-*>

LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Recetied Accessions No. &* Shelf No.

OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE

A DISCOURSE

BY NATHANIEL CULVERWEL, M.A

it

EDITED BY JOHN BROWN, D.D.

EDINBURGH.

WITH A CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE DISCOURSE

BY JOHN CAIRNS, MA.

BERWICK-ON-TWEED.

OP THE

UNIVERSITY

EDINBURGH: THOMAS CONSTABLE AND CO. HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO., LONDON.

MDCCCLVIT.

C730f

I £5 7

" NOBIS RES SALUBRIS VIDETUB ET IMPBIMI8 UTILIS, SI TEACTATU8 IN8TI- TUATUR SOBRJUS ET DILIGENS, QUI DE USU RATIONIS HUMANE IN THEOLOQICIS

PR^CIPIAT. EJUSMODI TRACT ATUM INTER DESIDERATA PONIMUS." — Bacon.

EDINBOB6H : T. CONSTABLE, PHINTER TO HER MAJESTY.

TO

HENRY ROGERS, ESQ.,

IN TOKEN OF THE EDITOR'S GRATITUDE

FOR THE INSTRUCTION AND DELIGHT

DERIVED FROM HIS WRITINGS.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

THE EDITOR'S PREFACE, . . . . ix

CRITICAL ESSAY ON ' THE DISCOURSE OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE,' . xxxi ORIGINAL DEDICATION, ..... 3

DR. DlLLINGHAM TO THE READER, ..... 5

RlCHARD CULVERWEL TO THE READER, ... 9

DISCOURSE OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE, . . . .17

NOTES.

A. — CULVERWEL AND ROGERS RECONCILED, . . , .281

B. — REFERENCE BY HOWE, . . . 283

C. — SELDEN, GROTIUS, AND SALMASIUS, . . 283

D.— THE THREE DURANDS, . 283

E.— SUAREZ, . . 284

F. — ETERNAL LAW — SUAREZ, HALLAM, HOOKER, . . . 284

G. — MAIMONIDES, . . . . . . 285

H.— THE TWO VASQUEZ, ... 285

I. — ARBOR IN VERSA, .... .285

J.— SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, .... .286

K.— CARDANO, . 286

L. —THE FOUR ZABARELLAS, ... . 286

viii CONTENTS.

PAGE

M.— CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONS, . 287 -

N.-NEMESIUS, . . 287

0. — EUGUBINE, . 287

P.— PSELLUS, 289

Q. — ZANCHIUS,

R.— THE TWO PICI OF MIRANDOLA, . 289

S. — AVERROES, . . • 289

T PROSPER, . 289

ADDITIONAL NOTE ARMINIANISM— ANTINOMIANISM, . 290

INDEX.

I.— OF NAMES AND THINGS, . 291

II. — OF TEXTS OF SCRIPTURE REFERRED TO, ... 297

IVER5ITY

THE PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

DURING the latter half of the sixteenth century, under the wise but arbitrary civil sway of the Maiden Queen, and the not less arbitrary, but much less wise ecclesiastical rule of Parker, and Grindal, and Whitgift, metropolitans of England, there lived in London a wealthy merchant citizen, Nicolas Culverwel, or, as it is sometimes written, Culverel, who, if we may judge from the history of his family, was, like many of his compeers, a devoted adherent to Puritanism ; a circumstance which, when we consider how much that form of religion was discountenanced both by royal and episcopal authority, and how serious were the dangers and sacrifices to which its rich professors were especially ex- posed, must be allowed to be a presumption, at least, that Nicolas was a sincere, earnest man.1

Two of his daughters were married to distinguished Puritan ministers ; one to Dr. Lawrence Chadderton, who was chosen by Sir Walter Mildmay, the founder of Ema- nuel College, Cambridge, to be the first master of that

1 Clark's Lives at the end of his Martyrology.

a

x PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

institution, which, under his care, soon took so high a place among its academical sisters. From his modesty, which equalled his learning, Dr. Chadderton was extremely reluctant to accept a situation so high and responsible, and complied only on Sir Walter saying, e If you will not be the master, sir, I will not be the founder of the college/ a

Another daughter became the wife of a still more cele- brated man, Dr. William Whitaker, the nephew of Nowel, Dean of St. Paul's, and, in succession, Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, and Master of St. John's College, in that University, whom Cardinal Bellar- mine is said to have pronounced ( the most learned heretic he had ever read ;' and of whom Bishop Hall says, c Who ever saw him without reverence, or heard him without wonder ?'2

A third daughter, the spouse of ' Mr. Thomas Gouge, a pious gentleman/ was the mother of Dr. William Gouge, for nearly half a century the venerated minister of Black- friars, in London, author of a Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, in a folio volume of immense size, a member of the Westminster Assembly, and the father of Thomas Gouge, the nonconformist and philanthropist, the memory of whose rare excellence Archbishop Tillotson, so much to his own honour, has embalmed in a funeral sermon, describ- ing him as c having left far behind him all he ever knew in cheerful, unwearied diligence in acts of pious charity ;

1 Brook's Lives oftJte Puritans, ii. 446 ; Fuller's Hist, of Cambridge, 147.

2 Churton's Life of Nowel, p. 64 ; Clark's Ecc. Hist., p. 816, and pp. 15-17 ; Wood's Ath. Ox., vol. i. p. 303 ; Leigh on Religion and Learning, p. 363.

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR. xi

having a singular sagacity and prudence in devising the most effectual ways of doing good, and in managing his charity to the best purposes, and to the greatest extent/1

Two of his sons, Ezekiel and Samuel, devoted themselves to the Christian ministry. Of Samuel we know nothing, but what Clark tells us, that he was ' a famous preacher.'

Of Ezekiel we know a little more, but still we have but scanty information respecting him. He was educated under the care of his brother-in-law, Dr. Chadderton, at Emanuel's, Cambridge. That College was then commonly called ' the Puritan College/ It owed its name, it is said, to a remarkable conversation between Queen Elizabeth and its founder. l Sir Walter/ said the Queen, with cha- racteristic haughtiness, c I hear you have erected a Puritan foundation at Cambridge/ c Madam,' said Sir Walter, ' far be it from me to countenance anything contrary to your Majesty's established laws; but I have set an acorn, which, when it becomes an oak, God alone knows what will be the fruit thereof/ Its growth was rapid, and its produce rich ; for the quaint Fuller says, ' Sure I am, it has overshadowed all the University ; more than a moiety of the present masters of colleges having been bred therein/

After finishing his university studies, Ezekiel became in succession Kector of Stambridge and Vicar of Felsted, in the hundreds of Essex, of which Sympson says, i In regard of air unhealthful ; yet that air was so sweetened with the savoury breath of the Gospel, that they were termed " the holy land/' ' During his last incumbency, we learn that

1 Middlettin's Biog. Evang. iii. 267 ; Clark's Lives; Tillotson's Sermons, Ser. xxiii.

xii PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

he was honoured to be the instrument of the conversion of his nephew William Gouge, then at the free school of Felsted j1 and that, in 1583, he was prosecuted for noncon- formity, and suspended for some time, by Bishop Aylmer, for not wearing the surplice.2

Dr. William Gouge, in an address to the Christian reader, prefixed to the seventh edition of the Treatise on Faith, says of his uncle, that < God sent Ezekiel Culverwel, as of old he sent Ezekiel Buzi, to set forth the promises of God more plentifully and pertinently than ever before ; and that to breed faith where it is not, to strengthen it where it is weak, to settle it where it wavereth, to repair it where it decayeth, to apply it aright to every need, to extend it to sanctification as well as to justification, and to point out the singular use of it in matters temporal, spiritual, and eternal/ l What I say of him, I know of him ; for from mine infancy have I known him, and under his ministry was I trained up in my younger years, he being at least two-and-twenty years older than myself/ ' Among other evidences of the power of God's word among them (Mr. Culverwers people), I will record one, a very remarkable one, and worthy to be had in more frequent use. It was this : In time of great dearth of corn and other food, there was order taken by public authority, that every family should forbear one meal in the week, and upon the Lord's day bring the value of it to the collectors for the poor. This being faithfully performed by them all, therewith they did provide good corn, which cost eighty-nine shillings the bushel, and sold it to the poor at twelvepence the peck.

1 Clark ; Middleton, ut sup. 2 Brook, ut sup.

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR. xiii

and yet reserved a good stock to set the poor on with/ ' He was many years/ says Dr. Sibbs, ' God's prisoner under the gout and stone ; such diseases as will allow but little liberty to them that are arrested and tortured by them. So fruitful an expense of time in so weak and worn-out a body, is seldom seen. Scarce any one came to him but went away better than they came. God gave him much strength of spirit to uphold his spirit from sinking under the strength of such diseases/1

The time of his death is not exactly known. His book, entitled A Treatise on Faith, was printed 1623 ; and he lived to publish a defence of it against the charge of Armi- nianism, in a small pamphlet, 1626. He was certainly dead when Dr. Sibbs published his Time well spent in Sacred Meditations ; Divine Observations and Heavenly Exhor- tations, 1635 ; and he must have been an old man when he died, as Dr. Sibbs says of that little book, that it was ' begun about forty years ago/ His only other writings are entitled, A Eeady Way to remember the Scriptures, said by Brook to have been printed 1637; and a small tract of twenty pages, entitled, The Way to a Blessed State in this Life. His Treatise on Faith seems to have been popular, for it reached a seventh edition in 1633. It was highly esteemed by Mr. Kobert Blair, who in his memoirs 2 says, that ' he was thereby much confirmed/ and is still worthy of perusal. Dr. Sibbs describes him as c a man very well experienced in all the ways of God / and Fuller classes him among ( the learned writers of Emanuel College/ but c no fellow/

1 Dedication of Time Well Spent,

2 Life of Robert Blair. Wodrow Soc., Edinburgh, p. 32.

a 2

xiv PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

< One generation goeth and another cometh.' There appears now a second race of Culverwels on the stage, but in what relation they stood to those who preceded them is doubtful. There is Nathanael, the author of The Dis- course of the Light of Nature; there is Richard, his brother, who subscribes a short address ' to the Courteous Reader/ prefixed to that discourse ; and there is a William, of whom we know only, that about the time Nathanael was a Fellow of Emanuel College, Cambridge, he was a Fellow of Trinity College in that University, and tutor to a Mr. Robert Blunt, who was ejected from a living in Northumberland, for nonconformity, in 1662.1 The name is uncommon, and he might be a cousin, if not a brother, of Nathanael and Richard. These seem to have been sons either of Samuel or of Ezekiel, probably of the latter.

We know that Nathanael died in 1650 or 1651, and that he died young, but we have no means of fixing the time of his birth. It is plain, however, from what has been stated, that he had c an honourable descent, and came of a stock of eminent preachers/ From information kindly obtained from the College books by a member of the University, it appears that he entered Emanuel College, Cambridge, as a pensioner in 1633, when he probably did not exceed eighteen years of age.2 He took his degree of B.A. in 1636, and of M.A. in 1640. He was chosen a Fellow, but when we know not ; and for some time before his death he had been a regular preacher in the chapel of his college.

1 Palmer, iii. 75 ; Calamy, iii. 504.

2 Howe was only seventeen when he was admitted as a sizar of Christ Church College, Cambridge.— Rogers's Life of Howe, p. 23.

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR. Xv

The master of the college, for some time previous to Culver wel's death, was Dr. Anthony Tuckney, who * had a considerable hand in the preparation of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms,'1 and whose candour and learn- ing, as well as zeal for orthodoxy, are strikingly manifested in his correspondence with Dr. Whichcote. Dr. Whichcote was a Fellow of Emanuel when Culverwel entered it, and continued so till 1644, when he became Provost of King's College, so that he may have been Culverwers tutor. Henry More became a student in Christ Church College two years before ; and John Smith, who had Whichcote for his tutor, joined Emanuel College two years after Cul- verwel. Smith died two years after him; so that con- sidering their congeniality of mind, they could scarcely miss being intimate. Dr. Ralph Cud worth was his con- temporary for seven or eight years at Emanuel's. Jere- miah Burroughs, and Dr. Wallis, afterwards Professor of Mathematics, were also fellow-students.

From Mount Ebal (p. 89), it is obvious that Nathanael was a decided Parliament-man, and a friend of the Solemn League and Covenant. He calls on his audience to * bless God for men of public spirit, Zerubbabels and Jehoshuas — such as are building God a temple ;' puts them in mind of their sacramental vows to maintain the cause of God ; and adds, ' You cannot but remember a late vow you have made too, the very sum of which was this, to stand for the public good/

1 Palmer, i. 266. It deserves notice, that, notwithstanding this, the Doctor voted against imposing subscription to the Confession as the term of ministerial communion. — Letters between Dr. Tuckney and Dr. Whichcote, published by Slater at the end of Whichcote's Aphorisms.

xvi PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

Some dark hints in his brother's address ' To the Reader/ seem to indicate that he had been characterized by something in his manner, which was misconstrued by some into haughtiness, and which is traced apparently to mental aberration, or some rather severe and uncommon bodily affliction, from which he did not recover. The pas- sage referred to is as follows : c I must say of him dvOpw- TTIVOV TI eTraOev. And as it is hard for men to be under

Lukexiii.2,4. affliction, but they are liable to censures, so it fared with him, who was looked upon by some, as one whose eyes were lofty, and whose eyelids lifted up, who bare himself too high upon a conceit of his parts ; although they that knew him intimately, are most willing to be his compur- . gators in this particular. Thus prone are we to think the staff under the water crooked, though we know it to be straight. However, turn thine eyes inward, and censure not thine own fault so severely in others. Cast not the first stone, except thou find thyself without this fault ; dare not to search too curiously into the avej-iyyidcnovs 6801/5 of God ; but rather learn that lesson of the Apostle's

Rom. xii. 3. in that elegant paronomasy, Mr) vTrepfypovelv Trap o Set typoveiv, d\\a (ppoveiv et? TO o-ayfypovelv? Dillingham, in the dedication to Tuckney, acknowledges his kindness to the author, c especially when he lay under the discipline of so sad a providence / and in his address £ To the Reader/ speaks of God c having chastised him somewhat sharply/

Such are all the notices, few and fragmentary as they are, which I have been able to glean from numerous quarters, respecting one who plainly held a high place as a man of genius, learning, eloquence, and piety, in the

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR. xvii

estimation of those who knew him best, and whose ' noble and gallant abilities' will not readily be questioned by any who, with the necessary information, have perused with due attention the little volume in which is enshrined all of his mind and heart which has been left among mortals.

Of Kichard Culverwel, the sum of what we know is, that he obtained the living of Grundisburgh, in Suffolk, during the Protectorate ; that he conformed in 1662, and continued there till his death in the year of the Revolu- tion, 1688.1

Soon after Nathanael Culverwel's death, Dr. William Dillingham (of whom I know nothing, but that he suc- ceeded to the Mastership of Emanuers when Dr. Tuckney was made Master of St. John's, and that he is said to have been the author of a translation into Latin of the West- minster Confession and Catechisms, published in 1655, and reprinted in 1659 ;2 from his not appearing either in Brook's list of Puritans, or Palmer's of Nonconformists, I conjec- ture him to have been a Conformist in 1662) published

1 This information I owe to the kindness of the Rev. Henry More of Lowestoft, Suffolk, the author of a very just and elegant estimate of Culver- wel and his work in the Evangelist, vol. i. pp. 375-377. The Rev. G. E. Webster, present Rector of Grundisburgh, has kindly furnished a copy of Richard Culverwel's epitaph. It is inscribed on a black marble slab, within the rails of the communion-table, on the north side, and is surmounted by a coat-of-arms : ' Here resteth the body of Richard Culverwel, who was minister of this parish for 40 years. He dyed the 4th of April 1688. Aged 67.'

2 A Mr. Thomas Dillingham, of Dean, is among the ministers summoned for the Westminster Assembly; but he is marked by Neal among those who 'did not appear at all.' — Hist, of the Pur. vol. ii. p. 47. Lond. 1822. As the name is not a common one, he was probably a relation of Dr. William.

xviii PREFACE OF THE EDITOR,

in 1651, a discourse of Mr. Culver weFs on 1st Corinthians xiii. 12, entitled Sacred Optics, which, being unfinished, seems to have been the last sermon he delivered in the College Chapel. The concluding words are, when the circumstances are taken into account, strikingly impres- sive : ' Thus have we shown you the several glasses through which "we see but darkly." There remains the visio recta, a sight of God " face to face," to " know as we are known." But of this hereafter/ The editor adds this distich, —

'What this "to know as we are known" should be, The author could not tellt but's gone to see.'

The intention of this publication was, as the editor says, 4 only for a taste, and to bear the mace into the world before that learned and elegant treatise, which the ingeni- ous author has left behind him, concerning the light of nature/ The reception of this little treatise was so favour- able, that within the course of less than a year, CulverweFs Eemains were published under the same editorship, with the title of ' An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, with several other Treatises : viz.. The Schism, The Act of Oblivion, The Child's Keturn, The Panting Soul, Mount Ebal, The White Stone, Spiritual Optics, The Worth of Souls. By Nathanael Culverwel, Master of Arts, and lately Fellow of Emanuel College, in Cambridge. Imprimatur, Edm. Calamy. 4to, 1652/ The Discourse of the Light of Nature fills 215 pages. There are three other editions — one in 1654, another in 1661, and another printed at Oxford in 1669. The first

PREFACE OF THE EDITOK. six

of these has been supposed to be surreptitious. The paper and print are greatly inferior to the edition of 1652, and it is ridiculously inaccurate. In the title-page, fo is printed for of, arid imrimatur for imprimatur ; and in the short dedication, father for farther, and wroth for worth. Ex pede disce — The fact that four editions, even though they should not have been large ones, were required in seven- teen years, and one of these it may be a pirated one,1 dis- tinctly indicates that the work at its appearance had a considerable measure of popularity. Since 1669, I am not aware that the volume has been reprinted. An edition of the White Stone was printed some years ago.

The book can scarcely be called rare in the bibliogra- phers' sense, for it frequently appears in booksellers'

1 On comparing carefully the second, and third, and fourth editions, I think the probability is that they are all genuine. In the second edition, not- withstanding its press blunders, some more important oversights of editing in the first are corrected. Both the second and third editions are printed with the same letter, not however page for page ; the paper of the third and fourth is even inferior to that of the second. Some, only some of the archa- isms of the spelling are corrected ; while in other cases a worse spelling is adopted, as Cambridg for Cambridge. The imprint of the second edition is, ' LONDON, printed by T. B. and E. M. for John Mothwel, at the Fountain and Bear in Cheap-side, in Gold-smiths-row. 1654:' of the third edition, 1 LONDON, printed by Tlio. Eoycroft for Mary Rothwell, at the Bear and Fountain, in Gold-smiths-row, in Cheapside, 1661:' of the fourth edition, 1 OXFORD, printed for Tho. Williams, and are to be sold by Henry Dymock, Bookseller in Oxford. Anno Dom. 1669.' In the second edition, the dis- course extends to 183 pages; in the third, it only reaches 175. The pagina- tion of the fourth edition corresponds with that of the third. There is no substantial difference in the four editions, though the first is incomparably superior in appearance to the other three. From there being a change made in the close of Eichard Culverwel's address ' To the Reader/ in the third edition, such as would have occurred to none but an author, I think it likely that that edition was printed under his care. The four editions have been carefully compared in preparing the present edition for the press.

•

logues ; but it

v unknown. I '' * -n of

meeting witn a commendatory mention of the book in some writer of a period not long subsequent to that of the author ; but after tasking my faculty of reminiscence to the uttermost, I cannot call up the name. I am not aware of having seen it quoted but by myself,1 though it abounds in passages well worthy of being quoted, and singularly fit for quotation ; nor of seeing it referred to in later writ- ings, except in one instance, where the name of the author is not given, by one who, "with a wider and yet more dis- tinct view of the whole subject of Culverwel's principal work, has given so powerful a delineation of c The Claims and Conflicts of Keason and Faith/2 The only bibliogra- phical sketch of the work is that excellent one in The Evangelist, by the Kev. Henry More, already referred to.

Many of the minor articles in the volume are of high merit. In every one of them are to be found passages of great beauty and power ; but there can be no doubt, that the Discourse of the Light of Nature, which now, after an interval of nearly two hundred years, we reproduce, as it is the longest, is, both as to thought and composition, by far the best of Culverwel's works.

That this work should have, on its first appearance, ex- cited the degree of interest, which three editions in ten years, four in less than twenty, indicate, is not at all won- derful. It may seem more difficult to account for its having so soon sunk into comparative oblivion, and so long continued so. Evidence that it has so sunk is abun-

1 Expos, of 1st Ptter, i. 368. 2 Rogers's Essays, iii. 174.

PKEFACE OF THE EDITOR. xxi

dant. It is not referred to by Baxter in his Life and Times. Doddridge does not mention it in his list of books on Christian Ethics, nor Kippis his editor. It does not appear in the ample list appended to Dr. Edward Williams's Christian Preacher. It is not noticed by either Dugald Stewart or Sir James Mackintosh, in their dissertations. And Hallam, who has seen and read so many books, does not seem to have met with this, else he could hardly have said, that ' Cumberland/ whose work De Legibus was not published till 1672, was 'the first Christian writer who sought to establish systematically the principles of moral right independent of revelation/1

What is perhaps still more remarkable, Nathanael Cul- verwel's name does not appear in Fuller's History in the list of c the learned writers' of Emanuel College, whether ( Fellows ' or ( no Fellows/ though, as we have remarked, that of Ezekiel, an immeasurably inferior man, does. I have not found his name in any biographical dictionary ; nor is he mentioned by Brook or Calamy, or Palmer or Bogue and Bennet. Dyer and Granger, and Noble and Brydges, have been examined in vain. His posthumous work is noticed by Watt and Darling, and that is all.

