending
κρίσις  krisis  judgement, discernment
κύριος  kurios  principal, authoritative, in charge, dominant, proper
λαμβάνειν  lambanein  grasp
λογικόν  logikon  rational
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<th>Greek Term</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
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<td>λογισμός, τὸ λογιστικόν</td>
<td>faculty of calculative reasoning</td>
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<td>expressed principle, reason, argument, account</td>
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<td>magnitude</td>
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<td>μένειν</td>
<td>persist, be stable</td>
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<td>τι ἔστι, τί ἢν εἶναι</td>
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The references after most of the technical and semi-technical terms are intended to illustrate Plotinus’ usage, especially in texts of central doctrinal importance. The lists of references are for the most part not complete. These references should serve to supplement the cross-reference in the translation.

**accident** (συμβεβηκός): The Peripatetic term for non essential attributes of sensibles, including both per se and non per se attributes. For Plotinus, there are no accidental attributes in the intelligible world.

**accompaniment** (παρακολούθημα): also secondary attribute. That which is extrinsic to the nature of something but is necessarily found with it. This is Plotinus’ version of the Peripatetic per se or καθ’ὑτό attribute. See 3.7.10.1 7; 6.3.3.6, 23.

**act** (ἐνέργημα): also activation. Used to refer to the result of an activity or actuality.

**act of apprehension** (ἐπιβολή): also direct apprehension. A term of Epicurean provenance. An unmediated cognition of an object whether sensible or intelligible. See 4.4.1.20; 6.2.4.23; 6.6.9.14; 6.7.35.21.

**activity** (ἐνέργεια): also, actuality. A Peripatetic term referring primarily to intellection and implying no imperfection. When translated as ‘actuality’ the term is used in discussing sensible composites which include a potency (δύναμις) related to the actuality. Occasionally, activation. See 1.1.9.21; 1.4.4.10; 2.3.16.48; 2.5.1.3 9; 3.2.16.19; 3.8.7.19; 4.3.23.16; 4.4.4.18; 5.1.3.9 18; 5.3.5.32 42; 5.9.10.14; 6.1.6.14, 10.13, 16.1; 6.2.7.20, 18.7 9, 22.25 29; 6.6.6.36 38; 6.7.3.32; 6.8.4.28, 7.49, 12.22 33, 20.11.

**acts of intellection** (νοήμες): see thinking.

**actuality** (ἐνέργεια): see activity.

**affection** (πείσες): see state.

**alteration** (ἀλλοίωσις): qualitative change. See change, motion. See 3.6.2.60; 4.4.32.45; 6.1.20.3 4; 6.3.21.47.

**always** (ἀει): Having no temporal limitations. See everlasting (αἰθιον) and eternity (αἰών), eternal (αἰώνιον). See 3.7.1.1 6, 6.21 34.
appetite (ἐπιθυμία): A state of the lowest part of the embodied soul. Sometimes, Plotinus uses the more general term ὀρέξις (desire) as equivalent. The appetitive faculty (ἐπιθυμητικόν) is the psychical power owing to which appetites are produced. The verb τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν is often used synonymously with the general term desire and is rendered ‘desiring’. See 1.1.1.1; 1.8.8.3; 2.9.5.2; 3.1.5.14; 4.3.19.20; 4.4.20.26; 4.8.2.17; 6.1.21.13; 6.8.2.4 5; 6.9.11.16.

appetitive faculty (ἐπιθυμητικόν): see appetite.

apprehension (ἀντίληψις): A general term for cognition, whether by sense perception or intellect. Plotinus sometimes uses the term κατάληψις synonymously, although the latter, owing to its Stoic provenance, tends to be used for cognition of sensibles. A term used more broadly than ἐπιθολή (act of apprehension). See 1.4.9.17; 2.9.5.22; 3.2.14.26; 4.3.23.8; 4.4.23.2 4; 5.1.12.12 13; 5.5.1.17; 6.4.1.26; 6.7.7.25 26.

appropriation (οἰκίσωσις): also affinity. A term of Peripatetic or Stoic origin, it refers to acts or practices that are conducive to the happiness of living beings of a certain nature. The appropriation or affinity is always owing to an innate sameness in the subject and object. See 3.5.13.8; 3.6.3.27, 17.3; 4.4.44.24; 6.7.27.18, 23.

archetype (ἀρχέτυπος): Something at a higher ontological level projected at a lower level. See 1.2.2.3; 2.4.15.22; 3.2.1.25; 3.5.1.33; 3.8.11.20; 4.3.13.3; 5.1.4.5; 5.3.6.17; 7.332, 13.31; 5.7.1.22; 5.8.3.1, 12.15, 19; 5.9.9.6; 6.2.22.35; 6.4.10.3 6; 6.7.15.9; 6.8.18.27; 6.9.11.45.

ascent (ἀνάγωγη): Practices or acts that result in souls being closer to the One or the Good. See 1.3.1.15; 18; 3.1.4.18; 3.8.10.20; 4.9.4.2; 5.4.1.2; 5.5.4.1; 5.7.1.2; 6.8.6.27; 6.8.21.22.

assimilation (ὕμωσις): Following Plato, this is the process of making oneself the same (ὕμων) as god. See sameness, likeness. See 1.2.2.4 8, 3.5, 6.26, 7.28; 3.6.7.43; 4.3.10.45; 6.7.26.3.

audacity (τόλμα): The term used for the characteristic of souls that leads to their separation from the intelligible world and of Intellect that led to its separation from the One. The term is of neo Pythagorean origin indicating the separation of the Indefinite Dyad from the One. See 1.2.5.27; 2.9.11.22; 5.1.1.4.

autonomous (αὐτεξούσιον): Used by Plotinus as a synonym for up to us (ἐν ὑμῖν) or that over which we are authoritative with respect to action. It has no implication that we legislate for ourselves. See 1.4.8.9; 3.2.10.19; 4.3.16.15; 4.8.5.26; 5.1.1.5; 6.8.3.10 21, 6.19, 7.17, 27, 42 44; 10.27, 20.34.

beauty, beautiful (καλόν, καλὸν): also Beauty. The term refers generally to the attribute of attractiveness of being. Like all attributes of being, the term can
be used in a sense of the One or Good. The moral connotation of the term is practically inseparable from the aesthetic. Hence, when the term is used, for example, for souls or virtues or practices, the temptation to translate it as ‘noble’ instead of ‘beautiful’ should be resisted. Plotinus uses one term for all. Plotinus’ terms for ‘nobility of birth’ are έγένεσις or γενναίος. See 1.3.1.22 31; 1.6, passim; 1.8.13.8; 2.3.9.25; 2.9.17.40; 3.5.1.21; 4.3.10.27; 5.5.1.40 42; 5.8, passim; 6.2.18.5; 6.3.11.21 28; 6.7.32.3; 6.8.6.18; 6.9.11.16.

**Being, being (δύναμις):** Being and Beings (δύναμις) are the terms used generally for the entirety of the intelligible world apart from the One. But Being also refers to one of Plato’s μέγιστα γένη (greatest genera). The term ‘being’ (‘beings’) is used most comprehensively for all that exists in the intelligible world and in the sensible world. When used for the latter, it refers to the result or product of generation or production or becoming.

**belief (δόξα):** also opinion. A cognitive state derived generally from sense perception and distinct from cognitive states that have only intelligibles as objects. Belief admits of falsity; higher forms of cognition do not. 1.1.2.26, 9.5; 1.8.4.11; 3.6.2.54; 5.3.1.21, 9.29.

**blending (κρασί):** see mixture. See 1.1.3.19; 1.6.1.52; 2.3.1.25, 5.6; 2.7.1.6, 11, 22; 2.9.5.19; 3.3.4.49; 4.7.8.31; 87.2, 3, 12, 84.8, 15; 6.2.2.22; 6.3.25.9.

**body (σώμα):** A composite of form and matter. The forms of bodies are expressions of nature, the lowest part of the soul of the cosmos. See 1.1.1.3, 3.1 4; 2.1.2.4 24; 2.3.9.17 27; 2.4.12.14; 2.7, passim; 3.6.6 19; 4.3.2.12 20; 4.4.18, 20.4, 29.1 5; 4.7.1.8; 4.9.2.11 15; 5.1.2.26; 5.4.1.17 19; 5.9.5.46; 6.3, passim.

**boundary (ὅρος):** also, definition. A broad term regarding anything with spatial limits or having a specific, limited nature. See 2.4.15.7; 2.8.2.6; 6.3.11.14, 12.15; 6.7.17.18, 20.

**breath (πνεῦμα):** The Stoic term for the vehicle of divine reason, used in refutation of their position on the materiality of soul. See 4.7.4 89.