The causes why a book so instinct with literary life — a book which, if the world were but aware of its worth, they certainly would c not willingly let die ' — should have run so obvious a risk of being forgotten, are not however far to seek. There was but little taste for such disquisitions among the body of theologians with whom Culverwel's Calvinism, Puritanism, and deep spiritual religion con-

1 Hallam, iii. 400. b

xxii PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

nected him. Among the great men of that party, I do not know of more than Howe, and perhaps Bates, who could completely sympathize with him. Among their Dii Minorum Gentium, I can think only of Trueman, and still more of Shaw1 (whose Immanuel breathes a spirit very like John Smith's, only more thoroughly baptized into the name of Christ), as men who would have found in Cul- verwel's peculiarities a recommendation of his writings.

It is not indistinctly intimated, both by Dr. Dillingham and Mr. Eichard Culverwel, that Nathanael was an object of suspicion with some of his party ; and I think there are symptoms of this feeling in Dr. Tuckney's letters to Whichcote, though the name of Culverwel, who was just dead when these letters were written, is not mentioned. On the other hand, those who, from their literary tastes and philosophical leanings, were most likely to take an interest in The Discourse, and were capable of appreciat- ing and relishing its rare excellences, were divided from the author by a great gulf of difference in religious and political opinion, widened by prejudices, of the strength of which we, whose lot has been cast in better times, can form but an inadequate estimate.

The book, besides, from the strangely mosaic appear- ance it exhibits, in consequence of the innumerable Greek and Latin citations, to say nothing of Hebrew, with which the text is inlaid, was singularly unattractive. The

1 Trueman, Shaw, and Bates, were all Cambridge men ; the first of Clare- hall, and the second of St. John's College ; Dr. Bates's college is not men- tioned. They entered the University between 1640 and 1650, so that they probably might be among Culverwel's hearers, and imbibe in some measure his spirit.

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR. xxiii

familiarity the author discovers equally with the classics, the fathers, and the schoolmen, is marvellous :

' He knew each lane, and every alley green, Dingle, or bushy dell, of this wide wood ; And every bosky bourne from side to side, His daily walks, and ancient neighbourhood.'

As but few of these citations are translated, to the ordinary English reader The Discourse ' was a sealed book ;' while so recondite are many of them, especially as separated from their context, that even a scholar, in perus- ing the book, would require such frequent recourse to his lexicon, as to make it anything but light and pleasant reading.

Add to all this, the work bears proof that it is posthu- mous, and obviously has owed but little to editorial care. Perhaps the proper duty of an editor was at that time not so well understood as it now is. But assuredly Dr. Dil- lingham appears to have taken his work very easily. With the exception of the Latin and the Greek, which, generally speaking, are accurately printed, little attention appears to have been paid to the correction of the press. Sentences arid paragraphs are often divided from, or run into, one another, in a way which at once injures the beauty of the composition, and obscures the course and connexion of thought.

The design of the treatise is well enough described by the original editor thus : l The design of the Discourse of the Light of Nature was, on the one hand, to vindicate the use of reason, in matters of religion, from the aspersions and prejudices of some weaker ones in those times, who.

xxiv PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

having entertained erroneous opinions, which they were no way able to defend, were taught by their more cunning seducers to wink hard, and except against all offensive weapons ; so, on the other hand, to chastise the sauciness of Socinus and his followers, who dare set Hagar above her mistress, and make faith wait at the elbow of corrupt and distorted reason — to " take off the head of that uncir- cumcised Philistine with his own sword," but better sharp- ened, and then to lay it up behind the ephod in the sanc- tuary. An enterprise, I confess, of no small import ; which yet, he hoped, with God's assistance to have effected, by giving unto reason the things that are reason's, and unto faith the things that are faith's. And had the world been favoured with his longer life, the height of his parts, and the earnest he gave, had bespoken very ample expectations in those who knew and heard him. But it pleased God, having first melted him with His love, and then chastised him, though somewhat sharply, to take him to Himself; from the contemplation of the light of nature, to the enjoy- ment of one supernatural, that </>&>? airpoairov — light in- accessible, which none can see and live, and to translate him from snuffing a candle here to be made partaker of the inheritance of the saints in light. So that all that he finished towards that undertaking was this Discourse of the Light of Nature in general, not descending so low as to show how the moral law was founded in it, or that gospel- revelation doth not extinguish it. Wherein, if, standing in the midst between two adversaries of extreme persua- sions, while he opposes the one, he seems to favour the other more than is meet ; when thou shalt observe him, at

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR. xxv

another time, to declare as much against the other, thou wilt then be of another mind. Judge candidly, and take his opinion, as thou wouldst do his picture, sitting; — not from a luxuriant expression, wherein he always allowed for the shrinking, but from his declared judgment when he speaks professedly of such a subject. For instance, if any expression seem to lift reason up too high, you may, if you please, otherwise hear it confess and bewail its own weak- ness (chap, xii.) ; you may see it bow the head and worship, and then lay itself down quietly at the feet of faith (chap, xviii.) So that, if thou read but the whole discourse, thou wilt easily perceive, as himself would often affirm, that he abhorred the very thought of advancing the power of Nature into the throne of free grace, or by the light of nature [reason] in the least measure to eclipse that of faith.'1

It is not my purpose to enter on the discussion of the merits of the Discourse as an exercise in ethical philo- sophy. That will be done immediately to good purpose, by one who, from the course of his studies, as well as for a deeper reason, is better able than I am to deal with such a subject. I may be permitted, however, to remark, that to form a fair estimate of the merit of the work, and the genius of its author, it is necessary to recollect, that it was published before any of the great works on morals, which illustrated the literature of England during the last half of the seven- teenth century, had appeared. Dillingham informs us that it was written six years before the author's death, that is, about the year 1646. Now Jeremy Taylor's Ductor Dubi- tantium, Cumberland's De Legibus, and Cud worth's Intel-

» Pp. 8, 9. 6 2 *

xxvi PKEFACE OF THE EDITOR.

lectual System, were all published posterior to this; the first in 1660, the second in 1672, and the third in 1678.1

Though he could not have read the works of that l set of men' at Cambridge, ' who/ as Burnet2 says, c studied to assert and examine the principles of morality on clear grounds, and in a philosophic method/ he no doubt en- joyed the advantage of frequent and intimate intercourse with some of them ; and though he differed from these great men on points of the quinquarticular controversy, he obviously had read the same books, cultivated the same studies, and cherished the same enlightened liberal spirit. It would be difficult to believe that John Howe, who en- tered the University in 1647, was not a great admirer of Culverwel, then one of the most celebrated of the university preachers ; and that his influence, fully as much as that of More or Smith, contributed to turn Howe's congenerous mind to those studies which gave his writings a character so different from that of any of those of the other great Nonconformists. Traces of Culverwel are to be found in Howe's works.

It only remains that I say a few words in reference to the manner in which this edition of the Discourse of the Light of Nature has been prepared for republication.

The citations from books in foreign tongues have gener- ally been put into the foot-margin, and translations have taken their place in the text; so executed, I trust, as to leave little or no trace of the fact, that a distance of two centuries intervened between the author and the translator,

1 Hallam, iii. 2 Life and Times, vol. i. p. 188, fol. ed.

i

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR. xxvii

Considerable paiiis have been bestowed on properly placing the points, and dividing the paragraphs.

While the author's language has been scrupulously re- tained, the archaic and irregular orthography has been modernized and made uniform ; and some affected collo- quial abbreviations, which deform the writings of some of the authors of this period, have been removed. Indeed, anything more with regard to the language would have been worse than supererogatory. The style is admirable for its perspicuity, force, and elegance ; and scarcely any either of the words or forms of expression, f turns of phrase/ as Hallam calls them, have, through the mutations of language during two centuries, become obsolete. So much for the advantage of a man writing unaffectedly and in earnest, on a subject he understands, and with the im- portance of which, deeply impressed himself, he wishes to impress others.

Almost the only fault of the style is that referred to by Mr. More in his Critique — a superabundance of figurative expression. It is, as he says, to a great extent c a book of poesie in prose compiled/ This dulce vitium may, no doubt, be carried too far ; but in Culverwel's pages, as well as in Bacon's, figures body forth abstract thought more accurately, as well as more agreeabl}7, than the most literal expressions could. Indeed Dillinghani's encomium scarcely passes the bounds of truth, when he calls this little book, 1 cloth of gold' ' weaved of sunbeams/ Culverwel was cer- tainly an exception to Dr. Hey's sweeping charge, that 'the Puritans were void of what we call taste and elegance/1

1 Lectures, book iv. art. xx. sec. 1.

xxviii PREFACE OP THE EDITOR.

In the former editions, there are few if any references. It has been found impossible to verify all the citations, and to give in every case the correct reference ; but a good deal has been done in this way, at an expense of time and trouble which I would almost blush to specify.

A few notes, chiefly in reference to some of the authors referred to, have been added. It would have been absurd to give notices of the leading philosophers of antiquity, as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, or of the Greek and Eoman Classical Authors, or of the great Fathers of the Church, or even of the more distinguished schoolmen, such as Aquinas, Scotus, Anselm, and Bradwardine, or of those men nearer the author's own age, who have secured for themselves a high and enduring place in the remembrance of all generations, such as the two Bacons — the Friar and the Chancellor — Selden, Grotius, and Hooker ; but in the present age, when a taste for such compositions as The Discourse of the Light of Nature is diffused far beyond the limits of academic education or professional scholar- ship, many will find it convenient to have an introduction to some of Culverwel's familiar acquaintance, to whom even the scholars of our times are all but strangers, and of whom the great body of readers have never heard the names : such as Suarez and Vasquez, Nemesius and Zaba- rella, Averroes and Prosper. For all the notes I am answerable — for Dillingham's edition is as unencumbered with these as the original texts of the Greek or Latin classics. It would have been an advantage to have had a few annotations written at the time. It would have saved a subsequent editor much trouble, and might have given

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

xxix

light to some expressions and references, which after all his attempts may still seem obscure.

In committing the work to the press, though I do not count on making what is called an impression on the public, I do indulge the hope that Culverwel, on his re- appearance, will find an audience, if not more meet than that which welcomed his original appearance, at any rate ultimately more numerous ; and my hope rests on the con- viction, that, on the one hand, the lovers of ethical science will not be deterred from the perusal of so admirable a treatise, because its author was a Calvinist and a Puritan ; and, on the other, that these interesting studies have now no more enlightened and devoted cultivators than are to be found among the inheritors of Culverwel's faith and spirit. Earnestly do I desire that, in his case, the proverb may be verified : ' Suum cuique decus posteritas rependet.' His claim has long been in abeyance.

The time and labour bestowed on this work, in which I have gratefully to acknowledge the assistance of kind friends,1 1 have not grudged ; for to use language, which I rather think is borrowed, though I know not from whence, ' I have felt as if I were doing an act of justice to long-overlooked merit, of a very high order ; and as at the

1 Next to the friend who has added so largely to the value of this volume, by furnishing a critique, every way worthy of The Discourse, my acknow- ledgments are due to my two esteemed kinsmen, Mr. John Brown of North Leith, and Mr. Robert Johnston, one of the Masters of Mill Hill School, Middlesex. I have also been indebted for useful hints, in conducting my in- vestigations into the history of Culverwel and his works, to my ancient and esteemed friend, Principal Lee ; hints which few but himself could have given.

xxx PREFACE OF THE EDITOR.

same time conferring a favour on the literary and religious public, by calling their attention to what needs only to be read to be acknowledged a work of great beauty and solid worth/

The other remains of Nathanael Culverwel, which, though bearing the strong impress of his genius and learning, are more fitted for the edification of ordinary Christians than The Discourse, have undergone a revision which, not less than the discourse, they greatly required. Their republication will in some measure depend on the reception which the present volume may receive.

ARTHUR LODGE, July 1857.

CRITICAL ESSAY.

THE work here reprinted is chiefly remarkable on three grounds, as a literary curiosity, as a monument of philo- sophical genius, and as a masterly discussion of the subject of which it treats, hardly surpassed in the course of British Ethics. The history of the Author, with all that makes the book singular in its fortunes, has been so amply illus- trated by the Editor, that on that point nothing remains to be said. Nor can much be added respecting the writer's philosophical genius. I shall only touch on this subject, and then proceed to make some observations on the doctrines and principles, metaphysical, ethical, and theological, which entitle this unpretending and long-forgotten work to a conspicuous rank in philosophical literature.

While Culverwel, in point of philosophical genius, is visibly allied to the other Cambridge Platonists of his day, both in the cast of his speculation, and in the circle of his reading, there are points of marked distinction which are generally in his favour. His mind is much less bur- dened with the weight of his learning, which for his years is almost as vast as that of Cudworth himself. His reading

xxxii CRITICAL ESSAY.

also extends more impartially than theirs over the polite as well as the philosophical literature of antiquity ; and his sympathies are not only with the schoolmen but with the anti-scholastic writings of Descartes and Bacon, and the new growth of European philosophy under their influence. He is remarkably free from the prejudices of all schools. He is not insensible to the false idealism of Plato, and does not follow his compeers in aggravating the evil by Neo- platonic additions. While he defends ' the immortal name of Aristotle' against Bacon's unfounded charge of neglect- ing his predecessors, he is himself just to ( the great and noble Verularn/ ' that great advancer of learning/ Though a zealous Protestant, he is warm in his praise of the Jesuit Suarez ; and his strong convictions, as a Christian and a Puritan, do not repress his cordial appreciation of Lord Herbert of Cherbury. The soaring and passionate ideality of his nature, is tempered by something of the sound English judgment of Locke ; and his rich and glowing fancy, in which he differs from all the Cambridge school but Taylor, though not always controlled by perfect taste, is in general happily wedded to masculine vigour of spe- culation.

The style of Culverwel can hardly be praised for its singularity, in an age which already possessed the master- pieces of Bacon and Hooker, and was soon to number the works of Hobbes among the models of philosophical English prose. Here, however, he will not suffer by com- parison with any of the Cambridge school. Though loaded with quotations, and occasionally tinged with youthful re- dundancies, his expression is not only free and spirited,

CRITICAL ESSAY. xxxiji

but delicately accurate ; and not a few of his sayings de- serve to rank with the felicities of English literature. Take the following as examples : — ( Eeason is the first-born, but faith has the blessing/ ' I shall always reverence a grey-headed truth ; yet prefer reason, a daughter of eter- nity, before antiquity, which is the offspring of time.' ' The Stoics were a kind of Pharisees among the heathen/ i The Sceptics pretend to more ignorance than they have, nay, than they are capable of; they would take time to consider, and no less than their lifetime/ ' Transubstan- tiation, that cloud and heap of contradictions, doth very compendiously put out the eyes of sense and reason both at once/

In endeavouring to form some estimate of Culverwel's views and opinions as relative to the development of English speculation in metaphysics, ethics, and theology, it is almost necessary to take them out of their original framework, as parts of a set of academic sermons on that text of Pro- verbs, which declares the understanding of a man to be ' the candle of the Lord/ No little strained ingenuity, it must be confessed, is displayed by the author in drawing out the parallel between the light of Nature, and that of a candle ; and this is the weakest side of the performance. But if the reader will disregard this accommodation to the defective taste of the times, he will find in this somewhat fanciful and' immethodical discussion — first, of what the light of Nature is ; and then, secondly, of how it resembles that of a candle — a series of most important utterances upon all the fundamental questions of philosophy and theology. These may be arranged under three heads,

c

xxxiv CRITICAL ESSAY.

the theory of knowledge, the theory of conscience, and the theory of faith.

I. In regard to the theory of knowledge, we find already in Culverwel that balance and equipoise between the sen- sationalist and intellectualist extremes, at which specula- tion has now with tolerable unanimity arrived. His whole treatise is an assertion of the existence of original elements of knowledge, both speculative and practical. This asser- tion is made with sunlike clearness, especially in the be- ginning of Chap. VII. c There are stamped and printed upon the being of man some clear and indelible principles, some first and alphabetical notions, by putting together of which it can spell out the law of nature/ c All the fresh springs of common and fountain notions are in the soul of man, for the watering of his essence, for the refreshing of this heavenly plant, this arbor inversa, this enclosed being, this garden of God. And though the wickedness of man may stop the pleasant motion, the clear and crystalline progress of the fountain, yet they cannot hinder the first risings, the bubbling endeavours of it. They may pull off nature's leaves, and pluck off her fruit, and chop off her branches, but yet the root of it is eternal, the foundation of it is inviolable/ ' You must not, nor cannot think that nature's law is confined and contracted within the compass of two or three common notions, as with one foot it fixes a centre, so with the other it measures and spreads out a circumference ; it draws several conclusions, which do all meet and crowd into these first and central principles. As in those noble mathematical sciences there are not only some first alTr^ara, which are granted as soon as asked,

CRITICAL ESSAY. xxxv

if not before, but there are also whole heaps of firm and immovable demonstrations that are built upon them. In the very same manner, nature has some postulata, some TrpoXrj^lreis, which Seneca renders prcesumptiones, which others call anticipationes animi, which she knows a rational being will presently and willingly yield unto ; and therefore by virtue of these it does engage and oblige it to all such commands, as shall by just result, by genuine production, by kindly and evident derivation flow from these' (pp. 81, 82). While these, and many similar expressions, guarantee the strength of Culverwel's adherence to the doctrine of a priori knowledge, he opposes the doctrine of connate species or innate ideas, as strongly as Locke himself; and affirms, that without the suggesting influence of sense and experi- ence, our fundamental beliefs or primary notions would never come into consciousness. He ridicules the Platonic theory of pre-existence, and of knowledge brought ready made from an earlier consciousness ; and happily expresses the mingled truth and error of that celebrated doctrine in these words : ' The Platonists in this were commendable, that they looked on the spirit of man as " the candle of the Lord," though they were deceived in the time when it was lighted' (p. 132). In like manner, in words that very nearly coincide with Locke's doctrine, that reflection is a source of distinct ideas, he says, c No other innate light, but only the poiver and principle of knowing and reason- ing, is " the candle of the Lord" ' (p. 128). And the following passage contains the substance of Locke's polemic against innate ideas without its one-sidedness ; ' Had you such y notions as these when you first peeped into being ? at the

xxxvi CRITICAL ESSAY.

first opening of the soul's eye ? in the first exordium of infancy ? Had you these connate species in the cradle ? and were they rocked asleep with you ? or did you. then meditate upon these principles: " To turn est majus parte," and " Nihil potest esse et non esse simul ?" Never tell us that you wanted organical dispositions, for you plainly have recourse to the sensitive powers, and must needs sub- scribe to this, that all knowledge comes flourishing in at these lattices. Why else should not your candle enlighten you before ? Who was it that chained up and fettered your common notions ? Who was it that restrained and im- prisoned your connate ideas ?' c There is some time to be allowed for the promulgation of nature's law by the voice of reason. They must have some time to spell the vdpos ypaTTTo? that was of reason's writing. The mind having such gradual and climbing accomplishments, doth strongly evince that the true rise of knowledge is from the observ- ing and comparing of objects, and from thence extracting the quintessence of some such principles as are worthy of all acceptation, that have so much of certainty in them, that they are near to a tautology and identity ; for this first principles are' (pp. 125-127).

In these two sets of extracts it is made apparent, that Culverwel had distinctly before his mind the whole truth in regard to what Cousin has styled (not very happily) the logical and chronological origin of our knowledge respec- tively, and had thus laid hold of results which it required many years of controversy to harmonize. It is true, indeed, as Sir William Hamilton, in his celebrated Dissertation on Common Sense (Reid's Works, p. 782) has remarked,

CRITICAL ESSAY. xxxvii

that Culverwel was anticipated in these views by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, to whom he makes honourable allu- sion ; but there is evidence of independent and critical power, in his references to that author, which show any- thing but a blind adherence to him; and it must have presupposed the firmest grasp of these principles on their own authority, to unite Culverwel with Herbert, as to the metaphysical foundation, when they departed so widely from each other in respect of the theological superstruc- ture. Had Locke built on the comprehensive foundation laid by this earlier English school, or had he developed more consistently the admissions and concessions of his own system, he would have escaped the reproach of sen- sationalism, somewhat unjustly cast on him, and have opened a quite different career to European philosophy.

While Culverwel is thus clear as to the existence of original knowledge, and yet free from any mystical exag- geration in regard to its date, it must be acknowledged that he is less precise and satisfactory in laying down the marks by which it is discriminated. In this respect he is more vague and rhetorical than Lord Herbert, though per- haps a candid reader might deduce all the criteria relied on by the earlier writer, from the casual statements, as well as the figures and illustrations, of the later. Like Lord Herbert, he lays the chief stress on universal agree- ment as the test of original knowledge ; but this, like him, he bases on self-evidencing clearness or certainty: cWe cannot justly distrust, but that if there should new nations, nay, if there should new worlds appear, that every rational nature amongst them would comply with and embrace the

c2

xxxviii CRITICAL ESSAY.

several branches of this law ; and as they would not differ in those things that are intrinsical to sense, so neither in those that are essential to the understanding' (p. 116). The same view is thus rhetorically expanded, c Then look upon the diversities of nations, and there you will see a rough and barbarous Scythian, a wild American, an unpolished Indian, a superstitious Egyptian, a subtle Ethiopian, a cunning Arabian, a luxurious Persian, a treacherous Car- thaginian, a lying Cretian, an elegant Athenian, a wanton Corinthian, a desperate Italian, a fighting German, and many other heaps of nations, whose titles I shall now spare, and tell me whether it must not be some admirable and efficacious truth, that shall so overpower them all, as to pass current among them, and be owned and acknowledged by them7 (p. 113).