**calculative reasoning (λογισμός):** also, calculation. The term is closely related to διάνοια (discursive thinking) used generally for the application of intellect to embodied life. The faculty of calculative reasoning is τὸ λογισμόν, τὸ λογιζόμενον. It is sometimes used synonymously with τὸ διανοητικόν (‘the faculty of discursive thinking’). The verb λογιζέσθαι is rendered ‘calculating’. See 1.2.1.19; 3.2.2.8; 4.3.18.1 13; 4.8.8.15; 5.3.3.14; 5.8.4.36; 6.2.21.33 37; 6.4.6.17 18; 6.7.1.20 38, 20.21; 6.8.2.4 16; 6.9.5.9.

**capacity (δύναμις):** see power.
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category (κατηγορία): also predicate. The Peripatetic term for the fundamental divisions of sensible reality. Plotinus also uses it for the divisions of the intelligible world according to Platonic principles. Often, Plotinus speaks of a category generally when he is referring specifically to a predicate within that category. The verb κατηγορεῖσθαι is to predicate. See 6.1, passim; 6.3.14.20; 6.4.2.12; 6.6.13.30.

cause (αἰτία, αἰτιον): also explanation. The term is used both for the four Peripatetic causes and for the Platonic paradigmatic cause. Generally, the translation ‘cause’ is used when referring to one of the three hypostases or agents and ‘explanation’ is used when Plotinus is referring to a discursive account. See 3.1.10.2; 4.4.32.1; 5.8.7.36 45; 6.2.6.18; 6.7.1.58; 2.27 43; 16.27; 6.8.14.21 28, 41; 6.9.6.54.

chance (τυχή): also luck, fortune. Used broadly for that which occurs without the guidance of reason. Occasionally, spontaneous (αὐτόματον) is used synonymously. See 3.2.1.1; 5.9.4.6, 10.6; 6.8.7.34; 6.8.10.5 6, 14.10 16; 6.9.5.1.

change (μεταβολή): also transformation. The Peripatetic generic term for either locomotion, alteration, quantitative, or qualitative occurrences, events, or processes. Plotinus uses it in his criticisms of Peripatetic accounts of nature. Plotinus holds that alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) is a species of motion, not of change and entertains the possibility that motion is the genus of which change is a species. See 2.1.1.5; 2.4.6.3; 3.2.15.28; 4.4.2.20; 4.7.9.15; 5.9.5.33; 6.1.16.35 36; 6.3.21.24 42; 6.5.3.10.

character (Ηθος): Generally, a settled moral (as opposed to intellectual) disposition resulting from habitual practices. See 1.3.6.23; 1.6.5.13; 2.3.7.9; 3.4.5.7, 11; 4.4.45.40; 6.4.15.19.

choice (προσιρέσις): The Peripatetic term used for deliberate desire or the culmination of a deliberative process. Plotinus uses it, roughly, in reference to the result of a deliberative process that is up to us (τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἡμῖν). See 2.3.2.17; 3.4.5.3 4, 14; 4.3.12.23, 13.3; 4.4.3.5 7, 22 33; 37.18 25; 5.4.1.29; 6.8.17.3, 8.

circuit (περιφορά): The complete (circular) path of the body of the universe or the cosmos. See revolution. See 2.1.7.21, 8.16; 2.3.9.3; 3.2.3.30; 3.4.6.51; 3.7.8.10, 12.46 51; 4.3.7.20, 26.

cognizing (γινώσκειν): see knowing.

combination (σύστασις): also structural integrity, constitution. See 1.8.8.4; 2.1.2.22, 6.55; 2.4.11.1, 12; 2.9.5.19, 7.25 27; 3.2.16.33, 51; 3.3.6.24; 4.7.3.33; 5.9.11.3; 6.2.2.10, 14.4; 6.3.25.10; 6.7.20.5.
complex (συναφέτερον): see composite. See 1.1.5.8, 7.2; 2.3.9.31; 2.5.2.11, 13; 3.6.9.36; 4.3.26.1; 4.7.3.10; 6.1.30.30; 6.3.7.14; 6.7.4.19, 5.2.

composite (συνθετον, συνθεσις, το κοινον): Often used to refer to form and matter together, but also used for the complex nature of anything other than the One, that is, anything whose existence and substantiality are distinct. See 1.1.2.2, 12.10 11; 1.7.3.21; 2.3.9.21; 2.4.2.6; 2.4.8.13; 3.3.6.5; 7; 3.6.7.4; 4.7.2.2; 5.3.1.5; 5.6.3.19; 5.9.3.18; 6.1.13.11; 26.16; 6.2.4.26; 6.2.18.12; 6.3.4.4 7, 10.21 23; 6.9.2.31.

compound (συγκριμα): see composite.

comprehension (συνεσις): also comprehensive grasp, understanding. Used generally for compositional cognition, that is, the mental seeing of parts as a whole. See 1.6.3.30; 3.2.5.19; 3.5.1.18; 4.3.26.46; 4.4.13.14 19; 5.3.2.25, 4.15; 5.8.11.23; 6.4.6.19; 6.7.31.33, 33.27; 6.9.4.2, 17.

conception (ἐννοια): Stoic term used by Plotinus for an intellectual state derived ultimately from sense perception. Closely related to conceptualization, conceptual distinction (ἐπίνοια). See 1.8.3.12; 2.4.1.3, 11.39; 3.7.1.4, 5.19, 9.83; 5.8.1.4; 6.1.3.22; 6.5.1.2; 6.8.1.17; 6.9.5.3, 40.

concord (συμφωνια): also harmony. See sympathy. Especially, the operational coordination of the parts of the embodied soul. More generally, the coordination of any cosmic parts. See 1.2.1.19; 3.4.5.24; 4.3.12.16, 19; 4.4.40.2; 5.1.9.25; 6.8.14.27.

confidence (πιστις): also, trust, conviction. A settled belief state of an embodied soul. See 1.3.1.34; 2.1.1.18; 3.6.6.67; 3.8.6.14; 5.3.6.9; 5.5.1.11 12; 6.3.10.16; 6.5.8.2; 6.9.4.32.

conscious awareness (παρακολουθία, παρακολουθησις): Term used, usually in a form of the verb παρακολούθειν, as a contrary to a state of non-consciousness or unconsciousness. More often, the term is used for self-awareness or self-consciousness. See self-awareness. See 1.4.5.2, 9.1, 10.23 29; 1.6.3.31; 2.9.1.43; 3.9.9.12 19; 4.3.26.45; 5.3.13.7.

contemplation (θεωρια): Primarily, the relation between the intellect and Forms or intelligible reality. See 1.1.7.14; 1.2.6.13; 1.8.13.15; 3.8, passim; 4.3.4.35; 4.4.41.1; 4.8.7.28; 5.3.5.18, 21; 5.5.3.22; 6.2.6.18; 6.7.39.26; 6.8.6.21.

contraries (ἀντικείμενα, ἐνάντια): also, opposites. The Peripatetic term for attributes in a category that cannot be simultaneously true of a subject. See for ἀντικείμενα, 4.5.8.34; 6.2.10.7 8, 12.25; 6.8.21.3, 6; for ἐνάντια, 1.1.11.7; 1.8.6.15 58, 11.1; 2.3.4.3; 2.3.16.45; 3.2.16.45 58; 4.4.18.33; 5.1.1.7; 6.1.4.40; 6.3.12.3, 20.2 36, 23.30; 6.6.3.28; 6.6.14.26.
controlling principle (ἡγεμονικόν):  esp. a Stoic term for the authoritative or ruling principle or part of the soul. For Plotinus, roughly equivalent to the rational faculty of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν). See 3.3.2.14; 6.1.28.5; 6.9.3.29.

corporeal (σωματικόν):  Referring to attributes of a composite of form and matter. Indicating three dimensionality and solidity. See 1.1.9.16; 2.2.1.17; 2.3.9.24; 2.9.17.4; 3.1.2.10; 3.6.5.36; 4.3.29.34; 4.4.21.8; 4.5.1.10; 4.7.3.17; 5.1.10.15; 6.1.19.8; 6.3.2.12; 6.9.5.2.

cosmos (κόσμος):  The organized or structured portion of the universe. The term is sometimes used for the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός) alone or for the 'microcosmic' intelligible world that is each individual rational soul. See universe (τὸ πάν) and heaven (οὐρανός). Also, order or arrangement. See 2.1.1; 2.3.1.7; 2.4.4.8; 5.28; 2.9.4.16; 8.26; 12.5 38; 3.2.1.16; 3.2.2.2; 3.2.17.3; 3.4.3.22; 3.5.5.12; 3.7.2.3; 11.27; 4.3.2.59; 4.4.10.1; 4.8.1.42; 5.1.4.1; 5.3.16.12; 5.7.1.10; 5.8.9.1; 5.9.3.3; 6.1.27.35; 6.4.12.43; 6.5.9.17; 6.9.2.29.