The deepest ground on which this certainty is made by Culverwel, as by Lord Herbert, to rest, is the impossi- bility of thinking at all without admitting these prin- ciples. This is admirably put in the following passage, which, however, is unjust to Descartes, who never meant anything so futile as to reduplicate on his own conscious- ness, but, like Culverwel himself, based knowledge on its ultimate clearness and certainty : c Sense is but the gate of certainty — the understanding is the throne of it. Des- cartes, the French philosopher, resolves all his assurance into thinking that he thinks, — why not into thinking that he sees ? and why may he not be deceived in that as in any other operations ? And if there be such a virtue in reflecting and reduplicating of it, then there will be more certainty in a super-reflexion, in thinking that he thinks

CRITICAL ESSAY. xxxix

that he thinks ; and so if he run in infinitum, according to his conceit, he will still have more certainty, though in reality he will have none at all, but will he fain to stop and stay in scepticism ; so that these refuges of lies being scattered, first principles and common notions, with those demonstrations that stream from them, they only remain, as the nerves of this assurance, as the souls of natural plerophory ; and he that will not cast anchor upon these, condemns himself to perpetual scepticism' (pp. 202, 203).

While universality and fundamental certainty are thus insisted on as criteria of primitive knowledge, there is no hint of that necessity (that is, objective necessity, or neces- sary connexion between the subject and predicate) which Leibnitz was the first to enounce as discriminating the truths of reason from those of experience ; and the great distinction of Kant between analytic or logical first truths, and synthetic or metaphysical, so far from being approached, is rather receded from in the unhappy statement of Cul- verwel, that first principles are ' near to a tautology and identity/

With all these abatements, and even allowing for its posteriority to Lord Herbert's De Veritate, this treatise of Culverwel must ever assert a prominent place in English speculation on the origin of knowledge, and the foundation of certainty.

II. In relation to the theory of conscience,, using the word in its widest sense, so as to include the theory of virtue, the work of Culverwel is not so marked and distinctive. Its doctrines are as just in morals as in metaphysics, but they do not anticipate in the same remarkable manner the

xl CRITICAL ESSAY.

whole course of subsequent speculation. Perhaps it was no disparagement to an elevated mind, that it did not re- fute beforehand the paradoxes of Hobbes, or the various schemes of utilitarianism which have prevailed in British Ethics beyond the example of any other nation. Possibly also, the psychological investigations, as to whether con- science were made up of sense or sentiment, or judgment, whether it were simple or complex, original or acquired, and similar inquiries, were too nice and subtle, and too characteristic of long-developed science, to be expected in the revival and first awakening of European philosophy. Certain it is, that in all these respects the ethics of Cul- ver wel bear the impress rather of the ancient and of the scholastic, than of the modern schools, and belong visibly to that primary formation, which, as Sir James Mackintosh has remarked, was so violently broken up by the revolu- tionary efforts of Hobbes, to be succeeded by the widely dissimilar age of Shaftesbury and 'Butler. As an ethical writer, Culverwel can hardly be regarded as standing on a different footing from Cudworth. A more genial nature, and a richer style, alone distinguish his treatise from the Eternal and Immutable Morality, which was, however, written a good many years later. Bearing this somewhat antiquarian character of Culverwel's ethics in view, the following points are not only well but admirably stated and enforced : —

1. The universality of moral distinctions. This fol- lowed as a corollary from his theory of original knowledge, which, indeed, is urged only for the sake of this moral result. Reason, in its moral application, discerns these

CRITICAL ESSAY. xli

eternal differences, and the consent of all nations attests its operation. In the style of Grotius, the eloquent testi- monies of heathen writers, Christian fathers, and leading schoolmen are amassed to confirm this fundamental prin- ciple ; and the author waxes especially indignant against those who would shut up within the Jewish soil, or the range of the written law, the moral revelation written on the heart : ' Yes, may some say, Pythagoras lighted his candle there, and Plato lighted his candle at theirs. But what, did they borrow common notions of them ? did they borrow any copies of Nature's law from them ? was this voi^os rypaTnos only some Jewish manuscript which they translated into Greek ? Can Pythagoras know nothing unless by a present p.e-re^v-^cT^, a Jew's soul come and inform him ?' (pp. 93, 94). The author meets the difficulties arising from obliquities and perversions of moral judgment, in the usual way, by ascribing them to erroneous applications of right principles, and offers on this subject these pointed remarks, — c There are many wild and anomalous individuums amongst them, ol iroppw /3dp/3apoi, ^7]pi(i^6L^ aXoyio-Toi,, as Aristotle calls them, ol Sie^Oappevoi, as others term them ; but are there not such also even amongst Jews ? nay, amongst such as call themselves Christians, that are lapsed and fallen below themselves ? Many natural precepts are violated even by them. Have you weeds, and briars, and thorns .in a garden ? no wonder, then, that you meet with more in a wilderness. Are there some prodigies in Europe ? you may very well look for more monsters in Africa. Do Christians blur and blot the law of nature ? no wonder,

xlii CRITICAL ESSAY.

then, that an American seeks quite to raze it out. Does an Israelite put truth sometimes in prison ? no wonder, then, that an Egyptian puts it in a dungeon. Yet, not- withstanding, amongst all those that have had so much culture and morality, as to knit, and embody, and compact themselves into a commonwealth, to hecorne rot? VOJJLOIS vTrofcel/juevot, to be regulated by a legal government, you will scarce find any nation that did generally and expressly, and for long continuance, either violate, or countenance the violation of any precept clearly natural' (pp. 117, 118). 2. The foundation of morality in the Divine nature. This position, so deeply rooted in the Platonic philosophy, and so eloquently asserted by Cicero, Plutarch, and other ancient moralists, had been nobly re-affirmed by Hooker, in the profound discourse on the Nature of Law, with which he opens his Ecclesiastical Polity. As a Platonist and a Christian divine, Culver wel eagerly propounds the same doctrine. He holds with Plato, that ' TO ov is the sure bottom and foundation of every law/ And speaking in his own name, he says, c Now this eternal law is not really distinguished from God himself. For Nil est db ceterno nisi ipse Deus. So that it is much of the same nature with those decrees of His, and that Providence which was awake from everlasting ' (p. 50). And again, i As we ascend to the first and Supreme Being by the steps of second causes, so we may .climb up to a sight of this eternal law, by the fruitful branches of secondary laws, which seem to have their root in earth, when it is indeed in heaven ; and that I may vary a little that of the Apostle to the Komans, the invisible law of God, long before the creation of the ivorld, is now

CRITICAL ESSAY. xliii

clearly seen, being understood by those laivs that do appear ' (p. 51). And once more, ' Wisdom and power, these are the chief ingredients in a law ; now where does wisdom dwell, but in the head of a Deity ? and where does power triumph, but in the arm of omnipotency ? A law is born ex cerebro Jovis, and it is not brachium sceculare but coeleste that must maintain it ; even human laws have their virtue, radicaliter and remote, as the schools speak, from this eternal law' (p. 52). The objection, that morality can- not be founded in the Divine nature, because it cannot eternally exist there as law, Culverwel repels by distinguish- ing between the perceptions, so to speak, of the Divine reason, and the movements of the Divine will : ' It is an eternal ordinance, made in the depth of God's infinite wisdom and counsel, for regulating and governing of the whole world, which yet had not its binding virtue in re- spect of God himself, who has always the full and unre- strained liberty of His own essence, which is so infinite, as that it cannot bind itself, and which needs no law, all goodness and perfection being so intrinsical and essential to it ; but it was a binding determination in reference to the creature, which yet, in respect of all irrational beings, did only fortiter inclinare, but, in respect of rationals, it does formaliter obligare' (pp. 53, 54).

3. The dependence of moral obligation on the Divine will. This has appeared to be the position of Culver we! , from the extracts already given ; and he repeatedly, and with great emphasis, animadverts upon the shortcomings of Plato and the Aristotelian schoolmen, in dwelling exclu- sively upon the harmony and inherent reason of laws,

xliv CRITICAL ESSAY.

without deducing their formal obligation from a supreme will. Plato, he says, ' did not lay stress enough upon that binding virtue, which is the very sinew, nay, the life and soul of a law ' (p. 44). Again, c Not the understanding, but the will of a lawgiver makes a law ' (p. 45). Again, c So that by this you see how those eternal ideas in the mind of God, and this eternal law, do differ. I speak now of ideas, not in a Platonical sense but in a scholastical, unless they both agree, as some would have them. For Idea est possibilium, lex tantum futurorum. God had before Him the picture of every possibility, yet He did not in- tend to bind a possibility but only a futurity. Besides, ideas were situated only in the understanding of God ; whereas a law has force and efficacy from His will; accord- ing to that much-commended saying, In ccelesti et an- gelica curia voluntas Dei lex est' (pp. 54, 55). The whole doctrine of Culverwel on this point is admirably expressed in the following passages : — ' In the commonwealth of / human nature, that proportion which actions bear to reason, is indeed a sufficient foundation for a law to build upon, but it is not the law itself, nor a formal obligation ' (p. 74). ( God, therefore, when from all eternity in His own glorious thoughts He contrived the being of man, did also with His piercing eye see into all conveniencies and discon- veniencies which would be in reference to such a being ; and by His eternal law did restrain and determine it to such acts as should be advantageous to it, which, in His wise economy and dispensation He published to man by the voice of reason, by the mediation of this natural law ' (p. 79). This mention of the ' proportion which actions bear to

'UNIVERSITY

CRITICAL ESSAY.

reason/ and of their ( conveniencies and disconveniencies/ will recal the c eternal fitnesses7 of Dr. Samuel Clarke; and it is worthy of notice, that he exactly follows Culver- wel in distinguishing between the fitnesses as the ground of obligation, and obligation itself, the latter of which lie expressly makes dependent on sovereign will. The more recent ethics of Kant, as is well known, even exceed those of the theological school in urging the imperative character of the moral law as its very essence, though by an unhappy exaggeration, that great moralist makes man too literally : a law to himself/ and excludes all direct reference to a higher will as heteronomy.

III. This brief sketch may be closed by a notice of Culver- wel's theory of faith, and more especially his doctrine of the harmony of faith and reason. In setting forth his views on this subject, it must be borne in mind, that we have only a fragment of the entire treatise which he had pro- jected. His whole Essay on the Light of Nature is only a general introduction to a comprehensive work, in which he had intended to show, first, ' that all the moral law is founded in natural and common light — in the light of reason ; ' and, secondly, f that there is nothing in the mys- teries of the gospel contrary to the light of reason/ No part of this great work was written ; and we have only a preliminary discussion of the general relations of faith and reason. It is also to be taken into account, that Culver- wel's Discourse belongs to a very early stage of the great apologetic controversy, which may be said to have been opened by Grotius in his treatise De Veritate ; and which, lasting down to our own times, has received innumerable

d

xlvi CRITICAL ESSAY.

lights from the ablest minds of England, France, and Ger- many ; and has become always more profound and ex- haustive. Still, the prevailing sagacity and depth of this treatise are here also fully sustained ; and our author's solution of the questions at issue will not suffer by compari- son with the very highest works in this department. His theory of faith, or doctrine of the relations of faith and reason, may be stated in the following propositions : —

1. The trutlis proper to faith are undiscoverable by reason. This hardly needs any separate evidence. Cul- verwel is throughout so completely a supernaturalist, that his whole writings are cast in this mould. However, the following passage is to the point : ' Could the sons of men have extracted all the spirits of reason, and made them meet and jump in one head ; nay, could angels and men have united and concentrated all their reason, yet they would never have been able to spy out such profound and mysterious excellencies as faith beholds in one twinkling of her eye' (p. 223). Not only does our author thus disclaim all sympathy with a Christianity falsely so called, which is the mere educt of metaphysics, but he also denies that reason can arrive by separate methods of its own at the results of revelation, even when the latter has led the way. 1 1 know there are some authors, of great worth and learn- ing, that endeavour to maintain this opinion, that revealed truths, though they could not be found by reason, yet when they are once revealed, reason can then evince them and demonstrate them. But I much rather incline to the determinations of Aquinas, and multitudes of others that are of the same judgment, that human reason, when

CRITICAL ESSAY. xlvii

it has stretched itself to the uttermost, is not at all propor- tioned to them, but, at the best, can give only some faint illustrations, some weak adumbrations of them. They were never against reason ; they were always above reason ' (p. 229). Culverwel, it may be added, glances but little, if at all, at the chief cause — why the truths of faith are un- discoverable by reason ; viz., that they are essentially state- ments of fact, which, being contingent and dependent on the will of God, cannot be arrived at by any human argu- mentation, but must be known by Divine disclosure. This element of contingency must ever be an insuperable bar to a logically deduced and demonstrated Christianity.

2. Faith is the reception of the Divine testimony ; and this, remotely by its outward evidence, but proximately by its own inward light, as discerned through grace. That faith is the reception of the Divine testimony, is simply and clearly asserted : ' This is the voice of nature itself, that whatsoever God reveals, must needs be true ; and this common principle is the bottom and foundation of all faith to build upon. The soul desires no greater satisfac- tion than an avros e$y ; for if God himself say it, who can question it ; who dare contradict it ?' (p. 224.) ' God being truth itself — eternal, immutable truth ; His word being vehiculum veritatis, and all revelations flowing from Him shining with the prints and signatures of cer- tainty, His naked word is a demonstration' (p. 225). Among these ( prints and signatures of certainty/ outward evidence holds the most remote place. c Nor yet is Provi- dence wanting in external means, which, by the goodness and power of God, were annexed as sigilla verbi — miracles I

xlviii CRITICAL ESSAY.

mean — which are, upon this account, very suitably and pro- portionably subservient to faith, they being above natural power, as revealed truths are above natural understanding' (p. 228). The Divine testimony, however, cannot be said to be received on the evidence of miracles, that is, faith has no existence, until the inward light of the doctrine attested commend it to the soul. Nor does this inward light shine, unless by the action of the Spirit of God. c But miracles, though they be very potent, yet they are not always pre- valent ; for there were many spectators of Christ's miracles, which yet, like so many Pharaohs, were hardened by them ; and some of them that beheld them were no more moved by them than some of them who only hear of them, and will not at all attend to them. So that only the seal of the Spirit can make a firm impression upon the soul, who writes his own word upon the soul with a conquering triumphant sunbeam, that is impatient either of cloud or shadow' (p. 228). ' This Holy Spirit of God creates in the soul a grace answerable to these transcendent objects; you cannot but know the name of it— it is called Faith ' (pp. 228, 229). Culverwel, who dwells but little upon the outward evidence of revelation, which he yet admits to exist, reserves all his eloquence and fancy for the mutual play of this inward faculty or eye of faith, and the Divine beauty and glory of its objects : c Kevealed truths shine with their own beams; they do not borrow their primitive and original lustre from this " candle of the Lord," but from the purer light, where- with God hath clothed and attired them as with a garment. God crowns his own revelations with his own beams. " The candle of the Lord" doth not discover them ; it doth not

CRITICAL ESSAY. xlix

oppose them ; it cannot eclipse them. They are no sparks of reason's striking, but they are flaming darts of Heaven's shooting, that both open and enamour the soul. They are stars of Heaven's lighting ; men behold them at a great distance twinkling in the dark. Whatsoever comes in God's name does aut invenire viam autfacere' (p. 223.) Faith is thus a disposition, faculty, or exercise, which is special, distinctive, and superadded to reason. ( This withal lays down a higher and nobler principle than reason is ; for in things merely natural, every rational being is there a com- petent judge ; in those things that are within the sphere and compass of reason, the reason of all men does agree and conspire, so as that which implies an express and palpable contradiction cannot be owned by any : but in things above nature and reason, a paucity here is a better argument than a plurality, because Providence uses to open His cabinets only for His jewels. God manifests these mysteri- ous secrets only to a few friends — His Spirit whispers to a few, shines upon a few, so that if any tell us that evan- gelical mysteries imply a contradiction, because they cannot apprehend them, it is no more than for a blind man con- fidently to determine, that it involves a contradiction to say there is a sun, because he cannot see it' (p. 231). This strong assertion of the essential supernaturalism (philoso- phically speaking, mysticism) of Christian illumination is in Culverwel no Puritanic peculiarity, but the echo of a profound conviction, which has expressed itself in all schools of Christian thought, from Augustine to Schleier- macher — a conviction proportioned in depth to the degree in which Christianity has not been a speculation, but a

1 CRITICAL ESSAY.

Kving fact of experience. Nevertheless, it may be ques- tioned, whether the difference between faith and unbelief is not exhibited by him too much in an intellectual, and too little in a moral point of view. He seems to lay hold of faith at its highest stage, where it resembles the action of the eye, and to overlook its lower, where it is better described by metaphors borrowed from the ear. Nor are the elements of faith intellectually considered so wanting apart from grace, as this style of representation would imply ; for upon the highest authority, unbelief is not the negation, but the rejection of light. The universal attain- ableness of Christian faith, as conditioned by humility and prayer, a point not less vital to Christian theology than its more exclusive or mystical aspect, can apparently thus alone be maintained ; and though this possibility is not denied in Culverwel's theory, it certainly does not re- ceive its just prominence.

3. The operation of faith is throughout consistent with reason, and so far from superseding it, demands its constant exercise. The first part of this proposition, viz., that the operation of faith is throughout consistent with reason, has been incidentally vouched for in some of the passages already brought forward. Thus, the operation of faith in receiving a revelation is ultimately based upon a prin- ciple of reason, that God is true ; and upon a further principle of reason, that God may communicate with His creatures by special channels. It is also by a principle of reason that faith repels the objection to the possibility of special illumination, viz., the principle of reliance upon personal experience rather than the experience of others ;

CRITICAL ESSAY. H

and the further principle of analogy, which shows, that every kind, even of natural light, is not extended to all. These principles of reason warrant the procedure of faith in admitting any mysteries of revelation, however transcend- ent, that do not contradict reason, which, of course, no true revelation can do, and which our author intended to prove at length that the mysteries of Christianity had not done. As it is, he protests with equal justness and em- phasis against the very idea of such a collision as nothing less than blasphemy. ' True religion never was, nor will be, nor need be, shy of sound reason, which is thus far lumen dirigens, as that it is obliged, by the will and com- mand of God himself, not to entertain any false religion, nor anything under pretence of religion, that is formally and irreconcilably against reason ; reason being above human testimony and tradition, and being only subordi- nate to God himself, and those revelations that come from God. Now it is express blasphemy to say that either God, or the Word of God, ever did, or ever will, oppose right reason ' (p. 218.)

While the one half of the proposition is thus true, that reason entirely warrants faith, the other half is equally true, that faith constantly demands the services of reason. Faith demands the services of reason, according to the scattered notices of our author, in the following respects : —

(1.) To evince the necessity of revelation. i Consider, that the very apprehending the weakness of reason, even this in some measure comes from reason. Reason, when awakened, feels her own wounds, hears her own jarrings, sees the dimness of her own sight. It is a glass that dis-

Hi CRITICAL ESSAY.

covers its own spots, and must it therefore be broken in pieces ? ' (p. 20.)

(2.) To test the evidence of revelation. On this head our author unanswerably puts down the outcries of a blind faith : ' If they tell us that all reason is distorted, whether, then, is theirs so in telling us so ? If they say that they do not know this by reason, but by the Word of God ; whether, then, is reason, when it acknowledges the Word of God, distorted or no ?' (p. 22.) Though, as has been ob- served, our author exalts the internal evidence of the Gospel, as compared with the external, yet it is as evidence apprehensible by reason, apprehensible even by its superior splendour, that reason has to deal with it. And external evidence also, he admits, may be so great, as in the case of Abraham's offering his son Isaac, that reason must con- fess its force, and yield to its authority : c All the stress and difficulty will be to know whether God reveals such a thing or not ' (p. 226). Thus the whole evidence of revela- tion must come before the tribunal of reason.

(3.) To assist the interpretation of revelation. Cul- verwel, indeed, holds, with all Protestants, that the Spirit of God is the ultimate interpreter of revelation, in the sense of being the author of the certainty of faith ; but he also urges the claim and need of reason to check and expose all departures from the verbal and literal sense. ' Though they be not come to such a height as this, yet, either by their flat and frigid explicating, they do endeavour to dispirit and enervate the Word of God ; or else, in a more violent and injurious manner, they do even ravish it, and deflower the virginity of it ; or else, in a more subtle and

CRITICAL ESSAY. liii

serpentine manner, they seek to bend the rule, and ex- pound it to their purposes and advantages. The letter of the Word, the vagina verbi, that does not wound them, that does not strike them ; and as for the edge, they think they can draw that as they please, they can blunt it as they list, they can order it as they will. But the law of sound reason and nature does oppose such unworthy deal- ings as these are ; for men look upon it very heinously to have their words misinterpreted, to have their meaning wrested and violenced ' (pp. 226, 227).

(4.) To vindicate and harmonize the doctrines of reve- lation. This was our author's chosen task ; and he magni- fies his office in one prolonged strain of eloquence. As a sample of this vindication, he instances, as already stated, the reasonableness of Abraham's sacrifice, since human life depends entirely on the will of God, and His command altogether altered the moral character of this act ; whereas an act absolutely condemned by reason, such as an act of blasphemy, is not enjoined anywhere in Scripture. Thus ought reason to deal with all the aspersed facts and mys- teries of revelation. ' It will be employment enough, and it will be a noble employment too, for reason to redeem and vindicate them from those thorns and difficulties with which some subtle ones have vexed them and encompassed them. It will be honour enough for reason to show that faith does not oppose reason; and this it may show, it must show this ; for else ol eo-w, those that are within the enclosure of the Church will never rest satisfied, nor ol efo>, Pagans, Mahometans, Jews, ever be convinced. God, indeed, may work upon them by immediate revela-

Hv CRITICAL ESSAY.

tion, but man can only prevail upon them by reason' (pp. 229, 230). In this way, too, will the infinite wisdom of the God of revelation fully appear. ' The more they exercise their own reason, the more they will admire and adore His. For none can admire reason, but they that use some reason themselves ' (p. 163).