craft (τέχνη):  also, craftsmanship. The ability to apply expressed principles to practical affairs or to products. See 3.1.3.14; 3.2.11.10; 3.3.5.31; 3.8.5.7; 4.3.10.16; 4.4.331.3; 4.8.8.15; 5.8.1.8 23; 5.9.5.40, 11.1; 6.3.26.10.

create (δημιουργέων):  A term used primarily for the Demiurge who imports order into the pre-cosmic disordered receptive. See 2.4.7.25; 2.8.4.8; 2.9.18.16; 4.7.13.8; 5.8.7.31.

creator (ποιητής):  See production. Used principally for the Demiurge in relation to the cosmos. See 1.1.12.31; 1.6.9.8; 2.3.18.13; 3.2.16.9; 3.2.17.19 45; 3.8.11.37; 5.8.3.8, 7.2; 5.9.3.26, 34; 5.20.

daemon (δαιμόν):  Semi divine living beings inferior to gods. See 2.3.9.46, 15.4; 3.4, passim; 3.5.1.1, 4.5, 25; 3.5.5.16, 6.15, 41, 56; 6.7.6.28.

deficiency (πλευρά):  also lack. Indicating an attribute of anything in relation to its paradigmatic cause. See 1.8.4.9, 24, 5.1, 12, 22, 8.23; 3.2.5.26, 28; 3.5.9.46; 3.9.9.23.

Demiurge (δημιουργός):  also creator (ποιητής). Referring mainly to the principle of order in Plato’s Timaeus. This is a divine intellect (νοῦς). Sometimes the term is used generically and is rendered ‘craftsmen’. See 2.3.18.15; 2.9.6.24, 8.2; 3.9.1.2; 4.4.9.9; 5.1.8.5.

desire (ἐφισίς, ἐφιέξε):  The cause generally of psychical motion. All desire is for the Good primarily, but secondarily for anything that appears to be an instance or image of it. For ἐφισίς see 1.4.6.17; 1.5.2.7; 1.7.1.13; 2.3.11.8; 3.2.4.21; 3.5.1.12, 9.46; 3.6.7.13; 3.8.7.5; 3.9.9.4; 4.3.26.42; 4.4.18.36; 5.3.11.12;
5.5.12.11, 17; 5.6.5.9 10; 6.4.8.45; 6.7.21.3; 6.7.27.4, 26 27; 6.8.15.7; 6.9.11.24; for δρέξις see 1.1.5.21 27; 1.8.1.10, 15.6 7, 21; 2.9.15.7; 3.5.1.17; 4.3.23.32; 4.4.28.72; 4.7.13.4; 5.3.6.39; 6.1.21.13; 6.2.19.9; 6.5.1.14; 6.8.2.12 33, 4.1.

destruction (φθορά): also perishing, passing away. The term usually paired with the contrary generation or ‘coming to be’ (γένεσις), describing everything corporeal or part of the sensible cosmos, excluding the cosmos itself. See 2.1.1.6; 2.3.16.37; 2.4.6.4. 9; 2.9.6.58; 3.2.4.4; 3.6.8.9; 4.3.8.51; 4.7.12.17; 5.9.5.34; 6.3.25.2; 6.7.20.5; 24.29.

destructible (φθαρτόν): A property of everything corporeal. See 2.1.2.23.

Difference (ἐπιρρότης): also difference. A fundamental principle in the intelligible world accounting for the distinctiveness of each nature cognized by Intellect. Difference is one of Plato’s ‘greatest genera’. The differences among things in the sensible world image intelligible differences. See identity. See 2.4.5.28 32; 2.4.13.18; 3.6.15.7; 5.1.1.4, 4.35; 6.2.15.15, 21.21; 6.3.22.42 43; 6.4.11.17; 6.7.11.12; 6.9.6.42; 6.9.8.32.

discursive faculty (διανοητικόν): The faculty of discursive or non intuitive thinking. This is the lowest part of intellect and the highest part of the embodied soul. Discursive thinking (δίανωσ) is the activity of the discursive faculty. See calculative reasoning, faculty of calculative reasoning (λογισμός, τὸ λογιστικὸν). See 1.1.9.9; 5.3.2.23; 5.3.3.20; 5.3.4.14 15; 5.3.6.20.

discursive thinking (δίανωσ): also thought. The primary activity of the embodied intellect, typically operating on the results of sense perception and resulting in belief (δόξα). See thinking. See 1.1.2.27, 9.4; 2.4.10.2; 3.3.5.14; 3.7.11.39, 3.8.9.19; 4.4.6.9; 5.3.1.21, 3.35; 5.8.9.2; 6.2.4.23; 6.6.3.27, 13.58; 6.9.6.13.

disposition (διάθεσις): also condition. An acquired attribute owing to which someone or something is inclined to perform actions of a particular type. See habit. See 1.2.3.19; 1.4.5.17; 1.8.12.4; 2.3.11.4; 3.1.9.7; 3.4.6.23; 3.7.11.2; 4.3.13.5; 4.3.33.6; 5.9.2.3; 6.1.4.41, 10.35; 6.6.6.38; 6.8.5.28, 17.9.

distinguishing property (ιδιωτική, ἴδιον): also essential property, property. It is that which distinguishes a species within a genus or individuals within a species. The term has both Peripatetic and Stoic provenance. See 1.1.8.4 5; 2.4.4.4, 13.23 27; 2.6.1.24, 3.6, 12; 4.4.18.2; 5.1.4.42; 6.1.2.16; 6.3.5.24, 15.1, 6, 22; 6.7.33.7.

divisible (μεριστόν): also divided. Generally applied to bodies that have parts outside of parts, but by extension applied to intelligible composites. Opposite indivisible, undivided (ἀμεριστόν). See 2.4.4.12, 14; 4.2.1.37 43; 4.2.2.40; 4.3.19.1 32; 4.7.8.11; 4.9.3.11; 6.4.3.30, 4.27, 34, 8.14 19, 13.20; 6.9.2.21.
Dyad (δύας): Usually referring to the Indefinite Dyad, the principle with the One from which Being is produced. The Indefinite Dyad is Intellect in the initial phase of its generation from the One. It is not two, but is the principle of duality. Also, a group of units with the cardinality of two. See 3.7.8.43; 5.1.5.7 14; 6.3.10.3, 13.20; 6.6.4.8, 5.4, 7, 14.19 22, 16.26.

element (στοιχεῖον): Peripatetic term for the first constituent in a sensible thing. Elements are what primarily undergo change. See 1.6.3.20; 2.1.1.5; 2.4.1.8, 11; 2.4.6.14; 2.6.1.3; 3.1.3.2; 3.6.8.8; 4.4.14.2; 31.14, 34, 47; 5.1.9.7; 5.9.3.20; 6.1.1.10; 6.2.3.22; 6.3.2.14; 6.3.3.11 20, 9.14; 6.6.5.43; 6.7.11.66.
equivocal (ὁμώνυμος): Characteristic of word with more than one referent having no more than a name in common. See univocal. See 1.2.3.26; 2.1.7.27; 3.6.12.19; 6.1.8.7, 19, 10.19, 12.48; 6.3.1.21, 3.26, 16.5, 22.18.

error (ἀμαρτία): also moral error. Usually having a moral or normative connotation, indicating a failure to achieve a goal that one ought to achieve. See 1.1.12.24 25; 1.2.6.1 2; 2.3.16.40; 2.9.9.13; 3.2.10.7; 3.8.7.23; 4.3.16.4; 4.8.5.6, 16.

essence (τι ἐστιν, τι ἐν οἴναι): Peripatetic term. Used both for substances and, by extension, for things not in the category of substance. Occasionally used by Plotinus as equivalent to Substantiality. The essence of something is that by which it is determined. See 2.1.6.29; 2.5.1.4; 6.7.2.15, 3.2.1, 4.18, 26. Sometimes, τι ἐστιν is used more broadly for a generic identification. See 1.4.4.33; 4.2.1.4; 5.3.4.18; 6.1.2.5; 6.3.27.36; 6.5.2.24; 6.7.2.12; 6.8.1.27; 6.9.2.13.

eternity (αἰών): also, eternal (αἰώνιον). Characteristic of everything above Soul. What is eternal is outside of time. See always (έν) and everlasting (αἰώνιον). See 3.7.3.36 39.

everlasting (αἰώνιον). Often used synonymously with eternal (αἰώνιον), but sometimes indicating no temporal beginning or end. See 3.7.3.1 5, 5.12 18.