These extracts are probably sufficient to make good the assertion, that a more just, temperate, and discriminating estimate of the relations of faith and reason is hardly to be found, either in our earlier or later theology. And it may add to the interest of this summary to remark, that Locke's celebrated comparison of the light of revelation to the telescopic light of a star, and of reason to the eye that descries it, whence he argues the folly of extinguishing the perceiving organ, is found in substance, and almost in words, in Culverwel. * Did you never observe an eye using a prospective-glass, for the discovering, and amplifying, and approximating of some remote and yet desirable object ? And did you perceive any opposition between the eye and the glass ? Was there not rather a loving corre- spondency and communion between them ? Why should there be any greater strife between faith and reason, seeing they are brethren ? ' (p. 222.)

In Culverwel, we thus see a noble example, rare in his age, and still more rare in his party, of a strictly supernaturalist theology, accurately defining its relations to philosophy without prejudice to either side, outflanking by anticipation the various objections of unbelief, afterwards concentrated in the sarcasm of Hume, c that our holy religion is founded on faith/ and projecting its theory, by its own vital force,

CRITICAL ESSAY. lv

onward into the exciting controversies of the nineteenth century. May it be given to all, who in our times take part in these struggles, on the one hand, to use our author's words, {not to look on religion as a bird of prey, that comes to peck out the eyes of men ;' arid, on the other, to aspire after that bloodless victory of faith which Cul- verwel thus so warmly celebrates. ' If the cherubim be ambitious of stooping, if angelical understanding do so earnestly irapaKv-fyai, methinks then the sons of men might fall down at the "beautiful feet" of evangelical mysteries, with that humble acknowledgment, Non sum dignus solvere corrigiam liujus mysterii. Only let thy faith triumph here, for it shall not triumph hereafter ; let it shine in time, for it must vanish in eternity ' (p. 236).

J. C.

AN

ELEGANT

And Learned

DISCOURSE

Of the

Light °f Nature.

By NATHANAEL CULVERWEL, Mafter of Arts, and lately Fellow of EMANUEL Colledge in CAMBRIDGE.

Imprimatur^ EDM. CALAMY.

London, Printed by T. R. and£. M. for JohnRothwellzt the Sun and Fountain in Pauls Church-yard. 1652.

TO THE

REVEREND AND LEARNED ANTHONY TUCKNEY, D.D.,

MASTEB OP EMANDEL COLLEGE IN CAMBRIDGE, AND TO THE

FELLOWS OF THAT RELIGIOUS AND HAPPY FOUNDATION.

HONOURED SIRS, — The many testimonies of your real affection towards this pious and learned author, especially while he lay under the discipline of so sad a providence, deserve all thankful acknowledgment and grateful comme- moration ; which I douht not but himself would have made in most ample manner, had it pleased God to have granted him longer life and farther opportunity. But since Divine Providence hath otherwise disposed, I thought it no solecism in friendship to undertake the executorship of his desires, and so far to own his debt of gratitude, as to endeavour some public acknowledgment of it, though the greatness of your benefits admits not of just recompense and satisfaction. Having therefore the disposal of his papers committed to me by his nearest and dearest friends, and finding them to be of such worth and excellency as ought not to be smothered in obscurity, I interpreted this a fit opportunity to let both yourselves and others understand

4 ORIGINAL DEDICATION.

how deep an impression your kindness to him hath left in the apprehensions and memories of those his friends to whom God and nature had given the advantage of being more peculiarly interested in his welfare. Upon which account I do here present you with this elegant issue of his noble and gallant abilities, which, besides the relation it hath to you by the father's side, would gladly entitle itself unto your acceptance and protection, as having been conceived in your college, and delivered in your chapel ; and, therefore, hope that you, who with much delight were sometimes ear-witnesses of it, will now become its sus- ceptors.

And thus having lodged it in its mother's arms, I leave it to her embraces. On whose behalf I shall only offer up this serious and hearty wish, that as, by the blessing of Heaven upon her fruitful womb, she hath been made a mother of many profitable instruments both in church and commonwealth, so God would be pleased to make good her name unto her, and delight still to use her as the handmaid-instrument of His glory ; that He would lay her top-stone in His blessing, as her foundation was laid in His fear.

So prays the meanest of her sons, and your humble servant,

WILLIAM DILLINGHAM.

Aug. 10, 1652.

TO THE READER,

COURTEOUS READER, — Xot many months have passed, since I sent abroad into the world a little treatise, which knew itself by the name of Spiritual Optics, with intention only to make some discovery of the minds and affections of men towards pieces of that nature; which having met somewhere, it seems, with kind entertainment and acceptance beyond its expectation, hath now persuaded all its fellows into a resolu- tion to take wing, and adventure themselves upon thy can- dour and ingenuity. I intend not here to hang out ivy, nor with my canvas to preface this cloth of gold. The work is weaved of sunbeams ; to hang anything before it were but to obscure it : yet something here must needs be said for mine own discharge, and thy better satisfaction. Know, therefore, gentle reader, that these pieces were first intended as scholastic exercises in a college chapel, and therefore more properly suited to such an auditory ; yet I make no question but some of them, the White Stone especially, may be read with much profit by those who are of meaner capacities and less refined intellectuals. The

6 TO THE HEADER.

Discourse of the Light of Nature, which, though here it bear the torch before the rest, is younger brother to them all, was written above six years ago. The design of it was, on the one hand, to vindicate the use of reason, in matters of religion, from the aspersions and prejudices of some weaker ones in those times, who, having entertained erroneous opinions, which they were no way able to defend, were taught by their more cunning seducers to wink hard, and except against all offensive weapons ; so, on the other hand, to chastise the sauciness of Socinus and his followers, who dare set Hagar above her mistress, and make faith wait at the elbow of corrupt and distorted reason ; to take off the head of that uncircumcised Philistine1 with his own sword, but better sharpened, and then to lay it up behind the ephod in the sanctuary. An enterprise, I confess, of no small import ; which yet, he hoped, with God's assist- ance, to have effected, by giving unto reason the things that are reason's, and unto faith the things that are faith's. And had the world been favoured with his longer life, the height of his parts, and the earnest he gave, had bespoken very ample expectations in those who knew and heard him. But it pleased God, having first melted him with His love, and then chastised him, though somewhat sharply, to take him to Himself ; from the contemplation of the light

1 An unacknowledged reference to a passage in ' the Discourse,' (p. 23.) It is remarkable that Dr. Whichcote, in his second letter to Dr. Tuckney, written in 1651 or 1652, uses the allusion also. ' I deserve as little to be called a Socinian, as David for extorting Goliath's sword out of his hand, and cutting the master's head off with it, did deserve to be esteemed a Philistine.'— Eight Letters of Dr. A. Tuckney and Dr. B. Whichcote, appended to Whichcote' s Moral and Religions Maxims.

TO THE READER.

of Nature, to the enjoyment of one supernatural, that aTrpoaiTov — light inaccessible, which none can see and live, * Tim vi and to translate him from snuffing a candle here to be made partaker of the inheritance of the saints in light. So that all he finished towards that undertaking was this Discourse of the Light of Nature in general, not descending so low as to show how the moral law was founded in it, or that Gospel revelation doth not extinguish it. Wherein, if standing in the midst between two adversaries of extreme persuasions, while he opposes the one, he seems to favour the other more than is meet ; when thou shalt observe him. at another time, to declare as much against the other, thou wilt then be of another mind. Judge candidly, and take his opinion as thou wouldst do his picture, sitting ; not from a luxuriant expression, wherein he always allowed for the shrinking, but from his declared judgment, when he speaks professedly of such a subject. For instance, if any expression seem to lift reason up too high, you may, if you please, otherwise hear it confess and bewail its own weak- ness, (chap, xii.) ; you may see it bow the head and wor- ship, and then lay itself down quietly at the feet of faith, (chap, xviii.) So that if thou read but the whole discourse, thou wilt easily perceive, as himself would often affirm, that he abhorred the very thought of advancing the power of Nature into the throne of free grace, or by the light of Nature in the least measure to eclipse that of faith.

I would not willingly by any prolepsis forestall thy reading, yet if thou shouldst desire a foretaste of the author's style, I would turn thee to the beginning of the seventeenth chapter ; never was light so bespangled, never

8 TO THE HEADER.

did it triumph in greater bravery of expression. But I detain thee too long. Let this suffice thee as a coarse list to a finer web, or as waste paper to defend this book from the injury of its covers. — Farewell.

CAMERA Aug. 10, 1652.

UNIVERSITY

RICHARD CULVERWEL TO THE READER.

COURTEOUS KEADER, — This discourse, which had ray brother for the author, might justly have expected me to have been the publisher. And I should think myself in- excusable, in this particular, did not the remote distance of my present abode, and the frequent avocations from study, by attendance upon my ministry, together with the ruins of a crazy body, somewhat apologize in my behalf.

That is obvious and '• notorious'1 in every man's mouth, that the brother should raise up seed to the brother ; but *>eut here, lo ! a friend that is nearer than a brother, who rears up this living monument to the memory of his deceased friend.

In this treatise we may perceive how the Gentiles' candle outwent us with our sunbeams : how they, guided only by the glimmering twilight of Nature, outstripped us who are surrounded with the rays of supernatural light, of revealed truth. Thou mayest here find Plato to be a Moses ' speaking Attic Greek,'2 and Aratus, Menander, and Epimenides called into the court, to bring in their suffrages to St. Paul's doctrine.

Here we may find reason, like a Gibeonite, hewing wood

2 Atticissans.

XXV

5-10.

10 TO THE READER.

josh. ix. 23. and drawing water for the sanctuary ; Jethro giving coun- Exod. xviii. sej j.Q Moses> (3}.0(j (jraws us with the cords of a man ; He

drew professed star-gazers with a star to Christ. Galen, a physician, was wrought upon, by some anatomical obser- vations, to tune a hymn to the praise of his Creator, though otherwise atheist enough.

Eeason, though not permitted, with an over-daring Pompey, to rush into the Holy of holies, yet may be al- lowed to be a proselyte of the gate, and, with those devoted Greeks, to worship in the court of the Gentiles.

Natural light, or the law written in the heart, improved Rom. i. i9. by that c knowledge of God71 which is written in the book of the creature in capital letters, so that he that runs may read, is that which this treatise bears witness to ; where these c heavenly twins,'2 those heaven-born lights are set up in the soul of man ; like those twin flames on the mariner's shroud, they presage a happy voyage to 'the fair havens/

As for the bosom-secrets of God — gospel mysteries, the

mercy-seat itself, into which the angels desire cto bend

i Pet 1. 12. down and look,'3 reason's plumb-line will prove too short

to fathom them ; here we must cry with the Apostle, 1 0

Rom. xi.33. the depth!'4 Eeason may not come into these seas, ex-

cept she strike her topsail ; here we may say with Aris-

totle at the brink of Euripus, not being able to give an

account of the ebbs and flows, clf I cannot comprehend

thee, thou shalt me !'

It is storied of Democritus, that he put out his eyes that

1 To ^vuvrbv TOV 0eoO. 3

2 Aioo-Kou/Ku— Castor and Pollux. * *Q pd0os.

TO THE HEADER. 1 1

he might contemplate the better. I do not counsel you to do so ; but if you would wink with one, the eye of reason — captivate every thought to the obedience of Christ — you might, with that other of faith, take the better aim at the mark, to obtain ' the prize of the high calling of God in Jesus Christ/ Phii.m.14.

Possibly an expression or two, more there are not, may seem to speak too much in reason's behalf, but, if well examined, will prove nothing to the prejudice of free grace : the whole scope of the book endeavouring to fix those land-marks and just bounds between religion and reason, which some, too superciliously brow-beating the handmaid, and others too much magnifying her, have removed.

These exercises suit well with the place where, and the auditors to whom they were delivered ; but, like Aristotle's i physical lectures/1 these are not for vulgar ears. These lucubrations are so elaborate, that they smell of the lamp., c the candle of the Lord/

As concerning the author of this treatise, how great his parts were, and how well improved, as it may appear by this work, so they were fully known, and the loss of them sufficiently bewailed by those among whom he lived and conversed ; and yet I must say of him, ' he suffered a mis- i cor. x. is. fortune incident to man/2 And as it is hard for men to be under affliction, but they are liable to censures, so it Luke xm .2,4. fared with him, who was looked upon by some, as one whose eyes were lofty, and whose eyelids lifted up, who Prov.xxx .13. bare himself too high upon a conceit of his parts ; although

12 TO THE READER.

they that knew him intimately, are most willing to be his compurgators in this particular. Thus prone are we to think the staff under the water crooked, though we know it to be straight. However, turn thine eyes inward, and censure not thine own fault so severely in others. Cast not the first stone, except thou find thyself without this fault ; dare not to search too curiously into ' the untrace-

Rom. xi. 33. able ways'1 of God; but rather learn that lesson of the Apostle's in that elegant paronomasy, ' not to think of thyself more highly than thou oughtest to think, but to

Rom. xii. 3. think soberly/2

Thus not willing longer to detain thee from the perusal of this discourse, I commend both thee and it to the bless- ing of God, and rest

Thine to serve thee in any spiritual work or labour of love,3

HIGH. CULVERWEL.

From my study at Grundisburg,

in the county of Suffolk,

August 18, 1652.

odofa.

2 MT) VTrep<ppoveiv Trap' 6 del (ppoveiv, dXXa typovtiv els TO ffd3<f>poveiv.

3 ' Thine to serve thee in all Christian offices ' — (third edition).

OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE,

A DISCOURSE.

PROVEKBS xx. 27.

DIN rWJ mrP -to.—Text. Heb.

&&s Kvpiov, TTVOTJ avQpuiTUv. — Sc.ptuag.

\vxvos Kvpiov Trvor) a.v9p&Truv. — Aqu. /Symm. Theod. ap. Origenis Hexapla.

Aa/uTTTT//) Kvpiov iTvevfjia avdp&irwv. — Alius. ap. Origenis Hexapla.

Lucerna Domini, spiraculum hominis. — Vulg.

Mens hominis lucerna Domini. — Versio Auctoris.

The lantern of the Lord is the breath of man. — Coverdale.

The light of the Lord is the breath of man. — Genev.

Hie lamp of our Lord, the breath of a man. — Douay.

The understanding of a man is the candle of the Lord. — Author's Translation.

The spirit of a man is the candle of the Lord. — The Authorized Version.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

CHAPTER I. THE PORCH OR INTRODUCTION, . . . . .17

CHAPTER II. THE EXPLICATION OF THE WORDS, . . . . .2(5

CHAPTER III. WHAT NATURE is, . . . . . 32

CHAPTER IV. THE NATURE OP A LAW IN GENERAL, .... 40

CHAPTER V. OF THE ETERNAL LAW, .... .50

CHAPTER VI. OF THE LAW OF NATURE IN GENERAL, ITS SUBJECT AND NATURE, . 57

CHAPTER VII. THE EXTENT OF THE LAW OF NATURE, . 81

CHAPTER VIII.

How THE LIGHT OF NATURE is DISCOVERED ; NOT BY TRADITION NOR

1 AN ACTING INTELLECT,' ..... 90

16 CONTENTS.

PAGE

CHAPTER IX. THE LIGHT OF REASON, ...... 98

CHAPTER X. OF THE CONSENT OF NATIONS, ... .109

CHAPTER XI. THE LIGHT OF REASON is A DERIVATIVE LIGHT, . .121

CHAPTER XII. THE LIGHT OF REASON is A DIMINUTIVE LIGHT, . . .164

CHAPTER XIII. THE LIGHT OF REASON DISCOVERS PRESENT, NOT FUTURE THINGS, . 176,

CHAPTER XIV. THE LIGHT OF REASON is A CERTAIN LIGHT, 190

CHAPTER XV. THE LIGHT OF REASON is DIRECTIVE, . . 205

CHAPTER XVI. THE LIGHT OF REASON is CALM AND PEACEABLE, . .219

CHAPTER XVII. THE LIGHT OF REASON is A PLEASANT LIGHT, . 237

CHAPTER XVIII. THE LIGHT OF REASON is AN ASCENDANT LIGHT, . . . 258

OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

CHAPTER I.

THE PORCH OR INTRODUCTION.

IT is a work that requires our choicest thoughts, the exactest discussion that can be — a thing very material and desirable, to give unto reason the things that are reason's, and unto faith the things that are faith's ; to give faith her full scope and latitude, and to give reason also her just bounds and limits. This is the first-born, but the other has the blessing :l and yet there is not such a vast hiatus neither, such a 'great gulf'2 between them, as some would imagine. There is no such implacable antipathy, no such irreconcilable jarring between them, as some do fancy to themselves. They may very well salute one another ' with a holy kiss/ ' the kiss of peace.'3 Reason Rom. and faith may embrace each other. There is a twin-light

springing from both, and they both spring from the same i Pet.sv Vi42 fountain of light, and they both sweetly conspire in the same end, — the glory of that being from which they shine, and the welfare and happiness of that being upon which they shine. So that to blaspheme reason, is to reproach

1 Note A. 2 M£ya xao'A"*- 3 'Ayiv ^tA^art — osculo pacis.

18 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

heaven itself, and to dishonour the God of reason, to question the beauty of His image, and, by a strange in- gratitude, to slight this great and royal gift of our Creator. For it is He that set up these two great luminaries in every heavenly soul, — the sun to rule the day, and the moon to rule the night ; and though there be some kind of crea- tures that will bark at this lesser light, and others so severely critical, as that they make mountains of those spots and freckles which they see in her face ; yet others know how to be thankful for her weaker beams, and will follow the least light of God's setting up, though it is but ' the candle of the Lord/

But some are so strangely prejudiced against reason, arid that upon sufficient reason too, as they think, which yet involves a flat contradiction, as that they look upon it not as the candle of the Lord, but as on some blazing comet that portends present ruin to the Church and to the soul, and carries a fatal and venomous influence along with it. And because the unruly head of Socinus and his followers, by their mere pretences to reason, have made shipwreck of faith, and have been very injurious to the Gospel, therefore these weak and staggering apprehensions are afraid of understanding anything, and think that the very name of reason, especially in a pulpit, in matters of religion, must needs have at least a thousand heresies couched in it. If you do but offer to make a syllogism, they will straightway cry it down for carnal reasoning.

What would these men have ? Would they be banished from their own essences ? Would they forfeit and renounce their understandings ? or have they any to forfeit or dis- claim ? Would they put out this candle of the Lord, intellectuals of His own lighting ? or have they any to put out ? Would they creep into some lower species, and go a-grazing with ^Nebuchadnezzar among the beasts of the

INTRODUCTION. 19

field ? or are they not there already ? Or if they them- selves can be willing to be so shamefully degraded, do they think that all others, too, are bound to follow their example ? Oh, what hard thoughts have these of religion ! Do they look upon it only as on a bird of prey that comes to peck out the eyes of men ? Is this all the nobility that it gives, that men by virtue of it must be beheaded pre- sently ? Does it chop off the intellectuals at one blow ?

Let us hear a while what are the offences of reason. Are they so heinous and capital ? what has it done ? what laws has it violated ? whose commands has it broken ? what did it ever do against the crown and dignity of heaven, or against the peace and tranquillity of men ? Why are a weak and perverse generation so angry and displeased with it ? Is it because this daughter of the morning is fallen from her primitive glory ? from her original vigour and perfection ? Far be it from me to extenuate that great and fatal overthrow which the sons of men had in their first and original apostasy from their God ; that, under which the whole creation sighs and groans : but this we are sure, it did not annihilate the Rom. via. soul, it did not destroy the essence, the powers and facul- ties, nor the operations of the soul ; though it did defile them and disorder them, and every way indispose them.

Well then, because the eye of reason is weakened and vitiated, will they therefore pluck it out immediately ? and must Leah be hated upon no other account, but be- cause she is blear-eyed ? The whole head is wounded, and aches, and is there no other way but to cut it off? ' The candle of the Lord' does not shine so clearly as it was wont ; must it therefore be extinguished presently ? Is it not better to enjoy the faint and languishing light of this c candle of the Lord/ rather than to be in palpable and disconsolate darkness ? There are, indeed, but a few

20 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

seminal sparks left in the ashes, and must there be whole (floods of water cast on them to quench them ? It is but an old imperfect manuscript, with some broken periods, some letters worn out ; must they, therefore, with an un- merciful indignation, rend it and tear it asunder ? It is granted that the picture has lost its gloss and beauty, the oriency of its colours, the elegancy of its lineaments, the comeliness of its proportion ; must it, therefore, be totally defaced ? must it be made one great blot ? and must the very frame of it be broken in pieces ? Would you per- suade the lutanist to cut all his strings in sunder because they are out of tune ? and will you break the bow upon no other account but because it is unbended ? Because men have not so much of reason as they should, will they therefore resolve to have none at all ? Will you throw away your gold because it is mixed with dross ? Thy very being, that is imperfect too ; thy graces, they are im- perfect,— wilt thou refuse these also ?