evil (κακόν): Plotinus identifies matter with evil. By extension, evil is that which tends to matter via deformation or disintegration. Evil is the complete absence of Good. It possesses a nature only in a sense because it is completely uniformed. The plural ‘evils’ (κακά) refers either to vices or to things that at least appear to be undesirable. See vice. See 1.6.6.22, 25; 1.7.3; 1.8, passim; 2.9.13.28; 3.2.5.26; 3.5.1.64; 4.8.7.16; 5.9.10.18; 6.6.3.4; 6.7.28.7 18; 6.8.4.21, 21.3; 6.9.11.37.

excellence (ἀρετή): Usually used with a moral connotation, referring generally to ideal human achievement. See 1.2, passim; 1.4.2.43; 1.5.2.5, 6.20, 10.21; 1.8.6.19; 2.3.9.17 19; 2.9.15.6 39; 3.4.2.28 29; 3.6.2; 6.2.18.16; 6.7.10.16; 6.8.5; 6.9.9.19, 11.48.
**exist (ὑπάρχω)**: Often, when appearing with the prefix ἐν, with the sense of (permanently) belonging to or found in something and always with the sense of being extra mental or concretely real. The prefix προ indicates logically or temporally prior existence. See 1.2.1.9 10; 1.4.3.24 33; 1.7.3.1; 2.1.2.28; 2.4.2.24; 3.1.4.25; 3.6.4.22; 3.7.4.20 21; 3.9.8.3; 4.3.6.29, 8.27 28; 4.4.2.53; 4.7.10.12; 5.1.4.30; 5.3.5.18; 5.5.2.13; 5.8.6.17; 6.1.3.18, 6.2, 25.22; 6.2.2.11, 11.15; 6.6.3.20, 11.9 11; 6.7.1.48, 3.16; 6.8.2.2.

**exist, come to (ὑφίστημι)**: Often used in relation to ὑπόστασις (existence, real), the result of φίστημι in the middle or passive. The term can indicate both temporal and atemporal existence. The verb is often used as a synonym for γίνομαι (come to be or exist). See 3.7.13.36; 5.1.6.1; 5.5.5.13 14; 5.6.3.16; 5.9.5.13; 6.8.13.50; 6.6.2.14, 3.1 2, 6.18, 10.35, 13.27; 6.8.11.33, 13.40.

**Existence, existence (τὸ ἐἶναι)**: also existing. The reality of anything logically distinct from the nature that it has. Existence refers to the principle for existing things in the intelligible world; existence refers to things in the sensible world. Existence and Substantiality are the two components of the primary endowment of the Good or One. The term τὸ X [pronoun in dative] ἐἶναι (essence) refers to the nature of that which exists. Nothing exists without having a nature. Sometimes, the reference to X is implicit and in these cases, τὸ ἐἶναι is rendered essence. See 1.5.2.9; 1.6.7.11; 1.8.5.10; 2.1.5.21; 2.3.15.22; 2.4.15.27; 2.5.5.3; 2.9.16.32; 3.1.1.10 12; 3.2.3.36; 3.5.2.39; 3.7.3.35; 4.22 30; 4.3.2.27; 4.7.3.10, 5.2.7, 9.1; 5.1.4.28, 6.2; 5.3.7.17 18; 5.4.2.37; 5.5.5.13 14, 22 24, 11.10; 5.6.6.19; 5.8.9.38 41; 6.1.27.6; 6.2.5.20 21, 7.36, 8.4 5; 6.3.7.9 28; 6.4.1.10; 6.6.6.2, 8.15; 6.7.2.17, 41, 24.26; 6.8.4.28, 7.49, 11.6 7, 14.31 32, 15.27 29; 6.9.1.10.

**existence, real (ὑπόστασις)**: also hypostasis, real existent, extra mental existence (existent), separate existent. The term is used of the three principles, One, Intellect, and Soul but it is also frequently used for items other than these. The term frequently connotes both τὸ ἐἶναι (‘existence’) and υφίστασθαι (‘substantiality’) together, indicating a real existent or something that is extra mental or separate. The term does not, however, necessarily connote independence of a cause of existence. See 1.4.9.19; 3.5.2.23 38; 3.5.7.9; 3.6.13.52; 4.5.6.5; 5.1.3.9, 15, 6.5, 33; 6.1.8.3; 5.3.16.36; 5.4.2.35; 5.5.1.15, 3.23; 5.6.3.11 17; 5.9.5.46; 6.1.6.3, 7.24 29, 8.3, 27.42; 6.2.4.17; 6.3.10.15; 6.4.9.25, 39; 6.6.5.17 24, 10.30, 12.1, 13.55; 6.7.2.37, 4.14, 40.19, 22; 6.8.7.26, 47, 10.12, 12.27, 14.18, 15.6, 28, 20.11.

**experience affections (παθεῖν, πάσχειν)**: also, experiencing, undergoing. The term is used both in a general or neutral sense for the attributes or states of something and in a particular sense for emotional or appetitive states of a living being. See state.
expressed principle (λόγος): As a technical term, the product of a higher principle at a lower level. In non-technical contexts, λόγος is used for items within the full range of elements of rational communication. The technical sense provides the ontological foundation for the non-technical senses. See 2.3.17.1; 3.2.2.36; 37; 3.3.4.9; 13; 5.16; 20; 3.8.2.20; 23; 30; 35; 3.1; 3; 4.3.5.8; 10; 9.48; 51; 4.4.13.3; 5; 5.1.3.8; 10; 5.13; 14; 6.45; 46; 7.42; 6.4.11.16; 6.7.5.5; 6; 12.41; 42; 6.8.15.33. The term λόγος is also used in a quasi-technical sense for any intelligible structure or its representation. It is variously rendered as ‘formula’, ‘ratio’, ‘account’, etc.

faculty (δύναμις): see power.

fate (εἰμαρμένη): Term used mainly in criticism of Stoic doctrine which identifies the unified cause of all things with reason, god, or nature. The term μοῖρα is used synonymously with εἰμαρμένη, and is so translated. The Fates (Μοῖραι) are a trio of Homeric gods referred to in Platonic myth. Plotinus uses the literary term μοῖρα, which is derived from the Greek word for a portion or share, to indicate not the result of an external imposition, but the result of human action, foresight (προφανεία), providence (πρόνοια). See 1.9.1.15; 2.3.9.28; 3.1, passim; 3.3.5.15; 3.4.6.32; 60; 4.3.13.20, 22, 15.11.

form (εἶδος): also Form, species, Species, kind. This term refers either to Platonic Forms or to their enmattered images or to Aristotle’s principle in hylomorphic composites. When used with genus, the term is rendered species. See 6.1.1; 21; 6.3, passim on the form of hylomorphic composites. On Forms in the intelligible world, see 5.5.1; 6, 5.9, 6.7 passim.

function (ἔργον): also deed, task. A defining activity according to the essence of something. More broadly, the term refers to the result of the defining activity.

generation (γένεσις): Indicates the beginning of anything that exists in time, or the entire world of becoming. In the latter sense, it is contrasted with Substance. The term is also used by analogy to refer to production in the intelligible world.

genus, genera (γένος, γένη): According to Peripatetic usage, the ‘logical’ matter in combination with the differentia, the ‘logical’ form, comprises the species which is the ‘logical’ hylomorphic composite. Plotinus adopts and adapts this usage, while preserving its Platonic provenance when applied to the intelligible world, especially for the μέγιστα γένη (greatest genera). He maintains that the intelligible genus contains species, but not in the way that the Peripatetic genus contains species, i.e., only logically. On the greatest genera see 6.2, passim.
goal (τίλος): Both a Platonic and Peripatetic term for the intended outcome of any action. The real goal of everything other than the Good is to achieve the Good insofar as possible even if this does not appear to the agent.

god (θεός): The term used for principles in the intelligible world, often virtually as an honorific adjective equivalent to ‘divine’ (θεός). The term is seldom used as a proper noun, even for the One.

Good (τό ἀγαθόν): The first principle of all, alternatively designated as the Idea of the Good and the One. See 5.5.6 13, 5.6.3 6, 6.7, 6.9, passim.