And then consider, that the very apprehending the weakness of reason, even this in some measure comes from reason. Reason, when awakened, feels her own wounds, hears her own jarrings, sees the dimness of her own sight. It is^a glass that discovers its own spots, and must it therefore be broken in pieces ? Reason herself has made many sad complaints unto you ; she has told you often, and that with tears in her eyes, what a great shipwreck she has suffered, what goods she has lost, how hardly she escaped with a poor decayed being ; she has shown you often some broken relics as the sad remem- brancers of her former ruins. She told you, how that when she swam for her life, she had nothing but two or three jewels about her, two or three common notions ;T and would you rob her of them also ? Is this all your

1 Note B.

INTRODUCTION. 21

tenderness and compassion ? Is this your kindness to your friend ? will you trample upon her now she is so low ? Is this a sufficient cause to give her a bill of divorcement, because she has lost her former beauty and fruitfulness ?

Or is reason thus offensive to them, because she cannot grasp and comprehend the things of God ? Yain men ! will they pluck out their eyes because they cannot look upon the sun in his brightness and glory ? What though reason cannot reach to the depths, to the bottoms of the ocean, may it not therefore swim and hold up the head as well as it can ? What though it cannot enter into the 1 holy of holies/1 and pierce within the veil ; may it not, notwithstanding, lie in the porch, at the gate of the temple called Beautiful, and be a door-keeper in the house Acts m. 2. of its God ? Its wings are clipped indeed ; it cannot fly Ps.ixxxiv.io. so high as it might have done ; it cannot fly so swiftly, so strongly as once it could ; will they not, therefore, allow it to move, to stir, to flutter up and down as well as it can ? The turrets and pinnacles of the stately structure are fallen ; will they therefore demolish the whole fabric, and shake the very foundations of it, and down with it to the ground ? Though it be not a Jacob's ladder to climb up to heaven by, yet may they not use it as a staff to walk upon earth withal ? And then reason itself knows this also, and acknowledges that it is dazzled with the majesty and glory of God ; that it cannot pierce into His mysterious and unsearchable ways. It never was so vain as to go about to measure immensity by its own finite compass, or to span out absolute eternity by its own more imperfect duration. True reason did never go about to comprise the Bible in its own nutshell. And if reason be content with its own sphere, why should it not have the liberty of its proper motion ?

1 Sanctum sanctorum. A 2

22 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

Is it because it opposes the things of God, and wrangles against the mysteries of salvation ? Is it therefore ex- cluded ? A heinous and frequent accusation indeed, but nothing more false and injurious. And if it had been an open enemy that had done her this wrong, why, then she could have borne it ; but it is thou, her friend and com- panion. Ye have taken sweet counsel together, and have PS. iv. i2-i4. entered into the house of God as friends. It is you that have your dependence upon her ; that cannot speak one word to purpose against her, without her help and assist- ance. What mean you thus to revile your most intimate and inseparable self ? Why do you thus slander your own beings ? Would you have all this to be true which you say ? Name but the time, if you can, when right reason did oppose one jot or tittle1 of the Word of God.

Certainly these men speak of distorted reason all this while. Surely they do not speak of i the candle of the Lord/ but of some shadow and appearance of it. But if they tell us that all reason is distorted, whether, then, is theirs so in telling us so ? If they say that they do not know this by reason, but by the word of God ; whether, then, is reason, when it acknowledges the word of God, distorted or no ? Besides, if there were no right reason in the world, what difference between sobriety and madness, between these men and wiser ones ? How, then, were the Rom. i. 20. heathen left c without excuse,'" who had nothing to see by but this t candle of the Lord ?' And how does this thrust men below sensitive creatures ! for better have no reason at all than such as does perpetually deceive and delude them.

Or does reason thus displease them, because the blackest errors sometimes come under the fair disguise of so beau- tiful a name, and have some tincture of reason in them ? But truly, this is so far from being a disparagement to

1 Apex.

INTRODUCTION. 23

reason, as that it is no small commendation of it, for ' it is becoming to put a good face on things.'1 Men love to pat a plausible title, a winning frontispiece upon the foulest errors. Thus, licentiousness would fain be called by the name of liberty, and all dissoluteness would fain be countenanced and secured under the patronage and pro- tection of free grace. Thus wickedness would willingly forget its own name, and adopt itself into the family of goodness. Thus Arminianism pleads for itself under the specious notion of God's love to mankind. Thus, that silly error of Antinomianism will needs style itself an ' evangelical honeycomb.' Thus all irregularities and anomalies in Church affairs, must pride themselves in those glittering titles of ' a new light/ c a gospel way/ ( a heaven upon earth/ No wonder, then, that some also pretend to reason, who yet run out of it, and beyond it, and beside it. But must none, therefore, come near it ? Because Socinus has burnt his wings at this f candle of the Lord/ must none, therefore, make use of it ? May he not be conquered with his own weapons, and beat out of his own strongholds ? and may not the head of an uncir- cuincised Philistine be cut off with his own sword ?

Or, lastly, are they thus afraid of reason, because by virtue of this men of wit and subtlety will presently argue and dispute them into an error, so as that they shall not be able to disentangle a truth, though in itself it be never so plain and unquestionable ? But, first, reason itself tells them that it may be thus, and so prepares and forti- fies them against such a trial ; and then this only shows that some men's reason is not so well advanced and im- proved either as it might be, or as others' is. A sharper edge would quickly cut such difficulties asunder. Some have more refined and clarified intellectuals, more vigorous

24 OF THE LIGHT OF NATUEE.

and sparkling eyes than others, and one soul differs from another in glory ; and that reason which can make some shift to maintain error, might, with a great deal less sweat and pains, maintain a truth.

There is no question but that Bellannine, and the rest of the learned Papists, could have, if they had pleased, far more easily defended the Protestant religion than their own. Besides, the vigour and triumph of reason is prin- cipally to be seen in those first-born beams, those pure and unspotted irradiations, that shine from it ; I mean those first bubblings up of common principles that are owned and acknowledged by all, and those evident and kindly derivations that flow from them. Keason shows her face more amiably and pleasantly in a pure and clear stream, than in those muddied and troubled waters in which the schoolmen that have leisure enough are always fishing. Nay, some of their works are like so many raging seas, full of perpetual tossings and disquietings and foam- ings, and sometimes ( casting up mire and dirt ;' and yet these vast and voluminous leviathans love to sport therein : and that which is most intolerable, these grand ' sages/ l that seemed so zealous for reason, at length in express terms disclaim it ; and, in a most blindfold and confused manner, cry up their great Diana, their idol of transub- stantiation. The Lutherans are very fierce against reason too, much upon the same account, because it would never allow of that other monstrous and misshapen lump of consubstantiation.

But why have I all this while beaten the air, and spilt words upon the ground ? why do I speak to such as are incurable and incapable ? for if we speak reason to them, that is that which they so much disclaim : if we do not speak reason to them, that were to disclaim it too. But I

INTRODUCTION. 2£

speak to men, to Christians, to the friends of learning, to the professors of reason ; to such as put this candle of the Lord into a golden candlestick, and pour continual oil into it. Yet, lest any among you Athenians1 should erect an altar to an 'unknown God;' lest you should 'ignorantly A^|JH- worship' him, we will l declare him to you/

And that which we have now said, may serve as a porch and preamble to what we shall speak hereafter out of these words : ' The spirit of a man is the candle of the rrov. xx. 27, Lord ;' where we shall see, — 1. How ' the understanding of a man is the candle of the Lord/ 2. What this ( candle of the Lord' discovers ; where we shall find — (1.) That all the moral law is founded in natural and common light, in the light of reason ; and, (2.) That there is nothing in the mysteries of the gospel contrary to the light of reason ; nothing repugnant to this light that shines from ' the candle of the Lord/

1 The Cambridge Academics.

THE

UNIVERSITY

26 OF THE LIGHT OF NATUKE.

CHAPTER II.

THE EXPLICATION OF THE WORDS.

Now, as for the words themselves, we cannot better judge of the fitness of this expression, than by considering who it was that spoke it. Now, these words were spoken by him that had a large portion of intellectuals, one that x. 23. was c above the people by a head/1 They were spoken by Solomon, in whom ' the candle of the Lord' did shine very clearly ; one that had asked this as the choicest favour that he could expect from the bounty of Heaven, to have a glorious lamp of knowledge shine in his soul for the en- lightening of it. And though the envious Jews would fain persuade the world that he lighted his candle at hell itself — for they esteemed him no better than a magician; as they esteemed Him also that was greater than Solomon — yet we know very well, that Solomon's was a purer candle than to be lighted at a lake of fire and brimstone. It was James L 17. not of Lucifer's setting up, but it came from 'the Father of lights/ It was lighted with sunbeams from heaven.

And it is a modest and humble expression in him, to call his understanding t the candle of the Lord/ when as the world looked upon him as a star of the first magni- tude, nay, as a sun shining in the firmament, gilding the world with knowledge, scattering beams of light, sparkling

EXPLICATION OF THE WORDS. 27

out in wise and proverbial sayings, so that the bordering princes and nations are ready to adore such an orient light ; and the Queen of the South thinks it no small happiness i Kings x. to sit under the shadow of it. But yet to be sensible of his own narrow sphere, of his own finite compass and in- fluence, did not at all take from his lustre, but did rather set it off, and add to his glory.

Thus that wise man among the heathen, Socrates, did so far complain of the weakness of his candle-light, as that he tells us his lamp would show him nothing but his own darkness. And though a wisej1 than Socrates be here, yet he is much in the same measure sensible of the dimness of his own intellectuals. And yet he was one that had made many discoveries with this i candle of the Lord ;' he had searched into the mines and several veins of knowledge ; he had searched into the hid treasures of wisdom, he had searched to the depth of state affairs, he had searched into the bowels of natural causes, into the 'great things and mysteries'1 of nature, as if among many other wives he had espoused nature also to himself ; he had searched into the several tempers and intellectual complexions of men ; he had searched long enough with this ' candle of the Lord/ to see if he could find any good under the sun ; he went with his candle to find out a ' chief good ;'2 he searched into all the corners of being ; and at length, being sufficiently wearied, you may see him sitting down ; you may hear him complaining, that he had but spent and wasted 'the candle of the Lord' in vain ; for so much is implied in rm nijn. This was but ' vexation of spirit/3 as he himself calls it. Eccies, i. n.

Yet he was one that showed others how they might make better improvement of their intellectual lamp ; and this was his wisest -advice, that he gave upon his most mature and concocted thoughts— this was ' as it were the

1 Magnalia et mysteria. 2 Summum bonum. 8 Depastio spiritns.

28 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

last gleam of a candle just about to be extinguished ;J1

that men would only follow this ' candle of the Lord/ as

it directs them in the ways of God, which are ' ways of

ni. 17. sweetness and pleasantness/ for this was 2D*!Kn ta — the

xii.13. very end why God set up such a light in the soul, that it

might search out his Creator with it.

And as for the mind of the words, though one would think they were very clear, and shining with their own light, yet interpreters are pleased to cloud them, to turn light itself into a chaos, and to cast darkness upon the face of the text ; like some unskilful ones, while they go about to snuff the candle, they put it out, but \ve will try whether it can be blown in again.

We shall reduce their several meanings to these three heads.

1. Some would have it thus : — ' The candle of the Lord is in the understanding of a man /3 as if the words did run thus, mn> i: D1K n»PJ3, that is, God with His candle discovers the very thoughts and intentions of men, He searches into every corner of the heart ; He has c a candle in the heart/ He spies out every atom, He perceives the first starting of a motion, the first peeping out of a thought. But this, though it be very true, yet is nothing to the purpose here.

2. Some gloss upon the words thus : The understanding of man, when it is enlightened with supernatural know- ledge, is then c the candle of the Lord / but these do rather dictate to Solomon, and tell him what they would have him say ; they do rather frame and fashion a proverb to themselves, than explain his meaning : and these are they that are afraid to give natural light and natural reason their due. But,

1 Tanquam mox emoritune lucernse supremus fulgor.

2 ' The whole of man.' 3 Lucerna Domini in mente hominis.

EXPLICATION OF THE WORDS. 29

3. I shall fully agree with them that take this for the proper and genuine meaning of the place, that God hath breathed into all the sons of men, reasonable souls, which may serve as so many candles to enlighten and direct them in the searching out their Creator, in the discovering of otEer inferior beings, and themselves also ; and this is that which is here implied by D1K riDBO, that same i breath of life/1 nay, that same immortal breath, that same rational Gen. 11.7. breath quickened by God himself, and flowing from Him as a pure derivation from His own being ; and thus the Hebrew doctors do still look upon this word mm, as that which expresses 'the reasonable soul/2 and, as they ob- serve, it has a plain vicinity with D"W — heaven, but, to be sure, the being is derived from thence whether the word be or not So then nD^J points out the supreme region, the very top and flower of a reasonable soul, l the summit of the soul ;'3 as fc>BJ4 does speak nothing but the dregs and bottom of it, the inferior and sensitive soul. The Apostle Paul, in his learned speech to the Athenians, Acts xvu 25. mentions them both, and calls them very significantly 1 life and breath ;'5 and so some also take that other place of the Apostle in that accurate discourse of his to the Corinthians. That which he calls ' living soul/6 they call l JJ1- **• B>aj iTTi, and that which he terms 'quickening spirit/7 they render D^n nDEO; though it be true also that sometimes they take the word S^Etf in a more generical sense ; — for thus they tell us, there are in man three souls — niDEO. 1. nirosn, the vegetable soul, a soul in the bud, the very blossom and flower of life. 2. rVDmn — £ the soul of the irrational/8 a soul looking out at the window of sense.

1 Spiraculum vitse. 5 Zuty Kal TTVO^V.

2 Tbv VQ\>V — animam rationis participem. 6 ^rvxhv &<rav.

3 Tty rijs ^u%^s Kopv^v. i HvevfjLa faoiroiovv.

4 tyvxt) — the animal soul. 8 Anima bruti.

B

30 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

3. K>D3 HDSnn — a soul sparkling and glittering with intel- lectuals, a soul crowned with light ; and this is the same with ntDB>J here. Now, as for that other word r\r\ — spirit, though sometimes the mind of man, his intellectual part, be expressed by it, yet the word in its own nature is a great deal more large and comprehensive ; and as it ex- tends to some material beings, so it reaches to all spiri- tuals ; hence tjnpn nn : nirv nn — * the Spirit of the Lord/ c the Holy Spirit/ and the angels both good and bad, frequently come under this name ; but when it is put for the mind and spirit of man, I find it yet very well differ- enced from nwj; for nn doth properly import 'the vigour and energy of the soul'1 — e the soul'2 (seat of feeling and passion), rather than ' the mind'3 (seat of reason) ; and the Hebrew doctors are pleased to tell us the several situa- tions of these : nn, they say, is ( in the heart ;'4 fWJ ' in the brain;'5 pea 'in the liver/6

Now, though I know that some places in the New Tes- tament which speak of soul and spirit meet with this inter- pretation, that spirit there is the purest eminency, the most refined part of the soul ; yet this is not at all pre- judicial to what we now speak of. For, 1. they may take it for the regenerate part of the soul, that which the Apostle calls the new creature ; or else, 2. suppose it to be spoken of the soul in its natural condition, it is worth the considering then whether it would not be better ren- dered by n»GM than nn, as riBBW here is rendered the spirit of a man ; but, 3. grant that nn be more answerable to it, and that nn should have the worth and precedency of n»6W, which yet will scarce ever be shown or explained ; yet this is very sure and unquestionable, that riDPJ does very properly speak a reasonable soul, and that the more

1 Impetum animi, motum mentis. 8 T6v vovv. 6 In cerebro.

2 T6v 0vfj.6v. * In corde. e In hepate.

EXPLICATION OF THE WOEDS. 31

peculiarly, because when Moses speaks of that very moment when it was created, and breathed into man, he calls it D"n noBO ; and the Arabic interpreter keeps as close to the Gen. i. 7. words as so vast a dialect will give leave, and styles it n&rnta HDD: — c breath of life/1 And it is sooth worth wondering at, that that learned interpreter of Genesis,2 who is so well versed in rabbinical writings, should yet expound that of the sensitive ; but they run as far into the other extreme that would understand nD^J of a soul advanced above itself by supernatural principles ; and I think this sense will scarce be owned by any that can con- strue Hebrew.

So then, these words are a brief commendation of natural light, of the light of reason. For the further clearing of which we must inquire, — 1. What Nature is ? 2. What the Law of nature is ? 3. What the Light of nature is ?

Halitus vitse. 2 Hugh Broughton ?

32 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

CHAPTEK III.

WHAT NATURE IS.

THE words being to be understood of 'the light of nature/1 according to the minds of the best and most interpreters, it will be very needful to inquire what Nature is, and here we will be sure not to speak one word for Nature, which shall in the least measure tend to the eclips- ing of Grace ; nay, nothing but what shall make for the greater brightening and amplifying of the free grace and distinguishing goodness of God in Christ ; and nothing but what an Augustine, or a Bradwardine, those great patrons of grace, would willingly set their seals unto.

Well then, as for nature, though it be not far from any one of us, though it be so intimate to our very beings ; though it be printed and engraved upon our essences, and not upon ours only, but upon the whole creation ; and though we put all the letters and characters of it together as well as we can, yet we shall find it hard enough to spell it out, and read what it is ; for as it is in corporeal vision, the too much approximation and vicinity of an object does stop up and hinder sight, so also many times in intellec- tual optics we see something better at a distance. The soul cannot so easily see its own face, nor so fully explain its own nature. We need some scholiast or interpreter to

1 Lumen naturale.

WHAT NATURE IS. 33

comment upon our own beings, and to acquaint us with our own idioms ; and I meet with many authors that speak of the light of nature, but I can scarce find one that tells us what it is. Those famous and learned triumvirs : SELDEN, that has made it his work to write De Jure Naturali ; and GROTIUS, that has said somewhat of it in his book De Jure Belli et Pads ; and SALMASIUS/ that has touched it in his late treatise De Coma, and in his little dialogue subordinate to it, in either of which, if he had pleased, he might have described it without a digression ; none of these, as far as I can find, give us the least adum- bration of it ; which notwithstanding was the rather to be expected from them, because the philosophers had left it in such a cloudy and obscured manner, as if they had never seen nature 'face to face/ but only 'through a glass darkly/ 1 Cor- iiU2- and ( in a riddle/

And as we read of a painter that represented nature appearing to Aristotle with a veil and mask upon her face, so truly Aristotle himself painted her as he saw her, with her veil on, for he shows her only wrapt up and muffled in matter and form ; whereas methinks he that could set in- telligences to the wheel to spin our time and motion, should have allowed them also some natural ability for performing so famous a task and employment, which his head set them about. And truly, why angelical beings should be banished from the commonwealth of nature ; nay, why they should not properly belong to physics as well as other particular beings ; or why bodies only should engross and monopolize natural philosophy, and why a soul cannot be admitted into it, unless it bring a certificate and commendamus from the body, is a thing altogether unaccountable, unless it be resolved into a mere arbitrary determination, and a philosophical kind of tyranny.

1 See Note C. B2

34 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

And yet Aristotle's description of nature has been held very sacred, and some of the schoolmen do even dote upon it. Aquinas tells us in plain terms, that ' people who wish to correct Aristotle's definition, are to be laughed at/1 The truth is, I make no question but that Aristotle's definition is very commensurate to what he meant by nature ; but that he had the true and adequate notion of nature, this I think Aquinas himself can scarce prove ; and I would fain have him to explain what it is for a thing 'to become known by the light of nature/2 if nature be only ' the beginning, or source of motion and rest/3

Yet Plutarch also, on this point, seems to compromise with Aristotle, and after a good, specious, and hopeful preface, where he says that he must needs tell us what nature is, after all this preparation he does most palpably restrain it to corporeal beings, and then votes it to be ' the source of motion, and of the absence of it/4 And Empe- docles, as he is quoted by him, will needs exercise his poetry and make some verses upon nature, and you would think at the first dash that they were in a good lofty strain, for thus he sings, —

" . . . . Qijffts ovfevbs effrlv eKaffTov QvTfjTUJV, ov8£ rls ov\ofj.evr) dav&roio yevtOXn)" —

' It was not of a mortal withering offspring, nor of a fading genealogy ;' but yet truly his poetical raptures were not so high as to elevate him above a body, for he presently sinks into 'matter/5 as opposed to 'mind/6 and makes nature nothing else but that which is ingenerable and incorrup- tible in material beings ; just as the Peripatetics speak of their ' primary matter/7

1 Deridendi sunt, qui volunt Aristotelis definitionem corrigere.

2 Innotescere lumine naturae. 3 Principium motus et quietis.

4 'Apx?? Kiv/)<T€W$, Kal tpTj/jiias.— Plutarch. Adv. Col, p. 573. Lips. 1778.

5 "T\vj. e Nous, 7 Materia prima.

WHAT NATURE IS. • 35

But Plato, who was more spiritual in his philosophy, chides some of his contemporaries, and is extremely dis- pleased with them, and that very justly, for they were degenerated into a most stupid atheism, and resolved all beings into one of these three originals, that they were either £ the workmanship of nature, or of fortune, or of art/1 Now, as for the first and chief corporeal beings, they made them the productions of nature ; that is, say they, they sprung from eternity into being by their own impetus, and ' by their own virtue and efficacy/2 like so many natural automata, they were the principles of their own being and motion ; and this they laid down for one of their axioms, 'that of the greatest and most lovely things nature and fortune are the authors, of the minor art/3 All the masterpieces of being, the most lovely and beautiful pictures, were drawn by nature and fortune ; and art only could reach to some poor rudiments, to some shadows, and weaker imitations, which you will be some- what amazed at, when you hear by and by what these 1 minor matters'4 were.

The foundation of being, that, they said, was natural ; the mutation and disposing of being, that they made the employment of fortune ; and then they said the work of art was to find out laws, and morality, and religion, and a deity ; these were the c minor matters' they spake of before.

But that divine philosopher does most admirably dis- cover the prodigious folly of this opinion, and demonstrate the impossibility of it, in that excellent discourse of his, in

5i& r^xv7Jv- — De Legibus, lib. x. Opera, torn. viii. p. 471. Lond. 1826. 2 'A-Trd TLvbs alrlas

36 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

his work De Legibus?- where he does most clearly and convincingly show, that those things, which they say were framed by art, were in duration infinitely before that which they call nature ; that ' soul is older than body ;'2 that spirituals have the seniority of corporeals. This he makes to appear by their — 1. c being first in motion ;'3 2. ' power of self-motion;'4 3. ' power of moving other existences ;75 for these three, though they be not expressly mentioned in him, yet they may very easily be collected from him. Souls move themselves, and they move bodies too, and therefore must needs be first in motion ; so that c intellect, art, and law, would exist before things which have the qualities of hardness or softness, heaviness or lightness/6 Keason and religion, laws and prudence, must needs be before density and rarity, before gravity and levity, before all conditions and dimensions of bodies. And laws and religion, they are indeed7 c the contrivances and productions of that eternal " mind and reason,"8 the wisdom of God himself/

So that all that Plato will allow to nature, amounts to no more than this, that it is not ' the maker of things/9 but only ' the handmaid and servant of the creating God/10 PS. cxxiii. 2. c As the eyes of a servant wait upon his master, and as the eyes of an handmaid look up to her mistress, so wait her eyes upon the Lord her God/ And he doth fully resolve and determine that God is the soul of the world, and nature but the body ; which must be taken only ' in a

1 De Legibus, lib. x. Opera, torn, viii.^p. 477. Lond. 1826.

2 tyvxtf t<rri Trpefffivrtpa ff6fj.aros. 3 UpwroKwrjaia. 4 AtiroKivrjo-la. 6 'A.X\OKivr)<rla.

6 Nous, Kal T4xv<r}> Ka-l P<Veos T&V o-KXripuv, Kal ^aXaKcDv, KO! jSa/sewv, /ecu Kov<f>u>v irpbrepa. &v etrj. 7 ToO vov yewr/para. 8 NoOs and X670S.

9 Ay/juovpybs — opifex rerum. — Plato, Dial. Sophista. Opera, vol. ii. part ii. p. 234. Berolin. 1816-23.

10 Dei dwiovpyovvros, famula et ministra.

WHAT NATURE IS. 37

flourishing and rhetorical sense :'1 that God is the foun- tain of being, and nature but the channel ; that he is the kernel of being, and nature but the shell. Yet herein Plato was defective, that he did not correct and reform the abuse of this word Nature ; that he did not screw it up to a higher and more spiritual notion. For it is very agreeable to the choicest and supremest being; and the Apostle tells us of ' the divine nature/2 So that it is time 2 Pet- '• 4- at length to draw the veil from nature's face, and. to look upon her beauty.

And first, it is the usual language of many, both philo- sophers and others, to put nature for God himselfj or at least for the general providence of God ; and this, in the schoolmen's rough and unpolished Latin, is styled natura naturans ;3 thus nature is taken for that constant and catholic Providence, that spreads its wings over all created beings, and shrouds them under its warm and happy pro- tection. Thus that elegant moralist, Plutarch, speaks more like to himself than in his former description : ' Nature is in all things accurate and punctual ; it is not defective nor parsimonious, nor yet sprouting and luxu- riant ;'4 and consonant to this is that sure axiom, ' Nature makes nothing in vain/5 Thus God set up the world as a fair and goodly clock, to strike in time, and to move in an orderly manner, not by its own weights (as Durandus would have it), but by fresh influence from himself, by that inward and intimate spring of immediate concourse, that should supply it in a most uniform and proportionable manner.

1 In sensu florido. 2 'H 0e?a 0i/crts.

8 The principle creating and upholding ; in opposition to natura naturata — things created and upheld.

4 IIai'Ta%oO y&p TJ (pticris d/c/H/ST/s, Kal (fiiXbre'xvos, dve\\nri]S, /cai airepi- T/AIJTOS. — De Amore Prolis, p. 195. Xyland.

5 Natura nihil facit frustra.

38 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

Thus God framed this great organ of the world ; he tuned it, yet not so as that it could play upon itself, or make any music by virtue of this general composure (as Durandus1 fancies it), but that it might be fitted and pre- pared for the finger of God himself, and at the presence of His powerful touch might sound forth the praise of its Creator in a most sweet and harmonious manner. And thus nature is that regular line, which the wisdom of God Himself has drawn in being, ( for nature is order, or a work of order/2 as he speaks ; whereas that which they miscalled fortune, was nothing but a line fuller of wind- ings and varieties ; and as nature was a fixed and ordinary kind of providence, so fortune was nothing but a more abstruse and mysterious and occult kind of providence ; and therefore fortune was not blind, as they falsely painted and represented her, but they themselves were blind, and could not see her. And in this sense, .that speech of that grave moralist, Seneca, is very remarkable : ' Providence, fate, nature, chance, fortune, are but different names for one and the same God/3

But then secondly, Nature, as it is scattered and distri- buted in particular beings, so it is the very same with essence itself; and therefore spirituals, as they have their essence, so they have their nature too ; and if we gloried in names, it would be easy to heap up a multitude of testi- monies, in which these two must needs be £ synonymous/4

And thus nature speaks these two things, — (1.) It points out ( the origin of existence,'5 it is the very genius of entity ; it is present at the nativity of every being, nay,

1 Note D. 2 Tci£is 7^/3 ^ renews fyyov TJ 0iVis. — Plutarch., ut sup.

3 Providentia, fatum, natura, casus, fortuna, sunt ejusdem Dei varia nomina. — De Benefitiis, iv. 8.

4 'l<rodvva/j.ovvTa.. 5 Originem entis.

WHAT NATURE IS. 39

it is being itself. There is no moment in which you can imagine a thing to be, and yet to be without its nature.

(2.) It speaks c the action of existence j'1 and it is a prin- ciple of working in spirituals, as well as 'the source of motion and rest'2 in corporeals. All essence bubbles out, flows forth, and paraphrases upon itself in operations. Hence it is, that such workings as are facilitated by custom, are esteemed natural. Hence that known speech of Galen, 'Habits are second (acquired) natures/3 Customs are frequently adopted and engrafted into nature. Hence also our usual idiom calls a good disposition a good nature. Thus the moralists express virtues or vices that are deeply rooted, by this term — e become natural/4

And so some, and Grotius among the rest, would under- stand that place of the Apostle, ' Does not even nature i cor xt. u. itself teach you/ of a general custom. But that word, c nature itself/5 does plainly refuse that interpretation ; and the learned Salmasius does both grant and evince that it cannot be meant of custom there.

And thus having seen what nature is, it will be very easy in the next place to tell you what the Law of nature is,

1 Operationem entis. 8 Principium motus et quietis.

3 ''E'jriKT'rjTot (pvaeis ra Wfj. — Medd. Grcec. Opera, Hiilm, vol. iv. p. 452.

4 . — Aristot. Categ, viii. 3.

40 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

. CHAPTEE IV.

THE NATURE OF A LAW IN GENERAL.

BEFOKE we can represent unto you the law of nature, you must first frame and fashion in your minds the just notion of a law in general. And Aquinas gives us this shadowy representation of it : f A law is a certain rule and measure, according to which any agent is led to act, or re- strained from acting/1 But Suarez is offended with the latitude of this definition, and esteems it too spreading and comprehensive, as that which extends to all naturals, ay, and to artificials too, for they have 'rules and mea- sures of their operations/2 Thus God has set a law to the waves, and a law to the winds ; nay, thus clocks have their laws, and lutes have their laws, and whatsoever has the least appearance of motion, has some rule proportion- able to it. Whereas these workings were always reckoned to be at the most but i tendencies and gravitations/3 and not the fruits of a legislative power. But yet the Apostle Paul, to stain the pride of them that gloried in the law, calls such things by the name of law as were most odious and anomalous. Thus he tells us of ' a law of death/4

1 Lex est qusedam regula et mensura, secundum quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur. 8 Regulas et mensuras operationum. 3 Inclinations et pondera. 4 N<Vos Oavdrov.

THE NATURE OF A LAW. 41

and ' a law of sin'1 though sin be properly ( lawlessness.'2 Rum. via. 2. Thus he mentions ( the law of our members/3 the same Rom. vu. 23. which the schoolmen call ' the law of excitement/4

And yet this is sure, that a rational creature only is capable of a law, which is a moral restraint, and so cannot reach to those things that are necessitated to act l to the utmost stretch of their powers/5 And, therefore, Suarez6 gives us a more refined description, when he tells us, that 1 a law is a certain measure of moral acts, of such a kind, that by conformity to it, they are morally right ; by dis- cordance with it, morally wrong/7

A law is such a just and regular tuning of actions, as that by virtue of this they may conspire into a moral music, and become very pleasant and harmonious. Thus Plato speaks much of that 'melody and harmony'8 that is in laws ; and in his second book De Legibus, he does altogether discourse of harmony, and does infinitely prefer mental and intellectual music, those powerful and practical strains of goodness, that spring from a well-com- posed spirit, before those delicious blandishments, those soft and transient touches that comply with sense, and salute it in a more flattering manner ; and he tells you of a spiritual dancing that is answerable to so sweet a music, to these ' most divine flutings/9 While the laws play in concert, there is a chorus of well-ordered affections that are raised and elevated by them.

And thus, as Aristotle well observes, some laws were

1 N6/AOS afJLaprias. a 'Ai>ofj.ia.

. 3 N6/XOS €i> TOIS /j,t\e(riv — Legem membrorum. 4 Legem fomitis — apud Rabbinn. jnn "TCP.

6 Ad extremum virium. 8 Note E.

7 Lex est mensura qusedam actuum moralium, ita ut per conformitatem ad illam rectitudinem moralem habeant, et, si ab ilia discordent, obliqui sint.

8 ~Evpv6fj,ia Kal <rv/j,(f>wvla. — De Legib. lib. ii. passim lib. iii. par. ii. vol. ii. p. 304. Bekker. Berol.

9 TA ^ei6rara avAi^uara. — Plato, Minos, Opera, torn. iii. p. 75. Lond. 1826.

C

42 OF THE LIGHT OF NATUEE.

wont to be put in verse, and to be sung like so many pleasant odes, that might even charm the people into obedience. It is true, that learned philosopher gives as the reason of this, that they were put into verse ' that they might remember them the better ;J1 but. why may not this reason also share with it, that they might come with a greater grace and allurement, that they might hear them as pleasantly as they would do the voice of a viol or a harp, that has rhetoric enough to still and quiet the evil spirit ?

But yet this does not sufficiently paint out the being of a law, to say that it is only ' a rule and measure;'2 and Suarez himself is sot ingenuous as to tell us, that he cannot rest satisfied with this description, which he drew but with a coal as a rudiment rather than a full portraiture ; and therefore we will give him some time to perfect it, and to put it into more orient colours.

And, in the meantime, we will look upon that specula- tive lawgiver, Plato, I mean, who was always new model- ling laws, and rolling political ideas in his mind. Now, you may see him gradually ascending and climbing up to the description of a law, by these four several steps, and yet he does not reach the top and 'peak73 of it neither. First, he tells us that laws are c such things as are esteemed fitting ;'4 but because this might extend to all kind of customs too, his second thoughts limit and contract it more ; and he tells us that a law is f a decree of a state ;'5 yet because the mass and bulk of people, ' the rude heap and undigested lump'6 of the multitude, may seek to esta- blish £a wicked decree/7 as he calls it; therefore he be- thinks himself how to clarify a law, how to purge out the

__ Prob. 19, sect. 28. Opera, torn. ii. p. 919. Berolin. 1831. 2 Begula et mensura. 3 'A/c/A-fy.

4 Ta voiuftfteva. 6 My/ma 7r6\ews — Decretum civitatis.

6 Ovid. Metam., i. 7. 7

THE NATURE OF A LAW. 43

dross from it, and tells us, in the next place, that it is ' the finding out of what really is/1 where it is very remarkable what this philosopher means hy ' that which is/2 by which he is wont usually to point out a Deity, which is styled by Aristotle 'the Being of beings;'3 but it is not capable of this sense here, for thus laws are not ' discoveries made of the Deity/4 but rather ( discoveries made by the Deity /5 ' a law is an invention or gift of God/6 as the orator speaks. ' That which is/7 therefore, in this place, speaks .these two particulars. (1.) "The right/8 for all rectitude has a being, and flows from the fountain of being, whereas obliquities and irregularities are mere privations and non- entities ; and it is a notable speech of Plato, ' the right is a royal law/9 the very same expression which the Apostle gives to the law of God, when he calls it ' the royal law/ James n. 8. (2.) 'That which is/10 implies 'the useful/11 Everything that is profitable has a being in it, but you can gather no fruit from a privation ; there is no sweetness in an obliquity, and therefore a law is a wholesome mixture of that which is just and reasonable, and that is 'the end of a law/12 as Plutarch speaks. Whereas, 'a wicked com- mand is not a law, but an injustice ;'13 for obligation is the very form and essence of a law. Now every law ' binds in the name of God ;'14 but so glorious a name did never bind to anything that was wicked and unequal. 'All that is just is sweet/15 'all that is just is useful/16 and that only

ToC &VTOS egetpeo-ts — Inventio ejus quod vere est.

3 *

ToO 6Vros e^evptaeis. 5 ToO 6j>ros

Lex est inventio, vel donum Dei. 7 To 8v.

T6 6p66v. 9 To ^tev opdbv

10 T^ 6v. u T6 X/JT/O-TOJ/.

14 TAos roO ^ou. — J^ J. Prtwc. Indoct., p. 780. Xyland.

13 Turpe prseceptum non est lex, sed iniquitas.

14 Obligat in nomine Dei. w Hai> SiKcuov r/5u. M Hay diKcuov

44 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

is countenanced from heaven. The golden chain of laws is tied to the chair of Jupiter, and a command is only vigorous as it issues out, either immediately or remotely, from the great Sovereign of the world. So that ' The Being'1 is the sure bottom and foundation of ev,ery law. But then because he had not yet expressed who were the competent searchers out of this c Being/2 therefore he tells you in the last place, that laws are ' political ordinances/3 which he clears by other things ; for ' medical ordinances74 are ' medical laws/5 and ( geometrical ordinances76 are ' geometrical laws/7 And he resolves it into this, that in all true kinds of government, there is some supreme power derived from God himself, and fit to contrive laws and constitutions agreeable to the welfare and happiness of those that are to be subject to them ; and i the better sort of men/8 as he speaks, are the fittest makers of laws.

Yet you must take notice here of these two things : — (1.) That he did not lay stress enough upon that binding virtue, which is the very sinew, nay, the life and soul of a law. (2.) That these three descriptions, ( things esteemed fitting/9 ' a decree of the state/10 'political ordinances/11 intend only human laws, and so are not boiled up to the purer notion of a law in general.

And though that same other branch, ' the finding out of what really is/12 may seem to reach farther yet, it is too obscure, too much in the clouds, to give a clear manifesta- tion of the nature of a law. And yet Aristotle does not in this supply Plato's defects, but seems rather to paraphrase upon these descriptions of human laws, and tells in more

To dV. 7 Tew/nerpLKol

To '6v. 8 01 updrroves.

TLoXiriKa ffvyypdfifji.a.ra. 9 Ta

'larpiKa crvyypdiJ.fJia.Ta. 10

'larpiKol v6/j,oi. n IIoXiTt/ca ffvyypdp.fia.ra..

ffvyypdfifjLO.ro.. 12 ToO &VTOS e£

THE NATURE OF A LAW, 45

enlarged language, that ' a law is a judgment determined by the common consent of the state, indicating how each thing must be done/1 Where yet he cannot possibly mean that every individual should give his suffrage, but certainly the representative consent of the whole will content him.

But I see these ancient philosophers are not so well fur- nished but that we must return to the schoolmen again, who by this time have licked their former descriptions into a more comely form. We will look upon Aquinas's first : 1 Law/ says he, ' is a rational ordinance for the advancing of public good, made known by that power, which has care and tuition of the public/2 And Suarez's picture of a law. now that it is fully drawn, hath much the same aspect. ' A law is a public command, a just and immovable com- mand, lifting up its voice like a trumpet ;'3 and in respect of the lawgiver, though it do ' presuppose an act of the in- tellect/4 as all acts of the will do ; yet it does formally consist ' in an act of the will /5 not the understanding, but the will of a lawgiver makes a law. But in respect of him that is subject to the law, it does consist l in an act of the reason/6 it is required only that he should know it, not ' in an act of the will/ 7 it does not depend upon his obedience. The want of his will is not enough to enervate and invali- date a law when it is made ; all laws would then be abro- gated every moment. His will indeed is required to the execution and fulfilling of the law, not to the validity and existence of the law ; and thus all the laws of God do not

1 '0 v6/jios early 6 Ao'yos (jopicr/Afros Ko.6' bjJLokayiav KQIVTJV 7r6Xews,

TTWS Sel Trpdrretv &ca<rrct — Mliet. ad Alexand. Par. I. torn. ii. p. 1420. Bekker. Berol. 1831.

2 Lex est ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam habet communitatis, promulgata.

3 Lex est commune prseceptum, justum ac stabile, sufficienter promvil- gatum. * Praesupponere actum intellectus.

6 In actu voluntatis. ' In actu rationis. 7 In actu voluntatis.

C 2

46 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

at all depend upon the will of man, but upon the power and will of the Lawgiver.

Now, in the framing of every law there is to be (1.) i An aiming at the common good;'1 and thus that speech of Carneades, c utility may almost be called the mother of what is just and fair/2 if it be taken in this sense, is very commendable, whereas, in that other sense (in which it is thought he meant it), it is not so much as tolerable. Law- givers should send out laws with olive-branches in their mouths; they should be fruitful and peaceable; they should drop sweetness and fatness upon a land. Let not then brambles make laws for trees, lest they scratch them

Ji4dgi5X' an(^ *ear t^iem? an(* w1^6 tneir laws m blood. But law- givers are to send out laws, as the sun shoots forth his Mai. iv. 2. beams, ' with healing in his wings/ And thus that elegant . moralist Plutarch speaks, " God," says he, " is angry with them that counterfeit his thunder and lightning, ' His sceptre, and His thunderbolt, and His trident/3 He will not let them meddle with these." He does not love they should imitate Him in his absolute dominion and sove- reignty, but loves to see them darting out those warm, and amiable, and cherishing 'rays/4 those ' beamings out' of justice, and goodness, and clemency. And as for laws, they should be like so many green and pleasant pastures, into which these ' shepherds of nations'5 are to lead their flocks, where they may feed sweetly and securely by those refreshing streams of justice that roll down like water, Amos T. 24. c and of righteousness like a mighty torrent/ And this consideration would sweep down many cobweb laws, that argue only the venom and subtlety of them that spin them ; this would sweep down many an Ahithophel's

1 Intentio boni communis. 2 Utilitas justi prope mater et sequi.

8 Ov ffKTJTTTpOV, 0V KepdWOV, 0V TpiOLLVOLV.

THE NATURE OF A LAW. 47

web, many a Hainan's web, many a Herod's web ; every spider's web that spreads laws only for the catching and entangling of the weaker ones. Such lawgivers are fit to be Domitian's playfellows, that made it his royal sport and pastime to catch flies, and insult over them when he had done. Whereas a law should be a staff for a common- wealth to lean on, and not a reed to pierce it through. Laws should be cords of love, not nets and snares. Hence it is that those laws are most radical and fundamental, that principally tend to the conservation of the vitals and essentials of a kingdom ; and those come nearest the law of God himself, and are participations of that eternal law, which is the spring and original of all inferior and deriva- tive laws. c All laws are made for the sake of advantage/1 as Plato speaks; and there is no such public benefit as that which comes by laws ; for all have an equal interest in them, and privilege by them. And, therefore, as Aris- totle speaks most excellently, 'law is intellect without propensiori.'2 A law is a pure intellect, not only without a sensitive appetite, but without a will. A law is impar- tial, and makes no factions ; and a law cannot be bribed, though a judge may. And that great philosopher does very well prosecute this ; ( If you were to take physic/ says he, l then indeed it is ill being determined by a book ; it is dangerous taking a printed receipt ; you had better leave it to the breast of the physician, to his skill and advice, who minds your health and welfare, as being most for his gain and credit. But in point of justice the case is very differ- ent ; you had better here depend upon a rule, than leave it to the arbitrary power of a judge, who is usually to decide a controversy between two, and, if left to himself, were apt to be swayed and biassed by several interests and

1 Tou aplffrov Zveica irdvra ra v6/j,ifj,a. — Plato, Z)« Legibus, i. sect. 4.

2 NO/AOS t<rrl vovs &vev (J/>^ews._Aristot,, Eih. Nic. I. 2. 1.

48 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

engagements, which might incline him to one more than another. Nay, now that there is a fixed rule, an immov- able law, yet there is too much partiality in the application of it ; how much more would there be if there were no rule at all ?'

But the truth is, the judge should only follow the ' last and practical dictate of the law j'1 his will, like a ' blind power/2 is to follow the ' last light of intellect'3 of this 'reason'4 that is to rule and guide him; and therefore Justice was painted blind, though c the law itself'5 be ( pos- sessed of eyes,'6 'for the mind sees, the mind hears,'7 and the will is to follow c the last decision of the head,'8 the meaning of the law in all circumstances.

(2.) In a lawgiver, there is to be judgment and con- structive wisdom for making laws.'9 The Egyptian hiero- glyphic for legislative power was c an eye in a sceptre ;'10 and it had need be such an eye that can see both £ before and behind.'11 It had need have a full and open prospect into public affairs, and to put all advantages into one scale, and all inconveniences into another.