Good-like (ἀγαθοειδής): The property that an intelligible entity has as an image of the Good. See 1.2.4.12; 1.7.1.16, 2.7; 3.8.11.16, 18; 5.3.3.10, 16.18 19; 5.6.4.5, 5.13; 6.2.17.28; 6.7.15.9 24, 16.5, 18.1, 7, 14, 25, 21.3 8, 22.33; 6.8.15.19.

grasp (λαμβάνειν often with prefixes κατά, μετά, προς, ύπο): Generally, cognition of something real, whether intelligible or sensible.

growth, faculty of (φυτικόν): Includes faculties of nourishment (θρεπτικόν), increase in size (αὐξητικόν), and reproduction (γεννητικόν). Applies to both plants and animals. Alternatively, we find φυτική ψυχή, θρεπτική ψυχή (‘growth soul’, ‘nutritive soul’), etc. See 1.4.9.27; 3.4.2.23, 4.38; 4.3.19.19; 4.4.22.3, 27.12, 28.11, 16, 59, 65; 4.7.85.25; 4.9.3.21.

habit (έξις): also condition, disposition, settled state. See disposition.

happiness (τύδαμονία): The ideal human condition, identification with the intellect, i.e., the true person. See 1.4, passim.

harmony (ἀρμονία): also attunement. The mutual suitability and cooperation of the parts either of a body or, by extension, of an intelligible entity. See 1.3.1.332; 1.4.10.18; 1.6.3.28; 2.3.1.34.6; 2.9.16.40; 3.2.2.29 33, 16.37 44, 17.44, 69 72; 3.6.2.5; 4.2.3.1; 4.4.8.57; 4.7.84.2 28; 5.9.10 11; 6.6.16.43 44; 6.7.6.3 5.

heaven (οὐρανός): The ‘vault’ of the planetary orb, containing the stars and planets and their spheres. Sometimes used as roughly synonymous with cosmos, universe. See 1.8.6.4; 2.1.1.12, 2.2, 15, 18, 5.14 19, 7.46; 2.9.5.10, 18.38; 3.2.3.28 34, 8.6; 3.5.2.15; 3.7.13.27 30; 4.3.7.4 5, 15.1, 17.1 3; 4.4.5.12, 8.55 57; 22.40; 4.5.8.1; 4.7.12.6; 5.1.2.17 39; 5.8.3.32; 6.7.12.4 19, 16.3.

human being (ἄνθρωπος): also person. The composite of body and soul, distinct from the true self which can exist apart from the body, identified either with soul generally or with the highest part of soul, namely, intellect.

Idea (= Form) (ἰδέα): The term alternatively used for intelligible paradigms of reality.
identical (ταύτόν): Always indicating oneness or unity as distinct from same (δόμοιον) which always indicates two or more entities. Only the One is unqualifiedly self identical. Therefore, the qualified or relational identity of two or more things entails their non-identity or difference. In this sense, identity and sameness are extensionally equivalent. See 1.1.2.5; 1.2.2.5; 1.4.4.15; 4.2.1.5; 2.4.1; 4.3.5.13; 4.9.1.8; 2.7; 5.3.5.5; 6.1.7.11; 8.22; 6.2.7.33 45; 6.4.1.23 25; 6.7.13.5 6.

Identity (ταυτότητα): One of Plato’s five ‘greatest genera’ and the principle of oneness. See Difference. See 1.2.5.2; 2.4.13.20; 3.7.2.15; 4.4.15.8; 5.1.4.34 35; 5.3.10.25 27; 6.1.6.19; 6.2.8.37, 15.15, 21.20; 6.7.39.6; 6.9.8.28.

imagination (φαντασία): The activity of the faculty of imaginative representation. The result of this activity is a semblance (φαντασμα). In the plural, φαντασίαι are imaginative representations. For φαντασίαι see 1.1.9.8; 1.2.5.20; 1.4.10.19 20; 1.8.15.18; 2.4.11.38; 2.9.11.22; 3.1.7.14; 3.6.4.19 21; 4.3.23.33; 29.27; 30.3; 31.5; 4.4.37.7; 4.6; 8.3; 13.14; 17.12; 20.17; 28.41; 48; 5.1.10.26; 5.3.3.6; 6.8.2.8, 3.8; 16; for φαντασμα see 2.4.10.9, 11.27 29; 3.5.7.8; 3.6.5.3; 7.13; 4.3.29.23, 31.11; 5.3.2.8, 11.7; 6.2.22.39; 6.6.17.10.

imaginative representation, faculty of (φανταστικὸν): see imagination. See 4.3.23.32, 30.2, 7, 10.

imitation (μιμημα): One of a family of terms indicating the relation between the lower and the higher, usually sensible in relation to intelligible, but also Soul in relation to Intellect and Intellect in relation to the One. Other related terms are image (εἰκὼν) and likeness (ὁμοιομα) and reflection (νεολαμα, εἰδωλοσ). For μιμημα see 1.2.2.3; 3.27 28; 2.4.4.8; 2.9.8.28, 16.46; 3.6.7.28, 11.3, 13.26, 17.3; 3.8.7.7; 4.3.10.18; 4.4.13.22; 5.3.16.40 41; 5.4.2.25; 5.9.3.37; 6.2.22.38, 41, 15.35; 6.4.2.2; 6.7.6.11, 28; 6.8.12.16; 6.9.11.27; for εἰκὼν see 1.2.7.28; 1.5.7.15; 1.8.3.8; 2.3.18.17; 2.9.4.26; 3.5.1.35; 3.6.5.5; 3.8.11.30; 4.4.10.12; 5.1.3.7; 5.3.4.21; 5.8.12.19; 6.2.22.43; 6.3.1.21, 15.32; 6.4.10.3; 6.7.35.17; 6.9.11.44.

immaterial (ἀνυλος): That which is separate from matter in contrast to that which is enmattered (ἐνυλος). For ἀνυλος see 2.5.3.18; 3.6.2.52, 56, 16.27; 4.7.4.19; 5.1.10.20; 6.4.8.2; 6.5.11.33, 35; 6.8.6.26; for ἐνυλος see 2.3.17.8; 6.5.8.26, 11.32, 34.

impression (τύπος, ἀντίτυπος): The intelligible residue of a higher principle in a lower, or of a sensible composite in the embodied intellect. An archetype (ἀρχέτυπος) is the higher principle in relation to the lower expression or representation of it. Even the One is sometimes referred to as an archetype. See 1.2.4.19 24; 1.5.6.4; 2.3.17.5, 16; 2.4.10.23; 2.9.6.4; 3.6.3.29; 4.3.26 29;
impulse (ὁρμή): Stoic term for the source of psychical motion. In the passive, rendered impelled. Roughly synonymous with desire, although impulses, unlike desires, can be found in non living things. See 2.3.13.12; 3.1.1.28, 4.15, 7.16, 23, 9.10; 3.1.1.9; 3.4.6.55; 3.5.2.6; 4.3.12.2, 23.13, 32; 4.4.7.7, 28.63, 32.42, 44.5; 4.5.2.43; 5.3.12.38; 6.2.8.22; 6.5.2.6; 6.8.2.3.

in charge of (κυριώς): also be authoritative over, in control of. Used both in reference to moral agency and to political rule.

in fact (ἐν): Literally ‘or’. Gloss: ‘or is it not the case that?’ Very frequently used by Plotinus to indicate the start of the expression of Plotinus’ own position after a dialectical discussion.

indestructible (ἄφθαρτον): Can be used of bodies, souls, and intelligible principles to indicate a nature incapable of decomposition. See 2.1.2.21, 23; 3.6.1.29; 4.7.12.20; 6.4.10.23.

individual (καθίκαστον): also particular. Used generally of members of a species but in particular for human beings or human souls. See 3.2.9.12; 3.9.2.2; 4.3.8.25, 13.23; 4.4.32.15; 4.8.2.28; 5.6.6.24; 5.7, passim; 5.9.12.4 5; 6.2.2.24, 20.11 13, 28; 6.3.9.20, 38; 6.4.16.34; 6.5.1.10 11; 6.8.1.40, 18.37.

indivisible (ἄμεριστόν): see divisible.

Intellect (νοῦς): also intellect (Pl. νοές, νοοῖ). Intellect is the second hypostasis; intellect is the true identity of rational living beings. Our intellects are undescended and engage in the same activity that Intellect does. The mode of cognition of Intellect and all intellects is non discursive.

intellecction (νόσησις): see thinking.

intellectual (νοηρός): Used of the activity of intellect and also of that which participates in Intellect insofar as it participates.

intelligible (νοητόν): see thinking.

intelligible world (ἰκτί): Literally ‘there’, used generally for the realm of Soul, Intellect, and the One, and for other components of intelligible reality. The phrase νοητός τόπος (literally ‘intelligible place’) is also rendered ‘intelligible world’.

interval (διάστημα): The space between bodies. See 2.4.11.18; 2.7.2.12; 2.8.1.50; 3.6.19.39 40; 3.7.7.25, 8.17 68; 4.2.1.19; 4.3.20.24, 26; 4.4.7.12; 4.5.4.17 21; 5.1.2.31; 6.3.11.3; 6.4.1.9, 2.8, 16.20; 6.5.4.22; 6.5.5.7; 6.7.39.3.
intrinsic (σύμφυτον): Belonging to the nature of a thing. See 1.2.1.36, 38; 2.6.3.15; 2.9.15.16; 3.6.11.21; 3.7.4.23; 3.8.2.2; 4.7.2.8; 5.4.2.32; 5.5.12.11; 6.7.1.16.