To be sure, the laws of God flow from a fountain of wisdom, and the laws of men are to be lighted at this ' candle of the Lord,' which He has set up in them, and those laws are most potent and prevalent that are founded in light ; ( the guidance of reason is golden and holy.'12 Other laws are i hard, and of iron ;'13 they may have an iron and adamantine necessity, but the others have a soft and downy persuasion going along with them, and there-

1 Ultimum et practicum dictamen legis. 2 Caeca poteutia.

3 Novissimum lumen intellectus. 4 Nous.

6 Ipsa lex. e Oculata.

7 Nous opq., vovs aKotiei. 8 Ultimum nutum capitis.

9 Judicium et prudentia architectonica ad ferendas leges.

10 Oculus in sceptro. u Updo-ffu /ecu 12 'H rov \oyifffJiov ay&yi) xpv(ri) Kal iepd. 13 2K\r)pol, /ecu

THE NATURE OF A LAW. 49

fore as he goes on, { reason is so beautiful, that it wins and allures, and thus constrains to obedience/1

(3.) There is to be c the seal of a law/ 2 I mean i the approving and passing of the law/3 After a sincere aim at public good, and a clear discovery of the best means to promote it, there comes then a fixed and sacred resolution, 1 we will and decree ;' 4 this speaks the will of the lawgiver, and breathes life into the law, it adds vigour and efficacy to it. But yet notwithstanding,

(4.) There must be c the voice of the trumpet/ 5 that is, ' the promulgation and recommendation of the law/6 The law is for a public good, and it is to be made known in a public manner ; for as none can desire an unknown good, so none can obey an unknown law; and therefore invincible ignorance does excuse, for else men should be bound to absolute impossibilities. But whether it be required to the publishing of a law that it should be in the way of writing1, which is more fixed and durable, or whether the manifesta- tion of it in a vocal and oral manner will suffice (which yet is more transient and uncertain), I leave the lawyers and schoolmen to dispute. Of this I am sure, that all the laws of God are proclaimed in a most sufficient and em- phatical manner.

1 ToO \oyia-fJiov /caXoO (j£v 6vros, irpdov 8£ Kal 01) fiiaiov.

2 Sigillum legis. 3 Electio et determinatio Icgis. 4 Volumus et statuimus. 5 Vox

0 Promulgatio et insinuatio legis.

50 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE ETERNAL LAW.

HAVING thus looked upon the being of a law in general, we now come to the spring and original of all laws, to the Eternal Law, that fountain of law, out of which you may see the Law of Nature bubbling and flowing forth to the sons of men. For, as Aquinas does very well tell us, the law of nature is nothing but 'the copying out of the eternal law, and the imprinting of it upon the breast of a rational being/1 That Eternal Law was in a manner in- carnated in the law of nature.

Now this eternal law is not really ^distinguished from God himself. For ' nothing exists from eternity but God himself/2 So that it is much of the same nature with those decrees of His, and that Providence which was awake from everlasting. For as God from all eternity, by the hand of infinite wisdom, did draw the several faces and lineaments of being, which He meant to show in time: so He did then also contrive their several frames with such limits and compass as He meant to set them ; and said to everything, c Hither shalt thou go, and no farther/

This the Platonists would call 'the ideal of laws/3 and

1 Participatio legis seternse in rational! creatura.

2 Nil est ab seterno nisi ipse Deus. 3 '15&w r&v vbfjuav.

THE ETEENAL LAW. 51

would willingly heap such honourable titles as these upon it, 'the guiding, originating, abstractly just, abstractly lovely, abstractly good, self-existent, germinating law/1 And the greatest happiness the other laws can arrive unto is this, that they be l ministering and subservient laws/ e waiting upon this their Koyal Law /2 or, as they would choose to style them, some * shadows and appearances of this bright and glorious law/3 or at the best they would be esteemed by them but ( the noble offspring and progeny of laws /4 blessing this womb that bare them, and this breast Luke xi. 27. that gave them suck.

And thus the law of nature would have a double portion as being ' the first-born of this eternal law/5 and c the Gen. x«x. s. beginning of its strength/ Now as God himself shows somewhat of His face in the glass of creatures, so the beauty of this law gives some representations of itself in those pure derivations of inferior laws that stream from it. And as we ascend to the first and Supreme Being by the steps of second causes, we may climb up to a sight of this eternal law, by those fruitful branches of secondary laws, which seem to have their root in earth, when as indeed it is in heaven ; and that I may vary a little that of the Apostle to the Eomans, c The invisible law of God, long Ro* { 20 before the creation of the world, is now clearly seen, being understood by those laws which do appear / so that ' the knowledge of the law'6 is manifested in them, God having shown it to them. Thus, as the schoolmen say very well, 1 every derivative law supposes a self-existent law/7 every

1 '0 v6/j.os apx~nybs> TrpwTovpybs, auroS/Kcuos, di/ro/caXos, avrodyados, 6

WS l>6yUOS, 6 ffTT€pfJ.aTlK6s J/6/AOS.

2 N6/-101 dovXevovres, KO.I UTTT/peroOres.

3 No/toetSets' ffKiai vdpuv. * N6/iot %Kyovoi.

6 Lex primogenita. 6 T6 yvuffrbv rov

7 Omnis lex participata supponit legem per essentiam.

52 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

impression supposes a seal from whence it came ; every ray of light puts you in mind of a sun from which it shines. Wisdom and power, these are the chief ingredients in a law ; now where does wisdom dwell, but in the head of a Deity ? and where does power triumph, but in the arm of omnipotency ?

A law is born ' from the brain of Jove/1 and it is not i the secular arm but^ the heavenly72 that must maintain it ; even human laws have their virtue, c radically and remotely/3 as the schools speak, from this eternal law. Thus that famous and most renowned orator and patriot (Tully, I mean) does most admirably express the lineage and descent of laws in this golden manner. i Wise men did ever look upon a law, not as on a spark struck from human intellectuals, not blown up or kindled with popular breath, but they thought it an eternal light shining from God himself, irradiating, guiding/ and ruling the whole universe, most sweetly and powerfully discovering what ways were to be chosen, and what to be refused. And the mind of God himself is the centre of laws, from which they were drawn, and into which they must re- turn/4

Thus also that florid moralist, Plutarch, resolves all law and justice into that primitive and eternal law, even God himself, for even thus he tells us, i Justice/ says he, ( does not only sit like a queen at the right hand*of Jupiter when he is upon his throne, but she is always in his bosom, and one with himself/ and he closes it up with this, that God

1 Ex cerebro Jovis. 2 Non brachium sceculare, sed cceleste.

3 Radicaliter et remote.

4 Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed selenium quiddam quod imiversum mundum regeret, imperandi proliibendique sapi- entia. Ita principem illam Legem et ultimam mentem dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis Dei. — De Legibus, lib. ii. sect. 4.

THE ETERNAL LAW. 53

himself is ' the oldest and most perfect of laws/1 As He

is the most ' ancient of days/ so also is He the most ancient Dan- Tii is.

of laws ; as He is the perfection of beings, so is He also the

rule of operations.

Nor must I let slip that passage of Plato, where he calls a law 'the sceptre of Jove ;'2 the golden sceptre by which God himself rules and commands ; for as all true govern- ment has a bright stamp of Divine sovereignty, so every true law has a plain superscription of His justice. Laws are anointed by God himself, and most precious oil drops down upon them to the skirts of a nation ; and the law of Psai. xiv.7. nature had the oil of gladness poured out upon it above its fellows.

So then, that there is such a prime and supreme law is clear and unquestionable ; but who is worthy to unseal and open this Law ? and who can sufficiently display the glory of it ? we had need of a Moses that could ascend up into the mount, and converse with God himself; and yet when he came down, he would bo fain to put a veil upon his face, and upon his expressions too, lest otherwise he might too much dazzle inferior understandings ; but if the schoolmen will satisfy you (and you know some of them are styled angelical and seraphical), you shall hear, if you will, what they say to it.

Now this law, according to them, is ' a kind of eternal practical method of the whole distribution and government of the universe/ 3 It is an eternal ordinance, made in the depth of God's infinite wisdom and counsel, for regulating and governing of the whole world, which yet had not its

1 T£i> v6/j,tw Trpeo-SvraTos, Kal re\et6raTos. — Plutarch, ad Princ. Tnerudit., ix. p. 573. Lips. 1778.

2 Zyvfa GKriiTTpov. — Alcibiades.

3 Sterna quaedam ratio practica totius dispositionis et gubernationis uuiversi. %

D

54 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

binding virtue in respect of God himself, who has always the full and unrestrained liberty of His own essence, which is so infinite, as that it cannot bind itself, and which needs no law, all goodness and perfection being so intrinsical and essential to it ; but it was a binding determination in re- ference to the creature, which yet, in respect of all irra- tional beings, did only ' strongly incline/1 but in respect of rationals, it does ' formally bind/2

By this great and glorious law, every good action was commanded, and all evil was discountenanced and for- bidden from everlasting. According to this righteous law, all rewards and punishments were distributed in thei eternal thoughts of God. At the command of this law all, created beings took their several ranks and stations, and, put themselves in such operations as were best agreeable* and conformable to their beings. By this law all essences were ordained to their ends by most happy and convenient means. The life and vigour of this law sprang from the will of God himself; from the voluntary decree of that eternal Lawgiver, minding the public welfare of being ; who, when there were heaps of varieties and possibilities in His own most glorious thoughts, when He could have made such or such worlds in this or that manner, in this or that time, with such and such species, that should have had more or fewer individuals, as He pleased, with such opera- tions as He would allow unto them ; He did then select and pitch upon this way and method in which we see things now constituted ; and did bind all things accord- ing to their several capacities to an exact and accurate observation of it.3

So that by this you see how those eternal ideas in the mind of God, and this eternal law, do differ. I speak now of ideas, not in a Platonical sense but in a scholastical,

1 Fortiter inclinare. 2 Formaliter obligare. 3 Note F.

THE ETERNAL LAW.

unless they both agree, as some would have them. For ( an idea has a reference to things possible, a law only to things future/1 God had before Him the picture of every possibility, yet He did not intend to bind a possibility, but only a futurity. Besides, ideas were situated only in the understanding of God ; whereas a law has force and effi- cacy from His will ; according to that much commended saying, i In the heavenly and angelic assembly the will of God is law/2 And then an idea does 'rather have refer- ence to the originator/3 it stays where first it was; but a law does ' rather have reference to an inferior ;'4 it calls for the obedience of another, as Suarez does very well dif- ference them.

Neither yet is this eternal law the same with the pro- vidence of God, though that be eternal also. But as Aquinas speaks, ' The law has the same relation to Pro- vidence, as a general principle to particular conclusions ; 5 or, if you will, ' as the first principles of action to wisdom/6 His meaning is this, that Providence is a more punctual and particular application of this binding rule, and is not the law itself, but the superintending power, which looks to the execution and accomplishment of it ; or as the most acute Suarez has it, ' Law means a scheme of right laid down generally, Providence the care which should be exercised in regard to individual acts/7

Besides, a law, in its strict and peculiar notion, does only reach to rational beings ; whereas Providence does extend

1 Idea est possibilium, lex tantum futuronim.

2 In coelesti et angelica curia voluntas Dei lex est.

* Magis respicere artificem. 4 Potius respicere enibditum.

5 Lex se habet ad providentiam, sicut principium generale ad particular* - conclusiones.

* Sicut principia prima practice ad prudentiam.

7 Lex dicit jus in communi constitutum, providentia dicit curam quae de singulis actibus haberi debet.

56 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

and spread itself over all. But that which vexes the schoolmen most, is this, that they having required promul- gation as a necessary condition to the existence of a law, yet they cannot very easily show how this eternal law should be published from everlasting. But the most satis- factory account that can be given to that is this, that other lawgivers being very voluble and mutable, before their mind and will be fully and openly declared, they may have a purpose indeed, but it cannot be esteemed a law.

James 1. 17. But in God there being 'no variableness nor shadow of turning/ this His law has a binding virtue as soon as it has a being, yet so as that it does not actually and formally oblige a creature till it be made known unto it, either by some revelation from God himself, which is possible only, and extraordinary ; or else by the mediation of some other law, of the law of nature, which is the usual and constant way that God takes for the promulgation of this His eternal law. For that ' written law/1 that sacred manu- script, which is writ by the finger of God himself in the

Rom. H. 15. heart of man, is a plain transcript of this original law, so far as it concerns man's welfare. And this you see does most directly bring me to search out the Law of Nature.

THE LAW OF NATURE. 57

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE LAW OP NATURE IN GENERAL, ITS SUBJECT AND NATURE,

THE Law of Nature1 is that law which is intrinsical and essential to a rational creature ; and such a law is as necessary as such a creature ; for such a creature as a creature has a Superior, to whose providence and disposing it must be subject ; and then as an intellectual creature it is capable of a moral government, so that it is very suit- able and co-natural to it to be regulated by a law, to be guided and commanded by One that is infinitely more wise and intelligent than itself is, and that minds its welfare more than itself can. Insomuch that the most bright and eminent creatures, even angelical beings, and glorified souls, are subject to a law, though with such a happy privilege, as that they cannot violate and transgress it; whereas the very dregs of entity, the most ignoble beings are most incapable of a law ; for yon know inanimate beings are carried on only with the veheniency and neces- sity of natural inclinations ; nay, sensitive beings cannot reach or aspire to so great a perfection as to be wrought upon in such an illuminative way as a law is ; they are

cot irpb 6(f)Qa\iJ.Cjv yivuffKetv rl v6(j,os 0u<n/cos Kal rl ra rys devre- s — ' Be careful to understand what is the law natural, and what is superinduced on it.' — Constitut. Apostol., i. 6; cited by Taylor.

D 2

58 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

4. not drawn with these ' cords of men/ with these moral engagements, but in a more impulsive manner driven and spurred on with such impetuous propensions as are founded in matter ; which yet are directed by the wise and vigilant eye, and by the powerful hand of a Providence to a more beautiful and amiable end, than they themselves were acquainted with. But yet the lawyers, the civilians, would fain enlarge the law of nature, and would willingly per- suade us that all sensitive creatures must be brought within the compass of it ; for this they tell us, ' The law of nature is that which nature has taught all animals, for that law is not limited to the human race, but is common to all animals that live on the land, and in the sea, and also to birds/1 Nay, they are so confident of it, as that they instance in several particulars, 'the union of male and female/2 e the begetting, upbringing, and preserva- tion of offspring/ 3 ' very many things done for self- support and protection/4 ' the organized republic of bees, the marriages of doves/5 But not only the critics, but the schoolmen also, do sufficiently correct the lawyers for this their vanity ; for certainly these men mean to bring beasts, birds, and fishes into their courts, and to have some fees out of them. Perhaps they expect also that the doves should take licenses before they marry ; it may be they require of the beasts some penitential, or, which will suffice them, some pecuniary satisfaction for all their adulteries ; or it may be the Pope will be so favourable, as

1 Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit, nam jus illud non solum human! generis est proprium, sed omnium animalium quse in terra marique nascuntur, avium quoque commune est. — Ulpian, lib. i., Off. de Justitia et Jure.

2 Maris et fceminse conjunctio.

3 Liberorum procreatio, educatio, conservatio.

4 Plurima in tutelam propriam facta.

6 Apium respublica ; columbarum conjugia.

THE LAW OF NATURE. 59

to give his fellow-beasts some dispensation for all their irregular and incongruous mixtures.1

But yet, notwithstanding, they prosecute this their notion, and go on to frame this difference between ' the law of nations and the law of nature/2 The law of nature, say they, is that which is common with men to irrational creatures also, but the law of nations is only between men ; but this distinction is built upon a very sandy bottom — what the true difference is, we shall see hereafter. Now, all that can be pleaded in the behalf of the lawyers is this, that they err more in the word than in the reality. They cannot sufficiently clear this title of a law ; for that there are some clear and visible stamps and impressions of nature upon sensitive beings, will be easily granted them by all, and those instances which they bring are so many ocular demonstrations of it ; but that there should a formal obligation lie upon brutes, that they should be bound to the performance of natural commands in a legal manner, that there should be a c law written73 Rom. a. is. upon them, ( so as that they should be left without Rom. 1 20. excuse/4 and lie under palpable guilt, and be obnoxious to punishment for the violation of it, this they cannot pos- sibly find out, unless they could set up this £ candle of the Lord' in sensitive creatures also, whereas there are in them only some c imitations of the life of men/5 as the philosopher calls them, which the orator renders ' resem- blances of virtues/6 some apish imitations of reason, some shadows of morality, some counterfeit ethics, some wild

1 The author is evidently of Valla's opinion, ' Jus naturale dicere quod natura omnia animalia docuit, ridiculum est.' — JElegant. Ling. Lot. c. 48.

2 N6/xt/toi' tOviicbv Kal v6fj.tfji.ov <j>vcriKbv — Jus gentium et jus naturale.

TTJS avdpuTrlvrjs ' Virtutum simulacra. — Cicero, De Finib. v. 15.

60 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

economics, some faint representations of politics, amongst some of them. Yet all this while they are as far distant from the truth of a law, as they are from the strength of reason. There you may see some sparks of the Divine power and goodness, but you cannot see ' the candle of the Lord/ Now these men might have considered, if they had pleased, that as for the prints and footsteps of nature, some of them may be seen in every being. For nature has stamped all entity with the same seal ; some softer beings took the impression very kindly and clearly, some harder ones took it more obscurely.

Nature played so harmoniously and melodiously upon her harp, as that her music proved not only like that of Orpheus, which set only the sensitive creatures on dancing ; but, like that of Amphion, inanimate beings were elevated by it, even the very stones did knit and unite themselves to the building of the universe.1 Show me any being, if you can, that does not love its own welfare, that does not seek its own rest, its centre, its happiness, that does not desire its own good, ' which all things desire/2 as he speaks. Pick out an entity, if you can tell where, that does not long for the continuation and amplification, for the diffusion and spreading of its own being. Yet surely the lawyers themselves cannot imagine that there is a law given to all inanimate beings, or that they are accountable for the violation.

Let them also demur a while upon that argument which Suarez3 urges against them, that these sensitive creatures are totally defective in the most principal branches of the law of nature ; as in the acknowledging of a Deity, in the adoring of a Deity. Where is there the least adumbration

1 Hor. Ars. Poet., 391, 394.

2 05 Trdjrct €(f>i€Tov. — Plato, ' the philosopher ;' vide preceding page.

3 De Legibus, lib. ii.

THE LAW OF NATURE. 61

of Divine worship in sensitive beings ? What do they more than the heavens, which ' declare the glory of God ; or the firmament, which shows his handiwork ?' Unless PS&L perhaps the lawyers can find not only a commonwealth, but a church also among the bees ; some canonical obedi- ence, some laudable ceremonies, some decency and con- formity amongst them. We will only set some of the poets to laugh the lawyers out of this opinion ; old Hesiod tells them his mind very freely : —

1 Never by brutal violence be swayed, But be the law of Jove in thee obeyed ; In these the brute creation, men exceed, They void of reason by each other bleed ; "While man by justice should be kept in awe, Justice, of nature well ordained the law.'1 —

COOK'S Translation.

What are those laws that are observed by a rending and tearing lion, by a devouring leviathan ? Does the wolf oppress the lamb by a law ? Can birds of prey show any commission for their plundering and violence ? That amorous poet, Ovid, shows that these sensitive creatures, in respect of lust, are absolute Antinomians.

And what though you meet with some c single cases/1 some rare patterns of sensitive temperance ? A few scat- tered and uncertain stories will never evince that the whole heap and generality of brutes act according to a law. You have heard, it may be, of a chaste turtle, — and did you never hear of a wanton sparrow ? It may be you have read some

1 Tbv 5£ yap avOp&TroHri vb^ov 5t£rct£e Kpovluv, 'IX^CTI y&p KO.I ^Tjpffl Kal otoivois TreTeijvois "EffOe/jLev dXXiJXous, £irel ov dlKrj eerl //,er' avrQv, 'Av6p(jt)Trot<n 5' l?5w/ce diKTjv, ij Tro\\bv apLcrTtj. —

HESIOD. "Epy. Kal'HfJitp., i. 274-277. 2 'A7ra£ \ey6p-eva.

62 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

story of a modest elephant, but what say you in the mean- time to whole flocks of lascivious goats ? Yet grant that the several multitudes, all the species of these irrational creatures were all without spot and blemish in respect of their sensitive conversation, can any therefore fancy that they dress themselves by the glass of a law ? Is it not rather a faithfulness to their own natural inclinations ? which yet may very justly condemn some of the sons of men, who, though they have ' the candle of the Lord/ and the lamp of His law, yet degenerate more than these inferior beings, which have only some general dictates of nature.

This is that motive with which the satirist quickened and awakened some of his time.

' This proves our spirits of the gods descend, While that of beasts is prone and downward bent ; To them but earth-born life they did dispense, To us, for mutual aid, celestial sense.' x — TATE'S Translation.

A law is founded in intellectuals, in the reason,2 not in the sensitive principle.3 It supposes a noble and free- born creature, for where there is no liberty there is no law, — a law being nothing else but a rational restraint and limi- tation of absolute liberty. Now all liberty is ' radically in the intellect ;'4 and such creatures as have no light, have no choice, no moral variety.

The First and Supreme Being has so full and infinite a liberty, as cannot be bounded by a law ; and these low and slavish beings have not so much liberty as to make

1 ' Sensum e ccelesti demissum traximns arce,

Cujus egent prona et terram spectantia ; mundi Principio indulsit communis conditor illis Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque.' —

JUVENAL, xv. 146-9.

2 riD^X 3 * Radicaliter in intellectu.

THE LAW OF NATURE. 63

them capable of being bound. ' Among brutes, laws have no voice/1 There is no ' base '2 nor t honourable '3 amongst them, no duty nor obedience to be expected from them, no praise or dispraise due to them, no punishment nor reward to be distributed amongst them.

But as the learned Grotius does very well observe, 1 Since crime cannot properly be attributed to beasts, when we have such a case as the killing of the animal according to the law of Moses, when a man had been guilty of bestiality, we must consider this as not really a punishment, but simply as an exhibition of man's lordship over the brute/4 For punishment in its formal notion is ( the avenging of a crime/5 as the Greek lawyers speak ; or as the fore-men- tioned author describes it, it is ( an evil of suffering, in- flicted on account of an evil of action/6 In all punishment there is to be some ' measured return'7 and l retribution/8 so that every Moss'9 or 'inconvenience'10 is not to be esteemed a punishment, unless it be c for the avenging of an offence/11 So as for those laws given to the Jews, where sometimes the beast also was to be put to death, the most renowned Selden gives a very full and satisfactory account of it out of the Jewish writings, and does clearly evidence that the meaning was not this, that the beast was guilty of a crime, and had violated a law, and therefore was to be condemned and put to death, but it was in order to the happiness and welfare of men ; for bestia cum homine concumbens was to be stoned, partly because it was the

1 Inter bruta silent leges. 2 Turpe. 3 Honestum.

4 Quoniam in bestias proprie delictum non cadit, ubi bestia occiditur ut in lege Mosis ob concubitum cum homine, non ea vere poena est, sed usus dominii humani in bestiam. — De Jure. Prolegg.

6 Malum passionis quod infligitur ob malum actionis.

7 ' 8

9 Damnurn. 10 Incommodum. n In vindictam culpse.

64 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

occasion of so foul a fact, and so fatal punishment unto man, and partly that the sight and presence of the object might not repeat so prodigious a crime in the thoughts of men, nor renew the memory of it, nor continue the dis- grace of him that died for it. But there was another dif- Exod.xxi.28 ferent reason, £in the case of a butting ox/1 for there, as Maimoriides2 tells us in his Moreli Nevocliim, it was c to take satisfaction from the owner;'3 the putting of that to death was a punishment to the owner for not looking to it better ; for I cannot at all consent to the fancy of the Jews, which Josephus mentions, c that it was deemed to be not useful for food/4 Although the fore-named critic give a better sense of it, than it is likely the author ever in- tended : ' It ought not to be taken for food, since thus it would bring advantage to the owner/5 But how such an interpretation can be extracted out of ' useful for food/6 is not easily to be imagined ; for those words of Josephus plainly imply, that the Jews thought such an ox could not yield wholesome nourishment ; or, at the best, they looked upon it as an unclean beast, which was not to be eaten ; which indeed was a fond and weak conceit of them, but they had many such, which yet the learned author loves to excuse, out of his great favour and indulgence to them. Yet, which is very remarkable, if the ox had killed a Gentile, they did not put it to death. It seems it would yield wholesome nourishment for all that. But this we are i cor. ix. 9. sure of, that as God does not take care for oxen, which the acute Suarez does very well understand of 'legislative

1 In bove corimpeta. 2 Note G.

3 Ad pcenam exigendam a domino.

4 MTjS' ei's rpo^rjv ^vxpyo'Tos elvai Kar^^iuj^epos. — Antiq. iv. 8, 36.

6 Non in aliment-urn sumi debuit unde scilicet in domini commodum cederet.

6 Etf;t/o?70TOS ets

THE LAW OF NATURE. 65

care/1 for otherwise God hath a providential care even of them, so neither does He take care for the punishment of oxen, but it is written for His Israel's sake, to whom He has subjected these creatures, and put them under their feet.

Neither yet can the proper end of a punishment agree to sensitive creatures ; for all punishment is ' for the sake of (to produce) good/2 as Plato speaks, 'not on account of the transgression, for what has been done can never be made undone/3 It is not in the power of punishment to recall what is past, but to prevent what is possible. And that wise moralist, Seneca, does almost translate Plato 1 word for word :'4 f No wise man punishes because a crime lias been committed, but that it may not be committed again ; for past offences cannot be recalled, but future ones are thus prevented.'5

So that the end of all punishment is either ' for com- pensation/6 which is c a retribution by the offender for the advantage of the punisher ;'7 it is 'for the advantage of the injured party /8 or else it is cfor improvement/9 and so ' for the advantage of the transgressor ;'10 in respect of which that elegant moralist, Plutarch, styles punishment ' medical treatment of the soul/11 and Hierocles calls it £ medicine for wickedness ;' 12 or else it is ' for the sake of

1 Cura legislativa. 2 "E^e/cot TOV ayaSrov.

8 Ou% 'ev€Ka TOV Ka.KOVpyf)ffa.t, ov yap TO yeyovbs aykvt]Tov &TTCU TTOT£. — Pro- tagor.

4 Verbatim.

5 Nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur : revocari enim prseterita non possunt, futura prohibentur. — De Ira, i. 16.

6 In compensationem.

* Kcwcou avTair6do<ns els TO TOV TifjioipovvTOs av[JL(f>£pov dva^epo^inj.

8 In utilitatem ejus, contra quern peccatum est.

9 In emendationem. 10 In utilitatem peccantis.

11 'IdTpelav if/vxf)$>

12 'laTptKTjv irovTjpias. — Com. in Aur. Carm. Pyth., 27-29.

E

66 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

example, for the advantage of others/1 as the Greek orator speaks, c That others may exercise foresight and fear;'2 the same which God speaks by Moses, ' That Israel may hear and fear ;' and thus punishment does c serve as a public example/3

But now none of these ends are appliable to sensitive creatures, for there is no more satisfaction to justice in inflicting an evil upon them, than there is in the ruining of inanimate beings, in demolishing of cities or temples for idolatry, which is only for the good of them that can take notice of it ; for otherwise, as that grave moralist, Seneca, has it, ' How foolish is it to be angry with objects that neither have deserved our anger, nor feel it !'4 No satis- faction is to be had from such things as are not apprehen- sive of punishment ; and therefore annihilation, though a great evil, yet wants this sting and aggravation of a punish- ment, for a [brute] creature is not sensible of it. Much less can you think that a punishment has any power to mend or meliorate sensitive beings, or to give example to others amongst them.

By all this you see, that amongst all irrational beings there is no t lawlessness/5 and therefore no ' offence/6 and therefore no c punishment /7 from whence it also flows, that the law of nature is built upon reason.

There is some good so proportionable and nutrimental to the being of man, and some evil so venomous and destructive to his nature, as that the God of nature does sufficiently antidote and fortify him against the one, and does maintain and sweeten his essence with the other.

1 In exemplum, in utilitatem allorum.

2 'Ira &\\oi Trphvoiav TTOLUVTOLI Kdl 0o/3u}j>rcu.

3 HapaSeiy/JiaTifcu'.

4 Quam stultum est liis irasci qn?e irnm nostram nee meruerunt, nee sentiunt. — Seneca, Philos. de Ira, lib. i. c. 16.

5 'Avo/Jiia. ° 'A/j-apria. 7 lijuiupta..

THE LAW OF NATURE. 67

There is so much harmony in some actions, as that the soul must needs dance at them ; and there is such a harsh discord and jarring in others, as that the soul cannot endure them.

Therefore the learned Grotius does thus describe the law of nature, ( The law of nature is a streaming out of light from " the candle of the Lord," powerfully discovering such a deformity in some evil, as that an intellectual eye must needs abhor it; and such a commanding beauty in some good, as that a rational being must needs be enamoured with it ; and so plainly showing that God stamped and sealed the one with His command, and branded the other with His disliking/1

Chrysostom makes mention of this c natural law/2 and does very rhetorically enlarge himself upon it in his twelfth and thirteenth orations 'concerning the statues/3 where he tells us that it is 'an instinctive (self-taught) knowledge of good and its opposite/4 a radical and fundamental knowledge, planted in the being of man, budding and blossoming in first principles, flourishing and bringing forth fruit, spreading itself into all the fair and goodly branches of morality, under the shadow of which the soul may sit with much complacency and delight. And as he pours out himself very fluently, ' There is no need of oratory to allure men to it, you need not heap up arguments to convince them of it ; no need of an inter-

1 Jus naturale est dictatum rectse rationis, indicans actui alicui, ex ejus convenientia vel disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rational!, inesse moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem moralem, et consequenter ab auctore naturse ipso Deo, talem actum aut vetari aut pnecipi. — De JUT. Bell, et Pac., lib. i. cap. 10. The rendering above is by the author.

2 Hepi 'A.vdpidi>Twv. N6/j.os 0f<n/cos.

3 Ilepl 'AvSpiavTuv. In these two orations the moral sense is largely treated Q?.—Ed.

4 AvTo8l8a.KTOS i] yvSxris rdv KO.\(JOV, /cat r&v ov TOIOIJTWV.

68 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

preter to acquaint them with it ; no need of the mind's spinning, or toiling, or sweating for the attaining of it j'1 it grows spontaneously, it bubbles up freely, it shines out cheerfully and pleasantly ; it was so visible, as that the most infant age of the world could spell it out, and read it without a teacher ; c without either Moses, or the pro- phets, or the judges/2 It was long extant before Moses was born, long before Aaron rung his golden bells, before there was a prophet or a judge in Israel. Men knew it, c being taught within themselves by conscience/3 They had a bible of God's own printing, they had this Scripture of God within them. By this c candle of the Lord/ Adam and Eve discovered their own folly and nakedness; this ' candle' flamed in Cain's conscience, and this law was proclaimed in his heart, with as much terror as it was published from Mount Sinai, which filled him with those furious reflections for his unnatural murder. Enoch, when he walked with God, walked by this light, by this rule.

Pet. ii. s. Noah, the preacher of righteousness, took this law for his text.4 Nay, you may see some print of this law upon the

d. ix. 27. hard heart of a Pharaoh, when he cries out, ' The Lord is righteous, but I and iny people have sinned/5

Hence it was that God, when He gave his law afresh, gave it in such a compendious c brachygraphy ;'6 He wrote it as it were in characters^ c Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not

xx.

13-15,

1 Ov XP€t& TU>V \6yojv, ov T&V dtSaffKaXoiv, ov r&v TTOVUV, ov

2 Ou MwuoTys, ov Trpo^TJrai, ov

3 OtKO&ev irapa rov 0wet56ros

4 Ante legem Moysi scriptam in tabulis lapideis, legem fuisse contendo non scriptam, quse naturaliter intelligebatur et a patribus custodiebatur. Nam unde Noe Justus inventus est, si non ilium naturalis legis justitia prae- cedebat? Unde Abraham amicus Dei deputatus, si non de sequitate et justitia legis hujus naturalis ? — Tertullian, Adversus Judceos, cap. ii. —Ed.

5 Hieron. Ep. 151, ad Algas. 6 Shorthand.

THE LAW OF NATURE. 69

commit adultery, thou shall not steal/1 without any expli- cation or amplification at all. He only enjoined it with an imperatorious brevity. He knows there was enough in the breasts of men to convince them of it, and to comment upon it ; only in the second command there is added an enforcement, because His people were excessively prone to the violation of it ; and in that of the Sabbath there is given an exposition of it, because in all its circumstances it was not founded in natural light. So that in Plutarch's language the Decalogue would be called c a roughly ham- mered law/2 gold in the lump, whereas other lawgivers use to beat it thinner.

Of this law, as it is printed by nature, Philo speaks very excellently, ' Eight reason/ says he, ' is that fixed and un- shaken law, not writ on perishing paper by the hand or pen of a creature, nor graven like a dead letter upon life- less and decaying pillars, but written with the point of a diamond, nay, with the finger of God himself, in the heart of man/3 A Deity gave it an imprimatur, and an eternal Spirit graved it in an immortal mind. So that I may borrow the expression of the Apostle, The mind of man is 'the pillar and ground of this truth/4 And I take it in i Tim. m. 15. the very same sense as it is to be taken of the church — it is a pillar of this truth not to support it, but to hold it forth.

Neither must I let slip a passage in Plutarch, which is very near of kin to this of Philo. You may take it thus : ' This royal law of nature was never shut up in a paper

1 Ov <f>oveti<reis, ov

2 N6/UOS (r<j>vp-rj\aTos.

3 N6yuos 5' di/'euS-fyy 6 op^bs \6yos, ou% virb rov Setpos ^VTJTOV 0^a/>ros

diavoia TU7rw^e£s. — Philonis rot evpicrK. vol. ii. p. 452. Bowyer, Land. 1742. 4 SrOXoy Kal edpaiufta. rrjs dA^S-efas

E 2

70 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

prison, was never confined or limited to any outward sur- face ; but it was bravely situated in the centre of a rational being, always keeping the soul company — guarding it and guiding it ;n ruling all its subjects (every obedient action) with a sceptre of gold, and crushing in pieces all its enemies (breaking every rebellious action) with a rod of iron. You may hear the lyric poet singing out the praises of this law in a very lofty strain, ( This law, which is the queen of angelical and human beings, does so rule and dis- pose of them, as to bring about justice with a most high and powerful, and yet with a most soft and delicate hand/2

You may hear Plato excellently discoursing of it, while he brings in a sophist disputing against Socrates, and such a one as would needs undertake to maintain this principle, ' That there was an untuneable antipathy between nature and law;'3 that laws were nothing but 'the in- ventions of men of weaker capacity ;'4 that this was l the most bright and eminent justice of nature/5 for men to rule according to power, and according to no other law ; that 'the stronger'6 was 'the superior'7 and 'the better;'8 that other laws were c all contrary to nature.'9 Nay, he calls them cheatings and bewitchings, 'not songs but incantations.'10 They come, says he, like pleasant songs,

1 '0 v6/u,os OVK ev /3t/3X£ots ££o> yeypa^evos, ovdt run £tfX(us, d\X' &v eaur<£ Xffyos ad VVVOLK&V Kal irapa^vKdrruv /cat /ATjS^Trore TTJV \pvxnv

N6//.OS 6 TrdvT&v j8atriAei)s QvarCov re Kal d^avdrdiv, "Ayei diKac&v TO fiibrarov,

Pindari, Opera Frag., torn. ii. p. 640. Lips. 1811. 3 TaDra tvavrla dXXiJXots evrlv, ^ re </>i50-ts Kal b v6/j.os. — Gorgias, Opera, torn. iii. p. 244. Lond. 1826. 4 Hoimnum irifirmiorum commenta.

5 T6 \a/Jnrp6raTOV 7775 0tf<rews 8'iKaiov. 6 '0

7 '0 KpdTTW. 8 '0

9 Hapa (pvcriv ttiravres. 10 OVK

THE LA.W OF NATURE. 71

whereas they are mere charms and incantations. But Socrates, after he had stung this same Callicles with a few quick interrogations, pours out presently a great deal of honey and sweetness, and plentifully shows that most pleasant and conspiring harmony that is between nature and law; that there is nothing more ' according to nature'1 than a law ; that law is founded in nature, that it is for the maintaining, and ennobling, and perfecting of nature ; nay, as Plato tells us elsewhere, that there is no way for men to happiness, unless they follow c these steps of reason/2 these footsteps of nature. This same law Aris- totle does more than once acknowledge, when he tells us of ' a private law ' 3 and { a public law ;' 4 a positive law with him is a more private law, e according to which, definitely written out, men live in society ;'5 but nature's law is a more public and catholic law — ( The things which, though unwritten, seem to be assented to by all men/6 which he proves to be a very sovereign and commanding law ; for thus he says, ' The law that is most filled with reason, must needs be most victorious and triumphant.'7

The same philosopher, in his tenth book, De Bepublica, has another distinction of laws, one branch whereof does plainly reach to the law of nature. There are, says he, ' laws in writing/8 which are the same with those which he called ' private laws ' 9 before ; and then there are 4 moral laws/10 which are all one with that he styled before ' public law/11 Now, as he speaks, these c moral

1 Karoi (frfotv. 2 Ta L^vrj T&V \6yuv.

3 N6/Aos i'Scos. 4 N6/Aos /cow6s.

6 Ka#' 5v yeypafji^vov TroAireiWrcu.

6 "Offa &ypa<pa Trapa Traatv 6/u.o\oye'io'6at §OKel.

7 '0 v6/J.os avayKaa-riKyv %x€i 8^va/j,iv} \6yos &v VTTO TWOS (fipovriaeus Kal vov. —Ethic. Nicom., lib. x. sect. 10. Opera, torn. ii. p. 1180. Berolin. 1831.

8 N6yuoi Kara ypa/uL/mara.

ra ra £ty. n N6/xos

72 OF THE LIGHT OF NATUEE.

laws'1 are 'more lordly/2 laws of the first magnitude, of a nobler sphere, of a vaster and purer influence. Where you see also that he calls the law of nature, the moral Rom. IMS. law, and the same which the Apostle calls 'written law/3 he with the rest of the heathen calls it ' laws unwritten/4 couching the same sense in a seeming contradiction.

The orator has it expressly, c A law not written, but innate/5 And amongst all the heathen, I can meet with none that draws such a lively portraiture of the law of nature, as that noble orator does. You may hear him thus pleading for it, c Grant/ says he, ' that Rome were not for the present furnished with a positive law, able to check the lust and violence of a Tarquin, yet there was a virgin law of nature, which he had also ravished and deflowered ; there was the beaming out of an eternal law, enough to revive a modest Lucretia, and to strike terror into the heart of so licentious a prince / for, as he goes on, (his meaning is not much different from this,) — ' Right reason is a beautiful law ; a law of a pure com- plexion, of a natural colour, of a vast extent and diffusion : its colour never fades, never dies. It encourages men in obedience with a smile, it chides them and frowns them out of wickedness. Good men hear the least whispering of its pleasant voice, they observe the least glance of its lovely eye ; but wicked men sometimes will not hear it, though it come to them in thunder ; nor take the least notice of it, though it should flash out in lightning. None must enlarge the phylacteries of this law, nor must any dare to prune off the least branch of it. Nay, the malice of man cannot totally deface so indelible a beauty. No pope, nor prince, nor parliament, nor people, nor angel,

1 N6fj.oi Kara ra Fbi). 2 Kvpi&repoi.

3 N6//.os ypcnrros. * "Aypacfia v6[jii/j.a.

"° Non scripta, sed nata lex. — Cicero, Or at. pro Milone, sect. 4.

THE LAW OF NATURE. 73

nor creature, can absolve you from it. This law never paints its face, it never changes its colour ; it does not put on one aspect at Athens, and another face at Home, but looks upon all nations and persons with an impartial eye : it shines upon all ages, and times, and conditions, with a perpetual light : " It is yesterday, and to-day, the same for ever." There is but one Lawgiver, one Lord and Supreme Judge of this law, " God blessed for evermore." He was the Contriver of it, the Commander of it, the Publisher of it ; and none can be exempted from it, unless he will be banished from his own essence, and be excommunicated from human nature. This punishment would have sting enough, if he should avoid a thousand more that are due to so foul a transgression/1

Thus you see that the heathen not only had this 1 written law'2 upon them, but also they themselves took special notice of it ; and the more refined sort amongst them could discourse very admirably about it, which must needs leave them the more inexcusable for the viola- Rom. i. 20. tion of it.

We come now to see where the strength of the law of nature lies, where its nerves are, where it has such an efficacious influence, such a binding virtue.

1 Est quidera vera lex recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna ; quse vocet ad officium jubendo ; vetando a fraude de- terreat: quee tamen probos neque frustra jubet aut vetat, nee improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nee propagari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet ; neque tota abrogari potest. Nee vero aut per senatum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus ; neque est quserendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alius. Non erat alia Romse, alia Athenis ; alia nunc, alia posthac ; sed et omnes gentes, omni tempore, una lex, et sempiterna, et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit quasi communis magister et legislator omnium Deus: Ille legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator; Cui qui non parebit ipse se fugiet, et naturam hominis aspernabitur ; Hoc ipso luet maximas pcenas, etiamsi czetera supplicia, quse putantur, effugerit. — De Repub., lib. iii. Frag, in Lactant. vi. 8. 2 N6yuos

74 OF THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

And I find Vasquez1 somewhat singular, and withal erroneous in his opinion, whilst he goes about to show that the formality of this law consists only in that harmony and proportion, or else that discord and disconvenience, which such and such an object, and such and such an action has with a rational nature ; for, says he, every essence is ca measure of good and evil/2 in respect of itself. Which, as he thinks, is plainly manifested and discovered also in corporeal beings, which use to fly only from such things as are destructive to their own forms, and to embrace all such neighbourly and friendly beings as will close and comply with them.

But he might easily have known, that as these material beings were never yet so honoured, as to be judged capable of a law, so neither can any naked essence, though never so pure and noble, lay a moral engagement upon itself, or bind its own being ; for this would make the very same being superior to itself, as it gives a law, and inferior to itself, as it must obey it. So that the most High and Sove- reign Being, even God himself, does not subject Himself to any law ; though there be some actions also most agreeable to His nature, and others plainly inconsistent with it, yet they cannot amount to such a power, as to lay any obliga- tion upon Him, which should in the least notion differ from the liberty of His own essence. Thus also, in the commonwealth of human nature, that proportion which actions bear to reason, is indeed a sufficient foundation for a law to build upon, but it is not the law itself, nor a formal obligation.

Yet some of the schoolmen are extremely bold and vain in their suppositions ; so bold, as that I am ready to question whether it be best to repeat them ; yet thus they say, i If there were no God, or if He did not enjoy or make

1 Note H. 2 Mensura boni et mali.

THE LAW OF NATURE. 75

use of reason, or if He did not judge rightly regarding matters ; if, nevertheless, there were in man the same clear direction of right reason, which he has at present, he would have also the same system of law which he has at present/1

But what are the goodly spoils that these men expect, if they could break through such