involuntary (ἀκούσιον, ἀπροσέχετον): All desire is for the Good. Hence, what is involuntary is a choice or an action based on a desire for the apparent, not the real, Good. For ἀκούσιον see 3.2.10.7; 4.3.2.15; 4.8.5.8; 6.8.1.41, 42, 4.15; for ἀπροσέχετον see 1.2.5.14, 19, 6.3; 1.4.15.17; 4.4.35.43.

judgement (κρίσις): also, discernment. Sometimes with prefix ἀκρι. The result of a process of calculative reasoning. See 1.1.1.10, 9.9, 18; 1.3.4.13; 1.6.3.4; 3.4.6.13; 3.6.1.5, 7; 4.3.3.22, 26.8; 4.4.22.31; 6.1.6.22; 6.4.6.14; 6.7.19.2.

knowing (γνώσκειν): also cognizing. The widest term for cognition above the level of sense perception and imagination. Knowing can indicate acquaintance, recognition, awareness, as well as propositional knowledge.

knowledge (γνώσις): The generic term. Also, cognition, cognizance. See knowing.

licit (θίμη): Term drawn from Greek religion, usually indicating behaviour that is within an acceptable range of moral norms. See 2.9.2.29, 9.6.67, 17.16; 3.6.13.33; 4.7.11.14; 5.5.11.13; 6.7.15.15; 6.9.9.56.

life (ζωή): also Life. The principle of self motion in any living being (ζωή). Plotinus uses the latter term broadly to include plants but more often referring only to animals. The principle of Life in the intelligible world is coordinate with the principles of Being or Existence and Intellect. Intellect is both said to have a life and to be Life itself. The term βίος (way of life) usually indicates a range of activities or specifically human activities that characterize someone over a lifetime.

likeness (ὁμοίωμα, ὁμοίωσις): see assimilation, sameness, imitation. The sameness of two things when one is ontologically dependent on the other. See 1.2.2.4 10, 7.28; 6.9.11.43.

living being (ζωή): also, animal, Living Being. Generally, anything with a soul, including plants; often used for animals exclusively. The Living Being is the entirety of intelligible reality plus the Intellect or Demiurge. The universal or complete living being is equivalent to the cosmos.

longing (πόθος): Generally an impulse for the Good. See 1.6.4.16; 3.5.2.40 41; 4.3.1.12, 21.21; 5.3.10.48; 5.5.4.7, 12.6; 6.7.34.1.

magnitude (μέγεθος): Geometrical term indicating the length, breadth, and depth of bodies (σώματα), usually contrasted with number (ἄριθμός) or multiplicity (πληθός) which pertains to that which is numerable.
mass (ὀγκος): A property of things with magnitude.

matter (ὕλη): A Peripatetic and Stoic term used by Plotinus both in his criticisms of these schools and to indicate total privation or non-being, that which is equivalent to evil.

memory (μνήμη): The presence in the soul of images or representations either of previous embodied experiences or of the life of the undescended intellect. See recollection. See 4.3.25, 4.4.12, passim.

mixture (μίξις, μίγμα): Used mainly in criticism of Peripatetic and Stoic theories of the composition of sensibles. See blending (κράσις). For μίξις see 2.1.7.17; 2.3.9.43; 2.7.2.39; 3.5.1.28; 38, 56; 6.3.10.3, 25.9. For μίγμα see 1.1.1.4; 1.6.5.35; 2.4.7.3; 8; 2.7.1.40; 2.9.5.20; 3.2.7.6, 16; 3.5.7.21; 4.3.19, 23; 4.4.17.19; 22; 6.3.1.22; 6.3.8.26; 6.7.30.33; 34.

moral error (ἁμαρτία): see error.

motion (κίνησις): also, Motion, one of Plato’s five ‘greatest genera’. A broad term used both for bodies and for psychical and intellectual activities, an alternative to ἐνέργεια (= κίνησις νοῦ).

multiplicity (πλῆθος): The general term for the opposite of unity, therefore applying to everything except the One. The term refers to anything complex, not just quantitatively. Primarily, it refers to that which is numerable as opposed to magnitude (μέγεθος) which is measurable.

nature (φύσις): The lowest part of the soul of the cosmos. Also, synonymous with form, essence, or intelligible structure. Nature is variously present in plants, animals, and human beings. Nature is prior to the sensible composite and determinative of it.

necessity (ἀνάγκη): Used for both physical and logical necessity.

non-being (μὴ ὄν): That which is without being or Being, primarily matter but including also everything that has a principle of difference in it.

nutritive faculty (θρεπτικόν): see growth faculty. See 3.6.4.32; 4.9.3.23, 25.

One (τὸ ἕν): also, one, unity. The first principle of all and a property of everything that exists in any way. Generally, the contrast between ἕν and πολλά is translated as ‘one many’ and the contrast between (τὸ) ἕν and ὄν is translated as unity being. Plotinus distinguishes between the One, the first principle of all, and unity as a hierarchically gradable property of both intelligibles and sensibles, using the same term τὸ ἕν for both.

order (τάξις): also, ordered parts, system, arrangement, rank. Sometimes with prefixes δια, συν. Refers generally to the intelligible arrangements of parts of a paradigm or paradigms and all that exists in imitation or likeness of them.
Disorder (ἀταξία) is intrinsically unintelligible. Sometimes, κόσμος (cosmos), which usually refers to the entire world order, is used for some portion of that and so synonymously with τάξις.

partake of (μετέχειν): Platonic term used to indicate the relation of an instance of an intelligible to the intelligible itself. Synonymous with participate in (μεταλαμβάνειν). See 1.7.2.3 5; 1.8.4.1; 2.1.6.46; 2.4.7.7; 13.8 9, 15.9; 2.9.17.21; 3.6.13.33, 14.22; 3.8.9.24; 4.4.32.9; 4.5.8.21; 4.9.2.26; 5.3.15.22, 19.9; 5.5.4.29 30; 6.1.26.33; 6.2.12.5; 6.7.23.20; 6.8.14.3; 6.9.1.38.

passible (παθητικόν): also, passive, subject to affection. See state and experience.

perceiving (αισθάνομαι): see sense-perception.

persist (μένων): also, be stable. Refers to the state of a higher principle which, although having an activity outside of itself, remains unchanged.

place (τόπος): also, region. Narrowly, the innermost boundary of a containing body. More broadly, a largely undefined section of the universe.

potency (δύναμις): see power.

power (δύναμις): also, potency, capacity, potentiality, faculty, virtuality. The term has both Platonic and Peripatetic provenance. When used according to the former, it indicates a principle in relation to whatever it is a principle of; when used according to the latter, it indicates a contrast with ἐνέργεια (actuality). It is also used technically for any distinct part of the soul as the source of a particular function. ‘Power’ and ‘capacity’ are used to render what for Aristotle would be an active potency. Virtuality indicates the fact that the higher principle is or has the lower expression of it but at a higher level of unity. If A is virtually B, then B is or has an expressed principle (λόγος) of A.

predicate (κατηγορεῖ): see category. The result of the act of predication within a category. The verb κατηγορεῖσθαι is rendered ‘to predicate’.

principal (κύριος): also, authoritative, proper, in charge, dominant. Generally, refers to that which in a system determines its direction or structure.

principle (ἀρχή): also, starting point. Used mainly in metaphysical contexts for that which is the explanans of any phenomenon. By extension, used for the axioms or definitions deployed in an argument that provides an explanation.

privation (στίρησις): Peripatetic term, along with form (ἐἴδος) and the substrate (ὑποκείμενον) indicating the principles of change. Plotinus argues for the equivalence of privation and underlying principle understood as matter. See 1.8.1.17, 19, 4.2.3, 5.24, 11.1 15, 12.1 2; 2.4.13.10 23, 14.1 21, 16.4 6; 3.6.9.24; 6.1.10.42; 6.6.14.5; 6.7.27.37.
procession (πρόόδος): The derivation of an order from its principle. See 4.8.5.33, 6.5; 5.5.3.9; 6.3.22.7, 47.

produce (ποιήμα): also, cause, make. To be the efficient cause of something.

production (ποίημα): also, creation. Used both for ordinary efficient causality and especially for the operation of the Demiurge, where creation is the imposition of form on the utterly formless. See 2.3.16.32; 3.2.7.43, 9.29, 12.9, 17.32, 43, 50; 4.4.15, 17, 35.6; 5.8.2.17.

proper (οἰκτιόν): That which belongs to something’s nature or is appropriate for it. See produce.

providence (πρόνωτα): also, foresight. The direction of the lower sensible world by the higher intelligible world. Especially, a Stoic term for the rational, causal order of nature. See 2.2.1.25 26; 2.9.15.8, 11, 16.15, 28, 31; 3.2, 3.3, passim; 4.4.26.19; 4.8.2.25; 6.1.22.23 24; 6.7.1.19, 28, 26.11, 39.27; 6.8.17.4, 7, 10.

rational (λογικόν): Used for the differentia of the human soul and also for the faculty of discursive thinking.

reason (λόγος): also, statement, argumentative procedure, argument, theory, rational discourse, account, definition, etc. A general term for any unit of intelligible communication. See expressed principle for the technical meaning of λόγος.

recognition (γνώση): see knowledge.

recollection (άνάμνησις): Generally used as synonymous with memory (μνήμη), but always with the connotation of the originative experience being in the intelligible world. For this reason, time is not attached to recollection, as it normally is to memory. See 1.8.15.28; 2.9.12.7, 16.47; 3.5.1.34; 3.7.1.23; 4.3.25.32, 37; 5.5.12.13.

reflection (πέπολον, ἐμφασις, ἱνδόλμα): An imperfect representation of a higher principle on a lower level. For ἐπολον see 1.1.7.12, 12.24 32; 1.4.10 11; 1.8.3.37; 2.4.5.18 19, 15.22 26; 2.9.1.62, 10.26 27; 3.3.7.12; 3.6.7.13 28; 3.7.11.53; 3.9.3.11 15; 4.2.10.39; 4.3.29.3; 4.5.7.44; 4.9.4.18; 5.1.6.46, 7.40; 5.3.8.9; 5.5.2.7; 5.9.5.18; 6.1.10.38; 6.3.15.30; 6.4.16.40 44; 6.6.2.13, 9.35; 6.7.5.14; 6.8.18.35 36; for ἐμφασις see 4.3.18.12; for ἱνδόλμα see 1.4.3.35; 1.8.4.30; 2.1.5.7; 2.3.18.12; 2.5.4.17; 3.8.5.7; 4.4.13.3; 19.3 4, 29.53; 5.3.8.47; 5.9.5.42; 6.1.9; 6.2.22.33, 43; 6.4.9.37; 40, 10.12; 6.7.40.19; 6.7.18.27.

relation (σχέσις): also, spatial relation, status, position. Sometimes used synonymously with ὁ πρός τι. Used especially in criticism of Peripatetic and Stoic categories. See 2.4.14.24; 3.1.5.11, 34, 39, 44, 50, 58, 6.15, 7.5; 4.4.26.2,
29.23; 33.4; 34.22; 4.7.4.18; 6.1.6.3; 21, 7.2; 31, 8.6; 19, 9.2; 26, 14.10, 15.15, 17.5, 11; 18.16 17; 6.2.16.2; 6.3.21.16 17, 28.5; 6.6.14.24. 31.

reversion (ἐπιστροφή): Literally ‘turning towards’. The process or result of the reconnecting of the lower with the higher. See 1.2.4.18; 2.2.3.9; 4.3.4.25; 4.8.4.2; 7.26; 5.1.7.5; 5.3.6.40; 5.8.11.9.

revolution (φορά): Used generally for the motion of the heavenly bodies (heaven) and of the universe itself. See circuit (περιφορά). See 2.1.8.18; 2.3.1.1, 9.25; 2.9.4.30; 3.1.2.11, 3.3, 5.2, 15, 6.4.

same (ὁμοιον): see identical (ταὐτόν). See: 1.1.2.6; 5.3.5.4; 5.6.3.8.

sameness (ὁμοιότης): also, Sameness. For Plotinus, the use of the term implies that there is something (self) identical (ταὐτόν) ‘over and above’ the things that are the ‘same’. See 1.1.9.23; 1.6.2.11 12; 3.1.5.3; 6.1.9.13; 6.3.15, 28.11. See likeness (ὁμοίωμα) referring to the sameness in something in relation to its model or paradigm. Sometimes, Plotinus speaks of the sameness or likeness of two things indifferently. See assimilation.

science (ἐπιστήμη): see scientific understanding.

scientific understanding (ἐπιστήμη): also, science. The non intuitive cognition of necessary, eternal truths or the formal expression of these. In the latter case, the term is rendered science. See 1.2.7.3; 1.3.4.8; 1.8.1.13; 3.9.2.1; 4.3.2.23, 50 54; 4.8.7.16; 4.9.5.7; 5.3.1.19; 5.4.1.9, 2.48; 5.5.13.14; 5.8.4.40, 51; 5.9.5.30, 8.5, 13.9; 6.1.1.9; 6.2.17.2, 18.8, 20.3 4, 16; 6.3.4.11; 6.4.11.23 24; 6.5.7.4; 6.6.6.20 29, 15.19 20; 6.7.1.25; 6.8.3.5; 6.9.4.1 9.

self-awareness (συναίσθησις): The activity of cognizing one’s own cognitive or affective states. The prefix συν indicates a level of cognition over and above that found in ἀισθήσις (sense perception) which implies a certain passivity and an external object. See 1.1.9.20, 11.11; 3.4.4.10; 3.8.4.19 20; 4.3.2.6.45; 4.4.2.31, 8.20, 24.21, 45.8, 34; 4.5.5.29; 5.1.7.12; 5.3.2.4, 13.13, 21; 5.4.2.18; 5.6.5.3 4; 5.8.11.23; 6.4.9.36; 6.7.16.19, 41.27.

self-control (σωφροσύνη): One of the classical virtues, variously defined according to whether the soul is considered with or without the body. See 1.2.1.18, 7.4; 1.6.1.46, 4.11, 5.13, 6.1, 7, 9.14; 2.9.14.12; 5.9.113.8; 6.2.18.15; 6.7.31.14, 33.6.

self-evident (ιναργής): What is cognized without inference.

self-transcendence (ἐκστασις): also inclination towards, displacement. Indicates generally the ascent from a lower to a higher principle. See 1.1.5.23; 5.3.7.14; 6.3.2.20; 6.9.11.23.

semblance (φάντασμα): see imagination.
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**seminal principles (σπερματικοί λόγοι):** Stoic term for the internal principles of growth and order in the cosmos.

**sense-datum (αισθημα):** see sense-perception.

**sense-perception (αισθησις):** also perception. The process or activity of using one or more of the five senses. Sometimes used of immediate cognition that is not of sensibles. **Sensibles (αισθητά) are the actual or potential direct objects of sense perception.** A **sense-datum (αισθημα) is the internal result of an act of sense perception.** **Perceiving (αισθάνεσθαι) is the act of using one or more of the five senses.** The faculty of sense perception (αισθητικόν) is that power of which sense perception is the actualization. When rendered 'perception', the term indicates some sort of awareness broader than that found in the five senses. For **αισθημα see** 4.2.2.20; 4.3.25.44, 29.33; 4.7.6.11, 20, 31; for **αισθητικόν see** 2.9.1.13; 3.4.4.13; 4.3.19.11, 22.17, 23, 31, 29.2 7, 26; 4.9.3.26; 5.3.2.3; 6.7.3.22 30, 6.1, 18, 28, 8.1.

**sensibles (αισθητά):** see sense-perception.

**signification (σημασία):** Used generally for the theory that the heavenly bodies and their positions and motions bear meaning or indications of terrestrial events. See 2.3.7.7, 10.1; 4.4.34.16, 23, 26, 39.17.

**sort of (οίον):** also, in a way, as it were, in a manner of speaking. A quasi technical term for the analogous application of a term, usually derived from the sensible world in application to the intelligible world.

**Soul (ψυχή):** also, soul. The third hypostasis. Also, soul is the principle of motion in any living being.

**species (είδος):** see form.

**spiritedness (θύμος):** also, passion, anger. See 1.1.5.22; 1.9.1.10; 2.3.11.5; 4.3.19.21, 28.13; 4.4.17.15, 28.9, 32.29, 35.29; 6.9.11.10.

**spiritedness, faculty of (θυμοσθείς):** The part of the soul that is the source of emotions or passions. See spiritedness. See 3.6.2.27, 55, 4.4; 4.4.28.64 65, 41.10.

**spontaneous (αὐτοματον):** see chance.

**stability (στάσις):** also, Stability, positioning, standstill, rest. One of Plato’s five ‘greatest genera’. This term refers to the contrary of motion in the sensible world and also the eternal state of non sensible Being without the implication of inactivity. The related verb σταματεί is sometimes rendered ‘to be stable’ or ‘come to a standstill’ or ‘be at rest’, indicating a prior motion.
star (ἀστρον): Fixed planet, constellation.

state (πάθος): also, experience, affection, feeling, emotion. A broad term used sometimes as equivalent to property or attribute; more often, used for a non intellectual property of a living being. Also, πάθημα. Sometimes, Plotinus uses these terms interchangeably, sometimes he uses πάθημα for the result of a πάθος, and sometimes he follows Stoic usage and reserves πάθος for states of the soul and πάθημα for certain non psychical, that is, bodily properties. For πάθος see 1.1.5.18; 1.4.2.3 4; 2.4.10.21; 2.8.1.34; 2.9.2.10; 3.3.5.40; 3.5.1.1 8; 3.6.3.19, 4.35; 5.5; 10.2; 3.8.4.11; 4.3.9.10; 4.4.7.3; 42.21; 4.6.3.69; 4.7.11.14 15, 12.19; 5.8.11.34; 5.9.10.19; 6.2.15.12; 6.3.16.40, 44, 19.18 21; 6.4.1.20, 8.18; 6.7.26.17, 33.23; for πάθημα see 1.1.3.4 7, 5.27; 2.3.9.10, 16.29; 3.1.3.24; 3.3.5.7; 3.5.1.65; 3.6.6.53, 12.13; 4.2.1.53, 76, 2.28; 4.3.26.56; 4.5.3.37; 4.7.3.12 13; 4.9.4.22; 5.3.2.6; 6.1.5.11, 27.41; 6.3.1.29; 6.6.12.2 18; 6.8.3.12, 6.11; 6.9.4.19.

stillness (ἡσυχία): The condition of Intellect and intellects in contemplation of intelligible reality. A term with a strong positive connotation. See 1.2.5.30; 1.3.4.16 17; 2.9.1.27, 6.19; 3.6.1.23; 3.7.11.6, 14, 12.11; 3.8.6.12; 3.9.1.17; 5.3.6.15, 7.13 16; 5.9.8.8; 6.3.2.27, 22.29; 6.3.23.4; 6.8.5.17 18.

structured ordering (συνταξίς): An order or arrangement implying purpose or intention. See order.

Substance (σωσία): also substance, Substantiality, substantiability. Term with both Platonic and Peripatetic provenance. When used Platonically, Substance refers to Intellect or to any distinct Being in the intelligible world; Substantiality refers to the essence of Intellect or of any distinct Being.

Intelligibles, that is, Platonic Forms, are variously referred to as Substances or the Substantiality of Intellect. When used Peripatetically, the term ‘substance’ refers to an individual ‘this something’; ‘substantiality’ refers to the essence of a substance, that is, its core reality or being. For Plotinus, true ontological primacy is found in Substance and Substantiality, not in substance and substantiality. Nevertheless, Plotinus follows Aristotle in making a distinction between Substance and Substantiality in the intelligible world which reflects Aristotle’s distinction between substance and substantiality in the sensible world. The adjective substantial, Substantial usually indicate an implicit contrast. Thus, Substantial Numbers (σωσιώδεις ἄρθροι) are contrasted with quantitative (i.e., non substantial) number.

substrate (ὑποκείμενον): also, underlying nature. A Peripatetic term indicating the putative subject of change or a principle of composition in relation to form. See 1.4.3.14; 1.8.10.9; 2.4.1.1, 4.7, 5.19 22; 6.2, 12.15, 13.1 6, 14.16; 2.5.1.30; 2.8.1.38; 3.3.4.31 33; 3.6.6.30; 9.13; 10.8, 12.8, 16.5; 3.7.3.9, 24; 5.17; 4.4.23.17; 4.7.4.19; 5.6.3.2; 5.8.4.18; 5.9.2.14;
susceptibility (ἀσθένεια): also weakness, both physical and moral. See 1.4.8.13, 17, 15.10; 1.8.14.1 49; 2.1.8.25; 2.3.13.41; 3.8.4.33 41; 4.6.3.46; 4.9.5.26; 6.4.15.20.

sympathy (συμπάθεια): The capacity of the parts of an organic whole, including the cosmos, for mutual affectivity indicating an affinity owing to sameness of origin or structure. The capacity is based on the shared possession of one or more expressed principles. See concord. See 3.1.5.8; 4.3.8.2; 4.4.40.1; 4.5.1.35, 2.15, 17, 3.17.

thinking (νοεῖν): The general term for cognition apart from sense perception. There are a number of other closely related terms. The term νόησις is sometimes used as equivalent to νοεῖν, but more often indicates the highest type of thinking, the activity of Intellect or of disembodied intellects. In these cases the term is rendered intellec tion. A thought (νόημα) is the result of the activity of thinking. See discursive thinking. An intelligible (νοητόν) is the object of thinking.

transcendent (ἐπικεῖνα): also, transcend. Literally ‘beyond’. Refers to the One or Good in relation to intelligibles and Intellect. Occasionally the term refers to the intelligible world in relation to the sensible world. Also used as a verb to translate ὑπερέχειν.

transformation (μεταβολή): see change.

truth (ἀλήθεια): The property of Being in relation to Intellect and to intellects. By extension, the term is used as a semantic property of propositions. The One or Good is the source of truth for Being.

unaffected (ἀπαθής): also, impassive, impassible, without passions. Not subject to change or alteration; especially applied to the (higher part of the) soul. See 3.6, passim.

unit (μόνος): Any principle of a number or numerable quantity.

unity (τὸ ἕν, ἕν): see One.

universe (τὸ πᾶν): The cosmos plus the higher causes of the cosmos. Often used synonymously with cosmos (κόσμος).

univocal (συνόνυμος): Characteristic of word with identical meaning in all its referents. See equivocal. See 1.4.3.3; 6.1.1.18, 8.6; 6.3.1.21.

unlimited (τὸ ἅπαν): also, absence of limit, infinite regress, unlimitedness. Generally, a property of something insofar as it is without Substantial Being or substantial being, for these provide limit, etc.
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up to us (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν): also, free. Alternative translations include ‘dependent on us’, ‘in our power’, ‘authoritative over ourselves’. See choice.

variegated (ποικιλος): also, complex. Refers to anything non uniform and, by extension, non simple. Used especially for Intellect or Being which is one (simple) many (variegated).

vice (κακία): Any state or action tending towards evil. Vice is generally owing to an association with a body and hence with matter. See evil. See 1.1.10.13; 1.5.6.14; 1.8.4.7, 10, 13, 6.6.13 17, 9.1 10, 11.6, 12.2, 13.4 20, 14.50; 2.3.1.9; 16.38; 2.9.8.35; 3.2.5.14 16; 3.5.7.45; 3.6.2.1 66; 4.4.45.22; 4.8.5.22; 6.3.18.24; 6.4.15.32 33; 6.7.20.15, 23.10, 28.13 15; 6.9.3.19.

virtuality (δύναμις): also, virtually (δυνατεί). See power.

virtuous (σπουδαίος): Term used for a person of elevated character. See 1.2.8.13; 1.4, passim; 1.9.1.12; 2.9.1.46, 9.3, 7 8; 3.1.10.11; 3.2.15.52 54; 3.4.6.1 2; 3.8.6.37; 4.4.43.1.

void (κενος): also, empty. Used in criticism of Stoic doctrine and in defence of Plato against Peripatetics.

volition (θελησις): The principle of conation, always used of rational beings. See wanting.

voluntary (ἰκουσιον): Adjective used synonymously for the verb wanting and the noun volition. All and only desire for the Good is voluntary; desire for apparent goods is involuntary. See 3.1.9.6, 11; 4.3.15.18; 4.8.5.3, 4, 7; 6.8.1.33 43, 3.19.

wanting (θελην): see volition; also, willingly (ἐκοι).

wickedness (πονηροια): The generic term whose species are defined by their location in the soul and the manner in which they incline the soul to evil. Roughly synonymous with vice. See 1.8.5.17; 2.3.14.13 14; 3.1.6.10; 3.2.5.19, 16.1.

will (βουλησις): The power in virtue of which something can be up to us. In practice what is ‘up to us’ is usually equivalent to voluntary, though they are not identical in definition. See 1.4.4.17, 6.14 20, 11.17; 2.1.1.2; 2.4.8.18; 3.3.5.37; 4.4.12.16; 5.2.2.10; 6.7.3.4; 6.8.3.3, 5.2.3, 6, passim; 6.9.6.40.

willingly (ἐκοι): see will.

wishing (θελησις): Used mainly for the One to indicate its perfectly unimpeded or unmediated activity. Often close in meaning to will, sometimes also used for the One. See 6.8.13.27, 30, 38, 45, 16.22, 23, 18.42.
wisdom (φρόνησις): also, practical wisdom. Often used synonymously with σοφία. Sometimes, φρόνησις and σοφία are contrasted, where they are rendered ‘practical wisdom’ and ‘theoretical wisdom’. In this case, the former is viewed as an application of the latter. See 1.2.1.8, 6.12; 1.3.5.7, 6.10; 1.6.6.2; 2.3.18.7; 2.9.5.6; 3.6.6.17; 4.2.2.48; 4.4.11.23 24, 28, 12.6 47; 4.7.10.16; 5.8.2.39; 6.6.18.20 33; 6.8.16.36.
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